Review of: Scientific Image by Bas C.

van Fraassen
Word Count (Starting Below this Line)- 999

Constructing Science: Empirical Adequacy as a Foundation

This paper will argue for the case of Constructive Empiricism (CE) highlighting the heuristic
validity of the element of Empirical Adequacy as a fundamental tool in the advancement of the
progress (construction) of science and theory acceptance.
It will make this case by briefly introducing the inescapable problem of truth in science as seen
by Bas C. van Fraassen and then contrasting views on truth in science between CE and
Scientific Realism. Upon this paper’s conclusion it is my hope the reader will agree that the
Constructive Empiricism’s view as proposed by Van Fraassen to accept theories which are
empirically adequate is sufficient for progressing science and a good and logical starting point.

Know the Problem

In searching for an appropriate philosophy of science by which to define the purpose and
validity of scientific contribution, many views and in fact ideologies have emerged. One well
received description of a contribution of science is put forward by Michael Polanyi who claims
it is that which is plausible, to a sufficient degree; has a scientific value which is defined by the
subject matter’s accuracy, systematic importance, and intrinsic interest; and has a level of
originality (Polanyi, 1962).
One of the problems of this definition –and indeed others— is accuracy, or truth of the subject
matter. Truth is difficult to ascertain, and as Catherine Elgin relates ‘…if truth is mandatory,
much of our best science turns out to be [at best] epistemologically unacceptable and perhaps
[at its worst] intellectually dishonest’ (Elgin, 2004). This accounts for why defining “What is
science?” and “What is true in science?” has been a difficult task undertaken by many groups
of philosophers and scientists over time. Constant boundary work in verisimilitude has marked
the last two millennia of science with the last 100 years belonging mainly to the Logical
Positivists which led to the Scientific Realists most recently.
The problem is best described by Van Fraassen, a Constructive Empiricist, as follows, ‘We
never have the option of accepting an all-encompassing theory, complete in every detail’
(1980). The reason for this is detailed by him later-on when discussing his main tenant of CE,
given as empirical adequacy to which he attests, even that ‘…goes far beyond what we can
know at any given time. (All the results of measurement are not in; they will never all be in;
and in any case, we won't measure everything that can be measured)’ (Van Fraassen, 1980).
Despite this obvious weakness in empiricists claims toward truth in science and theory some
followers of Scientific Realism (and Logical Positivists before them) feel right to go even
further in claiming absolutes of truth in theories by believing them to be linguistic
representations of absolute truth in nature; or, by validating them based on factors of predictive
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success by way of the No Miracles argument. Van Fraassen did not and would say that ‘…
predictive success gives us (inconclusive) reason to think we have an empirically adequate
theory’ (Musgrave, 1988), and it was for this and other reasons Van Fraassen proposed the
concept of Constructive Empiricism as an appropriate Philosophy of Science regarding theory
creation and acceptance.
In opposition to Scientific Realism which claims the aim of science is ‘…to have true theories
about the world…’ where the word true is ‘…absolute or objective’ (Musgrave, 1988), the
Constructive Empiricist believes a theory need not be true to be useful and the relation a
scientific theory has with the world is one which adequately explains the observations made
and protects the phenomena involved.

Critical Review
Van Fraassen’s Empirical Adequacy can be seen then as either a new “description of truth” in
theory acceptance (with a lesser burden of proof), or as a less restrictive methodology which
does not require the absoluteness of truth to accept a theory as relevant or useful. Either way
the result is Van Fraassen seems to free us of strict “burdens of proof” to allow for meaningful
investigation and inquiry into science, as well as science building while defending against
claims toward metaphysics.
In his interpretation we are saved from hardline Logical Positivists and Scientific Realists
cumbersome rigidity because it abandons the burdensome verifications criterion of meaning,
instead finding meaning in theory which is empirically adequate. This is important to early-
stage science and unobservable entity-based science. The only problem I see with this
departure is concerning Social Sciences which might attempt to use CE to reify ‘vaporous
nonsense’ (Cartwright, 2009) which is what the Logical Positivists set out to resolve. CE is less
of a philosophical resolution to truth in scientific theory then, and much more of a starting
point.
CE also seems to solve the Logical Positivists problem established by the Quine-Duhem thesis,
regarding scientific theory having to go past the observational evidence’s own suggestion and
confirmations of the theory which is allowable in CE because the phenomena are still protected
even if the observations themselves are theory laden and theoretical conclusions are derived
from hypothesis and experiments with untested underlying assumptions.
CE also seems to solve the issues with empirically equivalent yet, otherwise incompatible
theories, as ‘…Constructive Empiricists can happily accept both (believe both to be
empirically adequate), but the realist cannot believe both to be true’ (Musgrave, 1982).
Summarizations on CE Solutions
CE resolves several issues for previous philosophies of science regarding truth in science and
theory creation and acceptance. The stringent burden of proof in truth upon acceptance of a
theory is relieved, thus the ability to empirically theorize is restored with less fallacious
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tendencies towards absolutism. The burden of theory-ladenness in observation is relieved
allowing for underlying assumptions. The protection against metaphysics is restored and
science is allowed to once again “make mistakes” without suffering degradation to its
social/cultural capital.
While it may not be the best philosophy of science or most exceptional epistemic attitude for
establishing a higher level of verisimilitude, CE, by way of empirical adequacy allows for a
positive foundational framework with which to continue to construct science.

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Bibliography
Cartwright, N. (2009). ‘Logical Positivism’. In Our Time, BBC Radio 4. Available at:
https://www.bbc.co.uk/sounds/play/b00lbsj3 (Accessed: 20 January, 2021).

Elgin, C.Z. (2004). ‘True Enough*’in Philosophical Issues, 14: 113-131. Oxford: Blackwell
Publishing.

Musgrave, A. (1982). Constructive Empiricism Versus Scientific Realism. The Philosophical

Quarterly (1950-), 32(128), 262-271. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Musgrave A. (1988). ‘The Ultimate Argument for Scientific Realism’ In: Nola R. (eds)
Relativism and Realism in Science. Australasian Studies in History and Philosophy of Science,
vol 6. Dordrecht: Springer.

Polanyi, M. et al. (1962). ‘The Republic of Science: Its Political and Economic, Minerva, I(1)
(1962), 54-73.’ Minerva, vol. 38, no. 1, 2000, pp. 1–32.

Van Fraassen, B. (1980). The Scientific Image. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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