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A very complex criterion of fixedness:

Non-compositionality

Maria Helena Svensson

The terminology used in definitions of different types of fixed expressions (such

as idioms, locutions, proverbs etc.) is complex and sometimes ambiguous. Within
All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or applicable copyright law.

the field of phraseology, it is therefore subject to discussion. This chapter deals

with the complexity of the notion of non-compositionality. Non-compositionality
is a criterion that often appears in definitions of fixed expressions. It will be shown
that there are four dichotomies of particular interest within the very notion of
non-compositionality. These dichotomies are: motivation/non-motivation, trans-
parency/opacity, analysability/unanalysability and literal/figurative meaning.
Other notions of relevance to non-compositionality, such as common meaning,
prototypicality, salience and frequency as well as encyclopaedic composition-
ality will also be described and problematised. Finally, the notions of partial
compositionality, holistic or atomistic compositionality, and lexical content or
grammatical form, all describing different aspects of compositionality, will be
evoked, to further demonstrate the complexity of this criterion of fixedness.

. Introduction

Problems of terminology are frequently encountered within the field of phraseology.

When trying to define the notion of fixed expression or when searching for specific
fixed expressions of any kind, researchers very often run into those problems. The pur-
pose of this chapter is to show the complexity of the notion of non-compositionality, a
recurrent criterion in studies of fixed expressions. By comparing the criteria proposed
by linguists specialising in phraseology and by scrutinising certain fixed expressions, it
is possible to show that the complexity of the notion of non-compositionality is due
to the fact that it covers several aspects that do not necessarily function in the same
way. Sometimes only one of these aspects is considered in definitions, sometimes more
Copyright 2008. John Benjamins Publishing Co.

than one. In some cases, it is clear which aspect(s) are taken into account, but often
this is not stated explicitly. This makes it hard to define non-compositionality. Reveal-
ing the different aspects involved and specifying which aspect of non-compositionality
is intended in a given problem, definition or discussion, may lead to ways of avoiding
confusion.

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 Maria Helena Svensson

. The criterion of non-compositionality

Compositionality can be regarded as part of a dichotomy, in which the counterpart is

non- compositionality. It is, of course, the latter notion that is relevant in the context of
phraseology. When describing the notion of compositionality, Lyons (1995: 204) writes
“the meaning of a composite expression is a function of the meanings of its compo-
nent expressions”. Freely generated language is viewed as compositional, whereas fixed
expressions are said to be non-compositional (this, however, is sometimes disputed;
see, for instance, Gibbs 1994; Mejri 1997 and Svensson 2004).
In definitions of fixed expressions (Hudson 1998; Moon 1998) or prefabs (Er-
man & Warren 2000) of different types (idioms, locutions, proverbs etc.), the criterion
of non-compositionality is often mentioned (Gross 1996; Hudson 1998; Moon 1998;
Gonzáles Rey 2002; Svensson 2004). In some cases, it is the unmarked term ‘composi-
tionality’ that receives the most attention, but of course facts about compositionality
often yield relevant knowledge about non-compositionality as well.
The notion of non-compositionality is a complex one, which can be described by
as many as four dichotomies, and also by other features, which will be described in this
chapter. What is particularly problematic is that very often it is not clear that more than
one dichotomy is involved. It will be shown that it is possible to give each of the four
dichotomies definitions of their own. These definitions may overlap and be related to
one another, but they are not exact equivalents.
The notions of common meaning, prototypicality, salience and frequency, and the
notion of encyclopaedic compositionality are less confusing, but will also be discussed,
as well as other notions of importance, such as partial compositionality, lexical content
or grammatical form, and atomistic and holistic perspectives.

