VIRGILIO BON, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

G.R. No. 152160. January 13, 2004

Testimony of what one heard a party say is not necessarily hearsay. It is admissible in evidence, not to
show that the statement was true, but that it was in fact made. If credible, it may form part of the
circumstantial evidence necessary to convict the accused.

Facts
Petitioner Virgilio Bon and one Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr. were charged for violating Section 68 of PD 705 or
the Forestry Reform Code of the Philippines. Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged.

Trial ensued, and the prosecution presented Lascano and Dangalan et.al, which shows, among others
that Virgilio Bon admitted ordering the cutting and sawing of the trees into lumber.

However, Bon and his co-accused took the witness stand and denied the accusations. Virgilio Bon,
specifically denied the charge saying that he was in Manila from December 1989 and returned to
Sorsogon on March 21, 1990. He denied cutting and gathering the trees in the land and pointed to
Teresita Dangalan-Mendoza as the one who ordered the trees [to be cut] and sawed by Oscar Narvaez.
On the other hand, co-accused Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr., son-in-law of Virgilio Bon, denied that he hired
Oscar Narvaez to saw the lumber.

RTC: Granted. Convicted Bon and Jeniebre.

CA: CA sustained the trial court's assessment of the credibility of Prosecution Witnesses Julian Lascano
and Manuel Dangalan.

In sustaining petitioners’ conviction, CA ruled that despite the absence of direct evidence in this case,
the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to convict petitioner. It ruled that the requirements for the
sufficiency of the latter type of evidence under Section 4 of Rule 133 of the Rules of Court were amply
satisfied by the following established facts:

1) in the presence of Dangalan, Lascano and Natividad Legaspi, petitioner admitted that he had
ordered the cutting of the trees;
2) on February 12, 1990, he and his son Rosalio went to Dangalan-Mendoza, demanding that
she pay the value of the trees cut; and
3) on February 13, 1990, petitioner asked her to forgive him for cutting the trees.

The CA held, however, that the same circumstances did not support the conviction of Jeniebre, since no
other evidence was presented to show the latter's participation in the offense charged. Moreover, the
appellate court held that the res inter alios acta rule under Section 28 of Rule 130 7 of the Rules of Court
would be violated by binding Jeniebre to petitioner's admission, which did not constitute any of the
exceptions to this provision. It thus acquitted him.

Before the SC, petitioner contends that Lascano's and Dangalan's separate testimonies regarding his
alleged extrajudicial admission constitute hearsay evidence and are, therefore, inadmissible.
Re: Hearsay and Judicial Admissions
Issue 1: W/N hearsay testimony which is denied by the alleged author under oath in open court, is
admissible in evidence against him.

Ruling: Yes.

Section 36 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states the rule on hearsay evidence as follows:

"Sec. 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded. — A witness can
testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his
own perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules."

Under the above rule, any evidence — whether oral or documentary — is hearsay if its probative value is
not based on the personal knowledge of the witness, but on that of some other person who is not on the
witness stand. Hence, information that is relayed to the former by the latter before it reaches the court is
considered hearsay.

Here, Lascano and Dangalan testified that on February 12, 1990, they had heard petitioner admit to
having ordered the cutting of the trees. Their testimonies cannot be considered as hearsay for three
reasons:
1. First, they were indisputably present and within hearing distance when he allegedly made the
admission. Therefore, they testified to a matter of fact that had been derived from their own
perception.
2. Second, what was sought to be admitted as evidence was the fact that the utterance was actually
made by petitioner, not necessarily that the matters stated therein were true.
3. Third, even assuming that the testimonies were hearsay, petitioner is barred from questioning the
admission of Dangalan's testimony, because he failed to object to it at the time it was offered.

Moreover, a party's verbal admission that is established through the testimonies of the persons
who heard it fall under Section 26 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. According to this provision,
"[t]he act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against
him." This rule is based upon the notion that no man would make any declaration against himself,
unless it is true. The testimony of petitioner may, therefore, be received in evidence against him.

Re: Exclusionary Rules; Miranda Rights

Issue 2: W/N petitioner’s Miranda Rights were violated
Ruling: No.

We have ruled previously that constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a
spontaneous statement that is not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but is given in an
ordinary manner. The inquiry on the illegal cutting of trees, which — with the assistance of the barangay
tanods — was conducted by the owner's brother, Manuel Dangalan cannot be deemed a custodial
investigation. Consequently, the guarantees of the Miranda rights, cannot be successfully invoked by
petitioner.
Re: Credibility and Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence; Circumstantial Evidence may warrant conviction,
requisites

Issue 3: W/N prosecution’s circumstantial evidence warranted petitioner’s conviction

Ruling: Yes.
Punishable under the above provision are the following acts: (1) cutting, gathering, collecting or removing
timber or other forest products from the places therein mentioned without any authority; and (b)
possessing timber or other forest products without the legal documents.

Petitioner was charged with the first offense. It was thus necessary for the prosecution to prove the
alleged illegal cutting, gathering or manufacture of lumber from the trees.

It is undisputed that no direct evidence was presented. This kind of evidence, however, is not the only
matrix from which the trial court may draw its conclusions and findings of guilt. Conviction may be based
on circumstantial evidence, as long as the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain
that leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

To sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, it is necessary that the following

elements concur:
1. There is more than one circumstance.
2. The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven.
3. The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

In the case at bar, a review of the records shows that the fact of the alleged cutting, gathering and
manufacture of lumber from the trees was proven by the prosecution through the following pieces of
documentary evidence: photographs of tree stumps, the investigation report of an officer of the CENRO
that no permit was secured for the cutting of the trees, and the CENRO's computation of the value of the
timber generated from the felled trees. This fact, together with the circumstantial evidence, indubitably
points to no other conclusion than that petitioner was guilty as charged.

Disposition: CA decision is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that petitioner is sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of seven (7) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision
mayor as minimum; to eleven (11) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor as
maximum.