ARTICLE III, SECTION 19 OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION

A. Cruel, Degrading or Inhuman Punishment; Excessive Fines

(1601). People v. Estoista

GR No. L-5793 August 27, 1953

Article III Section 19, Cruel, Degrading or Inhuman Punishment; Excessive Fines

FACTS: Appellant was prosecuted for homicide through reckless imprudence and
illegal possession of firearm. He was acquitted of the first offense and found guilty of
the second for which he was sentenced to one year imprisonment.

ISSUE: WON the penalty and the duration of the imprisonment imposed on the
appellant infringe the constitutional provision against cruel and harsh punishment.

HELD: NO. Confinement from 6-10 years for possessing or carrying firearm is not cruel
or unusual, having due regard to the prevalent conditions which the law proposes to
suppress or curb. The rampant lawlessness against property, person and even the
very security of the government, directly traceable in large measure to promiscuous
carrying and use of powerful weapons, justify imprisonment which in normal
circumstances might appear excessive. If imprisonment of 5 to 10 years is out of
proportion to the present case in view of certain circumstances, the law is not to be
declared unconstitutional for this reason. The constitutionality of an act of the
legislature is not to be judged in the light of exceptional cases.

Judgment is MODIFIED, sentencing the appellant to imprisonment for five years.

(1602). People v. Dapitan

GR No. 90625 May 23, 1991 Davide, Jr;

Article III Section 19, Cruel, Degrading or Inhuman Punishment; Excessive Fines 

FACTS:
 On May 5, 1989, the herein accused-appellant was found guilty by the RTC of
Rizal of the crime of Robbery with Homicide sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim Rolando Amil in the
amount of Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) Pesos, without subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency.
 On 11 May 1989, the accused-appellant filed his Notice of Appeal, manifesting
thst he was appealing the decision to this Court. However, in the Order of 11 May
1989, Judge Cipriano de Roma erroneously directed the transmittal of the
 records of the case to the Court of Appeals. The same was transmitted to the
SC.
 In this appeal accused-appellant assigned only one error: THE TRIAL COURT
ERRED IN NOT APPLYING THE INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW THAT
FAVORS THE ACCUSED APPELLANT.
 The Court noted though that he is in complete agreement with the findings and
conclusion of facts by the trial court despite the said appeal.
 In support of the assigned error accused-appellant argues that the imposition
over him of the penalty of reclusion temporal by the trial court is "tantamount to
deprivation of life or liberty without due process of law or is tantamount to a cruel,
degrading or inhuman punishment prohibited by the Constitution" and he submits
that "the righteous and humane punishment that should have been meted out
should be indeterminate sentence" with "all mitigating circumstances as well as
the legal provisions favorable to the accused-appellant”.

ISSUE: WON the penalty imposed on the accused-appellant is tantamount to

inhuman punishment.

HELD: NO. The penalty of reclusion perpetua, in the case at bar in not cruel,
degrading, and inhuman. The Court expressly said that “To make that claim is to
assail the constitutionality of Article 294, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code, or of any
other provisions therein and of special laws imposing the said penalty for specific
crimes or offenses. The proposition cannot find any support. Article 294, par. 1 of
the Revised Penal Code has survived four Constitutions of the Philippines, namely:
the 1935 Constitution, the 1973 Constitution, the Freedom Constitution of 1986 and
the 1987 Constitution. All of these documents mention life imprisonment or reclusion
perpetua as a penalty which may be imposed in appropriate cases.[25] As a matter
of fact, the same paragraph of the section of Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987
Constitution which prohibits the imposition of cruel, degrading and inhuman
punishment expressly recognizes reclusion perpetua. Thus:
"Section 19 (1). Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or
inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall the death penalty be imposed,
unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter
provides it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion
perpetua.
As to the appreciation of mitigating circumstances, We also agree with the Solicitor
General that since robbery with homicide under paragraph 1 of Article 294 of the
Revised Penal Code is now punishable by the single and indivisible penalty of
reclusion perpetua in view of the abolition of the death penalty, it follows that the
rule prescribed in the first paragraph of Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code shall
apply. Consequently, reclusion perpetua must be imposed in this case regardless of
the presence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances.
 The trial court therefore correctly imposed on the accused the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.

1603. Baylosis vs. Chavez, Jr.

G.R. No. 95136 October 3, 1991
Article III, Sec. 19: Cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment; excessive fines
FACTS:
The constitutionality of the Section 1(3) of PD No. 1866 (provision punishes with
the penalty of reclusion perpetua any person who unlawfully manufacturers, deals in,
acquires, disposes of, or possesses any firearm "in furtherance of, or incident to, or in
connection with the crimes of rebellion, insurrection or subversion) is put at issue
because it inflicts on the convicted felon a cruel or unusual punishment, considering
that the RPC penalizes rebellion or subversion only by prision mayor.
ISSUE:
Whether or not punishment constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.

RULING:
NO. It is well settled that as far as the constitutional prohibition goes, it is not so
much the extent as the nature of the punishment that determines whether it is, or is
not, cruel and unusual and that sentences of imprisonment, though perceived to be
harsh, are not cruel or unusual if within statutory limits. To come under the ban, the
punishment must be “flagrantly and plainly oppressive” “wholly
disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the
community.” A penalty not normally proportionate to the offense may be
imposed in some instances without violation of the Constitution. xx (as) for
example, where the offense has become so rampant as to require the adoption of a
more effective deterrent.

MAIN POINT: Mere severity does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.

1604. People vs. Muñoz

G.R. Nos. 38969-70. February 9, 1989
Article III, Sec. 19: Cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment; excessive fines
FACTS:
Feliciano Muñoz, co-conspirator, was one of the 11 persons (most of them are
bodyguards of a town mayor) charged for murder in relation with the ruthless killings of
alleged cattle rustlers. Later on it turned out that the victims were only innocent farmers
and not dangerous criminals.
Each of the three killings constituted the crime of murder, qualified by alevosia.
There was treachery because every one of the three victims was completely helpless
and defenseless when shot and killed by the accused with no risk to themselves. The
penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code was reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to death, but this was modified by Article III, Section 19
(1) of the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the non-imposition of the death penalty modified the penalty into
three new periods.
RULING:
NO. There is really nothing in the provision which expressly declares the abolition
of the death penalty. The provision merely says that the death penalty shall not be
imposed unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes the Congress
hereafter provides for it and, if already imposed, shall be reduced to reclusion
perpetua. The range of the medium and minimum penalties remains unchanged. There
being no generic aggravating or mitigating circumstance attending the commission of
the offenses, the applicable sentence is the medium period of the penalty prescribed
by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code which, conformably to the new doctrine here
adopted and announced, is still reclusion perpetua.

The Masangkay ruling was not adopted in this case.

Masangkay ruling - Art. III, Sec. 9(1) divided the modified penalty into three new
periods as follows: the lower half of reclusion temporal maximum as the minimum; the
upper half of reclusion temporal maximum as the medium; and reclusion perpetua as
the maximum.

1605. People v. Amigo

G.R. No. 116719. January 18, 1996. MELO, J.

FACTS: Accused-appellant was charged with murder and with a penalty of reclusion
perpetua (medium period of reclusion temporal maximum to death). He claims that the
penalty of reclusion perpetua is too cruel and harsh a penalty and pleads for sympathy.
ISSUE: Whether or not the courts can declare that the penalty of reclusion perpetual
as cruel.
RULING: No. Courts are not the forum to plead for sympathy. The duty of courts is to
apply the law, disregarding their feeling of sympathy or pity for an accused. DURA LEX
SED LEX. The remedy is elsewhere — clemency from the executive or an amendment
of the law by the legislative, but surely, at this point, this Court can but apply the law.

1606. People v. Echegaray

G.R. No. 117472. February 7, 1997
FACTS: Accused-appellant was convicted for the crime of raping his ten-year old
daughter committed sometime in April 1994 when the Death Penalty Law (R.A. No.
7659) was already in effect. On behalf of accused-appellant, the Free Legal Assistance
Group of the Philippines (FLAG) filed a motion to reverse the death sentence on the
ground that R.A. No. 7659, reimposing the death penalty is unconstitutional because
the death penalty is cruel and unusual punishment for the crime of rape because,
unlike murder, it does not involve the taking of life.
ISSUE: Whether or not the death penalty is a cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual
punishment in violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel and unusual
punishments.
RULING/MAIN POINT: No. The penalty complained of is neither cruel, unjust nor
excessive. As adopted from several jurisprudence, “punishments are cruel when they
involve torture or a lingering death, but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the
meaning of that word as used in the constitution. It implies there something inhuman
and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life.” Furthermore,
the courts are not the fora for a protracted debate on the morality or propriety of the
death sentence where the law itself provides therefor in specific and well-defined
criminal acts. Also, the death penalty is imposed in heinous crimes because the
perpetrators thereof have committed unforgivably execrable acts that have so deeply
dehumanized a person or criminal acts with severely destructive effects on the national
efforts to lift the masses from abject poverty through organized governmental
strategies based on a disciplined and honest citizenry, and because they have so
caused irreparable and substantial injury to both their victim and the society and a
repetition of their acts would pose actual threat to the safety of individuals and the
survival of government, they must be permanently prevented from doing so.
1607. People v. Tongko

G.R. No. 123567 June 5, 1998 PUNO, J.

Article III, Section 19 of the 1987 Constitution: Cruel, Degrading or Inhuman

Punishment; Excessive Fines

FACTS:

Accused-appellant Roberto Tongko was found guilty of estafa and was

sentenced to suffer twenty seven (27) years of reclusion perpetua. He contends that
the penalty of 27 years of reclusion perpetua is too harsh and out of proportion to the
crime he committed. He submits that his sentence violates Section 19(1), Article III of
the Constitution which prohibits the infliction of cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the imposition of 27 years of reclusion perpetua against Tongko

violates of the Constitution.

RULING:

NO. The Court held that the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments
is generally aimed at the form or character of the punishment rather than its
severity in respect of duration or amount, and apply to punishments which never
existed in America or which public sentiment has regarded as cruel or obsolete.

The legislature was not thoughtless in imposing severe penalties for violation of
paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. The history of the law will
show that the severe penalties were intended to stop the upsurge of swindling by
issuance of bouncing checks. It was felt that unless aborted, this kind of estafa would
erode the people’s confidence in the use of negotiable instruments as a medium of
commercial transaction and consequently result in the retardation of trade and
commerce and the undermining of the banking system of the country. The Court
cannot impugn the wisdom of Congress in setting this policy.
1608. Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice

G.R. No. 132601 October 12, 1998 PER CURIAM

Article III, Section 19 of the 1987 Constitution: Cruel, Degrading or Inhuman

Punishment; Excessive Fines

FACTS:

Petitioner Leo Echegaray y Pilo was convicted with the crime of rape of the 10
year-old daughter of his common-law spouse and was sentenced of death penalty. In
the meantime, Congress had seen it fit to change the mode of execution of the death
penalty from electrocution to lethal injection, and passed Republic Act No. 8177. On
this regard, he raised that RA No. 8177 or An Act Designating Death by Lethal
Injection as the Method of Carrying out Capital Punishment is unconstitutional and void
for being cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment per se as well as by reason of its
being.

ISSUE:

Whether or not death by lethal injection is unconstitutional for being a cruel,

degrading and inhuman punishment.

RULING:

NO. The Court held that death penalty per se is not a cruel, degrading or
inhuman punishment. Punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a
lingering death, but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of
that word as used in the constitution. It implies there something inhuman and
barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life.

The lack in particularity as to the details involved in the execution by lethal

injection does not render the said law as cruel, degrading or inhuman. For reasons
hereafter discussed, the implementing details of R.A. No. 8177 are matters which are
properly left to the competence and expertise of administrative officials. Any infliction
of pain in lethal injection is merely incidental in carrying out the execution of death
penalty and does not fall within the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading
and inhuman punishment.
1609. Padilla vs. CA (supra, Right to Bail)
FACTS:
Robin Padilla was charged with violation of PD 1866 for illegal possession of firearms
punishable by reclusion temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua. Pending trial, he
was released on bail. Thereafter, he was convicted as charged and meted an
indeterminate penalty of 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal to 21
years of reclusion perpetua. The CA affirmed the conviction, cancelled his bail bond
and ordered his arrest for confinement at the New Bilibid Prison.
Robin further requested the court to allow him to go on his follow-up check-ups on his
previously operated injury.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Padilla’s request should be granted.
RULING:
Yes. The court ruled that while justice is the first virtue of the court, admittedly,
humanity is the second. Petitioner’s request for the badly needed X-ray and MRI
examinations for which the New Bilibid Prison Hospital is inadequately equipped, as
certified to by its Chief Officer it is not unwilling to accommodate his request for an X-
ray and Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) at St. Luke’s Hospital as follow-up
examinations for his 1994 slipped-disc operation, was granted.
The court further stated: “We recall that way back in 1946, we allowed in Dela Rama v.
People’s Court, a precedent on which appellant now anchors his application, a
prisoner to be released on bail when his continued detention would be injurious to his
health. This trend, however, has changed with the development of times. Besides,
appellant’s situation is not akin to Dela Rama’s factual milieu. While appellant now
shall be denied bail, nevertheless, we cannot be indifferent to his medical needs. And
by granting appellant’s request, the Court is merely performing its supervisory powers
over detainees to safeguard, among others, their proper accommodation and health
pursuant to Section 25 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended.”

1610. People v. Alicante

GR 127026-27 May 31, 2000
Section 19 – Inhumane punishments

FACTS:

The appellant, a father, raped his 13 yr old daughter fifteen times impregnating her. He
was convicted and was sentenced to death. The appellant contends that the death
penalty law, insofar as it orders the automatic and mandatory judicial killing of appellant
and others similarly situated, as punishments for acts which do not include the taking of
another person's life, is repugnant to the constitution and amounts to a barbaric,
excessive, cruel and unusual punishment.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the death penalty is cruel and unusual punishment for rape.