. Defining features of (non-)compositionality

. Four dichotomies associated with non-compositionality

The four dichotomies that will be discussed here are: motivation/non-motivation,

transparency/opacity, analysability/unanalysability and literal/figurative meaning. For
the sake of simplification, the pairs of notions examined are presented as dichotomies,
although two of them should rather be described as continuums (see Section
4.1 below).
The notions of non-motivation, opacity, unanalysability and figurative meaning
are often present in discussions on fixed expressions and their definitions (see Lan-
gacker 1987; Nunberg et al. 1994; Mejri 1997; Hudson 1998; Moon 1998; Le Pesant
2003; Petit 2003). They are often associated with non-compositionality and appear
in definitions where non-compositionality is a defining feature (Gross 1996: 10–11;
Martin 1997: 293; Gonzáles Rey 2002: 56–57). For instance, the notion of opacity is
often associated with figurative meaning. The fact that these notions appear under

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A very complex criterion of fixedness 

the same word in indexes or glossaries is also of importance here. Hudson (1998: 176)
says, for instance, in her index: “compositionality [...] see also analysability”. In Moon’s
(1998: 334) index, we read: “compositionality [...] see also motivation, transparency”.
The glossary of Gross (1996: 154) relates the terms compositionality and opacity:
“Compositionnalité [...] (voir Opacité)”.

.. Motivation vs. non-motivation

The definition of compositionality by Nunberg et al. (1994: 498) can be used to estab-
lish a relation between compositionality and motivation: “[...] compositionality – that
is, the degree to which the phrasal meaning, once known [my italics], can be analysed in
terms of the contribution of the idiom parts”. This quote points to a relation between
the criterion of compositionality and the possibility of accounting for the contribution
of each word to the whole, once the meaning of the expression in question (in this case
an idiom) is known.
More explicitly, their definition can be used in the following way: first the meaning
of an expression or prefab is learned. If, after this, it is possible to motivate the meaning
of the expression by making sense of the meaning of each word included in it, the ex-
pression/prefab is motivated. The term ‘motivatable’ (see for instance Farø 2005: 123)
is even more appropriate, since ‘motivating an expression’ is often about finding a
possible explanation for the appearance of the words in the expression. The explana-
tion found is not necessarily the one behind the original use of the expression, but
can serve as a motivation, correct or not. The expression is then ‘motivatable’ rather
than ‘motivated’. This implies that the motivatability can vary from one language-
user to another – some are more inclined to find possible explanations than others.
As a consequence, non-motivatability does not function well in definitions of fixed
expressions.
Colour expressions in which a colour term is used as an attribute of an abstract
noun can illustrate motivatability rather efficiently. Of course there is no actual, phys-
ical colour present since there is no concrete object to describe. In these expressions
the meaning of the colour term cannot be concrete and literal. Still, expressions of this
type can be used in at least two ways. One use is when the colour term can be moti-
vated, even in a synchronic perspective. The expression, or more specifically, the use
of the colour term in question, is motivatable if there is a relation between the colour
term and the meaning of the expression. There is often a conventional use of colour
expressions where the colour is associated with a particular meaning. For instance, the
colour term white is often associated with innocence or purity, black with pessimism
or illegality, and green with plants or youth. Therefore, expressions like white wedding,
black market and green policy are motivated (or motivatable), yet figurative (see Sec-
tion 3.1.4 below; see also Steinvall 2002, Chapter 7, for an analysis of the figurative use
of colour terms).
In other types of colour expressions, the choice of colour seems completely ar-
bitrary. Even if there was once a logical reason for the colour term to appear in the

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 Maria Helena Svensson

expression, the origin has been forgotten. This might be the case in expressions such as
purple prose or the French nuit blanche (‘white night’ – a night when one doesn’t sleep).

