D'Hondt method

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  v
 t
 e

The D'Hondt method[a] or the Jefferson method is a highest averages

method for allocating seats in an electoral system and thus a type of party-list
proportional representation. The method described is named in the United States
after Thomas Jefferson, who introduced the method for proportional allocation of
seats in the United States House of Representatives in 1792, as well as in
Europe after Belgian mathematician Victor D'Hondt, who described the
methodology in 1878. There are two forms: closed list (under which a party
selects the order of election of their candidates) and open list (under which
voters' choices determine the order).
Proportional representation systems aim to allocate seats to parties
approximately in proportion to the number of votes received. For example, if a
party wins one-third of the votes then it should gain about one-third of the seats.
In general, exact proportionality is not possible because these divisions produce
fractional numbers of seats. As a result, several methods, of which the D'Hondt
method is one, have been devised which ensure that the parties' seat allocations,
which are of whole numbers, are as proportional as possible. [1] Although all of
these methods approximate proportionality, they do so by minimizing different
kinds of disproportionality. The D'Hondt method minimizes the number of votes
that need to be left aside so that the remaining votes are represented exactly
proportionally. Only the D'Hondt method (and methods equivalent to it) minimizes
this disproportionality.[2] Empirical studies based on other, more popular concepts
of disproportionality show that the D'Hondt method is one of the least
proportional among the proportional representation methods. The D'Hondt
slightly favours large parties and coalitions over scattered small parties.[3][4][5][6] In
comparison, the Webster/Sainte-Laguë method, a divisor method, reduces the
reward to large parties, and it generally has benefited middle-size parties at the
expense of both large and small parties. [7]
The axiomatic properties of the D'Hondt method were studied and they proved
that the D'Hondt method is the unique consistent, monotone, stable, and
balanced method that encourages coalitions.[8][9] A method is consistent if it treats
parties which received tied vote equally. By monotonicity, the number of seats
provided to any state or party will not decrease if the house size increases. A
method is stable if two merged parties would neither gain nor lose more than one
seat. By coalition encouragement of the D'Hondt method, any alliance cannot
lose the seat.
Legislatures using this system include those
of Albania, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Aruba, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Burundi, Cambodia, Cape Verde, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, Denmark,
the Dominican Republic, East Timor, Ecuador, El
Salvador, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, Guatemala, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Japan, Lux
 embourg, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Mozambique, Netherlands, Nicaragua, 
North Macedonia, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San
Marino, Serbia, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
The system has also been used for the "top-up" seats in the Scottish Parliament,
the Welsh Parliament and the London Assembly; in some countries for elections
to the European Parliament; and during the 1997 Constitution era to allocate
party-list parliamentary seats in Thailand.[10] A modified form was used for
elections in the Australian Capital Territory Legislative Assembly, but this was
abandoned in favour of the Hare–Clark electoral system. The system is also
used in practice for the allocation between political groups of numerous posts
(Vice Presidents, committee chairmen and vice-chairmen, delegation chairmen
and vice-chairmen) in the European Parliament and for the allocation of ministers
in the Northern Ireland Assembly.[11]

Contents

 1Allocation
o 1.1Example
 1.1.1Further examples
o 1.2Approximate proportionality under D'Hondt
 2Jefferson and D'Hondt
 3Threshold
 4Variations
o 4.1Regional D'Hondt
 5Notes
 6References
 7External links

Allocation[edit]
After all the votes have been tallied, successive quotients are calculated for each
party. The party with the largest quotient wins one seat, and its quotient is
recalculated. This is repeated until the required number of seats is filled. The
formula for the quotient is[12][1]

where:

 V is the total number of votes that party received, and

 s is the number of seats that party has been allocated so far, initially 0 for
all parties.