RULING:

No. The court ruled that rape is the forcible violation of the sexual intimacy of another
person. It does injury to justice and chastity. Rape deeply wounds the respect,
freedom, and physical and moral integrity to which every person has a right. It causes
grave damage that can mark the victim for life. It is always an intrinsically evil act an
outrage upon decency and dignity that hurts not only the victim but the society itself.
We find no cogent reason to reverse our stand on the heinousness of the crime of rape
when the perpetrator of such bestial act is the father of the victim. To say that the crime
of incestuous rape is not heinous simply because the victim did not die is to ignore the
lifelong trauma and stigma of the victim brought about by rape.

1611.LIM VS PEOPLE
G.R 149276

FACTS:
Petitioner spouses issued to private respondent two postdated checks, The check was
dishonored upon presentment for having been drawn against insufficient funds.
petitioners reneged on their promise to cover the amount of check no. 464728, the
private respondent filed a complaint-affidavit before the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Quezon City charging petitioner spouses with the crime of estafa under Article 315,
par. 2 (d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by PD 818On August 22, 2001,
Petitioners contend that, inasmuch as the amount of the subject check is P365,750,
they can be penalized with reclusion perpetua or 30 years of imprisonment. This
penalty, according to petitioners, is too severe and disproportionate to the crime they
committed and infringes on the express mandate of Article III, Section 19 of the
Constitution which prohibits the infliction of cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment.

ISSUE: WON PD818 PD 818, a decree which amended Article 315 of the Revised
Penal Code by increasing the penalties for estafa is degrading or an inhuman
punishment.

RULING:
No. The Settled is the rule that a punishment authorized by statute is not cruel,
degrading or disproportionate to the nature of the offense unless it is flagrantly and
plainly oppressive and wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock
the moral sense of the community. It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive,
out of proportion or severe for a penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution. 2 Based
on this principle, the Court has consistently overruled contentions of the defense that
the penalty of fine or imprisonment authorized by the statute involved is cruel and
degrading.

MAINPOINT:

A punishment authorized by statute is not cruel, degrading or disproportionate to the

nature of the offense unless it is flagrantly and plainly oppressive and wholly
disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the
community.

1612.People v. Gabiana
G.R.123543

FACTS:

 Appellant Pedro Gabiana and Rosalia dela Cruz are live-in partners. Rosemarie
Argosino is the eldest of the three (3) children Rosalia dela Cruz with her
previous live-in partner.

 Pedro Gabiana raped Rosemarie was convicted and was sentenced to death. He
then contended that the death penalty imposed to him is cruel.

ISSUE: WON the death penalty for rape is cruel, inhuman and degrading.

RULING:

No. Countless of time, this Court has said that it will be guided in reviewing rape
cases by the settled realities that an accusation for rape can be made with
facility, and while the commission of the crime may not be easy to prove, it
becomes even more difficult, however, for the person accused, although
innocent, to disprove; that in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape
where only two persons normally are involved. Rape deeply wounds the respect,
freedom, and physical and moral integrity to which every person has a right. It causes
grave damage that can mark the victim for life. It is always an intrinsically evil act an
outrage upon decency and dignity that hurts not only the victim but the society itself. To
say that the crime of incestuous rape is not heinous simply because the victim did not
die is to ignore the lifelong trauma and stigma of the victim brought about by rape.

MAINPOINT: Death penalty is not a cruel penalty for the crime of rape.

1613. PEOPLE V. HORIO GR 137842, August 23, 2001

FACTS: The accused, Danilo Catubig y Horio, was charged with the crime of rape.
Appellant raped her daughter, Dannilyn. The Court finds accused DANILO CATUBIG Y
HORIO GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape and sentences him to
suffer the penalty of DEATH.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in imposing the death penalty on the
accused.

HELD: YES. The concurrence of the minority of the victim and her relationship to the
offender are special qualifying circumstances that are needed to be alleged in the
complaint or information for the penalty of death to be decreed. The Constitution
guarantees to be inviolable the right of an accused to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him. It is a requirement that renders it essential for
every element of the offense with which he is charged to be properly alleged in the
complaint or information. Here, the information failed to state the minority of the victim
and her relationship with the offender, both special qualifying circumstances under
Republic Act No. 7659, and for want of such allegations, the trial court erred in
imposing the death penalty on the accused. Appellant could only thus be convicted
under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, of simple rape punishable
by reclusion perpetua.

1614. PAGDAYAWON V. SEC. OF JUSTICE GR154569, Sept. 23, 2002

FACTS: At bar is the petition filed by thirty (30) death row inmates which seeks (1) to
enjoin the execution of their respective death sentences in view of the possible repeal
of laws authorizing the imposition of the death penalty by Congress and (2) a re-
examination of RA 76592 and RA 81773 with the end in view of declaring them
unconstitutional. It is well-settled that the Supreme Court has the power to control the
enforcement of its decisions, including the issuance of a temporary restraining order
(TRO) to stay the execution of a death sentence which is already final.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7659 does not comply with the constitutional requirement of
“compelling reasons involving heinous crimes” under Section 19(1) Article III of the
1987 Constitution.

HELD: NO. The mere pendency of a bill in either or both houses of Congress should
not per se warrant outright issuance of a temporary restraining order to stay the
execution of a death sentence that has become final. In fact, being speculative, it is not
and should not be considered as a ground for a stay of a death sentence. While
newspaper reports indicate the supposed acquiescence of a number of senators and
congressmen to the abolition of the death penalty, such is by no means an assurance
that these same legislators will eventually vote for the modification or repeal of the law.
Consequently, the petition for the issuance of a temporary restraining order should be
denied. Neither does the substantial change in the composition of the Court since the
promulgation of People vs. Muñoz and People vs. Echegaray warrant the re-
examination of RA 7659 and RA 8177. The validity or the constitutionality of a law
cannot be made to depend on the individual opinions of the members who compose
the Court. The Supreme Court, as an institution, has already determined what the law
is (e.g. RA 7659 and RA 8177 are constitutional) in the subject cases and therefore the
same remains to be so regardless of any change in its composition. Otherwise, we
shall see the specter of the same or similar petition every three or four years as new
members are appointed to the Court.

1615. Perez v. People

544 SCRA 532, G.R. No. 164763 February 12, 2008 Reyes, R.T., J:
Article III. Section 19. Cruel, Degrading or Inhuman Punishment; Excessive Fines

FACTS:
 Upon cash examination of Zenon Perez as the Acting Municipal Treasurer of
Tubigon, Bohol, a shortage amounting to P72,784.57 was found. He verbally
admitted to have used the money to pay for the loan of his late brother, for the
food of his family, and for his medicine.
 Bermudez restituted his shortage in six (6) payments. However, he pleaded not
guilty to the criminal charge of malversation, and denied his prior admission.
Instead, he claimed that the fund was in the custody of his accountable
personnel at the time of the audit, and that as it were remitted to him, he also
turned over the same until the full shortage was restituted.
  The Sandiganbayan convicted Perez for malversation of public funds. He
was sentenced “to suffer an indeterminate penalty of from TEN (10) YEARS
and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as the minimum to FOURTEEN (14)
YEARS and EIGHT (8) MONTHS of reclusion temporal as the maximum and
to suffer perpetual special disqualification.
 Perez argued that the penalty meted for the crime of malversation of public
funds “that ha[ve] been replenished, remitted and/or returned” to the
government is cruel and therefore unconstitutional, “as government has
not suffered any damage.”

ISSUE:
Whether the sentence imposed is cruel and in violation of Section 19, Article III of
the Constitution.

RULING:
Yes. The Court ruled that the imposition of a penalty for a crime of
malversation of public funds which have been replenished is cruel for what is
punished by the crime of malversation is the act of a public officer in
misappropriating government fund or property, by reason of his office. Payment
or reimbursement is not a defense for exoneration in malversation; it may only
be considered as a mitigating circumstance. This is because damage is not an
element of malversation. However, even though in imposing penalty, it is not
necessary to adhere to the rules of the Penal Code. The Court, in using its
discretional powers as authorized by law, believes that the circumstances
present in the commission of crimes should be taken into consideration, and in
the present case, the amount misappropriated was refunded.
In this case, the Court exercised an analogous discretion and entitled Perez to
two (2) mitigating circumstances of (1) payment, which is akin to voluntary surrender,
and (2) no intention to commit so grave a wrong. Thus, the sentence was reduced to
four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum
term, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum term, with
perpetual special disqualification. He was likewise made to pay a fine of P72,784.57,
the amount equal to the funds malversed.
 ARTICLE III, SECTION 20 OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION

A. Imprisonment for Debt

1616. Lozano v. Martinez

146 SCRA 323, G.R. No. L-63419 December 18, 1986 Yap J:
Article III. Section 20. Imprisonment for Debt; Check

FACTS:
 The constitutionality of BP 22 or the Bouncing Check Law was assailed by the
defendants in cases involving prosecution of offenses under the statute.
 The defendants moved to quash the informations charged against them on the
ground that the acts charged did not constitute an offense, the statute being
unconstitutional for conflicting the provision forbidding imprisonment for non-
payment of debt.

ISSUE:
Whether BP22 is unconstitutional.

RULING:
No. The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making
and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its
presentation for payment. It is not the nonpayment of an obligation which the
law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his
debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of
worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on
the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not
as an offense against property, but an offense against public order.
It may be constitutionally impermissible for the legislature to penalize a
person for non-payment of a debt. But certainly it is within the prerogative of the
lawmaking body to proscribe certain acts deemed pernicious and inimical to
public welfare. Acts mala in se are not the only acts which the law can punish. An act
may not be considered by society as inherently wrong, hence, not malum in se, but
because of the harm that it inflicts on the community, it can be outlawed and criminally
punished as malum prohibitum. The state can do this in the exercise of its police
power. The enactment of BP 22 is a declaration by the legislature that, as a matter of
public policy, the making and issuance of a worthless check is deemed public nuisance
to be abated by the imposition of penal sanctions.
1617. Caram Resources v. Contreras - 237 SCRA 724 (check).
Facts:
In a verified complaint filed by Caram Resources Corporation and Raymund B. Tejada,
respondent Judge Maximo C. Contreras, Presiding Judge was charged with gross
ignorance of the law and gross misconduct allegedly committed in relation to Criminal
Cases Nos. 142359-142362, which involved the violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22,
also known as the Bouncing Checks Law.

Teresita Dizon obtained a loan from Caram Resources payable in installments.

She issued a promissory note and postdated BPI checks, four of which were
dishonored when presented to the bank as the account against which they were
drawn had been closed. A complaint was filed against Dizon for violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, also known as the Bouncing Checks Law. The
respondent stated that to hold her liable there under "would violate the cardinal
rule under the Constitution that no person shall be imprisoned for failure to pay
his debt" and that the postdated checks were without consideration and were in
the nature of "guarantees to ensure the monthly collection" despite Dizon's
admission that they were payments for the loan and that she herself closed her
account resulting in the dishonor of the checks upon presentment.

According to the complainants, it has long been settled that B.P. Blg. 22 is
constitutional; accordingly, if its constitutionality is still doubtful to the respondent then
he has failed to keep abreast with the rulings of this Court, thus showing his
incompetence and gross ignorance of law.

Issue: Whether or not there is a violation of the cardinal rule under the Constitution
that no person shall be imprisoned for failure to pay his debt.
Or
Whether the ruling of the presiding judge is in line with the Constitutional right that
there should be no imprisonment for failure to pay debt.
Ruling: NO. It has long been settled that B.P. Blg. 22 is not unconstitutional or, more
specifically, that it does not transgress the constitutional inhibition against
imprisonment for non-payment of debt. The respondent either exposed his ignorance
of the law and the jurisprudence built thereon or simply ignored or disregarded the
above pronouncements of this Court and chose to make his own. The offense is
committed by the very fact of its performance, i.e. the mere act of issuing a worthless
check. The offense is malum prohibitum. An act may not be considered by society as
inherently wrong, because of the harm that it inflicts on the community, it can be
outlawed and criminally punished as malum prohibitum, pursuant to the State’s
exercise of police power.

MAINPOINT: The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of

making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its
presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the
law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his
debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the
making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its
deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law.
The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense
against public order.
1618. Tiomico v. CA – GR 122539 March 4, 1999 (trust receipt)
Facts: This is a petition for review by certiorari under Section 2, Rule 125, in relation to
Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to correct, reverse and annul the decision of
the Court of Appeals which affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting the
petitioner Jesus V. Tiomico for a violation of the Trust Receipts Law.
Petitioner executed a Trust Receipt Agreement for and in behalf of Paramount
Calibrators Merchandising of which he is the sole proprietor in favor of the Bank of the
Philippine Islands. Wherein the accused agreed to sell the same and with the express
obligation to remit to the complainant-bank the proceeds of the sale, and/or to turn over
the same if not sold, on demand, but the accused once in possession of the said items,
far from complying with his obligation, with unfaithfulness and abuse of confidence, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert
the same to his own personal use and benefit despite repeated demands, failed and
refused and still fails and refuses to account for and/or remit the proceeds of the sale
thereof, to the damage and prejudice of the said complainant-bank as represented by
Lourdes V. Palomo.

Issue: Whether Or not the Trust Receipt Law is a violation Constitutional right that
there should be no imprisonment for failure to pay debt.
Ruling: No, The Court upheld the validity of the Trust Receipts Law and
consistently declared that it does not violate the constitutional proscription
against imprisonment for non-payment of debts. Trust Receipts Law punishes
the dishonesty and abuse of confidence in the handling of money or goods to
the prejudice of another regardless of whether the latter is the owner or not. The
law does not seek to enforce payment of the loan. Thus, there can be no
violation of the right against imprisonment for non-payment of a debt.
MP: The Supreme Court ruled that BP 115 (Trust Receipts Law) is a valid
exercise of the police power and does not violate this provision, because the law
does not seek to enforce a loan but to punish dishonesty and abuse of
confidence in the handling of money or goods to the prejudice of another.
Violation of trust receipt agreement is punishable as estafa which is not an
offense against property, but against public order.