.. Transparency vs. opacity

When talking about the notion of ‘locution’, Martin (1997) writes that even if each
word in the expression is easy to understand, this is not sufficient to understand the
meaning of the whole French expression tirer le diable par la queue (‘pull the devil’s
tail’ – have difficulty living within small resources). In this context, he states that a
prototypical locution is characterised by its non-compositionality:
a prototypical locution is characterized [...] by its non-compositionality. Even
if one understands all of the words that make up the expression tirer le dia-
ble par la queue [‘pull the devil’s tail’], this is not enough to make the locution
comprehensible. [my translation] (Martin 1997: 293)1
This implies that non-compositionality is related to the difficulty with which an ex-
pression can be understood. Non-compositionality is explained in terms of compre-
hension, which in turn can be associated with the dichotomy transparency/opacity. If,
when presented with an expression, a language user understands it without any prob-
lems, without any other previous knowledge than understanding the separate words
that make up the expression, then it is transparent. Conversely, as Gross (1996: 155)
puts it: “a given sequence is said to be opaque when, from the meaning of the com-
posing elements, one cannot reconstruct the meaning as a whole” [my translation].
As Moon (1998: 22–23) points out, not all speakers of a language understand all the
expressions containing certain metaphors. Her examples of some semi-transparent
metaphors are grasp the nettle, on an even keel, the pecking order, throw in the towel
and under one’s belt.
One group of expressions that can be transparent despite not always being mo-
tivatable are similes. Often, one characteristic is expressed and then reinforced by
something that is supposedly a good example of the characteristic (although this is
sometimes more of a habit than an actual fact). Examples are as good as gold, as easy
as pie, dry as a bone or white as snow. Comparable French examples are fort comme un
Turc, (‘strong as a Turk’) soûl comme un Polonais (‘drunk as a Pole’) and bête comme
ses pieds (‘stupid like one’s feet’). There are similar expressions which reinforce a verb:
swear like a trooper and sleep/cry like a baby. Some French examples of this kind are:
pleurer comme une madeleine (‘cry one’s heart/eyes out’) and jurer comme un charretier
(‘swear like a carter’).
While this kind of expression is often easy to understand for a learner of a new lan-
guage (if the learner recognises a pattern, where for instance as adjective as noun – as
good as gold equals very adjective - very good), it is not obvious which simile is estab-

. “Une locution prototypique est caractérisée [...] par sa non-compositionnalité. On a beau

comprendre tous les mots qui entrent dans tirer le diable par la queue, cela ne suffit pas pour
comprendre ce que cette locution veut dire.”

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A very complex criterion of fixedness 

lished and conventionalised in the language in question. One possible explanation for
the conventionalisation of some of the examples given above is that of alliteration (see
Svensson (2004: 95) on phonological structure and Boers & Lindstromberg (2005),
who mention alliteration as a cognitively salient feature within another criterion of
fixedness, that of memorability).

.. Analysability vs.unanalysability

Compositionality can also be associated with the analysability of an expression (and
hence, non-compositionality can be associated with unanalysability). Here, we are
concerned with the contribution of each word in the expression to the meaning of the
whole. However, it is possible to separate these two notions, as for instance Langacker
does: “Compositionality [...] is to be distinguished from analysability, which pertains
instead to the extent to which speakers are cognizant [...] of the contribution that in-
dividual component structures [my italics] make to the composite whole” (Langacker
1987: 457). According to Langacker’s definition, each individual component must then
contribute to the meaning of the expression as a whole. Gibbs (1994: 278) uses the term
‘decomposition’, but his definition of ‘decomposable’ is comparable to Langacker’s def-
inition of ‘analysable’: “Idioms like pop the question, spill the beans, and lay down the
law are ‘decomposable’, because each component obviously contributes to the overall
figurative interpretation”.
These examples and their analysability can be further examined. According to
Gibbs et al. (1989: 578), there is no foolproof method of deciding the exact analysabil-
ity of an expression. There are, however, certain ways of examining expressions such
as idioms. One is to use semantic fields. The more the separate parts of an idiom share
the same semantic field as their idiomatic references, the easier it is to analyse the
idiom. In this perspective, both pop the question and spill the beans are decompos-
able (or analysable) (Gibbs 1994: 278). It is easy to figure out which part of the idiom
stands for the verb and which part contains the noun, which makes it easy to fig-
ure out which part contributes which meaning. In the case of pop the question, pop
can be taken to mean ‘ask’ and question means ‘wedding proposal’. Spill the beans can
be decomposed in the same way: spill means ‘reveal’ and beans means ‘secret’. But
the semantics of the words making up these idioms and their idiomatic references are
quite different from each other. In the first example, it is fairly easy to establish a se-
mantic relationship between pop and ‘ask’ as well as between question and ‘marriage
proposal’, because a marriage proposal is actually a question. In the case of spill the
beans, the semantic relations are not as obvious. There is a semantic relation between
spill and ‘reveal’, this being possibly an action done involuntarily. There is, however,
no natural semantic relationship between beans and ‘secret’. In the latter example it
is therefore only the structure of the phrase that makes it decomposable. One way of
making this more explicit is to say that the syntactic structure only defines the notion
of ‘analysability’. In my view, this is the most efficient way of dealing with this aspect
of (non)-compositionality.

