SpecPro Compilation of Prelim 98

CASE DIGEST
Hagans v. Wislezenus This involves an original petition for Certiorari before the SC on the question of w/n a judge of the CFI in special
proceedings is authorized under the law to appoint assessors for the purpose of fixing the amount due an administrator
for his services in the management and settles of the estate of the deceased person. The judge bases his alleged
authority on Act. 190 which provides that “either party to an action may apply in writing to the judge for assessors to sit
in trial ….” In other words, the issue is whether a “special proceeding,” like this case, is an action? NO. When the
Legislature used the word “action,” it did not mean “special proceeding.” An action is a formal demand of one's legal
rights in a court of justice in the manner prescribed by the court or by the law. It is the method of applying legal
remedies according to de nite established rules. The term "special proceeding" may be de fined as an application or
proceeding to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. Usually, in special proceedings, no formal
pleadings are required, unless the statute expressly so provides. The remedy in special proceedings is generally granted
upon an application or motion.
Natcher v. Court of Appeals After Graciano’s first wife died, the estate of the latter was extrajudicially adjudicated among themselves. Private
respondents filed a civil case against petitioner alleging the sale of a certain property to Graciano’s second wife
Natcher was fraudulent, while also alleging their legitimes have been impaired. RTC ruled the sale was void because it is
prohibited by law between spouses with conjugal properties but ruled that Natcher is also a compulsory heir of the
decedent and the
property sold was to be considered an advanced legitime. RTC in question has no jurisdiction because Sec. 2, Rule 90
provides that questions relating to advancements made by decedent shall be adjudicated by the court having
jurisdiction over the estate proceedings. The court in question is a general court not properly constituted to be a
probate court. The respondents also cannot raise questions relating to the settlement of the estate of the decedent in an
action for annulment and reconveyance of title.
Vda. De Manalo v. Court of Appeals Troadio Manalo died intestate leaving certain properties to be distributed to his children. A petition for extra judicial
settlement was filed with the Trial Courts but was opposed on the ground that there was no earnest effort to
compromise between families, thus was considered as an ordinary proceeding. But this was denied eventually by the SC
because the records show that what was filed in the Trial Court was an extrajudicial settlement (a special proceeding)
and not an ordinary civil action.
JURISDICTION
Mangaliman v. Gonzales Mangaliman was given a legacy of ⅛ undivided portion of Hacienda Evangelista. The said Hacienda was levied on
execution for the payment of the services of the administrator of the estate. In the same probate proceeding,
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SpecPro 3C 2021 Case Matrix
Preliminaries - Venue and Process
Mangaliman filed a petition for the reconveyance of her ⅛ undivided share after learning that the administrator obtained
the order of payment and writs of execution through fraud and misrepresentation. ISSUE: Whether the probate court
has jurisdiction to entertain the petition for reconveyance (NO). The probate court has limited jurisdiction and can take
cognizance only of “matters of probate, both testate and intestate estates, aaa and all such special cases and proceedings
as are not provided for. The jurisdiction is limited and special, it is understood to comprehend only cases related to
those powers specified in law, and cannot extend to the adjudication of collateral matters. Controversy involving rights
over real property will require the presentation of evidence and the determination of legal questions that should be
ventilated in a court of general jurisdiction.
Baybayan v. Aquino The probate court (special proceeding) adjudicated the land (including Lot E) in favor of the heirs (private
respondents). But when they were about to possess it, they were prevented by the registered owners (petitioners) of
the said lands. So the owners-petitioners filed a complaint for the quieting of their title (civil case). The same court
ordered the petitioners to amend their complaint (civil case) in order to ascertain the ownership of Lot E. So the
petitioners filed an amended complaint (Omnibus Motion) but the Judge found that the Amended Complaint did not
comply with his order to exclude Lot E and so he dismissed the case. The petitioners questioned the authority of the
Judge to issue such order in the probate proceeding where the petitioners are not even parties. SC: Since the petitioners
voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the probate court when they filed an Omnibus Motion amending
their complaint, they could no longer question the authority of the Judge. But the Judge committed a GADALEJ in
dismissing the complaint filed by the petitioners, for their alleged failure to amend their complaint to exclude Lot E. The
findings of the Judge as to the ownership of Lot E after the hearing conducted in probate proceeding do not justify the
order to amend the complaint. When questions arise as to ownership of property alleged to be a part of the estate of a
deceased person, but claimed by some other person to be his property, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the
deceased, but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate, such questions cannot be determined in the courts
of administrative proceedings. The CFI, acting as a probate court, has no jurisdiction to adjudicate such contentions,
which must be submitted to the CFI in the exercise of its general jurisdiction.
Fernandez v. Maravilla Facts: Herminio Maravilla, the husband of the decedent, was appointed as the universal heir and administrator in the
testator’s will. However, this will was denied probate because it had defects and this was appealed by Maravilla. The
siblings of the decedent sought annulment of Maravilla as administrator and nominated Eliezar as co-administrator in
order to protect their interests. The court appointed Eliezar as co-administrator to which Maravilla filed with the CA a
petition for certiorari and prohibition to annul the order. The CA issued a writ of preliminary injunction. The siblings
then filed a petition to certify the case to the SC as the amount exceeds 200,000 and alleged that the preliminary
injunction issued was not in aid of appellate jurisdiction of the CA as there was never an appeal on the denial of probate
by the CFI. Maravilla contends that the decision of the probate court is under appeal and that the amount is less than
200k as the amount to be protected by Eliezar was only around 90k. The CA granted the writ of certiorari and
prohibition. Hence, this appeal.
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Issue: WoN the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to issue the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for by
respondent, the same not being in aid of its appellate jurisdiction? - Yes, no jurisdiction.
Ruling: NO. The CA has no appellate jurisdiction as the appointment of Eliezar was only incidental to the probate
proceedings and the value of the estate in question is more than 200k ( 362k). Under Section 2, Rule 75, the property to
be administered and liquidated in testate/intestate proceedings is the entire estate and not merely the part of the
conjugal property pertaining to the deceased spouse. Not having appellate jurisdiction, as the amount is over 200k, the
CA cannot have original jurisdiction to issue the 2 above mentioned writs as such was merely incidental. Note that what
is at issue between the parties is the annulment of the appointment of Eliezar and is such a controversy involving a
contest for administration where the amount or value of the entire estate is in controversy. Maravilla’s contention is
that appeals in special proceedings are within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the CA as they are not enumerated
in Section 17 of the Judiciary Act. On the other hand, it has been held that the term “civil cases includes special
proceedings.” Such is untenable as a special proceeding has never been held to be a civil case. Further, Section 2, Rule 23
provides that the rules of ordinary civil action are applicable in special proceedings if they are not inconsistent with or
serve to complement special proceedings.
Manalo v. Paredes Laureana Hidalgo, surviving spouse of Francisco Villegas, filed with the Court of First Instance an application for letters
of administration who according to the application, died intestate. Justina Mendieta et. al filed a motion in court praying
for the probate of the supposed will. The court ordered the publication in the newspaper of the application for the
probate of the supposed will The proceeding for the probate of a will is a proceeding in rem, and the court acquires
jurisdiction over all the persons interested through the publication of the notice prescribed by section 630 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, and any order that may be entered is binding against all of them. ISSUE: W/N the court has acquired
jurisdiction over all the persons interested and hence these people are bound by the court’s judgment. YES. The court
having tried said application for probate, hearing all the testimony of the attesting witnesses of the said supposed will,
and the court having approved said stipulation and declared that Francisco Villegas died intestate according to said
agreement, all the parties became bound by said judgment; and if any of them or other persons interested were not
satisfied with the court's decision, they had the remedy of appeal to correct any injustice that might have been
committed, and cannot now through the special remedy of mandamus, obtain a review of the proceeding upon a new
application for the probate of the same will in order to compel the respondent judge to comply with his ministerial duty
imposed by section 330 of the Code of Civil Procedure; because this remedy, being extraordinary, cannot be used in lieu
of appeal, or writ of error.
RULE 72 - SUBJECT MATTER AND APPLICABILITY OF GENERAL RULES (NO CASES)
RULE 73 – VENUE AND PROCESS
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Salazar v. CFI of Laguna Facts: There are two wills in this case presented by Plaintiff Salazar and respondent Rivera respectively. Salazar, having
possession of a will by the deceased dated May 13, 1924, filed for the first probate proceeding that was opposed by
Rivera by presenting, through her counter-petition, a copy of a later dated will (May 11, 1930). In an MR, Rivera tried to
ask the court to set aside the proceeding initiated by Salazar. In setting aside Rivera’s MR, the probate court decided
that upon publication, the hearing for the probate of the two wills will be held jointly. Salazar filed two MRs but CFI
denied it. Hence, this certiorari proceeding.
Issue: WON the CFI acquired jurisdiction over the counter-petition by Rivera for probate of 2nd will despite Rivera’s
failure to file her pleading nor pay the fees to the clerk of court under Sec. 788 of Code of Civil Pro.
Held: CFI acquired jurisdiction over the probate of the second will based on the counter-petition of Rivera. Salazar’s
certiorari is denied. All the (see held) jurisdictional facts have been complied with by Rivera. 1st, Capistrano died
leaving a will. 2nd, Capistrano died in the province where the probate court exercises jurisdiction. Lastly, Rivera indeed
filed the copy of the 2nd will. With regard to non-payment of fees, the omission of the payment of fees of clerk of court
does not deprive the probate court of its authority to proceed with the probate of the 2nd will.
Cayetano v. Leonidas FACTS : Adoracion Campos died. Hermogenes Campos was the only compulsory heir hence he executed an Affidavit of
Adjudication whereby he adjudicated unto himself the ownership of the entire estate. 11 months later, Nenita Paguia (one of
her sister) filed a reprobate of a will stating that Adoracion executed it in the US because Adoracion at the time of her death
was an American citizen at the time of her death and was a permanent resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Hegemones filed
an opposition and questioned whether the will was allowed to be probated in the Philippines.
ISSUE
: Whether or not the will can be probated in the Philippines.
HELD : Under Section 1, Rule 73, if the decedent is an inhabitant of a foreign country, his will shall be proved or letter of
administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate. Thus, the
settlement of the estate of Adoracion Campos was correctly filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila where she had an
estate since it was alleged and proven that Adoracion at the time of her death was a citizen and permanent resident of
Pennsylvania, United States of America and not a "usual resident of Cavite" as alleged by the petitioner.
In re Kaw Singco FACTS: Sy Oa is the administratrix of the intestate estate of Kaw Singco. During the intestate proceedings, an opposition
is filed by one Co Ho. The latter claims that the court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter because the
proceedings were not filed in the province where the deceased last resided. Subsequently, the SC issued a resolution
stating that there is no issue with respect to jurisdiction but there is merely a question of venue.
ISSUE: Whether the last place of residence of the deceased is an element of jurisdiction.
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HELD: NO. Section 600 of Act no. 190, providing that the estate of a deceased person shall be settled in the province
where he had last resided, could not have been intended as defining the jurisdiction of the probate court over the
subject matter because such legal provision is contained in a law of procedure dealing merely with procedural matters
and as this court has said time and again, procedure is one thing and jurisdiction over the subject matter is another. The
law on jurisdiction confers upon the CFI jurisdiction over all probate cases independently of the place of residence of
the deceased. Since, however, there are many CFIs in the Philippines, the law of procedure fixes the venue or the place
where each case shall be brought. Thus, the place of residence of the deceased is not an element of jurisdiction over the
subject matter but merely of venue. And it is upon this ground that in the new Rules of Court in the province where the
estate of a deceased person shall be settled is properly called “venue.”
Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals

Virginia G. Fule (illegitimate sister) filed with the CFI of Laguna a petition for letters of administration alleging “that on
April 26, 1973, Amado G. Garcia, a property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the City of Manila, leaving real
estate and personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in other places, within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court.”
At the same time, she moved ex parte for her appointment as special administratix over the estate. Judge Malvar
granted the motion. A motion for reconsideration was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia, the surviving spouse of the deceased,
contending that 1) The decedent “resided” in QC for 3 months before his death as shown by his death certificate and
therefore have an improper venue.2) The CFI of Calamba lacks jurisdiction over the petition. CFI denied the motion, but
CA reversed and affirmed making Preciosa the administratix.
ISSUE: WoN the petition for letters of administration was properly filed in the proper venue – NO. The word “resides” in
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the
personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a
place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not
legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile
requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one’s domicile. No particular length of time of
residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary, and if he is an inhabitant of a
foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate. In this case, SC ruled that the last
place of residence of the deceased should be the venue of the court. As per the death certificate, the deceased resided in
QC and not in Calamba and thus, the petition must have been filed in the CFI of QC.
Cuenco v. Court of Appeals Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died in Manila. He was survived by his widow, Rosa Cayetano Cuenco (petitioner), and
their two minor sons, all residing in Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City, and by his 6 children of the first marriage,
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(remember important dates) (respondents), all of legal age and residing in Cebu. 5 March 1964 - Respondent Lourdes Cuenco filed a Petition for
Letters of Administration with the CFI of Cebu alleging that the late senator died was a resident of Cebu at the time of
his death. Petition for hearing, however, was later suspended and cancelled and a new and modified one released on 13
March 1964, in view of the fact that the petition was to be heard at Branch II instead of Branch I of the said Cebu court.
12 March 1964 - Petitioner Rosa Cuenco filed a petition with the CFI of Rizal (Quezon City) for the probate for the
deceased's last will and testament and for the issuance of letters testamentary in her favor. Where is the proper venue?
[Quezon City]
A fair reading of the Rule — since it deals with venue and comity between courts of equal and coordinate jurisdiction —
indicates that the court with whom the petition is first filed, must also first take cognizance of the settlement of the
estate in order to exercise jurisdiction over it to the exclusion of all other courts. [Residence issue] The Quezon City
court had already so determined Quezon City as the actual residence at the Cebu court's behest and respondents have
not seriously questioned this factual finding based on documentary evidence) and if the Cebu court should likewise
determine Quezon City as the actual residence, or its contrary finding reversed on appeal, only then to allow
petitioner-widow after years of waiting and inaction to institute the corresponding proceedings in Quezon City.
Ongsingco v. Tan FACTS: Tasiana Ongsingco is the wife and judicial guardian of Francisco de Borja who was declared incompetent.
Francisco de Borja is the surviving spouse of Josefa Tangco whose estate is being settled. Jose de Borja (respondent) is
the son of Francisco, who was appointed administrator of the estate. Francisco de Borja, is the owner of two parcels of
land situated in Santa Rosa, Nueva Ecija, which he acquired by inheritance from his late father Marcelo de Borja and as
such form part of his separate properties. As such guardian, petitioner took over from her husband the possession of
said two parcels of land. Meanwhile, Jose de Borja, as administrator of the estate of Josefa Tangco, filed a motion praying
that petitioner be restrained from threshing the palay on the lands until the ownership thereof has been definitely
determined either by the court or by agreement of the parties. Petitioner filed an action in the CFI of Nueva Ecija to
determine title and ownership of said lands. The Nueva Ecija court issued a preliminary injunction restraining
respondent administrator for interfering with the administration of said properties. court issued the 2 orders in
question prohibiting petitioner from continuing possession of said partials of lands. These orders not only go into the
issue of ownership but render ineffective the writ of injunction issued by the CFI of Nueva Ecija.
ISSUE: Whether the respondent court has jurisdiction to determine the dispute in the estate proceedings of ownership
of the late Josefa Tangco considering that the dispute between the parties involves the ownership of the lands now
subject of an action in the CFI of Nueva Ecija.
HELD: The dispute is between petitioner and respondent administrator involving the ownership of two parcels of land
and this question has been squarely raised in a civil action pending in the court of first instance, which was instituted
precisely because of the dispute that had arisen. Therefore the Court held that the respondent [probate] court exceeded
its jurisdiction in acting upon the question in its capacity as probate court.
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"The question of ownership of property is one which should be determined in an ordinary action and not in probate
proceedings, and this applies whether or not the property is alleged to belong to the estate.” Another case held that "The
general rule is that questions as to title to property cannot be passed upon in testate or intestate proceedings" or,
stating the rule more elaborately, "when questions arise as to the ownership of property alleged to be a part of the
estate of deceased person, but claimed by some other person to be his property, not by virtue of any right of inheritance
from the deceased, but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate, such questions cannot be determined in
the courts of administrative proceedings. The Court of First Instance, acting as a probate court, has no jurisdiction to
adjudicate such contentions, which must be submitted to the court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction.
Eusebio v. Eusebio FACTS: Petitioner Eugenio Eusebio filed a petition for his appointment as administrator of the estate of his father,
Andres Eusebio, according to said petition, in the City of Quezon but the oppositors, all surnamed Eusebio, objected to
said petition, stating that they are illegitimate children of the deceased and that the latter was domiciled in San
Fernando, Pampanga, and praying, therefore, that the case be dismissed upon the ground that venue had been
improperly filed. The deceased had always been domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga, where he had his home, as well
as some other properties. Inasmuch as his heart was in bad condition and his son, Dr. Jesus Eusebio, who treated him,
resided at Quezon City and that the bought a house and lot in said City. While transferring his belongings to this house,
soon thereafter, the decedent suffered a stroke (probably heart failure), for which reason Dr. Eusebio took him to his
(Dr. Eusebio's) aforementioned residence, where the decedent remained until he was brought to the UST Hospital, in
the City of Manila and contracted marriage in articulo mortis with his common law wife, in said hospital. Two (2) days
later, he died therein of "acute left ventricular failure secondary to hypertensive heart disease", at the age of
seventy-four (74) years. Consequently, he never stayed or even slept in said house at España Extention.
ISSUE #1: W/N the deceased abandoned his domicile in Pampanga and established a domicile in Quezon City –
NO, domicile is Pampanga
Since the domicile of origin of the decedent was San Fernando, Pampanga, where he resided for over seventy (70) years,
the presumption is that he retained such domicile, and, hence, residence, in the absence of satisfactory proof to the
contrary, for it is well-settled that "a domicile once acquired is retained until a new domicile is gained." Under the
circumstances surrounding the case at bar, if Andres Eusebio established another domicile, it must have been one of
choice, for which the following conditions are essential, namely: (1) capacity to choose and freedom of choice; (2)
physical presence at the place chosen; and (3) intention to stay therein permanently. Admittedly, the decedent was
juridically capable of choosing a domicile and had been in Quezon City several days prior to his demise. Thus, the issue
narrows down to whether he intended to stay in that place permanently.
There is no direct evidence of such intent. The aforementioned house and lot were bought by the decedent because he
had been adviced to do so "due to his illness.” It is not improbable — in fact, its is very likely — that said advice was
given and followed in order that the patient could be near his doctor and have a more effective treatment. It is well
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settled that "domicile is not commonly changed by presence in a place merely for one's own health", even if coupled
with "knowledge that one will never again be able, on account of illness, to return home."
Again, the decedent did not part with, or alienate, his house in San Fernando, Pampanga. Moreover, some of his children,
who used to live with him in San Fernando, Pampanga, remained in that municipality. Then, again, in the deed of sale for
the Quezon City property, the decedent gave San Fernando, Pampanga, as his residence. Similarly, residence certificates
used by the decedent in aknowledging said deed, before a notary public, was issued in San Fernando, Pampanga. Lastly,
the marriage contract signed by the deceased when he was married, in articulo mortis, two (2) days prior to his demise,
stated that his residence is San Fernando, Pampanga.
At any rate, the presumption in favor of the retention of the old domicile — which is particularly strong when the
domicile is one of the origin as San Fernando, Pampanga, evidently was, as regards said decedent — has not been offset
by the evidence of record.
ISSUE #2: W/N the CFI of QC has jurisdiction to appoint an administrator of the deceased’s estate - NO
But the lower court refused to consider petitioner's evidence on the domicile of the decedent, because of their alleged
lack of "personality", but, when tried to establish such "personality", they were barred from doing so on account of the
question of venue raised by him. The oppositors specially made of record that they were not submitting themselves to
the jurisdiction of the court, except for the purpose only o f assailing t he same, and the court felt that petitioners were
not giving up their stand, which was, and is, a fact. At any rate, the oppositors were entitled to establish facts tending to
prove, not only their right to object to oppositor’s petition, but, also, that venue had been laid improperly. Such facts
were: (a) their alleged relationship with the decedent, which, if true, entitle them to proceed him under the Civil Code of
the Philippines; and (b) his alleged residence is Pampanga. In other words, the lower court should have admitted the
documents in evidence and given thereto the proper effect, in connection with the issue under consideration.
Petitioner, however, asks: "What will happen if this case be dismissed in the CFI of Quezon City on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction or improper venue?" In this connection, it appears that, the Clerk of the CFI of Pampanga received a
petition of petitioner herein for the settlement of the "Intestate Estate of the late Don Andres Eusebio" and was granted
by an order, and which case was docketed. The oppositors then moved for the dismissal of said proceedings, owing to
the pendency of the present case, before the CFI of Rizal. This motion was granted, relying upon Rule 75, section 1,
of the Rules of Court, pursuant to which "the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a
decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts."
Although said order is now final, it cannot affect the outcome of the case at bar. Said order did not pass upon the
question of domicile or residence of the decedent. Moreover, in granting the court first taking cognizance of the case
exclusive jurisdiction over the same, said provision of the Rules of Court evidently refers to cases triable before two or
more courts with concurrent jurisdiction. It could not possibly have intended to deprive a competent court of the
authority vested therein by law, merely because a similar case had been previously filed before a court to which
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jurisdiction is denied by law, for the same would then be defeated by the will of one of the parties. More specially, said
provision refers mainly to non-resident decedents who have properties in several provinces in the Philippines, for the
settlement of their respective estates may undertaken before the court of first instance of either one of said provinces,
not only because said courts then have concurrent jurisdiction — and, hence, the one first taking cognizance of the case
shall exclude the other courts — but, also, because the statement to this effect in said section 1 of Rule 75 of the Rules of
the Court immediately follows the last part of the next preceding sentence, which deals with non-resident decedents,
whose estate may settled the court of first instance of any province in which they have properties.
In view, however, of the last sentence of Section 1 Rule 75, if proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased
resident are instituted in two or more courts, and the question of venue is raised before the same, the court in which the
first case was filed shall have exclusive jurisdiction to decide said issue. Should it be decided, in the proceedings before
the said court, that venue had been improperly laid, the case pending therein should be dismissed and the
corresponding proceedings may, thereafter, be initiated in the proper court.
In conclusion, we find that the decedent was, at the time of his death, domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga; that the
Court of First Instance of Rizal had no authority, therefore, to appoint an administrator of the estate of the deceased, the
venue having been laid improperly; and that it should, accordingly, have sustained petitioner's opposition and
dismissed oppositor's petition.
Sandoval v. Santiago Deceased Marquez executed a will and codicil whereby Sandoval was appointed as executrix. The will and codicil were
allowed for probate but before Sandoval qualified as executrix, the three heirs instituted in a will entered into
extrajudicial partition of the estate. This extrajudicial partition was not submitted to the court. One year after the
allowance of the will, the Court of First Instance ordered Sandoval to post bond to qualify her as executrix. Sandoval
manifested that she need not qualify as executrix as the properties were partitioned already. The judge still ordered her
to post bond and declared the extrajudicial partition as null and void on the ground that since the probate proceedings
have been commenced judicially, it must be terminated judicially. Sandoval then filed this current appeal. The issue is
WoN the judge is correct. Court held that he is and that the CFI has acquired exclusive jurisdiction to settle the testate
estate of the deceased and over the heirs and other person interested in the estate of the deceased from the moment the
application for the probate of the decedent's will was filed with the said court and the publication required by law were
made; and the heirs of the deceased Marquez could not divest the CFI of its already acquired jurisdiction by the mere
fact of dividing extrajudicially the estate of the deceased among themselves. If the extrajudicial partition made by the
heirs of the deceased was submitted to the court and approved by the respondent judge after verifying that it does not
prejudicially affect the rights of third parties, the testate proceedings pending in the court would have been legally
thereby terminated. In this case since the partition was not approved by the judge, the probate proceedings is not
terminated.
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Vda. De Manzanero v. CFI of Esteban M. Manzanero died. His brother, Fortunato, filed in the CFI of Batangas a sworn application praying for a
Batangas summary settlement of his estate. When the application was called for hearing, only Fortunato appeared.. Upon petition
of Fortunato, and after making sure that no opposition to the application had been presented, Judge David ordered the
clerk of court of Tayabas to take the evidence in the case and to submit his report. The case was called for hearing
without Remedios, the widow of Esteban Manzanero, having appeared to oppose the application. On the same date,
Judge David issued an order directing a summary distribution thereof. Remedios filed a motion praying for the return
and delivery to her of the money.
W/N the question of jurisdiction of a court to take cognizance of a summary settlement of the estate of a deceased
person, by reason of residence, may be raised by means of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari. -- No, questions of
jurisdiction cannot be raised in a remedy of certiorari.
The jurisdiction assumed by a CFI for the settlement of an estate, so far as it depends on the place of residence of a
person, or of the location of his estate, cannot be contested in a suit or proceeding except in an appeal from that court, in
the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
Benedicto v. Javellana Maximino Jalandoni, brother of the deceased Maximo Jalandoni, petitioned that the administrator, Julio Javellana, be
directed to pay him the sum of P985 which the latter held, in lieu of the land donated to him in his brother’s will.
One-half of the hacienda “Lantad” had been bequeathed to Jalandoni, subject to the payment of certain debts and
expenses of the estate. Jalandoni alleged that one-half of said hacienda was sold for the sum of P985 (which was in the
possession of Javellana) and that Javellana is no longer entitled to retain the P985 since there would be more than
enough required to pay the other debts and expenses of the estate. However, Javellana alleged that it was not proper to
ask, by means of a motion, for the relief that Jalandoni claimed, but that a complaint should have been filed and action
brought against the other legatees or rather against all the parties concerned in the estate, not against the administrator
alone.
Where should Maximino’s claim be filed: in the special proceedings or in a separate action? In the special proceedings.
Every demand or claim which any heir, legatee or party in interest in a testate or intestate succession may make must
be acted upon and decided within the same special proceedings, not in a separate action.
Casiano v. Maloto Adriana Casiano Maloto died and her niece and nephews commenced an intestate proceeding in the CFI believing that
she died intestate. However, a document purporting to be the last will and testament of Adriana was delivered to the
court containing larger stipulation of shares than what some of the heirs got from the intestate proceeding so
petitioners sought for the probate of the alleged will. The SC stated that the probate court (CFI in intestate proceeding)
had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for the probate of the alleged will. Indeed, the motion to reopen the was
denied because the same was filed out of time. Moreover, it is not proper to make a finding in an intestate estate
10
proceeding that the discovered will has been revoked. As a matter of fact, the probate court stated in an order that
"Movants should have filed a separate action for the probate of the Will." And this court stated in its resolution that ”The
more appropriate remedy of the petitioners in the premises stated in the petition is for petitioners to initiate a separate
proceeding for the probate of the alleged with in question." Thus, the intestate proceeding is not a bar to the petition for
probate of the alleged will of Adriana.
Cuizon v. Ramolete Marciano Cuizon applied for the registration of several parcels of land located at Opao, Mandaue City then covered by
certificates of Tax Declaration in Land Registration Case No. N-179. In 1970, he distributed his property between his
two children, Rufina and Irene. Part of the property given to Irene consisted largely of salt beds which eventually
became the subject of this controversy. Irene Cuizon executed a Deed of Sale with Reservation of Usufruct involving the
said salt beds in favor of the petitioners Francisco, Rosita and Purificacion, all surnamed Cuizon. At that time, Francisco
and Rosita were minors and assisted by their mother, Rufina, only sister of Irene. However, the sale was not registered
because the petitioners felt it was unnecessary due to the lifetime usufructuary rights of Irene. Although the decision in
L.R. Case No. N-179 was rendered way back in 1972, the decree of registration and the corresponding O.C.T. was issued
only in 1976 in the name of Marciano Cuizon. In that same year, T.C.T No. 10477 covering the property in question was
issued to Irene. The latter died in 1978. During the extrajudicial settlement of the estate, Rufina, the mother of Francisco
et al., adjudicated to herself all the property of Irene including the salt beds in question. She then executed a deed of
Confirmation of Sale wherein she confirmed and ratified the 1971 deed of sale and renounced and waived whatever
rights and interests and participation she may have in the property in question in favor of the petitioners. The deed was
annotated in T.C.T. No. 10477. Subsequently, T.C.T. No. 12665 was issued in favor of the petitioners. In 1978, Domingo
Antigua, who allegedly was chosen by the heirs of Irene to act as administrator, was appointed administrator by the CFI
of Cebu. Antigua included the salt bed in the inventory of Irene’s estate and asked the Cebu CFI to order petitioners to
deliver the salt to him.
Whether or not a probate court has jurisdiction over parcels of land already covered by a Transfer Certificate of Title
issued in favor of owners who are not parties to the intestate proceedings if the said parcels have been included in the
inventory of properties of the estate prepared by the administrator. - No. It is a well-settled rule that a probate court or
one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to
be a part of the estate and which are equally (claimed to belong to outside parties. All that the said court could do as
regards said properties is to determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of
properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, well and good; but if there is, then the parties,
the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the
conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so. In the instant case, the property involved is not only
claimed by outside parties but it, was sold seven years before the death of the decedent and is duly titled in the name of
the vendees who are not party to the proceedings.
11
Bernardo v. Court of Appeals Eusebio Capili and Hermogena Reyes were husband and wife. Eusebio died in 1958 and his wife died the following year.
A testate proceeding was conducted and his will was admitted to probate. After the wife died, Deogracias Bernardo, the
executor of the estate, filed a petition for Hermogena to be substituted by her collateral relatives and intestate heirs.
The executor then filed a project of partition in the estate proceeding but this was opposed by the collateral relatives of
Hermogena Reyes claiming that ½ of the properties of Eusebio should belong solely to the conjugal partnership of the
spouses and not to Eusebio alone. The probate court rendered a decision declaring the donation void because it falls
under the prohibition in the civil code which disallows donations between spouses during marriage. In the same order,
it disapproved both projects of partition and directed the executor to file another, dividing the property mentioned in
the last will and testament of Eusebio and the properties mentioned in the deed of donation between the instituted hers
of the deceased and legal heirs of Hermogena. The CA affirmed this.
The issue in this case is w/n the probate court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the claims of the heirs of Hermogena
he court held that as a general rule, the question as
involving title to the properties mentioned in the will of Eusebio. YES. T
to title to property cannot be passed upon on testate or intestate proceedings. An exception is where one of the parties
merely prays for the inclusion or inclusion from the inventory of the property, in which case the probate court may pass
provisionally upon the question without prejudice to its final determination in a separate action. The matter in
controversy is the question of ownership of certain of the properties involved — whether they belong to the conjugal
partnership or to the husband exclusively. This is a matter properly within the jurisdiction of the probate court which
necessarily has to liquidate the conjugal partnership in order to determine the estate of the decedent which is to be
distributed among his heirs who are all parties to the proceedings, including, of course, the widow, now represented
because of her death, by her heirs who have been substituted upon petition of the executor himself and who have
appeared voluntarily. There are no third parties whose rights may be affected. It is true that the heirs of the deceased
widow are not heirs of the testator-husband, but the widow is, in addition to her own right to the conjugal property.
And it is this right that is being sought to be enforced by her substitutes. Therefore, the claim that is being asserted is
one belonging to an heir to the testator and, consequently, it complies with the requirement of the exception that the
parties interested (the petitioners and the widow, represented by dents) are all heirs claiming title under the testator.
Uriarte v. CFI of Negros Occidental In 1961, Vicente Uriarte (Petitioner) filed with the Negros Court a petition for the settlement of the estate of Don Juan
Uriarte alleging that he was a natural son and sole heir of the latter and that during the lifetime of Don Juan, he
instituted a case for compulsory acknowledgment with the same court. Higinio Uriarte and Juan Uriarte Zamacona
(Respondents) filed an opposition stating that a Don Juan executed a will and Spain. In 1962, they further commenced a
special proceeding in Manila for the probate of the alleged will. After, Higinio and Juan filed a motion to dismiss before
the Negros Court stating that there was no legal basis for intestate proceedings as a will was left by Don Juan and that
Vicente was not yet acknowledged.
The matter of venue of probate proceedings provides that the estate of a decedent inhabitant of the Philippines at the
12
time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, shall be in the CFI in the province in which he resided at the time of his
death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the CFI of any province in which he had estate. Here, Don Juan was
a non-resident alien who left properties in both Negros and Manila.
The Court held that testate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person take precedence over
intestate proceedings. Thus, if in the course of intestate proceedings pending before CFI it is found that the decedent
had left a last will, proceedings for the probate of the latter should replace the intestate proceedings even if at that stage
an administrator had already been appointed, the latter being required to render final account and turn over the estate
in his possession to the executor subsequently appointed. This, however, is understood to be without prejudice that
should the alleged last will be rejected or is disapproved, the proceeding shall continue as an intestacy. As already
adverted to, this is a clear indication that proceedings for the probate of a will enjoy priority over intestate proceedings.
While it seems that Respondents should have submitted the will to the Negros Court (where the intestate proceedings
were first instituted by Petitioner) and not file a new proceeding in Manila, the Court held that the circumstances show
that Vicente waived the right to object to the wrong venue of Manila due to laches. He already knew of the will in 1961
but it was only in 1963 that he intervened in the Manila Court Special Proceeding to dismiss it due to wrong venue.
Hence, the proceeding in Manila for the probate of the will should continue.
Del Rosario v. Del Rosario [CASE DECIDED IN 1939] Facts in the complaint: Ramon del Rosario and Florencia Arcega (husband and wife) died in
1895 and 1933 respectively and the plaintiffs and defendants are both their heirs. The husband intestate and left
properties of the conjugal partnership valued at P19,000. These were administered by the wife along with the products
she acquired. The husband’s intestate was not commenced after his death in 1895, and only until the wife’s death in
1933 were the conjugal properties liquidated through a testamentary proceeding, (still in progress)..
The plaintiffs thus filed a complaint/an Action to Recover their Share in the Conjugal Properties left by the late Ramon
and Florencia. A demurrer was interposed on the ground of res judicata (another action pending b/w same parties
and same cause of action). The lower court sustained the demurrer and dismissed the case. An appeal was thus taken.
Issue: W/N Act No. 3176 or the former law applies to the case – Act No. 3176 only amends the former law in the sense
that upon the death of any of the spouses, the community property shall be liquidated in the testamentary or intestate
proceedings of the deceased spouse. But whatever law might be applicable, and even assuming that it was that prior to
Act No. 3176, the intestate of Ramon del Rosario not having been commenced upon his death in 1895 until his
widow Florencia Arcega also died in 1933, and the testamentary proceedings of Florencia Arcega having been
subsequently initiated, wherein, among other things, the liquidation of her conjugal properties with the deceased
Ramon del Rosario should be made, the pendency of these testamentary proceedings of the deceased wife
excludes any other proceeding aimed at the same purpose (Zaide v. Concepcion and Quintana). At any rate, the
13
plaintiffs have a right to intervene in the proceedings as parties interested in the liquidation and partition of
the conjugal properties of the deceased Sps. Del Rosario (so res judicata nga). The lower court’s decision was
AFFIRMED by the SC.
Dolar v. Roman Catholic Paulino Diancin married twice - first, with Margarita and second, with Dolar. When Paulino died, he left a will where he
distributes his properties among all of his heirs from his two marriages. Conflict arose when Paulino’s heirs from his
first marriage did not concur with the project of partition filed by his second wife, Dolar.
W/N all the heirs - both from the first and second marriage - must agree before a partition is allowed by the Court. - YES.
SC ruled that unless Paulino’s widow, Dolar, and the rest of his heirs come to an agreement, the partition should be
made with the intervention of all the interested parties according to law. The procedure is as follows:
1. All the debts and administration expenses shall first be paid.
2. The conjugal properties of the first and second marriage shall be partitioned among the heirs.
3. The properties of the deceased both from the first and second marriage shall be partitioned among the heirs.
4. The legacy to the church (there was a legacy of 8,000 to the church in the will) must be taken out of the free
portion, without impairment of the legitimes of the forced heirs.
5. The legal usufruct of the widow must be taken from the third available for betterment.
6. Legitimes shall be distributed among the forced heirs.
7. The remainder of the free portion is to be divided among the forced heirs in equal parts.
Alfonso v. Natividad Spouses Angeles obtained a loan from respondent Pedro Natividad and pledged a title to a land as security for said load.
When spouses Angeles died, Natividad took possession of the land as payment for the debt. Now Alfonso (petitioner) as
administrator of the estate of Pedro Angeles (husband) filed a case for recovery of the land for the purpose of
liquidation of the conjugal partnership and settlement of Pedro Natividad’s estate. ISSUE is whether Alfonso as
administrator may take possession of the land? SC said that the administrator (Alfonso) is entitled to the possession of
the conjugal property. It is a necessary consequence of settling the partner’s affairs. When a conjugal partnership is
dissolved by the death of the husband it would be extremely difficult to settle his estate without first settling the
partnership affairs. Therefore, the inventory should first be made and the partnership affairs settled in the same
proceeding and in the CFI having jurisdiction over the settlement of husband’s estate. While the settlement is being
made, the executor or administrator appointed in the proceeding settling the husband’s estate must be the person who
is entitled to the custody of the property of the conjugal partnership. Here, since the partnership was dissolved by the
death of the husband; that its affairs should be settled in the proceedings for the settlement of his estate; that Petitioner
is the administrator appointed in that proceeding; that the property in question belonged to the partnership, therefore
Petitioner is entitled to maintain this action.
Cruz v. De Jesus Two methods of liquidating the property of a conjugal partnership, if the marriage is dissolved by the death of one of
14
the spouses. The first is by testate or intestate proceeding according to whether the deceased died with or without a
will. The other is by ordinary proceeding for liquidation and partition. When the marriage is dissolved by the death of
the wife, as in this case, the legal power of management of the husband ceases, passing to the administrator appointed
by the court in the testate or intestate proceedings instituted to that end if there by any debts to be paid, and when
there is no debt pending, the liquidation and partition may be made in an ordinary proceeding for that purpose. Since
there are no debts to pay, the action for partition will lie, because while it is true that it prays for a liquidation of the
property of the conjugal partnership dissolved by the death of Juliana, said liquidation is implied in the action for
partition.
In sum, when there are no debts to pay, the liquidation and partition of the property of the conjugal partnership,
dissolved by the death of one of the spouses, may be made in an ordinary action instituted for that purpose.
De la Rama v. De la Rama CFI Iloilo rendered a decision decreeing divorce due to husband’s adultery, along w/ other sums based on the unpaid
share of the property belonging to the conjugal partnership, including support. Defendant Husband claims in his
original appeal that 1)It was not proper to settle the affairs of the conjugal partnership in divorce proceedings; 2) No
such settlement of a conjugal partnership could ever be made until there had been a final judgment ordering the
divorce. ISSUE: WON it is proper to settle the affairs of the conjugal partnership in divorce proceedings. HELD: YES - In
an action for divorce, the affairs of the conjugal partnership, if a decree of divorce is granted, can be liquidated in the
same proceeding. Civil Code provides that an inventory of the conjugal partnership must be made at once since:
[Conjugal property to be divided when partnership is dissolved = actual property possessed at the time of dissolution
less deductions & payments].
Villacorte v. Mariano Leon died and his third wife, Mariano, signed 3 documents where she renounced all her interest and rights in the estate
of the deceased Leon and her participation in the conjugal partnership with him in favor of Leon’s 4 daughters through
his first marriage in exchange for a riceland, P2,400, and a fishpond. Later, Mariano wanted to take back her
renunciation saying that the documents she signed was through her vitiated consent, but the SC ruled that the
documents were valid and her consent was not vitiated, so the renunciation was valid. Mariano argued that it was
wrong for the lower court to decide on this controversy based on the strength of the documents without previously
requiring an inventory and liquidation of the conjugal properties of the deceased Leon. SC said where the interested
parties (children of the dead Leon and his surviving 3rd wife) had already reached a compromise where the 3rd
wife renounced in favor of the children all her interest and rights in the estate of the dead Leon as well as her
participation in the conjugal partnership, it’s no longer needed to prepare an inventory of the conjugal
properties and make a liquidation.
Calma v. Tanedo Spouses Calma and Macasaquit were indebted to Tañedo, chargeable against their conjugal property. Macasauit died
15
and appointed her daughter as administratrix of her properties. While the probate proceedings of the the deceased
Macasaquit were pending, Tanedo filed a complaint against Calma for the recovery of the debt. The CFI ordered for
Calma to pay and the conjugal property was sold by the sheriff. Issue: WON the complaint for the payment of the debt
correctly filed against CalmaRuling: No, the court held that the sale was void. The conjugal property described in the
complaint is under Art. 3176, included among the inventoried properties subject to the testamentary proceedings of
Macasaquit. No complaint can be brought against Calma for the recovery of debt chargeable against conjugal property
because he has ceased to become the legal administrator of the conjugal property. The action should be instituted in the
testamentary proceedings of the Macasaquit, by filing it first with the committee of claims and thereafter, appeal to the
corresponding CFI, in an ordinary action against the judicial administratrix.
Ocampo v. Potenciano Spouses Ocampo and Yatco borrowed money from Spouses Potenciano and Reyes with their house & lot as mortgage,
and the contract however was made to appear as sale with pacto de retro. Spouses Ocampo was unable to repay the
loan thus Spouses Poteciano applied and was granted title to the house and lot by the Register of Deeds. Ocampo and
Reyes predeceased their spouses, but Potenciano offered an option to Yatco to repurchase the property again,
Potenciano however denied Yatco’s payment. The SC said It is not a sale, so Potenciano cannot transfer the title to his
name. Moreover, the equitable mortgage was not superseded through novation by the option agreement between
Potenciano and Yatco because Potenciano does not have the authority to re-sell the property to Yatco upon his wife’s
(Reyes) death, the surviving spouse had no such authority as de facto administrator of the conjugal estate according to
Rule 75 of the RoC.
Prado v. Natividad Casimiro Prado married Maria Prado, who died of tuberculosis and whose estate was under the administration of the
complainant who prayed that ½ of the conjugal property given to him; however, Casimiro said that conjugal
partnership has been liquidated already and no property was left, only a loss worth 10k. W/N appraisal of CPG
property should be based on the value at time of acquisition. Held: No, it should be based at the time of
LIQUIDATION to take into account the changes in value over time. Casimiro took loans to administer the property and
despite selling the estate, the proceeds weren’t enough to cover what is due; thus, no residue was left for petitioner
administrator.
De la Rama v. De la Rama CFI Iloilo rendered a decision decreeing divorce due to husband’s adultery, along w/ other sums based on the unpaid
share of the property belonging to the conjugal partnership, including support. Defendant Husband claims in his
original appeal that 1)It was not proper to settle the affairs of the conjugal partnership in divorce proceedings; 2) No
such settlement of a conjugal partnership could ever be made until there had been a final judgment ordering the
divorce. ISSUE: WON it is proper to settle the affairs of the conjugal partnership in divorce proceedings. HELD: YES - In
an action for divorce, the affairs of the conjugal partnership, if a decree of divorce is granted, can be liquidated in the
16
same proceeding. Civil Code provides that an inventory of the conjugal partnership must be made at once since:
[Conjugal property to be divided when partnership is dissolved = actual property possessed at the time of dissolution
less deductions & payments].
Fulgencio v. Gatchalian Josefa is the administratrix of the intestate estate of Dionisio. She filed a written complaint against Benita Gatchalian,
the wife of Dionisio, alleging that Benita refused to surrender certain properties which were conjugal partnership
property. Benita alleged that the subject properties were owned by her exclusively.
W/N the Benita’s paraphernalia property must be included in the settlement of the husband’s estate. - YES.
It has not been conclusively proven that the property claimed by the administratrix is paraphernalia and belongs
exclusively to the defendant Benita. As such they are deemed to be conjugal partnership property, liable for the debts of
the conjugal partnership, and therefore, the administratrix has a right to be placed in possession of the same for the
purpose of its inventory in the special proceedings, without prejudice to the rights of the widow Benita in relation to her
own property or to that of the nature of paraphernalia, for, once the inventory of the property of the intestate estate has
been made, the latter will have the same opportunity to claim the exclusion of the property belonging to her exclusively
and that of the nature of paraphernalia.
Lukban v. Republic Lukban married Chuidian. Days after their marriage, Chuidian left Lukban after a violent quarrel and never returned for
more than 20 years. Intending to move on and marry again, Lukban filed a petition praying for a declaration that
Lukban is a widow of her husband, Chuiduan who is presumtively dead. The SolGen opposed the petition on the ground
that the same is not authorized by law.
W/N the presumption of death can be the subject of judicial pronouncement. - NO.
While it is true that a special proceeding is “an application or proceeding to establish the status or right of a party, or a
particular fact”; but, as already said, that remedy can be invoked if the purpose is to seek the declaration of death of the
husband. A petition for judicial declaration that petitioner’s husband is presumed to be dead cannot be entertained
because it is not authorized by law, and if such declaration cannot be made in a special proceeding much less can the
court determine the status of petitioner as widow since this matter must of necessity depend upon the fact of death of
the husband. The philosophy behind this ruling is that a judicial pronouncement to that effect, even if final and
executory, would still be a prima facie presumption only. It is still disputable. It is for that reason that it cannot be the
subject of a judicial pronouncement of declaration, if it is the only question or matter involved in a case, or upon which a
complement court has to pass.
17
CASE RECIT READY
RULE 74
De la Rama v. De la Rama (1913 This case involves the same husband and wife from the 1907 De la Rama case ( I will refer to them as “Wife” and
case) “Husband”). In a previous case ruled by the CFI, the wife charged her husband with adultery and prayed for a divorce,
the division of the conjugal property, and alimony pendente lite. Husband denied the adultery charged against him,
(NOTE: Previous De la Rama case was charged his wife with adultery, and alleged that his only income was a salary of P450 per month received as manager of
1907) the firm "Hijos de I. de la Rama." Judgment was rendered against the husband by the trial court granting a divorce,
dissolving the conjugal partnership, and allowing plaintiff the sum of P81,042.76 as her share of the conjugal property,
and P3,200 as alimony. Husband appealed to the United States SC, arguing that both he and his wife committed
adultery, so divorce shouldn’t have been granted. The United States SC granted the husband’s petition, but only ruled
on the issues of DIVORCE, and not on any of the issues on their conjugal property. After that, the case was
remanded to the Philippine SC for further ruling on the conjugal properties of the husband and wife. The conflict in this
case arose in relation to the evidence presented by the husband as to the true value of the inventory. Basically, evidence
was submitted by the husband as to the alleged “true value” of the inventory of the properties. However, the CFI
rendered a decision in favor of the wife for a different value from the submitted inventory.
W/N the original CFI judgement should be upheld. - NO, because the submitted inventory does not bind the Court as to its
contents.
Exhibit 1 purports to be an inventory of the property of the firm of "hijos de I. de la Rama" as of July 5, 1902. The bulk of
the conjugal property. As pointed out by the trial judge, this inventory appears to have been prepared by or for the
defendant for the purposes of this action; and in any event it was prepared after this action was originally instituted and
under conditions which justified the trial judge in believing that the defendant had every opportunity to intervene in its
preparation and to use his personal influence to have the document speak favorably to his contentions. Granting that it
is true, as contended by the husband, that this document was admitted in evidence without objection, it by no
means follows that the trial judge was bound to accept its contents as true where other evidence of record
disclosed its inaccuracies and its failure correctly to list the properties in question. It was admitted for what it
was worth as evidence, but in very nature of things, it should not be held as conclusive of the truth of its
contents. We think that the trial judge is fully sustained by the evidence of record in his findings that this inventory
failed to set forth the true status of the affairs of the company, and we are of opinion, and so hold, that there was no
error in his findings as to the true value of the property in question.
Fulgencio v. Gatchalian Josefa is the administratrix of the intestate estate of Dionisio. She filed a written complaint against Benita Gatchalian,
1
the wife of Dionisio, alleging that Benita refused to surrender certain properties which were conjugal partnership
property. Benita alleged that the subject properties were owned by her exclusively.
W/N the Benita’s paraphernalia property must be included in the settlement of the husband’s estate. - YES.
It has not been conclusively proven that the property claimed by the administratrix is paraphernalia and belongs
exclusively to the defendant Benita. As such they are deemed to be conjugal partnership property, liable for the debts of
the conjugal partnership, and therefore, the administratrix has a right to be placed in possession of the same for the
purpose of its inventory in the special proceedings, without prejudice to the rights of the widow Benita in relation to
her own property or to that of the nature of paraphernalia, for, once the inventory of the property of the intestate estate
has been made, the latter will have the same opportunity to claim the exclusion of the property belonging to her
exclusively and that of the nature of paraphernalia.
Lukban v. Republic Lukban married Chuidian. Days after their marriage, Chuidian left Lukban after a violent quarrel and never returned for
more than 20 years. Intending to move on and marry again, Lukban filed a petition praying for a declaration that
Lukban is a widow of her husband, Chuiduan who is presumtively dead. The SolGen opposed the petition on the ground
that the same is not authorized by law.
W/N the presumption of death can be the subject of judicial pronouncement. - NO.
While it is true that a special proceeding is “an application or proceeding to establish the status or right of a party, or a
particular fact”; but, as already said, that remedy can be invoked if the purpose is to seek the declaration of death of the
husband. A petition for judicial declaration that petitioner’s husband is presumed to be dead cannot be entertained
because it is not authorized by law, and if such declaration cannot be made in a special proceeding much less can the
court determine the status of petitioner as widow since this matter must of necessity depend upon the fact of death of
the husband. The philosophy behind this ruling is that a judicial pronouncement to that effect, even if final and
executory, would still be a prima facie presumption only. It is still disputable. It is for that reason that it cannot be the
subject of a judicial pronouncement of declaration, if it is the only question or matter involved in a case, or upon which a
complement court has to pass.
CASE RECIT READY
RULE 74
1) Utulo v. Vda. De Garcia, 66 Phil 302 Juan Garcia Sanchez died intestate and was survived by his wife, Leona and three children, one of whom was named Luz
2
(1938) Garcia. An action was filed in the CFI Tarlac by Leona for the administration of her husband’s property. Luz later
married Pablo Utulo. However, during the pendency of the abovementioned administration proceedings, Luz died and
left no children her only forced heirs being her mother Leona and her husband Pablo. Pablo instituted an action for the
judicial administration of Luz’s property which consisted merely of her share in her father’s intestate estate. To this,
Leona filed an opposition. She alleged that since Luz left no indebtedness, there was no reason for the said judicial
administration but she stated that should the court grant the administration of the property, she should be appointed
the administratrix thereof in as much as she had the better right than the applicant. W/N the judicial administration of
Luz’s property is proper. NO. The Code of Civil Procedure provides: “ If no executor is named in the will, or of a person
dies intestate, the administration shall be granted..etc.” This provision enunciate the general rule that when a person
dies leaving property in the Philippines, his property should be judicially administered and the competent court should
appoint a qualified administrator, in the order established in the section, in case the deceased left no will, or in case he
had left one and he fails to name an executor therein. This rule however, is subject to exceptions pursuant to the CCP.
According to the first, when all the heirs are of lawful age and there are no debts due from the estate, they may agree in
writing to partition the property without instituting the judicial administration or applying for the appointment of an
administrator. According to the second, if the property left does not exceed six thousand pesos, the heirs may apply to
the competent court after the required publications to proceed with summary partition and, after paying all the known
obligations to partition all the property constituting the inheritance among themselves pursuant to law without
instituting the judicial administration and the appointment of an administrator.
Plaintiff Cresencia and her siblings acquired in common a parcel of land in Batangas from their father. Two of the
siblings (Maria & Aquilina) sold their combined portions to Andal and his wife for P860. The said portion is equivalent
to their combined allotted shares by virtue of a verbal partition among the five siblings. After the sale, Cresencia
attempted to repurchase the land for P150 but Andal refused since he was willing to part with the property only for a
consideration of P860 plus the expenses he had incurred. Cresencia then filed a supplemental complaint. During the
trial, plaintiff’s counsel objected to the validity of the parol partition of the land among the five siblings. The lower court
ruled that said parol evidence of partition was inadmissible, accede to the RoC (74 and 123) and Civil Code(1248). WON
2) Hernandez v. Andal, 78 Phil 196 Section 1 of Rule 74 is constitutive and not merely evidential of partition (Is writing the act that confers legal validity upon
(1947) the agreement?) No. Section 1 of Rule 74 is not constitutive but merely evidential of partition The requirement that a
partition be put in a public document and registered has, in our opinion, for its purpose the protection of creditors and
at the same time the protection of the heirs themselves against tardy claims. Note that the last sentence of the section
speaks of debts and creditors. The object of registration is to serve as constructive notice, and this means notice to
others. It must follow that the intrinsic validity of partition not executed with the prescribed formalities does not come
into play when, as in this case, there are no creditors or the rights of creditors are not affected. No rights of creditors
being involved, it is competent for the heirs of an estate to enter into an agreement for distribution in a manner and
upon a plan different from those provided by law.
3
Alberto Torres, one of the legitimate children of Paz E. Siguion- Torres who died intestate, prayed for the issuance in his
favor of letters of administration in connection with the properties left by the decedent. It was alleged therein that he
was unaware of any existing debt or obligation contracted by the deceased or her estate. This petition was opposed by
Conchita Torres, one of the heirs of the deceased on the ground that the appointment of an administrator is
unnecessary because the heirs had already entered into an extrajudicial partition and settlement of the estate pursuant
to Sec 1 Rule 74 of the ROC.
Petitioner contended that despite the extrajudicial partition attempt at the actual designation of their respective shares
have failed, thus needing the court’s intervention. It was also claimed that some properties of considerable value were
not included in said partition. In addition, the petitioner this time alleged that the estate has an existing debt of P50,000
from third persons which Alberto claimed was not incorporated in the petition by reason of oversight. The court found
that an extrajudicial settlement had already been entered into by the heirs and then dismissed the petition.
3) Torres v. Torres, 10 SCRA 185 (1964)
ISSUE: WoN a Special Proceeding is necessary for the settlement of the estate of the deceased?
NO. The SC held that where the decedent left no debts and heirs or legatees are all of age, as in this case, there is no
necessity for the institution of special proceedings and the appointment of an administrator for the settlement of the
estate because the same can be effected either extrajudicially or through an ordinary action for partition. The
subsequent bare allegation that the estate has an existing debt from third persons without specifying the creditor and
other details in regard thereto cannot be considered a concise statement to constitute a cause of action nor does the
unverified statement that there are other properties not included in the deed of extrajudicial partition in the possession
of one of the heirs, justify the institution of administration proceedings because such questions can be litigated in an
ordinary action for partition.
Eustaquio Arcillas (the deceased) is the owner of Lot No. 276 located in Zamboanga City covered by a TCT. In the
November 12 petition, Geronimo Arcillas (one of the heirs) sought the cancellation of the TCT and prayed for the
issuance of a new TCT in the names of the heirs of the deceased. Citing the Land Registration Act, Geronimo Arcillas
argued that the TCT shall accurately reflect the heirs’ respective proportions in the said lot. However, before any other
4) Arcillas v. Montejo, 26 SCRA 197 material pleading could be filed the five (5) other heirs initiated a special proceeding for the issuance of letters of
administration (November 16 petition) preparatory to the final settlement of the estate. It was averred that the
(1968)
deceased left no debts.
The CFI denied the November 16 petition and reasoned that to obviate the necessity of spending uselessly which would
only deplete the funds of the estate; to avoid unnecessary delay in the partition of the property involved herein, and
following the doctrines established by the SC in several cases of the same nature, which is in consonance with the
4
provisions of Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, the court is of the opinion that the herein petition (should) be
denied and (holds that) the cadastral motion covering the same property is the most expedient and proper action.
Issue: Whether the CFI properly dismissed the November 16 petition (administration proceedings) under the authority
of Section 1, Rule 74 upon averments that the estate left no debts and all the heirs are all of age (NO).
Geronimo Arcillas apparently view Section 1 of Rule 74 as mandatory so long as the deceased left no will nor any
pending obligations to be paid and his heirs are all of age. The Court disagrees. Under Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of
Court, if the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs and legatees are all of age, or the minors are represented by
their judicial guardians, the parties may, without securing letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves
as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the Register of Deeds and should they disagree, they may do so in
an ordinary action of partition. In Rodriguez v. Tan, the SC said that [Section 1, Rule 74] does not preclude the heirs from
instituting administration proceedings, even if the estate has no debts or obligation, if they do not desire to resort for
good reasons to an ordinary action of partition. Said Section is not mandatory or compulsory as may be gleaned from
the use made therein of the word may.
Having decided to institute administration proceedings instead of resorting to the less expensive modes of settlement of
the estate, i.e. extrajudicial settlement or ordinary action for partition, the heirs may not then be rebuffed in the
exercise of their discretion granted under Section I of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court merely on the ground that the
expenses usually common in administration proceedings may deplete the funds of the estate. The disputed order was
set aside.
Sps. Ermac died, leaving behind only one parcel of land. Their grandson Medelo filed for the summary settlement of
their estate. Judge Pineda granted this and ordered Medelo to present the proper project of partition of the lot. Pedro
Ermac filed an MR contesting the partition praying that the subject lot be excluded from the estate of Sps. Ermac
because the lot was owned by him and his wife but the court denied it because the remedy Pedro should’ve availed of
was to file a separate civil action. Pedro did file a separate civil action but despite this the court still granted Medelo's
5) Ermac v. Medelo, 64 SCRA 359 project of partition. Issue: W/N the court erred in approving the project partition despite there being a separate civil
action filed by Perdo – NO. Estates should be settled in the least amount of time. Hence, the rules provide summary
(1975)
proceedings. The probate court is not the place to resolve adverse claims of ownership over any property
belonging to the estate. It is not proper to delay the summary settlement of a deceased person just because an heir or a
third person claims that certain properties do not belong to the estate but to him. This is because such claims would
unnecessarily lengthen the settlement process. These claims must instead be ventilated in an independent civil
action. The probate court should proceed to the distribution of the estate, if there are no other legal obstacles to it. Such
distribution must always be subject to the results of the suit (i.e. the estate proceedings). To protect his rights as the
5
ntered.
claimant, Pedro should have the proper annotation of lis pendens e
Bonifacio Carreon and Celerina Dauag got married and they acquired land. When Bonifacio died, Celerina executed an
affidavit adjudicating to herself alone the land despite having children with her deceased husband. She was given a TCT
over the land but the certificate was annotated with a lien which subjected her title to Section 4 of Rule 74 of the RoC.
Celerina mortgaged the land to PNB and when the loan matured, she sold the land to Rufo Agcaoili. The loan of the bank
was paid, the mortgage released and a new TCT was issued in the name of Rufo. The children of Celerina filed a
complaint against spouses Agcaoili to have the sale be declared as a mortgage and seeking to recover ½ of the land. TC
found that the children had no legal basis.
6) Carreon v. Agcaoili, 1 SCRA 521 WoN Agcaoili is the rightful owner of the land? YES
Rufo Agcaoili was a buyer in good faith. There is no clear proof that when Rufo bought the land he knew of any flaw in
(1961)
Celerina’s title (that she had kids). The fact that Rufo was a townmate of Celerina is of no moment because ever since
1920 Rufo worked in the Philippine Constabulary and seldom went home to his relatives, thus, he cannot be expected to
know the relatives and children of his vendor even if they are townmates. Fraud cannot be presumed. It must be
established by clear and sufficient evidence. Also, pursuant to the mirror doctrine, Rufo is only charged with burdens
which are on the face of the title. There was a burden though, Section 4 of Rule 74 of the RoC. However, the lien in the
aforementioned provision is effective only for 2 years. From Sept. 28, 1946, when the TCT was issued to Celerina, to
Sept 8, 1949, when the deed of sale to Rufo was registered, more than 2 years had elapsed. The right to have such lien
cancelled had become functus officio.
Margarita Jose died and Palanca was appointed administrator of her estate and Lao and Cunyao became the latter’s
sureties. A partition of the estate of Lao was approved thus the administrator Velasco delivered to the heirs and
legatees the properties of the estate. Later, Palanca was removed as administrator of the estate of Jose and McMicking
replaced him. It was learned that Palanca was indebted to the estate of Jose. To satisfy such claims, the court ordered
Velasco to pay the claims as administrator of the estate of the surety Lao. A claim was thereafter made against Barretto
as surety of Velasco.
7) McMicking v. Sy Conbieng, 21 Phil
211 (1912) Issue is W/N the estate of Baretto is liable.
The Court ruled that it is not. NO. Doroteo Velasco for whom the deceased Barretto was surety would not have been
liable himself had this action been commenced against him so that if the principal is not liable, the surety cannot be.
An administrator who has been duly appointed and has taken possession of the property of his decedent and who upon
proper proceedings and order of court turns over the property to the owners thereof after a partition among them in
accordance with Sec 596 and 597 of the Code of Civil Procedure is approved performs his full duty and is discharged
6
from any liability.The principal Velasco is not liable because the discovery of an unpaid obligation (in this case, the
claim on Velasco as surety for Palanca) after an extrajudicial partition does not destroy the partition applied for by
Velasco. The partition is still binding and valid. It simply furnishes ground for the application by the creditor for the
appointment of an administrator.
Facts: Andres de Guzman Pereira died leaving his legitimate spouse, Victoria and sister, Rita, as his surviving heirs. Rita
instituted a special proceeding for the issuance of letter of administration in her favor pertaining to the estate of Andres
alleging that they were the only surviving heirs, the decedent did not leave a will, there are no creditors of the deceased
and there are only several properties left. Victoria filed an opposition and a motion to dismiss alleging that there exists
no estate of the deceased. The RTC appointed Rita as administratrix.
Issue: a) WON there exists an estate of deceased Andres de Guzman Pereira for purposes of administration. b) WON a
judicial administration proceeding is necessary where there are no debts left by the decedent.
Ruling: a) The resolution of this issue is better left to the probate court before which the administration proceedings
8) Pereira v. Court of Appeals, 174 SCRA are pending.
154 (1939) b) An exception to Section 6 Rule 78 is established in Section 1 of Rule 74, when all the heirs are of lawful age and there
are no debts due from the estate, they may agree in writing to partition the property without instituting the judicial
administration or applying for the appointment of an administrator. While Section 1 allows the heirs to divide the
estate among themselves as they may see fit, or to resort to an ordinary action for partition, the said provision does not
compel them to do so if they have good reasons to take a different course of action. In this case, we see no reason not to
apply this doctrine to the case at bar.
Nicolas Jalandoni died on October 3, 1960. Before the end of that month, on October 27, a special proceeding for the
settlement of his estate was filed before the sala of respondent Judge, petitioner Lucrecia Jerez, his widow, being
9) Jerez v. Nietes, 30 SCRA 905 (1969)
appointed as administratrix. A project of partition and final accounting was submitted on June 14, 1966, resulting in an
order from respondent Judge dated June 15, 1966, approving the same. On June 29, 1966, respondent Lucilo Jalandoni,
7
alleging that he is an acknowledged natural child of the late Nicolas Jalandoni, and respondent Victoria Jalandoni de
Gorriceta, alleging that she is an illegitimate daughter, sought to be allowed to intervene on the ground that they were
preterited in the project of partition which they would have respondent Judge reject for being contrary to law. Then
came on July 30, 1966 an order of respondent Judge allowing intervention and reopening the proceedings to
permit the movants, now private respondents, "to present whatever evidence they may have to show their right
to participate in the estate of the deceased." Hence, this petition questioning the order of respondent judge.
W/N the intervention was proper. - SC said that the intervenors must prove their interest to intervene first.
SC ruled that rather than require any party who can allege a grievance that his interest was not recognized in a testate
or intestate proceeding to file a separate and independent action, he may within the reglementary period secure the
relief that is his due by a reopening of the case even after a project of partition and final accounting had been approved.
Such a view finds support in the doctrine of liberality as to pleas for intervention so consistently followed and adhered
to by this Court.
However, the respondent judge acted too soon. The SC said that the verified motion on the part of private respondents
did not suffice to call into play the power of respondent Judge to allow intervention. There must be proof beyond
allegations in such motion to show the interest of the private movants. Thus, the lower court was directed to
require private respondents Lucilo Jalandoni and Victoria Jalandoni de Gorriceta to present evidence to justify their
right to intervene.
RULE 76
Facts: The heirs intestate of the late Benedicta de los Reyes have petitioned for a review of the decision of the Court of
Appeals (in CA-G. R. No. 31221-R) affirming that of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, in Special Proceeding No. 831
of said Court, admitting to probate the alleged last will and testament of the deceased, and overruling the opposition to
the probate. Ismaela Dimagiba submitted to the CFI a petition for the probate of the purported will of the late Benedicta
de los Reyes, executed on October 22, 1930. The will instituted the Dimagiba as the sole heir of the estate of the
1) Fernandez v. Dimagiba, 21 SCRA 428 deceased. The petition was set for hearing, and in due time, claimants to be heirs of the deceased filed their oppositions
(1967) to the probate asked. Grounds advanced for the opposition were forgery, vices of consent of the testatrix, estoppel by
laches of the proponent and revocation of the will by two deeds of conveyance of the major portion of the estate made
by the testatrix in favor of the proponent in 1943 and 1944, but which conveyances were finally set aside by this
Supreme Court. CFI found that the will was genuine and properly executed; but deferred resolution on the questions of
estoppel and revocation "until such time when we shall pass upon the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will or
when the question of adjudication of the properties is opportunely presented." Afterwards, CFI appointed Ricardo Cruz
8
as administrator for the sole purpose of submitting an inventory of the estate. Subsequently, it resolved against the
oppositors and held the will of the late Benedicta de los Reyes "unaffected and unrevoked by the deeds of sale."
Whereupon, the oppositors elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. The CA admitted the will to probate, had become
final for lack of opportune appeal; that the same was appealable independently of the issue of implied revocation; that
contrary to the claim of oppositors- appellants, there had been no legal revocation by the execution of the 1943 and
1944 deeds of sale, because the latter had been made in favor of the legatee herself, and affirmed the decision of the CFI.
Issue:
1. Whether the decree of the CFI allowing the will to probate had become final for lack of appeal
2. Whether the order of the Court of origin overruling the estoppel invoked by oppositors-appellants had likewise
become final
Held: A probate decree finally and definitively settles all questions concerning capacity of the testator and the proper
execution and witnessing of his last will and testament, irrespective of whether its provisions are valid and enforceable
or otherwise. As such, the probate order is final and appealable. Estoppel cannot be raised in probate proceedings. The
presentation and probate of a will are requirements of public policy, being primarily designed to protect the testator's,
expressed wishes, which are entitled to respect as a consequence of the decedent's ownership and right of disposition
within legal limits. It would be a non sequitur to allow public policy to be evaded on the pretext of estoppel. Whether
the order overruling the allegation of estoppel is still appealable or not, the defense is patently unmeritorious.
[May 28, 1931] Petitioner Antilano Mercado filed a petition for the probate of the will of his deceased wife, Ines Basa,
with the Pampanga CFI.
[June 31, 1931] The will was admitted to probate.
[October 27, 1932] Intervenor Rosario Basa de Leon filed with the justice of the peace court of San Fernando,
Pampanga, a complaint against Mercado for falsification/forgery of the will probated. Mercado was arrested. The
complaint was subsequently dismissed at the instance of de Leon herself.
[March 2, 1933] Same intervenor charged Mercado with the same offense, this time in the justice of the peace court of
2) Mercado v. Santos, 66 SCRA 215 Mexico, Pampanga. Mercado was arrested again. The complaint was likewise dismissed, again at de Leon’s instance.
(1938) [February 2, 1934] Same as March 2, 1933. Upon due investigation, the case was dismissed on the ground that the will
alleged to have been falsified has already been probated and that there was no evidence that Mercado had forged the
signature of the testatrix but that, on the contrary, satisfactory evidence was presented that established the authenticity
of said signature.
[April 11, 1934] Rosario Basa de Leon and other intervenors moved ex parte to reopen the probate proceedings,
alleging lack of jurisdiction to probate the will and to close the proceedings. This motion was denied, having been filed
ex parte.
[May 9, 1934] The provincial fiscal moved for reinvestigation of the criminal case for forgery before the Pampanga CFI.
9
The motion was granted, and for the fourth time, Mercado was arrested. The reinvestigation dragged on for almost a
year.
[May 24, 1934] A second motion to reopen and close probate proceedings was filed, this time with notice to the adverse
party. Same was denied.
[February 18, 1935] … until the CFI ordered the forgery case to be tried on the merits.
[July 26, 1935] Intervenors’ motion was appealed to the Supreme Court, which affirmed the probate court’s order of
denial.
[c. 1936~37] Mercado moved to dismiss the case, claiming again that the will alleged to have been forged had already
been probated and, further, that the order probating the will is conclusive as to the authenticity and due execution
thereof. The CFI overruled the motion. Mercado thus filed a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction with the
Court of Appeals, which promptly denied same.
HENCE, THIS PETITION.
ISSUE: WON the probate of Ines Basa’s will is a bar to Mercado’s criminal prosecution for the alleged forgery of said
will.
RULING:
Applicable law: Code of Civil Procedure (then governing the law on wills)
Sec. 306 provides, as re: the effect of judgments: in case of a judgment/order in respect to the probate of a will, such
judgment/order is conclusive upon the the will.
Sec. 333 establishes an incontrovertible presumption in favor of judgments declared by the Code to be conclusive.
Sec. 625 provides, as re: conclusiveness of the due execution of a probate will: “… the allowance by the court of a will of
real and personal estate shall be conclusive as to its due execution.”
Basis for PH law on wills (particularly Sec. 625 of the Code of Civil Procedure) — Statutes of [the US state of] Vermont.
Decisions of the Supreme Court of Vermont re: effect of probate of a will are of persuasive authority in PH.
Says the Vermont SC in Missionary Society vs. Eells: “The probate of a will by the probate court having jurisdiction
thereof, upon the due notice, is conclusive as to its due execution against the whole world.”
In view of the provisions of Secs. 306, 333 and 625 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a criminal action will not lie against
the forger of a will which had been duly admitted to probate by a court of competent jurisdiction.
Disposition: Mercado is entitled to have the criminal proceedings against him quashed; CA judgment is reversed,
without pronouncement as to costs.
Facts: On July 5, 1960, Mariano Sumilang filed for the probate of the alleged will of Hilarion Ramagosa, who died on
3) Sumilang v. Ramagosa, 21 SCRA 1369 December 26, 1949 in the Court of First Instance of Quezon. The said will was written in Tagalog, dated February 26,
(1967) 1949 and institutes Sumilang as his sole heir. The petition was then opposed by 2 sets of opposItors, first were
Saturnina and Santigo Ramagosa who questioned the due execution of the will contending that it was procured with
10
under duress and was not intended to be the Last Will and Testament of the testator and likewise claimed that they
were entitled to inherit the estate of the deceased instead of Similang. The other set of oppositors prayed for the
disallowance of the will. During the hearings, oppositors moved for the dismissal of the petition for probate of the will
on the ground that the court lacks jurisdiction over the subject-matter alleging that the will was impliedly revoked by
the testator himself when he sold the parcel subject in the will to the petitioner Mariano Sumilang and his brother
Mario six years before his death. Petitioner then filed opposition to the motion for dismissal stating that: a.) that
oppositors have no legal standing in court and they are bereft of personality to oppose the probate of the last will and
testament of the testators; and b.) that oppositors have no valid claim and interest in the distribution of (the) estate of
the aforesaid testator and no existing valid right whatsoever.
Issue: Whether or not the probate of the will Hilarion Ramagosa be denied.
Ruling: NO, the petition for probate goes to the extrinsic validity of the will which is a compliance with the formal
requisites or solemnities required by law. The alleged sale of the property goes to the intrinsic validity of the will and is
not a ground for the dismissal of the petition for probate.
Leodegaria Julian, in her will, partitioned her paraphernal as well as all the conjugal properties as if they were all owned
by her, disposing of her husband's one- half share.
Felix Balanay, Jr. filed a petition for the approval of his mother's will which was opposed by the husband and some of
her children. During the pendency of the probate proceedings, Balanay submitted to the court a document showing his
father's conformity to the testamentary distribution, renouncing his hereditary rights in favor of his children in
deference to the memory of his wife.
The probate court denied the opposition, set for hearing the probate of the will and gave effect to the affidavit and
conformity of the surviving spouse.
Meanwhile, a certain Atty. David Montaña, Sr. allegedly, in behalf of the Balanay, moved to dismiss the probate
4) Balanay v. Martinez, 64 SCRA 452 proceedings and requested authority to proceed by intestate proceedings on the ground that the will was void, which
(1975) motion was granted by the probate court.
The CFI of Davao dated February 28, 1974, declaring illegal and void the will of Leodegaria Julian, converting the testate
proceeding into an intestate proceeding and ordering the issuance of the corresponding notice to creditors.
ISSUE: Whether the probate court can pass upon the intrinsic validity of the will, before ruling on its allowance or
formal validity, and in declaring it void. - YES
The SC held that the trial court acted correctly in passing upon the will's intrinsic validity even before its formal validity
had been established. The probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically
void. Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is
probated, the court should meet the issue.
11
VALID WILL [not SPECPRO-related but jic sir asks]

