Theories of Conflict Resolution and Their
To Protracted Ethnic Conflicts
Kumar Rupesinghe*
International Peace Research Institute, Oslo
1. Introduction: a challenge to peace
research,
A major challenge for the study of conflict
resolution is its application to violent and
protracted ethnic conflicts. Theories con-
cerned with social conflicts or group con-
tlicts have managed to accumulate a body
of studies on mediation, arbitration, the
role of third party bargaining, negotiations
and problem solving. Further, there has
been a cumulative growth in studies con-
cerned with inter-state conflicts within the
international system. Many studies have
also dealt with the role of the international
system, particularly the United Nations, as
conflict manager. However, despite the
manifest increase in violence caused by eth-
nic conflicts, and despite scholarly interest
on the causes of ethnic conflicts, only re-
cently have the social sciences taken the
problem of conflict resolution in this area
seriously. Indeed, this has led Ekerhart
Krippendorf to remark:
Considering the undeniable empirical evi-
dence of the growth of ethnic/religious/racial
minority consciousness everywhere, accompa-
nied by manifest acts of violence (’terrorism’)
aimed at the creation of an audience for min-
ority grievances, it is rather surprising that
Peace Research has so far almost completely
ignored the problem. Yet, few problems - if
any - have greater relevance to a discipline
*
Kumar Rupesinghe, Ph.D., is Research Fel-
low at the International Peace Research Insti-
tute, Oslo.
Applicability
created by scholars concerned with research
into the causes and originsof violence in con-
I
temporary societies
More recently, Bjorn Hettne has con-
firmed this by stating:
the majority of ethnic problems are still un-
resolved and theory building on ethnic conflict
resolution is still in its beginning.-
2. Cost of ethnic conflicts
Ethnic conflict appears to be the major
source of manifest and direct violence in the
world today, especially in some parts of the
Third World. It has been argued that during
the post-war period, associated with deco-
lonisation and ’nation-building’, state build-
ing has largely been at the expense of
minorities.~ Recent history has shown that
too many ethnic conflicts get out of hand.
Too often the cost of waging a conflict
proves exorbitant, and even the victorious
party may end up with a net loss. Too often
the termination of certain forms of conflict
behaviour (e.g. by a ceasefire agreement) is
not accompanied by significant reductions
in hostile attitudes. Ethnic conflicts fre-
quently give rise to violence by both ma-
jority and minority groups. All too often
nationalist movements, and those who op-
pose them, resort to hijacking, bombing,
assassination, kidnapping, murder, rioting
and terrorism. This in turn leads to counter-
measures, to repression by police and mili-
527
tary and to civil wars, to genocidal policies,
leaving its wake a history of bitterness.
in
There is a cause for concern if, as has
been calculated, most countries in the world
are multi-ethnic societies. Of 132 indepen-
dent states in 1971, only 12, representing
9% of the total, were ethnically homogen-
ous.4 The persistence of ethnic conflict is
underlined by the fact that, since World
War II, as many as 20 million people have
died in such conflicts. Walter O’Connor
reports that nearly half the world’s states
have experienced varying degrees of ’ethni-
cally inspired dissonance’ since World War
II/’ Given the persisting economic crisis and
uneven economic development and the
acute difficulties faced by many Third
World countries, a further intensification of
ethnic conflicts seems likely in the future.
Conflict resolution studies should be con-
cerned with ethnic conflicts. As noted, they
constitute a major source of direct violence
in the Third World today. Further, authori-
tative power approaches - such as military
solutions, or forced assimilation techniques,
or imposition of solutions by force - may
escalate the contlict even further. Conflict
management approaches must be found
which can be satisfactory to all parties to
the contlict.
3. Study of ethnic conflicts hns been
neglected
Why have ethnic conflicts been neglected in
studies on conflict resolution? The relative
neglect in analysing ethnic conflicts may be
due to the predisposition of the analyst.
O’Connor suggests that the study of ethnic
conflicts has often been a grudging con-
cession to something distasteful?7 As a
scholarly discipline social anthropology has
accumulated a vast storehouse of knowl-
edge on tribal and ethnic minorities. Socio-
logy has also produced a considerable
literature on group conflicts and group
dynamics. Social sciences in general have
produced ample material on the causes of
conflict. Yet all this wealth of cumulative
literature may not provide us with the
528
theoretical and analytical tools necessary
for ethnic conflict resolution.