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 Maria Helena Svensson

The example lay down the law is equally interesting. Since Gibbs (1994: 278) states
that each word contributes independently to the figurative interpretation of the ex-
pression as a whole, each of the words lay, down, the and law should contribute to the
meaning of the idiom. At a closer look, it can be difficult to see how each part con-
tributes independently to the meaning of the whole. The last part of this expression is
less problematic. The law refers to laws, rules or principles that must be applied in a
given situation. But how does lay contribute to the meaning? And down? Lay can mean
‘put’ or ‘place’, but how the word down contributes independently to the meaning is
not clear. Lay and down together can also mean ‘place’ or ‘put’, so this part of the ex-
pression can be said to mean ‘impose’ or something similar. But there is no obvious
relation between the down part of the expression and the figurative interpretation. An-
other possible meaning of lay down is ‘put aside’, which would imply the opposite of
‘impose’. A comparison with the Swedish expression lägga ner (literally ‘lay down’) is
interesting here. These two words can be parts of expressions like lägga ner fabriken
(literally ‘lay down the factory’ – close the factory) and lägga ner sin röst (literally ‘lay
down one’s voice’ – refrain from voting). In other words, it is not obvious that the
words in the expression lay down the law each contribute individually to the meaning
of the expression.
More obvious examples of unanalysable expressions are bite the dust and saw logs.
They are both unanalysable, since it is the expression as a whole that makes up the
sense of the expression. The words contribute to the meaning, but not individually,
since it is not possible to say which part means what.

.. Literal meaning vs. figurative meaning

The last dichotomy examined here is that between literal and figurative meaning. The
problem of defining literal language is well known, and some researchers even reject
the view that a phrase can have a literal meaning independent of its context (see for
instance Searle 1978: 207 and Recanati 1995: 209–210). Defining a figurative or (of-
ten) metaphorical meaning is not necessarily less problematic, but there are ways of
dealing with it. Beardsley (1967: 285) suggests that one way of recognising a figura-
tive or metaphorical use of language, is to identify something in an utterance that
would be a logical contradiction or an absurdity if interpreted literally. According to
Black (1993: 34), it is not just an obvious contradiction of the intended meaning that
is decisive for an interpretation to become figurative, but also that it would become
meaningless if interpreted literally. Yet another indication of a figurative meaning is
when an utterance deviates from its context (see Ariel 2002: 362–364).
There is, supposedly, a relation between literal and compositional as well as be-
tween figurative and non-compositional. Gross illustrates this with the following ex-
planation, where he states that word units that cannot be interpreted literally (from
the separate words that make up the unit) do not have a compositional meaning:

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A very complex criterion of fixedness 

[...] in any language, there are many sequences that a foreigner cannot interpret
literally, even if he or she knows the common meaning of all the words that make
them up. This is the case in the following sentence: La moutarde lui monte au
nez [‘The mustard goes up his nose’]. The ‘ordinary’ meaning of the words in this
sentence does not allow one to conclude that the whole sentence means that a per-
son is getting angry. We will say that this sentence does not have a compositional
meaning. [my translation] (Gross 1996: 11)2

The feature ‘not having a literal interpretation’ must be equivalent to ‘having

a figurative interpretation’, which implies that the word unit in question has a
figurative meaning.

.. Combinations of the dichotomies

One effect of separating the notions in the dichotomies above is that several of them
can be activated at the same time. What is interesting here is not that they can be defin-
ing features of the same expression, but the fact that in one of the dichotomies the
part normally describing freely generated language can be used to describe an expres-
sion that clearly falls under the description of a fixed expression according to another
dichotomy. One and the same expression can be motivatable, yet have a figurative
meaning. The expression a shot in the arm can be used as an example. The word shot
is not to be taken here as something that comes out of a firearm. The shot in ques-
tion is supposed to be an injection, meant to give energy. This makes the expression
motivatable. Still, the expression is at the same time opaque to some language users.
In the same way, many expressions including colour terms can be figurative yet moti-
vatable. They can be transparent or not, depending on the knowledge of the speaker
or listener. As we will see (see Section 4.2 below), the example saw logs can be said
to be motivatable or not, depending on the perspective with which we look upon the
expression (atomistic or holistic). Taken separately, the words do not contribute to the
meaning ‘snore’, so it is unanalysable. Taken together, as a unit, the expression can be
motivatable. The meaning is clearly figurative.
When combining several properties from the dichotomies, it is possible to find
examples that fit the description of most of the combinations. Below are some com-
binations of the terms in the dichotomies and examples of English and French fixed
expressions that fit under their description. This list is simplified and it is necessary to
bear in mind that an expression can be partly motivatable (see Section 4.1 below):
Figurative, motivatable, transparent and analysable:
green policy

