10

The Cognitive Distortions of

Child Sexual Abusers
Evaluating Key Theories

Caoilte Ó Ciardha and Theresa A. Gannon

University of Kent, United Kingdom

Tony Ward
Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand

Introduction

Addressing the cognitive distortions of sexual offenders has for many years been a
major component in treatment approaches. However, the evidence is limited for (1)
the existence of stable distortions in offenders’ cognition and (2) the impact of treat-
ment of cognitive distortions on treatment efficacy. In this chapter, we appraise two of
the most influential theories of cognitive distortions in sexual offenders against chil-
dren: Abel’s early theory (Abel, Becker, & Cunningham-Rathner, 1984; Abel, Gore,
Holland, & Camp, 1989; Abel, Rouleau, & Cunningham-Rathner, 1986), and Ward’s
Implicit Theories Theory (Ward, 2000; Ward & Keenan, 1999). We also evaluate the
Judgment Model of Cognitive Distortions (Ward, Gannon, & Keown, 2006; Ward,
Keown, & Gannon, 2007), which, although less influential than its predecessors, in
our view provides the most complete account of child sexual abusers’ cognitive dis-
tortions to date. We then examine alternative views on cognitive distortions which
challenge conventional clinical/forensic psychological approaches, namely Maruna
and Mann’s (2006) contention that pathologizing cognitive distortions may represent
a fundamental attribution error, and Ward and Casey’s (2010) reconceptualization of
cognitive distortions within an extended mind theory framework. We subsequently
attempt to consolidate the current state of the research literature regarding cogni-
tive distortions with current practice in offender treatment. From this, we offer some
recommendations for treatment.

The Wiley Handbook on the Theories, Assessment, and Treatment of Sexual Offending.
Edited by Douglas P. Boer. Volume I: Theories, edited by Anthony R. Beech and Tony Ward.
© 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Published 2016 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
DOI: 10.1002/9781118574003.wattso010
208 Single Factor Theories

In writing this chapter, we drew in particular on two recent papers: an invited debate
paper for the Journal of Sexual Aggression regarding the need for cognitive distortions
to be targeted in treatment (Ó Ciardha & Gannon, 2011) and a review paper evalu-
ating theories of cognitive distortions in sexual offenders published in a special issue
of Trauma, Violence, and Abuse (Ó Ciardha & Ward, 2013). This chapter attempts to
synthesize the key findings from both of those papers to examine what we know about
cognitive distortions and how this impacts on treatment. Before considering theory
appraisal, we first look at the history of the term cognitive distortion and attempt to
draw together the various concepts to which it has referred before suggesting a work-
ing definition of the term.

History and Definition of Cognitive Distortions

Abel and colleagues are widely accepted as the first researchers to use the term cogni-
tive distortions in the context of sexual offending (Gannon & Polaschek, 2006; Ward,
Polaschek, & Beech, 2006). At the time, the term was popular in the clinical psycho-
logical literature, referring to dysfunctional thinking styles and beliefs associated with
psychological problems such as depression and anxiety (e.g., Beck, 1976). In apply-
ing the term to the domain of antisocial behaviour, Abel and colleagues appear to
have linked the term with Bandura’s (1986) construct of faulty thinking (Ward et al.,
2006). Their initial work identified cognitive distortions as beliefs (Abel et al., 1984).
However, later they incorporated post-offence elements such as justifications into their
understanding of cognitive distortions (Abel et al., 1989). Since these seminal studies,
a number of other authors have adopted the term and expanded it to the point that
Ó Ciardha and Gannon (2011) stated that the term ‘can now be said to include belief
systems (Abel et al., 1984), justifications, perceptions, judgements (Abel et al., 1989),
excuses (Pollock & Hashmall, 1991), defensiveness (Rogers & Dickey, 1991), ratio-
nalizations (Neidigh & Krop, 1992), and denials or minimizations (Bumby, 1996)’
(pp. 130–131).
In order to appraise different theories of cognitive distortions, Ó Ciardha and Ward
(2013) offered the following rough definition of the term: ‘Cognitive distortions in
sex offenders are specific or general beliefs/attitudes that violate commonly accepted
norms of rationality, and which have been shown to be associated with the onset and
maintenance of sexual offending. These beliefs may violate rationality norms in a num-
ber of ways – for example, they may be based on sources of evidence that are not
considered to be sufficient to ground particular beliefs/attitudes (e.g., the responses
of an abused child; the responses of fellow offenders; pornography use, etc.)’ (p. 6).
Key here is that to be considered a cognitive distortion, a belief or attitude must violate
accepted norms and be shown to influence the onset or the maintenance of offend-
ing. As we discuss later, this may well preclude phenomena such as excuse making and
minimizations from being labelled as cognitive distortions, as such behaviour may be
quite normal, and might not be a contributory factor in offending (Maruna & Mann,
2006).
 The Cognitive Distortions of Child Sexual Abusers 209

Evaluating Theories of Cognitive Distortions

A comprehensive theory of sexual offending is likely to be multifactorial in nature and

provide a broad, systematic account of how developmental experiences, social and cul-
tural learning, and evolved mechanisms combine to create offence-related vulnerabili-
ties (Ward et al., 2006). According to such multifactorial theories, an individual com-
mits sexual offences as a result of a combination of causal factors such as deviant sexual
preferences, empathy deficits, intimacy problems, emotional dysregulation, problems
with action control, and distorted beliefs or values. Although a single factor such as
cognitive distortions is unlikely to explain on its own why a person commits an offence,
it still remains a crucial piece of the aetiological puzzle. A specific theory of cognitive
distortions aims to describe the mechanisms that generate the cognitive phenomena
(or products) commonly articulated by child sexual abusers during assessment and
treatment and, in addition, specifies the content and form of these products.
Thus, theories of cognitive distortions are single-factor theories (Ward et al., 2006)
that can be seen as fitting into multifactorial explanations of offending. Ó Ciardha
and Ward (2013) appraised key theories of cognitive distortions using detailed cri-
teria drawn from Hooker (1987) and Newton-Smith (2002), and recommended for
evaluating theories in the forensic psychological domain by Ward et al. (2006). In the
following section, we outline key theories of cognitive distortions and summarize the
results of our appraisal. Readers interested in a more detailed appraisal should consult
the published article. Ward et al. highlighted that appraisal criteria provide a method
for comparing competing theories rather than the indicative truth of a theory and
summarized the main theory appraisal criteria using the following themes:

1. Empirical adequacy and predictive accuracy: Does the theory account for the
findings within the experimental literature? Are the key hypotheses associated with
the theory supported by empirical research?
2. Internal coherence: Does the theory contain any gaps in logic or any contradic-
tions?
3. Explanatory depth: Does the theory explain the phenomena beyond the surface
level? Does it sufficiently explain deeper processes or mechanisms to be of value?
4. Heuristic value: Does the theory open up new fruitful avenues of research or
treatment?
5. Unifying power: Does the theory draw together findings or phenomena from
different domains or unify previously disparate theories?
6. Simplicity: Does the theory explain phenomena as simply as possible given the
available evidence?
7. External consistency: Is the theory consistent with other currently accepted
related theories or background theories?

Abel’s Theory of Cognitive Distortions

The pioneering early work on cognitive distortions by Abel and colleagues remains
extremely influential to date. This is especially notable given that Abel and colleagues
210 Single Factor Theories

did not outline their theory of cognitive distortions in one specific paper, and it must
be pieced together from several sources (Abel et al., 1984, 1986, 1989). In summary,
Abel et al. (1984) argued that distorted beliefs arise once the individual becomes aware
that their sexual interests are at odds with societal norms and may be reinforced by
masturbation. In a later paper (Abel et al., 1989), they expanded that the offending
behaviour itself can also reinforce distorted beliefs. In other words, distortions may
be seen as preceding offending but also playing a maintaining role. Abel et al. (1986)
argued that the distortions may become entrenched over time, and later (Abel et al.,
1989) incorporated justifications, perceptions, and judgements into their definition of
cognitive distortions. When drawn together it, appears that Abel and colleagues view
cognitive distortions as the cognitive consequences that emerge from a process of cog-
nitive dissonance stemming from an existing deviant sexual interest (see Gannon &
Polaschek, 2006). The cognitive distortions are strengthened initially through mas-
turbation and then through offending behaviour, and serve to justify sexual arousal in
the face of conflicting social mores.
The difficulty with Abel’s theory is that it must be drawn together from disparate
sources, running the risk that different readers may interpret the theory in alternative
ways. Although it appears that Abel sees cognitive distortions primarily in a maintain-
ing role rather than an aetiological role, the lack of clarity renders the theory somewhat
internally inconsistent. The view of cognitive distortions arising out of deviant sexual
interest is externally inconsistent with multifactorial theories of offending (e.g., Ward
& Beech, 2006), which view cognitive distortions as playing an aetiological role in
offending independent of deviant sexual interest. Additionally, this emphasis on cog-
nitive distortions arising out adolescent deviant sexual interest limits the scope of Abel’s
theory as it does not seem to account for cognitive distortions in adult-onset offend-
ing or offending where deviant sexual interest does not seem to be a key factor. As
the mechanism through which cognitive distortions are actually created is not clearly
mapped out, the theory can also be seen as lacking explanatory depth.
Abel and colleagues’ contributions to treatment and research with child sexual
abusers have been significant. Indeed, the questionnaire developed by Abel et al.
(1989) and similarly constructed questionnaires (e.g., Bumby, 1996; Hanson,
Gizzarelli, & Scott, 1994) are widely used in the offender treatment community,
attesting to the theory’s heuristic value. However, when taken together, studies
examining child sexual abusers’ endorsements on cognitive distortions questionnaires
have not been consistently able to discriminate child sexual abusers from other groups
(Gannon, Keown, & Rose, 2009). Given these mixed results and given the lack of
conceptual clarity in Abel’s theory, it is difficult to evaluate empirical evidence that
would support or reject the theory (weak empirical adequacy and predictive accuracy).
Despite this, we see the contribution of Abel and colleagues to the issue of offender
cognition as invaluable and as a starting point for a fertile area of research.

Implicit Theories Theory

The Implicit Theories Theory (ITT) proposed by Ward and Keenan (1999) and Ward
(2000) has been one of the most influential theories of cognitive distortions to date.
 The Cognitive Distortions of Child Sexual Abusers 211

Within this theory, offenders are viewed as holding sets of beliefs in the form of
schemas, or what Ward prefers to call ‘implicit theories’. This theory also represents
the first of three different theories developed by Ward and colleagues that attempt
to account for the cognitive distortions of offenders. Nevertheless, the ITT remains
the most influential as evidenced by formal publication citation counts.1 Mann and
Beech (2003) also outlined a theory of cognitive distortions as schemas. However,
this theory is arguably less detailed (and is more of a process explanation) and, as a
result, we do not provide a detailed appraisal in this chapter (see instead Ó Ciardha &
Ward, 2013; Ward et al., 2006).
In developing the ITT, Ward (2000) drew on personality, developmental, and cog-
nitive literature. He argued that implicit theories are particular types of schemas that
offenders draw upon to ‘explain, predict, and interpret interpersonal phenomena’
(p. 494) and that these theories play a key aetiological role in sexual offending. These
implicit theories are seen as deep cognitions that individuals may not be able to artic-
ulate fully but that share features with scientific theories. For example, like scientific
theories, they contain ontological assumptions about the core psychological structures
and processes inherent in human beings. Implicit theories are used by individuals to
make sense of the behaviour of people in different contexts, and to make assumptions
about the underlying psychological states of those individuals. Like scientific theories,
implicit theories involve interconnected concepts or beliefs and are used to interpret
evidence. Implicit theories differ from scientific theories (or at least differ from good
scientific practice) in that they do not go through the same rigorous process of hypoth-
esis generation, evidence testing, and theory refinement. Rather, once established,
individuals may engage in confirmation bias, whereby evidence that supports their
implicit theory is given weight and contradictory evidence is disregarded.
Ward and Keenan (1999) described five implicit theories that they argue to be preva-
lent among sexual offenders against children. Ward and Keenan believe that child
sexual abusers may not necessarily hold all five theories and will vary regarding the
configurations of implicit theories held. They also argue that non-offenders may also
hold some of these theories and that other factors such as deviant interest, poor social
competency, and insecure attachment in combination with problematic implicit theo-
ries will generate sexual offending behaviour. Ward and Keenan’s five implicit theories
are as follows:

1. Children as sexual objects: Beliefs that children are inherently sexual and able
to make informed decisions about sex. Individuals holding this theory may view
innocent actions by children as being imbued with sexual meaning.
2. Entitlement: Beliefs that one’s needs supersede those of others due to superiority.
As a result, child sexual abusers holding this theory may view their own sexual
and emotional needs as paramount and ignore or downplay the needs or rights of
victims.

1 At the time of writing, Ward and Kennan’s (1999) account of the ITT was cited in PsychINFO 142 times,

whereas Ward, Gannon, and Keown’s (2006) Judgment Model of Cognitive Distortions was cited only
seven times. Ward and Casey’s (2010) newer extended mind theory of cognitive distortions has been cited
six times.
212 Single Factor Theories

3. Dangerous world: Beliefs that the world is an inherently dangerous place where
others – including children – are not to be trusted owing to malevolent self-
interest. Child sexual abusers holding this belief may feel motivated to protect
themselves and potentially to act pre-emptively against a hostile world. An alter-
native strand of this theory involves viewing adults as being hostile and untrust-
worthy, with children as the only trustworthy or reliable agents.
4. Uncontrollability: Beliefs that the world is an uncontrollable place upon which
the abuser cannot exert any influence. External influences such as the victim,
spiritual entities, or drug or alcohol intoxication are seen as driving offending.
Alternatively, internal factors such as sexual urges are deemed to be beyond the
abuser’s control.
5. Nature of harm: Beliefs that sexual contact between adults and children may be
beneficial and that harm is only caused where there is physical violence involved
or physical injury caused.

On a conceptual level, the ITT has clear strengths in suggesting an aetiological role
of cognitions in sex offending. It has shown fertility and heuristic value inspiring sim-
ilar theories to explain the schematic nature of offence-supportive cognition in other
types of offenders (e.g., Beech, Fisher, & Ward, 2005; Beech, Parrett, Ward, & Fisher,
2009; Gannon, Hoare, Rose, & Parrett, 2012; Gilchrist, 2009; Ó Ciardha & Gan-
non, 2012; Polaschek, Calvert, & Gannon, 2009; Polaschek & Ward, 2002). The ITT
has also demonstrated unifying power in couching cognitive distortions among sex
offenders in the broader cognition literature. The theory does, however, lack explana-
tory depth (or possibly demonstrates internal incoherence) in failing to pin down fully
the process through which implicit theories may be malleable at first but may become
more entrenched over time (see Ó Ciardha & Ward, 2013; Ward et al., 2006). Despite
this limitation, however, the theory represents a clear advance in how cognitions might
be viewed as contributing to the aetiology of offending.
However, the empirical findings that have emerged in the literature call into
question the empirical adequacy and predictive accuracy of the theory. Approaches
based on the measurement of surface cognitions (e.g., Keown, Gannon, & Ward,
2010; Marziano, Ward, Beech, & Pattison, 2006), lend some support to Ward and
Keenan’s (1999) implicit theories through allocating statements – articulated by child
sexual abusers – to implicit theory categories (e.g., statements sexualizing children
would be categorized as belonging to the children as sexual beings theory). However,
where researchers have attempted to measure implicit theories on a deeper level, the
results have been mixed and have yet to provide convincing support for considering
these implicit theories as schematic belief systems. The measures most successful in
demonstrating evidence of implicit theories as schemas have relied on testing simple
associations of concepts using tasks such as the Implicit Association Test or Implicit
Relational Assessment Procedure (e.g., Dawson, Barnes-Holmes, Gresswell, Hart,
& Gore, 2009; Mihailides, Devilly, & Ward, 2004). Several studies have attempted
to use more complicated designs to demonstrate more clearly that implicit theories
form coherent beliefs that influence information processing using, for example,
the interpretive bias task (Keown et al., 2008a), a sentence completion lexical
decision task (Keown et al., 2008b), a modified Rapid Serial Visual Presentation
 The Cognitive Distortions of Child Sexual Abusers 213

measure (Keown et al., 2010), and a vignette-based task (Gannon, Wright, Beech,
& Williams, 2006). Each of these tasks has failed to find clear evidence of implicit
theories.
However, some research using complicated designs has demonstrated some poten-
tial in eliciting an effect. The results of Keown et al. (2008b) seemed to tap into an
uncontrollability implicit theory, while being unable to demonstrate an effect of any
of the other implicit theories. Additionally, an investigation of the implicit theories of
female sexual offenders using an interpretive bias task (Gannon & Rose, 2009) found
evidence of a schema involving offenders seeing men as threatening. As a result, it is
not clear whether tasks need to be refined or replaced in order to demonstrate evidence
of implicit theories as cognitive structures or whether it is the theoretical understand-
ing of offence-supportive implicit theories that needs to be revised. While accepting
that the empirical research examining cognitive distortions through indirect means
remains in its infancy, we must conclude at this point that the ITT does not satis-
factorily account for the available evidence. However, further rigorous well-designed
research is needed to consolidate mixed findings in the research to date.