The total votes cast for each party in the electoral district is divided, first by 1,
then by 2, then 3, up to the total number of seats to be allocated for the
district/constituency. Say there are p parties and s seats. Then a grid of
numbers can be created, with p rows and s columns, where the entry in
the ith row and jth column is the number of votes won by the ith party, divided
by j. The s winning entries are the s highest numbers in the whole grid; each
party is given as many seats as there are winning entries in its row.
Example[edit]
In this example, 230,000 voters decide the disposition of 8 seats among 4
parties. Since 8 seats are to be allocated, each party's total votes are divided
by 1, then by 2, 3, and 4 (and then, if necessary, by 5, 6, 7, and so on). The 8
highest entries, marked with asterisks, range from 100,000 down to 25,000.
For each, the corresponding party gets a seat. Note that in Round 1, the
quotient shown in the table, as derived from the formula, is precisely the
number of votes returned in the ballot.
For comparison, the "True proportion" column shows the exact fractional numbers of
seats due, calculated in proportion to the number of votes received. (For example,
100,000/230,000 × 8 = 3.48) The slight favouring of the largest party over the
smallest is apparent.

round Seats
won
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
(1 seat per (bold)
round)

Party A
quotient 100,000 50,000 50,000 33,333 33,333 25,000 25,000 25,000
4
seats after 1 1 2 2 3 3 3 4
round

Party B
quotient 80,000 80,000 40,000 40,000 26,667 26,667 26,667 20,000
3
seats after 0 1 1 2 2 2 3 3
round

Party C
quotient 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 15,000 15,000
1
seats after 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
round

Party D
quotient 20,000 20,000 20,000 20,000 20,000 20,000 20,000 20,000
0
seats after 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
round

The chart below shows an easy way to perform the calculation:

Denominator /1 /2 /3 /4 Seats True proportion

 won (*)

Party A 100,000* 50,000* 33,333* 25,000* 4 3.5

Party B 80,000* 40,000* 26,667* 20,000 3 2.8

Party C 30,000* 15,000 10,000 7,500 1 1.0

Party D 20,000 10,000 6,667 5,000 0 0.7

Total 8 8

Further examples[edit]
A worked-through example for non-experts relating to the 2019 elections in
the UK for the European Parliament written by Christina Pagel is available as
an online article with the institute UK in a Changing Europe.[13]
A more mathematically detailed example has been written by British
mathematician Professor Helen Wilson.[14]
Approximate proportionality under D'Hondt[edit]
The D'Hondt method approximates proportionality by minimizing the largest
seats-to-votes ratio among all parties.[15] This ratio is also known as the

advantage ratio. For party  , where   is the overall number of parties,
the advantage ratio is

where

 – the seat share of party  ,  ,

 – the vote share of party  ,  .

The largest advantage ratio,
 captures how over-represented is the most over-represented
party. The D'Hondt method assigns seats so that this ratio
attains its smallest possible value,

where   is a seat allocation from the set of all allowed

seat allocations  . Thanks to this, as shown by Juraj

Medzihorsky,  the D'Hondt method splits the votes into
[2]

exactly proportionally represented ones and residual ones,

minimizing the overall amount of the residuals in the
process. The overall fraction of residual votes is

The residuals of party   are

.
For illustration, continue with the above example of
four parties. The advantage ratios of the four parties
are 1.2 for A, 1.1 for B, 1 for C, and 0 for D. The

reciprocal of the largest advantage ratio is  . The

residuals as shares of the total vote are 0% for A,
2.2% for B, 2.2% for C, and 8.7% for party D. Their

sum is 13%, i.e., . The decomposition of the votes

into represented and residual ones is shown in the table
below.

Vote Seat Advantage Residual Represented

Party
share share ratio votes votes

A 43.5% 50.0% 1.15 0.0% 43.5%

B 34.8% 37.5% 1.08 2.2% 32.6%

C 13.0% 12.5% 0.96 2.2% 10.9%

D 8.7% 0.0% 0.00 8.7% 0.0%

Total 100% 100% - 13% 87%

Seat allocation of eight seats under the D'Hondt method.