The epistemological and paradigmatic
assumptions of various disciplines may have
tended to minimise the importance of eth-
nic conflicts. Development theory, itself a
product of the post war decade, has shown
an undoubted neglect in terms of incorpor-
ating ethnic groups within its general
framework. Theories of uneven develop-
ment derived from the dependencia
tradition have tended to treat the ’periph-
ery’ or ’the Third World’ as a homogenous
analytical category. The recent ethnic re-
vival retlects in many ways the true hetero-
geneity of the cultures which co-exist in the
Third World. This heterogeneity stems
from different social and historical ex-
periences and differing types of colonial
formations. These social formations may
co-exist with each other either as cast, tribe,
indigenous peoples, minorities, ethnic
groups or be stratified according to class
and status. In general, centre-periphery
theories may provide certain insights into
the conditions for nationalism between the
centre and the periphery, but they cannot
provide an adequate basis of explanation
for the ethnic revival in some parts of the
Third World. Furthermore, this approach
seems to offer no precise statements on the
linkages between particular development
strategies and ethnic nationalism. An at-
tempt to correct this approach in develop-
ment theory can be identified with the
concept of ethno-development. Rudolpho
Stavenhagen suggests that ethnicity should
be incorporated into mainstream develop-
ment theory.,
Marxist and liberal approaches have also
been criticised for neglecting the salience
and recurrence of ethnic identity. Some
Marxists have insisted on class factors alone
as the motor force of history, whereby eth-
nicity is interpreted as ’false consciousness’.
Such neglect of the ethnic factor led Tom
Nairn, a professed Marxist, to claim that
’the theory of nationalism represents
Marxism’s greatest failure’.9 Bill Warren
provides a more recent example of a
Marxist approach to under-development,
when he suggests that there is an uninter-
rupted progress of capitalist development in
the periphery where capitalism produces a
working class and a culture of liberalism
which creates the necessary conditions for
social change. The development of the for-
ces of production is assumed to be unprob-
lematic. However, ethnicity assumes
analytical importance precisely because of
the way in which the transition to capitalism
is effected, and the way in which the state
mediates and regulates the forces of pro-
duction, and in the co-existence of different
social formations. &dquo;’
What, then, of liberalism? ’The liberal
expectancy’ with its post-renaissance belief
in the primacy of the individual, has held
that with modernisation, group affiliation
will fade and ultimately disappear. What
radical Marxist theories and liberalism alike
have, however, is ignorance of the potent
force of religious fundamentalism and ethni-
city when confronted with rapid strategies
of modernisation and industrialisation.
Similar criticism has been launched with
regard to international relations theory.
Here the dominant assumption of realism
has tended to focus attention on the state
as the rational actor within the international
system. Recently, an emerging school of
criticism has successfully shown that inter-
state conflicts are often a result of conflicts
between the state and non-state actors
which spill over into the international
arena. 11I
What seems most striking, however, is
that peace research, which was born out of
a concern for war and peace, should have
neglected a consideration of ethnic conflict
and its resolution. Perhaps this reflects the
relatively short period of its existence, but
it may also emphasize the priority of the
peace research paradigm which until re-
cently has been dominated largely by a
concern with East/West conflicts, the threat
of nuclear war and the arms race/disarma-
ment. At any rate, peace research has in
fact attempted a paradigm shift in thinking
with regard to non-state actors, and has
contributed to the study of conflict manage-
ment, conflict resolution, and institutional
mechanisms for conflict resolution. Studies
have been undertaken to discuss ways in
which a conflict situation could be resolved
to the satisfaction of all parties concerned.
What still remains is to develop the theor-
etical frameworks and its application or
relevance in the study of ethnic conflicts,
particularly in the Third World. However,
also within this tradition, it is acknowledged
that some types of ethnic conflicts, although
of an internal character, have ramifications
for entire regions and sometimes may act as
a catalyst for a world wars
Perhaps a reason for the relative neglect
of ethnic conflict is its ambiguous character
and complexity. Some have defined ethnic
conflicts as protracted social conflicts,
characterised by such enduring features as
economic and technological underdevelop-
ment, and unintegrated political systems. In
most cases, these conflicts involve unequal
bargaining between the state and a min-
ority, where questions of identity, needs,
and security are intricately interlinked. This
problem is succinctly identified by John
Burton:
The conflicts which are of global concern in-
volve deep issues of ethnic and cultural ident-
ity, of recognition and of participation that are
usually denied to ethnic minorities, in addition
to issues of security and other values that are
not negotiates
It is therefore difficult to delineate class
and ethnic conflicts, precisely because they
are a mixture of both. Often behind ethnic
conflicts are structural issues which go far
beyond immediate grievances: It is a chal-
lenge to the modern nation-state and a form
of mediated class consciousness which chal-
lenges social inequalities differently from
the past. Ethnic grievances therefore co-
incide with socio-economic inequalities and
discrimination.