But the probate court erred in declaring in its order of February 28, 1974 that the will was void and in converting the
testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding notwithstanding the fact that in its order of June 18, 1973 it gave effect
to the surviving husband's conformity to the will and to his renunciation of his hereditary rights which presumably
included his one-half share of the conjugal estate.
The statement of the testatrix that she owned the "southern half" of the conjugal lands is contrary to law because,
although she was a co-owner thereof, her share was inchoate and proindiviso. But that illegal declaration does not
nullify the entire will. It may be disregarded.
Subject to the foregoing observations and the rules on collation, the will is intrinsically valid and the partition therein
may be given effect if it does not prejudice the creditors and impair the legitimes. In the instant case there is no doubt
that the testatrix and her husband intended to partition the conjugal estate in the manner set forth in paragraph V of
her will. It is true that she could dispose of by will only her half of the conjugal estate but since the husband, after the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership, had assented to her testamentary partition of the conjugal estate, such
partition has become valid, assuming that the will may be probated.
The instant case is different from the Nuguid case, supra, where the testatrix instituted as heir her sister and preterited
her parents. Her will was intrinsically void because it preterited her compulsory heirs in the direct line. In the instant
case, the preterited heir was the surviving spouse. His preterition did not produce intestacy. Moreover, he signified his
conformity to his wife's will and renounced his hereditary rights. "The very existence of a purported testament is in
itself prima facie proof that the supposed testator has willed that his estate should be distributed in the manner therein
provided, and it is incumbent upon the state that, if legally tenable, such desire be given effect independent of the
attitude of the parties affected thereby" Testacy is favored. Doubts are resolved in favor of testacy especially where the
will evinces an intention on the part of the testator to dispose of practically his whole estate. So compelling is the
principle that intestacy should be avoided and that the wishes of the testator should prevail that sometimes the
language of the will can be varied for the purpose of giving it effect.
DOCTRINE:
The probate court may pass upon the intrinsic validity of the will in extreme cases where the provisions of the will are
of dubious legality and when the probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be
intrinsically void.
Facts: The illegitimate child (Quemada) of Pastor Sr. (deceased) initiated a probate proceeding of a holographic will
5) Pastor Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 122 stating that the deceased conveys a legacy to Quemada 30% of the 42% of Pastor Sr.’s share from ATLAS (with
SCRA 885 (1983) royalties). Subsequently the probate court in Cebu appointed Quemada as special administrator for the entire estate of
Pastor Sr. As a special admin, Quemada filed a reconveyance of all properties received by the children of the deceased,
Pastor Jr. (Junior) and Sofia Pastor (Sofia), oppositors in this case. The defense of the children of the deceased is that
they are the owners of the properties subject of reconveyance in their own right and not via inheritance. Probate court
12
allowed the probate and SC denied the MR of the siblings. There was a delay in the proceeding with the civil action for
reconveyance when the probate court issued an order of garnishment resolving the question of ownership for the
ATLAS royalties in favor of Quemada. Oppositors filed an MR w/ probate court halting the transfer and, while the MR
was pending for reso, filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for Prelim. Injunction. Both were denied by the probate
court and CA respectively.
Issue: WON the Probate Court resolved with finality the question of ownership and intrinsic validity of the will?
Held: No! The Order sought to be executed by the assailed Order of execution is the Probate Order allegedly resolved
the question of ownership of the disputed mining properties. However, nowhere in the dispositive portion is there a
declaration of ownership of specific properties. On the contrary, it is manifested therein that ownership was not
resolved. For it confined itself to the question of extrinsic validity of the will, and the need for and propriety of
appointing a special administrator. Thus it allowed and approved the holographic will “with respect to its extrinsic
validity, the same having been duly authenticated pursuant to the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law.” It
declared that the intestate estate administration aspect must proceed subject to the outcome of the suit for
reconveyance of ownership and possession of real and personal properties.
Facts: Chiu Guimco, the executor of the estate of his brother Joaquin Cruz, drew up a petition for probate of the latter’s
will. He also entered into agreements with the testator’s wives regarding the distribution of the estate. Chiu Guimco
however never filed the petition in court nor did he take further action to distribute the testator’s estate. When asked to
produce the will for proper institution of proceedings, he insisted that the will was never in his possession. Thus a
6) US v. Chiu Guimco, 36 Phil 917 complaint under Section 628 of the Code of Civil Procedure was filed against him for failure to produce the will within
the time prescribed by law. The CFI of Misamis found Chiu Guimco guilty and ordered his imprisonment until he
(1917)
produces the will.
Issue: WON CFI Manila had authority to order Chiu Guimco’s imprisonment. NO
Held: The penalty of imprisonment under Section 628 of the Code of Civil Procedure is only applicable when the court
is acting in the exercise of its jurisdiction over probate proceedings. Since this case is merely an ordinary criminal
prosecution, a petition for probate needs to be filed first before Section 628 can apply.
Fr. Celestino Rodriguez was born in Parañaque, Rizal. He died in Manila on February 12, 1963. He was Parish priest of
the Catholic Church of Hagonoy, Bulacan, from the year 1930 up to the time of his death. He was buried in Parañaque,
and left real properties in Rizal, Cavite, Quezon City and Bulacan.
7) Rodriguez v. Borja, 17 SCRA 418
(1966) On March 4, 1963, Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan delivered to the Clerk of Court of Bulacan a purported last
will and testament of Fr. Rodriguez. Maria Rodriguez and Angela Rodriguez (the Rodriguezes), through counsel filed a
petition for leave of court to allow them to examine the alleged will.
13
On March 12, 1963, the Rodriguezes filed before the CFI of Rizal a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of
Fr. Rodriguez and praying that Maria Rodriguez be appointed as Special Administratrix of the estate.
On the same day (March 12, 7963), Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan filed a petition in CFI Bulacan for the
probation of the will, delivered to the court on March 4.
The Rodriguezes moved to dismiss the petition for probate, on the ground that since the intestate proceedings in the
CFI of Rizal was filed at 8:00 A.M. while the petition for probate was filed in the CFI of Bulacan at 11:00 A.M. on the
same date, the CFI Bulacan has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for probate.
The CFI denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that a difference of a few hours did not entitle one proceeding to
preference over the other. As early as March 7, the Rodriguezes were aware of the existence of the purported will of
Father Rodriguez, deposited in the Court of Bulacan, since they filed a petition to examine the same, and that movants
clearly filed the intestate proceedings in Rizal "for no other purpose than to prevent this Court (of Bulacan) from
exercising jurisdiction over the probate proceedings".
ISSUE #1: WHICH COURT HAS JURISDICTION - CFI BULACAN
The jurisdiction of the CFI Bulacan became vested upon the delivery thereto of the will of the late Father Rodriguez on
March 4, 1963, even if no petition for its allowance was filed until later, because upon the will being deposited the court
could, motu proprio, have taken steps to fix the time and place for proving the will, and issued the corresponding
notices conformably to what is prescribed by section 3, Rule 76, of the Revised Rules of Court (Section 3, Rule 77, of the
old Rules).
The use of the disjunctive in the words "when a will is delivered to OR a petition for the allowance of a will is filed" in
Section 3, Rule 76, plainly indicates that the court may act upon the mere deposit therein of a decedent's testament,
even if no petition for its allowance is as yet filed. Where the petition for probate is made after the deposit of the will,
the petition is deemed to relate back to the time when the will was delivered. Since the testament of Fr. Rodriguez was
submitted and delivered to the CFI Bulacan on March 4, while petitioners initiated intestate proceedings in the CFI Rizal
only on March 12, eight days later, the precedence and exclusive jurisdiction of the Bulacan court is incontestable.
W/N SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION - NO

The Rodriguezes argued that CFI Bulacan did not have jurisdiction because the decedent was domiciled in Rizal
province. But the Court said that Fr. Rodriguez's 33 years of residence as parish priest in Hagonoy, Bulacan
(1930-1963) can not disregard. Also, the domicile of the testator only affects the venue but not the jurisdiction of the
Court
14
The estate proceedings having been initiated in CFI Bulacan ahead of any other, that court is entitled to assume
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts, even if it were a case of wrong venue by express provisions of Rule 73
(old Rule 75) of the Rules of Court.
There are two other reasons that militate against the success of the Roseiguezes. One is that their commencing intestate
proceedings in Rizal, after they learned of the delivery of the decedent's will to the Court of Bulacan, was in bad faith,
patently done with a view to divesting the latter court of the precedence awarded it by the Rules. Certainly the order of
priority established in Rule 73 (old Rule 75) was not designed to convert the settlement of decedent's estates into a
race between applicants, with the administration of the properties as the price for the fleetest.
The other reason is that, in our system of civil law, intestate succession is only subsidiary or subordinate to the testate,
since intestacy only takes place in the absence of a valid operative will, as provided in Article 960 of the Civil Code.
Therefore, as ruled in Castro, et al. vs. Martinez, 10 Phil. 307, "only after final decision as to the nullity of testate
succession could an intestate succession be instituted in the form of pre-established action". The institution of intestacy
proceedings in Rizal may not thus proceed while the probate of the purported will of Father Rodriguez is pending.
We rule that the Bulacan Court of First Instance was entitled to priority in the settlement of the estate in question, and
that in refusing to dismiss the probate. proceedings, said court did not commit any abuse of discretion. It is the
proceedings in the Rizal Court that should be discontinued.
Mortera executed a will in Spanish which was attested by three witnesses and acknowledged before a notary. In the
said will, she said she has neither descendants nor ascendants. She gave P20k, as legacy, to Dr. Rene Teotico who was
the husband of her niece. After her death, Vicente Teotico filed a petition for probate of the will. Ana de Val Chan
opposed the allowance of the will on the ff grounds: a) not in accordance with law and duress; and b) Dr Rene’s legacy is
void since he took care of the decedent during her last illment. She further claimed that she is the acknowledged
8) Teotico v. Del Val, 13 SCRA 406 natural child of the decedent’s deceased brother and an adopted child of the decedent’s deceased sister. (In short, she is
an illegitimate daughter of her father and after the latter’s death, she was adopted by the sister of the decedent and her
(1965)
father) The Trial court allowed her intervention and subsequently ordered the allowance of the will but declared the
legacy of Dr. Rene void and the portion of which shall go to intestate succession. Both filed for motion for
reconsideration but to no avail. Hence, this petition.
1. W/N the intervention of Del Val is proper- No. A person is allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding if he/she
15
has an interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be affected by it either as executor or as a
claimant of the estate. Interested party is defined as one who would be benefitted by the estate such as an heir
or one who has a claim against the estate like a creditor. Here, the will did not give anything to Del Val. She is
not a creditor. As an illegitimate child of her father she can’t inherit from the latter’s legitimate relative. As an
adopted child of the decedent’s sister, her relationship is solely limited to the adopter.
2. W/N the allowance of the will proper- Yes. The three witnesses testified as to the due execution of the will.
Allegation of duress must be supported by substantial evidence and must be of a kind that would overpower
and subjugate the mind of the testatrix. Here, the allegation that the decedent resided in the house of Dr. Rene
was not sufficient to show duress.
3. W/N the probate court could determine the intrinsic validity of the provisions of a will- No Opposition to the
intrinsic validity or legality of the provisions of the will cannot be entertained in probate proceeding
because its only purpose is merely to determine if the will has been executed in accordance with law.
(no exception was mentioned in this case) Dr. Rene was not even given an opportunity to defend the validity
of the legacy for he was not allowed to intervene in the proceeding.
This case involved two combined cases of guardianship and an intestate estate proceeding.
Guardianship proceeding: Hermogenes Fernando was appointed the guardian of Rufino Crisostomo and his 4 minor
children. In this case, Hermogenes was appointed guardian of Rufino and his 4 minor children. When Rufino died, the
children were left under the guardianship of Hermogenes. He then filed for the approval of an extrajudicial settlement
of the estate of the deceased parents of the minors which was denied by the court ruling that the guardian of the
children is not the administrator of the estate until and after the said estate has been acquired by the minors by proper
proceedings.
On the intestate estate proceeding of the sps. Crisostomo: German Crisostomo filed a petition as next on kin for the
9) Fernando v. Crisostomo, 90 SCRA opening of intestate proceedings of the estate of the deceased and the appointment of himself and Pacita Fernando as
585 (1951) co-administrators which was granted by the court.
ISSUE #1:
1. Whether the court’s appointment of Crisostomo and Fernando as co-administrators is valid.
YES, no evidence is presented why the brother and sister of the deceased, as nearest of kin, should not be appointed
co-administrators of the Intestate Estate of said decedent either on account of their incompetency or lack of moral
qualifications.
ISSUE #2:
2. What must a petition for allowance or probate of a will show?
A petition for the allowance or probate of a will must show, so far as known to the petitioner, the following:
16
1) the fact of the death of the testator, indicating the time and place of such death;
2) the fact that the deceased left a will and attaching a copy of said will;
3) the fact that the will was executed according to law;
4) whether the person named as executor consents to act as such, or renounces his right to become an executor;
5) the names, ages, and residences of the heirs, legatees and devisees of the decedent;
6) the probable value and character of the property of the estate
7) the name of the person whose appointment as executor is prayed for; and
8) if the will has not been delivered to the court, the name of the person having custody thereof (Salazar vs. CFI)
It is essential to the jurisdiction of a court to entertain probate proceedings that the testator be dead, although it is
enough if there be proof sufficient to satisfy a statutory presumption of death by absence.
Rosario Darwin Araujo inherited from her mother a hacienda. She married later, but she eventually died without an heir
(only collateral relatives). These relatives sought to succeed to the hacienda, which was in the possession of the
defendant (Rosario's mother-in-law). The mother-in-law claims that Rosario executed a will which left all her
properties to Jose, so that when Jose died, all his properties became hers (the mother-in-law's).
W/N Rosario executed a legal and valid will in the form and manner alleged by the defendant—NO.
10) Araujo v. Celis, 6 Phil 459 (1906)
The will was never introduced by the mother-in-law. She also did not offer secondary parol evidence as to its contents.
The loss of the alleged original will has not been sufficiently established. The principal witness of the mother-in-law
further testified that he never saw the original of that will because the same was retained by the notary. This was all the
more important as the witness further testified that the will, a copy of which he saw and had in his possession, was
signed by two witnesses only. A will signed by two witnesses only could not under any circumstances be valid.
Suntay died in China. He first married Manuela Cruz with whom he has now several children living in the Philippines.
He married the second time to Maria Natividad Lim Billiam whom he had a son. Apolio Suntay (oldest son from 1st
marriage) instituted an intestate proceeding in CFI. In the same court, Lim Billian also instituted a probate proceeding
saying that before Suntay died in China, he left her a sealed envelope containing a will and other documents. According
11) Lim Billian v. Suntay, 63 Phil 793 to Go Toh (Atty. Infact of Billian Lim), he showed the envelope to the children in the 1st marriage but they snatched it
and threw it away, then that’s when they filed the intestate proceeding. The children, as an answer, argued that they
(1936)
didn’t have the will and denied having snatched it from Go Toh. Lower Court ruled in favor of Billian Lim saying that the
children were not able to adduce evidence to counter the testimony of Go Toh. The issue is W/N evidence is sufficient
to establish the loss of the will? The SC said YES. The petitioner, through testimonies by witnesses, proved this. She also
presented and attached an open envelope signed by Suntay. It is undeniable that this envelope is the same one that
contained the will executed by the deceased which sufficiently points to the loss of the will. Case is remanded to court of
17
origin.
The judge allowed the probate of the will of Ines Basa. The administrator’s inventory was then duly approved and he was held to be the sole heir of
the testatrix. The petitioners thereafter came
forth and prayed for the reopening of the proceedings on the ground that the
court didn’t have jurisdiction due to noncompliance with publication requirements. In this motion the appellants claim
that the provisions of section 630 of the Code of Civil Procedure have not been complied with in view of the fact that
although the trial judge, on May 29, 1931, ordered the publication of the required notice for "three weeks successively"
previous to the time appointed for the hearing on the will, the first publication was on June 6, 1931, the third on June
20, 1931, and the hearing took place on the 27th of that month, only twenty-one days after the date of the first
publication instead of three full weeks before the day set for the hearing.
12) Basa v. Mercado, 61 Phil 632 (1935) It is held that the language used in section 630 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not mean that the notice, referred to
therein, should be published for three full weeks before the date set for the hearing on the will. In other words the first
publication of the notice need not be made twenty- one days before the day appointed for the hearing. Furthermore no
attempt has been made to prove that it was a newspaper devoted to the interests or published for the entertainment of
a particular class, profession, trade, calling, race or religious denomination. The fact that there is another paper
published in Pampanga that has a few more subscribers (72 to be exact) and that certain Manila dailies also have a
larger circulation in that province is unimportant. The law does not require that publication of the notice, referred to in
the Code of Civil Procedure, should be made in the newspaper with the largest numbers is necessary to constitute a
newspaper of general circulation.
The private respondents in this case filed a case before the RTC for the petition for probate and allowance of the last
will and testament of the late Montserrat R-Infante y G-Pola. The petition specified the names and addresses of the
legatees and devisees. The RTC issued an order setting the petition for hearing. It was published in “Nueva Era” which
is a newspaper of general circulation, once a week for 3 consecutive weeks. No oppositor appeared and the hearing
pushed through. The petitioners, who are legatees and devisees, filed an MR because no notices were sent to
them as required by the ROC. The probate court, however, denied their MR. The CA also dismissed their petition for
13) De Aranz v. Galing, 161 SCRA 628 certiorari.
(1988)
W/N personal notice of probate proceedings is mandatory under the rules of court - YES
It is clear from rule 74 Section 4 that notice of the time and place of hearing for the allowance of a will shall be
forwarded to the designated or other known heirs, legatees and devisees residing in the Philippines at their
places of residence, IF SUCH PLACES OF RESIDENCE BE KNOWN. In this case, there is no question that the
residences of herein petitioners legatees and devisees were known to the probate court. But despite such knowledge,
18
the probate court did not cause copies of the notice to be sent to petitioners. The requirement of the law for the
allowance of the will was not satisfied by mere publication of the notice of hearing for three (3) weeks in a newspaper
of general circulation in the province.
Emil Johnson is a native of Sweden and a naturalized citizen of the United States. He died in Manila and left an
estate worth P231,800. He left a holographic will being written in his own handwriting and is signed by himself and
two witnesses only, instead of three, as required by Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This will, therefore,
was not executed in conformity with the provisions of law generally applicable to wills in the Philippines, and hence,
could not have been proved under the rules. A petition was then filed in the CFI of Manila for the probate of this
holographic will. This is on the ground that 1.) Johnson was, at the time of his death, a citizen of the State of Illinois, US;
and 2.) hence, his will could be properly probated under Section 636 of the Code of Civil Procedure (despite the
incomplete requirements).
A hearing was set and a publication was made for three weeks in the Manila Daily Bulletin. The petitioner seeks to avoid
the probate of the will of her father and said that, at the time the court made the order of publication, it was apprised of
the fact that the petitioner lived in the United States and that as daughter and heir she was necessarily interested in the
probate of the will. It is, therefore, insisted that the court should have appointed a date for the probate of the will
sufficiently far in the future to permit the petitioner to be present either in person or by representation; and it is said
that the failure of the court thus to postpone the probate of the will constitutes an infringement of that provision of the
14) In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil 156 Philippine Bill which declares that property shall not be taken without due process of law.
(1918)
W/N there was sufficient publication to give the court jurisdiction to entertain the proceeding and to allow the will to be
probated - YES
The law provides that the petitioner had six months to show that she had been precluded from appearing in the probate
proceedings. While indeed this is a short time to expect the petitioner to appear and be prepared to contest the order,
the remedy still existed. In this case, the court said that there was no deprivation of due process of law. As previously
held, the proceeding as to the probate of a will is essentially one in rem, and in the very nature of things the state is
allowed a wide latitude in determining the character of the constructive notice to be given to the world in a proceeding
where it has absolute possession of the res. It would be an exceptional case where a court would declare a statute void,
as depriving a party of his property without due process of law, the proceeding being strictly in rem, and the res within
the state, upon the ground that the constructive notice prescribed by the statute was unreasonably short.
Thus, where a will is duly probated after publication pursuant to Section 630 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the order
admitting the will is, in the absence of fraud, effective against all persons. The fact that an heir or other interested
party lives so far away as to make it impossible for such party to be present at the date appointed for the
19
probate of the will does not render the order of probate void for lack of due process.
Generoso Abut (son) filed with CFI Misamis Oriental a petition for probate of the will of Cipriano Abut(his father). After
filing, publication and the fact that the CFI had taken jurisdiction, he died. So Gavina Abut (his sister) filed an amended
petition to replace Generoso, but because publication was again required (as a jurisdictional requirement) and that she
did not comply with it, the CFI dismissed the amended petition without prejudice.
Issue: WoN the court erred in dismissing the amended petition filed by the sister – YES, the court held that the refusal to
amend the amended petition is untenable as jurisdiction is already there upon the filing of the original petition and
compliance with Secs. 3 and 4 of Rule 76.
The petition for probate is an in rem proceeding, which meant that the court's jurisdiction extends to all persons
interested in said will or in the settlement of the estate of the deceased (i.e. heirs, devisees, legatees). The fact
15) Abut v. Abut, 45 SCRA 326 (1972) that the amended petition named additional heirs not included in the original petition did not require that notice of
the amended petition be published anew. All that Section 4 of Rule 76 provides is that those heirs be notified of the
hearing for the probate of the will, either by mail or personally. Service of notice on individual HDL is a procedural
matter, not a jurisdictional requisite. So, even if the names of some heirs had been omitted from the petition for
allowance of the will — and therefore were not advised — the decree allowing the will does not ipso facto become
void for want of jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction once acquired continues until termination. However, the admission of the amended petition does not mean
that Gavina Abut's prayer to be appointed administratrix with the will is necessarily meritorious. It simply recognizes
that since the lower court has acquired jurisdiction over the res, such jurisdiction continues until the termination of the
case. The probate of the will and the appointment of the administratrix is a different matter.
Rodelas filed a petition with the CFI for the probate of the holographic will of Ricardo B. Bonilla and the issuance of
letters testamentary in her favor. Since the holographic will was said to be lost, Rodelas only presented a PHOTOCOPY
of the will. This was opposed by appellees Aranza, et al., on 4 grounds:
(1) That Rodelas was estopped from claiming that the deceased left a will by failing to produce the will within twenty
days of the death of the testator as required by Rule 75, section 2 of the Rules of Court;
(2) The alleged copy of the alleged holographic will did not contain a disposition of property after death and was not
16) Rodelas v. Aranza, 119 SCRA 16 intended to take effect after death, and therefore it was not a will;
(1982) (3) The alleged holographic will itself, and not an alleged copy thereof, must be produced, otherwise it would produce
no effect, as held in Gam v. Yap, 104 Phil. 509; and
(4 ) The deceased did not leave any will, holographic or otherwise, executed and attested as required by law.
W/N a holographic will which was lost or cannot be found can be proved by means of a photostatic copy. - YES.
Pursuant to Article 811 of the Civil Code, probate of holographic wills is the allowance of the will by the court after its
20
due execution has been proved. The probate may be uncontested or not. If uncontested, at least one Identifying witness
is required and, if no witness is available, experts may be resorted to. If contested, at least three Identifying witnesses
are required. However, if the holographic will has been lost or destroyed and no other copy is available, the will can not
be probated because the best and only evidence is the handwriting of the testator in said will. It is necessary that there
be a comparison between sample handwritten statements of the testator and the handwritten will. But, a photostatic
copy or xerox copy of the holographic will may be allowed because comparison can be made with the standard
writings of the testator.
Felicidad Yap died of a heart failure, leaving properties in Pulilan, Bulacan, and in Manila. Fausto Gan, her nephew,
initiation proceedings with a petition for the probate of a HOLOGRAPHIC WILL allegedly executed by the deceased.
The will itself was not presented because Felicidad’s husband, Ildefonso, supposedly took it. What was presented were
witness accounts of relatives who knew of her intention to make a will and allegedly saw it as well. According to the
witnesses, Felicidad did not want her husband to know about it, but she had made known to her other relatives that she
made a will.
The trial court refused to probate the holographic will based purely on these testimonies.
W/N a holographic will can be probated solely upon the testimony of witnesses who have allegedly seen it and who declare
O, the will must be presented.
that it was in the handwriting of the testator? N
17) Gan v. Yap, 104 Phil509 (1958)
SC ruled that the execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the bare
testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read such will.
“In the probate of a holographic will” says the New Civil Code, “it shall be necessary that at least one witness who knows
the handwriting and signature of the testator explicitly declare that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of
the testator. If the will is contested, at least three such witnesses shall be required. In the absence of any such witnesses,
(familiar with decedent’s handwriting) and if the court deem it necessary, expert testimony may be resorted to.”
The witnesses need not have seen the execution of the holographic will, but they must be familiar with the decedent’s
handwriting. Obviously, when the will itself is not submitted, these means of opposition, and of assessing the evidence
are not available. And then the only guaranty of authenticity — the testator’s handwriting — has disappeared.
The purpose of this action was to obtain the probation of a last will and testament of Miguel Mamuyac. It appears from
the record that on July 1918, Miguel Mamuyac executed a will. During the probate proceedings on 1922, it was opposed
18) Gago v. Mamuyac, 49 Phil 902 by several people. After hearing all the parties, the petition for the probation of said will was DENIED because Miguel
Mamuyac had executed a new will and testament on April 1919. Another probate proceeding was held to secure the
(1927)
probation of the April 1919 will. However, the same group of people opposed the petition saying that:
1. The said will is only a copy of the second will and testament;
2. That the same had been cancelled and revoked during the lifetime of Miguel Mamuyac; and
21
3. That the said will was not the last will and testament of the deceased Miguel Mamuyac.
After hearing the respective parties, it was again DENIED upon the ground that the same had been cancelled and
revoked in the year 1920. That the will presented is a mere carbon of its original which remained in the possession of
the deceased testator, and a witness saying that he actually saw the will on 1920 be cancelled and revoked. It was also
presented in evidence that the original will could not be found.
Whether the lower court committed an error in not finding from the evidence that the will in question had been
executed with all the formalities required by law. NO.
There is positive proof, not denied, that the will in question had been cancelled in 1920. The law does not require
any evidence of the revocation or the cancellation of a will to be preserved. That fact that such cancellation has taken
place must either remain unproved or be inferred from evidence showing that after due search, the original will
cannot be found. Where the will which cannot be found which is last seen in the possession of the testator,
when last seen, the presumption is, in the absence of competent evidence, that the same was cancelled or
destroyed.
The force of the presumption of cancellation or revocation by the testator, which varying greatly, being weak or strong
according to the circumstances, is never conclusive, but may be overcome by proof that the will was not destroyed by
the testator with intent to revoke it. In view of the fact that the original will could not be found and in view of the
positive proof that the same had been cancelled, we are forced to the conclusion that the conclusions of the lower court
are correct! Having proved its execution by the proponents, the burden is on the contestant to show that it had been
revoked, which the plaintiffs failed to show.
Deceased, a widow and a resident of the municipality of Sibonga, Province of Cebu, died on May 4, 1924, in the
municipality of San Juan del Monte, the petition for the probate of the will was presented to the Court of First Instance
of Cebu on May 22, 1924, and was by order of the court set down for hearing on June 21, 1924. After due publication of
the order Canuto, Teodora, Feliciano and Raymundo Salutillo and Valeria Llanos appeared as opponents Petitioner
presented a motion asking the court to authorize the taking of the depositions of the witnesses to the will on the ground
19) Aldanese v. Salutillo, 47 Phil 548 that being residents of the City of Manila said witnesses were unable to appear personally before the Court of First
(1925) Instance of Cebu revoked the order in question on the ground that it had not been sufficiently shown that it was
impossible for the witnesses to appear personally before the court and that therefore their depositions would be
inadmissible in evidence. The petition for probate was finally heard on August 22, 1924. The deposition were duly
presented but were ruled out by the court on the ground stated in its order of July 11th and there being no other
sufficient evidence of the execution of the will, the petition was denied and this appeal brought.
22
ISSUE
Whether or not the Court erred in holding that the depositions in question were inadmissible in evidence in the probate
proceedings.
RULING
Yes. It is true that the rule prevailing in this jurisdiction is that when a will is contested the attesting witnesses must be
called to prove the will or a showing must be made that they cannot be had, but that does not necessarily mean that
they must be brought bodily before the court. It is their testimony which is needed and not their actual personal
presence in the court room
In the present case, the will was presented for probate in Cebu; the attesting witnesses were living in Manila and were
beyond the process of the court for compulsory attendance. They were called to testify and produced before an officer
legally authorized to take their testimony in the form of depositions. The notice required by section 361, supra, was
duly given and the opponents given the opportunity to be present and to cross-examine the witnesses. In the
circumstances, this must certainly be considered a sufficient "calling" of the witnesses and satisfies the law
Dorotea Cabang, wanted a probate of her dead husband’s will, Celestino Delfinado. Martin Delfinado filed an opposition
to the allowance of the will of his father, Celestino Delfinado. He alleged that the will was not signed by his father nor
by any other person in his presence and by his express direction. The wife of the decedent only presented one of the
subscribing witnesses of the will. No reason was given why the wife couldn’t present the other two subscribing
witnesses of her husband’s will despite these witnesses being alive and within the control of the process of the court.
One was living in Manila while the other in Nueva Ecija.
20) Cabang v. Delfinado, 34 Phil 291 The wife testified that her husband couldn’t read or write which was why his signature was just a “cross” and that his
name was written by another person. The son of the decedent contested and presented evidence entitled “Exhibit A”
(1916)
showing that his dad did actually know how to write and sign his name, so his dad’s “cross” signature on the will is
questionable, so the will should not be admitted.
Issue: W/N Will should be admitted to probate without having 2 of the subscribing witnesses called, despite them living
within the court’s jurisdiction. NO.
If no person appears to contest the allowance of the will at the times appointed, the court may grant allowance of the
will on the testimony of one of the subscribing witnesses only. The will may also be allowed if none of the subscribing
23
witnesses reside in the Philippines when testator died. The problem in this case is that the will was CONTESTED by the
testator’s son, so all the subscribing witnesses required by law for valid execution of the will must be called and
examined on probate. The only exceptions to this rule is 1. Dead witnesses, 2. Witnesses insane or 3. Witnesses beyond
court jurisdiction. In this case, because the other two witnesses to the will were not presented despite these witnesses
being alive and within the control of the process of the court, the will would be denied probate since it was contested.
Eutiquia Avera instituted proceedings for the probate of the will of Esteban Garcia. The proponent of the will
introduced one of the three attesting witnesses. This was contested by Marino Garcia and Juan Rodriguez. The
opposition introduced a single witness whose testified that at the time the will was made, the testator was so
debilitated as to be unable to comprehend what he was doing.
ISSUE: (1) WON a will can be admitted to probate upon the proof of a single attesting witness, without producing or
accounting for the absence of the other two (2) WON the will is rendered invalid by reason of the fact that the signature
of the testator and of the three attesting witnesses are written on the right margin of each page of the will instead of the
left margin NO
21) Avera v. Garcia, 42 Phil 145 (1921) RULING: (1) When the petition for probate of a will is contested, the proponent should introduce all three of the
attesting witnesses, if alive and within the reach of the process of the court; and the execution of the will cannot be
considered sufficiently proved by the testimony of only one, without the satisfactory explanation of the failure to
produce the other two. Nevertheless, an objection to the probate of the will on such ground cannot be made for the first
time on appeal. (2) The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith
and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guarantee their truth and authenticity. Therefore the
laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. But any interpretation, that
adds nothing but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustrative of the testator's last will, must
be disregarded. In this case, where ingenuity could not suggest any possible prejudice to any person, such deviation
must be considered too trivial to invalidate the instrument.
Esteban Javellana, Jr.’s mother Salustia died leaving all her property, to him. Esteban Jr, died without descendants,
ascendants, brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces. His only surviving relatives are: (1) his maternal aunt, petitioner
22) Solivio v. Court of Appeals, 182 Celedonia Solivio, the half-sister of his mother, Salustia Solivio; and (2) the private respondent, Concordia
Javellana-Villanueva, sister of his deceased father, Esteban Javellana, Sr.
SCRA 119 (1990)
Concordia and Celedonia had an agreement where the latter would take care of the proceedings. Celedonia, filed for a
Special Proceeding for her appointment as administratrix of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr., praying that she be
24
declared sole heir of the deceased; and that the estate be adjudicated to her.
Concordia filed a civil case in the RTC of Iloilo for partition. Celedonia averred that the estate of Esteban Jr. was subject
to reserva troncal and thus it should redound to her as a relative within the 3rd degree on his mother side.
WON Branch 26 had jurisdiction to entertain the action for partition and recovery of Concordia Villanueva’s share of the
estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. even while the probate proceedings (Special Proc. No. 2540) were still pending in Branch
23 of the same court (NO)
In view of the pendency of the probate proceedings in Branch 11 of the Court of First Instance (now RTC, Branch 23),
Concordia’s motion to set aside the order declaring Celedonia as sole heir of Esteban, and to have herself (Concordia)
declared as co-heir and recover her share of the properties of the deceased, was properly filed by her in Spl. Proc. No.
2540. Her remedy when the court denied her motion, was to elevate the denial to the Court of Appeals for review on
certiorari. However, instead of availing of that remedy, she filed more than one year later, a separate action for the same
purpose in Branch 26 of the court. SC holdd that the separate action was improperly filed for it is the probate court that
has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal distribution of the estate.
WON the property was subject to reserve troncal? (NO)
No. There is no merit in the petitioner’s argument that the estate of the deceased was subject to reservatroncal, and that
it pertains to her as his only relative within the third degree on his mother’s side.
The persons involved in reservatroncal are:
The person obliged to reserve is the reservor (reservista)—the
1. ascendant who inherits by operation of law property from his descendants.
2. The persons for whom the property is reserved are the reservees (reservatarios)—relatives within the third
degree counted from the descendant (propositus), and belonging to the line from which the property came.
3. The propositus—the descendant who received by gratuitous title and died without issue, making his other
ascendant inherit by operation of law. (p. 692, Civil Law by Padilla, Vol. II, 1956 Ed.)
Clearly, the property of the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., is not reservable property, for Esteban, Jr. was not an
ascendant, but the descendant of his mother, Salustia Solivio, from whom he inherited the properties in question.
25
Therefore, he did not hold his inheritance subject to a reservation in favor of his aunt, Celedonia Solivio.
Laureana Hidalgo, surviving spouse of Francisco Villegas, filed with the Court of First Instance an application for letters
of administration who according to the application, died intestate. Justina Mendieta et. al filed a motion in court praying
for the probate of the supposed will. The court ordered the publication in the newspaper of the application for the
probate of the supposed will The proceeding for the probate of a will is a proceeding in rem, and the court acquires
jurisdiction over all the persons interested through the publication of the notice prescribed by section 630 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, and any order that may be entered is binding against all of them.
ISSUE: W/N the court has acquired jurisdiction over all the persons interested and hence these people are bound by the
court’s judgment. YES.
The proceeding for the probate of a will is a proceeding in rem and the court acquires jurisdiction over all the
23) Manalo v. Paredes, supra
persons interested through the publication of the notice prescribed by section 630 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, and any order that may be entered is binding against all of them. The court having tried said
application for probate, hearing all the testimony of the attesting witnesses of the said supposed will, and the court
having approved said stipulation and declared that Francisco Villegas died intestate according to said agreement, all the
parties became bound by said judgment; and if any of them or other persons interested were not satisfied with the
court's decision, they had the remedy of appeal to correct any injustice that might have been committed, and cannot
now through the special remedy of mandamus, obtain a review of the proceeding upon a new application for the
probate of the same will in order to compel the respondent judge to comply with his ministerial duty imposed by
section 330 of the Code of Civil Procedure; because this remedy, being extraordinary, cannot be used in lieu of appeal,
or writ of error.
(1919) When Juan Pons died in Manila, petitioner Riera (widow) was living in Spain and she only knew about the
probate proceedings 6 mo’s later. She filed a case for rehearing the probate claiming she was deprived of the
opportunity to be heard by reasons out of her control. This was denied by CFI since more than 6 mo’s already passed
24) Riera v. Palmaroli, 40 Phil 105 since entry of probate. Issue: W/N rehearing of probate will be allowed on grounds that interested party was prevented
from participating and will did not comply with formalities required by law. Held: NO. SC will not entertain petitioner
(1919)
filed under Sec. 513 (present petition and set aside judgment) of old civil procedure to set aside judgment and obtain
new trial in CFI where the latter can still grant relief under Section 113 (relief from judgment). SC’s jurisdiction depends
on the lack of remedy in CFI. 113 is limited only to granting new trial upon judgments rendered upon default which
arises during contentious litigations (party impleaded as defendant but didn’t appear). PROBATE OF WILL NOT
26
CONTENTIOUS LITIGATION. It’s specpro so sec. 513 not applicable. The decision deprived petitioner of the opportunity
to oppose the will and to apply with CFI for relief under sec. 113.
During the pendency of probate proceedings of the will of decedent, Engracia (sister of decedent) failed to file an
opposition. 1 year after the will was admitted to probate, Engracia filed an MR on the ground that she was not notified
of the proceedings, and alleged that the court erred in admitting the will due to failure to comply with external
25) Manahan v. Manahan, 58 Phil 448 formalities. SC held that for her failure to file an opposition to the petition for probate, Engracia is not an interested
(1933) party and so she did not have the right to be notified of the probate of the will. As to her second argument, SC held that
once a will has been authenticated & admitted to probate, questions on its validity can no longer be raised on appeal.
The decree of probate is conclusive with respect to the due execution thereof and it cannot be impugned on any of the
grounds authorized by law, except fraud, in any separate of independent action or proceeding.
RULE 77
Jose Suntay (a Filipino citizen and resident of RP) died in China, leaving real and personal properties in the Philippines
and a house China. He left 9 children in the first marriage and a child named Silvino in the second marriage with Maria
Natividad who survived him. Intestate proceeding was held in the CFI of Bulacan and Federico (son from the 1st
marriage) was named administrator. Afterwards, the surviving widow filed a petition in the court for the probate of a
last will and testament claimed to have been executed and assigned in the RP in November 1929. Jose also executed a
will in China in January 1931. This petition was denied because of the loss of the RP will and the insufficiency of the
evidence to establish the loss. An appeal was taken and the SC held the evidence before the probate court sufficient to
prove the loss of the will and remanded the case to the CFI of Bulacan for further proceedings. In the meantime, the
Pacific War supervened. After liberation, Silvino filed a petition in the intestate will executed in China in January 1931 .
Whether the China Will may be probated