Jefferson and D'Hondt[edit]

The Jefferson and the D'Hondt methods are
equivalent. They always give the same results, but
the methods of presenting the calculation are
different. George Washington exercised his first
veto power on a bill that introduced a new plan for
dividing seats in the House of Representatives that
would have increased the number of seats for
northern states.[16] Ten days after the veto, Congress
passed a new method of apportionment, now known
as Jefferson's Method. Statesman and future US
President Thomas Jefferson devised the method in
1792 for the U.S. congressional
apportionment pursuant to the First United States
Census. It was used to achieve the proportional
distribution of seats in the House of
Representatives among the states until 1842.[17]
Victor D'Hondt presented his method in his
publication Système pratique et raisonné de
représentation proportionnelle, published in
Brussels in 1882.
The system can be used both for distributing seats
in a legislature among states pursuant to
populations or among parties pursuant to an
election result. The tasks are mathematically
equivalent, putting states in the place of parties and
population in place of votes. In some countries, the
Jefferson system is known by the names of local
politicians or experts who introduced them locally.
For example, it is known in Israel as the Bader–
Ofer system.
Jefferson's method uses a quota (called a divisor),
as in the largest remainder method. The divisor is
chosen as necessary so that the resulting quotients,
disregarding any fractional remainders, sum to the
required total; in other words, pick a number so that
there is no need to examine the remainders. Any
number in one range of quotas will accomplish this,
with the highest number in the range always being
the same as the lowest number used by the
D'Hondt method to award a seat (if it is used rather
than the Jefferson method), and the lowest number
in the range being the smallest number larger than
the next number which would award a seat in the
D'Hondt calculations.
Applied to the above example of party lists, this
range extends as integers from 20,001 to 25,000.
More precisely, any number n for which 20,000 < n
≤ 25,000 can be used.

Threshold[edit]
In some cases, a threshold or barrage is set, and
any list which does not achieve that threshold will
not have any seats allocated to it, even if it received
enough votes to have otherwise been rewarded with
a seat. Examples of countries using the D'Hondt
method with a threshold are Albania (3% for single
parties, 5% for coalitions of two or more parties, no
threshold is applied for independent
individuals); Denmark (2%); East
Timor, Spain, Serbia,
and Montenegro (3%); Israel (3.25%); Slovenia (4%
); Croatia, Fiji, Romania and Tanzania (5%); Russia
(5%); Turkey (10%); Poland (5%, or 8% for
coalitions; but does not apply for ethnic-minority
parties),[18] Hungary (5% for single party, 10% for
two-party coalitions, 15% for coalitions of 3 or more
parties) and Belgium (5%, on regional basis). In
the Netherlands, a party must win enough votes for
one strictly proportional full seat (note that this is not
necessary in plain D'Hondt), which with 150 seats in
the lower chamber gives an effective threshold of
0.67%. In Estonia, candidates receiving the simple
quota in their electoral districts are considered
elected, but in the second (district level) and third
round of counting (nationwide, modified D'Hondt
method) mandates are awarded only to candidate
lists receiving more than the threshold of 5% of the
votes nationally. The vote threshold simplifies the
process of seat allocation and discourages fringe
parties (those that are likely to gain very few votes)
from competing in the elections. Obviously, the
higher the vote threshold, the fewer the parties that
will be represented in parliament. [19]
The method can cause a hidden threshold.[20][21] It
depends on the number of seats that are allocated
with the D'Hondt method. In Finland's parliamentary
elections, there is no official threshold, but the
effective threshold is gaining one seat. The country
is divided into districts with different numbers of
representatives, so there is a hidden threshold,
different in each district. The largest district,
Uusimaa with 33 representatives, has a hidden
threshold of 3%, while the smallest district, South
Savo with 6 representatives, has a hidden threshold
of 14%.[22] This favors large parties in the small
districts. In Croatia, the official threshold is 5% for
parties and coalitions. However, since the country is
divided into 10 voting districts with 14 elected
representatives each, sometimes the threshold can
be higher, depending on the number of votes of
"fallen lists" (lists that do not receive at least 5%). If
many votes are lost in this manner, a list that gets
5% will still get a seat, whereas if there is a small
number votes for parties that do not pass the
threshold, the actual ("natural") threshold is close to
7.15%. Some systems allow parties to associate
their lists together into a single "cartel" in order to
overcome the threshold, while some systems set a
separate threshold for such cartels. Smaller parties
often form pre-election coalitions to make sure they
get past the election threshold creating a coalition
government. In the Netherlands, cartels
(lijstverbindingen) (until 2017, when they were
abolished) could not be used to overcome the
threshold, but they do influence the distribution of
remainder seats; thus, smaller parties can use them
to get a chance which is more like that of the big
parties.
In French municipal and regional elections, the
D'Hondt method is used to attribute a number of
council seats; however, a fixed proportion of them
(50% for municipal elections, 25% for regional
elections) is automatically given to the list with the
greatest number of votes, to ensure that it has a
working majority: this is called the "majority bonus"
(prime à la majorité), and only the remainder of the
seats are distributed proportionally (including to the
list which has already received the majority bonus).
In Italian local elections a similar system is used,
where the party or coalition of parties linked to the
elected mayor automatically receives 60% of seats;
unlike the French model though the remainder of
the seats are not distributed again to the largest
party.