1619. RECUERDO vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 133036 January 22, 2003 Carpio Morales, J.

FACTS:
  Recuerdo bought a 3-karat loose diamond worth P420,000 from Yolanda
Floro. She would pay a downpayment of P40,000 and the balance were
secured using 9 post-dated checks.
 When Yolanda encashed the checks, only 3 were cleared while the rest
were dishonored due to the closure of the Recuerdo’s account.
 Despite demand, Recuerdo did not pay for the balance.
 She was sentenced for violation of B.P. 22 (Bouncing Check Law) and was
to be imprisoned for 30 days.
 Recuerdo contends that she was punished for non-payment of debt
contrary to section 20 of the Bill of Rights.
ISSUE:
Whether the constitutional right of the accused was violated?
RULING:
No. The Court held that B.P. Blg. 22 does not punish the non-payment of an
obligation but it punishes the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a
check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. The thrust of the law
is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and
putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the
practice is proscribed by law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against
property, but an offense against public order.

ARTICLE III, SECTION 21 OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION

I. Dismissal at Preliminary Investigation; No Jeopardy

II. Attachment of jeopardy

1620. PEOPLE vs. YLAGAN

G.R. No. L-38443 November 25, 1933 Abad Santos, J.

FACTS:
  Elisea Ylagan was charged with the crime of serious physical injury. Upon
arraignment, she pleaded not guilty to the information. The private prosecutor
with the concurrence of the deputy provincial fiscal would move for the dismissal
of the case, which was granted by the court.
 Eleven day later, the acting provincial fiscal filed another information against
Elisea Ylagan with the same offense of serious physical injury.
 The second case was dismissed on the ground of double jeopardy.
ISSUE:
Whether there was double jeopardy?
RULING:
Yes. The Court held that in a criminal prosecution, the defendant is in legal
jeopardy when placed on trial on the following conditions: (1) In a court of competent
jurisdiction; (2) upon a valid complaint or information; (3) after he has been
arraigned; and (4) after he has pleaded to the complaint of information. Since
Elisea Ylagan already pleaded not guilty in the first case, the second case filed would
constitute double jeopardy. The rule against double jeopardy protects the accused not
against the peril of second punishment, but against being again tried for the same
offense.

Rationale: Without the safeguard this article establishes in favor of the accused, his
fortune, safety, and peace of mind would be entirely at the mercy of the complaining
witness, who might repeat his accusation as often as dismissed by the court and
whenever he might see fit, subject to no other limitation or restriction than his own will
and pleasure. The accused would never be free from the cruel and constant menace of
a never-ending charge, which the malice of the complaining witness might hold
indefinitely suspended over his head, were it not that the judiciary is exclusively
empowered to authorize, by an express order to that effect, the repetition of a
complaint or information once dismissed in the cases in which the law requires that this
be done.
1621 People v. Balisacan
L-26376
Art 3. Sec 21. Attachment of jeopardy

Facts: 
Aurelio Balisacan was charged with homicide in the CFI of Ilocos Norte. Upon
being arraigned, he entered into a plea of guilty. In doing so, he was assisted by
counsel. At his counsel de officio, he was allowed to present evidence and
consequently testified that he stabbed the deceased in self-defense. In addition, he
stated that he surrendered himself voluntarily to the police authorities. On the basis of
the testimony of the accused, he was acquitted. Thus, the prosecution appealed.

Issue: 
Whether or not the appeal placed the accused in double jeopardy. 

Ruling: 
The Supreme Court held that it is settled that the existence of plea is an essential
requisite to double jeopardy. The accused had first entered a plea of guilty but however
testified that he acted in complete self-defense. Said testimony had the effect of
vacating his plea of guilty and the court a quo should have required him to plead a new
charge, or at least direct that a new plea of not guilty be entered for him. This was not
done. Therefore, there has been no standing of plea during the judgment of acquittal,
so there can be no double jeopardy with respect to the appeal herein. 
The presentation of evidence of complete self-defense amounted to a
withdrawal of his original plea. And since no new plea was entered, there was no
first jeopardy.

1622 Cinco v. Sandiganbayan

202 SCRA 726
Art 3. Sec 21. Double jeopardy

FACTS:
A letter complaint was lodged with the Office of the Tanodbayan against herein
petitioners. During the pendency of the criminal cases filed against them, they were
also charged with violations of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. They filed
motions for reinvestigation wherein they never complained that they were
preliminarily investigated for alleged offenses other than for those violations.
Petitioners now argue that they might be put in jeopardy of being charged with
informations or crimes other than the crime imputed in the dismissed cases.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is double jeopardy.

RULING:
NO. There could be no double jeopardy for the simple reason that they have not
yet pleaded to the offense. Besides, a preliminary investigation is not a trial for which
double jeopardy attaches.

1623. People v, Vergara - 221 SCRA 560

ART. III, SEC. 21: DISMISSAL AT PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION; NO JEOPARDY;

ATTACHMENT OF JEOPARDY

FACTS: Criminal cases for frustrated murder were filed against herein private
respondents. They were arraigned where they all pleaded “not guilty.” The cases were
later dismissed but were, however, reinstated. After pleading “not guilty” to the new
Informations, the accused moved to quash on the ground of double jeopardy. This was
raised by the defense after respondent Judge, upon motion of the Provincial Fiscal,
ordered without notice and hearing the dismissal of criminal cases for frustrated
murder, which thereafter were reinstated upon initiative of the Secretary of Justice and
docketed anew as Crim. Cases Nos. 8572 and 8573.

ISSUE: Whether or not the defense of double jeopardy should prosper.

RULING: YES. The requisites which must concur for double jeopardy to attach:
(a) a valid complaint or information; (b) a court of competent jurisdiction; (c) the
accused has pleaded to the charge; and, (d) the accused has been convicted or
acquitted or the case dismissed or terminated without the express consent of
the accused. The concurrence of all these circumstances constitutes a bar to a
second prosecution for the same offense, an attempt to commit the said offense, a
frustration of the said offense, or any offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the first offense charged.

1624. Navallo v. Sandiganbayan 234 SCRA 175

ART III SEC 21. ATTACHMENT OF JEOPARDY

FACTS: Petitioner Ernesto Navallo was the Collecting and Disbursing Officer of the
Numancia National Vocation School charged with having violated Article 217,
paragraph 4, of the Revised Penal Code for misappropriating P16,483.62 of the public
funds. When arraigned by the RTC, he pleaded not guilty. However, the prosecution
moved that the case be transferred to the Sandiganbayan, which the petitioner
opposed, arguing that since he had already been arraigned by the RTC, the attempt to
prosecute him before the Sandiganbayan would constitute double jeopardy.

ISSUE: Whether or not double jeopardy set in when petitioner was arraigned by the
Regional Trial Court.

RULING & MP (in bold): NO. Double jeopardy requires the existence of the
following requisites: (1) The previous complaint or information or other formal
charge is sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) The court
has jurisdiction to try the case; (3) The accused has been arraigned and has
pleaded to the charge; and (4) The accused is convicted or acquitted or the case
is dismissed without his express consent. When all the above elements are
present, a second prosecution for (a) the same offense, or (b) an attempt to
commit the said offense, or (c) a frustration of the said offense, or (d) any
offense which necessarily includes, or is necessarily included in, the first
offense charged, can rightly be barred. In the case at bench, the RTC was devoid of
jurisdiction when it conducted an arraignment of the accused which by then had
already been conferred on the Sandiganbayan. Moreover, neither did the case there
terminate with conviction or acquittal nor was it dismissed. There is no jeopardy
where the court had no jurisdiction.

1625. Galvez v. CA
FACTS: Petitioners Honorato Galvez (incumbent mayor of Bulacan) and Godofredo
Diego were charged in 3 separate informations with homicide and 2 counts of
frustrated homicide in the sala of Judge Villajuan. Before petitioners were arraigned,
respondent prosecutor filed an ex parte motion to withdraw informations, which was
granted, and filed 4 new informations against petitioners for murder, 2 counts of
frustrated murder, and violation of PD 1866  for illegal possession of firearms before
Judge Pornillos. Petitioners claim they have been prejudiced by the filing of the new
informations.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners were placed in double jeopardy.

RULING & MP (in bold): NO. In any event, the Court is inclined to uphold the propriety
of the withdrawal of the original informations, there having been no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the court in granting the motion and, more importantly, in
consideration of the fact that the motion to withdraw was filed and granted before
herein petitioners were arraigned, hence before they were placed in jeopardy. Thus,
even if a substitution was made at such stage, petitioners cannot validly claim double
jeopardy, which is precisely the evil sought to be prevented under the rule on
substitution, for the simple reason that no first jeopardy had as yet attached.
Consequently, although the offenses charged under the new informations necessarily
include those charged under the original informations, the substitution of informations
was not a fatal error. A contrary ruling would sacrifice substantial justice for formal
nuances on the altar of procedural technicalities. Furthermore, petitioners’ right to
speedy trial was never violated since the new informations were filed immediately after
the motion to withdraw the original informations was granted.

1626. Cunanan v. Judge Hermin Arceo

FACTS: An information for murder was filed against Ferdinand Cunanan (police
officer), which contained no averment that he committed the offense in relation to his
public office. Trial proceeded thereafter and the case was submitted for decision, when
respondent Judge Arceo ruled that on the basis of the evidence adduced during the
trial, petitioner had committed the offense charged while in the performance of his
official functions. He then held that the RTC had no jurisdiction to try this case and
ordered the transfer of the case to Sandiganbayan. Petioner now argues that his trial
had already ended and the case was already submitted for decision. Hence, a transfer
of his case to the Sandiganbayan at this late stage will expose him to double jeopardy
of punishment for the same offense. 
ISSUE: Whether or not the defense of double jeopardy has become available to the
petitioner upon transfer of his case to the Sandiganbayan.
RULING & MP (in bold): NO. Petitioner had not been exposed at all to legal jeopardy
by the commencement and trial of his criminal case because the RTC was not a court
of competent jurisdiction to try the case in the first place. Consequently, upon the
commencement of this case before the Sandiganbayan, petitioner will for the first time
be placed in jeopardy of punishment for the offense of murder. By the same token, the
dismissal of the Information by the RTC was not equivalent to, and did not operate as
an acquittal of petitioner of that offense. The "dismissal" (later deleted by the RTC) had
simply reflected the fact that the proceedings before the RTC were terminated, the
RTC having ascertained that it had no jurisdiction to try the case at all. 

1627. People v. Tampal 244 scra 202

ATTACHMENT OF JEOPARDY

FACTS: In an information, private respondents Luis Tampal, Samuel, Arsenio and

Domingo Padumon were charged with the crime of robbery with homicide and multiply
serious physical injuries. On the day of the hearing, the assistant provincial prosecutor
moved for postponement as he was not able to contact his material witness. When the
case was called again, the prosecutor was absent. Hence, respondent Judge
dismissed the case for failure to prosecute. The prosecution moved to reconsider,
reasoning that the provincial prosecutor was then closed because it was a Muslim
holiday (excuse for the prosecutor’s absence), but said MR was denied. SolGen now
contends that the dismissal of the case is void. Hence, the case may be reinstated
without placing the private respondents in double jeopardy.

ISSUE: Whether or not the reinstatement of the case would place the private
respondents in double jeopardy.

RULING & MP (in bold): NO. The 3 requisites of double jeopardy are: (1) a first
jeopardy must have attached prior to the second, (2) the first jeopardy must have been
validly terminated, and (3) a second jeopardy, must be for the same offense as that in
the first.  Legal jeopardy attaches only: (a) upon a valid indictment, (2) before a
competent court, (3) after arraignment (4) when a valid plea has been entered,
and (5) when the defendant was acquitted or convicted , or the case was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused.
Dismissal of cases on the ground of failure to prosecute is equivalent to an
acquittal that would bar further prosecution of the accused for the same offense.
It must be stressed, however, that these dismissals were predicated on the clear
right of the accused to speedy trial. These cases are not applicable to the petition at
bench considering that the right of the private respondents to speedy trial has not been
violated by the State. It is apparent that the public prosecutor's failure to attend the
September 20, 1991 hearing was due to his good faith and belief that said date was a
Muslinm Legal Holiday. To be sure, the prosecutor could not be faulted for not working
on that day since the Provincial Prosecutor's Office was closed pursuant to the
aforequoted memorandum circular. The facts in field in no way indicate that the
prosecution of private respondents in the criminal case had been unjustly delayed by
the prosecution, hence, the respondent judge should have given the prosecution a fair
opportunity to prosecute its case.

1628. People v. Montesa 248 scra 641

ATTACHMENT OF JEOPARDY
FACTS: An information was filed with the RTC charging private respondents Apolonio
and Bernarda Cruz with the crime of falsification of public document. The private
respondents filed a petition for reinvestigation because after the information was filed,
material and relevant evidence was discovered, which was granted. At the
reinvestigation conducted by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Edsel M. Rutor, the
private respondents presented an affidavit of Feliza Constantino who declared that she
was the one responsible for the preparation of the questioned public document. Rutor
then recommended the dismissal of the case. Respondent Judge ordered the
arraignment of the private respondents and forthwith dismissed the case on the basis
of Rutor’s recommendation. Hence, the petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal of the case was null and void. Hence, the
information should be reinstated.
RULING & MP (in bold): YES. Where an order dismissing a criminal case has
been issued with gave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, the same is null and void—and the information is reinstated. It must
be observed that, although the respondent Judge was convinced of Rutor’s
recommendation to dismiss the case on the ground of want of probable cause because
of the “admission” of Feliza Constantino, he still ordered the arraignment of the private
respondents. He seemed to have something in mind for the protection of the interest of
the private respondents. Presumably, he thought that the arraignment which was
immediately followed by the dismissal of the case would forever foreclose, on
the ground of double jeopardy, any reopening of the case. For having been
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
thereby depriving the State of due process of law or a fair opportunity to present
its evidence and prove its case, the challenged order of the respondent Judge
dismissing the criminal case is null and void. The Court set it aside and ordered
the reinstatement of the information.