1) Suntay v. Suntay, 95 Phil 500 (1954)
NO. The China will may be probated if the following requisites are established. The fact that the foreign tribunal is a
probate court. In the absence of proof that the municipal district court of Amoy, China is a probate court and on the
Chinese law of procedure in probate matters, it may be presumed that the proceedings in the manner of probate or
allowing a will in the Chinese courts are the same as those provided in our laws. It is a proceeding in rem and for the
validity of such proceedings, personal notice or by publication, or both to all interested parties must be made. The laws
of a foreign country on procedure and allowance of wills. Where it appears that the proceedings in the court of a foreign
country were held for the purpose of taking the testimony of 2 attesting witnesses to the will and the order for the
probate court did not purport to allow the will, the proceedings cannot be deemed to be for the probate of a will, as it
was not done in accordance with the basic and fundamental concepts and principles followed in the probate and
allowance of wills. Consequently, the will referred to therein cannot be allowed, filed and recorded by a competent
27
court of this country.
Fluemer is the administrator of the estate of His. Respondent is Hix’s ex -wife. Fluemer filed a petition for probate of the
will of Edward Hix, alleging that he resided in West Virginia, and that the laws of that jurisdiction govern. He submitted
an excerpt of the West Virginia Code, certified by the Director of the Nat’l Library. CFI denied probate of the will.
While the appeal was pending submission in this court, the attorney for the Fluemer presented an unverified petition
asking the court to accept as part of the evidence is the document disclosing that a paper writing purporting to be the
last will of the Hix, was presented for probate to the clerk in Virginia, and was proven by the oaths of the subscribing
witnesses. Also another document showed that the Clerk of court appointed an administration. Application for probate
was filed first in the Philippines. CFI denied. WON the will should be allowed for probate? NO. First, the requirements of
2) Fluemer v. Hix, 54 Phil 610 (1930)
the law was not complied with. The laws of a foreign jurisdiction must be proved as facts. There was no showing that
the book from which an extract was taken was printed or published under the authority of the State of West Virginia.
Nor was the extract from the law attested by the certificate of the officer having charge of the original, under the seal of
the State of West Virginia. No evidence was introduced to show that the extract from the laws of West Virginia was in
force at the time the alleged will was executed. Second, the due execution of the will was not established. The only
evidence on this point is to be found in the testimony of the petitioner. Lastly, no attempt has been made to comply with
the Code of Civil Procedure, for no hearing on the question of the allowance of a will said to have been proved and
allowed in West Virginia has been requested.
The partition of the estate left by the deceased Joseph G. Brimo is in question in this case. Andre Brimo, one of the
brothers of the deceased, opposed it. The court, however, approved it. Appellant's opposition is based on the fact that
the partition in question puts into effect the provisions of Joseph G. Brimo's will which are not in accordance with the
laws of his Turkish nationality, for which reason they are void as being in violation or article 10 of the Civil Code (This is
the current Civil Code provision which provides that the law of the nationality of the person shall govern himself, and
the law where the properties are located, will govern it).
Issue: WoN the approval of the opposition was proper?

3) Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil 867 (1924)
YES. In the event that the foreign law was not pleaded and proven, it would be presumed to be the same as that of the
Philippines. Also, another aspect of the will which was questioned was the denial of the appellee of his share as a
legatee. The Court then ruled that the institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the condition is that the
instituted legatees must respect the testator's will to distribute his property, not in accordance with the laws of his
nationality, but in accordance with the laws of the Philippines. If this condition as it is expressed were legal and valid,
any legatee who fails to comply with it, as the herein oppositor who, by his attitude in these proceedings has not
respected the will of the testator, as expressed, is prevented from receiving his legacy. The fact is, however, that the said
28
condition is void, being contrary to law, for article 792 of the civil Code
The Court reminds that under the Civil Code provides that the national law of the testator is the one to govern his
testamentary dispositions.
Butler (the decedent) died in New York City leaving a will. The said will was duly probated by the Court of New York.
The will contained a residuary clause which states that after the payment of the testator’s debts, the remainder of the
estate is bequeathed to Mercedes de Leon. It further states that, “[s]ince [de Leon] is not of sound judgment, and
discretion in the handling of money, it is not my wish that she be given any sums of money other than for her current
needs… In case the amount available for this bequest be sufficient to purchase an adequate annuity, the executors in
their discretion may do so.” In carrying out the letter of the will, Butler’s executor bought an annuity from
Manufacturers Life Insurance Co. in Toronto, Canada. The contract stipulates that de Leon will receive monthly
payments of $57.60 through Manufacturers’ Manila Office.
De Leon had the will probated by the CFI and secured the appointment of Ghezz as administratrix. Upon approval of
appointment, Ghezzi filed a motion praying for the citation of the manager of Manufacturers Manila Office to appear and
render certain funds the said Branch allegedly has in its possession and claimed to belong to the estate. The CFI denied
the said motion and held that these funds came into the possession of the Manufacturers regularly and in due course
and, therefore, sees no justifiable ground to require said company to render an accounting thereon.”
4) Leon & Ghezzi v. Manufacturers Life
Insurance Co., 90 Phil 459 (1951) Issue: Whether the CFI properly denied Ghezzi’s motion. (YES)
The general rule universally recognized is that administration extends only to the assets of a decedent found within the
state or country where it was granted, so that an administrator appointed in one state or country has no power over
property in another state or country. This principle is specifically embodied in Section 4 of Rule 78 of the Rules of Court.
It is manifest from the facts before set out that the funds in question are outside the jurisdiction of the probate court of
Manila. Having been invested in an annuity in Canada under a contract executed in that country, Canada is the situs of
the money. The party whose appearance the appellant seeks is only a branch or agency of the company which holds the
funds in its possession, the agency's intervention being limited to delivering to the annuitant the checks made out and
issued from the home office.
Furthermore, the power of the court to cite a person for the purpose stated in the administratrix's motion is defined in
Section 7 of Rule 88, which provides. The administratrix did not entrust to the branch office the money she wants the
latter to account for, nor did the said money come to the branch office's possession in trust for the administratrix. In
other words, the administratrix is a complete stranger to the subject of the motion and to Manufacturers. There being
29
no creditors, the only subject of the motion is to enable de Leon to get the legacy in a lump sum in complete disregard of
the wishes of the testator, who showed deep concern for her welfare, and of the annuity contract which the annuitant
herself applied for in conjunction with the trustee.
30
Rule 78 - Rule 85 and Rule 87
CASE RECIT READY
RULE 78 – RULE 85 AND RULE 87
In 1901, Teran was appointed administrator of the estate. In 1902, Maria Munoz was appointed guardian of minors; from this date therefore, with respect to
the interests of the minors in the estate, Maria Munoz was in charge of its administration and not Teran. In 1906, the Court revoked the appointment of Maria
Munoz as guardian because she was not a Philippine resident.
1) Guerrero v. Teran The issue is W/N the revocation of Maria Munoz as guardian was proper. (YES)
When this case was promulgated, there was no rule yet that non-residents should not be allowed as administrators or guardians. However, the Court still held
that they should disallow appointments of non-residents as administrators or guardians because the courts will find it difficult to fulfil their duty of protecting
estates of deceased persons and wards of the estate if the administrators and guardians are not personally subject to their jurisdiction.
This is an appeal dated Nov. 11, 1922 from an order of the CFI appointing Jose Garcia as administrator of the estate of deceased Geronima Uy Coque.
The appellant is the surviving spouse of the deceased and maintains that the court erred in not appointing him instead. The court said that even though there
was no appeal from the order of the court below dated Sept. 30, 1922 and the question raised in this appeal is already res judicata, they will still give another
reason for the satisfaction of counsel.
2) Navas v. Garcia Generally, the preferential rights of the surviving spouse to be the administrator cannot be arbitrarily and without sufficient reason be disregarded. However,
when the person enjoying preferential rights is unsuitable, the court may appoint another person. The determination of a person’s suitability rests in the
discretion of the court and will no be interfered with on appeal unless it was clearly wrong.
In this case, it appeared from the record that the appellant had adverse interests in the estate of such character as to render him unsuitable as administrator.
Unsuitableness may consist in adverse interest of some kind or hostility to those immediately interested in the estate. The court below stated the facts which
may constitute grounds for setting aside the preferential rights and which, in the absence of proof to the contrary, must be presumed sufficient.
Monsignor Juan Bautista Gorordo died in Cebu and left a will instituting his sister Maria Jaen as universal heir to his estate. He named Father Emiliano Mercao
as executor and in the absence of the latter, Alejandro Espina. The will of Monsignor was probated without opposition and CIF of Cebu confirmed appointment
of Father Emilio Mercado as executor. The heirs opposed to the appointment of the executor. The heirs claimed that Father Mercado was unfit and
incapacitated to discharge the duties of the executor alleging (1) notwithstanding the opposition, he contracted services of attorneys to represent him in these
proceedings for the sole purpose of repaying the obligations he owed to the attorney (2) He cannot be impartial as the executoe because the church of San
Nicolas of which he is parish priest is one of the legatees named in the will (he would favor the interest of his parish) (3) Since the estate had no debts and the
3) Mercado v. Vda. De heirs instituted in the will are all of age, there is no necessity of making the estate incur unnecessary expenses as the exector’s fees (4) Heirs are better able to
protect their interests of the estate (5) Another attorney is willing to render professional services to the estate for free. They prayed for the suspension of said
Jaen appointment. Lower court denied their motion
WON the lower court erred in overruling the opposition of the heirs of the deceased to the appointment of the executor-- No
When Monsignor chose father Mercado as executor, he must have had a good and sufficient reason, therefore his will must be respected. The evidence shows
that when the deceased bishop made his will naming said priest in preference to anybody else, he was in the full enjoyment of his intellectual faculties. Under
the circumstances, it is not only just but also right to fully comply with his last will; and this is precisely what the lower court did in confirming the
1
appointment of Father Mercado as executor herein. As a matter of fact, section 641 of Act No. 190 provides that when a will has been probed and allowed, the
court is bound to issue letters testamentary thereon to the person named as executor therein provided he accepts the trust and gives the bond as required by
law, which Father Emiliano Mercado certainly did willingly before assuming his trust. While it is true, as the appellants contend, that this provision of the law
should not be strictly interpreted because the court would be deprived of its power not to appoint, in certain cases, one who is unworthy of the trust,
notwithstanding the fact that he was named as such by the testator (sec. 653, Act No. 190); it is also true that in order to do this, the unworthiness, incapacity,
ineptitude and unfitness of such person must be manifest and real and not merely imaginary
Carlos Palanca died leaving a will where he named Petitioner Ramon Ozaeta as executor. Upon Palanca’s death, petitioner presented a petition for the probate
of the will with a prayer that he be appointed special administrator. Some of decedent’s heirs oppose the petition. The court appointed Phil. Trust Company as
special administrator, which later presented a petition to resign as such. The court then appointed Sebastian Palanca. However, it reconsidered its order
appointing Sebastian Palanca as special administrator and appointed BPI instead. It held that it has the discretion to choose the special administrator and is
not bound to appoint the person named in the will as executor because the order had been appealed.
4) Ozaeta v. Pecson and
BPI WON the probate court erred in appointing as special administrator a person other than the executor named in the probated will even if its order of probate is
on appeal – YES
When a will has been admitted to probate, it is the duty of the probate court to issue letters testamentary to the person named as executor in the will upon the
latter's application, even if the order of probate is on appeal.
This is an opposition of Angelica Limcolioc against the appointment of Apolinario de Guzman as her co-administrator in the estate of their father, Proceso. The
SC ruled that the principal consideration in the appointment of the administrator of the estate is the interest of that person in the estate. This is why
preference is given to the widow of a deceased husband as the administrator. HOWEVER, THIS PREFERENCE IS NOT ABSOLUTE if the Court finds that there is
5) De Guzman v. another who has more interest therein than the surviving spouse.
Limcolioc
In this case, Apolinario as Angelica’s brother has the same or in fact, more interest than her. For more, she shall not worry because Apolinario will only serve
as her helper. The fact that Apolinario was sued by their own father while he was living for misappropriating 12k to 15k to buy a fishery, a sedan, and a duck
farm is of no moment because the same case was withdrawn by their father. Lastly, the appointment of the administrator is discretionary on the part of the
Court and in the absence of grave abuse of discretion – the appointment shall not be disturbed.
6) Gonzales v. Aguinaldo In the intestate proceeding involving the estate of the deceased Doña Ramona Gonzales Vda. de Favis, the court a quo appointed petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales
and private respondent Teresa Olbes as co-administratices of the estate.
Doña Ramona is survived by 4 children who are her only heirs, namely, Asterio Beatriz, Teresa, and Cecilia.
Beatriz F. Gonzales went to the US to accompany her ailing husband who was receiving medical treatment. Teresa Olbes filed a motion to remove Beatriz as
co-administratrix, on the ground that she is incapable to discharge the trust and had committed acts and omissions detrimental to the interest of the estate.
Respondent Judge cancelled the letters of administration granted to Beatriz. Beatriz filed an MR. Cecilia Gomez stated that it would be pointless to re-appoint
Beatriz F. Gonzales as co- administratrix. Beatriz contends that her removal was not shown by respondents to be anchored on any of the grounds provided
under Section 2, Rule 82, Rules of Court.
Section 2, Rule 82, Rules The SC ruled in favor of Beatriz Gonzales and reappointed her as a co-administrator.
of Court, which states:
Sec. 2. Court may remove Section 6 of Rule 78 establishes the order of preference in the appointment of administrators for the estate. The underlying assumption behind this rule is that
or accept resignation of those who will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy, economical administration of the estate, or, on the other hand, suffer the consequences of waste,
executor or improvidence or mismanagement, have the highest interest and most influential motive to administer the estate correctly. Administrators have such an
2
administrator. interest in the execution of their trust as to entitle them to protection from removal without just cause. Hence, Section 2 of Rule 82 of the Rules of Court
Proceedings upon death, provides the legal and specific causes authorizing the court to remove an administrator.
resignation or removal —
If an executor or There must be evidence of an act or omission on the part of the administrator not conformable to or in disregard of the rules or the orders of the court, which
administrator neglects to it deems sufficient or substantial to warrant the removal of the administrator.
render his account and For mere disagreements between such joint fiduciaries, without misconduct, one's removal is not favored. Conflicts of opinion and judgment naturally, and,
settle the estate perhaps inevitably, occur between persons with different interests in the same estate.
according to law, or to
perform an order or In this case, the court a quo failed to find hard facts showing that the conflict and disharmony between the two (2) co-administratrices were unjustly caused
judgment of the court, or by petitioner, or that petitioner was guilty of incompetence in the fulfillment of her duties, or prevented the management of the estate according to the
a duty expressly provided dictates of prudence, or any other act or omission showing that her continuance as co-administratrix of the estate materially endangers the interests of the
by these rules, or estate. Respondent Judge removed petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales as co-administratrix of the estate also on the ground that she had been absent from the
absconds, or becomes country. Beatriz explained that her absence from the country was due to the fact that she had to accompany her ailing husband to the United States for
insane, or otherwise medical treatment. However, Beatriz had continually maintained correspondence with each other with respect to the administration of the estate during
incapable or unsuitable the petitioner's absence from the country. As a matter of fact, petitioner, while in the United States, sent respondent Olbes a letter addressed to the Land Bank
to discharge the trust, the of the Philippines duly authenticated by the Philippine Consulate in San Francisco, authorizing her (Olbes) to receive, and collect the interests accruing from
court may remove him, or the Land Bank bonds belonging to the estate, and to use them for the payment of accounts necessary for the operation of the administration.
in its discretion, may The above facts, we note, show that Beatriz had never abandoned her role as co-administratrix of the estate nor had she been remiss in the
permit him to resign. . . . fullfilment of her duties. Suffice it to state, temporary absence in the state does not disqualify one to be an administrator of the estate.
As held in re Mc Knight's Will, a temporary residence outside of the state, maintained for the benefit of the health of the executors' family, is not such a
removal from the state as to necessitate his removal as executor.
The appointment of petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales was valid, and no satisfactory cause for her removal was shown, the court a quo gravely abused its
discretion in removing her. Stated differently, petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales was removed without just cause. Her removal was therefore improper.
Carmen Johannes died intestate in Singapore. Her heirs are the following: her husband (B.E. Johannes), 2 siblings (Frederick and Ida) living in Singapore, and 1
brother (Alfred) who lived in Manila. Her husband was named the administrator of her property in Singapore while her brother Alfred, through his petition,
was named the administrator of her property in Manila by Judge Harvey. The husband says the appointment of an administrator in Manila is unnecessary
because he was already appointed the administrator in Singapore.
WON an administrator in Manila was still necessary. - YES.
It is often necessary to have more than one administration of an estate. When a person dies intestate owning property in the country of his domicile as well as
in a foreign country, administration is had in both countries. That which is granted in the jurisdiction of decedent's last domicile is termed the principal
7) Johannes v. Harvey
administration, while any other administration is termed the ancillary administration. The reason for the latter is because a grant of administration does not
ex proprio vigore have any effect beyond the limits of the country in which it is granted. Hence, an administrator appointed in a foreign state has no authority
in the United States. The ancillary administration is proper, whenever a person dies, leaving in a country other than that of his las domicile, property to be
administered in the nature of assets of the decedent, liable for his individual debts or to be distributed among his heirs. Hence, even though the husband was
declared the administrator of the Singapore property, he had no administration powers over the Manila property since the latter property was located in
another country.
There is still another aspect to the case. This is that pursuant to section 783 of the Code of Civil Procedure, an order of a Court of First Instance appointing an
administration of the estate of a deceased person constitutes a final determination of the rights of the parties thereunder, within the meaning of the statute,
and is appealable
3
Dr. Francisco Varela Calderon was a bachelor, a citizen of the Philippine Islands, and at the time he made his will was residing temporarily in France and that
at the time of his death he left no ascendants. The petitioner in this case is the administrator of the estate of Dr. Calderon. The appellants are brothers and
sisters of full blood of the deceased and have filed an opposition to the project of partition of their deceased brother Calderon, the lower court denied their
intervention. The beneficiaries of Calderon are his illegitimate children. The CFI of Manila issued an order of partition based from the will of Calderon. The
appellants who are siblings of the testator, sought to intervene and oppose the approval of the project of partition since the beneficiaries of the will are his
illegitimate children. The appellants contend that the illegitimate children are not qualified to inherit from the deceased. However, the CFI rejected the
opposition, stating that the siblings have no right to intervene in the consideration of the project of partition as well as the adjudication of the property of Dr.
Calderon. With the opposition being denied, the appellants appealed before the Supreme Court.
8) Gutierrez de Ocampo
WoN the trial court erred in refusing the appellants to intervene - No.
v. Valera Calderon
The beneficiaries under the will of Francisco Varela Calderon, granting that they are illegitimate children, are not incapacitated to take property under the will
of their father. Article 763 of the Civil Code provides that a person who has no forced heirs may dispose by will of all his property or any part of it in favor of
any person qualified to acquire.
The appellants in this case are not forced heirs of the deceased and therefore have no right to any part of the property left by the testator, once he had
disposed of the same by will. If any of them were forced heirs they would be entitled to intervene in this case and protect their interest in so far as they may
have been prejudiced by the will. It is evident therefore that they have not been injured or prejudiced in any manner whatsoever. Only forced heirs whose
rights have been prejudiced have a right to intervene in a case of this character.
This case involves the two wills of Crisostomo. The Court allowed for probate the October 19 will. Her nephews and nieces filed a petition for relief of the
allowance of the said will and alleged: the lower court failed to perform its legal duty to set date for proving the will of August 16 will and the failure to set
aside a date for proving the will of August 16 with the will of October 19 was entirely due to the lower court's fault or negligence. (Medyo magulo ung case so
inayos ko nalang for recit-ready)
Issues:
W/N failure to send personal notice to legal heirs make the order void- NO. This was raised first time in the appeal. Hence, there is the legal presumption that
the probate court promulgated the order in accoradnce with the Rules.
9) Trillana v. Crisostomo
W/N the court erred in not setting a date for the hearing of the allowance of the August 16 will- NO, the court did not err. The August 16 will was expressly
revoked by the October 19 will. The revoked will may be probated and allowed only if the subsequent revoking will is disallowed. (Additional facts: According
to the attorneys for the appellant, the will dated August 16 was sent together with a writing called "Manifestation" by registered mail on October 30, 1948,
from Manila to the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, by Attorney Mr. Tomas V. Barnes, and said will must have been received by the Clerk of Said Court on or
after November 1, 1948, the date when the subsequent will of October 19, was filed for probate.)
W/N the nephers and nieces are interested parties- NO. In civil actions and special proceedings, unless otherwise provided by law, the interest in order that a
person may be a party on appeal must be material and direct, so that he will be materially and directly benefited or injured by the court's order,
4
decree or judgment: and not indirect or contingent Here, the interest claimed by the appellants is purely contingent or dependent upon several uncertain
and future events to (1) The disallowance of the will of October 19, 1948 (2)The allowance of the will of August 16, 1948, and (3) invalidation of certain
legacies left in said will of August 16, 1948. Moreover, in their petition they did not even specify the degree of relationship they had with the testatrix.
Irene Santos died intestate. Her only heirs were her surviving spouse, Jose Villegas, and her two nieces, Rizalina Santos Rivera and Adela Santos Gutierrez. Jose
filed a petition for LOA and was appointed administrator of the estate. In the petition, he named as intestate heirs, besides himself, Rizalina and Adela. During
the proceeding, an unverified manifestation signed by Adela, accompanied by a kasulatan, was presented to the Probate Court, stating that she will no longer
take part in the proceedings and is transferring all her rights, interests, and participation to Rizalina. Adela averred that such manifestation was obtained
through fraud by Villegas, as she thought she was signing for a loan, but was instead signing a Deed of Sale. An opposition was interposed by the
administrator, who alleged that Adela, although originally a party to the probate proceedings, has voluntarily and expressly desisted from being so, and that
having assigned by sale, all her rights, interests and participations in the estate, she has no longer any legal standing in the case.
10) Gutierrez v. Villegas

ISSUE: W/N Adela is still entitled to be furnished with pleadings filed by the administrator in the probate proceedings. Yes.
Although Adela had filed a manifestation dropping herself from the proceedings and presenting therewith the supposed Deed of Assignment, the record,
nevertheless fails to show that action thereon had been taken by the probate Court. Every act intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees
or devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other transaction. No serious argument can
be offered to deny the co-heir-ship of appellee in the estate under probate. It appearing that the transaction is in the nature of extra-judicial partition,
court approval is imperative, and the heirs cannot just divest the court of its jurisdiction over the estate and over their persons, by the mere act of
assignment and desistance.
Pio died intestate. He was survived by his wife Josefina, his siblings, and nephews and nieces. Cipriano, one of Pio's surviving brothers, through a public
instrument, renounced all his hereditary rights in favour of Josefina. Cipriano later filed a petition for intestate proceedings, praying to be the administrator.
Josefina opposed this since Cipriano was not an interested person (any more). Cipriano countered by saying that Josefina wasn't even Pio's real wife. Another
brother, Miguel, also asked to be co-petitioner of Cipriano. The CFI held that Cipriano was no longer an interested party.
W/N Cipriano and Miguel are interested persons—NO.

11) Duran v. Duran
The brothers argue that an assignment by one heir of his share in the estate to a co-heir amounts to a partition needing approval by the settlement court to be
effective; and that the assigning heir does not lose his status as a person interested in the estate, even after said assignment is approved by the court. But the
case relied upon the brothers cannot apply to them. The assignment in the Santos case took place when no settlement proceeding was pending. The properties
subject matter of the assignment were not under the jurisdiction of a settlement court. Cipriano’s assignment is deemed valid and effective against him, so that
he is left without that “interest” in the estate required to petition for settlement proceedings.
Respondent Elaine de Guzman (surviving spouse) filed a petition for settlement of estate of deceased Monolito de Guzman before the RTC Makati. She filed a
motion for writ of possession on 5 vehicles registered under the name of the decedent alleging that it is conjugal property but in the possession of petitioner
12) De Guzman v. Angeles
Pedro de Guzman (father of deceased). She also filed a motion to appoint herself as special administratrix and this was granted by the court. Pedro resisted
when the Deputy Sheriffs tried to take the vehicles saying that they were his personal properties. Pedro also argued that the appointment of special
5
administratrix constitutes abuse of discretion for having been made without giving him and other parties an opportunity to oppose appointment. The issue is
whether or not probate court may appoint special administratrix and issue writ of possession even before notice is served to all interested parties? The SC
said NO. RTC Makati acquired jurisdiction over the proceedings upon filing of petition for settlement of estate but not over the persons who are interested in
the settlement of estate. Rule 79, Sec. 3 provides that the court should set time for hearing and notice. Thus, where there is no notice to persons believed to
have an interest in the estate, the proceeding is considered void and should be annulled because notice through publication is jurisdictional.
The court defined a Special Administrator: representative of the decedent appointed by the probate court to care for and preserve his estate until an executor
or general administrator is appointed.
Virginia G. Fule (illegitimate sister) filed with the CFI of Laguna a petition for letters of administration alleging “that on April 26, 1973, Amado G. Garcia, a
property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the City of Manila, leaving real estate and personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in other places,
within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court.” At the same time, she moved ex parte for her appointment as special administratix over the estate. Judge
Malvar granted the motion. A motion for reconsideration was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia, the surviving spouse of the deceased, contending that 1) The
decedent “resided” in QC for 3 months before his death as shown by his death certificate and therefore have an improper venue.2) The CFI of Calamba lacks
jurisdiction over the petition. CFI denied the motion, but CA reversed and affirmed making Preciosa the special administratix of the estate.
Whether CFI Quezon City erred in granting Garcia special administratorship. - NO.
Section 1 of Rule 80 provides that "(w)hen there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration by any cause including an appeal from the
allowance or disallowance of a will, the court may appoint a special administrator to take possession and charge of the estate of the deceased until the
13) Garcia Fule v. Court questions causing the delay are decided and executors or administrators appointed. Formerly, the appointment of a special administrator was only proper
of Appeals when the allowance or disallowance of a will is under appeal. The new Rules, however, broadened the basis for appointment and such appointment is now
allowed when there is delay in granting letters testamentary or administration by any cause e.g., parties cannot agree among themselves. Nevertheless, the
[old case; edited the old discretion to appoint a special administrator or not lies in the probate court. That, however, is no authority for the judge to become partial, or to make his
digest to make it relevant personal likes and dislikes prevail over, or his passions to rule, his judgment. Exercise of that discretion must be based on reason, equity, justice and legal
to the topic] principle.
Virginia G. Fule, however, disputes the status of Preciosa B. Garcia as the widow of the late Amado G. Garcia. With equal force, Preciosa B. Garcia maintains that
Virginia G. Fule has no relation whatsoever with Amado G. Garcia, or that, she is a mere illegitimate sister of the latter, incapable of any successional rights. On
this point, We rule that Preciosa B. Garcia is prima facie entitled to the appointment of special administratrix. It needs be emphasized that in the
issuance of such appointment, which is but temporary and subsists only until a regular administrator is appointed, the appointing court does not
determine who are entitled to share in the estate of the decedent but who is entitled to the administration. The issue of heirship is one to be
determined in the decree of distribution, and the findings of the court on the relationship of the parties in the administration as to be the basis of
distribution. The preference of Preciosa B. Garcia is with sufficient reason. In a Donation Inter Vivos executed by the deceased Amado G. Garcia on January 8,
1973 in favor of Agustina B. Garcia, he indicated therein that he is married to Preciosa B. Garcia. In his certificate of candidacy for the office of Delegate to the
Constitutional Convention for the First District of Laguna filed on September 1, 1970, he wrote therein the name of Preciosa B. Banaticla as his spouse. Faced
with these documents and the presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage, Preciosa B. Garcia can be reasonably believed to be the surviving spouse of the late Amado G. Garcia. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio.
6
Carlos Palanca was able to leave a will before he died. He named therein Ozaeta as executor of the will in case of unavailability of General Roxas. When Palanca
died, Roxas died after and Ozaeta was prompted to file a petition for the probate of Palanca’s will, with the prayer of being appointed as a special
administrator. The heirs opposed the appointment. The bank previously appointed as administrator resigned on grounds of conflict of interest.
It should be noted at the outset that Rule 81 of the Rules of Court, under the provisions of which the order appealed from was made, grants discretion to the
probate court to appoint or not to appoint a special administrator. It is silent as to the person that may be appointed as special administrator, unlike section 6
of Rule 79, which expressly gives the order of preference of the persons that may be appointed regular administrator. The appointment of special
administrators is not governed by the rules regarding the appointment of regular administrators. However, that while the choice of the person lies within the
court's discretion, such discretion should not be a whimsical one, but one that is reasonable and logical and in accord with fundamental legal principles and
justice. The fact that a judge is granted discretion does not authorize him to become partial, or to make his personal likes and dislikes prevail over, or his
passions to rule, his judgment. Such discretion must be based on reason and legal principle, and it must be exercised within the limits thereof. And there is no
reason why the same fundamental and legal principles governing the choice of a regular administrator should not be taken into account in the appointment of
the special administrator.
The choice of his executor is a precious prerogative of a testator, a necessary concomitant of his right to dispose of his property in the manner he wishes. It is
14) Roxas v. Pecson
natural that the testator should desire to appoint one of his confidence, one who can be trusted to carry out his wishes in the disposal of the estate. The
curtailment of this right may be considered as a curtailment of the right to dispose. And as the rights granted by will take effect from the time of death, the
management of his estate by the administrator of his choice should be made as soon as practicable, when no reasonable objection to his assumption of the
trust can be interposed any longer. It has been held that when a will has been admitted to probate, it is the duty of the court to issue letters testamentary to
the person named as executor upon his application. It is the testator that appoints his executor, as the question as to his peculiar fitness for such a position or
his want of ability to manage the estate can not be addressed to the discretion of the county judge.
In the case at bar, the will has already been admitted to probate, and respondent judge himself has expressly appointed petitioner as administrator. The only
reason or ground, therefore, for suspending his appointment, and for the appointment of a special administrator, who is not the petitioner himself, is a very
technical one. It also appears that the Philippine Trust Company, which had acted as special administrator for a period of only a few months, has submitted a
bill for P90,000. This would cut deep into the income of the estate, and if the new special administrator appointed by the respondent judge takes office, it is
not improbable that the estate may again be subjected to the same expensive cost of administration. Under these circumstances, it would seem unreasonable
to refuse to appoint the petitioner as special administrator. To do so would be delaying the fulfillment of the wishes of the testator and subjecting the estate to
unnecessary expense.
Manuela Ruiz and Carlos Gurrea were married in Spain and lived together. They had a son named Theodoro. Crlos abandoned Manuela and lived in the
Philippines with their son Teoforo in 1945. He resided at Pontevedra, Negross Occidental. Carlos lived maritally with Rizalina Perez whom he had 2 children.
Manuela then went to the Philippines in 1960 but Carlos refused to admit her to his residence. Hence, Manuela filed a case for support and annulment of some
15) Pijuan v. Vda. De
alleged donations of the conjugal property in favor of Rizalina. The court granted Manuela a monthly alimony of P2K, which was reduced by the CA to P1k.
Gurrea
Carlos then died and left a will naming Marcelo Pijuan as an executor and disinherited Manuela and their son. Pijuan then instituted a SPECPRO of the CFI of
Negros for the Probate of the will. He was appointed as the administrator afterwards. This was opposed by Manuela, Teodoro, and one Pilar Gurrea, an alleged
7
illegitimate daughter. In 1962, Manuela instituted a SPECPRO wherein she alleged in a motion that the alimony pendente lite has been suspended after the
Death of Carlos. She also moved to be appointed as the administratrix of the estate of the deceased. This was denied by the probate court.
W/N Manuela should be appointed as administratrix - NO
In the language of this provision, said preference exists "if no executor is named in the will or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the
trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate." None of these conditions obtains, however, in the case at bar. The deceased Carlos Gurrea has left a
document purporting to be his will, seemingly, is still pending probate. So, it cannot be said, as yet, that he has died intestate. Again, said document names
Marcelo Pijuan as executor thereof, and it is not claimed that he is incompetent therefor. What is more, he has not only not refused the trust, but, has, also,
expressly accepted it, by applying for his appointment as executor, and, upon his appointment as special administrator, has assumed the duties thereof.
It may not be amiss to note that the preference accorded by the aforementioned provision of the Rules of Court to the surviving spouse refers to the appoint
of a regular administrator or administratrix, not to that of a special administrator, and that the order appointing the latter lies within the discretion of
the probate court,and is not appealable.
The present administratrix, of Go Kiu's estate, Maxima Tan, sought to recover from Go Lee, the former administrator whom the former succeeded P54,700.39.
Lower courts awarded P42,849.08 to Tan. Hence, Lee’s appeal.
When Kiu died in China in in April 15, 1920, Lee was appointed as special administrator with three sureties on his bond amounting to 30k. On May 25, 1920,
Lee’s status become that of an administrator. He was allowed to operate Kiu’s business in Cebu City and municipality of Toledo, Cebu but was ordered to
provide a written report every month. The total claims admitted against Kiu’s estate amounted to P69,029.91. Only P16,700.39 was paid by Lee because Kiu’s
businesses were not doing well (lost 19k) and the debtors of Kiu’s estate have not yet paid.
Issue: WON Lee is liable for the debts not paid. No.
16) Tan v. Go Chiong Lee

