Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Harvard Extension School Thesis Proposal
Harvard Extension School Thesis Proposal
Ian Lamont
31 Arlington Road
Waltham, MA 02453
(781) 373-1887
ianlamont@yahoo.com
I.
Tentative Title:
“Chinese Policy Toward Vietnam during the Deng Xiaoping Era: Understanding the
Views of Beijing’s Leading Nucleus through a Content Analysis of the New China News
Agency”
II.
Research Problem
China under Deng Xiaoping (1977-1993) had a difficult relationship with Vietnam.
Relations between the two countries in the first 11 years of the Deng era were dominated
by several contentious bilateral and multilateral issues, including the “boat people”
tragedy, the Kampuchean conflict, and Hanoi’s close relationship with Moscow. In 1979
and 1988 the military forces of China and Vietnam engaged in pitched battles in remote
border areas and the South China Sea. By the early 1990s, and until Deng’s retirement in
1993, however, the relationship had entered a cooling-off period, as Vietnam’s direct
modern Chinese and Southeast Asian history, international relations experts, military
analysts, and journalists. Yet their understanding of China’s attitudes toward and policies
involving Vietnam during this period are largely defined by qualitative research, based on
the two countries’ shared history, statements of Chinese diplomats, military deployments,
bureaucratic actions, events, treaties, official documents, and other sources. Many
the treatment of ethnic Chinese in Vietnam, Soviet support for Vietnam. This type of
1
research makes it difficult to gauge the relative importance to the Chinese leadership of
Is there any other way to study Chinese attitudes toward Vietnam? Can an empirical
methodology be applied, in order to better understand the various factors that were
important to China during this period? If so, what Vietnam-related issues will be seen as
most important to China at various points in time, and which countries or other
service operated by the state-run New China News Agency to evaluate these questions
with other Indochinese countries, the two superpowers, and two prominent international
bodies, the United Nations and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. I aim to
provide an empirical basis for understanding China’s complex relationship with Vietnam
Kampuchea dominated China’s views of Vietnam from the late 1970s to the late 1980s. I
Vietnam’s 1989 troop withdrawal from its neighbor, just as China came to see the United
Nations as an important player in the Kampuchean conflict. My hypothesis also finds that
the Soviet Union was not seen by China as a dominant factor in issues touching Vietnam
or the Kampuchean conflict, with the exception of the first five years of the Deng period.
Further, Chinese concerns regarding Soviet influence faded in the last five years of the
2
Deng period. My study confirms that, in China’s view, issues relating to the United
States, Laos, or ASEAN were seldom viewed by China as important factors relating to
The significance of my research is twofold. First, it will provide an empirical basis for
understanding official Chinese attitudes toward Vietnam during the Deng era. Second, I
which may encourage others to use the vast amounts of Chinese media data now being
III.
Definition of Terms
“NCNA”: The New China News Agency is the office state-run news agency of the
abbreviation NCNA.
translated from the agency’s domestic Chinese service, many dispatches are written by
“NCNA news item”: Any feature, commentary, report, dispatch, caption, brief,
summary, or statement broadcast over the NCNA English Service. It is the sampling unit
3
for my survey. Those items that contain any one of the content variables listed below (V,
never head of state or head of the CCP, but was China’s de-facto leader. Political titles
included member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, chairman of the
CCP’s Central Military Commission, vice-chairman of the CCP, and vice premier.
“The Deng era”: Establishing the start and end dates of Deng Xiaoping’s leadership
of China is difficult. His post-Mao leadership influence is regarded as starting with his
post-Gang of Four rehabilitation by the Third Plenary Session of the Tenth Central
State Council, Vice-Chairman of the Military Commission and Chief of the General Staff
According to another source, the 3rd session of the Eleventh Central Committee in
December 1978 is “commonly reported as the start of Deng’s supreme and de facto
leadership.”3 There is no consensus on the end date of his rule. He stepped down from his
official state and party posts in the late 1980s and early 1990s, but had influence on state
and party affairs until his death in 1997. For the purpose of this study, I will consider
Deng’s de-facto leadership role ending in March 1993. After 1992 Deng was in frail
health, seldom seen in public, and presumably unable to actively manage the country’s
1
“Key Figures: Deng Xiaoping.” China Daily, updated June 25, 2004. Available from
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-06/25/content_342508.htm.