529
4. What are ethnic conflicts?
4.1. The mass media perspective
It is common today to lump together all
group conflicts or collective conflicts as
’ethnic conflicts’. The mass media tend to
relay news of episodic events, bloody viol-
ence, local wars, collective struggles, and
struggles for self-determination, terming
them as ethnic conflicts. We are frequently
told that Muslims are fighting Hindus, that
Buddhists are killing Tamils, that Hindus
are killing Sikhs, that Protestants are killing
Catholics and vice versa, and that these are
’ethnic conflicts’. The vocabulary of the dis-
course on ethnic conflicts has its own
ambiguities. Often newspapers portray
these conflicts as groups killing or mass-
acring each other - be it Muslims, Hindus,
Buddhists - and these events are portrayed
as riots, communal violence, terrorist at-
tacks, without any adequate picture of the
contextual situation. A desire for episodic
news means that such ’ethnic conflicts’ have
no history: they come and go, claiming the
mass media for a brief moment. There are
’riots’, ’communal riots’, ’massacres’, ’geno-
cides’, ’mass killings’ but there is still no
-
word, for example, for the situation where
the state is itself, an actor, the perpetrator
of a riot or where sections of the state plan
a pogrom. Nor does the mere existence of
ethnic diversity or of conflicts mean that
they should all be characterised as ’ethnic
conflict’.
This point is well stated by Elise Bould-
ing :
There are 6,276 significant ethnic groups in
159 countries. If we subtract 159 groups, i.e.
the mainstream ethnic group in each country
which presumably has the central government
available as its advocate, that leaves 6117 eth-
nic groups spread out over the 159 nations of
North and South, as over against 177 advocate
groups concentrated in 44 nations, organized
to promote ethnic and minority advancement.
The vast majority of the worlds ethnic and
minority groups, in short, do not currently
have an identifiable advocacy infrastructure to
carry out political goals. 14
530
This observation is important, for Bould-
ing’s study demonstrates that it is only in
specific situations that ethnic conflicts
would give rise to separatism.
4.2. Towards a definition of ethnic conflicts
Without going into all types of collective
conflicts, then, we should try to delimit and
specify more clearly what kinds of contlicts
are of concern to us. Here it should be self-
evident that we are most interested in those
types of ethnic conflicts’ with a strong poten-
tial for direct violence.
Johan Galtung has defined conflict as the
situation where an action system has two
incompatible goals. He draws the important
distinction between action systems consist-
ing of individuals and of collectivities, as
well as distinguishing between inter- and
intra-system conflicts.l5 This is delineated in
Table 1.
Ethnic group conflicts would constitute
an intermediate group within a nation, but
where conflicts could be either international
or intra-national or both. If an ethnic group
has a cross-border affiliation, then such
conflicts have an international and intra-re-
gional manifestation. Here, we shall not
discuss all types of ethnic conflicts: we are
primarily concerned with types of ethnic
conflicts which tend to become destructive
behaviour and which tend to be self-rein-
forcing. In discussing ethnic conflicts, we
have in mind a type of conflict where a
given ethnic minority resorts to violence to
force a solution to its grievances or to its
claims. Exactly how this develops will de-
pend largely on the political system, the
ethnic balance of power, and the strategies
adopted by the state. The history of the par-
ticular ethnic group and their perceptions
will, of course, be equally important.
We should be careful to distinguish be-
tween ethnic claims and nationalism. There
is a certain conceptual confusion in this con-
text, deriving partly from differing usages in
different academic disciplines and from dif-
ferent shades of meaning in different
languages. ’National minority’ is often used
Table 1. Types of action-systems in conflict
as a synonym for ’ethnic groups’. The con-
cept of ’nation’ has primarily been used to
define groups of people who have formed
or attempted to form their own state on the
basis of a common culture. This confusion
in terminology between ethnic groups, and
nationalist struggles, may also display para-
digmatic preferences.
Anthony D. Smith distinguishes an ’eth-
nic group’ by four features: the sense of
unique group origins, the knowledge of a
unique group history and belief in its des-
tiny, one or more dimensions of collective
cultural individuality, and finally a sense of
unique collective solidarity. In an ex-
tended definition, Smith identifies the
’ethnie’ or ethnic community as a social
group whose members share a sense of
common origins, claim a common and dis-
tinctive history and destiny, possess one or
more distinctive characteristics, and feel a
sense of collective uniqueness and soli-
darity.