The standard of responsibility of the administrator is best measured as in essence the responsibility of a bailee. Like any bailee, he must pursue his discretion
honestly and in good faith, or he will become personally liable, to those who are interested in the estate, for waste, conversion, or embezzlement. But where an
administrator, entrusted with the carrying on of an estate, acts in good faith and in accordance with the usual rules and methods obtaining in such business,
he will not be held liable for losses incurred. It was not proven that the loss of the business was due to Lee’s fault.
However, 6k was allowed to be recovered from Lee for his failure to inventory 850 sacks of corn.
Another doctrine: The general rule is that a personal representative will be protected in the payment of a claim which has been duly allowed or ordered paid
by the court, although it should not have been paid in full, unless it is made to appear that such allowance of the claim, or order for the payment thereof, was
obtained through his collusion or bad faith. Hence, Lee was not held liable for the fact that some of the creditors were paid and some were not.
17) Lizzaraga Hermanos Sociedad de Lizzarraga – creditor; claimed in the estate of Caponong
v. Abada Felicisima Abada – widow; administratrix
8
Francisco Caponong – deceased husband of Abada

Vicente Alvarez – new husband
Caponong (defendant Abada’s first husband) died in 1906 and he owed money to Sociedad de Lizzarraga Hermanos. Now widowed, Abada was appointed as
administratrix of the estate, and the commissioners were appointed to appraise the estate and to pass on the claims against it. So plaintiff Sociedad presented
their claim (P12k) which was allowed by the commissioners as seen in the commissioners’ report dated 1909. Abada, as administratrix, leased the
sugar cane hacienda (AKA “Coronacion”) to Hilario Zayco for years until Abada got married to Vicente Alvarez. The lease of the hacienda to Zayco then got
transferred to Alvarez in 1908.
7 years after the first husband’s death, Sociedad filed a suit in CFI Negros against Abada (personally and as administratrix):
in order to recover the P12k and that Abada, in her own name, had been receiving from Sociedad money and effects (1908-1912) which was
used “in the expense of cultivation and the exploitation of the Hacienda ‘Coronation’ ” and that Abada had delivered to Sociedad the sugar
produced until the last crop which she refused to deliver. Moreover, Sociedad argued that Abada’s account showed that she still owes Sociedad an
amount of P62k plus interest.
The guardian of the minor children of the deceased intervened and denied this claim; they also prayed for the dismissal of the action because they already had
an amicable settlement (Compromise Agreement), so the CFI dismissed the case. Record shows that Sociedad filed a claim in the intestate proceedings of
the deceased. Furthermore, the settlement agreed upon was that Abada and the guardian recognized the deceased’s indebtedness to Sociedad. It was
revealed that this included a security on the debt dated 1914 – Mortgage on all the property of deceased (including carabaos) and on all the property
belonging exclusively to Abada. The compromise and the mortgage were approved by the court, but the mortgage was not recorded in the registry of
property up to the time of this suit (1916).
Later on, Sociedad then filed another action to attach the properties of the estate as well as the appointment of a receiver because the debt is still not fully
paid. It cited Abada’s negligence in the conservation and care of the property which is why it wasn’t enough to pay the debt. Thus, a receiver was appointed for
the mortgaged property and Abada (plus guardian and minors) got ousted from the house that they had been occupying on the premises.
Abada filed an answer arguing that the claim of Sociedad against the intestate proceedings had been allowed only in the sum of P12k by the
commissioners. The court sustained Abada’s claim and declared that the only sum to be paid Sociedad is P13k. The attachment was dissolved and the
receiver discharged, and was ordered to return the property to Abada.
Issue: WON Lizzarraga Hermanos has the right to assail the compromise agreement for the alleged non-payment of the debts of the estate
The estate owed Sociedad less than P13,000 when the commissioners passed on their claim. Part of this has been paid, and there was a balance due Sociedad
of P8,555.78 at the time of the trial, plus interest. The Sociedad, after their claim had been presented and allowed by the commissioners, made advances to
the administratrix till their claim was more than P68,000. It is urged that the major part of this debt of P68,000 is administration expenses, and as such
is chargeable against the assets of the estate. No reason is given why the expense of administration should be so great, and the evidence fails to sustain this
position. By expense of administration we understand to be the reasonable and necessary expense of caring for the property and managing it till the debts are
paid, as provided by law, and of dividing it, if necessary, so as to partition it and deliver to the heirs.
Plaintiff Warner, Barnes filed a complaint in the CFI of Negros Occidental against the defendant Luzon Surety for the recovery of the sum of P6,000, plus the
costs and P1,500 fork attorney's fees. The basis of the complaint was a bond in the sum of P6,000 filed by Agueda Gonzaga as administratrix of the Intestate
Estate of Arguedo Gonzaga in Special Proceeding No. 452 of the CFI of Negros Occidental. Defendant Luzon Surety is the surety to this bond. The bond was
filed on the condition that said bond would be void if [case said “if” but I think this should be “would be void, UNLESS…] the administratrix faithfully prepares a
18) Warner Barnes v. correct inventory of all the property of the deceased, faithfully pays all debts, legacies, and bequests, and renders a just and true account of his
Luzon Surety administrations.
Warner Barnes alleges in its complaint that Agueda violated the terms of the bond by failing to file an inventory, failing to pay the approved claim of Warner
Barnes, and failing to render a true and just account of her administration in general.
Warner Barnes then filed a motion for summary judgement. CFI approved this and ordered Luzon Surety to pay the 6,000 due to Warner Barnes. Hence, this
appeal by Luzon Surety.
9
Luzon Surety claims that there are genuine controversies between the parties litigant, and that, contrary to the allegations of the complaint, the administratrix
made a return to the court of the war damage payments she received; the administratrix cannot be charged with having failed to pay plaintiff’s claim because
there is no showing that she was ever authorized to pay approved claims; the administratrix may be presumed to have rendered an accounting of her
administration, likely in 1948, in accordance with section 8 of Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.
In answer, it is sufficient to state that the allegations that the administratrix failed to file an inventory, to pay the plaintiff’s claim, and to render a
true and just account of her administration, are factual and remained uncontroverted by counter-affidavits which the appellant could have easily
filed.
Luzon Surety also claims that the plaintiff should have first filed a claim against the Estate of the deceased administratrix Agueda Gonzaga, in conformity with
section 6 of Rule 87 of the Rules of Court providing that "Where the obligation of the decedent is joint and several with another debtor, the claim shall be filed
against the decedent as if he were the only debtor, without prejudice to the right of the estate to recover contribution from the other debtor."
Apart from the fact that his defense was not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer and was therefore waived (section 10, Rule 9 of the
Rules of Court), it appears that even as late as September 17, 1952, when the present complaint was filed, (more than two years after the death of Agueda
Gonzaga), there were no proceedings for the administration of her estate, with the result that section 6 of Rule 87 loses its applicability. Moreover, it
is to be noted that the appellant had also chosen to file a third-party complaint in the present case against Romualdo Araneta, joint and several
counter-guarantor of the deceased administratrix, instead of presenting a claim against the latter’s estate.
The decedent here is Charles Rear and the administrator of his estate is J.J. Wilson. The private respondents are M.T. Rear and heirs of decedent. Charles Rear
was murdered by Moros in an isolated area in his plantation somewhere in Cotabato. This plantation consisted of public lands. Meanwhile, an inventory and
report were made by the Commissioners (report of claims) against estate. These claims were not paid so the court ordered Wilson to sell a portion of the
property in the estate. Wilson then filed his final account, which was objected to by the heirs. Court approved the final account. Thus, this petition. Private
respondents want Wilson to be held liable for his neglect and imprudence. Allegedly, Wilson made disbursements in excess of the amount required to
preserve the estate. They also assert that loans and advances made cannot be charged against the estate since no authority therefor was granted by court.
19) Wilson v. Rear Issue therefore is whether Wilson may be held liable for the claims against the estate. Court said he can be liable. Some portions in the livestock sold were
unaccounted for. The assessed value is around 4k, yet he accounted only for P628. Further, the amount that he disbursed did not match the amount he had
received based on sales of the property (essentially leaving deficit as a result). If the personal property of the estate had been promptly sold, and sold for its
appraised value, all the debts of the deceased and the court costs and expenses of administration would have been paid and would still even have a balance.
Instead of doing that, the administrator without any authority from the court, continued the operation of the plantation and the employment of Fleming as
manager and a large number of men in the plantation at the expense of estate. However, in computing for his liability, the Court became lenient considering
his circumstances that he lived 300km away from the plantation. Operating expenses of the plantation for the first 8 months and claims of the Commissioners
were deducted from his liability.
20) Luzon Surety v. Luzon Surety issued two administrator’s bond of P15,000 each, i n behalf of Pastor Quebrar as administrator of two special proceedings. In consideration of the
Quebrar suretyship, where Luzon Surety was bound jointly and severally with Pastor Quebrar, Kilayko executed two indemnity agreement where they agreed to pay
Luzon Surety for every 12 months a sum of P300 and to indemnify Luzon Surety any and all damages, losses, costs, stamps, taxes, penalties, charges, and
Terms and effectivity of expenses.
bond does not depend on
10
the payment of premium
and does not expire until For the first year from 1954 to 1955, defendants paid Luzon Surety a total of P600 for premiums and documentary stamps. On 1957, CFI Negros approved
the administration is the amended Project of Partition and Accounts of Pastor Quebrar and Kilayko . O n 1962, Quebrar filed a motion for cancellation of executor’s bonds on the
closed. As long as the ground that t he heirs of these testate estate have already received their respective shares. Luzon Surety however demanded an amount of P4,872.00 for
probate court retains the period of 1955 to 1962. Quebrar refused to pay the said amount.
jurisdiction of the estate,
the bond contemplates a 1. Whether the determination of the liability of the surety and of the principal on the bond must depend primarily upon the language of the bond itself
continuing liability. (YES)
The statute which requires the giving of a bond becomes a part of the bond and imparts into the bond any conditions prescribed by the statute. The bonds in
question contain practically the very same conditions in Sec. 1, Rule 81 of the ROC which requires the administrator/executor to put up a bond for the purpose
of indemnifying creditors, heirs, legatees, and the estate. The surety is then liable under the administrator’s bond, for as long as the administrator has
duties to do as such administrator/executor. Since the liability of the surety is co-extensive with that of the administrator and embraces the
performance of every duty he is called upon to perform in the course of administration, it follows that the administrator is still duty bound to respect
the indemnity agreements entered into by him in consideration of the suretyship.
It is shown that Quebrar still had something to do as executor even after the approval of the amended project of partition and accounts on 1957.
Quebrar did not cease as executor for administration is for the purpose of liquidation of the estate and distribution of the residue among the heirs and
legatees. And liquidation means the determination of all the assets and of the estate and payment of all debts and expenses. It appears that there were still
debts and expenses to be paid after 1957!
2. Whether the indemnity agreements ceased to have force and effect with the non-payment of the stated premiums. (NO)
To allow Quebrar and Kilayco to evade their liability under the Indemnity Agreements would ultimately lead to giving the administrator the power to diminish
or reduce and altogether nullify his liability under the Administrator’s Bonds. The payment of the annual premium is to be enforced as part of the
consideration, and not as a condition!
Therefore, Quebrar and Kilayco are made liable to pay the remaining balance of the unpaid premiums from 1957 to 1962 in the amount of P4,632.00.
Manuel Soriano, ex-administrator of the estate of Baldomero Cosme was indebted to the
estate in the sum of P23,603. CFI ordered the execution of his bond after he was unable to
turn over said amount. The new administrator also had the sheriff levy on the properties of
21) Cosme de Mendoza v.
Soiano’s sureties Pacheco and Cordero to pay the remaining balance. The sureties
Pacheco
appealed to the SC alleging that CFI as probate courts had no authority to order execution
of the administrator’s bond in the same proceeding. SC held that such is within the probate
court’s power albeit not expressly stated by law.
Father died so his son was appointed administrator of his estate. The son filed his accounts for the years 1923-1925. Wife of the deceased wanted the son
22) Gustilo v. Sian removed as administrator for his negligence and for making it appear in his accounts illegal expenses ruinous to the estate under administration. The son, as
administrator, demanded a yearly salary of P3000. He also presented several accounts for the years 1926-1927. The problem was that there appeared to be
11
deficits in these accounts presented by the son.
A creditor of the dead father’s estate opposed the accounts presented by the administrator and also opposed the salary demanded by the administrator. He
also opposed the accounts since it appeared that certain alleged debts had been charged twice to the estate without adequate vouchers to justify the charges.
The creditor also took exception to the distribution of surplus of around P11,000
Judge Santamaria disapproved of the accounts presented by the administrator and asked him to present amended accounts reflecting the correct amounts.
However, another judge, Judge Salas, overturned Judge Santamaria’s order and approved the 2 accounts presented by the administrator. The creditors did not
receive due notice of Judge Salas's order to approve the 2 accounts. Now, the creditors are opposing the order of Judge Salas approving the accounts presented
by the administrator and are praying for the administrator’s removal.
Issue: W/N Judge Salas was correct in approving the accounts presented by the administrator? NO.
The administrator did not administer his dad’s estate with due regard to the rights of the other persons in interest such as the creditors. He should be
removed as administrator. He presented accounts with obvious deficits. Furthermore, the creditors were not given the opportunity to make an effective
opposition before Judge Salas overturned Judge Santamaria’s order. In the end, proceedings should be restored to the position before Judge Salas’ approval
order except with a new administrator.
Umpig was the appointed special administrator of the estate of Mina. This case was filed by Degala who sought relief from the failure or refusal of the judge to
remove said special administrator. He sought Umpig’s removal on the ff grounds (1) he has an adverse interest (2) he is a stranger to the estate (3) failed to
include some properties in his inventory (4) failed to pay certain taxes (5) failed to render an accounting. Degala invoked Section 2 of Rule 83 which provides
that “if an executor neglects to render his account and settle the estate... ... the court may remove him, or in its discretion may permit him to resign”.
WON Judge Ceniza gravely abused his discretion in not removing Umpig as the administrator
NO. The removal of an administrator lies within the discretion of the court appointing him. The sufficiency of any ground for removal should thus be
23) Degala v. Ceniza and determined by said court. And in the case at bar, we cannot hold that the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion, particularly in view of the
Umipig circumstance that the alleged grounds for removal are not in fact weighty. Just because Quintillan, (a former administrator who was removed by the court on
the ground of adverse interest) is Umpig’s attorney does’t mean that Umpig is necessarily disqualified on the same ground. Any interest which Quintillian may
have is exclusively personal to him.
Other grounds: Whether Umpig failed to include in his inventory some, is question of fact to be determined by the Judge after the reception of necessary
evidence.Also, it may be true that Umpig failed to pay all taxes due, but said failure may be due to lack of funds. Regarding the alleged failure to render an
accounting, it appears that he did so on January 28, 1947. Whether it was filed on time and was complete and correct, are matters addressed to the discretion
of the Judge.
24) Chua Tan v Del Chua Tan seeks to appeal the decision of CFI Manila for dismissing their complaint and absolving Del Rosario as administratix of estate of Chua Toco. Chua Tan
Rosario
12
is alleging that CFI erred in sustaining the Res Judicata argument of the Respondents because there was already an existing ruling by the SC about the
Intestate Proceedings of Chua Piaco.
Issue W/n Res Judicata applies in this case? YES, it applies.
Requisites of Res Judicata (1) the former judgment must be final; (2) the court that rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it is
a judgment on the merits; and (4) there is an identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action. All requisites for Res Judicata are present in this case.
Identity of parties - Benedicta Santa Juana, as administratrix of the intestate estate of Chua Piaco, was the legal representative of said estate and its creditors
and heirs. The decision in the former case is conclusive and binding upon plaintiffs in the present case. Under the provisions of the law, the judicial
administrator is the legal representative not only of the testate or intestate estate, but also of the creditors, and heirs and legatees, inasmuch as he represents
their interest in the estate of the deceased.
Identity of Subject Matter - In the former case the petition was for the rendering of an accounting of certain funds. In the present case the petition is for the
partition of those same funds and their fruits between the heirs of both deceased.
Identity of Cause of Action – Former case had refused to render an accounting of said funds. In the present case the plaintiffs include the same allegation of
trust, and the defendant makes the same denial.
Identity of Cause of Action - The relief sought by Chua Tan is different, but the question at issue is the same, namely, whether Chua Piaco or Chua Toco was the
owner of said funds.
(case was in Spanish) Petitioner (admin of the estate of deceased Rudocindo Adapon) while oppositor is the latter’s surviving spouse in his 2nd marriage.
Petitioner filed an inventory of properties and assets and respondent asked the court to order petitioner to pay her monthly allowance of P50, and to include
properties in the inventory. Petitioner also claimed some of the properties in the list of respondent. Respondent asked the court to relieve respondent of his
25) Adapon v. Maralit duties and appoint another in the latter’s place. W/N CFI could, upon petition of oppositor to include certain properties in inventory prepared by
administrator, determine the question of ownership over the properties involved. Held: YES. It is not seen how probate court can determine respective merits
of the conflicting claims made by admini. And oppositor without necessary declaring the lawful ownership of the properties involved. Such declaration is
necessary and inevitable, and without it the probate court cannot properly proceed and dispose the petition submitted by oppositor.
Surviving wife and child of the deceased Samuel Allen wants to claim support from the decedent’s intestate estate. However, liabilities of the deceased are
actually greater than the value of the estate*. ISSUE: WON the widow can validly demand for support/allowance when the liabilities of the deceased’s estate is
greater than its assets? = NO.
26) Moore & Sons RATIO: SC said that support cannot be granted if it is proved that there is no more property (private/conjugal) pertaining to the surviving spouse/heirs. As
Mercantile Co. v. Wagner per Art. 1430 (NCC), support is only an advance payment on account of the respective share of each partner. In this case, it is indisputable that the liabilities of
the decedent estate exceed its assets. Plus, the widow admitted that she has not contributed to the property of marriage. Thus, it is unlawful to grant support
when there is really no property to be partitioned.
13
*Estate is insolvent: Liabilities - P2,457.00; Estate’s Balance - P870.97
Petitioners are the children begotten by the late Pablo Santero with Felixberta Pacursa while private respondents are 4/7 children begotten by the same Pablo
Santero with Anselma Diaz. Both sets of children are the natural and illegitimate children of the late Pablo Santero since neither of their mothers, was married
to their father Pablo. Pablo died. Anselma and private respondents filed for a Motion for Allowance: 1st motion prayed for a sum to be given to 4/7 children;
2nd motion: prayed that an order to include the other 3/7 children be granted directing the administrator to deliver the sum of P6,000.00 to each of the 7
children of Anselma Diaz as their allowance from the estate of Pablo Santero. Petitioner opposed. Anselma Diaz clarified that the inclusion of the 3 other
children children who were then of age. Petitioners argue that private respondents are not entitled to any allowance since they have already attained majority
age, 2 are gainfully employed and 1 is married as provided for under Sec. 3 Rule 83, of the Rules of Court. Petitioners also allege that there was
misrepresentation on the part of the guardian in asking for allowance for tuition fees, books and other school materials and other miscellaneous expenses for
school term 1982-83 because these wards have already attained majority age so that they are no longer under guardianship.
27) Santero v. CFI of
Cavite ISSUE: W/N children of the deceased who are not minors/incapacitated can be granted support during the settlement of the estate? YES.
The fact that the private respondents are age, gainfully employed or married is of no moment and should not be regarded as the determining factor of their
right to allowances under Art. 188. While the Rules of Court limit allowances to the widow and minor or incapacitated children of the deceased, the New Civil
Code gives the surviving spouse and his/her children without distinction. Hence, the private respondents are entitled to allowances as advances from their
shares in the inheritance from their father Pablo Santero. Since the provision of the Civil Code, a substantive law, gives the surviving spouse and to the
children the right to receive support during the liquidation of the estate of the deceased, such right cannot be impaired by Rule 83 Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court
which is a procedural rule. Be it noted however that with respect to "spouse," the same must be the "legitimate spouse" (not common-law spouses who are the
mothers of the
children here).
On February 8, 1935, the administatrix Estefania Fenix of the intestate of the deceased Rafael Jocson, executed in favor of appellant Jesus R. Nava a contract of
lease period of five crop years, over certain properties of the estate, at a stipulated rental of P1,000 a year. The contract was entered into without the
intervention of the court acting in the intestate proceedings. Hillado, filed a motion in said proceedings, praying that the administratix be required to explain
certain details in the matter of said lease; and in reply to the answer filed by said administratrix to lease the lands compromised in the contract to the highest
bidder at public auction. Jesus R. Nava, the lessee, filed a motion asking that the order be set aside, it having been issued without jurisdiction. The motion was
denied, and he appealed.
28) Concepcion Jocson de
Hilado v. Nava W/N the lower court has the power to annul, in the intestate proceedings, a contract of lease executed by the administratrix without its intervention?
Appellant maintains that it has no such power, and that the contract can only be annulled in a separate, independent proceeding. The contract, being a mere
act of administration, could validy be entered into by the administratrix within her powers of administration, even without the court's previous
authority. And the court had no power to annul or invalidate the contract in the intestate proceedings wherein it had no jurisdiction over the person of the
lessee. A separate ordinary action is necessary to that effect.
(This is the entire case. If nakatrip si sir, just know that the 2 cases [Gamboa Case and Ferraris Case] cited by the SC was quoted in spanish. haha)
14
On May 1, 1960, Nombre, in his capacity as judicial administrator of the intestate estate leased one of the properties of the estate (a fishpond identified as Lot
No. 1617 in Kabangkalan, Negros Occidental), to Pedro Escanlar.
The terms of the lease was for three (3) years, with a yearly rental of P3,000.00 to expire on May 1, 1963, the transaction having been done, admittedly,
without previous authority of approval of the Court where the proceedings was pending.
Subsequently, Nombre was removed as administrator by Order of the court and Sofronio Campillanos was appointed to replace him. The appeal on the Order
of Nombre's removal is supposedly pending with the Court of Appeals. Respondent Escanlar was cited for contempt, allegedly for his refusal to surrender the
fishpond to the newly appointed administrator.|||
On March 20, 1961, Campillanos filed a motion asking for authority to execute a lease contract of the same fishpond, in favor of petitioner, Moises San Diego,
Sr., for 5 years from 1961, at a yearly rental of P5,000.00. Escanlar was not notified of such motion. Nombre, the deposed administrator, presented a written
opposition to the motion of Campillanos pointing out that the fishpond had been leased by him to Escanlar for 3 years, the period of which was going to expire
on May 1, 1963.|||
29) San Diego v. Nombre Campillanos also argued that the validity of the lease contract entered into by a judicial administrator, must be recognized unless so declared void in a
separate action. The opposition notwithstanding, the Court, in effect, declared that the contract in favor of Escanlar was null and void, for want of judicial
authority and that unless he would offer the same as or better conditions than the prospective lessee, San Diego, there was no good reason why the motion for
authority to lease the property to San Diego should not be granted.|
ISSUE: WoN the contract of lease entered into by the former administrator (Nombre) was legal?
YES. While it may be admitted that the duties of a judicial administrator and an agent (petitioner alleges that both act in representative capacity), are in some
respects, identical, the provisions on agency (Art. 1878, C.C.), should not apply to a judicial administrator. A judicial administrator is appointed by the Court.
He is not only the representative of said Court, but also the heirs and creditors of the estate.
The Rules of Court provide that — "An executor or administrator shall have the right to the possession of the real as well as the personal estate
of the deceased so long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and the expenses of administration, and shall administer the estate of the deceased
not disposed of by his will."
And the Court reiterated its ruling in previous cases that lease has been considered as an act of administration
Antonio Tan commenced a special proceeding alleging that Carlos Villa Abrille (decedent) died intestate, and that he left real and personal properties (among
which are 19% share in the co-ownership of Juna Subdivision and cash deposits in different banks). Tan was appointed as the Special Administrator. Tan filed
an ex-parte petition for the withdrawal of certain sums (₱109,886 and ₱72,644) from PNB. Tan was alleging that these amounts were deposited in the name of
30) Jaroda v. Cusi Jr. the deceased but they actually belong to, and were held in trust for, the co-owners of the Juna Subdivision. The CFI granted the petition (CFI Order #1).
Afterwards, Tan together with the other co-owners of the Juna Subdivision executed a power of attorney appointing Tan as attorney-in-fact to sell or dispose
upon terms and conditions he deems wise the lots in the said subdivision. The CFI issued letters of administration to Tan. Thereafter, Tan, as regular
15
administrator, filed another petition alleging that the deceased was the manager of and a co-owner in the Juna Subdivision and that he had been engaged in
the business of selling the lots, and praying for the approval by the court of the power of attorney executed by him, in behalf of the intestate estate, and
appointing and authorizing himself to sell the lots. This was granted (CFI Order #2).
Natividad Jaroda, the decedent’s daughter, moved to nullify Orders #1 and #2.
Issue: Whether CFI Orders #1 and #2 are null and void. (YES)
As to the propriety of CFI Order #1 (allowing the special administrator to withdraw the decedent's bank deposits): Such order was in abuse of the court’s
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. First, said withdrawal is foreign to the powers and duties of a special administrator laid down in Section 2, Rule
80, which states “take possession and charge of the goods, chattels, credits and estate of the deceased and preserve the same for the executor or administrator
afterwards appointed…” Second, the order was issued without notice to, and hearing of, the heirs of the deceased. It would seem that such withdrawal of the
deposits may be view as taking of possession and charge of the credits of the estate, but actually, said withdrawal is a waiver by the special administrator of a
prima facie exclusive right of the intestate estate to the bank deposits in favor of the co-owners of the Juna Subdivision. The bank deposits were in the
decedent’s name which prima facie belongs to his estate. And until the contrary is shown by proper evidence at the proper stage, when money claims may be
filed in the intestate proceedings, the special administrator is without power to make the waiver or to hand over part of the estate, or what appears to be a
prima facie part of the estate, to other persons on the ground that the estate is not the owner thereof. Hence, CFI Order #1 is null and void. An administrator is
not permitted to deal with himself as an individual in any transaction concerning trust property.
As to the propriety of CFI Order #2 (approving the power of attorney executed by Tan): The said order is, likewise, void for want of notice and for
approving an improper contract or transaction. The very rule, Section 4 of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court, relied on by Tan to sustain the power of attorney for
the sale of the pro-indiviso share of the estate in the subdivision requires "written notice to the heirs, devisees, and legatees who are interested in the estate to
be sold" and, admittedly, administrator Tan did not furnish such notice. Without such notice, the order of the court authorizing the sale is void.
Gregorio Verdejo died, leaving an open will where he named as heirs his three sisters (plaintiffs) and Escudero (defendant) as one of the administrators. The
intestate proceedings were commenced for the properties not disposed of by will. Plaintiffs brought an action against the defendant to render an account of
the properties inherited by them. The trial court ordered Escudero to deliver the properties of the deceased (such as furniture, jewelry, cattle, and coconut
lands). In Escudero’s statement, he explained that these properties have been either seized, destroyed by fire, and the cattle died due to rinderpest.
31) Garcia v. Escudero The issue is W/N the administrator should be held liable for the properties under his administration through fortuitous event. (No)
The administrator in an administration proceeding is not responsible for the loss, by a fortuitous event, of the personal properties under administration in the
absence of proof that said loss was due to his negligence. Also, the administrator is not bound to render an account of the products of the realties seized by the
Philippine revolutionary troops during the Philippine Revolution.
This is an appeal taken by Domingo Nicolas, ex-administrator of the intestate of the deceased Santiago Nicolas. Domingo was ordered by the CFI of Tarlac to
32) Nicolas v Nicolas
turn over the balance of P726.01 to Protasio Santos.
16
Domingo assigns alleged errors as committed by the court:

1. Domingo said that the lower court erred in disapproving the record on appeal and in ordering the amendment thereof by eliminating certain
pleadings, orders, decrees and judgments as these constituted the best evidence of the services rendered by him and his lawyer.
a. What Sec 778 requires to be transmitted to this Court in case of an appeal from a decree approving or disapproving the accounts of an
administrator is a certified transcript of the appeal, order, decree, or judgment appeal from and of the accounts embraced in the order, the
inclusion of any other order, decree, or judgment from which no appeal has been taken being unnecessary and superfluous. So, the CFI
committed no error in ordering the elimination.
2. WoN the CFI erred in not submitting the appellant to an examination under oath and in not holding a hearing on his accounts?
a. The record shows that the CFI ordered the accounts in question to be called for hearing, in order that the parties might present evidence in
support of their respective claims. Therefore, Domingo was given the opportunity to explain his accounts and present his evidence in
support thereof, and that he appeared at the hearing of said accounts. So, now he cannot allege that he was not examined under oath and
that no hearing was held on the accounts in question.
3. Domingo alleged that there were expenses which were rejected by the CFI. These were money advances to the lawyer, partial payment of the debt of
the deceased to a creditor, partial payment to the Commissioner and expenses during the death anniversary of the deceased.
a. These were unauthorized by the court and they have already been discussed in the Judge’s order from which no appeal was taken.
b. As for the expenses during the death anniversary, these were not funeral expenses despite the erection of a mausoleum which forms part of
the sepulture of the deceased. So, it cannot be claimed as funeral expenses.
4. With regard to the other expenses and fees:
a. The law only authorizes the payment of P4.00 to the administrator for each day of service, not for each and every task he might perform,
even if it were to take only a few minutes to do so, as indicated by the nature of the great majority of the task performed by him, for each
and every one he seeks to collect P4.00. 18 days at P4.00 each is reasonable.
Panis was counsel for the administration of said estate and that he, before the final settlement of accounts, presented a motion in the probate proceedings for
the allowance of attorney's fees in the sum of P15,000. The respondent judge, over the objections in writing presented by the administrator, granted the
motion and allowed the fees claimed by Panis. The administrator (petitioner) the herein did not appeal from the order of the court, but on February 8, 1928,
Jacinto Yangco, in his capacity as guardian ad litem of the minors Pedro and Bruno Uy Tioco, the sons and then the only heirs of the deceased, presented a
motion for reconsideration on the grounds that he was not notified of the motion for the allowance of fees and had no knowledge thereof or of the order
granting the motion until a few days before the filing of there motion for reconsideration; that the fees allowed Panis were excessive and prejudicial to the
interest of the estate; and that considering the nature of the work performed, the services rendered with him did not warrant the payment of the sum claimed.
33) Uy Tioco v. Imperial Attorney Felix Wijangco, on behalf of Panis, filed a motion in the probated proceedings in which be set forth among others; that the property involved in the
case is community property in which one-half belongs to the petitioner; that consequently the minor Pedro Uy Tioco is only entitled to a one-fourth of the
property pertaining to the estate, and that therefore his appeal from the order allowing the attorney's fees can only relate to one-fourth of the amount
allowed, wherefore the movent asked that the administrator be ordered to make payments of three-fourths of the amount within five days from the
presentation of the motion. The respondent judge ordered the administrator to make payment of three-fourths of P15,000 within five days. The administrator
refused to make such payment, and on March 17th the court, after citing him to show cause, again ordered him to pay as provided for in the order of March 6,
under penalty of removal from office.
17
WON the attorney can hold the estate directly liable for the payment of his fees-- NO
The arguments submitted indicate a misconception of the character of the liability for the attorney's fees are claimed are supposed to have been rendered to
the executor or administrator to assist him in the execution of his trust. The attorney can therefore not hold the estate directly liable for his fees; such fees are
allowed to the executor or administrator and not to the attorney. The liability for the payment rests on the executor or administrator, but if the fees paid are
beneficial to the estate and reasonable, he is entitled to the reimbursement from the estate.
Tirso DACANAY is one of Justiniano’s three acknowledged natural children. Silverio HERNANDEZ is the surviving spouse of Justiniano’s only legitimate child,
BIENVENIDA. Justiniano died testate. His natural child Tirso was named executor. The will greatly favored the natural children at the expense of Bienvenida,
the only legitimate child. The will stated that Bienvenida had been disobedient thus the decedent felt justified in curtailing her inheritance. The will was
presented for probate and was duly probated. Tirso qualified as administrator and commissioners on claims and appraisal were appointed. Silverio
Hernandez, in representation of his deceased wife and his children, opposed the approval of the scheme on the ground that the portions of the estate assigned
to the natural children greatly exceeded the maximum shares allowed them as acknowledged natural children. The court disapproved the partition and
ordered the commissioners to make a new partition. Tirso filed before the SC a motion for the reopening of the case on the ground that he had discovered new
evidence consisting in an inventory of property alleged to have been donated to Bienvenida on the occasion of her marriage. The Court granted the motion
and ordered the case remanded to the CFI for additional proof. The CFI judge found the inventory genuine and directed the commissioners to submit a new
scheme of partition. The record was again remanded to the CFI and the commissioners submitted another scheme of partition which was opposed by Silverio.
The parties, finding the plan by the commissioners unsatisfactory, entered into stipulation. The court approved this stipulation. No regular final account was
presented by the administrator, but annual accounts for 10 years were submitted. The accounts show income as against expenses. Silverio and his daughters
opposed the approval of accounts.
34) Dacanay v.
Gernandez WON the scheme of partition presented by administrator Tirso Dacanay should not have been approved.
Yes. The fees and deductions laid down in the accounts (deduction of value of bundles of palay allegedly stolen and spoiled, compensation for administrator
Dacanay’s services, attorney’s fees - NOTE THAT THE CASE LISTS THE SPECIFIC EXPENSES IN SPANISH) relate to services rendered for the benefit of the
administrator and for that of the other natural children of Justiniano, not for the benefit of the estate. It is true than an administrator may employ competent
counsel on questions affecting his duties and on which he is in reasonable doubt and that reasonable expenses may be charged against the estate subject to the
approval of the court. Such however, is not the case here. The administrator deliberately and knowingly resorted to falsified documents for the purpose of
defrauding legitimate heirs of the deceased. The claims that palay was lost and spoiled cannot be entertained. Repairs in the storehouse were made from time
to time with permission of the court. There is room for grave suspicions that the administrator converted to his own use at least a part of the palay alleged to
have been stolen or spoiled. The administrator was in a position in some respects analogous to that of a bailee for his own sole benefit and was bound to
exercise great care and attention in the conservation of the property under administration. The administrator must then be held responsible for loss or
disappearance of the palay and must be ordered to pay the value of the same to the estate. The compensation administrator is asking for seems excessive. The
prolongation of the settlement of the estate was entirely due to the efforts of the administrator to defraud the legitimate heirs and he cannot be allowed to
profit from his own fraud. The per diem compensation of an administrator can only be allowed for necessary services.
Facts: Atty. Ephraim Serquina petitioned the probate court for the probate of the will of Carmelita Farlin (her heirs are the petitioners in this case). Atty.
35) Lacson v. Reyes
Serquina petitioned in his capacity as the COUNSEL OF THE HEIRS (petitioners) and the executor under the will. Later on, Atty. Serquina filed a Motion for
18
Attorney’s Fees worth 68,000 pesos. The heirs answered that they only agreed to pay him 7,000. A motion for execution against the heirs was later on ordered
by the Court. The heirs now argue that the granting of attorney’s fees to Atty. Serquina was in violation of Rule 86, Section 7.
Issue: WON Atty. Serquina is entitled to attorney’s fees worth 68,000 pesos? No, however on a quantum meirut basis, he is entitled to 15,000. But he has
already been paid 6,000.
Held: The rule is clear that an administrator or executor may be allowed fees for the necessary expenses he has incurred as such, but he may not recover
attorney's fees from the estate. His compensation is fixed by the rule but such a compensation is in the nature of executor's or administrator's commissions,
and never as attorney's fees. Accordingly, to the extent that the trial court set aside the sum of P65,000.00 as and for Mr. Serquina's attorney's fees, to operate
as a "lien on the subject properties," the trial judge must be said to have gravely abused its discretion.
Note that attorney’s fees in this case is to be shouldered by the CLIENT and not by the estate. Mutatis mutandis, where the administrator is himself the counsel
for the heirs, it is the latter who must pay therefor. In this case, Atty. Serquina did not do anything out of the ordinary – he will was uncontested, he assisted
the parties in transferring the properties to their names in the BIR and the Registry of Deeds, and helped sell real property that was already subject for sale
before the decedent died. Hence, 15,000 is enough as based on quantum meirut.
Upon the death of Henry W. Elser, C. W. Rosenstock filed a petition in the CFI of Manila for the probate of Elser's will, and that he, Rosenstock, be appointed as
executor of the estate. Judge Diaz admitted the will to probate, and appointed Rosenstock as executor, who later qualified and entered upon the discharge of
his duties. At the time of his appointment, all parties agreed that the executor should have and receive P1,000 per month for his services.
Rosenstock filed a petition to be allowed P1,000 per month as compensation as administrator of the estate. He stated that all parties in the above-entitled case
have agreed that the said sum of P1,000 per month, as compensation for the executor, is just and reasonable. CFI granted.
The widow of Mr. Elser led a petition asking that the order of October 3, 1923, be revoked, and that the compensation of the executor should be based upon
the provisions of section 680 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Judge Imperial revoked the order of 1923, and fixed the compensation of the executor at P400 per month, the widow appeals. contending that the trial court
erred in failing to reduce the compensation of the executor to the statutory amount allowed under section 680.
SC upheld the reduction of the fee from P1000 to P400.
The present order, reducing the executor's fee to P400 per month, from which both parties have appealed, was made on June 13, 1925, more than nineteen
months after the original order was made. That is to say, that at the time the last order was made, Rosenstock had been acting as executor of the estate for
36) Rosenstock v. Elser more than nineteen months, and, as such, had been administering the affairs of the estate, with the ultimate view of winding up and closing it.
It is very apparent that whatever reasons may have existed for allowing him a compensation of P1,000 per month at the time of his appointment have ceased
to exist. During that period, all of the assets and liabilities of the estate should have been legally ascertained and determined. In other words, the character and
class of the work which now devolves upon the executor is of a very different type and nature now than at the time of his appointment. Although by mutual
consent his compensation was fixed at P1,000 per month at the time of his appointment, that was not a valid or binding contract continuous throughout
the whole administration of the estate. It was always subject to change and the approval of the court, and to either an increase or decrease as conditions
might warrant. At all times the compensation of the executor was a matter largely in the discretion of the probate court.
The original order of October 3, 1923, and the last order of June 13, 1925, were both made in the court in which the probate proceedings were pending, and all
matters pertaining to the estate were peculiarly within the knowledge and province of that court, by which all orders were made, and in which all accounts
were filed. That is to say, from the date of the appointment of the executor until the order of June 13, 1925, the lower court had before it all of the records,
orders, and proceedings growing out of the administration of the estate. Based upon such records, it found as a fact that under all of the existing circumstances
the fee of the executor from June 1, 1925, should be P400 per month.
In matters of this nature, the findings and conclusions of the probate court are entitled to much weight, particularly on questions of fact.
37) Joson v. Joson Tomas Joson in Quezon, Nueva Ecija, survived by 9 heirs from his 3 wives. His will was presented to CFI Nueva Ecija by his son Felicisimo Joson for probate
19
who was appointed as administrator. He filed an inventory of the properties left by the deceased.
Felicisimo rendered accounts for 1945-1948 which were not approved. Eduardo, one of the heirs filed an opposition to all the accounts alleging that the
administrator diminished the shares of the heirs in the yearly produce of the properties and had padded his expenses of administration. He also asked that the
administrator to post a bond in the amount of P50,000.
In the meantime, or on December 30, 1952, the heirs entered into an extrajudicial settlement and partition of the entire estate. Since the Court was not
informed of this, an order requiring the administrator to file an accounting of his administration from 1949 to 1954, was rendered by the Court and complied
with.
On November 25, 1954, without said accounts having been heard or approved, the administrator filed a motion to declare the proceeding closed and
terminated and to relieve him of his duties as such. The trial court granted it, stating that the reports were a mere incident in proceeding to wind up the estate
of the deceased
WON the duty of an administrator to make an accounting of his administration a mere incident which can be avoided once the estate has been
settled? NO.
The duty of an administrator to render an account is not a mere incident of an administration proceeding which can be waived or disregarded when the same
is terminated, but that it is a duty that has to be performed and duly acted upon by the court before the administration is finally ordered closed and
terminated. The extrajudicial settlement and partition is not a waiver of the objections of the heirs to the accounts submitted by the administrator not only
because to so hold would be a derogation of the pertinent provisions of our rules but also because there is nothing provided in said partition that the aforesaid
accounts shall be deemed waived or condoned.
Picard was appointed as administrator of the Intestate Estate of James Burt upon filing a bond of 1k. After some time, he was dismissed as administrator and
appointed Phil Trust in his place. An inventory report was done by the latter showing only 57.75 pesos as the only asset left in the estate of Burt. After review
by the Court, it was found that there is still 7k balance so Picard was ordered to deliver within 48 hours from receipt of a copy of the Order. Later on, he was
prosecuted for estafa. The Court then ordered Luzon Surety to show cause why the administrator's bond filed by it on behalf of Picard would not be
confiscated. Luzon filed a motion to set aside said order upon the following grounds: Firstly, that the Court cannot order the confiscation of the
administrator's bond, on prejudice or injury to creditors, legatees or heirs of the estate of James R. Burt having been shown Secondly, that "a probate court
38) Phil. Trust Co. v. cannot, ex proprio motu, prosecute the probate bond." Court denied the motion as well as the MR.
Luzon Surety
WON the the surety is privy to the proceedings against the executor or administrator? YES
From the very nature of the obligation entered into by the surety on an administrator’s bond, he (surety) is bound and concluded, in the absence of fraud and
collusion, by a judgment against his principal, even though said surety was not a party to the proceedings against the administrator, nor notified in connection
therewith prior to the issuance of the court order for the confiscation of the bond.
20
In the case of the De Mendoza vs. Pacheco, 64 Phil. 135, the sureties on the administrator’s bond were held liable thereon altho they were not parties to the
proceeding against the administrator, nor were they notified in connection therewith prior to the issuance of the court order for the confiscation of the bond.
Lastly, according to Section 11, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, upon the settlement of the account of an executor or administrator, his sureties “may upon
application, be admitted as a party to such accounting.” The import of this provision is that the sureties are not entitled to notice but may be allowed to
intervene in the settlement of the accounts of the executor or administrator if they ask for leave to do so in due time.
This is involves the estate of Fallon and Murphy which owns 2/4 share pro-indiviso Hacienda Rosario in Negros Accidental. The whole hacienda was held in
lease by Camon even before the institution of the intestate proceedings. Dela Cruz, as administrator, filed a motion before the probate court to order Camon to
pay the 2/4 share of the rentals of the hacienda for yea crop years 1948-1949. Camon opposed and argued that the court has no jurisdiction over his person.
The probate court denied the motion and ruled that the demand for rentals cannot be made by mere motion by the administrator but by independent action.
Hence, this appeal.
W/N the probate court may order the payment of rentals- No, the probate court has no power to order it.
Here, the court sits as a probate court. Said court is primarily concerned with the administration, liquidation and distribution of the estate. For these purposes,
property in the hands of the estate's administrator comes within the power of the probate court. The amount demanded is not, by any means, liquidated. Thus,
the lessee may interpose certain defenses which shall be heard in full blown trial. In this case, Camon even argues that he will raise the defense of sale.
39) Dela Cruz v. Camon
Because of all of these, the money (rentals) allegedly due is not property in the hands of the administrator; it is not thus within the effective control of the
probate court. Neither does it come within the concept of money of the deceased "concealed, embezzled, or conveyed away", which would confer upon the
court incidental prerogative to reach out its arms to get it back and, if necessary, to cite the possessor thereof in contempt. At best that money is debt to the
estate — not against the estate. Recovery thereof, we are persuaded to say, should be by separate suit commenced by the administrator.With reason,
because of the absence of express statutory authorization to coerce the lessee debtor into defending himself in the probate court.
Doctrine: "When the demand is in favor of the administrator and the party against whom it is enforced is a third party, not under the court's
jurisdiction, the demand can not be by mere motion by the administrator, but by an independent action against the third person." For even
"matters affecting property under judicial administration" may not be taken cognizance of by the court in the course of intestate proceedings, if the
"interests of third persons are prejudiced
Involved are several motions for reconsideration involving the estate of Don Alfonso Castellvi filed by Juan Gomez, Jesus David, the Raquiza children, and
Antonio Quirino, which the Court resolved separately. The relevant claims in this case are for attorney’s fees [AF for brevity] and for payment for services
rendered to estate by the administrator.
40) Quirino v. Gorospe Juan Gomez was claiming that AF equivalent to 12% of 1/3 of the estate should be rendered to the heirs of Don Juan [son of Don Alfonso]. These claims may
not be properly charged against the estate of Don Alfonso. It is important to note that Juan’s claims for attorney’s fees and transportation as well as
representation expenses are for services rendered to the alleged substituted heirs of Don Juan and such services did not inure to the benefit of Don Alfonso
Castellvi or his estate. The court charged with the settlement of the estate of Don Alfonso Castellvi is bound to protect the estate from any disbursements based on
claims not chargeable to the estate.
21
Jesus David’s claims for AF is for services rendered for the benefit of Dona Carmen Castellvi [daughter of Don Alfonso, previous administratix until she passed
away], and not for the benefit of Don Alfonso Castellvi or his estate. Only claims which could have been enforced against the deceased in his lifetime are
allowed to be presented against his estate, with the exception of:
1. funeral expenses,
2. expenses for the last sickness and
3. administration expenses in the ordinary course thereof.
For the Court to allow in this proceeding—which is for the settlement of the estate of Don Alfonso Castellvi—the enforcement of the claim of David against
Dona Carmen’s alleged share in the estate of Don Alfonso Castellvi, would amount to summarily declaring Dona Carmen an heir of Don Alfonso, without giving
the other heirs or claimants to the latter’s estate an opportunity to oppose the same. Moreover, whatever fees Dona Carmen might have earned during her
lifetime as administratrix of the estate of Don Alfonso should go to her estate. Hence, whatever claim herein intervenor has against the deceased Dona Carmen,
should be presented before the court with jurisdiction in settling her estate.
With regard to one of the Raquiza children’s claim for payment for services rendered to the estate of Don Alfonso, the rule is that where the monetary claim
against the administrator has a relation to his acts of administration in the ordinary course thereof, such claims can be presented for payment with the court
where a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate is pending, although said claims were not incurred by the deceased during his lifetime and collectible
after his death. This is so, because the administration is under the direct supervision of the court and the administrator is subject to its authority. A monetary
claim against the administrator which has a relation to his acts of administration may be presented for payment with the court where a special proceeding for
the settlement of the estate is pending, though such claim was not incurred by the deceased in his lifetime and collectible after his death.
Salinas and Sps. Aguas filed an action to recover damages from Llemos. Llemos allegedly served the latter through registered mail a copy of a petition for a
writ of possession with notice that the same would be submitted to the said court of Samar on 23 February 1960 at 8.00 AM. Salinas and the Aguases
proceeded to the court but found out that no such petition had been filed and that Llemos maliciously failed to appear in court, so that their expenditure and
trouble turned out to be in vain. Llemos died before he could answer the complaint. Thus, the complaint was amended to include Llemos' heirs. In denying the
heirs' motion to dismiss, the lower court ruled that testate or intestate proceedings should be initiated since the action was for recovery of money.
W/N the action for recovery of money survives even after the death of Llemos—YES.
The actions that are abated by death are: (1) claims for funeral expenses and those for the last sickness of the decedent; (2) judgments for money; and (3) “all
41) Aguas v. Llemos
claims for money against the decedent, arising from contract express or implied” . None of these includes that of Salinas and the spouses; for it is not enough
that the claim against the deceased party be for money, but it must arise from “contract express or implied”. On the other hand, actions that survive against a
decedent's executors or administrators, and they are: (1) actions to recover real and personal property from the estate; (2) actions to enforce a lien thereon;
and (3) actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property. The present suit is one for damages under the last class, it having been held that
"injury to property" is not limited to injuries to specific property, but extends to other wrongs by which personal estate is injured or diminished.To
maliciously cause a party to incur unnecessary expenses, as charged in this case, is certainly injurious to that party's property.
Ultimately, parties have arrived at an amicable settlement of their differences, and that they have agreed to dismiss this appeal. The settlement has been
approved and embodied in an order of the Court of First Instance. #happyending
22
A passenger bus owned and operated by Felicidad Balla and driven by Domingo Casin collided with a Ford Fiera owned by Mateo Lim Relucio and driven by
Ruben Lim Relucio, then further collided with another passenger bus owned by Benjamin Flores and driven by Fabian Prades. Balla, mother of Prades, Casin,
Ruben Relucio and Prades all died because of the accident. Sps. Oscar and Victora Prades (heirs of Prades) filed for damages. The heirs of Balla moved to
dismiss saying that there is no cause of action against them. Heirs of Prades amended their complaint to include estate as defendant. The CFI denied the
motion to dismiss. No intestate proceeding was filed by the heirs of Balla saying that deceased Balla left no properties.
42) Melgar v. Buenviaje

The issue is whether or not CFI has the power to entertain a suit for damages arising from the death of a person, filed against the estate of another deceased
person as represented by the heirs? The SC said YES.
Rule 87, Sec. 1 provides that actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property may be brought against executor or administrator. However, since
no estate proceeding exist by reason that the heirs of Balla had not filed any proceedings for settlement of estate, the court may adopt the alternative of
allowing the heirs of the deceased to be substituted for the deceased.
The petitioners are the widow and children of the brother of the principal private respondent. She and her brother appear to be the only remaining issue of
the mother who seems to have caused all the present confusion. The mother was Juana Balane de Suterio, who had a brother named Felipe Balane and a sister
named Perfecta Balane de Cordero. Perfecta Balane de Cordero died intestate in 1945 and leaving a tract of 28hectares of land with buildings and
improvements in the Quezon Province. On May 20, 1946, perfecta’s siblings Juana and Felipe executed a public instrument entitled “ Extra- judicial settlement
of the estate of the decease Perfecta Balane de Cordero.” In it they disposed that in according to Perfecta’s wishes and in consideration of love and affection,
the said property be donated to private respondent Salud Suterio de Matias, Perfecta’s niece, who will assume the encumbrance/obligation to the Philippine
National Bank in the amount of P 1,000. In the same document, the done accepted the donation in a public instrument. The instrument was never registered
nor the title transferred to Salud’s name although she immediately took possession of the land. Sometime in 1951,
Salud transferred the possession of the land to her mother Juana, who was then staying with her brother Claudio and his family. During the period they were
occupying the land, Claudio paid realty taxes thereon. On May 25, 1956, Juana executed a deed of absolute sale conveying the land to Claudio. Two years later,
Claudio had the land registered in his name. Claudio died in 1961 and his mother in 1963. On June 30, 1965, the private respondents Salud and Pedro Matias
filed a complaint for the reconveyance of the property on the ground that the deed of sale in favour of Claudio was fictitious and the registration in his name
43.) Pajarillo v. IAC was null and void. Salud claimed that no compensation was paid by Claudio and that the transaction was deliberately concealed from her by her brother and
the defendants.
W/N donation was valid? Yes.
There is nothing in either of the two instruments showing that "authentic notice" of the acceptance was made by Salud to Juana and Felipe. And while the first
instrument contains the statement that "the donee does hereby accept this donation and does hereby express her gratitude for the kindness and liberality of
the donor," the only signatories thereof were Felipe Balane and Juana Balane de Suterio. That was in fact the reason for the separate instrument of acceptance
signed by Salud a month later.
A strict interpretation of Article 633 can lead to no other conclusion than the annulment of the donation for being defective in form as urged by the
petitioners. This would be in keeping with the unmistakable language of the above-quoted provision. However, we find that under the circumstances of the
present case, a literal adherence to the requirement of the law might result not in justice to the parties but conversely a distortion of their intentions. It is also
23
a policy of the Court to avoid such an intepretation.
The purpose of the formal requirement is to insure that the acceptance of the donation is duly communicated to the donor. In the case at bar, it is not even
suggested that Juana was unaware of the acceptance for she in fact confirmed it later and requested that the donated land be not registered during her lifetime
by Salud. Given this significant evidence, the Court cannot in conscience declare the donation ineffective because there is no notation in the extrajudicial
settlement of the donee's acceptance. That would be placing too much stress on mere form over substance. It would also disregard the clear reality of the
acceptance of the donation as manifested in the separate instrument dated June 20,1946, and as later acknowledged by Juana.
[Copied from the first Bernardo v. CA case which I also digested. I emphasized in bold characters the doctrine relating to the rule]
Eusebio Capili and Hermogena Reyes were husband and wife. Eusebio died in 1958 and his wife died the following year. A testate proceeding was conducted
and his will was admitted to probate. After the wife died, Deogracias Bernardo, the executor of the estate, filed a petition for Hermogena to be substituted by
her collateral relatives and intestate heirs. The executor then filed a project of partition in the estate proceeding but this was opposed by the collateral
relatives of Hermogena Reyes claiming that ½ of the properties of Eusebio should belong solely to the conjugal partnership of the spouses and not to Eusebio
alone. The probate court rendered a decision declaring the donation void because it falls under the prohibition in the civil code which disallows donations
between spouses during marriage. In the same order, it disapproved both projects of partition and directed the executor to file another, dividing the property
mentioned in the last will and testament of Eusebio and the properties mentioned in the deed of donation between the instituted hers of the deceased and
legal heirs of Hermogena. The CA affirmed this.
The issue in this case is w/n the probate court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the claims of the heirs of Hermogena involving title to the properties
mentioned in the will of Eusebio. YES.
44.) Bernardo v. CA
The court held that as a general rule, the question as to title to property cannot be passed upon on testate or intestate proceedings. An exception is where one
of the parties merely prays for the inclusion or inclusion from the inventory of the property, in which case the probate court may pass provisionally upon the
question without prejudice to its final determination in a separate action.
The matter in controversy is the question of ownership of certain of the properties involved — whether they belong to the conjugal partnership or
to the husband exclusively. This is a matter properly within the jurisdiction of the probate court which necessarily has to liquidate the conjugal
partnership in order to determine the estate of the decedent which is to be distributed among his heirs who are all parties to the proceedings,
including, of course, the widow, now represented because of her death, by her heirs who have been substituted upon petition of the executor
himself and who have appeared voluntarily. There are no third parties whose rights may be affected. It is true that the heirs of the deceased widow are not
heirs of the testator-husband, but the widow is, in addition to her own right to the conjugal property. And it is this right that is being sought to be enforced by
her substitutes. Therefore, the claim that is being asserted is one belonging to an heir to the testator and, consequently, it complies with the requirement of
the exception that the parties interested (the petitioners and the widow, represented by the respondents) are all heirs claiming title under the testator.
Espiridion Guanco obtained a credit, not exceeding P175K, with interest, from PNB, pledging pledging as security 250 shares of the capital stock of the
Binalbagan Estate, Inc., and 6,196 shares of the capital stock of the Hinigaran Sugar Plantation, Inc. (Hinigaran)
45.) Guanco v. National In the following year, Hinigaran gave the bank a promissory note for P273,932.11, the original debt of Guanco being included therein and a mortgage on real
Bank property in favor of the PNB for P350,000 as security for the note and for such future credits as might be granted the company. The shares given the bank as
security for the transaction of January 18, 1921, were not mentioned in the mortgage.
After Guanco’s death, the administrator filed a petition asking that the Court of First Instance issue an order requiring the president or manager of the bank to
24
appear in court for examination with regard to the 250 shares of the Binalbagan Estate under section 709 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Such was granted.
The manager did not appear but PNB filed an answer stating that the pledge of 250 shares was still in force. Thereupon, the Court ordered delivery of such
shares to the administrator.
Issue: WON the CFI exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering the bank manager to deliver the subject shares to the administrator – YES
SC held that the proceeding under sec. 709 only provides a proceeding for examining persons suspected of having concealed, embezzled, or conveyed away
property of the deceased or withholds information of documentary evidence tending to disclose rights or claims of the deceased to such property or to
disclose the possession of his last will and testament. The purpose of the proceeding is to elicit evidence, and the section does not authorize the court to
enforce delivery of possession of the things involved. To obtain the possession, recourse must therefore generally be had to an ordinary action.
Gregorio Navarro died (no exact date when) and in 1910, Prospero Alafriz was appointed as administrator of Navarro’s estate by the CFI Ilocos Sur. At the
time of his death, Navarro left some minor children, a widow, and property (real and personal). The CFI also appointed Navarro’s widow as the guardian of the
minor children.
Alafriz alleged that Pia Mina had possession of a document for jewelry which was previously deposited as security for a loan worth P160 by the deceased. As
administrator, Alafriz filed a motion for Pia Mina to appear in court to determine if such a document was really in her possession. Upon appearance, she
presented Pawn Ticket No. 243 (this was for inventory purposes as directed by the court to the administrator) but thereafter filed a motion so that the jewelry
be excluded from the inventory. She also offered to introduce proof that such jewelry belongs to her and her mother. This was denied, and the jewels
deposited remained with the court for inventory of the estate.
Issue: (1) WoN the administrator may bring such actions against Pia Mina as he may deem necessary and the rights of which pertain to the intestate estate of
which he is the administrator? - YES
46.) Alafriz v. Mina
Section 709 of the Code (presently Rule 87, Sec. 6) expressly authorized the order of which complaint is made. If upon the hearing, there was good reason for
believing that the person cited had property in his or her possession belonging to the estate, then it was the duty of the administrator to proceed by an
ordinary action to recover possession of the same.
(2) WON the court erred in not permitting the introduction of evidence relative to the ownership of the said jewel? – NO.
Section 709 does not seem to make provision for the determination of the right of ownership of property. Said section provides that the person suspected of
having property belonging to the estate may be cited, and the court may examine such person, under oath, on the matter of such property.
It will be observed that the section nowhere expressly gives the court the power to determine the right of property. The usual way of determining the right
of contending parties to the ownership of property is by instituting an ordinary action for that purpose. The court believes that Sec. 709 did not
provide for a trial of the right of property of a deceased person, embezzled or alienated by a third person.
The administrator in this case placed the jewelry In his inventory but this is in no way deprives the Mina of her property therein. She is still entitled to be
heard upon the question of ownership to a proper court.
47.) Heirs of Gregoire v. J. H. Ankrom died on September 1922. The appellee, A. L. Baker, qualified as his administrator. A few months later, the administrator filed his inventory of the
Baker assets pertaining to the estate of his decedent, in which inventory was included a tract of land covered by Torrens certificate of title and containing an area of
25
more than 930 hectares. [we shall refer this as “subject land”]
The heirs of Rafael Gregoire, appellants, filed a claim against the estate of Ankrom for the sum of Php70,000 based upon a court decision in the SC of Panama.
This claim was allowed in the estate of Ankrom.
Initially, the assets appeared to be sufficient to pay all claimants, but Baker later discovered that the decedent executed a real estate mortgage on the subject
land. Two days after the execution of the REM, the decedent assigned all his interest in re: the mortgaged property to a certain Jung for a sum of Php1 and
other valuable consideration. As such, Baker presented an amended inventory omitting the subject land. However, the Court noticed that omitting the subject
property would make the estate INSOLVENT; thus, it issued an Order reinstating the subject property to the inventory. [ORDER 1]
Then… upon motion by Baker, the Court reversed itself an omitted the subject property from the inventory. [ORDER 2]
What is the remedy of the claimants (heirs of Rafael Gregoire)?
The precise remedy open to the appellants in the predicament above described is clearly pointed pout in section 713 of our Code of Civil Procedure, which
reads as follows:
When there is a deficiency of assets in the hands of an executor or administrator to pay debts and expenses, and when the deceased person made in his
life-time such fraudulent conveyance of such real or personal estate or of a right or interest therein, as is stated in the preceding section, any creditor of the
estate may, by license of the court, if the executor or administrator has not commenced such action, commence and prosecute to final judgment, in the name of
the executor or administrator, an action for the recovery of the same and may recover for the benefit of the creditors, such real or personal estate, or interest
therein so conveyed. But such action shall not be commenced until the creditor files in court a bond with sufficient surety, to be approved by the judge,
conditioned to indemnify the executor or administrator against the costs of such action. Such creditor shall have a lien upon the judgment by him so recovered
for the costs incurred and such other expenses as the court deems equitable.
The remedy of the appellants is, therefore, to indemnify the administrator against costs and, by leave of court, to institute an action in the name of
the administrator to set aside the assignment or other conveyance believed to have been made in fraud of creditors.
W/N ORDER 1 which reinstated the subject property to the inventory became final already, making ORDER 2 invalid.
This contention is untenable. Orders made by a court with reference to the inclusion of items of property in the inventory or the exclusion of items
therefrom are manifestly of a purely discretionary, provisional, and interlocutory nature and are subject to modification or change at any time
during the course of the administration proceedings. Such order in question not final in the sense necessary to make it appealable. In fact we note that the
appealed order was expressly made without prejudice to the rights of the creditors to proceed in the manner indicated in the provision above quoted from the
Code of Civil Procedure.
A certain Benjamin is the decedent here. He died leaving his wife and children as heirs. During his lifetime, Benjamin owned 64% of shares of stock of
corporation called Island Associates Inc. When he died, the administrator of his estate Muñoz, together with the officers of the said company mortgaged three
of the company’s parcels of land to a certain Villanueva. These lands were also sold to Villanueva after the lapse of some time. Now surviving spouse Maria and
48) Velasquez v. George children filed a complaint to annul the sale made since they maintain that this impaired the distribution of Benjamin’s estate. Administrator however
countered by saying that under Rule 87 Sec.3, only the administrator of the estate has the capacity to file a case.
The issue thus is whether heirs of Benjamin (wife and children) can file said complaint. Court said they can. The administrator is not the only person who can
26
file a case. The heirs of the decedent can do this too because they became the owners of the property upon Benjamin’s death (Art. 777). This is especially true
in this case considering that the administrator was the one who caused the contested sale. It would be far-fetched to expect the same administrator to file the
action on behalf of the estate. The heirs here have an interest in the estate; they possess the requisite personality to cause the annulment of sale.
27
Rule 88-98
CASE RECIT READY
RULE 88
The intestate Mercedes Cano died in August, 1945, leaving as her only heir her son Florante C. Timbol then only 11 years old. On September 27, 1946,
Jose Cano, brother of the intestate, was appointed administrator. On April 13, 1951 Jose Cano, proposing that the agricultural lands of the intestate be
leased to the administrator Jose Cano for an annual rental of P4,000, this rental to be used for the maintenance of the minor and the payment of land
taxes and dues to the government. Judge Edilberto Barot, then presiding the court, approved the motion in an order dated April 27, 1951.
Rental was reduced to P2,400 and conversion of the 30 hectares of agricultural land to a subdivision. On April 2, 1957, upon motion of the administrator,
a project of partition was approved, designating Florante C. Timbol the sole and exclusive heir of all the properties of the intestate. Florante C. Timbol
was appointed administrator in place of Jose Cano and on January 6, 1958 he presented a motion, which he modified in a subsequent one of January
8, 1958, alleging among other things (a) that the area destined for the projected subdivision be increased from 30 hectares to 41.9233 hectares and (b)
that the plan submitted be approved. Cano's objected contenting that (1) that the enlargement of the subdivision would reduce the land leased to him
and would deprive his tenants of their landholdings, and (2) that he is in possession under express authority of the court, under a valid contract, and
may not be deprived of his leasehold summarily upon a simple petition.
Jose C. Cano avers that this Court, in the instant proceedings, cannot pass upon the legality of the aforesaid lease contract, but in its general jurisdiction.
There is no need for the court to declare such contract illegal and, therefore, null and void as the law so expressly provides.
5.) Timbol v. Cano WON the court had jurisdiction to deprive Cano of his rights under the lease-- YES
Cano argues that the court below, as a probate court, has no jurisdiction to deprive the appellant of his rights under the lease, because these rights may
be annulled or modified only by a court of general jurisdiction. This argument holds no merit. In probate proceedings the court orders the probate of the
will of the decedent (Rule 80, See. 5); grants letters of administration to the party best entitled thereto or to any qualified applicant (Id., Sec. 6);
supervises and controls all acts of administration; hears and approves claims against the estate of the deceased (Rule 87, See. 13); orders payment of
lawful debts (Rule 89, Sec. 14); authorizes sale, mortgage or any encumbrance of real estate (Rule 90, Sec. 2); directs the delivery of the estate to
those entitled thereto (Rule 91, See. 1). It has been held that the court acts as a trustee, and as such trustee, should jealously guard the estate and see that
it is wisely and economically administered, not dissipated. Even the contract of lease under which the appellant holds the agricultural lands of the
intestate and which he now seeks to protect, was obtained with the court's approval. If the probate court has the right to approve the lease, so may it
order its revocation, or the reduction of the subject of the lease. The matter of giving the property to a lessee is an act of administration, also subject to
the approval of the court.
We have taken pains to answer all the arguments adduced by the appellant on this appeal. But all said arguments are squarely laid to naught by the
declaration of the court that the lease of the agricultural lands of the estate to the appellant Cano, who was the administrator at the time the lease was
granted, is null and void not only because it is immoral but also because the lease by the administrator to himself is prohibited by law.
Dayadante and Rogero obliged themselves to be indebted to Jaucian. Rogero is the surety, but on the terms of obligation both debtors bound themselves
jointly and severally. Jaucian went after Rogero but she had died, so he charged the claim against Rogero’s estate belatedly, 2 years after the committee
filed their report for allowance on the claims against the estate. Rogero being solidarily liable to the obligation with Dayadante, Jaucian’s claim is an
6.) Juacian v. Querol absolute one, one that should have been allowed by the committee had it been presented to the committee on ti
Where a guarantor or surety is jointly and severally bound with the principal debtor, the obligation of the guarantor or surety, equally with that of the
Rule 88-98
principal debtor, is absolute and not contingent within the meaning of section 746 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Where two persons are bound in
solidum for the same debt and one of them dies, the whole indebtedness can be proved against the estate of the latter; and if the claim is not presented
to the committee appointed to allow claims against the estate within the time contemplated in section 689 of the Code of Civil Procedure the same will
be barred as against such estate, under the provisions of section 695 of the same Code An appeal to reverse a judgment of the Court of first Instance of
Albay refusing to allow a claim in favor of the plaintiff Jaucian against the estate of Rogero.
Facts: Tiaoqui filed a case for collection of money against the Cu Unjiengs. In this case of collection, the properties of the Cu Unjiengs were preliminarily
attached upon filing of bond by Tiaoqui during his lifetime. However, during the proceedings, Tiaoqui died and was substituted later on by the
administrators of his estate. When Tiaoqui died, estate proceedings were commenced and when asked to file accounts and project of partition, the
administrators found it hard to do so due to the pending litigation with the Cu Unjiengs. When the accounting was submitted and duly approved, the
final project of partition took a later time to do. In the collection case, the Cu Unjiengs had a counterclaim against the estate of Tiaoqui saying it is
actually Tiaoqui who should pay them for losses suffered by them in credits, bonds and securities when they were negotiating in China and for damage
to their reputation. The intestate court was not informed of the counterclaim filed by the Cu Unjiengs against Tiaoqui’s estate so it proceeded to order
the delivery of the properties of Tiaoqui’s estate to the different heirs. Cu Unjieng is now praying for the annulment of the deed of delivery of the
properties to the heirs of Tiaoqui and says that the properties should remain with the estate of Tiaoqui to answer for the counterclaim.
Issue: Should the court annul the deed of delivery of the properties of the estate to the heirs of Tiaoqui due to the counterclaim of the Unjiengs against
the estate? No. The properties should still be delivered to the heirs.
The Unjiengs did not duly appear in the intestate proceedings. They didn’t inform the court of their counterclaim nor did they ask for the retention of
properties sufficient to pay said counterclaim. The Unjiengs are not entitled to the cancellation of the deed of delivery or to the return by the heirs of the
properties to the intestate estate.
7.) Cu Unjieng v. Tiaoqui
The defense of the Unjiengs is that they were not in duty bound to inform the probate court of the existence of the counterclaim in the collection case.
Therefore, the court should have cancelled the deed of delivery, so there will be enough properties left in the estate of answer for the counterclaim of the
Unjiengs.
The rules of civil procedure doesn’t contain any provision imposing the duty on the Unjiengs to inform the probate court of the counterclaim. However,
probate court alone had acquired jurisdiction to try and decide the settlement, payment of debts and distribution of the estate of the deceased, to the
exclusion of all other courts, so the Unjiengs should have informed the probate court to adequately protect their rights. They should timely apply to it
and ask for the retention of properties sufficient to pay for the counterclaim in case it should prosper rather than wait till the properties have actually
been delivered to the heirs.
The Unjiengs claim that the court was in duty bound to order the cancellation of the deed of delivery and the return by the heirs of the properties
received by them. Generally, they are correct that in the ordinary course of an intestate proceedings, the probate court should not authorize the delivery
of the properties to the heirs until the counterclaim has been decided. However, the probate court cannot be faulted since it was not informed of the
pendency of the counterclaim of the Unjiengs in another civil case. The remedy of the Unjiengs would be to ask the heirs who received the distributed
properties to pay the counterclaim in proportion to the value of the properties received by them, should the counterclaim be granted.
Rule 88-98
In the summary settlement of the estate of Gonzales, due to the failure of the heirs of the deceased to pay the creditor, Abarro, the court ordered the only
property left by deceased (a piece of lot) to be sold at an auction. The lot was awarded to the creditor himself. The deed of sale contained a proviso
stating that the property was subject to redemption within 1 year. With no redemption having been made, the creditor filed a motion praying that a final
deed of sale shall be executed in his favor. De Guia, the heir of the deceased opposed and alleged she had delivered the redemption price to the sheriff.
8.) Intestate of Januaria The lower court ruled in favor of the heir.
Gonzales
ISSUE: WON the sale of the estate of the deceased is subject to legal redemption. RULING: NO. De Guia has no right to redeem and the sale made in favor
of Abarro is final. In the administration and liquidation of the estate of a deceased person, sales ordered by the probate court for payment of debts are
final and are not subject to legal redemption. Neither the Civil Code nor the Code of Civil Procedure authorizes the redemption of properties sold in
public auctions for the payment of debts of the deceased. The procedures in which such sales take place is special, provided for by special legal
provisions, and not by the general ones that regulate ordinary actions in which the redemption of properties sold in public auction is provided for.
Angelina Echaus instituted a civil case against C.N. Hodges praying for the recovery of her share in the profits covering the Ba-Ta subdivision plus
damages. During its pendency and before a decision could be rendered by the RTC, Hodges died, with PCIB as administrator. A petition for the
settlement of the estate of C. N. Hodges was instituted in 1962. 1963, a notice to creditors was published in "Yuhum" (newspaper). A judgment was
rendered by the trial court in favor of Echaus and a writ of execution was subsequently issued against PCIB. On February 20, 1967, Echaus filed her
motion for direct payment. Magno averred that the claim of Echaus was already barred for she filed it more than 4 years from the publication of notice.
ISSUE: WON the claim presented in the estate proceedings is prescribed.

