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Answer Keys For Problem Set 6: MIT 14.04 Intermediate Microeconomic Theory Fall 2003
Answer Keys For Problem Set 6: MIT 14.04 Intermediate Microeconomic Theory Fall 2003
x1i x2i
ui (xi ) = min( , )
X1 X2
For any endowment (ω1 , ω2 ), any price p (different from (0, 0)) is part of a
Walrasian equilibrium. Indeed consider the allocation
p.ωi
xji = X j
p.X
(p, x) is a Walrasian equilibrium.
endowment
Exercise 7.4
Consumer A has a Cobb-Douglas utility function, his demand functions are
mA p2
x1A = a =a
p1 p1
mA
x2A = (1 − a) =1−a
p2
1
The demand functions of consumer B are
mB p1
x1B = x2B = =
p1 + p2 p1 + p2
By Walras’s law, if one market is cleared the other one will also be cleared.
Check for example that the market for good 2 has to clear:
p1 a
x2A + x2B = 1 ⇐⇒ =
p2 1−a
p1 a
In equilibrium the prices will be such that p2 = 1−a and the allocation will
be x1A
= x2A
= 1 − a and x1B = x2B = a.
Exercise 7.6
Those agents have Cobb-Douglas utility functions
u1 = xa1 x1−a
2
u2 = xb1 x21−b
Exercise 7.8
Let an allocation be defined by (x1A , x2A ) where A gets (x1A , x2A ) and B gets
(1 − x1A , 2 − x2A ).
The set of strongly Pareto efficient allocations is S = {(1, 0), (0, 2)}.
2
Exercise 7.10
The demonstration is identically the same as the one on p321, until the equal-
ity � k �
� �k
∗ ∗ ∗
max(0, zi (p )) p .z(p ) = zi (p∗ ) max(0, zi (p∗ ))
i=1 i=1