. “Dans les langues, il existe un grand nombre de suites qu’un étranger ne peut pas interpréter
littéralement, même s’il connaît le sens habituel de tous les mots qui les composent. Il en est
ainsi de la phrase suivante: La moutarde lui monte au nez. Le sens ‘ordinaire’ des mots de cette
phrase ne permet pas de conclure que la phrase dans son ensemble signifie que l’on parle d’une
personne qui se fâche. Nous dirons que cette phrase n’a pas de lecture compositionnelle.”

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 Maria Helena Svensson

Figurative, motivatable, opaque and analysable:

marcher sur des œufs [‘to walk on eggs’ – see Section 4.1, below]
Figurative, non-motivatable, transparent and analysable:
soûl comme un Polonais [‘drunk as a Pole’]
Figurative, non-motivatable, opaque and analysable:
put the kibosh on something
Figurative, motivatable, transparent and unanalysable:
bite the dust
Figurative, motivatable, opaque and unanalysable:
spill the beans, lay down the law
Figurative, non-motivatable, transparent and unanalysable:
? (Fixed expressions of this combination are particularly hard to find)
Figurative, non-motivatable, opaque and unanalysable:
blue movie, purple patch
Expressions with a literal meaning are not included in this list. They are not necessarily
transparent, but they are motivatable and analysable. It is hard to imagine an expres-
sion with a literal meaning that would be unanalysable and non-motivatable. Finding
a figurative meaning that is analysable is, however, possible, as indicated in the list
above. Another example is spill the beans, which, in my view is analysable (if only the
syntactic structure is taken into account), yet figurative.
As indicated in the list, it is difficult to find examples of the combination figurative,
non-motivatable, transparent and unanalysable. A transparent expression is likely to
be motivatable. One exception to this might be some similes. They are easy to under-
stand, but their origin might be based on old prejudices and stereotypes, making them
non-motivatable from a modern perspective. But finding transparent expressions that
are both non-motivatable and unanalysable is harder. This is a challenge for anyone
reading the list above.

.. The (in)efficiency of the dichotomies

The dichotomies examined obviously have properties rather different from one an-
other. While the criteria may appear in contexts where fixed expressions are dis-
cussed, and hence are relevant in a sense, they are not necessarily efficient. Fur-
thermore, it is often possible to be more precise about which of these aspects of
(non-)compositionality is the relevant one for a given example.
The dichotomies analysability/unanalysability and literal/figurative meaning
meaning are inherent properties of an expression (either it is analysable or not, ei-
ther it is figurative or not, though it can be partially so) that are quite objective and
easy to use. The transparency or opacity is bound to vary from one receiver to another,
although it might be possible to label certain expressions as opaque for the majority
of language users who have not learned the meaning yet. The same can be said about
motivatability. As we have seen, the motivatability of an expression depends on each
speaker’s inventiveness and creativity. The dichotomies motivation/non-motivation

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A very complex criterion of fixedness 

and transparency/opacity are therefore more subjective and difficult to use as definite
criteria. They may be of use in other contexts, but it is not certain that definitions of
fixed expressions benefit from the use of the terms opaque or non-motivatable. I have
stated elsewhere (see Svensson 2004) that none of the features non-motivatable, opac-
ity, unanalysability and figurative meaning are both necessary and sufficient conditions
for defining fixed expressions.