An interesting definition of ethnic nation-
alism has been advanced by Benedict
Anderson: ’... it (the nation) is an imagined
political community - and imagined as
both inherently limited and sovereign’. 17
The striking feature of Anderson’s defi-
nition is that ethnic nationalism is seen as a
powerful myth, which despite its ambiguity
has the capacity for mobilisation. However,
in discussing ethnic contlicts it is not ethni-
city, or ethnic identity per se, which is the
subject matter of conflict research, but the
point at which ethnic identities are mobil-
ised for political goals. Therefore the
proper concern for conflict research are
those conditions upon which ethnic identity
acts as a strong catalyst for mobilisation and
action. When we say that politicised ethni-
city has become the crucial principle of
political legitimation and delegitimation of
systems, the interesting problem is to de-
termine why and when politicisation occurs.
The mere existence of ethnicity is certainly
no precondition for conflicts; it would be
absurd to assume that there will be conflicts
merely because ethnic groups as such exist.
What characterises these types of inflam-
mable ethnic conflicts? Harry Eckstein has
suggested that communal conflicts or ’inter-
nal wars’, as he refers to them, differ in
detail but have common features.&dquo;&dquo; First,
they all involve the use of violence to
achieve goals which also might be achieved
without violence. Second, they all indicate a
breakdown of some dimension of legitimate
political order, as well as the existence of
collective frustration and aggressive tenden-
cies in a population. Third, all presuppose
certain capabilities of violence for those in-
citing the internal war and certain incapaci-
ties for preventing violence among those on
whom internal war is made. Fourth, all tend
to scar societies deeply and to prevent the
formation of consensus for an indefinite
period.
What is crucial for conflict research is to
analyse the steps that are taken between
primordial markers and outright civil war,
or at least what kind of potential exists for
this.
The diagram below suggests possible
steps in conflict escalation.
531

The stages in the process between mobil-
isation to civil war can be a long and pro-
tracted process and it is only under certain
conditions that separatist or secessionist
movements will emerge.
.
There have been several suggestive at-
tempts to delineate models of ethnic stratifi-
cation. These can provide useful typologies
which raise issues of relevance to conflict
resolution. Joseph Rotschild suggests:
’Societies may stratify their ethnic groups
according to models of vertical hierarchy,
of paralleled segmentation or of cross pat-
terned reticulation’.ly In the vertical
hierarchical model, ’there is a correspon-
dence among all dimensions, political,
social, economic and cultural - of ethnic
superordination and subordination’. 20 To
take one example, South Africa’s apartheid
system would easily fit this model.
In models of parallel ethnic segmen-
tation, ’each ethnic community is internally
stratified by socio-economic criteria and
each has a political elite to represent its in-
terest vis a vis the corresponding elites of
the other ethnic segments.,21
In the reticulate model ’ethnic groups and
social classes cross populate each other -
but the system is not random or symmetri-
cal or egalitarian. Each ethnic group
pursues a wide range of economic functions
and occupations, and each economic class
or sector organically incorporates members
of several ethnic categories’.22 Rotschild
suggests that the reticulate model provides
the best conditions for the gradual and
peaceful resolution of ethnic conflicts.
Similarly Donald L. Horrowitz makes a
distinction between ranked and unranked
ethnic groups. He sees the distinction as
resting upon the coincidence of social class
532
with ethnic groups. When the two coincide
it is possible to speak of ranked ethnic
groups. Where groups are cross class, it is
possible to speak of unranked ethnic
groups.
Both authors, Rotschild and Horrowitz,
point to a major distinction in ethnic stratifi-
cation. If ethnic groups are ordered in a
hierarchy, with one group superordinate
and another subordinate, ethnic conflict
moves in one direction. But if groups are
parallel, with neither subordinate to the
other, conflict takes a different course.
Stratification in ranked systems is synony-
mous with ethnic membership. Mobility
opportunities are restricted by group ident-
ity. In unranked systems on the other hand,
parallel ethnic groups co-exist, each group
internally stratified. Horrowitz suggests that
ethnic and class conflict coincide when eth-
nicity and class coincide in ranked systems.
Ethnic conflict, however, impedes or obscu-
res class conflict when ethnic groups are
cross class, as they are in unranked systems.
It is obvious that this model describes two
pure types which may not exist so clear-cut
in reality. What is crucial in the distinction
is to note that what we are mostly discussing
with regard to modern ethnic conflicts are
unranked systems, so characteristic of many
multi-ethnic societies in the Third World.
A major characteristic for conflict resol-
ution also rests on the balance of power, or
the distribution and forms of power in
multi-ethnic societies. Does the system en-
courage direct confrontation with the cen-
tralised state or does it encourage dispersed
ethnic conflicts? What is suggested here is
that violent conflicts occur between a strong
centre and the periphery, and most often
between a hegemonic central power and a
fairly strong minority.