The Judgment Model of Cognitive Distortions

In later work, Ward and colleagues revisited the topic of cognitive distortions as
they did not believe that the complexity of that concept had been fully theoreti-
cally addressed by the ITT (Ward, Gannon, & Keown, 2006; Ward et al., 2007).
In an attempt to overcome these limitations, they developed the Judgment Model
of Cognitive Distortions (JMCD). Within this model, cognitive distortions are seen
as emerging from thematic networks, which in turn emerge out of an interaction of
the individual’s belief-based judgements, their value based-judgements, and their action-
based judgements, as follows:

1. Beliefs: Beliefs and belief-based judgements as outlined within the JMCD

incorporate most of the preceding theoretical and empirical work on cognitive
distortions. The theory of Abel and colleagues along with the ITT of Ward
and colleagues viewed cognitive distortions as arising from the belief systems
of offenders, and it was these belief systems that empiricists attempted to tap
into with their cognitive–experimental approaches. However, from the empirical
work attempting to validate the implicit theories theory, it became clear that
the evidence for distortions as arising from consistent stable belief systems was
equivocal. The JMCD proposed by Ward and colleagues argues that some, but
not all, sexual abusers will hold core false beliefs but that those who do not
may articulate what appear to be cognitive distortions based on more temporary
faulty reasoning.
2. Values: The JMCD builds on the implicit theories model in identifying that the
distorted cognitions of individuals, along with their offending behaviour, may
emerge from the values that they prioritize. Within the JMCD, Ward and col-
leagues do not argue that child sexual abusers value the wrong things but rather
that they make bad decisions in order to achieve these values, or that the offender
214 Single Factor Theories

may place too much emphasis on certain values at the expense of others. These
judgements relate strongly to the Good Lives Model of treatment (Ward & Gan-
non, 2006), where the identification of values or goods important to the offender
is central, along with determining ways of meeting these goods in a non-offending
manner.
3. Actions: The JMCD attempts to accommodate the types of minimizations,
denials, and justifications proposed by many authors to represent cognitive dis-
tortions. In short, Ward and colleagues suggest that the offenders’ judgements
of their actions may lead them to make problematic statements that do not stem
from more deeply held beliefs or values. In this way, actions may result in the
offender attempting to present themselves in a socially desirable light by finding
ways of minimizing their responsibility (see also Maruna & Mann, 2006).

Ward and colleagues view cognitive distortions as having the potential to arise out
of any of these three judgement types or from their interactive influence. The JMCD
includes an account of how the discourse indicative of offence-supportive cognition
can be considered within thematic networks. These networks map the JMCD onto
the five implicit theories of child molesters (Ward, 2000; Ward & Keenan, 1999), and
explain how different arrangements of belief, value, and action judgements may bring
about the type of discourse previously taken as evidence for these implicit theories.
The JMCD attempts to account for inconsistent findings in measuring cognitive
distortions beyond surface cognitions. It demonstrates strong unifying power in addi-
tion to external consistency in subsuming many of the key features of the ITT of both
child molesters (Ward, 2000; Ward & Keenan, 1999) and rapists (Polaschek & Gan-
non, 2004; Polaschek & Ward, 2002), and the schema-based model of cognitive
distortions (Mann & Beech, 2003). The model also complements the Good Lives
approach to offender treatment (Ward & Gannon, 2006) (see Chapter 18) in addi-
tion to being accommodated into the Integrated Theory of Sexual Offending (Ward
& Beech, 2006, 2008) (see Chapter 6). However, Gannon, Ward, and Collie (2007)
suggested that the JMCD lacks explanatory depth in explaining how different offender
types might be associated with the various explanatory belief, value, and action mech-
anisms. For example, the JMCD holds some unifying power since it explains how the
types of post-offence cognitions seen by some as cognitive distortions (e.g., denial,
minimization, and justification) may fit into an overall picture of offender cognition
without necessarily indicating distorted beliefs. However, the exact role of these action
judgements in the aetiology of offending (i.e., explanatory depth) is unclear within the
JMCD. It is not apparent, for example, how (or if) some justifications may be nor-
mative and non-problematic whereas others may eventually feed back into the belief
structures of the offenders.
At the time of writing, no empirical study has been published that has explicitly
claimed to test the JMCD in the 6 years since its publication. Additionally, the ITT
remains far more influential, garnering many more citations in the research literature.
Taken together, this suggests that the JMCD lacks fertility or heuristic value. It appears
that the continued appeal of the ITT over the JMCD stems from the former’s appeal-
ing simplicity and from difficulties with falsification of the latter. Although internally
 The Cognitive Distortions of Child Sexual Abusers 215

coherent on the whole, the JMCD accounts for both null and alternative findings and
therefore makes it difficult to generate testable hypotheses.
Despite the lack of studies directly examining the predications of the JMCD, the
theory is, however, consistent with the majority of research conducted on cognitive
distortions in sexual offenders. It is difficult to evaluate the empirical adequacy and
predictive accuracy of the theory, however, as it has yet to be challenged by research
questions with the potential to falsify it. The main challenges to the validity of the ITT
remain challenges to the JMCD. Although the JMCD’s empirical adequacy and pre-
dictive accuracy are less reliant on being able to identify distorted beliefs in offenders,
it is still underpinned by the belief that they exist in a significant proportion of cases.
However, with the possible exception of the children as sexual beings implicit theory,
the evidence for identifiable belief structures among child sexual abusers is still fairly
limited. Despite the early success of the IAT paradigm (Mihailides et al., 2004), suc-
cessive attempts using different paradigms have failed to demonstrate convincing evi-
dence for multiple cognitive structures akin to implicit theories or offence-supportive
beliefs (Gannon et al., 2006; Keown et al., 2008a, 2008b, 2010).
Overall, the JMCD is conceptually strong and represents some clear improvements
over previous theories. In the absence of clear empirical evidence of the presence of
offence-supportive belief systems among at least a proportion of offenders, however, it
is impossible to consider the JMCD supported. Despite this, it remains a better fit for
the available data than its predecessor, the ITT. We have argued that although the evi-
dence for the presence of offence-supportive beliefs among offenders is limited, there
remains a rationale for conducting further investigation that may yet demonstrate reli-
ably the presence of such structures (Ó Ciardha and Ward, 2013). This in turn may
lend support to or disprove one of the key structures hypothesized by the JMCD.