1629. De La Rosa vs. CA

G.R. No. 116495 Date: February 9, 1996 Ponente:
Panganiban, J.
Topic: Attachment of Jeopardy
Legal Doctrine: Constitutional precept that the right against double jeopardy cannot be
invoked when the dismissal of the case was upon the act of the petitioner himself.
Such act does not conform on the fourth requisite of legal jeopardy.
FACTS:
● Nine separate criminal informations were filed against herein petitioner Romulo
De La Rosa charging him with violating BP Blg. 22.
● The trial for the cases were postponed numerous times for various reasons.
Thereafter, De La Rosa invoked his constitutional right on speedy trial of cases.
Thus, the trial court dismissed all nine cases against De La Rosa for reasons that
the complainant is not ready to testify.
● Private respondent Magtoto appealed to the CA. The CA reinstated the criminal
proceedings against De La Rosa.
● Hence, the current petition contending that the dismissal of the cases against
him (De La Rosa) by the trial court was based on his constitutional right to a
speedy trial, the reinstatement and remand of the same would place him in
double jeopardy.
ISSUE:
● W/N the reinstatement of the criminal cases against De La Rosa places him in
double jeopardy.
RULING:
● NO. The Supreme Court held that double jeopardy does not apply in the case.
The requisites that must occur for legal jeopardy to attach are: (a) a valid
complaint or information; (b) a court of competent jurisdiction; (c) the accused
has pleaded to the charge; and (d) the accused has been convicted or acquitted
or the case dismissed or terminated without the express consent of the accused.
The fourth requisite is lacking. The dismissal of the nine cases was upon the
motion of De La Rosa himself.

1630. People vs. Leviste

G.R. No. 104386 Date: March 28, 1996 Ponente:
Panganiban, J.
Topic: Attachment of Jeopardy
Legal Doctrine: Constitutional precept that when the termination of a case was within
the act of the accused himself, then the constitutional right against double jeopardy
cannot be invoked.
FACTS:
 An information for libel was filed against herein private respondent Arnulfo Talisic
for publishing a libelous article in the Sun Star Daily portraying as a land grabber
one Democrito Mendoza.
 Talisic filed for a motion to dismiss alleging that it wasn’t him who published the
libelous article. The trial court, presided by respondent Hon. Leviste, hastily
dismissed the case on the grounds that the prosecution is not ready to present
their case.
 The private prosecutor filed an urgent motion for reconsideration stating that the
prosecution had no opportunity to file an objection and that its principal witness is
in another place. The motion was denied the same.
 Hence, the current petition where Talisic claims that a reopening of the case
would place him in double jeopardy.
ISSUE:
 W/N the reopening of the dismissed case would place Talisic in double jeopardy.
RULING:
 NO. The Supreme Court held that Talisic cannot invoke his right against double
jeopardy. Legal jeopardy attached only: (1) upon a valid indictment, (2) before a
competent court, (3) after arraignment, (4) when a valid plea has been entered,
and (5) when the defendant was acquitted or convicted, or the case was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the
accused. In the instant case, the termination of the case was precisely
sought by private respondent Talisic himself through his motion to
dismiss. In any event, private respondent's right to speedy trial not having been
violated, he cannot invoke the right against double jeopardy.
1631. People v. Cawaling

G.R. No. 117970 July 28, 1998 Panganiban, J.

FACTS:

Prior to the institution of the criminal case against appellants, an administrative

case had been filed before the National Police Commission, in which Policemen
Tumbagahan, De los Santos, Cajilo and Fontamillas were charged by Nelson Ilisan
with the killing of his brother. They were found guilty of grave misconduct and ordered
their dismissal from the service with prejudice. Subsequently, an Information for
murder against the appellants, Fontamillas, and Cawaling were filed. Appellants raised
that the lower court committed error in not considering double jeopardy and argued
that the first jeopardy attached when a criminal case for murder was filed before the
Judge Advocate Generals Office (JAGO), which was allegedly dismissed after several
hearings had been conducted.

ISSUE:

WON the first jeopardy was attached when the criminal case was filed before the
Judge Advocate General’s Office.

RULING: No. In this case, the appellants have presented no sufficient and
conclusive evidence to show that they were charged, arraigned and acquitted in
a military commission, or that the case was dismissed therein without their
consent. The defense merely offered as evidence certain disposition forms and a
letter recommending that the be dropped and considered closed. No charge sheet
and record of arraignment and trial were presented to establish the first
jeopardy.

MP in Bold

Omar
1632. Cudia v. CA

G.R. No. 110315 January 16, 1998 Romero, J.

FACTS:

Petitioner was arrested for possessing an unlicensed revolver. The City

Prosecutor of Angeles City filed an information against him for illegal possession of
firearms and ammunition, docketed as Criminal Case No. 11542. However, the
provincial prosecutor of Pampanga also filed an information charging petitioner with
the same crime, docketed as Criminal Case No. 11987. Petitioner filed a Motion to
Quash Criminal Case No. 11987 on the ground that his continued prosecution for
which he had been arraigned in Criminal Case No. 11542, and which had been
dismissed despite his opposition would violate his right not to be put twice in jeopardy
of punishment for the same offense.

ISSUE:

WON the first jeopardy was attached when the criminal case was filed before the
Court of Angeles City.

RULING: No. The first jeopardy did not attach because Branch 60 of the Regional
Trial Court of Angeles City was not the proper venue for hearing the case. Venue
in criminal cases is jurisdictional, being an essential element of jurisdiction. In
all criminal prosecutions, the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of
the municipality or territory wherein the offense was committed or any one of
the essential ingredients thereof took place. Although both Branches 60 and 56 are
sitting in Angeles City, it is Branch 56 which has jurisdiction to try offenses committed
in Mabalacat, Pampanga. Petitioner was arraigned before Branch 60, not Branch 56.

If the complaint or information was insufficient because it was defective in form or

substance, its dismissal without the consent of the accused cannot be pleaded. As the
fiscal had no authority to file the information, the dismissal of the first
information would not be a bar to petitioner’s subsequent prosecution. Jeopardy
does not attach where a defendant pleads guilty to a defective indictment that is
voluntarily dismissed by the prosecution.

MP in Bold

Omar
1633. TECSON vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 123045 November 16, 1999 Quisumbing, J.

Sec. 21. Attachment of Jeopardy

FACTS:

Demetrio Tecson was the Municipal Mayor of Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur. He
was found guilty of violating Section 3(c) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
which penalizes directly or indirectly, requesting or receiving any gift. He contends that
being tried before the Sandiganbayan violated his constitutional protection against
double jeopardy since the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur had already
cleared him of all charges.

ISSUE:

Does double jeopardy attach?

RULING:

No. Double jeopardy attaches only: (1) upon a valid indictment; (2) before a
competent court; (3) after arraignment; (4) when a valid plea has been entered; and (5)
when the defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without the express consent of the accused. None of the requisites for
the attachment of double jeopardy applies to the hearings conducted by the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur. It must be stressed that the said
proceedings were not criminal, but administrative in nature. Hence, double
jeopardy does not apply.

1634. DIMATULAC vs. VILLON

G.R. No. 127107 October 12, 1999 Davide, Jr., J.

Sec. 21. Attachment of Jeopardy

FACTS:

A complaint for Murder was filed against private respondents Mayor Santiago
Yabut and others. A preliminary investigation was conducted and found probable
cause. Warrants were issued for the crime of murder. However, Asst. Prov. Prosecutor
Alfonso-Flores conducted a reinvestigation and issued warrants for homicide instead.
Before the information for homicide was filed, petitioners filed an appeal to the
Secretary of Justice assailing said resolution by Flores. In the meantime, petitioners
also filed for a motion to defer the proceedings pending the appeal with the SOJ.
Respondent judge ignored this and set the arraignment for homicide.

ISSUE:

Can double jeopardy be invoked?

RULING:

No. DOJ Order No. 223 of 30 June 1993 recognizes the right of both the
offended parties and the accused to appeal from resolutions in preliminary
investigations or reinvestigations. Petitioners herein were not barred from appealing
from the resolution holding that only homicide was committed, considering that their
complaint was for murder. By holding that only homicide was committed, the Provincial
Prosecutors Office of Pampanga effectively dismissed the complaint for murder (while
it is was still in the stage of prelim investigation).

Judge Villon also committed a grave abuse of discretion in rushing the

arraignment of the Yabut’s on the assailed information for homicide. Again, the State
and the offended parties were deprived of due process. When the State is deprived
of due process in a criminal case by reason of grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the trial court, the acquittal of the accused  or the dismissal of the case  is
void, hence double jeopardy cannot be invoked by the accused.

(1635). People v. Maquiling

GR No. 128986 June 21, 1989 Panganiban;

Art. III Section 21, Attachment of Jeopardy

Facts: RTC convicted Maquiling of homicide and serious physical injuries. CA

reversed the ruling and accepted the claim of self-defense. Solicitor General, through
certiorari, seeks to set aside CA decision for having been allegedly rendered with grave
abuse of discretion for the following reasons: (1) failed to discuss the effect of
Maquilings escape from confinement during the pendency of the case; (2) shifted the
burden of proof on the prosecution to prove Maquilings guilt, although he admitted
killing the victim in self-defense; (3) ignored the strong physical evidence.
Issue: Whether the petition for certiorari was violative of the accused’s right against
double jeopardy
Ruling: Yes. While certiorari may be used to correct an abusive acquittal, the petitioner
in such extraordinary proceeding must clearly demonstrate that the lower court
blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to
dispense justice. On the other hand, if the petition, regardless of its nomenclature,
merely calls for an ordinary review of the findings of the court a quo, the
constitutional right against double jeopardy would be violated. Such recourse is
tantamount to converting the petition for certiorari into an appeal, contrary to the
express injunction of the Constitution, the Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence
on double jeopardy.
The mere fact that a court erroneously decides a case does not necessarily deprived it
of jurisdiction. Thus, assuming arguendo that a court commits a mistake in its
judgment, the error does not vitiate the decision, considering that it has jurisdiction over
the case.
Main Point: In dismissing the petition for certiorari, the Court is not ruling on the guilt
or the innocence of Maquiling. Neither is it agreeing with the findings of the CA that the
accused is innocent. Such conclusions are rendered only in an appeal properly brought
before the Court. But as already stated, an appeal or a petition for review of a
judgment of acquittal is barred by the rule on double jeopardy (1 st jeopardy has already
attached – defendant was convicted by RTC).

(1636). People v. Nitafan

GR Nos. 107964-66 February 1, 1999

Art. III Section 21, Attachment of Jeopardy

Facts: Three criminal informations for violation of Section 4 of CBC No. 960 were filed
against Imelda Marcos. Without Imelda yet taking any action or filing any motion to
quash the informations, respondent judge required petitioners to show cause why the
case should not be dismissed on the ground that Imelda’s right to double jeopardy was
violated. It is respondent judges posture that based on the Solicitor-Generals
allegations in its Motion for Consolidation that the three cases form part of a series of
transactions which are subject of the cases pending before another court, all these
cases constitute one continuous crime. Respondent judge ruled that the prosecution of
private respondent was part of a sustained political vendetta by some people in the
government aside from what he considered as a violation of private respondents right
against double jeopardy. From his disquisition regarding continuing, continuous and
continued offenses and his discussion of mala prohibita, respondent judge further
ratiocinated his dismissal order in that the pendency of the other cases had placed
Imelda in double jeopardy because of the three cases before his sala.
Issue: Whether judge’s invocation of double jeopardy was applicable to Imelda’s case.
Ruling: No, the same is improper and has neither legal nor factual basis in this case.
In this case, it is manifestly clear that no first jeopardy has yet attached nor any such
jeopardy terminated.
Other than the Solicitor-Generals allegation of pending suits, respondent judge has no
other basis on whether Imelda had already been arraigned, much less entered a plea
in those cases pending. Even assuming that there was already arraignment and plea
with respect to those cases which respondent judge used as basis to quash the three
informations pending in his sala, still the first jeopardy has not yet attached. Precisely,
those cases are still pending and there was as yet no judgment on the merits at the
time respondent judge quashed the three informations in his sala. Imelda was not
convicted, acquitted nor the pending cases against her dismissed or otherwise
terminated which definitely shows the absence of the fifth requisite for the first
jeopardy to attached. Accordingly, it was wrong to say that the further prosecution of
private respondent under the three informations (considering the already-pending
cases) would violate the formers right against double jeopardy.
Main Point: “The first jeopardy attaches only (1) upon a valid indictment, (2) before a
competent court, (3) after arraignment, (4) when a valid plea has been entered, and (5)
when the defendant was convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused.”
1637. Binay v Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 120681, October 1, 1999

Art. III, Sec. 21: DISMISSAL AT PRELIMMINARY INVESTIGATION; NO JEOPARDY

Facts:

Petitioner Jejomar Binay seeks to annul, among others, the Resolution of the
Sandiganbayan denying his motion to refer his 3 criminal cases (one for violation of
Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code, and two for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019) to the RTC of Makati. Petitioner claims that SB has no jurisdiction over his cases
and the pending informations filed with the same exposes him to double jeopardy.

Issue:

WON the trial to be conducted by respondent court, if the case shall not be dismissed,
will expose the petitioners who are accused therein to double jeopardy.

Ruling:

No. The filing of the information in the Sandiganbayan did not put petitioners in double
jeopardy even though they had already pleaded not guilty to the information earlier
filed in the RTC. The first jeopardy never attached in the first place, the RTC not being
a court of competent jurisdiction (SB does). There can be no double jeopardy where
the accused entered a plea in a court that had no jurisdiction.