2
John King Fairbank. China: A New History (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of
Harvard University Press, 1992), 406.
3
“Leaders of China (People’s Republic of China).” Zárate’s Political Collections
(ZPC), Roberto Ortiz de Zárate, 1996-2003. Available from
http://www.terra.es/personal2/monolith/china.htm.
4
affairs, although he certainly had some degree of influence. Additionally, March 27,
1993, was the date Jiang Zemin, China’s next paramount leader, was officially elevated
“Leading Nucleus”: The high-level state and party officials, who, along with China’s
paramount leader, are responsible for making decisions about China’s foreign affairs.4
“V”: The content variable consisting of any one of three terms in any NCNA news
item corresponding to Vietnam or issues related to Vietnam. Any NCNA news item with
“K”: The content variable consisting of any one of nine terms in any NCNA news
“L”: The content variable consisting of any one of three terms in any NCNA news
items corresponding to Laos or issues related to Laos. L search terms are “Laos” or
“Laotian” or “Vientiane,” but during L searches, an additional six terms are excluded to
screen out NCNA news items that mention Chinese writer Lao She and Chinese
philosopher Lao Zi. Any NCNA news item with this term will be counted as 1 L item.
4
Ning Lu, “The Central leadership, Supraministry Coordinating Bodies, State Council,
Ministries, and Party Departments,” in David M. Lampton, ed., The Making of Chinese Foreign
and Security Policy in the Era of Reform, 1978-2000 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press,
2001), 41.
5
“Soviet Union”: Officially known as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, The
“Russia”: The country officially known as the Russian Federation, which inherited
the mantle of Soviet power following the official demise of the USSR in 1991.
“S”: The content variable consisting of any one of 12 terms in any NCNA news item
issues. Any NCNA news item with this term will be counted as 1 S item in the survey.
“United States”: The country officially known as the United States of America.
“U”: The content variable consisting of any one of eight terms in any NCNA news
item corresponding to the United States or U.S.-related issues. Any NCNA news item
with this term will be counted as 1 U item in the survey. “America,” “American,” and
“U.S.” are not included in U search terms (see VI: Limitations of Research)
“United Nations”: The international organization that aims to provide a forum for
“I”: The content variable consisting of any one of 16 terms in any NCNA news item
corresponding to the United Nations or any U.N.-related agency or issue. Any NCNA
6
“A”: The content variable consisting of either of two terms in any NCNA news item
Any NCNA news item with this term will be counted as 1 A item.
IV.
Background
China’s relations with Vietnam were tense during most of the Deng era. 1977, the
first year of my study, was a time of transition for both countries. China had a new
political landscape. The Cultural Revolution was over, and paramount leader Mao
Zedong was dead. The Gang of Four had been vanquished and Deng Xiaoping had re-
emerged as a contender for leadership of the country. Vietnam was also undergoing
change. Communist North Vietnam had forced reunification with the South less than two
years previously, and the country was attempting to rebuild itself while shutting down the
capitalist system that dominated the South. Hanoi and Beijing were nominal allies. Both
governments were Communist, and China had sent a great deal of military aid to North
Vietnam during the civil war, and was preparing to follow up with economic assistance.
Nevertheless, a series of crises soon emerged that turned China against Vietnam and
strained the relationship to the breaking point. The crises included the widespread
and occupation of Kampuchea in late 1978; and Hanoi’s increasingly cozy relationship
with Moscow. The breaking point occurred in early 1979 when China invaded Vietnam
and briefly occupied Vietnam’s northern provinces. Relations were hostile until the late
1980s. Border skirmishes took place regularly, and in 1988 China launched an attack on
disputed islands in the South China Sea and wrested them from Vietnam’s control. Yet
7
the following year signs of a thaw began to appear, as Vietnam withdrew from
Kampuchea and Soviet power began to disintegrate. By the time Deng stepped down
from his last official post in 1993, a few sticking points remained — most notably
overlapping territorial claims in the South China Sea — but the two sides were actively
I believe a computer-assisted content analysis of NCNA news items can help explain
China’s evolving views of Vietnam during this period. The research will touch upon five
areas: specific issues relating to Sino-Vietnamese relations; Chinese foreign policy in the
context of regional and geopolitical trends; international relations theory; Chinese media
and its role reflecting the views of China’s leaders; and content analysis methodologies.
prism of one or two of the issues named above. Other issues are downplayed or ignored.