Alternative Views on Cognitive Distortions

Although the JMCD represents the most complete theoretical model of cognitive
distortions to date, several authors have offered alternative views. Perhaps the most
influential has been that of Maruna and Mann (2006), who questioned whether the
cognitive distortions articulated by abusers should be considered problematic at all.

The Pathologization of Cognitive Distortions as an Attribution Error

In an influential article, Maruna and Mann (2006) highlighted the bind that offend-
ers find themselves in by being expected to take responsibility for their offending
behaviour. In short, Maruna and Mann argued that excuse making has typically been
seen to be indicative of criminal thinking (i.e., not taking responsibility), whereas
attributing behaviour solely to internal factors, in the absence of excuse making (i.e.,
taking responsibility by implicating dispositional factors), would also be negative since
an offender would then be viewed as being a ‘criminal type’. Maruna and Mann
articulated clearly the definitional difficulties faced as a result of successive authors’
interpretations and re-interpretations of the term ‘cognitive distortions’. They also
216 Single Factor Theories

highlighted the lack of empirical support for the concept of cognitive distortions
as belief structures. Instead, they asked whether excuse making and justification are
simply normal mechanisms for coping with stress, relieving anxiety, and maintaining
self-esteem. Maruna and Mann advocated an alternative way of approaching so-called
cognitive distortions in offenders. They suggested seeking alternative ways through
which an offender may take responsibility, for example, through taking active respon-
sibility for putting things right in the future. They also suggested that explanations
of offending that separate the offending behaviour from how they see themselves
(such as seeing the offence as a complete accident), while minimizing, may in fact
aid desistence from crime. Creating a non-deviant, non-criminal self-image by exter-
nalizing blame in this way, they argued, may facilitate an exit from criminal behaviour.
Maruna and Mann suggested that listening to the excuses that individuals make may
indicate individual risk factors such as stress or alcohol consumption.
Importantly in the context of this chapter, Maruna and Mann (2006) advocated
separating rationalizations from attitudes or beliefs that support offending. They
argued that beliefs and attitudes are likely to contribute to offending whereas mini-
mizations can at least in part be helpful in desisting from crime. Despite advocating
a de-emphasis on cognitive distortions, when taken as a whole, Maruna and Mann’s
position complements well the JMCD, which also attempts to tease apart beliefs
from action-based judgements that arise, after the fact, out of the offending process.
Building on this view, we argue that rationalizations and minimizations should not
be considered true cognitive distortions as they do not fit the definition that we
provided earlier (see Ó Ciardha & Ward, 2013) in that they do not violate accepted
norms, and have not been shown to play a causal or maintaining role in offending.

Extended Mind Theory of Cognitive Distortions

In applying ‘extended mind theory’ to the study of sex offending, Ward and Casey
(2010) also offered a compelling alternative view of cognitive distortions. Extended
mind theory proposes that the cognitive systems of individuals can be viewed as
extending into the surrounding world much as a spider’s web is an integral part
of a functional unit that is not bounded by the body of the spider (Barrett, 2011;
Menary, 2007; Sterelny, 2012). If an individual allocates tasks that have a cognitive
(brain-bound) alternative to entities outside their brain (e.g., note keeping), these
may be seen as an extension of their cognitive system. Acknowledging that extended
mind theory has many different iterations depending on the viewpoints of different
authors, Ward and Casey (2010) adopted three main assumptions as the premises
of extended mind theory: ‘(a) human cognitive agents are physically embodied; (b)
human agents have soft selves (that is, they exhibit plasticity of cognitive functioning
and agency capability); and (c) human agents possess hybrid cognitive systems that
incorporate internal and external components’ (p. 53). Based on these assumptions,
Ward and Casey attempted to apply extended mind theory to cognitive distortions in
sexual offending.
Adopting the framework of the extended mind theory allowed Ward and Casey
(2010) to consider how social networks, therapists, group members, etc. all fit into
an extended cognitive system for the offender. As a result, they argued that cognitive
 The Cognitive Distortions of Child Sexual Abusers 217

practices and, therefore, cognitive distortions are ‘dynamic, context dependent and
involve both internal and external components’ (p. 55). It follows, therefore, that a
significant cause of distorted thinking involves the external social and cultural context
of the offender’s life. Furthermore, any typologies of cognitive distortions need to
take ecological context into account. Adopting the extended mind model allows for
viewing the child sexual abuser as an embodied agent and, in turn, for understand-
ing of how threats to the physical body such as stress, intoxication, or illness to the
physical body can negatively affect cognition.
In the extended mind theory of cognitive distortions, Ward and Casey presented
an internally coherent alternative theory of cognitive distortion. However, their the-
ory lacks a clear rationale as to why factors external to the brain, but implicated in
offending, should be considered as extensions to cognition. The assertion that this
wider context is important has clear implications for treatment. If one does not accept
the tenets of the broader extended mind theory, Ward and Casey did not present a
conclusive argument to alter that view. They did not, for example, clearly elucidate
the mechanism through which cognition can extend into the outside world, demon-
strating a lack of explanatory depth. Therefore, although the theory represents unifying
power in incorporating cognitive distortions into the extended mind theory, opponents
of that theory may disregard the contribution of Ward and Casey’s version applied to
the sexual offending domain. This is unfortunate, as the extended mind theory of
cognitive distortions shows external validity in relation to the Integrated Theory of
Sexual Offending (Ward & Beech, 2006, 2008) and heuristic value, at least in terms
of treatment implications that complement current approaches to offender treatment
(e.g., Good Lives; Ward & Gannon, 2006) and offender management (e.g., Circles of
Support and Accountability; Wilson & Prinzo, 2001). The theory may have limited
fertility and heuristic value when it comes to research, as devising experiments that
could falsify the theory may prove difficult and may ultimately encourage the reten-
tion of some of the positive aspects of the theory in a simpler account of cognitive
distortions.