4.3. The role of the state
The role of the state and its relationship to
the periphery is central to an understanding
of ethnic conflicts. The structure of dis-
persed ethnic systems encourages inter-
ethnic cooperation, while the structure of
centralised ethnic systems impedes it. They
involve the whole state. The state is not an
arbitrator, not neutral: it is itself a focal
point of competition, an actor in the con-
flict. Whether ethnic politics is localised or
central will however depend on the ethnic
balance of power. The dispersion model
would seem to be an appealing one for con-
flict reduction.
What are the factors which characterise
this particular type of conflict? There is no
single explanatory variable or a single
mono-causal explanation. Perhaps the con-
cept of conjuncture or the concept of
overdetermination is more appropriate as a
methodological approach. The concept of
conjuncture is used by Louis Althusser to
suggest a coincidence of disparate elements
which come together so as to form a par-
ticular social phenomenon. The concept of
overdetermination is used by him to explain
the overmaturation of specific social for-
ces. 24
Some of the features of the type of ethnic
conflicts we are discussing can thus be
identified as follows:
1. They are what are known as protracted
social conflicts: Protracted social con-
flicts are defined as long drawn out
social processes which combine ethnicity
with a demand for economic redistri-
bution. In such conflicts it is difficult to
distinguish between needs, interest, and
security. 25
2. Theyinvolve a conflict between the per-
ipheryand the centre. Hechter uses the
concept of internal colonialism to des-
cribe this process. 26
3. They are segmented, deeply divided
societies of an open type.
4. The system represents unranked stratifi-
cation systems.
5. They represent a State often bound by
primordial loyalties, the defective
state. 27
5. Ethnic conflicts and conflict
resolution
The very existence of a variety of multi-
ethnic states suggests that it would be diffi-
cult to produce any general theory of ethnic
conflict. Instead we need to evolve middle
range theories, applicable to a class of eth-
nic conflicts which have a potential for
violence. We should thus aim to arrive at
statements of a limited general scope, not
sweepingly valid as in the so-called grand
theories of social science. Let us recall,
however, that there are several grand
theories which attempt to explain societal
conflicts.
5.1. ’Consociated’ democracy
Perhaps the most ambitious and interesting
efforts to discuss a particular type of ethnic
conflicts are from those writers who deal
with ways of managing conflict in countries
divided by serious ethnic, religious or
linguistic divisions. It is in such societies
that conflict management mechanisms are
subject to the greatest strain and are most
necessary. The theoretical starting point for
this school is to discuss how solutions of
pluralism can be established and maintained
in multi-ethnic societies with the help of dif-
ferent types of political institutions.
The idea behind ’consociated’ democracy
is that all ethnic groups within the state
should be guaranteed a reasonable degree
of influence in the political system, which
should thereby ensure the fairest possible
distribution of resources between the ethnic
groups within the state. Consociated
democracy represents an alternative to what
may be called a ’majority’ democracy -
where the individual citizen is the most im-
portant political unit, and political legit-
imacy is won on the basis of support from
the majority of individual citizens. The
starting point for a consociated model is
groups, for example ethnic or religious
ones. A consociated system of government
means that political decisions are based on
collaboration between representatives from
these different groups. This requires that
533
the elites collaborate and recognise the
rights of the various groups to work for
their own interests and values.
Consociationalism should be seen as a
theoretical approach with a limited appli-
cation to a specified set of conditions and a
particular set of countries. It is restricted to
societies that are deeply divided and open.
It is concerned with conflict management
rather than conflict resolution. It assumes
that ethnic mobilisation is there to stay and
that the problem is to manage it. For
example, Eric A. Nordlinger states that his
study deals with conflict regulation in
deeply divided societies featuring open
regimes:
Our approach falls squarely within what may
be described as a conflict approach to the
study of politics. The crucial problem of pol-
itics is the management of conflict. No regime
could endure which did not cope with this
problem. All politics, all leadership and all or-
ganization involve the management of con-
fliCt.28
Important criticisms can be raised against
the consociational model. For example, it
could be argued that consociationalism will
tend to freeze ethnic identity and lead to
long-term polarisation, and that it can func-
tion as a starting point for eventual par-
tition. Further, that consociationalism
would have a success only in plural societies
with a low degree of conflict potential, and
will not have general applicability to deeply
divided societies, and that elite accommo-
dation is often preempted by inter-ethnic
rivalries and challenges from one’s own eth-
nic group.
Moreover, consociationalism assumes
that the state is an instrument of rational
manipulation, even though states in the
Third World are often defective states,
bound by hegemonic patron/client relations.