Such is the case with studies of Vietnam’s ethnic Chinese population by Ramses Amer
(1991)5 and Chang Pao-min (1982),6 as well as the numerous studies of China’s territorial
claims in the South China Sea, including Lin Wei-Zen (1999),7 Marwyn Samuels
(1982),8 and those collected by Bob Catley and Keliat Makmur (1997).9 Charles
5
Ramses Amer, The Ethnic Chinese in Vietnam and Sino-Vietnamese Relations
(Kuala Lumpur: Forum, 1991).
6
Chang Pao-min, Beijing, Hanoi, and the Overseas Chinese (Berkeley, CA: Institute
of East Asian Studies, University of California at Berkeley, Center for Chinese Studies, 1982).
7
Wei-Zen Lin. The Transformation of Hainan’s Historical Geography: From 110 BCE
to 1949. Ph.D. diss. (Syracuse: Syracuse University, 1999), 218-219.
8
Marwyn S. Samuels, Contest for the South China Sea (New York: Methuen, 1982).
9
Bob Catley and Makmur Keliat, eds., Spratlys: The Dispute in the South China Sea
(Brookfield, Vt.: Ashgate, 1997).
8
McGregor (1988)10 recognizes the complicated, interlocking nature of the multiple
regional and geopolitical issues impacting Sino-Viet relations, but neglects to include
Vietnam’s persecution of ethnic Chinese as a major factor. McGregor also places Soviet
economic and military support for Vietnam as being of crucial importance to Beijing
from the mid -970s until 1988, and sees ASEAN as being of crucial importance to
China’s plans for Kampuchea. Neither idea is fully supported by the NCNA data.
Stephen Morris’ 1999 study11 of Sino-Viet relations is the most inclusive in terms of the
variety of factors considered. He concludes that issues relating to Kampuchea were the
main sticking points in relations between China and Vietnam. This is confirmed by the
NCNA data I have gathered. Morris also explores in detail additional historical,
ideological, geopolitical, regional, and military issues that impacted the relationship. My
research can clarify the data relative importance of some, but not all, of these factors. Of
these researchers only one uses empirical data: Ramses Amer, who cites statistics from
the U.N., national censuses, and other sources to describe the humanitarian disaster that
affected Vietnam’s ethnic Chinese population in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
As for international relations theory, Marxism and realism are often used to describe
Chinese foreign policy during the Deng era. Steven Levine (1994) examines the role of
Zedong Thought was not rendered irrelevant after Mao’s death in 1976. Rather, it was
10
Charles McGregor, The Sino-Vietnamese Relationship and the Soviet Union
(London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1988).
11
Stephen Morris, Why Vietnam Invaded Cambodia: Political Culture And The
Causes Of War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999).
9
to suit its current needs.”12 Moreover, Levine notes the importance of Marxism-Leninism
foreign policy-related jobs. This may be the case, but not explain why China viewed with
such hostility the Communist leadership in Hanoi for much of the Deng period.
relations during the Deng period. Data gathered from my NCNA content analysis support
the idea that Chinese policy toward Vietnam during the Deng era was indeed firmly
grounded in China’s realist goals in the region, and Marxism as a guiding principle for
Chinese foreign policy was dead, despite the fact that the governments of Vietnam,
China, and the U.S.S.R. were based on Communist systems. Other observers of Chinese
foreign policy have also embraced realism. Jack Snyder (2004) observes that China’s
foreign policy is based upon “realist ideas that date back millennia.” 13 Elizabeth
Economy (2001) charts China’s rise from an insular state to a prominent player in global
affairs. She notes that in 1977 China was a member of 21 international governmental
organizations, but by 1997 belonged to 52.14 Nonetheless, she says, China viewed these
groups with suspicion, seeing them as a front for other states attempting to exercise
power internationally. The NCNA data suggests that when it came to issues involving
12
Steven Levine, “Perception and Ideology in Chinese Foreign Policy,” in David
Shambaugh and Thomas W. Robinson, eds., Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 32.
13
Jack Snyder, “One World, Rival Theories,” Foreign Policy, November/December
2004 (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), 55.