Implications for Treatment

Following Maruna and Mann’s (2006) timely questioning of the role of certain
so-called cognitive distortions in offending and desistence, several authors have
further explored this argument and examined whether cognitive distortions should
any longer be a focus for treatment (Dean, Mann, Milner, & Maruna, 2007; Marshall,
Marshall, & Kingston, 2011; Marshall, Marshall, & Ware, 2009). Ultimately, these
authors concluded that only cognitive distortions that are demonstrably criminogenic
should be the focus of treatment. This once again aligns with Ó Ciardha and Ward’s
(2013) definition of cognitive distortions requiring true cognitive distortions to have
an association with the onset and maintenance of sexual offending. Marshall et al.
(2009) set out a position, reiterated later by Marshall et al. (2011), whereby they
suggested that denial, minimization, and excuse making are not criminogenic and to
treat them would run counter to the ‘need principle’ of Andrews and Bonta’s (2003)
influential risk–needs–responsivity model of offender assessment and rehabilitation.
218 Single Factor Theories

Ó Ciardha and Gannon (2011) largely agreed with Marshall and colleagues’ posi-
tion – which fits well with Maruna and Mann’s (2006) conceptualizations. However,
Marshall and colleagues also suggested that there is little evidence to support the
premise that cognitive distortions (in the form of beliefs) represent criminogenic
needs for child sexual abusers (see Hanson & Bussière, 1998; Hanson & Morton-
Bourgon, 2005) and, as such, these factors may not need to be targeted in treatment.
In contrast, Ó Ciardha and Gannon argued that treatment programmes for sexual
offenders should always contain modules that explicitly target cognitions that play
an aetiological role in offending. Where the individual has entrenched beliefs, such
as that children are sexual beings or that the world is a hostile and dangerous place
(Ward & Keenan, 1999), facilitators and clients may collaboratively explore the nature
of these cognitions and their role in offending. Marshall and colleagues pointed out
that criminogenic cognitions that do not dissipate through the initial stages of the
therapeutic process may be supportively challenged later on. We believe that although
denial, minimization, rationalizations, excuses, and so forth may diminish as a result
of a building of a relationship between the client and therapist, these are exactly the
types of phenomena that should not be considered true cognitive distortions.
The JMCD, espoused here as the most complete theory of cognitive distortions,
allows for the cognitive processes and structures that produce both of these appar-
ently non-criminogenic offender statements and more problematic (potentially
criminogenic) cognitive distortions. It also allows for a separation of both types
by viewing denials, minimizations, and justifications as judgements about actions
whereas criminogenic cognitive distortions are more likely to arise from belief and
value judgements. As a result, we see the JMCD as externally consistent with the
current understanding of the treatment needs of criminogenic and non-criminogenic
phenomena in offender cognition.
Viewing the offender as part of a wider system as Ward and Casey’s (2010) extended
mind theory of cognitive distortions does complement the emphasis that Marshall
et al. (2011) place on contextual factors in reducing distorted cognitions. Ward and
Casey emphasized that the extended mind model encourages therapists to engage in
addressing the broader context of offending. The theory also suggests that offenders
need to be surrounded by individuals who will demonstrate the appropriate levels of
acceptance, sympathy, and understanding of social and cognitive norms. This empha-
sis on a supportive ecological context would include both the offenders’ surrounding
during treatment but also when attempting to reintegrate into the wider community.
Finally, Ward and Casey argued that skills should be taught that allow the individ-
ual to function well within their environmental context. As mentioned above, we see
this as externally consistent with philosophies of offender treatment and management
such as the Good Lives model (Ward & Gannon, 2006) and Circles of Support and
Accountability (Wilson & Prinzo, 2001). However, we do not feel that Ward and
Casey’s theory gives a simple account of the mechanisms and structures of cognitive
distortion. As a result, we feel that knitting the treatment implications of their model
with the more detailed mechanistic account of cognition provided by the JMCD may
prove to underpin current treatment best. This viewpoint would emphasize several key
points. First, offenders may have certain criminogenic beliefs/attitudes that need to
be supportively challenged or collaboratively explored. Second, offenders may seek to
 The Cognitive Distortions of Child Sexual Abusers 219

diminish their responsibility for their actions, but this should not be considered prob-
lematic in most cases and in any respect, may well dissipate as the treatment process
progresses. Finally, at least on a metaphorical level, it is useful to consider cognitive dis-
tortions as unbounded by the brain, and thus as dynamic risk factors that may interact
with contextual environmental factors. The challenge remains for researchers, how-
ever, to demonstrate whether the JMCD, in particular, can be empirically supported.
In order to do this, validated sophisticated measures of criminogenic beliefs and atti-
tudes are needed. To date, these true cognitive distortions remain slippery constructs
to measure.