9.) Echaus v. Blanco
NO. The Rules of Court allows a creditor to file his claim after the period set by the court in the notice to creditors, provided the conditions stated in the
rules are present. The period prescribed in the notice to creditors is not exclusive; that money claims against the estate may be allowed any time before
an order of distribution is entered, at the discretion of the court for cause and upon such terms as are equitable. At the time of Echaus’ motion to
direct payment of the judgment credit was filed, no order of distribution was issued yet. In this case, the claim was filed in the probate court on
February 1969, while the defendants in the civil case were still perfecting their appeal therein. The record does not show that the administrator objected
thereto upon the ground that it was filed out of time. The pendency of that case is a good excuse for tardiness in the filing of the claim.
RULE 89
Facts: Commissioners in the settlement of the estate of Luis Gamboa Carpizo in favor of Balbino Jaucian for Php. 2,720.00. The claim was secured by a
mortgage on real estate stating that since it was mortgaged to Jaucian then Jaucian had a preference in the payment of the mortgage debt. The court,
without notice to any of the parties, and without hearing any of them, made an order directing that the property mentioned in the petition be sold for the
purpose of paying the mortgage debt to Balbino Jaucian. T he creditor who has appealed says that the document evidencing the loan of Balbino Jaucian is
1.) Estate of Gamboa v. not a mortgage. The appellant has not seen fit to have the document brought here and this assignment of error cannot, therefore, be sustained.
Florenza
Issue: WON the probate court has the power to sell specific assets of the estate to pay specific creditors? Held: NO.
There is nothing in any one of these sections nor in any other sections of the code which indicates that the Court of First Instance, in the exercise of its
probate jurisdiction, has any power to order the sale of a specific piece of real estate for the purpose of
paying a mortgage debt which is a lien thereon
Rule 88-98
Doctrine: General not specific; It may be that the court would have authority to sell the property, subject to the mortgage lien, for the purpose of paying
other debts of the estate, but there is nothing giving the court authority to sell it for the purpose of paying that specific debt.
The administrator of the estate of Sps. Isaac was authorized by the probate court to sell certain lands belonging to the estate. These lands were sold to
Roberto Soler. Subsequently, a new administrator was appointed, who then sought to annul the sale on the ground that the sale was fraudulent bec. It
was made w/o notice (of the hearing of application to sell) to the heirs, and that the sale was not beneficial to the heirs. Issue: WON the sale of a
decedent’s property can be annulled on the ground that certain heirs were not sent any notice of hearing (of the application to sell) = YES. Ratio: SC said
2.) Boñaga v. Soler that a sale of properties of an estate as beneficial to the interested parties (under Rule 89) must comply with the requisites. Among these requisites, is
the fixing of the time & place of hearing for an application to sell, AND notice thereof to the heirs. Without these requisites, the authority to sell, the sale
itself, & the order approving it, are null & void ab initio.
Asuncion Vda. de la Santa is one of the instituted heirs in the will of her deceased brother, Teofilo Roque, together with her other siblings, Marcela,
Catalina, Sofronio, Joaquin, Manuela and Francisco, all surnamed Roque, and was given a 1/7 undivided share in a house and lot in Manila. The will was
probated. Sofronio, one of the heirs, is the executor (also referred to as administrator in the case) of the estate.
The instituted heirs, with the exception of Asuncion Roque who was very ill in the provinces, had prayed for the sale of the house and lot in question for
the price of P350,000; the administrator asked that the said authority be not given until after 2 weeks; in view of the fact that Asuncion Roque had not
appeared before the court; and, that the difficulty of her non- appearance might be avoided in view of the fact that Asuncion had already executed a
special power of attorney in favor of her son, Ricardo.
The judge ordered that notice should be given to Ricardo de la Santa, as attorney-in-fact of Asuncion. However, Ricardo failed to appear in court to
manifest his acceptance of the proposal to sell the property, hence, the hearing were postponed several times. The judge issued another order, which
authorized the administrator to sell the property for a price of not less than P350,000 within one month, which authority shall automatically be
cancelled if the sale is not realized within said period of time.
Asuncion filed a petition to the effect that the allegedly undervalued personal properties of the deceased valued at P2053.83 be sold to cover the debt of
the deceased to her amounting to P1600, since the sale was not realized within the period provided in the order.
3.) Vda. De Celis v. Vda. De The other heirs asked the court to authorize them to sell the property from P245,000 to P300,000. The court gave them the authority to sell it for not
la Santa less than P245,000. The Judge approved the deed of sale of the property, executed by the administrator in favor of Luisa Vda. de Celis, for P320,000, and
also authorized the administrator to receive the purchase price from appellant and to deposit one-half thereof in the PNB.
No copies of the orders were received by Asuncion or Ricardo, in spite of the fact that the orders contained directives that notice of the same be served
upon them. Asuncion filed an action to ANNUL THE SALE. CFI granted w/ respect to 1/7 share of Asuncion.
W/N the order issued by the judge can be attacked collaterally.

NO. The validity of a judgment/order of a court entered in a special proceeding cannot be assailed collaterally unless the ground for the attack is lack of
jurisdiction or fraud by the party sought to be charged with it in its procurement. If the nullity of the judgment or order assailed is for failure to adhere
to or comply with the statutory requirements which must be followed before such judgment or order may be entered, the remedy for the agreed party is
to appeal from such order or judgment, or if final, to apply for relief under Rule 38.
The order in question in so far as Asuncion Roque Vda. de la Santa is concerned is not final and executory because, as found by the CA, she has not been
notified not only of the petition, filed not by the executor but by five of the heirs and devisees named in the will of the late Teofilo Roque duly probated,
praying for authority to the executor named in the will and duly appointed to sell the lot and buildings erected thereon but also of the orders granting
such authority and approving the sale made by the executor pursuant to such authority. Hence this action is improperly brought because the plaintiff has
still the remedy of appeal to assail directly the validity of the order.
Rule 88-98
W/N the sale should be annulled due to the lack of notice to an heir
NO. The notice caused by the court to be made may be given to the person interested personally or by mail or by publication or otherwise, as it shall
deem proper. If the interested party to whom the notice was mailed at his residence, as it appeared on the record of the special proceedings, had
absented himself therefrom and failed to receive it, that fact would not deprive the court of the power to proceed with the hearing of the petition of the
executor or administrator seeking authority to sell property of the estate of the deceased and to grant or deny it.
Granting that she objected to the sale of the lot and buildings erected thereon and her objection considered, as it must be presumed for it was in the
record of the special proceedings when the hearing of the application for authority to sell was heard, but was disregarded, by the probate court, could
her objection be sufficient to prevent the probate court from granting the executor authority to sell the property? The Rules of Court do not deprive the
probate court of the power to grant license to the administrator or executor to sell personal or real property of the deceased even if there be an
objection to it by an heir, devisee or legatee, provided that such license to sell will redound to the benefit of the interested persons and hasten the
winding up or the final settlement of the estate. The intent of the framers of the rules to grant more power to probate courts in dealing with the
settlement and administration of the estate of deceased persons.
Consequently, neither the objection of Asuncion to the application for authority to sell the property belonging to the estate of Teofilo nor the failure to
receive the notice of such application caused to be served upon her personally or upon her son Ricardo as her attorney-in-fact, it appearing that she had
actual knowledge thereof, is sufficient legal cause to annul the sale, because the probate court had authority under the provisions of sections 4 and 7,
Rule 90, (Now Rule 89) to grant authority to the executor or administrator to sell the property of the deceased.
Eusebia, the sister of the decease had a claim against the estate. The claim was never heard. Instead, she entered into a stipulation of facts with the
administratrix Ines (wife of the deceased) and yhe heirs of Cirilio (brother of the deceased). The agreements was that they were recognized as
co-owners of a certain parcel of land with the deceased. Ines and Eusebia also entered into a Supplementary Stipulation of Facts, where Eusebia waived
all her money claims. This was presented to court for approval, stating that the agreement will preserve family filiation and preclude further litigation.
Probate court approved the agreements. Years later, Leon, the son of Ines replaced her as admin. He filed an action to annul the stipulations on the
grounds of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the probate court to act on the agreements and lack of notice to the heirs of Melecio (deceased). Defendants
moved to dismiss claiming res judicata and prescription. Trial Court dismissed the complaint.
IWON the stipulations in question are void and ineffective
YES. While the probate court had jurisdiction to act on and approve the stipulations in question, the requisite notice to the heirs was not complied with.
The probate court had jurisdiction to act on and approve of the stipulations in question, not only as an incident to its power to exclude any property
4.) De Jesus v. De Jesus from the inventory of the estate of the deceased, but under section 9, Rule 90 (old ROC, it is now under sec 9, Rule 89), Rules of Court, which permits the
probate court, whenever the deceased in his lifetime held real property in trust for another person, to authorize the executor or administrator to deed
such property to the person or persons for whose age and benefit it was so held. There being no controversy between the former administratrix and the
defendants that the latter and the deceased Melecio de Jesus own the lot in question in common and that it was registered in the deceased's name only in
trust for all the co- owners, there was no need to file a separate action in an ordinary court to establish the common ownership of the parties over said
property.
Section 9, Rule 90 (now sec 9, rule 89), however, provides that authority can be given by the probate court to the administrator to convey property held
in trust by the deceased to the beneficiaries of the trust only "after notice given as required in the last preceding section"This rule makes it mandatory
that notice be served on the heirs and other interested persons of the application for approval of any conveyance of property held in trust by the
deceased, and where no such notice is given, the order authorizing the conveyance, as well as the conveyance itself, is completely void.
Here, plaintiffs claim that no such notice was given the heirs of the deceased Melecio de Jesus of the petition for approval of the stipulations in question,
Rule 88-98
and it is quite probable that the claim is true, because said heirs were all minors when the proceedings in question took place.
Doctrine: The Rules of Court make it mandatory that notice be served on the heirs and other interested persons of the application for approval of any
conveyance of property held in trust by the deceased, and where no such notice is given, the order authorizing the conveyance itself, is completely void.
RULE 90
FACTS: Concepcion Lopez filed a petition in the intestate proceedings of the deceased Emeterio Lopez, claiming to be an acknowledged natural daughter
of the deceased and praying that she be declared his universal heiress entitled to a summary award of his estate, same being valued at less than six
thousand pesos (P6,000). The oppositors-appellants, thru Attorney Simplicio B. Peña, filed an opposition, denying petitioner’s claim and praying that, as
they are nephews and nieces of the deceased, they be adjudged entitled to the property let by him.
Concepcion Lopez filed later an amended petition, alleging that, according to a new assessment, the estate was worth nine thousand pesos (P9,000) and
that, therefore, its distribution could not be made summarily but thru regular administration proceedings. Accordingly, an administrator was appointed
who, thru Attorney Simplicio B. Peña, filed later a motion for a declaration of heirs and prayed that the oppositors-appellants be so adjudged.
After hearing, the court issued an order declaring the petitioner an acknowledged natural daughter of the deceased entitled to the rights accorded her by
law. The oppositors appealed.
ISSUE: Whether Concepcion Lopez is an acknowledged natural daughter of Emeterio Lopez who died intestate, leaving no descendants, ascendants, or
widow - YES.
RULING: Contrary to appellants’ contention, it is a well-settled rule that a person claiming to be an acknowledged natural child of a deceased need not
1.) Lopez v. Lopez
maintain a separate action for recognition but may simply intervene in the intestate proceedings, by alleging and proving therein his or her status as
such, and claiming accordingly the right to share in the inheritance.
The petition filed by Concepcion Lopez in the intestate proceedings is alleged to be insufficient. It is said that there is no prayer therein that she be
declared an acknowledged natural child, but only that she be adjudged universal heiress, of the deceased. In the body of the petition there is an
allegation that she is a natural child of the based and has been in an uninterrupted possession of such status. And inasmuch as the recognition of her
status is a prerequisite to her right to heirship, her prayer that she be declared universal heiress implies a like prayer that she be recognized as an
acknowledged natural child. Furthermore, it is a well-settled rule of pleadings, applicable to motions or petitions, that the prayer for relief, though part
of the pleading, is no part of the cause of action or defense alleged therein, and the pleader is entitled to as much relief as the facts duly pleaded may
warrant.
The facts found by the lower court as basis for the declaration that the petitioner had been in an uninterrupted possession of the status of natural child
of the deceased In previous cases, similar facts were held to be sufficient to entitle a natural child to recognition.
Order is affirmed, with costs against appellants.

Rule 88-98
An intestate proceeding for the deceased Benita Lambengco was commenced in the CFI. Ambrosio Santiesban, the husband of the decedent, was named
judicial administrator. As the decedent left no unpaid debts or other obligations, her heirs (Ambrosio and their children) executed an extrajudicial
partition, which was approved by the CFI. After the delivery of the properties to the heirs, and payment of inheritance tax, the CFI ordered the final
closure of the intestate. Thereafter, Ambrosio conveyed his share (eight parcels of land) to Guadalupe (his daughter), who in turn applied for the
registration of the said properties in her name. However, this was opposed by Macondray & Co., Inc., alleging that it was the owner pursuant to an action
of foreclosure of a mortgage executed by the original owners of the property. Registration to Guadalupe was denied.
More than 2 years after the closure of the intestate, Ambrosio filed a motion in the intestate asking that the same be reopened. It was initially denied, but
was granted after reconsideration. The CFI reopened the intestate and required the proposal of a new administrator. No proposal was made. The court
ordered the heirs to show cause why the intestate should not again be definitely closed. Guadalupe filed a motion alleging that Ambrosio had died and
that she suffered damages for the loss of the eight parcels of land sold to her by her father. For these reasons, there is a necessity to reopen the intestate.
This was vigorously opposed by the other heirs. In an order, the CFI reopened the intestate and appointed a new administrator. However, upon motion
for reconsideration by the other heirs, the CFI, through the assailed order set aside the reopening of the intestate.
2.) Heirs of Perfecto Whether the CFI properly dismissed the motion to reopen the intestate (YES).
Santiesban v. Santiesban
The CFI’s orders which reopened the intestate and appointed a new administrator were irregularly issued, because the order closing the intestate put an
end thereto and relieved the administrator from his duties. Under Section 753 of the Code of Civil Procedure, what brings an intestate proceeding to a
close is the order of distribution directing the delivery of the residue to the persons entitled thereto after paying the indebtedness, if any, left by the
deceased. This order was issued in the intestate when the court approved the partition executed and submitted by all the heirs.
The CFI in dismissing the motion to reopen, it ruled that the conduct observed by Ambrosio Santiesteban and his children Guadalupe and Clara, in
connection with the eight parcels of land and the application for registration which the latter subsequently filed, was suspicious. The appelants in this
case contend that this conclusion of the court is gratuitous and unfounded because not supported by any evidence and because they were not given an
opportunity to be heard. The error assigned is without merit because it does not constitute a ground to modify or reverse the appealed order. The
conclusion assailed, if erroneous, does not affect any rights of the appellants which should be considered and resolved in this appeal. In truth, the
pronouncement neither affects nor controls the resolution of the alleged damages suffered by the appellants in connection with the eight parcels of land
which their deceased father conveyed to his daughter Guadalupe. The appealed order being in accordance with law is affirmed.
Esteban, Jr. inherited properties from his mother. Before he died, he expressed to his aunt Celedonia that he wants to place his estate in a foundation
after the name of his mother. Celedonia communicated the same to Concordia and the latter agreed. When Esteban, Jr. died, Celedonia filed for
appointment as special administratrix of the estate and she was declared sole heir. Concordia filed an MR because she too was an heir of the deceased.
Both the trial court and CA ruled that the Celedonia should submit an inventory and accounting of the estate. Celedonia refused as the properties of the
deceased have already been transferred to the foundation. The issue is whether Branch 26 had jurisdiction to entertain the case for partition and
recovery of Concordia’s share of Esteban’s estate even while probate proceedings were still pending in Branch 23 of the same court, there being as yet
3.) Solivio v. CA no orders for the submission and approval of the administratix's inventory and accounting, distributing the residue of the estate to the heir, and
terminating the proceedings. (NO) The orders of the RTC 26 in setting aside the probate proceedings on the ground of extrinsic fraud, declaring
Concordia to be a co-heir, ordering the partition of the estate, and requiring Celedonia to submit inventory and accounting, were improper as these are
within the exclusive competence of the probate court. Therefore, the said order which declared Celedonia as the sole heir of the estate does not toll the
probate proceedings. A court should not interfere with probate proceedings pending in a co-equal court. The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate
under administration only after the payment of all the debts and the remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the same.
Rule 88-98
Celestino Salvador owned 9 parcels of land which he sold to Alfonso Salvador and Anatolia Halili. However, Celestino alleged that the sale was void for
lack of consideration, so he filed a suit for reconveyance (Branch 1). During the suit, he died testate so 21 of his alleged hers substituted him. Meanwhile
a special proceedings for the probate of his will was instituted (Branch 2). They were in different courts but both in the CFI of Bulacan. In the
reconveyance suit, the CFI rendered judgement ordering the Alfonso and Anatolia (defendants) to reconvey the land to the estate of Celestino. Alfonso
and Anatolia appealed but the CA affirmed the reconveyance with the correction that the reconveyance be in favor of the 21 substituted plaintiffs.
Around 3 years later, the probate court ordered that one of the parcels of land (Lot 6) in the reconveyance suit be sold so that its proceeds would be
used to pay for debts of the estate. This was bought by PNB for P41,184. After this, the defendants in the reconveyance suit executed a deed of
reconveyance pursuant to the order of the court. Initially it was addressed to the estate of Celestino but this was revoked since the court ordered them to
reconvey to the 21 substituted plaintiffs. So the 21 plaintiffs got a TCT in their name. A month later, the court in the reconveyance suit ordered PNB to
pay the proceeds of the sale of Lot 6 to the 21 plaintiffs, however, no release was made because PNB also awaited for the order of the probate court. In
the next year, the probate court ordered PNB to release the money to the administrator of the estate instead of the 21 plaintiffs. So the 21 plaintiffs
4.) Salvador v. Sta. Maria instituted a special civil action for certiorari to assail the order to pay the debts of the estate with the 41k proceeds of the sale of Lot 6 and to question
the probate court’s power to dispose of the land involved in the reconveyance suit. WoN the properties pertain to the estate? YES
It is settled that the right of the heirs to specific distributive shares of the inheritance does not become finally determinable until all of the debts of the
estate are paid. Until then, they remain inchoate and subject to the existence of a residue after payment of debts. The 21 plaintiffs do not question the
existence of the debts but only they only just want the properties in the reconveyance sale to be given to them instead of the estate because the
properties do not pertain to the estate and should not be liable for the debts of the estate. This is erroneous.
The 21 plaintiffs rights to the properties come from the their character of being heirs of Celestino. The reconveyance to them was reconveyance as heirs
of Celestino. It follows that the properties they are claiming are part of the estate. Their having received the properties in the reconveyance suit was
perforce in trust for the estate and subject to its obligations.
The intestate Mercedes Cano died in August, 1945, leaving as her only heir her son Florante C. Timbol then only 11 years old. On September 27, 1946,
Jose Cano, brother of the intestate, was appointed administrator. On April 13, 1951 Jose Cano, proposing that the agricultural lands of the intestate be
leased to the administrator Jose Cano for an annual rental of P4,000, this rental to be used for the maintenance of the minor and the payment of land
taxes and dues to the government. Judge Edilberto Barot, then presiding the court, approved the motion in an order dated April 27, 1951.
Rental was reduced to P2,400 and conversion of the 30 hectares of agricultural land to a subdivision. On April 2, 1957, upon motion of the administrator,
a project of partition was approved, designating Florante C. Timbol the sole and exclusive heir of all the properties of the intestate. Florante C. Timbol
was appointed administrator in place of Jose Cano and on January 6, 1958 he presented a motion, which he modified in a subsequent one of January
8, 1958, alleging among other things (a) that the area destined for the projected subdivision be increased from 30 hectares to 41.9233 hectares and (b)
that the plan submitted be approved. Cano's objected contenting that (1) that the enlargement of the subdivision would reduce the land leased to him
5.) Timbol v. Cano and would deprive his tenants of their landholdings, and (2) that he is in possession under express authority of the court, under a valid contract, and
may not be deprived of his leasehold summarily upon a simple petition.
Jose C. Cano avers that this Court, in the instant proceedings, cannot pass upon the legality of the aforesaid lease contract, but in its general jurisdiction.
There is no need for the court to declare such contract illegal and, therefore, null and void as the law so expressly provides.
WON the court had jurisdiction to deprive Cano of his rights under the lease-- YES
Cano argues that the court below, as a probate court, has no jurisdiction to deprive the appellant of his rights under the lease, because these rights may
be annulled or modified only by a court of general jurisdiction. This argument holds no merit. In probate proceedings the court orders the probate of the
Rule 88-98
will of the decedent (Rule 80, See. 5); grants letters of administration to the party best entitled thereto or to any qualified applicant (Id., Sec. 6);
supervises and controls all acts of administration; hears and approves claims against the estate of the deceased (Rule 87, See. 13); orders payment of
lawful debts (Rule 89, Sec. 14); authorizes sale, mortgage or any encumbrance of real estate (Rule 90, Sec. 2); directs the delivery of the estate to
those entitled thereto (Rule 91, See. 1). It has been held that the court acts as a trustee, and as such trustee, should jealously guard the estate and see that
it is wisely and economically administered, not dissipated. Even the contract of lease under which the appellant holds the agricultural lands of the
intestate and which he now seeks to protect, was obtained with the court's approval. If the probate court has the right to approve the lease, so may it
order its revocation, or the reduction of the subject of the lease. The matter of giving the property to a lessee is an act of administration, also subject to
the approval of the court.
We have taken pains to answer all the arguments adduced by the appellant on this appeal. But all said arguments are squarely laid to naught by the
declaration of the court that the lease of the agricultural lands of the estate to the appellant Cano, who was the administrator at the time the lease was
granted, is null and void not only because it is immoral but also because the lease by the administrator to himself is prohibited by law.
Facts: Petitioner filed for an intestate proceeding in CFI-Negros but respondents contend that Don Juan left a will found in Spain and therefore they filed
a proceeding for the probate of will in the Manila court. Petitioner’s contention is that Manila court did not have any jurisdiction over the estate
proceedings since it was the Negros court that first took cognizance of the settlement of the estate. There are 2 special proceedings in this case. One is
with the CFI-Negros (intestate proceeding) and the other’s with the CFI-Manila (probate of the will/testate proceeding).
Issue: WON the respondent should have filed the probate of the last will of Don Juan with the CFI-Negros or to commence a separate action as he did in
the Manila court
6) Uriarte v. CFI of Negros
Occidental, 33 SCRA 252
Held: Respondent should have submitted the will for probate in CFINegros, either in a separate proceeding or in a separate motion filed in the same
special proceeding. HOWEVER, Don Juan is a non-resident and he has properties both in Negros and Manila court. Petitioner’s contention that Manila
court did not have jurisdiction cannot be accepted. Wrong venue is merely a waiveable procedural defect and that petitioner in this case has waived his
right to raise such objection from doing so by laches.
Doctrine: [lifted from escra] Where intestate proceedings before a court of first instance had already been commenced, the probate of the will should be
filed in the same court, either in a separate special proceeding or in appropriate motion
RULE 91
This is a petition for escheat filed by the Municipal Council of San Pedro Laguna wherein they assert their claim over the Hacienda de San Pedro
Tunasan. The Colegio de San Jose, Inc., appeared specially and assailed the petition upon the grounds that the court has no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of and decide the case and that the petition does not allege sufficient facts to entitle the applicants to the remedy prayed for; and asked that
the petition be finally dismissed. The court DISMISSED the petition for escheat. Hence, this appeal.
Municipal Council of Laguna

v. Colegio de San Jose
The Court held that it was correct that the petition for escheat should be dismissed. According to the law at the time: The following are jurisdictional
facts that must be alleged and seen in a petition for escheat:
1. That a person has died intestate or without leaving any will;

2. That he has left real or personal property; that he was the owner thereof;
3. That he has not left any heir or person who is by law entitled to the property; and
Rule 88-98
4. That the one who applies for the escheat is the municipality where the deceased had his last residence, or in case he should have no residence
in the country, the municipality where the property is situated.
(NOT REALLY IMPORTANT) Is the Municipality the only interested party in the petition for escheat? NO. In a special proceeding for escheat under
sections 750 and 751 the petitioner is not the sole and exclusive interested party. Any person alleging to have a direct right or interest in the property
sought to be escheated is likewise an interested and necessary party and may appear and oppose the petition for escheat. Colegio de San Jose claims to
be the exclusive owner of the property and Carlos Young (intervenor) claims to be the lessee of the property are then admitted as interested parties.
HOWEVER, the petition shall be dismissed because AS ALLEGED BY THE MUNICIPALITY ITSELF the hacienda has already been confiscated by the King
of Spain (note, this is a 1938 case) from the possession of the Fathers of the Society of Jesus and hence is now a property of the Crown. From the Crown it
has been passed to the Americans and hence has been passed to the Government of the Philippines. From the moment the hacienda was confiscated by
the Kingdom of Spain, the same ceased to be the property of the children of Esteban Rodriguez de Figueroa, the Colegio de San Jose or the Jesuit Fathers,
and became the property of the Commonwealth of the Philippines by virtue of the transfer under the Treaty of Paris, alleged in the petition. Hence, the
property is no longer one owned by a deceased person who has not left any heir or person who may legally claim it. Hence, it cannot be subject to
escheat.
The property in dispute was among the lands taken over by the US Government under the Philippine Property Act of 1946 enacted by the American
Congress. Under the said Act, the land was supposed to be transferred to the Republic of the Philippines.
It was registered in 1930 under TCT No. 9509 of the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga in the name of Kantiro Koyama, a Japanese national, who has not
been heard from since the end of World War II. The transfer was never made and the property remained registered under Koyama.
The Republic of the Philippines had filed escheat proceedings, claiming that the registered owner of the land "had been absent for the past 10 years or
more and he, therefore, may be presumed dead for the purpose of appointing his successor." It also alleged that since he left no heirs or persons entitled
to the aforementioned property, the State should inherit the same in accordance with Rule 91 of the Rules of Court.
After the required publications, hearing was held at which the City of Zamboanga did not appear and no claim or opposition was filed by any party. The
trial court declared the property escheated to the State in favor of the City of Zamboanga where the property is located for the benefit of public schools
and public charitable institutions and centers in the City of Zamboanga.
The Board of Liquidators elevated the case to the SC arguing that there was a mere oversight on the part of the American government which prevented
the formality of a transfer of the property to the Philippine government. That neglect should not divest the Republic of the property.
2. Republic (as represented IAC argues that the property was not transferred as required by the said law. Hence, it was properly escheated to the City of Zamboanga, on the
by the Board of Liquidators) unrebutted presumption that the registered owner was already dead, and there being no heirs or other claimants to the land in question.
v. IAC The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Board of Liquidators. Rule 91 does not apply.
It is clear, and the respondent City of Zamboanga does not deny it, that there was mere inadvertence on the part of the American government in omitting
to transfer the disputed land to the Republic of the Philippines. The obvious purpose of the Act was to turn over to the Philippine government all enemy
properties situated in its territory that had been seized and were being held for the time being by the United States, which was then exercising
sovereignty over the Philippines. While it is true that there are no records of such transfer, we may presume that such transfer was made.
We hold that where it comes to ordinary real properties the owners of which may be presumed dead and left no heirs, the same may be escheated,
conformably to Rule 91 of the Rules of Court, in favor of the political subdivisions in which they are located. The said Rule, however, does not cover
properties taken from enemy nationals as a result of World War II and required to be transferred to the Republic of the Philippines by the United
States in accordance with its own enactment commonly known as the Philippine Property Act of 1946. Such properties, including the land in dispute,
belong to the Philippine government not by virtue of the escheat proceedings but on the strength of the transfer authorized and required by the said Act.
It may really be that, for practical reasons, the disputed property should be entrusted to the City of Zamboanga, for the purposes indicated in the Rules of
Court. That may still be effected. But this will require a transfer of the land to the city by the Republic of the Philippines, to which it belongs and which
has the power to dispose of it.
Rule 88-98
Dominga is an adopted daughter. She married a chinaman and they emigrated to China. Dominga died intestate, and left a lot in Davao City, but both her
husband and children never returned to PH to claim the lot. Dominga’s cousin (her adopted mother’s nephew) occupied a part of Dominga’s property.
That cousin collected the rentals from the owners of homes occupying the lot. Another cousin alerted the Sol.-Gen. About the said property. Then, the
City of Davao filed a petition in the CFI to declare the prop. in favor of the city, and declare Dominga and her children presumed dead pursuant to Rule.
92 under the old rules of court. ISSUE: WON the City of Davao had personality to file the escheat petition = YES. RATIO: The case does not fall under
3. Vicente Tan v. City of the present Rule 91 because the petition was filed on Sept. 12, 1962. At the time the escheat petition was filed, the applicable rule was still
Davao Rule 92 of the 1940 RoC.
Under the old Rules of Court (Rule 92, Sec. 1, 1940 RoC) - the Municipality/City where the deceased last resided MAY FILE a petition in the CFI of the
province, praying that the estate of the deceased be declared escheated.
Rule 91 Escheat was not the main issue—it was merely the remedy decreed by the court for the case so there’s nothing on Rule 91
FACTS: This is a case between Bermudo and the Chinese Nationalist Party. Tom Chow & Go Se Pieng obtained a judicial decree of registration as
co-owners over Lot 77s. They were issued OCT 10256 in 1932. But before the OCT was issued, they both renounced all their interests and rights over the
property, saying that they were mere trustees of the lot for the Chinese Nationalist Party. The Party allegedly acquired the property from Philippine
Refining Company. 24 years later, Bermudo filed in the CFI a petition for the reconstitution of the records. He alleged that he was sold ½ of the property.
The reconstitution was granted and he was issued a TCT because there was no opposition. The Chinese Nationalist party filed a petition for relief from
the order and prayed for its annulment. They claimed that the reconstitution was obtained in bad faith because they were not notified of the hearing in
spite of the fact that Bermudo lived adjacent to Lot 776 and had personal knowledge that the lot had been owned and possessed by the Party for more
than 30 years. The reconstitution was annulled by the CFI. CA affirmed.
ISSUE #1: WON CA exceeded authority in affirming the CFI. YES
When the Chinese Nationalist Party filed its petition for relief, the order of reconstitution had not only become final and executory, the said order was
already executed by the issuance of the reconstituted OCT No. 10256 which resulted in the issuance of TCT No. 1948 to Bermudo. As a petition for relief
from judgment is proper only when the court is still in control of the proceedings, the lower court should not have entertained the Party’s (Chinese)
4. Bermuda v. CA petition because at that time, it was already deprived of its jurisdiction over the case. Furthermore, the lower court should have considered the fact that
premised on equity, relief from judgment is granted only in exceptional cases, and being an act of grace, it is not regarded with favor.
ISSUE #2: WON Bermuda properly owned the ½ of the property. NO.
As correctly held by the CFI and CA, Bermudo acted in bad faith in seeking reconstitution of OCT No. 10256. However, doubts as to the capacity of the
Chinese Nationalist Party came into view—there being no proof that it had the juridical capacity to hold property when it acquired it because only
corporations that are 60% Filipino owned could hold property.
ONLY MENTION OF RULE 91 ESCHEAT: To remove all doubts over the Party's right over lot 776 and to settle the question of who really should be
entitled to register said lot in his name, We are convinced that an escheat proceeding under Section 5, Rule 91 of the Rules of Court must be initiated by
the government. All interested parties, especially the actual occupants and the adjacent lot owners including petitioner Bermudo shall be personally
notified of the proceeding and given the opportunity to prevent their valid claims over Lot 776 otherwise it will be reverted to the State. Doctrine: When
there is doubt as to the ownership of the property, the Court may make use of Escheat proceedings where in the property is reverted back to the
ownership of the state if there is no proper claim to the ownership of the property.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is herein dismissed. The Solicitor General or his representative
Rule 88-98
is hereby directed to immediately file an escheat proceeding pursuant to Section 5, Rule 91 of the Rules of Court in the proper Regional Trial
Court which shall give priority to the case and decide it at the earliest possible time.
Pursuant to the Unclaimed Balance Act, Pres. Roxas Rural Bank (Roxas bank) submitted to the Treasurer of the Philippines documents showing their
depositors who are dead, unheard of, who have not made withdrawals or deposits for 10 years or more. The said bank submitted two names. The
treasuer of the philippines caused the publication. Thereafter, the Republic instituted the escheat proceedings before the CFI Manila against the 31
banks including herein private respondent. Summons were serve to the banks and to the named depositors and order them to file an answer 60 days
from publication of the notice of the proceedings. Roxas Bank filed motion to dismiss on the ground that the venue is improperly laid. This was granted.
Hence, this petition.
W/N the bank is a real party-in-interest- Yes. A "real party in interest" has been defined as the party who would be benefitted or injured by the judgment
of the suit or the party entitled to avail of the suit. 1 There can be no doubt that private respondent bank falls under this definition for the escheat of the
dormant deposits in favor of the government would necessarily deprive said bank of the use of such deposits. It is in this sense that it stands to be
"injured by the judgment of the suit;" and it is for this reason that Section 3 of Act No. 3936 specifically provides that the bank shall be joined as a party
in the action for escheat.
5) Republic v. CFI Manila