Cynthia Enloe, for instance, has noted the
tendency of such hegemonic elites to recruit
ethnic armies which are bound by concepts
of security which negate the claims of min-
orities. Such elites tend to interpret ethnic
claims as security threats. 21
534
However, despite the criticism, consoci-
ationalism, with its emphasis on rationality
and choice, has great relevance to conflict
theory and conflict resolution. According to
one observer,
Consociational theory relates to a situation
with two or more collective actors that cannot
be integrated (for one reason or another) to
form one unified actor, but who realize (for
one reason or another) that they have to co-
exist within and delegate some sovereignty to
a common institutional framework. 30
The consociational theory underlines that
successful conflict management in such situ-
ations is dependent on a mutual respect for
the autonomy and integrity of each actor
and on deviation from the majority prin-
ciple in the decision-making procedures.
Reformulated in such terms, the theoretical
contribution of consociationalist scholars
could be useful for analysing possible pro-
cedures for coexistence in many deeply
divided societies.
An effort at stratifying ethnic groups and
the balance of power between them and the
centre has been undertaken by Rotschild. 31
In attempting to understand the dynamics
of mobilisation processes which aim at pol-
itical autonomy and secessionist solutions,
he analyses the relationship of ethnic
groups to the centre and the form of this
relationship. This reflects not only demo-
graphic conditions but also differences
between different ethnic groups, resource
bases, economic power and functional
specialisation. Also whether the ethnic
groups enjoy a contiguous resource base,
and whether ethnic stratification has a cross
border or regional dimension. Rotschild
suggests seven different outcomes of strati-
fication from a conflict resolution perspec-
tive :
1. Dominating majority.
2. Dominating minority.
3. Balanced relation with nation-building
people and several ethnic groups or
nationalities.
4. Division of power between politics and
economy.
5. Division of power between territorial
based and functional groups.
6. Oppressed but economically strong min-
ority.
7. Many small groups in balance.
This provides us with a useful typology
for speculating on the types of conflicts
which each model will generate. With re-
gard to secessionist movements, types (1)
and (3) seem likely candidates, but this will
of course depend on several other factors.
The worst possible situation is where the
majority and minority have strong percep-
tions of being engulfed and dominated by
the other.
These models also help us to discuss more
clearly the types of conflict reduction mech-
anisms possible within each given model, so
that we may delineate and draw boundaries
between the different types of conflicts
which are likely to be generated, given dif-
ferent types of structures. Certainly, the
model also shows that some structures have
a potential for direct violence, whilst others
have a potential for mediation and rec-
onciliation. It indicates that the propensity
for violent conflict exists in some societies
but not in all, and it thus represents a wel-
come corrective to those who would suggest
a displacement of class by ethnicity, or to
psychological approaches which merely
prescribe changes in attitudes.
Certainly an ideal situation which has
been proposed by consociationalists is that
the management of ethnic conflicts be dif-
fused, or localised, or taken off the central
stage of politics, where institutional mech-
anisms are found for intra ethnic compet-
ition rather than intra ethnic rivalry. The
optimal solution in all cases is the devol-
ution of power and the provision for local
autonomy.
Consociationalism, in a way, could be
presented as a series of policy proposals
where there are no developed mechanisms
for resolving conflict. Further, it implies a
political will to build political institutions
which can manage ethnicity. In the absence
of institutions for conflict management, it
suggests various policy options such as the
devolution of power, autonomy and feder-
alism. Elites and rulers in such cases are
also conflict managers, if they are to accom-
modate a variety of ethnic claims, and what
the theory proposes are legitimate struc-
tural means for the diffusion of conflict.
There is a growing awareness of the
universality and complexities of ethnic
problems and the need for concerted action
to devise strategies, programmes and struc-
tures for the management of ethnic con-
flicts. Some multi-ethnic states have devised
federal forms of devolution. However, in
the reach for constitutional models there
has been conflict over unitary and federal
efforts, and the extent of devolution and
autonomy. In many countries there is, how-
ever, a growing recognition of the need to
reexamine not only centre-state relations
with regard to the extent of devolution, but
also education and cultural policy, police
powers and the composition of the army.
5.2. Institutional approaches to conflict res-
olution,
Institutional approaches to conflict resol-
ution or conflict management have been the
subject matter of a variety of disciplines, in-
cluding peace research. A vast literature
exists on social conflicts and their manage-
ment, and indeed institutions have been
established to manage social conflicts. Such
institutions range from family reconciliation
boards to various councils for managing in-
dustrial disputes. Further, theoretical
advances have been made in the role of
third parties in conflict resolution, as well
as improving bargaining and negotiating
strategies. New forms of conflict resolution
mechanisms have been suggested, from
problem solving approaches to the role of
professional facilitators in conflict resol-
ution. However, most of these theoretical
advances have been experimented upon
within stable democracies, where there has
535
long been an evolving tradition in conflict
management.