1638. Limpangog v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 134229, November 26, 1999

Art. III, Sec. 21: DISMISSAL AT PRELIMMINARY INVESTIGATION; NO JEOPARDY

FACTS:
 The petitioners were found guilty of frustrated murder and homicide and was
sentencing to suffer reclusion perpetua. Upon appeal to the CA, the latter court
declared itself to have no jurisdiction over petitioner’s appeal of their murder conviction.
Where the sentence imposed is reclusion perpetua, the appeal falls within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the SC. However, later Citing SC Circular 2-90, the CA refused
to forward the appeal to the Supreme Court; instead, acquitted the petitioners. Case is
brought up to the SC for review.

ISSUE:

WON the accused is put in double jeopardy by the review of the judgement by SC.

RULING:

NO. The CA acted without jurisdiction in resolving the appeal of the conviction for
frustrated murder and dismissing the murder case. Hence, the CAs acquittal of the
petitioners on charges of frustrated murder is void. We hasten to add that, with the
voiding of the CA Decision and the review by this Court of the RTC judgment,
petitioners cannot claim double jeopardy, because they were never legally in danger of
conviction by the Court of Appeals.

1639. 1639. FLORES VS JOVEN

GR No. 129874 Dec 27, 2002
FACTS: Petitioner caused the filing of a criminal complaint for Rape against
respondent Navarro and nine other persons. Before all the accused can be arraigned,
Navarro filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it does not
sufficiently describe the crime of rape in any of its forms under Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code. An Amended Information for Rape was filed against Navarro, as
the principal accused. Respondent Navarro then filed a motion to quash the Amended
Information, which was granted. Petitioner filed an MR, but was denied thus, through
her private prosecutors, filed the instant special civil action for certiorari. Respondent
contends that the private prosecutors who initiated the instant petition have no
personality to file the same as it is vested with the public prosecutors.
ISSUE: W/N the petitioner has the personality or the right to file herein petition for
certiorari
RULING: YES. The Court recognized the right of offended parties to appeal an order of
the trial court which deprives them of due process, subject to the limitation that they
cannot appeal any adverse ruling if to do so would place the accused in double
jeopardy. The offended party in a criminal case has sufficient interest and personality
as a “person aggrieved” to file a special civil action of prohibition and certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court in line with the underlying spirit of the liberal construction
of the rules in order to promote its object.

1640. 1640. Miranda V. Tuliao

486 SCRA 377
FACTS: Burnt dead bodies of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao were discovered. Two
informations for murder were filed against all the accused, who were convicted and
sentenced them to two counts of reclusion perpetua except SPO2 Maderal who was
yet to be arraigned at that time, being at large. The case was appealed to this Court on
automatic review where the court acquitted the accused therein on the ground of
reasonable doubt. Later on, SPO2 Maderal was arrested and he executed a sworn
confession and identified petitioners herein as the persons responsible. Respondent
filed a criminal complaint for murder against petitioners and submitted the sworn
confession of SPO2 Maderal. Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan issued
warrants of arrest against petitioners and SPO2 Maderal. Petitioners appealed the
resolution of State Prosecutor to the Department of Justice. A new Presiding Judge
Anastacio D. Anghad took over the case and ordered the cancellation of the warrant of
arrest issued against petitioner Miranda. Judge Anghad issued a Joint Order
dismissing the two Informations for murder against petitioners. Respondent Tuliao filed
with this Court a Motion to Cite Public Respondent in Contempt alleging that Judge
Anghad “deliberately and willfully committed contempt of court” when he issued the
dismissal of the informations for murder. The Court of Appeals rendered the assailed
decision granting the petition and ordering the reinstatement of the criminal cases as
well as the issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners and SPO2 Maderal.
Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of this Decision, but the same was denied,
hence this petition.
ISSUE: W/N Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in ordering the
reinstatement of the criminal cases as well as the issuance of warrants which
constitute double jeopardy
RULING/MAINPOINT: NO. There is no double jeopardy in the reinstatement of a
criminal case dismissed before Arraignment. In any case, the reinstatement of a
criminal case dismissed before arraignment does not constitute double jeopardy.
Double jeopardy cannot be invoked where the accused has not been arraigned and it
was upon his express motion that the case

1641. Cabo v. Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 169509 June 16, 2006 YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

Article III, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution: Attachment of jeopardy

FACTS:

Cabo was charged with violation of RA 3019 for allegedly bribing her co-accused.
She claimed to have been deprived of due process, so the Sandiganbayan (SB)
ordered for the reinvestigation of her case. While the investigation was ongoing, she
filed for a motion to travel abroad. This was granted by the SB in exchange for her
“conditional arraignment”, in which she pleaded NOT GUILTY. One of the conditions of
her arraignment was that, if the complaint was amended, she automatically waived her
right to object to the amendment and her right against double jeopardy. Her
arraignment was set on another date, and for this she filed another motion reiterating
her previous plea. Meanwhile, her co-accused, Municipal Mayor Balahay moved to
quash the information on the ground that the facts did not constitute the crime charged.
The SB did not grant his motion, but ordered the amendment of the original complaint,
of which the prosecution subsequently complied with. Cabo thus filed for a motion to
cancel her second arraignment, on the ground that the amendment was done after she
had entered her plea, and that since she had already reiterated her plea of not guilty,
double jeopardy had already attached.

ISSUE:

Whether or not double jeopardy had already attached

RULING:

NO. The Court ruled that it is elementary that for double jeopardy to attach,
the case against the accused must have been dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid
information sufficient in form and substance and the accused pleaded to the
charge. With or without a valid plea, still petitioner cannot rely upon the principle of
double jeopardy to avoid arraignment on the amended information. In the instant case,
the original information to which petitioner entered a plea of “not guilty” was neither
valid nor sufficient to sustain a conviction, and the criminal case was also neither
dismissed nor terminated. Double jeopardy could not, therefore, attach even if
petitioner is assumed to have been unconditionally arraigned on the original charge.

1642. Romualdez v. Marcelo

G.R. Nos. 165510-33 July 28, 2006 YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

Article III, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution: Attachment of jeopardy

FACTS:

This is a petition involving previous criminal cases which were dismissed by the
SB against petitioner because the Informations were filed by an unauthorized party,
hence void. Ombudsman conducted a preliminary investigation in the dismissed cases.
Petitioner now claims that the Office of the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion
in recommending the filing of 24 informations against him for violation of Section 7 of
Republic Act (RA) No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and that the
Ombudsman cannot revive the aforementioned cases which were previously dismissed
by the Sandiganbayan.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the preliminary investigation conducted by the Ombudsman in the

criminal cases was a nullity

RULING:

NO. An order sustaining a motion to quash on grounds other than

extinction of criminal liability or double jeopardy does not preclude the filing of
another information for a crime constituting the same facts. The Court cited the
case of Cudia v. Court of Appeals, 284 SCRA 173 (1998), where it held that: In fine,
there must have been a valid and sufficient complaint or information in the former
prosecution. If, therefore, the complaint or information was insufficient because it was
so defective in form or substance that the conviction upon it could not have been
sustained, its dismissal without the consent of the accused cannot be pleaded. As the
fiscal had no authority to file the information, the dismissal of the first information would
not be a bar in petitioners subsequent prosecution.

1643. People vs Terrado

558 SCRA 84
(Acquittal not reviewable)

Facts:
Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari assailing the Decision of Honorable Judge
P. Vedaña of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), finding the accused "Hapon" not guilty of
Carnapping (punished under Republic Act 6538, otherwise known as the "Anti-
Carnapping Act of 1972"). In its Decision dated April 6, 2001, the trial court acquitted
accused Joseph Terrado for failure of the prosecution to establish intent to take the
tricycle and intent to gain from the same. Thus, the court held that the prosecution
failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The dispositive
portion of the trial court’s decision. Aggrieved, the complainants come to this Court via
a Petition for Certiorari seeking to annul and set aside the Decision.
Issue:
Whether the accused can be tried again
Ruling:
No. The mere fact that a court erroneously decides a case does not necessarily
deprive it of jurisdiction. Thus, assuming arguendo that the trial court committed a
mistake in its judgment, the error does not vitiate the decision, considering that it has
jurisdiction over the case. For this reason, the dismissal of the instant petition is called
for. This Court cannot rule any other way. Accused Joseph Terrado, after being
acquitted of the crime charged, must be afforded the protection against repeated
attempts for conviction, in faithful adherence to the constitutional rule against double
jeopardy.
In our jurisdiction, availment of the remedy of certiorari to correct an erroneous
acquittal may be allowed in cases where petitioner has clearly shown that the public
respondent acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. However, and more serious than the procedural
infraction, if the petition merely calls for an ordinary review of the findings of the court a
quo, we will run afoul of the constitutional right against double jeopardy. Such recourse
is tantamount to converting the petition for certiorari into an appeal, which is proscribed
by the Constitution, the Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence on double
jeopardy. Verdicts of acquittal are to be regarded as absolutely final and
irreviewable. The fundamental philosophy behind the principle is to afford the
defendant, who has been acquitted, final repose and to safeguard him from
government oppression through the abuse of criminal processes.
1644. People vs CA
G.R. No. 161083
(Double Jeopardy)

Facts:
On May 14, 2001, around 12:15 a.m., a fire broke out inside the plant of Sanyoware
Plastic Products Manufacturing Corporation (Sanyoware). The Sanyoware plant had
four single-storey buildings, enclosed in concrete walls with steel tresses and
galvanized iron sheet roofing. After preliminary investigation, then State Prosecutor
Carlos C. Pormento issued a Resolution, recommending hat an information for
Destructive Arson be filed against Wilson Ting, Edward Yao, Willy So Tan and Carol
Ortega. That the case against Samson Ting be dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence
to indict him under the charge.
Prior to the arraignment of respondents and before warrants of arrest could be issued,
respondents filed a Motion to Conduct Hearing to Determine Probable Cause and to
Hold in Abeyance the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest Pending Determination of
Probable Cause. Accordingly, for lack of probable cause, the instant case is
DISMISSED as ordained under Sec. 6, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. CA and SC confirmed that there was no grave abuse of the RTC to arrive
in its decision.

Issue:
Whether or not the rule on Double Jeopardy Applies.

Ruling:
No. The dismissal of the petition does not preclude petitioner from availing of any other
action it deems appropriate under the premises. Double jeopardy cannot be invoked
where the accused has not been arraigned and it was upon his express motion that the
case was dismissed. Moreover, while the absence of probable cause for the issuance
of a warrant of arrest is a ground for the dismissal of the case, the same does not
result in the acquittal of the said accused. The judge is required to personally evaluate
the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately
dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. To
this Court’s mind, the RTC had complied with its duty of personally evaluating the
supporting evidence of the prosecution before arriving at its decision of dismissing the
case against respondents.

1645. People vs CA
G.R. No. 183652
Attachment of Jeopardy

Facts:
Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari questioning the Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) dated June 6, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00422-MIN. The CA reversed
and set aside the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kapatagan, Lanao del
Norte, Branch 21, dated February 28, 2006 in Criminal Case No. 21-1211, and
acquitted private respondents Raymund Carampatana, Joefhel Oporto, and Moises
Alquizola of the crime of rape for the prosecution's failure to prove their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
That on or about 10:30 o’clock in the evening of March 25, 2004 at Alson’s Palace,
Maranding, Lala, Lanao del Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
HonorableCourt, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with lewd
designs forcefully drunk AAA, a 16-year-old minor, with an intoxicating liquor and once
intoxicated, brought said AAA at about dawn of March 26, 2004 at Alquizola Lodging
house, Maranding, Lala, Lanao del Norte and also within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, and once inside said lodging house, accused RAYMUND
CARAMPATANA and JOEPHEL OPORTO took turns in having carnal knowledge
against the will of AAA while accused MOISES ALQUIZOLA, with lewd designs, kissed
her against her will and consent.
RTC found accused guilty. CA then reversed the decision acquitting the accused being
that it found that the prosecution failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Issue:
Whether or not there was a violation of double jeopardy

Ruling:
No. The Court finds that the petitioner has sufficiently discharged the burden of
proving that the respondent appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion
in acquitting private respondents. As a general rule, the prosecution cannot appeal
or bring error proceedings from a judgment rendered in favor of the defendant in a
criminal case. The reason is that a judgment of acquittal is immediately final and
executory, and the prosecution is barred from appealing lest the constitutional
prohibition against double jeopardy be violated. If there is grave abuse of discretion,
granting petitioner’s prayer is not tantamount to putting private respondents in
double jeopardy. (substantive)
While it is true that the RTC found Alquizola guilty as mere accomplice, when he
appealed from the decision of the trial court, he waived the constitutional safeguard
against double jeopardy and threw the whole case open to the review of the appellate
court, which is then called upon to render such judgment as law and justice dictate,
whether favorable or unfavorable to the accused-appellant. (procedural)
The appellate court merely echoed the private respondents’ testimonies, particularly
those as to the specific events that transpired during the crucial period - from the
dinner at Gemeno’s house to the following morning at the Alquizola Lodging House. As
a result, it presented the private respondents’ account and allegations as though these
were the established facts of the case, which it later conveniently utilized to support its
ruling of acquittal. Decision of CA is reversed and set aside and SC find the 3 accused
guilty of 4 counts of rape. (CA’s fault

III. Termination of Jeopardy; Existence; Non-Termination

1646. Bulaong v. People
17 SCRA 746

Double Jeopardy

Facts:

On May 31, 1956 Agaton Bulaong and others were charged before the Court of First
Instance of Laguna with the crime of rebellion. Trial did not proceed with respect to
Agaton Bulaong until 1958 for he was then at large. Meanwhile Congress enacted the
Anti-Subversion Act (Republic Act 1700) which took effect on June 20, 1957.
On September 12, 1958, Agaton Bulaong was arrested.
The information for rebellion filed with the Court of First Instance of Laguna. On the
same date another information was filed before the Court of First Instance of Manila
charging Agaton Bulaong of the crime of subversion defined in Section 4 of the Anti-
Subversion Act. The case for subversion is still pending in the Court of First Instance of
Manila; while the case for rebellion has already been decided by the Court of First
Instance of Laguna adversely against the accused.1 Accused Bulaong appealed to the
Court of Appeals interposing the defense of double jeopardy. Accused contends that
rebellion as defined in Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code is a lesser cognate
offense to that defined in Section 4 of Republic Act 1700. And he further contends that
since the facts alleged in the informations for rebellion and subversion are the same he
can not be legally prosecuted for both offenses without being placed twice in jeopardy
of being punished for the same acts.