References
Abel, G. G., Becker, J. V., & Cunningham-Rathner, J. (1984). Complications, consent, and
cognitions in sex between children and adults. International Journal of Law and Psychia-
try, 7 (1), 89–103. doi:10.1016/0160-2527(84)90008-6
Abel, G. G., Gore, D. K., Holland, C. L., & Camp, N. (1989). The measurement of
the cognitive distortions of child molesters. Annals of Sex Research, 2, 135–152.
doi:10.1007/BF00851319
Abel, G. G., Rouleau, J. L., & Cunningham-Rathner, J. (1986). Sexually aggressive behavior.
In W. J. Curran, A. L. McGarry, & S. A. Shah (Eds.), Forensic psychiatry and psychology:
Perspectives and standards for interdisciplinary practice (pp. 289–313). Philadelphia, PA:
F. A. Davis.
Andrews, D. A., & Bonta, J. (2003). The psychology of criminal conduct. Cincinnati, OH:
Anderson.
Bandura, A. (1986). Social foundations of thought and action: A social cognitive theory. Engle-
wood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Barrett, L. (2011). Beyond the brain: How body and environment shape animal and human
minds. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Beck, A. T. (1976). Cognitive therapy and emotional disorders. New York, NY: Meridian.
Beech, A. R., Fisher, D., & Ward, T. (2005). Sexual murderers’ implicit theories. Journal of
Interpersonal Violence, 20, 1366–1389. doi:10.1177/0886260505278712
Beech, A. R., Parrett, N., Ward, T., & Fisher, D. (2009). Assessing female sexual offenders’
motivations and cognitions: An exploratory study. Psychology, Crime and Law, 15,
201–216. doi:10.1080/10683160802190921
Bumby, K. M. (1996). Assessing the cognitive distortions of child molesters and rapists: Devel-
opments and validation of the MOLEST and RAPE scales. Sexual Abuse: A Journal of
Research and Treatment, 8, 37–54. doi:10.1007/bf02258015
Dawson, D. L., Barnes-Holmes, D., Gresswell, D. M., Hart, A. J., & Gore, N. J. (2009). Assess-
ing the implicit beliefs of sexual offenders using the implicit relational assessment proce-
dure: A first study. Sexual Abuse: A Journal of Research and Treatment, 21(1), 57–75.
doi:10.1177/1079063208326928
Dean, C., Mann, R. E., Milner, R., & Maruna, S. (2007). Changing child sexual abusers’ cog-
nition. In T. A. Gannon, T. Ward, A. R. Beech, & D. Fisher (Eds.), Aggressive offenders’
cognition: Theory, research and practice (pp. 117–134). Chichester, England: John Wiley
& Sons, Ltd.
Gannon, T. A., Hoare, J. A., Rose, M. R., & Parrett, N. (2012). A re-examination of female
child molesters’ implicit theories: evidence of female specificity? Psychology, Crime and
Law, 18, 209–224. doi:10.1080/10683161003752303
220 Single Factor Theories

Gannon, T. A., Keown, K., & Rose, M. R. (2009). An examination of current psychometric
assessments of child molesters’ offense-supportive beliefs using Ward’s implicit theories.
International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology, 53, 316–333.
doi:10.1177/0306624x07312791
Gannon, T. A., & Polaschek, D. L. L. (2006). Cognitive distortions in child molesters: A re-
examination of key theories and research. Clinical Psychology Review, 26, 1000–1019.
doi:10.1016/j.cpr.2005.11.010
Gannon, T. A., & Rose, M. R. (2009). Offense-related interpretative bias in female child
molesters: A preliminary study. Sexual Abuse: A Journal of Research and Treatment, 21,
194–207. doi:10.1177/1079063209332236
Gannon, T. A., Ward, T., & Collie, R. (2007). Cognitive distortions in child molesters: Theoret-
ical and research developments over the past two decades. Aggression and Violent Behavior,
12, 402–416. doi:10.1016/j.avb.2006.09.005
Gannon, T. A., Wright, D. B., Beech, A. R., & Williams, S. (2006). Do child molesters hold
distorted beliefs? What does their memory recall tell us? Journal of Sexual Aggression, 12,
5–18. doi:10.1080/13552600500451655
Gilchrist, E. (2009). Implicit thinking about implicit theories in intimate partner violence.
Psychology, Crime and Law, 15, 131–145. doi:10.1080/10683160802190863
Hanson, R. K., & Bussière, M. T. (1998). Predicting relapse: A meta-analysis of sexual
offender recidivism studies. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 66, 348–362.
doi:10.1037/0022-006X.66.2.348
Hanson, R. K., Gizzarelli, R., & Scott, H. (1994). The attitudes of incest offenders – sexual
entitlement and acceptance of sex with children. Criminal Justice and Behavior, 21,
187–202. doi:10.1177/0093854894021002001
Hanson, R. K., & Morton-Bourgon, K. E. (2005). The characteristics of persistent sex-
ual offenders: A meta-analysis of recidivism studies. Journal of Consulting and Clinical
Psychology, 73, 1154–1163. doi:10.1037/0022-006x.73.6.1154
Hooker, C. A. (1987). A realistic theory of science. Albany, NY: State University of New York
Press.
Keown, K., Gannon, T. A., & Ward, T. (2008a). The effects of visual priming on informa-
tion processing in child sexual offenders. Journal of Sexual Aggression, 14, 145–159.
doi:10.1080/13552600802248114
Keown, K., Gannon, T. A., & Ward, T. (2008b). What were they thinking? An exploration of
child sexual offenders’ beliefs using a lexical decision task. Psychology, Crime and Law, 14,
317–337. doi:10.1080/10683160701770112
Keown, K., Gannon, T. A., & Ward, T. (2010). What’s in a measure? A multi-method
study of child sexual offenders’ beliefs. Psychology, Crime and Law, 16, 125–143.
doi:10.1080/10683160802622022
Mann, R., & Beech, A. R. (2003). Cognitive distortions, schemas, and implicit theories. In T.
Ward, D. R. Laws, & S. M. Hudson (Eds.), Sexual deviance: Issues and controversies (pp.
135–153). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Marshall, W. L., Marshall, L. E., & Kingston, D. A. (2011). Are the cognitive distortions
of child molesters in need of treatment? Journal of Sexual Aggression, 17 , 118–129.
doi:10.1080/13552600.2011.580572
Marshall, W. L., Marshall, L. E., & Ware, J. (2009). Cognitive distortions in sexual offenders:
Should they all be treatment targets? Sexual Abuse in Australia and New Zealand, 2,
21–33.
Maruna, S., & Mann, R. E. (2006). A fundamental attribution error? Rethinking cog-
nitive distortions. Legal and Criminological Psychology, 11, 155–177. doi:10.1348/
135532506X114608
 The Cognitive Distortions of Child Sexual Abusers 221