14
Elizabeth Economy, “The Impact of International Regimes on Chinese Foreign
Policy Making: Broadening Perspectives and Policies, But Only to a Point,” in David M.
Lampton, ed., The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform, 1978-
2000 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), 230.
10
Indochina, China under Deng preferred to involve United Nations agencies more than
David Shambaugh (1994) examines China’s relations with the United States during
the Deng period. China was suspicious of Washington’s and Moscow’s geopolitical
ambitions, and struggled to adjust to U.S. policies under different presidents, as well as
the dominant role of the United States in the international order following the failure of
the Soviet system. A question that I asked myself when reading Shambaugh’s analysis
was if China was indeed suspicious of geopolitical ambitions of the two superpowers, did
it see issues relating to Vietnam as an extension of that crisis, or more of a regional issue
tied in with China’s own bilateral relations with Vietnam? My own NCNA research
demonstrates that China treated issues relating to Kampuchea and Vietnam with more
prominence than issues relating to the Soviet Union and Vietnam. There was relatively
little correlation in NCNA news items between issues relating to the United States and
There is a large body of research relating to China’s media and how it serves the
state. For my study it is particularly important to establish the connection between the
foreign policy bureaucracy and the mission of the New China News Agency.
Lu Ning’s 2001 analysis of China’s foreign policy bureaucracy notes the multiple
agencies involved in carrying out foreign policy. However, he finds a top-down control
structure in which “ultimate decision-making power has been retained by the paramount
leader or the leading nucleus.” This leading nucleus is responsible for determining the
operations that involve actual or potential conflict with other countries, decisions
11
regarding regional and national policies toward key world powers, and decisions
Who was in the leading nucleus in the late 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s? By Lu’s
logic, certainly Deng Xiaoping, and a handful of top-level ministers, Communist Party
leaders, and PLA commanders. However, the Foreign Ministry, Politburo, and PLA had
How does the New China News Agency fit into this centralized power structure?
There is a very direct line of communication. NCNA during the Deng era reported to the
reported to the CCP Central Committee,17 the key party leadership body of which Deng
was vice chairman. This is a crucial connection: My hypotheses assume that NCNA
English service has an important mouthpiece role propagating the policies and positions
editor for NCNA’s English service in the late 1970s, “Occasional errors of syntax in
English translation would get through [the editing] process, but errors of line almost
never did; the [NCNA External Deparment] carried responsibility for ensuring that
15
Ning Lu, “The Central Leadership, Supraministry Coordinating Bodies, State
Council, Ministries, and Party Departments,” in David M. Lampton, ed., The Making of
Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform, 1978-2000 (Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press, 2001), 44.
16
Lu, 52-61.
17
Chang Won Ho, Mass Media in China: The History and the Future (Ames: Iowa
State University Press, 1989), 195.
12
China’s policies were understood overseas, and political errors were unacceptable.”18
understand PRC policy is not a new concept. Nor should it be surprising, considering the
close relationship between Chinese media and the Chinese Communist Party. Lenin
the people, and further the goals of party organization.19 These ideas were held very dear
by Mao Zedong himself: Much of his early party work involved writing articles for party-
affiliated publications.
Among Western scholars, the use of the Chinese press has long been recognized as an
authoritative source of the policies and attitudes of the Chinese leadership. Roger Garside
(1981) recognized this in the crucial transition period following the 1976 death of Mao
Zedong, noting that Beijing residents — Chinese and foreign — paid close attention to
official press reports: “Small changes in emphasis, the reformulation of a set phrase, the
appearance of a new slogan or the quiet dropping of an old one occurred only by design
and reflected a political development whose meaning one must search for.”20 Garside’s
views, however, are based on the selective use of Chinese press reports.
Quantitative research on Chinese press sources tends to study journalism and media
theory as it relates to current affairs, as opposed to historical research. Still, the methods
used in such studies are useful. For instance, Yu Xinlu (1996) conducted a content
18
Robin Porter, Reporting the News from China (London: Royal Institute of
International Affairs, 1992), 6.
19
J. Herbert Altschull, Agents of Power: The Media and Public Policy (White Plains,
NY: Longman Publishing USA, 1995), 211.
20
Roger Garside, Coming Alive: China after Mao (New York: McGraw Hill, 1981), 3.