Issue:

Whether or not accused Bulaong can interpose the defense of double jeopardy in this
case.

Ruling:

No. Accused's contention has no merit. Under Section 9, Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court, the defense of double jeopardy is available to the accused only where he was
either convicted or acquitted or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his consent. Such is not the situation in this case. For accused has
not been convicted or acquitted in the case filed in the Court of First Instance against
him for subversion. Neither was the said case dismissed or terminated without his
consent, for as stated, it is still pending in said court. Needless to say, it is the
conviction, acquittal of the accused or dismissal or termination of the case that bars
further prosecution for the same offense or any attempt to commit the same or
frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily
included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.

1647. Bustamante v. Maceren 48 SCRA 155

FACTS: This suit for certiorari was filed with the avowed aim of correcting a judicial
misstep presumably offensive to the constitutional right of petitioner not to be twice put
in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense The petitioner was accused of
murder in an information filed with the Court of First Instance of Laguna
petitioner entered a plea of guilty, and after proving the privileged mitigating
circumstance of incomplete self-defense .the Court finds the accused Danilo
Bustamante guilty of the crime of murder as charged in the information.
Considering in his favor the privileged mitigating Circumstances of incomplete
self-defense, plea of guilty, voluntary surrender and lack of intent to commit so
grave a wrong,
Accordingly, the Hon. Judge Jorge Coquia, who rendered the aforesaid judgment,
issued a commitment order dated December 14, 1970, addressed to the Provincial
Warden of Laguna . . ., and the Provincial Warden, also on the same day,
acknowledged receipt of the body of the petitioner, who forthwith started serving his
sentence of imprisonment on that date . . .;
On December 21, 1970, the Hon. Judge Jorge Coquia issued the following order:
‘Submitted for resolution is the motion for modification of penalty filed by the
Assistant Provincial Fiscal. On the other hand accused through counsel in view
of the motion of the prosecution filed a motion for withdrawal of plea of guilty
and waiver of commitment. But in view of the motion of accused, the motion of the
prosecution has become moot and academic and the motion filed by the accused is
hereby granted petitioner was reassigned to the sala presided over by the
Honorable Maximo Maceren, before whom petitioner was re arraigned and after
petitioner entered a plea of not guilty, said judge held a new hearing of the case on the
merits and thereafter, Judge Maceren rendered a new judgment against petitioner
the accused Danilo Bustamante y Villanueva is hereby declared guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide, and applying the provisions of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law and considering the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender in his favor, he is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six
(6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum, to twelve (12) years and one
(1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum; to indemnify the heirs of the offended party
in the sum of P12,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and to
pay the costs. Considering that the accused is now serving under preventive
imprisonment, he shall be credited for the period of his preventive imprisonment
pursuant to the provisions of Rep. Act 6127.’ . . .; Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the above decision in which motion petitioner questioned the
jurisdiction of the trial court to try his case anew after he had fully served the
judgment rendered by Judge Coquia against him Petitioner, in said motion, argued
that the judgment against him had already become final when he started serving his
sentence thereunder and that therefore, the Court thereafter lost jurisdiction over his
case; and that no amount of waiver or consent on his part could bestow on said court
jurisdiction that it had already lost. At the hearing of said motion, however, the
respondent Judge Maximo Maceren took the position that he could not nullify an order
of another judge of equal rank and that only a higher court had the authority to nullify
said order
ISSUE:WON the petitioner is place in double jeopardy
RULING:No re-opening of a case may be ordered of a criminal case after accused has
started serving his sentence; a judgment in a criminal case becomes final after the
lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal or when the sentence has been partially or
totally satisfied or served or the defendant that waived in writing his appeal; withdrawal
of plea of guilty does not constitute waiver of defense of double jeopardy timely
invoked.

1648. People v. Obsania - L-24447

Facts: The accused was charged with Robbery with Rape before the
Municipal Court of Balungao, Pangasinan. He pleaded not guilty. His counsel moved
for the dismissal of the charge for failure to allege vivid designs in the info. Said motion
was granted. From this order of dismissal the prosecution appealed.

Issue: Whether or Not the present appeal places the accused inDoubleJeopardy.

Held:  In order that the accused may invoke double jeopardy, the following
requisites must have obtained in the original prosecution, a) valid complaint, b)
competent court, c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge, d) defendant was
acquitted or convicted or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent.
In the case at bar, the converted dismissal was ordered by the Trial Judge upon the
defendant's motion to dismiss. The “doctrine of double jeopardy” as enunciated in P.vs.
Salico applies to wit when the case is dismissed with the express consent of
the defendant, the dismissal will not be a bar to another prosecution for the same
offense because his action in having the case is dismissed constitutes a waiver of his
constitutional right/privilege for the reason that he thereby prevents the Court from
proceeding to the trial on the merits and rendering a judgment of conviction against
him.
In essence, where a criminal case is dismissed provisionally not only with the
express consent of the accused but even upon the urging of his counsel there can be
no double jeopardy under Sect. 9 Rule 113, if the indictment against him is revived by
the fiscal. 

1649. Rivera, Jr. v, People

189 SCRA 331, G.R. No. 93219 August 30, 1990 Paras, J.;
Article III. Section 21. Termination of Jeopardy; Existence; Non-Termination

FACTS:
 Marcelino Rivera, Jr. was arrested and detained for he was allegedly about to
transport marijuana to Manila; he was later charged for violation of RA 6425
where he pleaded not guilty.
 The hearing of the case was repeatedly rescheduled for various reasons,
including the non-appearance of witnesses. During a hearing, the Forensic
Chemist, who was to stand as witness in order to present the marijuana
 specimen, did not appear. Judge Bautista verbally granted the motion of the
defense (invoking the right to speedy trial) to dismiss the case and ordered the
immediate release of Rivera.
 However, the Forensic Chemist later arrived, and upon satisfactory explanation,
Judge Bautista set aside his prior verbal order and rescheduled the case for
continuation of trial.
 Rivera alleged that the verbal order of dismissal made in open court amounted to
acquittal and may no longer be set aside without violating his constitutional rights
against double jeopardy.

ISSUE:
Whether there is violation against double jeopardy.

RULING:
No. Where there is a valid information and the accused has been arraigned, an
order of dismissal issued by the court, motu proprio, in the course of a trial of a criminal
case, whether based on the merits or for failure of prosecution witnesses to appear,
has the effect of a judgment of acquittal and double jeopardy attaches. The order is
also immediately executory. However, this order of dismissal must be written in the
official language, personally and directly prepared by the judge and signed by
him conformably with the provisions of Rule 120, section 2 of the Rules of Court.
In the instant case, it is very clear that the order was merely dictated in open court by
the trial judge. There is no showing that this verbal order of dismissal was ever
reduced to writing and duly signed by him. Thus, it did not yet attain the effect of
a judgment of acquittal, so that it was still within the powers of the judge to set it
aside and enter another order, now in writing and duly signed by him, reinstating
the case.
1650. Dizon-Pamintuan v. People -
234 SCRA 63, G.R. No. 111426 July 11, 1994 Davide, Jr., J.;
Article III. Section 21. Termination of Jeopardy; Existence; Non-Termination
FACTS:
 Norma Dizon-Pamintuan was charged with the violation of the Anti-fencing Law
for unlawfully buying and keeping pieces of jewelry, which she knew to have
been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery.
 She was adjudged guilty but the penalty imposed was set aside. The CA
remanded the case to the trial court and was ordered to receive additional
evidence on the correct valuation of the pieces of jewelry involved for the sole
purpose of determining the penalty to be imposed.
 Norma contended that a remand of the case would place her in double-jeopardy.

ISSUE:
Whether there is violation against double jeopardy.

RULING:
No. The Court ruled that the concurrence of double jeopardy would not occur
assuming the case was remanded to the trial court. There is double jeopardy when
the following requisites concur: (1) the first jeopardy must have attached prior to
the second, (2) the first jeopardy must have validly been terminated, and (3) the
second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first.
In this case however, the Court set aside the remanding of the case to the trial
court as sufficient evidence to prove the actual value of the recovered articles was
already established.

1651. COMELEC v. CA - 229 SCRA 501

Facts: The COMELEC charged private respondents in twelve separate information

filed with the Regional Trial Court of Bataan. In each information, the three were
accused of having tampered, in conspiracy with one another, with the certificates of
canvass by increasing the votes received by then senatorial candidate Juan Ponce
Enrile in certain municipalities of Bataan in the May 8, 1995 elections. The twelve
cases was summarily dismissed before the accused was even arraigned. The
COMELEC sought to appeal the dismissal of the cases to the Court of Appeals by filing
notices but the judges denied due course to its appeal. Hence this petition for certiorari
and mandamus seeking the nullification of the orders of the two judges, denying due
course to the Notices of Appeal of the COMELEC.
Issue: Whether or not in approving the appeal the accused will be placed in double
jeopardy.
Ruling: No. In criminal cases the prosecution cannot appeal if the accused would
thereby be placed in double jeopardy, but here the cases were dismissed by the
judges before the accused were arraigned and, therefore, jeopardy has not
attached. For while the right to appeal is statutory and is not constitutional, once it is
granted by statute, its denial would be a violation of the due process clause of the
Constitution. The issue is not just the right of the prosecution to appeal from the
previous orders of dismissal. It is settled that the approval of a notice of appeal, in
cases where no record on appeal is required by law, is a ministerial duty of the court to
which the notice of appeal is addressed, provided that such appeal is timely filed.
MP: Double jeopardy does not attached when the case is dismissd before the accused
were even arraigned. In criminal cases the prosecution cannot appeal if the
accused would thereby be placed in double jeopardy, but here the cases were
dismissed by the judges before the accused were arraigned and, therefore,
jeopardy has not attached. For while the right to appeal is statutory and is not
constitutional, once it is granted by statute, its denial would be a violation of the due
process clause of the Constitution. The issue is not just the right of the prosecution to
appeal from the previous orders of dismissal. It is settled that the approval of a notice
of appeal, in cases where no record on appeal is required by law, is a ministerial duty
of the court to which the notice of appeal is addressed, provided that such appeal is
timely filed.

1652. People v. Bans - 239 SCRA 48

Facts: Private respondent Vicente Magsaysay was charged with illegal possession of
firearms, Upon arraignment, private respondents pleaded not guilty. After the
prosecution rested its case, private respondents filed a Demurrer to Evidence alleging
failure on the part of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt, on
the ground that since the search warrant and the order to break open six vaults were
illegally issued, the firearm and ammunitions seized in compliance therewith are
inadmissible in evidence, respondent judge granted the Demurrer to Evidence and
ACQUITTED the accused of the offense charged in the information. The prosecution
filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the same was denied by respondent judge on
the ground that any reconsideration of the aforesaid order will place private
respondents in double jeopardy.

Issue: Whether or not a reconsideration of the case will place the private respondents
in double jeopardy.

Ruling: Yes. Generally, the dismissal of a criminal case resulting in acquittal made with
the express consent of the accused or upon his own motion will not place the accused
in double jeopardy. However, this rule admits of two exceptions, namely: insufficiency
of evidence and denial of the right to a speedy trial. In the case before us, the
resolution of the Demurrer to Evidence was based on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence after a finding that the search warrant was illegally issued. Hence, it clearly
falls under one of the admitted exceptions to the rule. Double jeopardy therefore,
applies to this case and this Court is constitutionally barred from reviewing the order
acquitting the accused.
MP: Generally, the dismissal of a criminal case resulting in acquittal made with
the express consent of the accused or upon his own motion will not place the
accused in double jeopardy. However, this rule admits of two exceptions,
namely: insufficiency of evidence and denial of the right to a speedy trial.

1653. STATE PROSECUTORS vs. MURO

A.M. No. RTJ-92-876 September 19, 1994 Per Curiam

FACTS:
 Judge Manuel T. Muro was charged by State Prosecutors with ignorance of the
law, grave misconduct for issuing an order dismissing eleven cases against the
accused Mrs. Imelda Marcos, for Violation of Central Bank Foreign Exchange
Restrictions solely on the basis of newspaper reports after arraignment and
without the consent of said accused.
 The prosecution contends that the lightning speed with which respondent Judge
acted to dismiss the cases deprived them of their right to due process when they
were not even given the chance to present their evidence.
  In another case, an appeal was made by the State Prosecutors of Judge Muro’s
order where the CA found him to have acted with grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the dismissal and ordered the reinstatement of the case.
ISSUE:
Whether double jeopardy can be invoked by Imelda Marcos?
RULING:
No. The Court held that since the CA declared the Judge Muro acted with grave
abuse of discretion, this amounted to a lack of jurisdiction. In the absence of jurisdiction
of the court, double jeopardy cannot set in. It is settled doctrine that double jeopardy
cannot be invoked where the prosecution which represents the sovereign people
in criminal cases is denied due process.

1654. PEOPLE vs. BELLAFLOR

G.R. No. 103275 June 15, 1994 Bidin, J.