Variations[edit]
The D'Hondt method can also be used in
conjunction with a quota formula to allocate most
seats, applying the D'Hondt method to allocate any
remaining seats to get a result identical to that
achieved by the standard D'Hondt formula. This
variation is known as the Hagenbach-Bischoff
System, and is the formula frequently used when a
country's electoral system is referred to simply as
'D'Hondt'.
In the election of Legislative Assembly of Macau, a
modified D'Hondt method is used. The formula for

the quotient in this system is  .

In some cases such as the Czech regional
elections, the first divisor (when the party has no
seats so far, which is normally 1) was raised to
favour larger parties and eliminate small ones. In

the Czech case, it is set to 1.42 (approximately 

, termed the Koudelka coefficient after the politician
who introduced it).
The term "modified D'Hondt" has also been given to
the use of the D'Hondt method in the additional
member system used for the Scottish
Parliament, Senedd Cymru – Welsh Parliament,
and London Assembly, in which after constituency
seats have been allocated to parties by first-past-
the-post, D'Hondt is applied for the allocation of list
seats taking into account for each party the number
of constituency seats it has won.
In 1989 and 1992, ACT Legislative
Assembly elections were conducted by
the Australian Electoral Commission using the
"modified d'Hondt" electoral system. The electoral
system consisted of the d'Hondt system,
the Australian Senate system of proportional
representation, and various methods for preferential
voting for candidates and parties, both within and
across party lines.[23] The process involves 8 stages
of scrutiny.
Some systems allow parties to associate their lists
together into a single kartel in order to overcome the
threshold, while some systems set a separate
threshold for cartels. In a system of proportional
representation in which the country is divided in
multiple electoral districts, such
as Belgium the threshold to obtain one seat can be
very high (5% of votes since 2003), which also
favors larger parties. Therefore some parties pool
their voters in order to gain more (or any) seats.
Regional D'Hondt[edit]
In most countries, seats for the national assembly
are divided on a regional or even a provincial level.
This means that seats are first divided between
individual regions (or provinces) and are then
allocated to the parties in each region separately
(based on only the votes cast in the given region).
The votes for parties that have not gained a seat at
the regional level are thus discarded, so they do not
aggregate at a national level. This means that
parties which would have gained seats in a national
distribution of seats may still end up with no seats
as they did not gain enough votes in any region.
This may also lead to skewed seat allocation at a
national level, such as in Spain in 2011 where
the People's Party gained an absolute majority in
the Congress of Deputies with only 44% of the
national vote.[1] It may also skew results for small
parties with broad appeal at a national level
compared to small parties with a local appeal (e.g.
nationalist parties). For instance, in the 2008
Spanish general election, United Left (Spain) gained
1 seat for 969,946 votes, whereas Convergence
and Union (Catalonia) gained 10 seats for 779,425
votes.

Notes[edit]
 1. ^ English: /dəˈhɒnt/; Dutch: [ˈdɔnt]; French: [dɔ̃t]. The name
D'Hondt is sometimes spelt as "d'Hondt". Notably, it is
customary in the Netherlands to write such surnames
with a lower-case "d" when preceded by the forename:
thus Victor d'Hondt (with a small d), while the surname
all by itself would be D'Hondt (with a capital D).
However, in Belgium it is always capitalized, hence:
Victor D'Hondt.

