Abortion

Feminist Perspectives on Moral Philosophy

Dr. Clea F. Rees Feminist Philosophy

We looked last week at Gilligan’s research (1982, 1987, 1995) and started to discuss feminine
and feminist approaches to ethics. We continued exploring these ideas today by further
examining feminist responses to Gilligan (Baier 1995; Card 1990). We are now going to ask
whether these theoretical frameworks can illuminate discussions of a particular moral issue:
abortion. We will be interested in the ways in which the various theories illuminate, or fail
to illuminate, women’s work on abortion. We will also be interested in how feminists should
approach the moral issues raised by abortion.

1. What is distinctive about feminist approaches to abortion, according to Sherwin1 ? Is

abortion a feminist issue?

2. Why does Sherwin refuse to characterise her position on abortion as either “pro-life”
or “pro-choice”?

3. Why does Sherwin think that no feminist can consistently adopt a position which is
“against choice in abortion” (1991, fn. 4)? Is she right?

4. Sherwin argues that women’s right to choose must be protected even though women
may be mistaken in their moral judgements. Is her argument a good one? Might
women also opt for abortion despite judging it morally wrong? If so, would that affect
Sherwin’s case?

5. Does Sherwin’s failure to provide criteria against which to judge the moral permissibility
of any particular abortion amount to a failure to take her responsibilities as a theorist
sufficiently seriously?

6. Do the theoretical frameworks we discussed last week illuminate Sherwin’s article?

Does her article provide support for any of those frameworks?

7. What position should feminists take on abortion? Is the answer to this question any
different from the answer to the question, what position should non-feminists take on
abortion?

8. Read the information on menstrual extraction in figure 1. Is this a “powerful example

of medical research done by women on and for ourselves”? If so, what is its significance?

1
Substitute ‘Little’, ‘Jaggar’ or ‘Parsons’ into these questions in place of ‘Sherwin’ as you read other
articles on this topic.
Dr. Clea F. Rees Abortion 2 of 3

Menstrual Extraction
In the early 1970s, self-help groups at the Feminist Women’s Health Center
in Los Angeles and elsewhere developed a technique using a small flexible
plastic cannula to remove the lining of the uterus at about the time that
the menstrual period is due. Women practiced on each other in order to
develop safe instruments and techniques. Menstrual extraction is done on
an experimental research basis by women in advanced self-help groups; it
cannot be obtained at a medical facility.
Menstrual extraction also helps women avoid the discomfort of a menstrual
period, provides information about menstruation, and enables women to
learn basic health care skills. A very early pregnancy, if present, would
probably be removed along with the lining of the uterus.
We need to do more research before we can know whether frequent ex-
traction of the uterine lining creates any long-term or delayed health
problems, although there is no evidence of any so far. Several aspects of
the techniques developed for menstrual extraction have been incorporated
into medical practice for early abortion with flexible cannulas.
Internationally, a similar technique, called menstrual regulation (MR),
is used in developing countries — throughout Latin America, in Asia,
in many African countries, and on a limited basis in the Middle East.
MR has dramatically reduced the complication rate in countries in which
abortion is unsafe because it is either inaccessible or illegal.
Women in the U.S. who do ME consider it to be legal — a home health
care technique. They do not see themselves as performing abortions, since
no medical diagnosis of pregnancy has been made. ME has not been
challenged in court, and it is difficult to say what would happen if a suit
were to be brought under current abortion laws or those governing the
practice of medicine.
Menstrual extraction is a powerful example of medical research done by
women on and for ourselves. (The Boston Women’s Health Book Collective
1998, p. 391)

Figure 1: extract from Our Bodies, Ourselves for the New Century
Dr. Clea F. Rees Abortion 3 of 3

9. A similar example to that discussed in question 8 involves Jane (Parsons 1979).

Jane was an feminist organisation operating in Chicago between 1969 and 1973.
Jane moved from providing an abortion counselling and referral service to working
directly with illegal abortionists. As they did so, the women involved began assisting
with abortions. Eventually, they were performing all abortions themselves. Jane
provided approximately 12,000 illegal abortions to women on a sliding scale through
a determinedly non-hierarchical service. Any woman could play any role in the service
and women using the service were encouraged to take an active role in their own
care. Does Jane reflect a specifically feminist approach to women’s needs? Jane
closed shortly after abortion became legal throughout the United States. What should
feminists be doing in our society today?

References

Baier, Annette C. (Mar. 1985). ‘What Do Women Want in a Moral Theory?’ In: Noûs 19.1,
pp. 53–63. JSTOR: 2215117.
— (1995). ‘What Do Women Want in a Moral Theory?’ In: Moral Prejudices: Essays on
Ethics. Published in hardcover in 1994. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University
Press, pp. 1–17. Partial/earlier version appeared as Baier (1985).
Card, Claudia (1990). ‘Gender and Moral Luck’. In: Identity, Character and Morality:
Essays in Moral Psychology. Ed. by Owen J. Flanagan and Amélie Oksenberg Rorty.
Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press and MIT CogNet. Chap. 9, pp. 199–218.
Gilligan, Carol (1982). In A Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development.
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
— (1987). ‘Moral Orientation and Moral Development’. In: Women and Moral Theory.
Ed. by Feder Eva Kittay and Diana Tietjens Meyers. New Jersey: Rowman & Littlefield,
pp. 19–33.
— (1995). ‘Hearing the Difference: Theorizing Connection’. In: Hypatia 10.2, pp. 120–127.
EBSCOhost accession number: 9506261263.
Jaggar, Alison M. (1997). ‘Regendering the U.S. Abortion Debate’. In: Journal of Social
Philosophy 28.1, pp. 127–140. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9833.1997.tb00368.x.
Little, Margaret Olivia (1999). ‘Abortion, Intimacy, and the Duty to Gestate’. In: Ethical
Theory and Moral Practice 2.3, pp. 295–312.
Parsons, Kathryn Pyne (1979). ‘Moral Revolution’. In: The Prism of Sex: Essays in the
Sociology of Knowledge. Ed. by Julia A. Sherman and Evelyn Torton Beck. Proceedings
of a symposium sponsored by WRI of Wisconsin, inc. Madison: University of Wisconsin
Press, pp. 189–227.
Sherwin, Susan (1991). ‘Abortion Through a Feminist Ethics Lens’. In: Dialogue: Canadian
Philosophical Review 30.3, pp. 372–342.
The Boston Women’s Health Book Collective (1998). Our Bodies, Ourselves for the New
Century. New York: Simon & Schuster.