W/N the venue is improperly laid- Y es. The first sentence of Section 3 of Act No. 3936 directs the Attorney General to commence an action or actions in
the name of the People of the Philippines in the Court of First Instance of the province where the bank is located. A single action to cover all banks
wherever located in the Philippines would not be legally feasible in view of the venue prescribed for such action under the same section. Thus, the
addition of the last sentence, which the lower court had correctly interpreted to mean "that for escheat of unclaimed bank balances all banks located in
one and the same province where the Court of First Instance concerned is located may be made parties defendant "in one action" was clearly intended
to save on litigation and publication expenses, but certainly not as authority for the lumping together of all banks wherever found in the
Philippines in one single escheat proceedings.
o. Escheat proceedings are actions in rem which must be brought in the province or city
W/N the rule of venues on personam actions apply in this case- N
where the rem in this case the dormant deposits, is located.
RULE 92
Feliciano Francisco is the duly appointed guardian of the incompetent Estefania San Pedro. Pelagio Francisco, claiming to be a first cousin of
Estefania San Pedro, together with two others, said to be nieces of the incompetent, petitioned the court for the removal of Feliciano and for Pelagio’s
appointment in his stead.. Among other grounds, the petition was based on the failure of the guardian to submit an inventory of the estate of his ward
and to render an accounting. Feliciano thereafter submitted an inventory to which Pelagio filed an objection on the ground that Feliciano actually
received P14,000.00 for the sale of a residential land and not P12,000.00 only as stated in the deed of sale and reported by him in his inventory. The
Francisco v. CA Judge found the claim to be true, and relieved the Feliciano as guardian. On motion of Feliciano, however, the Judge reconsidered his finding.
Nevertheless, the Judge ordered the retirement of Feliciano on the ground of old age.
Subsequently, the court appointed Pelagio as the new guardian of the person and property of the incompetent Estefania San Pedro. Feliciano filed with
the CA a petition for certiorari challenging the validity of the order of the trial court granting the execution pending appeal of its decision and appointing
Rule 88-98
Pelagio Francisco as the new guardian despite the fact that Pelagio is 5 years older than Feliciano. The CA dismissed the petition.
1. W/N CA committed GAD in holding that the removal of Feliciano as guardian of the ward Estefania San Pedro on the ground of old age is a
good ground for the execution of the decision pending appeal. No.
A guardian is or becomes incompetent to serve the trust if he is so disqualified by mental incapacity, conviction of crime, moral delinquency or physical
disability as to be prevented from properly discharging the duties of his office. A guardian, once appointed may be removed in case he becomes insane
or otherwise incapable of discharging his trust or unsuitable therefor, or has wasted or mismanaged the estate, or failed for thirty (30) days after it is
due to render an account or make a return.
The SC agreed that there is a need for Feliciano to be retired from the guardianship over the person and property of incompetent Estefania San Pedro.
The conclusion reached by the trial court about the "rather advanced age" of Feliciano at 72 years old (Feliciano is now 76 years old) finding him unfit to
continue the trust cannot be disturbed. As correctly pointed out by the CA, this finds direct support in the delay of the accounting and inventory made by
Feliciano. To sustain Feliciano as guardian would, therefore, be detrimental to the ward. While age alone is not a control criterion in determining a
person's fitness or qualification to be appointed or be retained as guardian, it may be a factor for consideration.
2. W/N CA committed grave misapprehension and misinterpretation of facts when it declared that Feliciano did not question the appointment of
Pelagio as guardian in his stead on the ground that the latter is older than the former by five (5) years. No.
With respect to the issue of execution pending appeal in appointing Pelagio as guardian to succeed Feliciano while the latter's appeal was still pending,
the CA correctly sustained the propriety of said execution pending appeal. Upon urgent and compelling reasons, execution pending appeal is a matter of
sound discretion on the part of the trial court, and the CA will not interfere, control or inquire into the exercise of this discretion, unless there has been
an abuse thereof, which there is none in this case.
Inasmuch as the primary objective for the institution of guardianship is for the protection of the ward, there is more than sufficient reason for the
immediate execution of the lower court's judgment for the replacement of the first guardian. In sustaining execution pending appeal, an indefinite
continuance in office would defeat the intent and purpose of the order relieving the present guardian.
After his wife died, Alberto instituted a guardianship proceeding involving his seven minor children. Alberto alleged that the estate of his wife was
P35,000.00 (each child would have P7,000.00). Alberto was eventually appointed as guardian. The first City Court judge authorised Alberto to settle the
estate extrajudicially and to sell shares of stock, which he eventually did. Alberto filed a motion for confirmation and approval of the Deed of Exchange,
but the new City Court judge dismissed the case since the amount of the estate is beyond the City Court's jursidiction. The new judge also revoked
Alberto's appointment as guardian.
Issue: Whether the city court's jurisdiction over a petition for general guardianship is based on the total value of the estate OR on the value of the
2. Lavides v. City Court of
individual share of the minors in the estate of their deceased mother
Lucena
The Court ruled the Rules of Court clearly grants concurrent jurisdiction to municipal and city courts and Court of First Instance in the appointment of
guardians. However, the Rules are also clear in stating that the Court of First Instance shall have jurisdiction when the value of the property of such
minor or incompetent exceeds the jurisdiction of the municipal or city courts. The value of the property of the minor or incompetent sought to be placed
in guardianship determines which court has jurisdiction. When there is more than one minor or incompetent, what determines which court has
jurisdiction is the value of the individual property of each minor or incompetent. The value of each child's share (P7,000.00) is well within the city
court's jurisdiction (according to Section 88, Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended by R.A. No. 3828). Moreover, the case had already been dragged out for
Rule 88-98
more than a decade, so fairness dictates that Alberto's petition be granted. Remanded for further proceedings
RULE 93
Sotero Baluyut died and 45 days later his alleged nephew, Alfredo Baluyut filed a petition in the CFI of Quezon City for the settlement of his estate.
Alfredo alleged that Sotero’s widow (Mrs. Baluyut) was mentally incapable of administering her affairs and the decedent’s estate or acting as executrix of
his will. Alfredo played to the appointed as administrator. The appointment was set aside by the SC in another case because the persons contesting her
capacity to act were not given adequate opportunity to be heard. The Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court. Meanwhile, 2 successive petitions were
filed in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City were filed to declare Mrs. Baluyut incompetent and to place her under guardianship.
The first was filed by Alfredo which was dismissed and the second was filed by the widow’s sisters which were given due course. The Court summarily
declared MRs. Baluyut as incompetent on the basis of a report of a psychiatrist who was not cross examined, and without hearing the evidence of the
1. Encarnacion Lopez Vda. de
parties.
Baluyut v Judge Leonor
Luciano
W/N Mrs. Baluyut was denied due process of law when the guardianship court summarily announced a verdict on her incompetency? – YES
A finding that a person is incompetent should be anchored on clear, positive, and definite evidence. That kind of proof has not yet been presented to the
guardianship court to justify the conclusion that Mrs. Baluyut was an incompetent. The lower court should have adhered strictly to the procedure in Rule
93 which provides that after the filing of the petition, the court should fix a time and place for hearing and give proper notices. At the hearing, the alleged
incompetent must be present if able to attend, and if must be shown that the required notice has been given. Thereupon, the court shall hear the
evidence of the parties in support of their respective allegations.
Luis Yangco, 21 years old, is the owner of property valued at P1M and temporarily travelling abroad at the time of the proceedings were had. He was
declared a spendthrift and guardians of his property was appointed. Summary of causes of action. The proceedings mentioned were conducted without
notice personally given to the petitioner.
WON the decree declaring the petitioner a spendthrift and appointing a guardian for his property was void for lack of jurisdiction? YES, because notice to
the petitioner as required by the statute is jurisdictional.
The petitioner is a resident and was only temporarily absent therefrom traveling abroad at the time proceedings were instituted.
2) Yangco v. CFI of Manila, 21 The decree declaring the petitioner a spendthrift and appointing a guardian for his property was and is void for lack of jurisdiction. In proceedings of
Phil 184 this class notice as required by the statute is jurisdictional and the lack of it deprives the court of power to make a valid decree in the premises. The
Statute provides that notice must be given to the supposed insane or incompetent person of the time and place of hearing the petition, not less than five
days before the time so appointed. The statute does not authorize a substituted service except in cases where the person for whose property the
guardian is sought to be appointed is a resident of a foreign country. Personal notice being essential under the statute, the notice to the
mother-in-law and brother-in-law of the alleged spendthrift was of no legal value. To declare a person of full age to be incompetent to manage his
affairs and thereby deprive him of the possession of and right to hold and manage his property is a serious thing. Hence, personal notice is important for
him to be present in court during proceedings. Even if petitioner is to be considered as non-resident, still the notice required has not been given. That
section requires notice "to all interested, in such manner as such court orders, by publication or otherwise." No notice whatever was given to the alleged
incompetent, either by publication or otherwise, and he certainly is one of the parties "interested."
Rule 88-98
RULE 94
Mrs. Santos-Nario was issued by the Philippine American Life Insurance Co. a life insurance policy under a 20-year endowment plan with a face value of
PHP5,000. She designated thereon her husband, Delfin Nario, and their unemancipated minor son, Ernesto, as her irrevocable beneficiaries. In 1963,
Mrs. Nario applied for a loan under the policy after the same has been in force for 3 years. The purpose of using the proceeds thereof is for the expenses
for education of her minor son Ernesto. The application has the signature and consent of Delfin in two capacities. First as one of the irrevocable
beneficiaries of the policy and the other, as father-guardian of the minor son and as administrator of the minor’s properties pursuant to Article
320 of the Civil Code. However, the Insurance Company denied the application because the written consent for the minor son must not only be given by
his father as legal guardian but it must be authorized by the court in a competent guardianship proceeding. Because of this, Mrs. Nario signified her
decision to surrender the policy back to the insurance company and just demanded its cash value (this is allowed under the policy) but this was also
denied by the company. After the said denial, the spouses brought an action against the company to compel the latter to give them the cash value of the
policy. The lower court ruled in favor of the insurance company. Hence, this petition.
W/N court authorization is needed for the policy loan application and the surrender of such policy - yes
Delfin Nario v. PhilAm Life

Insurance Company The vested interest or right of the beneficiaries in the policy should be measured on its full face value (5k php) and not on its cash surrender value
(520php), for in case of death of the insured, said beneficiaries are paid on the basis of its face value and in case the insured should discontinue paying
premiums, the beneficiaries may continue paying it and are entitled to automatic extended term or paid-up insurance options, etc. and that said vested
right under the policy cannot be divisible at any given time. We likewise agree with the conclusion of the lower court that the proposed transactions in
question (policy loan and surrender of policy) constitute acts of disposition or alienation of property rights and not merely of management or
administration because they involve the incurring or termination of contractual obligations.
As above noted, the full face value of the policy is P5,000.00 and the minor's vested interest therein, as one of the two (2) irrevocable beneficiaries,
consists of one-half (½) of said amount or P2,500.00. It appearing that the minor beneficiary's vested interest or right on the policy exceeds two
thousand pesos (P2,000.00) and that plaintiffs did not file any guardianship bond to be approved by the court; and as later implemented in Section 7,
Rule 93 of the Revised Rules of Court, plaintiffs should have, but, had not, filed a formal application or petition for guardianship, plaintiffs-parents
cannot possibly exercise the powers vested on them, as legal administrators of their child's property, under articles 320 and 326 of the Civil Code. As
there was no such petition and bond, the consent given by the father-guardian, for and in behalf of the minor son, without prior court
authorization, to the policy loan application and the surrender of said policy, was insufficient and ineffective, and defendant-appellee was
justified in disapproving the proposed transactions in question.
The guardian of Tito Jocsing, an imbecile, sued Jungsay, the former guardian of Tito, together with his bondsmen who absconded with Tito’s funds
amounting to P6,000.00. Jungsay and bondsmen lost and the latter appealed. They seek to be credited with P4,400, the alleged value of certain property
attached as that of the absconding guardian, all of which is in the exclusive possession of third parties under claim of ownership.
Arroyo v. Jungsay
Issue: WON bondsmen should be credited 4,400? No.
The bondsmen are invoking excussion but before the surety is entitled to this benefit, he must point out to the creditor property of the principal debtor
which can be sold and which is sufficient to cover the amount of the debt. Manresa says that property must also be realizable to insure the fulfillment of
Rule 88-98
the obligation and at the same time furnish the creditor with the means of obtaining its fulfillment without hindrance or delays.
Here, the property pointed out by the sureties is not sufficient to pay the indebtedness and is not salable as it is incumbered with claims of ownership
without leaving to the absconding guardian a fractional or reversionary interest without determining first whether the claim of one or more of the
occupants is well founded. In all these respects the sureties have failed to meet the requirements of article 1832 of the Civil Code.
Where a guardian absconds or is beyond the jurisdiction of the court, the proper method, under article 1834 of the Civil Code and section 577 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, in order to ascertain whether such guardian is liable and to what extent, in order to bind the sureties on his official bond, is by a
proceeding in the nature of a civil action wherein the sureties are made parties and given an opportunity to be heard. All this was done in the instant
case.
RULE 95
Sps. Enrique and Maximina Navarro died intestate in 1945 (March and Feb respectively) and left the ff. heirs: 2 daughters (Benita and Leonora) and 2
minor grandchildren (Ramon and Delia, represented by their mom). During the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouses in the CFI, a Project of
Partition was executed and presented to court by all those mentioned heirs and the court approved it. One of the daughters (Leonora) got (1) a parcel
of land in Davao (Lot 634-A) and (2) all the rights and interests in a portion of a lot in Davao (Lot 633 and 632).
Later on, Eldegardes Yuson de Pua (daughter and judicial guardian of Leonora, who became incompetent) filed a verified petition praying for an
authority to sell no. (1), which the court granted on the condition that “the sale of the aforesaid property will be beneficial to the ward and her minor
children because the proceeds thereof could be expended for their maintenance.” The lot was then sold by De Pua to Justiniano San Agustin for P13k
evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale. The court approved the sale and directed De Pua to deposit with PNB the payment for the sale of property, in the
name of the guardianship, to be withdrawn only upon previous approval of the court.
Subsequently, De Pua also sold no. (2) first before filing another petition for authority to sell. She justified it by saying that said lots cannot be
maintained nor improved by the estate, as well as the fact of the needs of the insane ward (Leonora) and the expenses of her children. Because she sold
De Pua v. San Agustin the lots first before securing authority, De Pua also filed a motion to approve the sale of (2). The petition disclosed the true area of the lots which
was 11 hectares (and not the initial 1.5 hectares). The court denied both the petition and the motion as it was unnecessary nor beneficial to the ward.
The other heirs discovered the true area of (2) and thus they executed a Supplemental Project of Partition which recognized the conveyance to San
Agustin and that they convey their rights to Leonora subject to payment of certain amount. They presented it to the court and approved it (IMPT,
assume they presented it to the probate court). Here, De Pua decided to return first the amount Agustin advanced as payment for (2) so that said lots
may be returned to the guardianship. However, San Agustin filed a motion with the court to confirm the transfer of rights over (2) to him, which was
decided by the lower courts as void ab initio.
Issue: (1) WoN sale of a ward’s property without prior authority by the guardianship is void - YES, Rule 95 requires that the properties of a ward could
be sold only under the prior authority of the guardianship court. Even assuming that the lack of authority from the guardianship court resulted only in a
voidable sale (w/c is ratifiable), there is no showing of any ratification. The approval of the probate court of the Supplemental Project of Partition
is not tantamount to the required ratification.
Rule 88-98
(2) WoN a probate court has jurisdiction to authorize the sale of property under guardianship - NO, a probate court has no jurisdiction to authorize this,
more so when the sale has been previously disapproved by a guardianship court. Probate court’s approval of the Supplemental Project of Partition did
not confer upon De Pua the power to dispose no. (2) lots without prior permission of the guardianship court. A probate court neither has any power
to approve a sale of an heir-ward which had been disapproved by the guardianship court.
A guardianship court is designed purposely to see to it that the interests of wards under its jurisdiction are taken care of by the court appointed
guardian with the diligence and prudence of a bonus pater familiae.
Rodolfo Gonzales married twice. He had mutiple children in both marriages. Gonzalez and his second wife executed an "Agreement for Dissolution of
Conjugal Partnership and for Establishment of Separation of Property," for the declared purpose of avoiding "confusion and/or differences among the
two sets of heirs (of said Rodolfo Gonzalez) in the settlement of the estates of the said spouses in case of death." They then filed a petition with the
Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court of Manila for approval of their agreement, entitled "In the Matter of the Voluntary Dissolution of Conjugal
Partnership," and which was docketed as Civil Case No. E-01680.
Salvador R. Gonzalez, the eldest of the four children of the first marriage, instituted in the same Court proceedings to place under guardianship the
property of his father Rodolfo P. Gonzalez, grounded on the latter's alleged incapacity "to manage and direct his financial and ownership status"
resulting from the deterioration of his mental faculties on account of illness and advanced age. [GUARDIANSHIP PROCEEDING]
MEANWHILE, Rodolfo P. Gonzalez and his second wife drew up a contract for the sale of two parcels of land situated in Jose Batute Street and United
Nations Avenue in favor of Helen Grace Silvestre and Rica Marie Silvestre. The lots were covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Numbered 6803 and
6802 issued in their names, and were subject of first mortgages held, respectively, by the Philippine Trust Company and the Philippine National Bank. It
appears however that the mortgagee banks were not willing to accede to the assumption by the vendees of the spouses' mortgage obligations. What the
vendor spouses did, on July 16, 1975, was to cause annotation of the sales as adverse claims on the corresponding certificates of title. [ADVERSE
CLAIMS]
Gonzales v. Ordanez-Benitez Salvador caused notices of lis pendens on to be annotated on some of the properties of Rodolfo and Luz on the ground of the guardianship proceedings
ongoing in Court, including the 2 parcels of land already sold to vendee spouses.
Rodolfo filed a petition to cancel the annotation on the ground that the subject properties where his and his second wife's conjugal property. The lower
court DENIED Rodolfo's petition.
W/N the Notice of Lis Pendens is properly based on the guardianship proceedings. - YES.
The children of the first marriage indisputably have an interest in the property of the first marriage, as well as in the property of the second. They have a
right to allege and prove in the appropriate proceeding in the proper forum that their father, Rodolfo P. Gonzalez, had brought property acquired by him
and his first wife into his second marriage with Luz Dizon, and also that all or certain of the property acquired during said second marriage is conjugal in
character. And they have the right to challenge in the appropriate proceeding in the proper forum, as they have done, their father's capacity to make
dispositions of property acquired during either of his marriages. The issues necessarily involved are factual, i.e., the degree of Rodolfo P. Gonzalez'
alleged incapacity; the manner and other circumstances of the acquisition of the properties during the first and second marriages; the attendance of
fraud, or undue pressure or influence on any dispositions or attempts at disposition by Rodolfo P. Gonzalez of any property. Obviously, these issues
cannot be resolved without evidence which, to be sure, may not be received and passed upon by this Court in the first instance. And until these
issues are resolved, there is clearly a need to warn any person interested in any property titled in the name of Rodolfo P. Gonzalez, among
others, of the pendency of the proceedings which might eventually result in the invalidation of any transaction made by said Rodolfo P.
Rule 88-98
Gonzalez affecting such property.
Of course, as Mr. and Mrs. Rodolfo P. Gonzalez point out, "the effect of the notices of lis pendens . . .are not delimited to the properties of Dr. RODOLFO P.
GONZALEZ, but extend to the proprietary interests of Dra. LUZ DIZON-GONZALEZ, . . . who is not personally involved in the proceedings for
guardianship." This is true, but it cannot be helped, since the latter's name does in fact appear in the titles together with her husband's, and under the
law, no disposition of property can be made alone by either of them.
Plaintiffs here (all surnamed Lindain) were already the registered owners of a parcel of land even when they were still minors. Their mother then
(acting guardian of minor children) sold the land to defendant Spouses Valiente and Ila. These spouses then registered it under their name. Now
plaintiffs assailed this sale by their mother. They argue that it was null and void since sale was effected without judicial authority and/or court approval.
Defendants maintain that the sale was valid since the value thereof at time of sale was less than 2k and considering the ages now of the plaintiffs (then
minors at time of sale), the youngest now 31 years old at time of complaint filing, their right to rescind the contract has already prescribed (4 years after
reaching age of majority).
Lindain v. CA Issue is whether judicial approval was necessary for the sale of the minor’s property by their mother who was then acting as their guardian. SC said that
under the law, a parent, acting merely as the legal as compared to judicial administrator of the property of his/her minor children, does not
have the power to dispose of or alienate the property of said minor children without judicial approval. Civil Code provides that “The father, or in
his absence the mother, is the legal administrator of the property pertaining to the child under parental authority. If the property is worth more than
two thousand pesos, the father or mother shall give a bond subject to the approval of the Court of First Instance." The defense of buyer in good faith was
also not accepted by SC since spouses defendants knew from the start that the property was sold even without judicial authority and that the owners
were then minors. The action for reconveyance has not prescribed yet. Real actions over immovables prescribe after 30 years. Sala happened in 1966.
This suit was instituted on 1987.
Margarita died intestate, leaving nine children. One of them, Maneclang, petitioned for the settlement of the estate. No guardian ad litem was
appointed for any of the minor heirs.
On September 1949, despite the absence of notice to the heirs, the intestate court issued an Order "authorizing the administrator to mortgage or sell so
much of the properties of the estate for the purpose of paying off the obligations" referred to in the petition. Some properties were then sold; the City of
Dagupan bought a parcel of land and built a market on it. In 1965, the newly appointed administratrix contested said sale, saying that no sale can be
valid with the absence of notice to the heirs, who did not even have a guardian ad litem to begin with. The RTC ruled for the annulment of the sale
and demanded that the City of Dagupan return the properties it bought. Aggrieved, the City appealed the RTC decision.
Whether the sale of a parcel of land by the administrator of an intestate estate made pursuant to a petition for authority to sell and an order
granting it which were filed and entered, respectively, without notice to the heirs of the decedents, is valid.
Maneclang v. Baun
NO. Without notice and hearing, the sale, mortgage or encumbrance is void. Notice is mandatory. Noncompliance therewith under the sale is null and
void. Violation of Rule 95 rendered the sale void ab initio.
The authority to sell, the sale itself and the order approving it would be null and void ab initio.
1. The Civil Code provides that the father or mother, as such, the administrator of the child's property but it does not follow that for purposes of
complying with the requirement of notice under Rule 89 of the Rules of the Court, notice to the father is notice to the children.
2. It is explicitly provided that notice must be in be writing, must be given to the heirs, devisees, and legatees and that the court shall fix a time
and place for hearing such petition and cause notice to be given to the interested parties.
In this case, however, only the surviving spouse, Severo Maneclang, was notified through his counsel. The remaining seven (7) children were still minors
Rule 88-98
with no guardian ad litem having been appointed to represent them. Obviously then, the requirement of notice was not satisfied. The requisite set forth
in the aforesaid sections of Rule 89 are mandatory and essential. Without them, the authority to sell, the sale itself and the order approving it would be
null and void ab initio.
NOTE however that 4 of 9 children are BARRED by laches, as they are already of legal age when the sale was executed. As it was Oscar who
executed the deed of sale, he cannot be expected to renounce his own act. With respect to Hector, Cesar and Amanda, they should have taken immediate
steps to protect their rights. Their failure to do so for thirteen (13) years amounted to such inaction and delay as to constitute laches. (Hence, only 5/9 of
the property may be recovered as stated in the dispositive portion!)
RULE 96
Special Proceedings No. 2641 for the guardianship of the incompetent Soledad Rodriguez was originally filed before Branch I- Lucena, CFI of Quezon but
the case was thereafter transferred to Branch IV-Calauag, of the same court and province presided over by respondent Judge who was detailed at Lucena
to assist in decongesting the dockets of Branches I & II. Upon motion of the private respondent, the legally appointed guardian, respondent judge
authorized the sale of three lots belonging to the ward to the petitioners. On May 13, 1968, the private respondent went to court for the examination of
the petitioners regarding alleged concealment and embezzlement of the questioned properties to the prejudice of the ward. On July 29, 1968, the
presiding judge of Branch I, Lucena issued orders for the transfer to its court of the incident sought and for the submission of an inventory and
accounting of the ward’s properties. On April 15, 1969, even after respondent Judge had ordered the transmittal of the records of the case to Branch I, he
ordered petitioners to reconvey the three parcels of land to private respondent. Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration as well as a Second Motion for
Reconsideration on the ground of lack of jurisdiction were denied. Instead of instituting an appeal, petitioners went on certiorari to the Court of Appeals
to set aside respondent judge’s decision of April 15, 1969. The petition was dismissed, reconsidered, and finally dismissed.
Issue: WON the respondent judge had authority to take further action on the case after the presiding judge of Branch I-Lucena had asserted its
jurisdiction over it. NO
WON guardianship court has authority to adjudicate on the ownership over the lands in question,despite the fact that a guardianship court is of limited
jurisdiction. NO
1. Parco vs CA
The Supreme Court held that respondent judge had no power or authority to retain jurisdiction over Special Proceeding 2641 which, at its inception,
originally pertained to Branch 1-Lucena. when the presiding judge of said branch asserted and resumed its prior jurisdiction thereon, the respondent
judge could no longer take further action on the case as the same constitutes undue interference in the proceedings of another coordinate and co-equal
court. The court further held that a guardianship court cannot actually order the delivery of the property found embezzled or concealed to the ward as a
determination of said disputed title or right must be determined in a separate ordinary action.
Resolution of the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside; judgment of respondent judge declared null and void; and case remanded to Branch I-Lucena
for further proceedings.
Doctrine: Generally, the guardianship court exercising special and limited jurisdiction cannot actually order the delivery of the property of the ward
found to be embezzled, concealed or conveyed. In a categorical language of this Court, only in extreme cases, where property clearly belongs to the ward
or where his title thereto has been already judicially decided, may the court direct its delivery to the guardian.
Rule 88-98
Don Mariano Cui sold three of his lots to three of his children in equal shares. However, one was not able to pay, so Mariano shared ownership with his
two other children, Antonio and Mercedes. The two children borrowed money from Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, subject to mortgage of the land.
Mariano allowed the mortgage, with the condition that all the rentals will go to him. He did not participate with the payment of the loan. Nearly a year
later, his other children filed a guardianship proceeding, which the court granted. The other children tried to nullify the sale to Antonio and Mercedes,
which was still pending. When they asked the court to deliver the rental payments to them, Judge Piccio granted it.
Issue: Whether Piccio acted in grave abuse of discretion in allowing such delivery of rental payments to the ward
2. Cui vs Piccio Ruling: Yes. Under Sec 6 of Rule 97, the ward may ask the guardian court to deliver an actual or prospective interest which was owned by the ward, and
wa mbezzled, concealed, or conveyed by another. In the case at hand, Sec 6 of Rule 97 does not apply, since the rental payments Is still a subject of
controversy, as to who really owns such payments. This must be litigated in a ordinary civil action, to which a guardian court does not have jurisdiction.
Neither in guardianship proceedings nor in administration proceedings may the court determine the ownership of property claimed by the gurdian or
administrator to belong to the ward or to the estate of the deceased, and order its delivery to them. We believe that the purpose of these two rules, Rule
97, section 6 and Rule 88, section 6 of the Rules of Court is merely to secure evidence from persons suspected of embezzling, concealing or conveying
away any property of the ward or of the deceased so as to enable said gn ardian or administrator to institute the appropriate action to obtain the
possession of and secure title to said property, all for the protection of the interests of the ward and the estate of the deceased.
RULE 97
In two civil cases, involving the annulment of deeds of sale, Ypil filed complaints as guardian of the properties of Lao (an incompetent) against Spouses
Durano (respondents). However, during the pendency of the cases, Lao died intestate. On June 29, 1978, 1978, the trial court dismissed the 2 civil cases
involving annulment on the ground that the death of the ward terminated the guardianship, and all powers and duties of the guardian ceases. Take note
that afterwards, the heirs filed a petition for letters of administration and on July 26, 1978, Ypil was appointed and issued letters of administration.
WON Section 17 Rule 3 should apply, allowing the guardian to substitute for the ward? YES
1. Ypil v Salas Under Section 17 Rule 3, the court shall order the legal representative of the deceased in his capacity as administrator of the estate to appear for and in
behalf of the interest of the deceased. It may be true that Ypil is the plaintiff in both annulment cases, but this is only so in form and in caption. The real
truth and substance is that Ypil was suing as the guardian, the legal representative of the real party in interest, Lao, who died during the pendency of the
case. Moreover, Ypil was issued letters of administration. Under the peculiar facts of the case wherein admittedly the real party in interest died during
the pendency of the civil cases instituted by his guardian in his behalf and admittedly said guardian was appointed thereafter administrator and issued
letters of administration by the same judge presiding and acting in said civil cases, Rule 17 Section 3 must apply. It then becomes the duty of Ypil to
appear as administrator of the estate and no longer as judicial guardian of the incompetent ward. The captions of the pleadings must be amended. There
is no necessity of filing new civil actions for it would serve no useful purpose in the speedy and inexpensive administration of justice since the parties
are already before the court and the issues have already been joined.
(Yung topic sa syllabus was only mentioned by the lower court which is termination of guardianship)
Rule 88-98
RULE 98
Petrona Francisco provided in her last will that half the income from her fishpond shall be devoted to the celebration of various activities in the will.
Upon probate CFI Rizal appointed Maria and Casimiro Tiangco as trustees. When the accounts were submitted, Proceso Francisco (oppositor-appellee)
filed an opposition. The court appointed the clerk of court as commissioner to make an examination of the accounts already submitted, and declared its
order approving the accounts over the objection of Proceso Francisco, of no legal force and effect. In the subsequent reports, Proceso Francisco made
several objections. The court issued the following order requiring the resignation of the trustees, on the ground of not faithfully discharging their duties,
and appointed Father L.R. Arcaira as temporary trustee.
ISSUE: W/N the court had the power to make them resign as trustee, and if so do they have sufficient grounds? YES.
Tiangcos did not have anything to do with the trust until their appointment by the lower court, and they were commissioned only because their selection
1) Tiangco vs
was approved by the lower court in the belief that they would faithfully perform their obligations. The same court found later that they "have not
Francisco
faithfully discharged their duties and that their continuance in office would cause further prejudice to the estate under trusteeship," and the SC cannot,
on appeal, override the action of the lower court by reversing its finding, and indirectly sanction the violation of an unquestioned and legally existing
trust.
The Tiangcos likewise contend that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the resignation of the trustees-appellants. The power
to appoint a trustee is discretionary with the court before whom application is made, and this court will decline to interfere except in case of clear abuse.
Thereafter, upon proper showing that the interests of justice would be adequately served with the removal of the incumbent trustees, it is likewise
within its discretion to do, and SC will refuse to interfere in the absence of a showing of grave abuse or whimsical and capricious exercise of that
discretion.
Plaintiff is the trustee of a charitable bequest made for the construction of a leper hospital and that Father Agustin de la Peña was the duly authorized
representative of the plaintiff to receive the legacy. The defendant is the administrator of the estate of Father De la Peña. On 1898, the books of Father
De la Peña, as trustee, showed that he had on hand as such trustee the sum of P6,641. In the same year he deposited in his personal account P19,000 in
the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank at Iloilo. Shortly thereafter and during the war of the revolution, Father De la Peña was arrested by the military
authorities as a political prisoner, and while thus detained made an order on said bank in favor of the United States Army officer under whose charge
then was for the sum thus deposited in said bank. The arrest of Father De la Peña and the confiscation of the funds in the bank were the result of the
claim of the military authorities that he was an insurgent and that the funds thus deposited had been collected by him for revolutionary purposes. The
money was taken from the bank by the military authorities by virtue of such order, was confiscated and turned over to the Government.In this
jurisdiction, therefore, Father De la Peña's liability is determined by those portions of the Civil Code which relate to obligations.
Issues:
2. Roman Catholic v. De la
WON Father dela Pena (or his estate) is liable for the funds lost while in trust. --
Peña
NO
Ruling:
By placing the money in the bank and mixing it with his personal funds De la Peña did not thereby assume an obligation different from that under which
he would have lain if such deposit had not been made, nor did he thereby make himself liable to repay the money at all hazards. If the money had been
forcibly taken from his pocket or from his house by the military forces of one of the combatants during a state of war, it is clear that under the provisions
of the Civil Code he would have been exempt from responsibility. The fact that he placed the trust fund in the bank in his personal account does not add
to his responsibility. Such deposit did not make him a debtor who must respond at all hazards. We regard such discussion as substantially fruitless,
inasmuch as the precise question is not one of negligence. There was no law prohibiting him from depositing it as he did and there was no law which
changed his responsibility by reason of the deposit. The court, therefore, finds and declares that the money which is the subject matter of this action was
deposited by Father De la Peña in the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation of Iloilo; that said money was forcibly taken from the bank by the
Rule 88-98
armed forces of the United States during the war of the insurrection; and that said Father De la Peña was not responsible for its loss. The judgment is
therefore reversed, and it is decreed that the plaintiff shall take nothing by his complaint.

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CASE DIGEST

RULE 72 - SUBJECT MATTER AND APPLICABILITY OF GENERAL RULES (​NO CASES​)

RULE 73 – VENUE AND PROCESS

Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals

CASE RECIT READY

VALID WILL [not SPECPRO-related but jic sir asks]

ISSUE #1: WHICH COURT HAS JURISDICTION - CFI BULACAN

W/N SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION - NO

WON the property was subject to reserve troncal? (NO)

The persons involved in reservatroncal are:

The person obliged to reserve is the reservor (reservista)—the

1. ascendant who inherits by operation of law property from his descendants.

Whether the China Will may be probated

court of this country.

Issue: WoN the approval of the opposition was proper?

CASE RECIT READY

RULE 78 – RULE 85 AND RULE 87

WON an administrator in Manila was still necessary. - YES.

10) Gutierrez v. Villegas

W/N Cipriano and Miguel are interested persons—NO.

W/N Manuela should be appointed as administratrix - NO

16) Tan v. Go Chiong Lee

Francisco Caponong – deceased husband of Abada

deficits in these accounts presented by the son.

Issue W/n Res Judicata applies in this case? ​YES, it applies.

*​Estate is insolvent: Liabilities - P2,457.00; Estate’s Balance - P870.97

Domingo assigns alleged errors as committed by the court:

42) Melgar v. Buenviaje

W/N donation was valid? Yes.

a policy of the Court to avoid such an intepretation.

What is the remedy of the claimants (heirs of Rafael Gregoire)?

CASE RECIT READY

ISSUE: WON the claim presented in the estate proceedings is prescribed.

W/N the order issued by the judge can be attacked collaterally.

IWON the stipulations in question are void and ineffective

Order is affirmed, with costs against appellants.

Municipal Council of Laguna

1. That a person has died intestate or without leaving any will;

ISSUE #1​: WON CA exceeded authority in affirming the CFI. YES

5) Republic v. CFI Manila

Delfin Nario v. PhilAm Life

Gonzalez affecting such property.

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RULE 72 - SUBJECT MATTER AND APPLICABILITY OF GENERAL RULES (NO CASES)

Issue W/n Res Judicata applies in this case? YES, it applies.

*Estate is insolvent: Liabilities - P2,457.00; Estate’s Balance - P870.97

ISSUE #1: WON CA exceeded authority in affirming the CFI. YES