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ENIN - 433 - Quantitative Aspects of System Analysis - Lecture14
ENIN - 433 - Quantitative Aspects of System Analysis - Lecture14
ENIN 433
Risk Assessment and Decision Analysis
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C D C D
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Simple Systems
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FT Quantification
P=PA ● PB ● PC ● PD
Note: AND gate reduces
PT=16x10-24
probability
A B C D
P=PA + PB + PC + PD – (PAB + PAC + PAD + PBC + PBD + PCD) + (PABC + PABD + PACD + PBCD) – (PABCD)
PT=8x10-6
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FT Quantification
PA=8x10-6
P=4x10-6 P=4x10-6
A B C D
P=4x10-12 P=4x10-12
A B C D
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Voting Gate
The fault tree of Figure 8.6 appears in a voting system that produces an
output if m or more components out of n generate a command signal. A
common application of the m-out-of-n system is in safety systems, where it is
desirable to avoid expensive plant shutdowns by a spurious signal from a
single safety monitor.
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Voting Gate
As an example, consider the two-out-of-three shutdown device of Figure 8.7.
Plant shutdown occurs when two out of three safety monitors generate
shutdown signals. Consider a case where the plant is normal and requires no
shutdown. An unnecessary shutdown occurs if two or more safety monitors
produce spurious signals. Denote by B; a false signal from monitor i.
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Example-Two-out-of-three system
Compare the unavailability Qs(t) for the two out- of-three configuration of
Figure 8.9 and the OR configuration of Figure 8.10.
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