Law cases to find

1.merit vs merit

Facts

Mr and Mrs Merritt married in 1941. They held their matrimonial home in joint names. In 1966 Mr
Merritt left the family home to live with another woman. Mr Merritt agreed to pay Mrs Merritt £40
per month. At Mrs Merritt’s request, he signed a document confirming that when she had repaid the
balance on the mortgage, he would transfer the matrimonial home into her sole name. Mrs Merritt
paid off the mortgage and successfully acquired a declaration that the house belonged to her. Mr
Merritt appealed.

Issues

Mr Merritt contended the agreement was a domestic arrangement between husband and wife and
there was no intention to create legal relations and, as such, there was no enforceable contract. He
also argued the purported contract was insufficiently certain to be enforceable by the court, and
that Mrs Merritt had failed to provide consideration for his promise. Mrs Merritt argued that given
they were in the process of separating, the presumption of there being no intention to create legal
relations did not apply. She claimed there was every intention of creating legal relations, and her
having paid off all the expenses on the home and finishing off the mortgage payments amounted to
consideration.

Held

Mr Merritt’s appeal was unsuccessful. When parties are in the process of separating, or are
separated, the presumption of there being no intention to create legal relations does not apply. The
arrangement was sufficiently certain to be enforceable, and the paying of the mortgage was ample
consideration for Mr Merritt’s promise. Mrs Merritt was entitled to the matrimonial home entirely.

2.case on legal relations (business agreement )

Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Malaysian Mining Corporation, [1989] 1 WLR 379

Intention to create legal relations in the formation of contracts.

Facts

A company incorporated in Malaysia, acquired a cash loan from merchant bankers for the purposes
of funding its subsidiary trading company in London. The Malaysian company wrote the bank a
‘comfort letter’ asserting that its policy is to ensure that the subsidiary company is in a position to
meet its liabilities to the bank. The bank granted a £5 million facility initially, and, following a second
identical letter, the bank raised the facility to £10 million. When the subsidiary company went into
liquidation, the merchant bankers relied upon these letters to order the company to pay the
subsidiary’s outstanding sums. The Malaysian company claimed that the letters were not intended,
nor understood, by both parties to create legal obligations.

Issue
The issue arose as to whether the assertion in the letters were intended to create legal relations in
respect of future payment as a legally-binding contract.

Held

The Court held that, in the absence of an expressly stated intention to create legal relations in
respect of the payment, the Court must determine whether the statement within its context was
intended and understood by the parties, as a binding legal promise as to future conduct.

On the facts, the Court held the express words used were not in the form of a contractual promise
and were a mere statement of fact concerning the bank’s present “policy;” and not a promise that
this “policy” will remain in the future. Further, when placed within the context of the letter itself and
bank documentation, the assertion does not evidence an intention to create a legal obligation as to
future conduct. The words were merely of comfort and of moral responsibility, and did not have the
meaning nor effect of creating a legal promise of future conduct with legally-binding effect.

3.case of capacity necessaries

FACTS

This case is about the government of Malaysia as the plaintiff whom had sued Gurcharan Singh the
first defendant whom is a promisor of a contract and ORS as the second and third defendant whom
act as the sureties of the contract for breaching the contract made between them. The contract is
about the government of Malaysia providing the first defendant a scholarship for his study at
Malayan Teacher’s Training Institution with an agreement that the first defendant will serve the
government inconsideration for being trained as a teacher. The duration of the contract is 5 years
while the first defendant only served the government for 3 years 10 months only. However during
the time the contract was made, the first defendant was in a minor state. The claim for the
compensation for this case is $11,500.

ISSUES

There are three issues evolved in this case, these are:1) Whether the contract made between them
is a valid contract?2) Whether the first defendant is liable on the claim for necessaries?3) Whether
the amount claimed or payable for compensation is reasonable and accepted regarding thecase?

DECISIONS

The contract entered into by the first defendant was a void contract as he was an infant at the
relevant time. Thus the principal debtor was not held liable and consequently the second and third
defendants whom were the sureties of the contract also were not held liable. However, due to the
exception on necessaries claim, the first defendant was therefore liable for the repayment of the
sum expended for his education and training as being expended on necessaries. The amount of
damages payable in this case must be based on repayment of the proportion of the actual sum
expended based on the completed months of service and in the circumstances judgment would be
given for the plaintiff against the defendants for $2,683.
4)Kes karuppan chetty v suah tian

Karuppan Chetty v. Suah Tian (1916) 1 F.M.S.L.R 300

Fact of the case: The parties agreed upon the granting of a lease at RM 35 per month for as long as
he likes’.

Issue: Whether the use of ‘for as long as he likes’ had rised the ambiguity in its terms.

Held: The court held that the requirement of certainty had not been satisfied as the duration of
one of themost important term of the lease was undefined or uncertain. Therefore, the agreement
is void.

Reason of decision: The language used by the party is not specifiand too vague. In a nutshell, all
uncertain contracts are voidby virtue to Section 30 of Contract Act 1950.