13
analysis on English-language reports submitted by Chinese state-run television to CNN
before and after the 1989 Tiananmen Square demonstrations. Yu found an increase in
political news and a decrease in negative news in the Chinese television reports
immediately after the crackdown, but by 1994 the tone and subject matter in the reports
had largely returned to pre-1989 levels.21 Hugh Culbertson (1997) conducted content
development in the mid-1990s and found it closely adhered to the official line on rural
development policies.22 While instructive, these studies are different from my research in
several respects. First, their units of analysis — television news segments, and newspaper
articles — are sampled. My study uses the entire census of NCNA news items. Second,
Yu and Culbertson code for specific issues (political news, land reform, etc.) and/or
editorial slant (positive, negative, neutral). My methodology counts all issues relating to a
specific country in aggregate, and does not code for editorial slant. Third, I am using
computer programs to perform most coding tasks, as opposed to the mostly human
coding techniques used by Yu and Culbertson. Machine coding has its own problems (see
VI: Limitations of Research) but it lessens the chance of coder bias and human error.
This brings us to the literature pertaining to content analysis. Manual and automated
content analysis of media sources has been a staple of media studies and international
relations for decades. A groundbreaking content analysis was carried out by Harold
Laswell, Daniel Lerner, and Ithiel de Sola Pool (1954) at Stanford University. They were
21
Lu Xinlu, “What Does China Want the World to Know: A Content Analysis of CNN
World Report Sent by the People’s Republic of China,” Gazette: The International Journal for
Communications Studies (Leiden, Netherlands) 58 (1996), 17.
22
Hugh M. Culbertson, “‘China Daily’ Coverage of Rural Development: A Broad
Window, or a Small Peep-Hole? Gazette: The International Journal for Communications
Studies (Leiden, Netherlands) 59 no. 2 (1997), 106.
14
interested in analyzing phrases (which they called “themes”) in political communications
When it is desired to survey politically significant communications for any historical period
on a global scale, the most practicable method is that of counting the occurrence of key
symbols and clichés. Only in this way can the overwhelming mass of material be reliably and
briefly summarized. By charting the distributions in space and time, it is possible to show the
principle contours of … political history.23
To carry out their study, they employed a rigorous manual coding regimen and
statistical techniques (calculated using primitive machine tabulation) to gather data and
perform their analyses. In the 1960s, researchers began to use computers to automatically
Since these early studies, the techniques of thematic content analysis have been
refined and can be applied to the study of totalitarian regimes. For instance, in 1991
William Harvey performed a text analysis on the speeches of Fidel Castro and concluded
that the dictator was attempting to create a “culture of martyrdom” based on the
that greatly speed data collection and analysis, and reduce human error and coder bias.
Kimberly Neuendorf (2002) describes many of the pitfalls that can befall CATA studies,
analyses. She also notes that the online news database LexisNexis was never intended to
23
Harold D. Laswell, Daniel Lerner, and Ithiel de Sola Pool, The Comparative Study of
Symbols: An Introduction. Hoover Institute Studies, Series C, No. 1 (Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press, 1954), 16.
24
Daniel Riffe, Stephanie Lacy and Frederick Fico, Analyzing Media Messages Using
Quantitative Analysis in Research (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2005), 8.
15
be used for academic content analysis of news content.25 While this certainly explains
some of the more frustrating limitations of the tool that I encountered, no other database
of NCNA news items that I have access to is as complete or goes back as far LexisNexis.
V.
Methodology
involved searching the LexisNexis news database for every news item published by the
NCNA English Service for each month from January 1977 to December 1993. I then
assembled seven lists of terms corresponding to Vietnam, Kampuchea, Laos, the Soviet
Union/Russia, the United States, the United Nations, and ASEAN. The Vietnam,
Kampuchea and Laos lists were run through the LexisNexis database alone (e.g., V), with
each other (e.g., V+L), and with the other superpower and international organization lists
(e.g., V+K+U, V+K+A) for each month in 22 permutations and entered into an Excel
spreadsheet. Using simple math I was able to determine an additional 23 values based on
exclusion of variables (e.g., V+K-S). I also determined frequency counts relative to either
the monthly NCNA news item total or other variables. For some variables, I calculated
ratios (e.g., the ratio of V to L items in January 1981 was 5.20:1). These calculations
allowed me to compare the single variables and variable combinations with each other.