The challenge for those who argue for an
institutional approach to conflict resolution
is to see how many of these institutional
mechanisms and third party interventions
can be developed in countries of the Third
World. We need to study the question of
competence building within Third World
societies, and in particular, the develop-
ment of local institutions and mechanisms
for conflict resolution.
Some of the problems associated with ins-
titution building for conflict reduction or for
conflict management may seem intractable.
More research is necessary to identify such
institutions in Third World countries. Cer-
tainly, there do exist a great many insti-
tutions and cultural mechanisms and
religious and collective experiences which
help to enhance co-operation and tolerance
whilst respecting the positive aspects of eth-
nicity. They may in normal situations range
from the market place, to the school, and
places of common worship, but also trade
unions and other informal community or-
ganisations. The religions, be they
Christian, Buddhist, Hindu or Muslim,
sometimes are partly responsible for the es-
calation of conflict. However, there is a
need to identify sections within those re-
ligious organisations which are seeking for a
more authentic role for religion as peace-
maker.
During the period of decolonisation,
elites in the Third World were frequently so
involved in nation-building that they may
have ignored or deliberately neglected to
develop legal and other institutional safe-
guards for the protection of minorities. The
British imperial power, when granting pol-
itical independence, certainly did provide
some constitutional guarantees for the pro-
tection of minorities. More comparative
studies are necessary on how constitutions
and law can create the framework for politi-
cal competition, compromise and accommo-
dation. Law can, in the long run, affect the
framework in which these forces will oper-
536
ate and can reinforce
or weaken the claims
of particular groups in society. There is,
however, no universal prescription for
making laws; the type of legislation and ins-
titutional mechanisms will depend on the
political leaders and their willingness to give
serious consideration to institutions which
can accommodate ethnic bargaining or eth-
nic claims.
A report by the Minority Rights Group
attempts to raise the question of what can
be done by internal laws in particular coun-
tries with regard to minority groups. 12 The
report presents an interesting catalogue of
numerous techniques, mostly derived from
the British experience, to secure equality
and non-discrimination. Such techniques in-
clude the adoption of a Bill of Rights,
special anti-discrimination constitutional
provisions, anti-discrimination statutes,
special institutional arrangements to super-
vise the administration (such as an om-
bundsman to investigate complaints),
special institutional arrangements in the pri-
vate sphere, judicial action and law enforce-
ment machinery to secure equality before
the law. What the report suggests is an ar-
ray of legal techniques and institutions both
of a public and private character which pro-
vide mechanisms for the early management
of conflict.
5.3. Inter-national responses and mechanisms
for ethnic conflict regulation
Concern has been expressed at the lack of
the capacity of international institutions,
such as the United Nations, or the various
regional organisations such as the OAU, to
intervene effectively in violent internal con-
flicts. The case for international interven-
tion is particularly obvious if the state is by
itself unable to resolve such conflict. Fur-
ther, the management of ethnic conflict
becomes particularly urgent if there are no
internal mechanisms for conflict resolution.
Perhaps some countries in the Third World
may also lack the necessary professional ex-
perience in dealing with ethnic demands.
The need for conflict resolution and in-
tervention by third parties is especially
urgent if systematic violations of human
rights are to be averted. Particularly in the
area of ethnic conflict, it seems legitimate to
consider international mechanisms to create
structures, rules and processes to avoid con-
flict, or channel it into acceptable (or less
damaging) paths.
5.3.1. The role of the UN
The UN has a considerable potential in con-
flict prevention and conflict resolution.
However, it is obvious that the UN has a
limited mandate when it comes to violent
conflicts, often defined as ’internal con-
flicts’. Nevertheless, the organisation has
been involved in ethnic conflicts in coun-
tries such as the Congo, Cyprus and Leba-
non and observer missions to Palestine and
Kashmir. It may seem that the UN has de-
veloped some competence in peace-keeping
efforts but not in peace-making or in peace
building.
Separating the parties to a conflict may
be important in conflict resolution: but
peace keeping is only one approach. Ac-
cording to Galtung:
No peace story ends with dissociation. The
whole idea of conceiving of peace both negat-
ively and positively amounts to rejecting the
dissociative approach as a goal. It is too negat-
ive, too uncooperative, non-integrative -
even if there may also be harmony in dis-
sociation. The goal lies beyond negative
peace, hence the necessity of a positive peace
concept in addition.33
Much will depend on the willingness
governments accept a peace-keeping
to
peace-making force, and in particular
the veto power of the Security Council.