References[edit]
1. ^ Jump up to:a b c Gallagher, Michael
(1991).  "Proportionality, disproportionality and electoral
systems"  (PDF).  Electoral Studies.  10  (1): 33–
51.  doi:10.1016/0261-3794(91)90004-C. Archived
from  the original  (PDF)  on November 16, 2013.
Retrieved 30 January  2016.
2. ^ Jump up to:a b Juraj Medzihorsky (2019).  "Rethinking
the D'Hondt method". Political Research
Exchange.  1 (1):
1625712. doi:10.1080/2474736X.2019.1625712.
3. ^ Pukelsheim, Friedrich (2007).  "Seat bias formulas in
proportional representation systems"  (PDF).  4th ECPR
General Conference. Archived from the
original  (PDF)  on 7 February 2009.
4. ^ Schuster, Karsten; Pukelsheim, Friedrich; Drton,
Mathias; Draper, Norman R. (2003). "Seat biases of
apportionment methods for proportional
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676.  doi:10.1016/S0261-3794(02)00027-6. Archived
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02-02.
5. ^ Benoit, Kenneth (2000). "Which Electoral Formula Is
the Most Proportional? A New Look with New
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Electoral Laws, 1945-85". The American Political
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7. ^ "Election - Plurality and majority
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8. ^ Balinski, M. L.; Young, H. P. (1978). "The Jefferson
method of Apportionment"  (PDF). SIAM Rev.  20  (2):
278–284. doi:10.1137/1020040.
9. ^ Balinski, M. L.; Young, H. P. (1979). "Criteria for
proportional representation"  (PDF). Operations
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10. ^ Aurel Croissant and Daniel J. Pojar, Jr., "Quo Vadis
Thailand? Thai Politics after the 2005 Parliamentary
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 11. ^ "D'Hondt system for picking NI ministers in
Stormont".  BBC News. 11 May 2011. Retrieved 7
July  2013.
12. ^ Lijphart, Arend  (2003), "Degrees of proportionality of
proportional representation formulas", in Grofman,
Bernard; Lijphart, Arend (eds.), Electoral Laws and Their
Political Consequences, Agathon series on
representation,  1, Algora Publishing, pp. 170–
179,  ISBN  9780875862675. See in particular the section
"Sainte-Lague", pp. 174–175.
13. ^ "EU elections voting system explained: D'Hondt
worry". UK in a changing Europe. 2019-05-20.
Retrieved 2019-10-06.
14. ^ https://www.ucl.ac.uk/~ucahhwi/dhondt.pdf
15. ^ André Sainte-Laguë (1910). "La représentation
Proportionnelle et la méthode des moindres
carrés"  (PDF).  Annales Scientifiques de l'École Normale
Supérieure. l'École Normale Supérieure. 27.
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1792 - HISTORY.com".  HISTORY.com. Retrieved  2018-
05-02.
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the United States Congress - Jefferson's Method of
Apportionment".  Mathematical Association of America.
Retrieved 25 June  2017.
18. ^ Lebeda, Tomáš  (2001), "Hlavní proměnné
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Systems of Proportional
Representation]  (PDF),  Sociologický
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0288
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Teaching and Learning Resources. Retrieved  2018-05-
05.
20. ^ Venice Commission (2008).  Comparative report on
thresholds and other features of electoral systems which
bar parties from access to parliament  (Report). Council
of Europe. Retrieved February 14, 2016.
21. ^ Gallagher, Michael; Mitchell, Paul (2005). "Appendix
C: Effective threshold and effective
magnitude"  (PDF). The Politics of Electoral
Systems. Oxford University
Press. ISBN 9780199257560. Archived from  the
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22. ^ Oikeusministeriö. Suhteellisuuden parantaminen
eduskuntavaaleissa.
23. ^ "Modified d'Hondt Electoral
System".  elections.act.gov.au. 2015-01-06.
Retrieved 2018-05-05.

External links[edit]
 Simulator Election calculus simulator based on
the modified D'Hondt system
 Calculations using the pure d'Hondt method
 PHP Implementation of D'Hondt system
 Java D'Hondt, Saint-Lague and Hare-Niemeyer
calculator
 SciencesPo, R package for performing seats
allocation based on the D'Hondt system
 Downloadable Excel calculator for the D'Hondt
method