Marziano, V., Ward, T., Beech, A. R., & Pattison, P. (2006). Identification of five fundamental
implicit theories underlying cognitive distortions in child abusers: A preliminary study.
Psychology, Crime and Law, 12, 97–105. doi:10.1080/10683160500056887
Menary, R. A. (2007). Cognitive integration: Mind and cognition unbounded. Basingstoke,
England: Palgrave Macmillan.
Mihailides, S., Devilly, G. J., & Ward, T. (2004). Implicit cognitive distortions and sex-
ual offending. Sexual Abuse: A Journal of Research and Treatment, 16, 333–350.
doi:10.1023/B:SEBU.0000043327.10168.5b
Neidigh, L., & Krop, H. (1992). Cognitive distortions among child sexual offenders. Journal
of Sex Education and Therapy, 18, 208–215.
Newton-Smith, W. (2002). A companion to the philosophy of science. Oxford, England: Blackwell.
Ó Ciardha, C., & Gannon, T. A. (2011). The cognitive distortions of child molesters
are in need of treatment. Journal of Sexual Aggression, 17 , 130–141. doi:10.1080/
13552600.2011.580573
Ó Ciardha, C., & Gannon, T. A. (2012). The implicit theories of firesetters: A prelimi-
nary conceptualization. Aggression and Violent Behavior, 17 , 122–128. doi:10.1016/
j.avb.2011.12.001
Ó Ciardha, C., & Ward, T. (2013). Theories of cognitive distortions in sexual offend-
ing: What the current research tells us. Trauma, Violence, and Abuse, 14(1), 5–21.
doi:10.1177/1524838012467856
Polaschek, D. L. L., Calvert, S. W., & Gannon, T. A. (2009). Linking violent thinking: Implicit
theory-based research with violent offenders. Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 24, 75–96.
doi:10.1177/0886260508315781
Polaschek, D. L. L., & Gannon, T. A. (2004). The implicit theories of rapists: What con-
victed offenders tell us. Sexual Abuse: A Journal of Research and Treatment, 16, 299–314.
doi:10.1023/B:SEBU.0000043325.94302.40
Polaschek, D. L. L., & Ward, T. (2002). The implicit theories of potential rapists: What our
questionnaires tell us. Aggression and Violent Behavior, 7 , 385–406.
Pollock, N. L., & Hashmall, J. M. (1991). The excuses of child molesters. Behavioral Sciences
and the Law, 9, 53–59. doi:10.1002/bsl.2370090107
Rogers, R., & Dickey, R. (1991). Denial and minimization among sex offenders. Sexual Abuse:
A Journal of Research and Treatment, 4, 49–63. doi:10.1007/bf00850139
Sterelny, K. (2012). The evolved apprentice: How evolution made humans unique. Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press.
Ward, T. (2000). Sexual offenders’ cognitive distortions as implicit theories. Aggression and
Violent Behavior, 5, 491–507. doi:10.1016/S1359-1789(98)00036-6
Ward, T., & Beech, A. R. (2006). An integrated theory of sexual offending. Aggression and
Violent Behavior, 11, 44–63. doi:10.1016/j.avb.2005.05.002
Ward, T., & Beech, A. R. (2008). An integrated theory of sexual offending. In D. R. Laws &
W. T. O’Donohue (Eds.), Sexual deviance: Theory, assessment, and treatment (2nd ed., pp.
21–36). New York, NY: Guilford Press.
Ward, T., & Casey, A. (2010). Extending the mind into the world: A new theory of
cognitive distortions in sex offenders. Aggression and Violent Behavior, 15, 49–58.
doi:10.1016/j.avb.2009.08.002
Ward, T., & Gannon, T. A. (2006). Rehabilitation, etiology, and self-regulation: The com-
prehensive Good Lives Model of treatment for sexual offenders. Aggression and Violent
Behavior, 11, 77–94. doi:10.1016/j.avb.2005.06.001
Ward, T., Gannon, T. A., & Keown, K. (2006). Beliefs, values, and action: The judgment model
of cognitive distortions in sexual offenders. Aggression and Violent Behavior, 11, 323–340.
doi:10.1016/j.avb.2005.10.003
222 Single Factor Theories

Ward, T., & Keenan, T. (1999). Child molesters’ implicit theories. Journal of Interpersonal
Violence, 14, 821–838. doi:10.1177/088626099014008003
Ward, T., Keown, K., & Gannon, T. A. (2007). Cognitive distortions as belief, value and
action judgments. In T. A. Gannon, T. Ward, A. R. Beech, & D. Fisher (Eds.), Aggres-
sive offenders’ cognition: Theory, research and practice. Chichester, England: John Wiley &
Sons, Ltd.
Ward, T., Polaschek, D. L. L., & Beech, A. (2006). Theories of sexual offending. Chichester,
England: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Wilson, R. J., & Prinzo, M. (2001). Circles of support: A restorative justice initiative. Journal
of Psychology and Human Sexuality, 13, 59–77. doi:10.1300/J056v13n03_05