FACTS:
 Private respondent Reuben Albaño was charged with the crime of Arson.
 While the case was pending, Judge Bellaflor replaced assisting Judge Fortun
because the latter was reassigned.
 A decision was promulgated by Judge Fortun convicting the accused of arson. At
the time of the promulgation of the decision, Judge Bellaflor was already
presiding as assisting judge.
 Respondent would file a motion for reconsideration which Judge Bellaflor granted
and acquitted him of the crime charged. Judge Bellaflor also declared the
decision of Judge Fortun null and void for having been promulgated after said
judge vacated his office.
 A motion for reconsideration was filed by the People. The accused contends that
the resolution was already final and executory and a reconsideration thereof will
place him under double jeopardy.
ISSUE:
Whether a reconsideration of the resolution acquitting the respondent tantamount
to double jeopardy?
RULING:
No. The Court ruled that protection against double jeopardy is not available
where the dismissal of the case was effected at the instance of the accused.
Since private respondent had moved for the dismissal of the criminal case filed against
him and therefore, the protective mantle of double jeopardy does not cover him.

Rules on double jeopardy when case is dismissed:

An appeal by the prosecution from the order of dismissal of the criminal case shall not
constitute double jeopardy if (1) the dismissal is made upon motion, or with the express
consent of the defendant, and (2) the dismissal is not an acquittal or based upon
consideration of the evidence or of the merits of the case; and (3) the question to be
passed upon by the appellate court is purely legal so that should the dismissal be
found incorrect, the case would have to be remanded to the court of origin for further
proceedings, to determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant.
1655 Guerrero v. CA
257 SCRA 703
Art 3. Sec 21. Termination of jeopardy; existence; non-termination

FACTS:
Guerrero was charged with Triple Homicide Through Reckless Imprudence for
flying a private airplane despite insufficiency of fuel thus, forcing them to make an
emergency landing which resulted to the death of three passengers thereon. No action
was taken by the prior judge until the case was reshuffled to Judge Aquino who
ordered the retaking of the testimonies of the witnesses due to non-completion by the
parties of the transcript of stenographic notes. The case was set for re-hearing to which
the petitioner opposed contending that such would place him in double jeopardy.
ISSUE: Whether or not the rehearing of the case will place the accused in double
jeopardy.

RULING:
No. There has been no termination of the criminal prosecution (i.e. first jeopardy).
To raise the defense of double jeopardy, the following requisites must concur: (1) a first
jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been
validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense, or the
second offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first
information, or is an attempt to commit the same or is a frustration thereof. And legal
jeopardy attaches only: (a) upon a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c)
after arraignment; (d) a valid plea having been entered; and (e) the case was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused.
In the present case, there has not even been a first jeopardy, since the fourth element
(e)—dismissal or termination of the case without the express consent of the accused—
is not present. Moreover, measured against the aforequoted standard, the re-taking of
testimonies cannot in any wise be deemed a second jeopardy.

MAIN POINT: Double jeopardy cannot be raised when a case which is not yet
resolved is set for rehearing.

1656 Teodoro v. CA
258 SCRA 603
Art 3. Sec 21. Termination of jeopardy; existence; non-termination

FACTS:
Vice President Amado Teodoro was charged with slander by deed for uttering
abusive words against the Treasurer Tanco-Young during a company meeting.
Petitioner appealed the decision of the MeTC finding him guilty of simple slander and
sentenced him to pay a fine of P110 to the RTC. However, instead of filing a
memoranda, he filed a motion to withdraw his appeal which the RTC denied for the
records were already in the RTC and the prosecution had already submitted its brief.
RTC then rendered a decision finding him guilty of grave slander and sentenced him to
three months of arresto mayor. Petitioner contended that RTC’s decision will put him in
double jeopardy as he already paid the fine imposed by MeTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused was place in double jeopardy when RTC rendered a
decision with a different penalty after accused paid the fine imposed by MeTC

RULING:
No. Petitioner’s motion to withdraw his appeal having been denied, his payment
of the fine as imposed on the judgment of the MeTC did not render that decision final
and executory. Hence, petitioner was not placed in double jeopardy by the decision of
the RTC on his appeal.

MAIN POINT:
Accused is not placed in double jeopardy when he is meted with a different
penalty by the appellate court despite satisfying the judgment of a lower court for such
decision is not yet final and executory.

1657.Cuidia v. CA – 284 SCRA 173

ART III SEC 21: TERMINATION OF JEOPARDY; EXISTENCE; NON-TERMINATION

FACTS: Illegal possession of firearm was charged against Renato Cudia for having in
his possession an unlicensed revolver. Two separate Informations containing the same
crime were filed in Angeles RTC by Pampanga provincial prosecutor and Angeles City
provincial prosecutor. The first Information which was filed by Angeles City provincial
prosecutor was withdrawn as the accused was apprehended in Pampanga and not in
Angeles City hence, not within the its jurisdiction. Petitioner filed a motion to quash
contending that his continued prosecution in the criminal case filed by Pampanga
provincial prosecutor after being arraigned in the criminal case filed by Angeles City
provincial prosecutor will put him in double jeopardy.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused was put in double jeopardy

RULING: No. As the Angeles City fiscal had no authority to file the information, the
dismissal of the first information would not be a bar to petitioner’s subsequent
prosecution. Jeopardy does not attach where a defendant pleads guilty to a defective
indictment that is voluntarily dismissed by the prosecution. In fine, there must have
been a valid and sufficient complaint or information in the former prosecution. If,
therefore, the complaint or information was insufficient because it was so defective in
form or substance that the conviction upon it could not have been sustained, its
dismissal without the consent of the accused cannot be pleaded.
MAIN POINT: Jeopardy does not attach where a defendant pleads guilty to a
defective indictment that is voluntarily dismissed by the prosecution

1658.People v. Lising – 285 SCRA 595

ART III SEC 21: TERMINATION OF JEOPARDY; EXISTENCE; NON-TERMINATION

FACTS: Police officer Lising and four other accused were charged with the crime of
Kidnapping with Double Murder for kidnapping and killing a UP Law graduate who was
then reviewing for the bar and a graduating MassCom student of UP. Two amended
Informations for Carnapping and Kidnapping with Double Murder were filed. Two of the
accused, Manalili and Garcia, were exonerated by the trial for the crime of Kidnapping
for conspiracy was not proven with respect to them.
ISSUE: Whether or not Manalili and Garcia may be convicted again of the crime of
kidnapping
RULING: No. Furthermore, the decision of the trial court exonerating Manalili and
Garcia for the crime of Kidnapping and finding the rest of the accused guilty for the
crime of Slight Illegal Detention only does not escape us. There being conspiracy, all
the accused should be equally guilty for the crimes as charged. Unfortunately, we can
no longer convict Manalili and Garcia for Kidnapping in consonance with the
constitutional right against double jeopardy.
MAIN POINT: Accused who was exonerated from the offense cannot be convicted of
the same crime without violating his right against double jeopardy.

1659. People vs Araneta

FACTS: Narito Araneta, was found guilty by the TC with the crime of Homicide (Case
No. 34642) for the death of Mansueto Datoon, Jr. and of Frustrated Homicide (Case
No. 34643) for the wounding of Hilario Malones. Narito appealed to the Court of
Appeals and modified the decision of the TC holding accused guilty of Murder and
acquitting him of Frustrated Murder. However, accused jumped bail and escapes
custody. Section 8, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court provides the court upon motion of
the appellee or on its own motion, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from
prison or confinement or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the pursuance of the judgment of the CA would violate the rule
on Double Jeopardy.

RULING: No, for the murder as adjudged by the CA, to avoid mockery of justice, we
resolved to continue exercising jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 34642. The
acquittal of accused-appellant in Criminal Case No. 34643, however, can no longer be
reviewed in view of the rule on double jeopardy.

1660. Cuison vs CA

FACTS: RTC found Eduardo Cuison guilty of the crime of double homicide sentencing
him to suffer imprisonment from 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor to reclusion
temporal maximum. The decision was appealed to CA. CA affirmed with modification
as to the grant of civil damages without indicating in the said decision if imprisonment
would be imposed. RTC judged promulgated the CA decision on April 4, 1995 only for
the payment of civil damages and not imprisonment. Petitioner submits that the trial
courts promulgation of the CA Decision on April 4, 1995 cannot be set aside and a
second promulgation be ordered for the imprisonment because to do so would
contravene the prohibition against double jeopardy. He contends that the judgment as
promulgated on April 4, 1995 has become final and that courts have thus lost
jurisdiction over the case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the pursuance of the judgment of the CA would violate the rule
on Double Jeopardy.

RULING: No, The constitutional proscription of double jeopardy is not violated by a CA

order requiring the trial court to promulgate a decision sentencing the accused to
imprisonment even if, earlier, the same decision has been promulgated in regard only
to the payment of the modified civil indemnity arising from the same criminal act.
Otherwise stated, the promulgation of only one part of the decision, i.e., the liability for
civil indemnity, is not a bar to the subsequent promulgation of the other part, the
imposition of the criminal accountability.

1661. People vs CA GR 128986

Termination of Jeopardy; Existence

FACTS: RTC rendered judgment guilty beyond reasonable doubt against Casan
Maquiling of homicide for killing the deceased Frederick Pacasum, and of serious
physical injuries for having physically injured Oligario Villarimo. CA overturned
the decision and acquitted Casan on the basis of self-defense. Petitioner now
seeks to set aside the decision of the CA for having been rendered with grave
abuse of discretion. However, the rule on double jeopardy, however, prohibits the
state from appealing or filing a petition for review of a judgment of acquittal that
was based on the merits of the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the pursuance of the judgment of the CA would violate the rule
on Double Jeopardy.

RULING: No, double jeopardy is present if the following elements concur: (1) the
accused individuals are charged under a complaint or an information sufficient in
form and substance to sustain their conviction; (2) the court has jurisdiction; (3)
the accused have been arraigned and have pleaded; and (4) they are convicted
or acquitted, or the case is dismissed without their express consent. Elements
1,2,3, and 4 are present in this case.

1662. People vs Serrano gr No 135451

Termination of Jeopardy; Existence
FACTS: The RTC Branch 16, Naval, Biliran, rendered decision acquitting the Danilo F.
Serrano, Sr. of rape on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. The decision was promulgated. Assistant Public Prosecutor filed a
notice of appeal to the SC from the decision acquitting the accused for being contrary
to the facts and the law. A resolution issued by the SC required Judge Domael to
explain why he should not be dismissed from office for gross ignorance of the law, for
acting on judgment of the said acquittal in violation of the principle of double jeopardy.
ISSUE: Whether or not the pursuance of the judgment would violate the rule on Double
Jeopardy.
RULING: Yes, Judge Domael was suspended for two (2) months. It is elementary that
the rule against double jeopardy prohibits an appeal from a judgment of acquittal on
the merits. A verdict of acquittal is immediately final and a re-examination of the merits
of such acquittal, even in an appellate court, will put him a second time in jeopardy for
the same offense. Such a constitutional guarantee and the law does not provide for
exceptions other than deprivation of due process or grave abuse of discretion under
exceptional circumstances.

1663. Barangan vs. CA

G.R. No. 123307 Date: November 29, 1999 Ponente:
Bellosillo, J.
Topic: Termination of Jeopardy; Existence; Non-Termination
Legal Doctrine: Constitutional precept that the acquittal of the accused herein must
stand in line with the constitutional mandate of double jeopardy because the first trial
had been duly had on a valid indictment before a court of competent jurisdiction
despite the illegal nature of their organization which engaged in the practice of
“paluwagan.”
FACTS:
 Herein petitioner Atty. Samuel Barangan is the chairman of the San Mateo Small
Town Multi-Purpose Cooperative (SMSTMC), an organization which engages in
the practice of “paluwagan.” At some point in time the organization was dissolved
but was later christened into a new name dubbed the “Biyaya Foundation” which
still engaged in the same practice.
 Their office was raided by NBI agents taking with them incriminatory evidence.
Thereafter, two criminal cases of estafa was then filed against Barangan and his
fellow board members of Biyaya.
 The trial court in both cases acquitted Barangan and his fellow accused on
reasonable doubt but they were ordered to pay the victim Leovino Jose the
amount of P43 000 as civil liability. The CA affirmed this decision.
 Hence, the current petition claiming that Bacaran cannot be held liable because
there is no evidence that Leovino actually invested any amount with Biyaya
Foundation.
ISSUE:
 W/N the acquittal of Barangan and his fellow accused must be upheld in
accordance with the constitutional right against double jeopardy despite having
sufficient evidence that they were engaged in an illegal activity.
RULING:
 YES. The Supreme Court held that It is undisputed that BIYAYA was engaged in
one such activity which was cloaked in the guise of a paluwagan. Jose's
investment of P43,500.00 was not returned because the officers of BIYAYA went
into hiding after the authorities raided its office. For having engaged in an illegal
transaction, the officers and the members of the Board of the Biyaya Foundation
who had actual knowledge of the transactions and thus tacitly approved and
acquiesced thereto, should be made to answer criminally and civilly. It is indeed
difficult to fathom why the accused were acquitted considering that
BIYAYA could not have possibly undertaken the illegal transactions
without the imprimatur of its officers and board members. Yet our hands
are now tied by the constitutional mandate against double jeopardy, hence,
their acquittal must stand.
1664. People vs. Velasco
G.R. No. 127444 Date: September 13, 2000 Ponente:
Bellosillo, J.
Topic: Termination of Jeopardy; Existence; Non-Termination
Legal Doctrine: Constitutional precept that as mandated by our Constitution, statutes
and cognate jurisprudence, an acquittal is final and unappealable on the ground of
double jeopardy, whether it happens at the trial court level or before the Court of
Appeals.
FACTS:
 Three criminal informations for murder were filed against private respondent
Honorato Galvez and Godofredo Diego for the shooting incident that happened in
Bulacan. Galvez was charged additionally with violating PD 1866.
 The trial court pronounced a consolidated decision on the four cases finding
Diego guilty of the crimes of murder and double frustrated murder. However,
Galvez was acquitted due to insufficiency of evidence.
 Hence, the current appeal questioning the acquittal of Galvez.
 In proposing a re-evaluation of Philippine jurisprudence on double jeopardy,
petitioner people insists that Wilson and Scott have unquestionably altered the
seascape of double jeopardy previously navigated by Kepner and Ball. Using as
its flagship the pronouncement in Wilson that appeals of acquittal are
possible provided the accused will not be subjected to a second trial, it
argues that this should apply to the case at bar because, anyway, a review
of the acquittal of private respondent Honorato Galvez will not result in
another trial inasmuch as the Court will only have to examine the evidence
adduced below to pass final judgment on the culpability of the accused.
ISSUE:
 W/N the acquittal of Galvez can be questioned in light of American jurisprudence
in the case of Wilson and Scott without violating the constitutional right against
double jeopardy.
RULING:
 NO. The Supreme Court held that the acquittal in the American case of Wilson
was not based on evidence. The rule therefore fixed in Wilson is that where a
judge holds for the defendant on a ruling of law, and not on the basis of
evidence, after a jury entered a verdict of guilty, the prosecution may
appeal the acquittal without violating double jeopardy, as this is allowed
under the pertinent law. The same observation holds true for Scott. That it was
the defendant who secured the dismissal of the charges against him without any
submission to either judge or jury as to his guilt or innocence, but on a ground
totally outside evidentiary considerations, i.e., pre-indictment delay, definitely
forecloses the applicability, if not relevance, of Scott to the instant case.
  We are therefore insufficiently persuaded to adopt petitioner’s concept of
"another trial" because, as discussed above, it disregards the contextual
interpretation of the term in light of the legal and factual morphology of the double
jeopardy principle obtaining in Wilson and Scott. To sum up, in the cause before
us, the records show that respondent trial judge based his finding of
acquittal, no matter how erroneous it might seem to petitioner, upon the
evidence presented by both parties.
1665. Tupaz v. ULEP