Criticism with regard to the inadequacy of
the UN is particularly cogent when we con-
sider the number of so-called ’internal
conflicts’ which exist at any given moment.
The number of potential conflict generators
is equally alarming.
What is therefore necessary is to continue
to discuss ways in which the UN role as
peace-maker can be advanced in the future.
Many suggestions have been made, from
improving reporting systems or early warn-
ings, strengthening the role of the Secretary
General, to developing competence within
the Secretary General’s office, and appoint-
ing special rapporteurs, etc. Proposals have
also been made to enhance the role of neu-
tral countries within the UN. However, in
most instances, the problem has not been
one of insufficient information about prob-
able crises, but that the specialised agencies
lack the mandate to act on the information.
We may definitely conclude that the vital
question of peace and security, the consoli-
dation and the maintenance of human
rights, and the early resolution of conflicts
should not be left solely to the Secretary
General of the United Nations, or to the
UN Secretariat, or to any of the related
agencies alone.
5.4. The role of non-governmental actors
Given the paradigm shift in conflict man-
agement, and growing recognition of the
role of non-state actors in conflict esca-
lation, what is necessary is to create insti-
tutional settings for professionalisation and
standard setting in the area of conflict man-
agement. This point has been well pres-
ented by Burton:
Learning by experience in situations which are
characterized by high levels of destruction and
violence cannot be justified. An adequate
theoretical framework and training in logically
deduced processes are a necessary precon-
dition to an intervention in such disputes. 34
of
or Considerable competence has already
on been accumulated in group dynamics, me-
diation and problem solving. What is there-
fore of concern is to identify institutions
which can gather this knowledge and make
it available for interested parties. There is
much of value in the call for professional
conflict managers and institutions with
knowledge and the capacity to provide
training. There is, however, one important
qualification. Often ethnic conflicts are not
between groups but involve the state and a
537
particular group. While social groups may
voluntarily accept third party intervention
or be required to do so by law, this is rarely
the case where the state is involved in what
is defined as an internal conflict. Where the
state is a party to a conflict (more often a
strong party) there exist few mechanisms
which can bring the parties together. Even
more disquietening, there is almost no in-
ternational setting or framework where
grievances can be ventilated. It is in this
area that more work should be done, so as
to provide fora and settings where parties to
a dispute can express their grievances.
Particularly in the area of conflict resol-
ution, the NGO community has an import-
ant role to play. NGOs have developed
their expertise in specialised fields of social
action. They represent the ’third system’,
potential forces of countervailing power.
The NGO community in general can plav a
crucial role in early warnings, monitoring,
providing immediate relief and finding cre-
ative ways of resolving conflicts. The co-
existence of a broad range of NGOs, from
humanitarian and development groups to
human rights and social justice groups, pro-
vides a multiplicity of actors. Given suf-
ficient training and resources, they can
contribute local expertise and motivation,
draw attention to the problems of particu-
larly deprived sections of the community,
influence governments and domestic
authorities in the respect for international
standards and human rights, as well as pro-
vide a broad base of support for early
reporting and mediation of conflicts.
This is not to suggest that no such organ-
isations already exist in mediation and
conflict resolution: several NGOs have de-
veloped competence relevant to conflict
management. Highly significant here is the
work of the International Red Cross and the
Society of Friends, to mention only two
groups. What is still needed is international
and local NGOs to be trained as conflict
managers. Several proposals have been
made for international private organisations
for precisely the purpose of mediation,
538
along the model of Amnesty International.
Here we may quote one source, the
Refugee Policy Group:
The creation of a citizen based private organis-
ation, for creating a strong network to receive
the facts early, to verify them accurately, and
initiate a range of strategies to put pressure on
governments and international organisations
to act. This type of organisation would work
with NGOs and inter-governmental and
governmental so as to effect co-
organisations
ordinated actions
Such an organisation would have to work
with local organisations and mobilise
closely
the vast storehouse of knowledge which
does exist with regard to ethnicity and con-
flict management. It is here that Develop-
ment Agencies in the West, particularly the
’like-minded donors’, should consider pro-
viding more resources for competence
building in peace-making. Today they are
witnessing how neglecting investments in
peace-making and not providing sufficient
resources for peace have meant that even
successful development projects have to be
abandoned. There are strong arguments for
the identification of local resources for com-
petence-building in conflict resolution, and
for strengthening the links between peace
and development.
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3. Walter O’Connor. ’Nation Building or
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4. Ibid, p. 24.
5. A. Greely, Ethnicity in the United States.
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6. Walter O’Connor, ibid.
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1st World: The Present in Historical
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