. Common meaning, prototypicality, salience, and frequency

The notion of (non)-compositionality can be further problematised. Other terms that

appear in definitions are (not having) common meaning, (not having) prototypical
meaning or use and (not having) salient meaning or use. We have also considered
Gross’s (1996: 11) example La moutarde lui monte au nez. Gross states that the words
do not have their ‘common’ meaning (‘sens ordinaire’) in this expression. The prob-
lem with the word ‘common’ is that it is not very well defined. It could refer to the
original meaning, or the most frequent meaning or something else. Since the meaning
of the phrase is clearly figurative, common meaning could refer to its literal meaning.
Usually, concrete meaning is considered literal whereas abstract meaning is considered
to be figurative. Hanks (2005: 182) says, for instance, “[i]f a term has both a concrete
meaning and an abstract meaning, the concrete one generally has preferential status as
literal”.
To make things more interesting, it is not always the case that the literal meaning
is the prototypical meaning. Hudson (1998: 66) points out that it is not always clear
which meaning is prototypical. According to her, salience is related to prototypical-
ity and frequency. One way of defining salient meaning is to let this term refer to the
most frequent meaning. Consider Hudson’s (1998: 66) example of way: “[way] can be
used in a concrete sense (‘path’, ‘road’) or in an extended metaphorical sense (‘fash-
ion’, ‘means’). Corpus investigation shows [...] that the latter, metaphorical sense is
much more frequently used in present-day English, and I therefore call this the salient
sense”. This means that if compositionality is linked with high frequency or proto-
typicality (and non-compositionality with low frequency and non-prototypical use of
words and/or meanings), this has to be clearly stated in each case. If this is taken into
account, the question of whether an expression like in this way is non-compositional
or not will depend on the view adopted.

. Encyclopaedic (non-)compositionality

There is yet another feature associated with the notion of (non-)compositionality.

Some expressions have the property of being motivatable, transparent, literal and
analysable but are still considered non-compositional. How is this possible? This oc-
curs when the meanings of the separate words each contribute to the meaning of the
expression but the expression also has an additional meaning. Langacker (1987: 455)
states that “most composite expressions have a conventional meaning more specific

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 Maria Helena Svensson

than their compositional value”. His example with the (made up) expression “patri-
otic pole-climber” (Langacker 1987: 454) is rather specific. There are actual, existing
expressions which are less spectacular. Consider for instance the compound green-
house. It is fairly transparent, easily motivated, partially literal (the house in itself is
not necessarily green, but its appearance might be because of its content) and both
green and house contribute to the meaning. But it is, of course, not just a ‘green
house’. An even more obvious example is perhaps the White House, which can re-
fer to something that is exactly that: a house that is white. In most contexts, there
is also an important meaning which includes the American government or politics.
This meaning, however, is not possible to derive just from the meaning of ‘white’ and
the meaning of ‘house’. Our encyclopaedic knowledge tells us about the additional
meaning of this compound. Barkema (1996: 139) refers to this kind of expression as
“pseudo-compositional”, while Mel’čuk (1998: 30) calls them “quasi-phrasemes” or
“quasi-idioms”. Martin (1997: 297) gives some examples in French, for instance at-
tendre un bébé which means ‘expect a baby’ (literally ‘wait for a baby’), but also much
more. Attendre un bébé is not just about expecting the arrival of (any) baby, but also
implies (in the case of a mother-to-be) carrying a foetus in the body while it is develop-
ing. What one awaits is for the mother to give birth to the baby. In this context, Warren
(2001: 110) talks about “unexpressed constraints” and “conventional meaning”. For
instance, the conventional meaning of from coast to coast, includes an unexpressed
constraint, implying that such a journey should take place over land, and not over
water, even though the latter could also describe travelling from coast to coast.

. Other important notions

. Partial compositionality

In the descriptions given above, the definitions are simplified. As Langacker (1987: 449)
points out, the compositionality of an expression is often a question of partial com-
positionality rather than a clear-cut compositional/non-compositional dichotomy:
“[l]inguistic phenomena lend themselves more easily to a claim of partial rather than
full compositionality” (see also Barkema 1996: 140). The same is true for some of the
components examined in the dichotomies. At least two of the dichotomies are more
likely to be scalar than either/or. The motivation as well as the literal meaning of an ex-
pression can be partial. It might be more problematic to define a ‘partial transparency’.
Either you understand the expression or you do not. The same goes for analysability.
Either you can tell which part contributes which meaning or you cannot.
The scalarity of motivation and literal meaning can be illustrated with the French
expression marcher sur des œufs (‘walk on eggs’), which can have several meanings,
depending on context. It is, of course, possible to walk on eggs in the most literal
and concrete sense of the words, although this probably does not occur very often.
If this meaning is intended, the expression is literal and motivated. Another possible