This methodology of the quantitative stage treats all issues relating to a country
variable in aggregate. For instance, the issue may be mentioned in an insignificant and
neutral context (in a news item about a diplomatic banquet, the Kampuchean ambassador
is mentioned in the fifth paragraph) or important and critical (a news item about the
25
Kimberly A. Neuendorf, The Content Analysis Guidebook (Thousand Oaks, CA:
Sage Publications, 2002), 76.
16
United Nations debating the Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea). But their inclusion
in an NCNA news item is not by accident, or NCNA journalists simply writing about the
events of the day. The fact that an issue is mentioned reflects the concerns of the Chinese
and priorities regarding Vietnam, other countries in Indochina, the two superpowers, and
The qualitative stage of my research involves analyzing this data in light of events
relating to the seven variables, as well as known Chinese policy issues, as discussed in
the literature above. I have already charted timelines of the variables in Excel in order to
attached (See “Vietnam with 1 Var, Yearly % of All Vietnam Items,” and “Vietnam,
VI.
Limitations of Research
There are several limitations relating to the quality of data I have gathered.
Transferring data from the LexisNexis interface to the Excel spreadsheet is a manual
process, and I have to assume that at least a handful of the approximately 5,000 search
Search terms were also problematic for some of the content variables. I attempted to
use all of the terms that corresponded to the country or organization in question without
returning false results. This entailed trying out dozens of terms for each content variable
— country names, adjectives, the last names of politicians, capital cities, etc. — to see if
they generated good results (i.e., news items that were about U) without including bad
17
results (i.e., news items that are not about U, but turned up because the term in question
happens to have another meaning). Terms relating to the United States were particularly
problematic, for several reasons: First, LexisNexis does not recognize punctuation or
capital letters, so “U.S.” is treated the same as the pronoun “us”. Second, “America” and
“American” could not be used, because these terms also correspond to North America,
Latin America, Central America, South America, and non-U.S. countries within those
regions. Third, “Congress” and “Senate” are used in stories about non-U.S. countries
(including China). Fourth, a news item that mentioned an American company by name
but not any other term related to the United States could not be counted automatically,
because there are too many American companies and no way to build a list of them
without manually reviewing NCNA news items. Therefore, I have to assume that U items
were undercounted during the entire survey period. It may be possible to estimate how
much of an effect this had on the U totals via a manual review of these terms in a random
sampling of months, and then applying the average to U item totals for all 204 months of
the study. This was not a problem for the other content variables under study.
Using NCNA news items as a gauge of Chinese views and policies can be
problematic if China turns off the flow of NCNA coverage of a certain issue. For
instance, there were few NCNA news items concerning the Tiananmen demonstrations in
1989, until blanket foreign media coverage forced the Chinese leadership to acknowledge
the crisis to the rest of the world. However, issues that are important to Beijing yet not
covered by NCNA tend to be sensitive domestic issues that China does not want to
acknowledge abroad. These are quite different from sensitive issues involving foreign
countries, in which China wants its views to be known to the rest of the world, not only to
18
influence other countries and international opinion, but also to counter critical publicity
Lastly, I unable to read Chinese or Vietnamese. This will lead to bias in my review of
VII.
Tentative Schedule
Final text submitted to thesis director and research advisor …………… January 15, 2007
VIII.
Bibliography
Works Cited:
Altschull, J. Herbert. Agents of Power: the Media and Public Policy. White Plains, NY:
Longman Publishing USA, 1995.
Amer, Ramses. The Ethnic Chinese in Vietnam and Sino-Vietnamese Relations. Kuala
Lumpur: Forum, 1991.
19
Catley, Bob; Keliat, Makmur, eds. Spratlys: The Dispute in the South China Sea.
Brookfield, VT: Ashgate, 1997.
Chang, Pao-min. Beijing, Hanoi, and the Overseas Chinese. Berkeley: Institute of East
Asian Studies, University of California at Berkeley, Center for Chinese Studies,
1982.
Chang, Won Ho. Mass Media in China: The History and the Future. Ames: Iowa State
University Press, 1989.
Fairbank, John King. China: A New History. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press, 1992.
Garside, Roger. Coming Alive: China after Mao. New York: McGraw Hill, 1981.