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A very complex criterion of fixedness 

meaning of this expression is ‘to walk on the ground with caution’. This meaning is
probably intended more often than the literal one. There are usually no eggs present
in this context, but the reference to eggs can be said to be motivated (motivatable).
Eggs are fragile and can therefore be associated with caution. The verb still has its
literal meaning. Consequently, the expression is partially literal (or partly figurative),
but still motivatable. The expression has one more possible meaning: ‘to act with cau-
tion’. Here, the meaning of the verb is less salient. The action is not specified and walk
must now be taken as a figurative meaning for ‘act’ in some way. The motivation for
the verb is no longer obvious. The word eggs is still motivatable, since the meaning
‘with caution’ is still present. The third possible meaning of the expression is therefore
figurative, and partly motivatable.

. Holistic or atomistic compositionality

As we have seen, the expressions saw logs and bite the dust are unanalysable, which
means that the words do not contribute individually to the meaning of the expres-
sions in question, although the expressions taken as whole units might be motivatable
and/or transparent. Two other terms that are sometimes evoked in this context are
holistic and atomistic. Gosselin (1996: 161) uses the term “atomistic compositional
approach” to describe cases where the global meaning (‘signification globale’) is a di-
rect result of the analyses of the individual meanings of the elements that make up an
utterance. The terms atomistic and analysable seem to be related as do the terms holis-
tic and unanalysable. An unanalysable expression such as saw logs (where neither saw
nor logs make up the meaning ‘snore’) is nevertheless motivatable if looked upon in a
holistic perspective. Taken as a whole, the expression has a logical interpretation via an
association of the sound that a snoring person makes.

. Lexical content or grammatical form

In order to describe yet another aspect of compositionality, let us look at two ways
of deciding on the motivatability of an expression. Here, the French expression les
carottes sont cuites (literally ‘the carrots are cooked’, meaning ‘it’s over’, ‘it’s no use’, ‘it’s
too late’) is a useful example. When looking at the meaning (that is, the semantic or
lexical content) of each of the words in the expression, it is easy to draw the conclusion
that it is non-motivatable. Nothing in the semantics of carrots or cooking carrots yields
‘it’s over’ as a logical conclusion. However, the grammatical form of this expression is
actually motivatable. The verb form in the expression implies that the action in the
expression has already taken place and is indeed concluded. It would be less logical to
use a progressive form or another choice of tense (such as the future or the present)
to express the rather fatalistic state that is evoked by the expression. Likewise, using an
adjective instead of the verb would not be a natural way to express the irreversibility of
the event. This aspect should therefore be taken into account when the motivatability
or transparency of an expression is being decided.

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 Maria Helena Svensson

. Conclusion

This chapter shows that there are many notions that appear in descriptions of the
notion of (non)-compositionality, some of which are lexical content and grammat-
ical form, partial compositionality, atomistic and holistic compositionality, proto-
typicality, salience and common meaning. Some of these notions, such as atomistic
compositionality and analysability, are equivalents or near equivalents.
The properties most commonly associated with (non-)compositionality are prob-
ably the dichotomies motivation/non-motivation, transparency/opacity, analysabil-
ity/unanalysability and literal/figurative meaning. In the definitions examined here,
there is clearly an association between each of the four notions of non-motivation,
opacity, unanalysability and figurative meaning and the notion of non-compositionality.
Even so, these concepts are not equivalents. More than one of them can appear in the
same definition. The proof that they are not synonyms is that the same expression
can be classified on different sides of the dichotomies. It can thus be shown that the
dichotomies are relevant notions on their own and that they exist independently.
There is no doubt that the notion of (non-)compositionality is very complex.
While it is interesting and in many respects relevant in discussions about fixed ex-
pressions, the complexity makes it difficult to apply an all-embracing notion of non-
compositionality as a criterion for fixed expressions and prefabs. Unless it is possible
to be very specific about which aspect is intended, other criteria are probably better
suited for defining fixed expressions (see Svensson 2004: 109 for further discussion of
alternatives).

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