Laswell, Harold D., Daniel Lerner, and Ithiel de Sola Pool. The Comparative Study of
Symbols: An Introduction. Hoover Institute Studies, Series C, No. 1. Stanford,
CA: Stanford University Press, 1954.
Lin, Wei-Zen. The Transformation of Hainan’s Historical Geography: From 110 BCE to
1949. Ph.D. diss. Syracuse: Syracuse University, 1999.
Lu, Ning. “The Central leadership, Supraministry Coordinating Bodies, State Council,
Ministries, and Party Departments.” In David M. Lampton, ed. The Making of
Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform, 1978-2000. Stanford,
CA: Stanford University Press, 2001: 41-65.
20
Lu, Xinlu. “What Does China Want the World to Know: A Content Analysis of CNN
World Report Sent by the People’s Republic of China.” Gazette: The
International Journal for Communications Studies (Leiden, Netherlands) 58
(1996): 173-187.
Microsoft Excel X for Mac Service Release 1. Microsoft Corp., Redmond, Washington.
McGregor, Charles. The Sino-Vietnamese Relationship and the Soviet Union. London:
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1988.
Morris, Stephen. Why Vietnam Invaded Cambodia: Political Culture and the Causes of
War. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999.
Neuendorf, Kimberly A. The Content Analysis Guidebook. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage
Publications, 2002.
Porter, Robin. Reporting the News from China. London: Royal Institute of International
Affairs, 1992.
Samuels, Marwyn S. Contest for the South China Sea. New York: Methuen, 1982.
Snyder, Jack. “One World, Rival Theories.” Foreign Policy (November/December 2004):
53-62. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Works Consulted:
Aronson, Elliot and Anthony Pratkanis. Age of Propaganda: The Everyday Use and
Abuse of Persuasion. New York: Henry Holt, 2001. This book summarizes recent
research and theory regarding propaganda, and how it is manifested in mass
media.
Gutmann, Ethan. Losing the New China: A Story of American Commerce, Desire, and
Betrayal. San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2004. Guttman, an American who
worked in Beijing as a media and public relations advisor, examines the ethical
practices of American companies operating in China, and discusses Chinese
media coverage of events relating to foreign countries.
Harrison, Henrietta. China: Inventing the Nation. London: Arnold, 2001. Harrison
explores the rise of nationalism in China, finding that the rise of literacy and a
popular press has been instrumental in creating the modern Chinese national
21
identity. She notes the importance of issues relating to foreign countries in
building nationalist sentiment.
Huang, Chengju. “Transitional Media vs. Normative Theories: Schramm, Altschull, and
China.” Journal of Communication, September 2003. Philadelphia: International
Communication Association/Annenberg School of Communications (University
of Pennsylvania). Huang finds that propaganda-based theories of press systems in
Communist countries are inadequate for describing the recent development of
Chinese journalism, largely owing to social and economic factors.
Riffe, Daniel, Stephanie Lacy, and Frederick Fico. Analyzing Media Messages Using
Quantitative Analysis in Research. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2005. The
authors describe content analyses of various mass media sources. Many case
studies and appraisals of different content analysis techniques are included.
Roberts, Carl, ed. Text Analysis for the Social Sciences: Methods for Drawing Statistical
Inferences from Texts and Transcripts. Mahwah NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1997.
This is a collection of text analysis using mass media sources. There are sections
on thematic, semantic, and network text analyses, and an introduction to
computer-assisted text analysis (CATA) techniques.
Stone, Robert. “Speaking to the Foreign Audience: Chinese Foreign Policy Concerns as
Expressed in China Daily, January 1989-June 1993.” Gazette: The International
Journal for Communications Studies (Leiden, Netherlands) 53 (1994): 43-52.
Stone performed a content analysis of an English-language newspaper in China to
determine China’s foreign policy priorities in the last years of the Deng era.
Works to be Consulted:
Finkelstein, David M. and Maryanne Kivlehan, eds. China’s Leadership in the 21st
Century: The Rise of the Fourth Generation. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2003.
Meisner, Maurice. The Deng Xiaoping Era: An Inquiry into the Fate of Chinese
Socialism, 1978-1994. New York: Hill and Wang, 1996.
Unger, Jonathan, ed. The Nature of Chinese Politics: From Mao to Jiang. Armonk, NY:
M.E. Sharpe, 2002.
22