G.R. No. 12777 October 1, 1999

FACTS:

 State Prosecutor filed with the MeTC, an information against accused for
nonpayment of deficiency corporate income tax for the year 1979 in violation of
the Tax Code of 1977. The MeTC dismissed the information for lack of
jurisdiction.
 SP Molon filed with the RTC two (2) informations, against accused for the same
alleged nonpayment of deficiency corporate income tax for the year 1979.
 Accused filed with the RTC a motion to dismiss/quash information for the reason
that it was exactly the same as the information against the accused pending
before RTC however, the motion was denied.
 The trial court (Branch No. 105) arraigned accused Petronila C. Tupaz in
Criminal Case and she pleaded not guilty to the information therein.
 Judge Ulep issued an order directing the prosecution to withdraw the information
pending before RTC after discovering that said information was identical to the
one filed with Branch 105.
 Prosecutor Agcaoili filed with the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 105,
a motion to reinstate information in Criminal Case Q-91-17321, stating that the
motion to withdraw information was made through palpable mistake, and was the
result of excusable neglect.
 The Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 105, granted the motion and
ordered information in Criminal Case No. Q-91-17321 reinstated.
  Accused filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration. On December 4,
1996, the trial court denied the motion.

ISSUE: WON the reinstatement of the information filed against the Petitioner violates
her right against Double Jeopardy.

RULING:

Yes, the reinstatement of the information would expose her to double jeopardy.
An accused is placed in double jeopardy if he is again tried for an offense for
which he has been convicted, acquitted or in another manner in which the
indictment against him was dismissed without his consent. In the instant case,
there was a valid complaint filed against petitioner to which she pleaded not guilty. The
court dismissed the case at the instance of the prosecution, without asking for
accused-petitioner’s consent. This consent cannot be implied or presumed. Such
consent must be expressed as to have no doubt as to the accused’s conformity. As
petitioner’s consent was not expressly given, the dismissal of the case must be
regarded as final and with prejudice to the re-filing of the case. Consequently, the
trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in reinstating the information
against petitioner in violation of her constitutionally protected right against
double jeopardy.

MP in Bold

Omar

1666. People v. Verra

G.R. No. 134732 May 29, 2002 Puno, J.

FACTS:

 On November 14, 1988, respondent Acelo Verra was charged with the crime of
murder for killing Elias Cortezo. A warrant of arrest was issued by the Regional
Trial Court against him on November 21, 1988 and only until May 24, 1996 when
he voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court accompanied by
 his counsel. Immediately, an arraignment proceeded entering a plea of "Not
Guilty."
 On the same day, the prosecution called to the witness stand the wife of the
victim, private complainant Damiana Cortezo who testified that: (1) she has
executed an affidavit of desistance; (2) she is no longer interested in prosecuting
the case; and (3) other witnesses of the shooting incident have turned hostile and
have similarly lost concern in pursuing the same. Thereafter, the prosecution,
joined by the counsel for the accused, moved for the dismissal of the case which
was granted by the court.
 After learning of the dismissal, two other witnesses asserted that Damiana and
the accused misled the trial court and deprived the plaintiff, People of the
Philippines, its day in court and that the Order dismissing the case should be
voided.
 The Court of Appeals ruled that the dismissal of the case against petitioner has
attained finality, and that its revival requires the filing of a new case or
information.

ISSUE: WON the revival of the case is violative of the respondent’s constitutional
right against double jeopardy.

RULING: Yes. Under Article III, Section 21 of the Constitution, "No person shall
be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is
punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall
constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act." In a long line of
decisions, the court enumerated the following requisites for double jeopardy to
attach: (1) upon a valid indictment; (2) before a competent court; (3) after
arraignment; (4) when a valid plea has been entered; and (5) when the defendant
was acquitted or convicted or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without the express consent of the accused. There are however two occasions
when double jeopardy will attach even if the motion to dismiss the case is made by the
accused himself. The first is when the ground is insufficiency of evidence of the
prosecution, and the second is when the proceedings have been unreasonably
prolonged in violation of the right to a speedy trial.

In the case at bar, all the above-cited requisites were present. First, there was a
valid information, sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction, duly signed
by an Assistant Provincial Fiscal. Second, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10 clearly
had jurisdiction to hear and try the murder charge against the respondent. Third, he
was arraigned in open court with the assistance of a counsel de officio. Fourth, during
the arraignment, he entered a plea of not guilty. Finally, there was a valid termination of
this case on the basis of the trial judge's Order to dismiss the case. While it is true that
the respondent joined the prosecution in praying for its dismissal, double jeopardy will
still attach since the basis for the ruling was the insufficiency of evidence of the
prosecution.

MP in Bold Omar

1667. MERCIALES vs. CA

G.R. No. 124171 March 18, 2002 Ynares-Santiago, J.

Sec. 21. Termination of Jeopardy; Existence; Non-Termination

FACTS:

Leticia Merciales, mother of the deceased rape victim, sought the reversal of the
Decision of the CA, which denied her petition to annul the Order of the RTC, which
dismissed the charge of rape with homicide based on a demurrer to evidence filed by
private respondents, accused rapists. The accused argue that reopening the case will
violate their right against double jeopardy.

ISSUE:

Was there a violation of the right of the accused against double jeopardy?

RULING:
 No. Inasmuch as the acquittal of the accused by the court a quo was done
without regard to due process of law, the same is null and void. It is as if there was no
acquittal at all, and the same cannot constitute a claim for double jeopardy. By
contending that the challenged Decision is void for having been issued with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the petition does not
violate the right of the accused against double jeopardy. It is elementary that double
jeopardy attaches only when the following elements concur: (1) the accused are
charged under a complaint or information sufficient in form and substance to sustain
their conviction; (2) the court has jurisdiction; (3) the accused have been arraigned and
have pleaded; and (4) they are convicted or acquitted, or the case is dismissed without
their consent.

Thus, even assuming that a writ of certiorari is granted, the accused would not be
placed in double jeopardy because, from the very beginning, the lower tribunal had
acted without jurisdiction. Precisely, any ruling issued without jurisdiction is, in legal
contemplation, necessarily null and void and does not exist.

1668. POSO vs. JUDGE MIJARES

A.M. No. RTJ-02-1693 August 21, 2002 Per Curiam

Sec. 21. Termination of Jeopardy; Existence; Non-Termination

FACTS:

The instant administrative case stemmed from the proceedings in Crim. Case
No. 2477 for murder, “People v. Virgilio de Guia,” where the victim, a certain Lito M.
Galupo, was a relative of complainant Oscar M. Poso. Poso alleges that Judge Mijares
unjustly and to the prejudice of the People of the Philippines and the private
complainants committed the following acts in the course of the criminal case:
 (a) convicted the accused of homicide, after he had pleaded guilty to this lesser
offense, when the charge was for murder of which he should have been convicted;

(b) acted favorably on 10 January 1996 on an unsigned Motion for

Reconsideration filed by the accused for the reduction of the prison term imposed on
him, i.e., from four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as
minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum, to two (2)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to six (6)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum, without notice to the handling
Public Prosecutor Napoleon C. Lagrimas;

(c) unjustly released the accused on 11 January 1996 on the recognizance of

OIC Clerk of Court, respondent Flor Serio, without notice and hearing;

(d) gave due course to the application of the accused for probation in his Order of
12 January 1996 without hearing and in violation of Sec. 9 of the Probation Law which
provides that the benefits of the law do not extend to those sentenced to serve a
maximum term of imprisonment of more than six (6) years; and,

(e) barred the issuance of certified copies of relevant documents in Crim. Case
No. 2477 requested by complainant for purposes of his appeal, in conspiracy with the
OIC Clerk of Court Flor Serio. Complainant contended that respondent Judge violated
Sec. 3, pars. (e) and (f), RA 3019, punishing the acts of causing any undue injury to
any party including the government or giving any private party any unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference as well as neglecting or refusing, after due request
and without sufficient justification, to act within a reasonable time on any matter
pending for the purpose of discriminating against any interested party.

ISSUE:

Is the decision still valid and may give rise to double jeopardy in a subsequent
prosecution?

RULING:
 No. Marred by what is obviously a miscarriage of judicial ethics, the proceedings
beginning with the issuance of the controversial 10 January 1996 Resolution are
patently void and therefore produce no legal effects whatsoever. From the lowering of
the penalty to qualify the accused for probation, the authorization for temporary liberty
on recognizance, and finally the grant of probation, the orders of respondent Judge
arising from these proceedings do not compel respectability and finality to constitute
res judicata or even double jeopardy. A judgment rendered with grave abuse of
discretion or without due process does not exist in legal contemplation and cannot be
considered to have attained finality for the simple reason that a void judgment has no
legality from its inception.

(1669). People v. Alberto

GR No. 132374

Termination of Jeopardy

FACTS; Subject of this appeal, which we find meritorious, is the judgment 1 dated
August 21, 1997, of the RTC of Pagadian City, convicting Lucio Alberto of the special
complex crime of robbery with homicide. On June 26, 1996, the trial court issued an
order dismissing the case for failure of the prosecution to submit its formal offer of
exhibits. The said order was lifted after the prosecution filed a motion for
reconsideration on July 1, 1996. Thereafter, the prosecution continued to present its
evidence whereby appellant herein is found guilty. Appellant contends that he was
placed in double jeopardy when the trial court reconsidered its order dismissing the
case against him. Hence, This petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not appellant was placed in double jeopardy when the trial court
reconsidered its order dismissing the case;

RULING: No. We agree with the Solicitor General that the dismissal order made by the
trial court was not valid and cannot be used as basis for a claim of double jeopardy.
The said right cannot be grounded on an error of law. the trial court exceeded its
authority when it dismissed the case without giving the prosecution a right to be heard,
hence there was a violation of due process. Further, the failure of the prosecution to
offer its exhibits is not a ground to dismiss the case. Even without any documentary
exhibits, the prosecution could still prove its case through the testimonies of its
witnesses. Thus, we find that when the trial court reconsidered its order of dismissal, it
merely corrected itself.

(1670). Condrada v. People

GR 141646

Article III Section 21, Termination of Jeopardy

FACTS: Petitioner was charged with rape in Criminal Case No. 10770 presently
pending before the RTC of Borongan, Eastern Samar, Branch 2. On March 31, 1999,
the date set by the trial court for the initial hearing, the prosecution moved that the
same be postponed due to the absence of the complainant and her witnesses. The
hearing was reset on April 29, 1999.On April 29, 1999, the prosecution again moved to
postpone the hearing due to the absence of the complainant and her witnesses.
Petitioner objected to the motion on the ground that his right to speedy trial was being
violated by such postponements.During the hearing on May 31,, the prosecution
requested for another postponement. Petitioner moved for at least a temporary
dismissal of the case. The prosecution manifested that it would not object to a
temporary dismissal. Thus, on the same date, the trial court issued an order
temporarily dismissing the case. The trial court set the hearing on the motion for
reinstatement on June 25, 1999. Petitioner opposed the motion contending that the
revival or reinstatement of the case will place him in double jeopardy. Hence, This
petition.

ISSUE: Whether the reinstatement of Criminal Case No. 10770 places the petitioner in
double jeopardy.

RULING: No, it is clear from the records that the dismissal ordered by the trial court on
May 31, 1999 was a temporary dismissal of the case, and not a permanent dismissal
on the ground that the right of the accused to speedy trial had been violated by the
delay in the prosecution of the said case. In contrast, a provisional dismissal of a
criminal case is a dismissal without prejudice to the reinstatement thereof before the
order of dismissal becomes final or to the subsequent filing of a new information for the
offense within the periods allowed under the Revised Penal Code or the Revised Rules
of Court.

1671. People v. Romero

GR144156, March 20, 2003

Art. 3, Sec 21, TERMINATION OF JEOPARDY; EXISTENCE; NON-TERMINATION

FACTS:
 Appellant was charged of murder. With the assistance of his counsel he, pleaded
guilty to the lesser offense of homicide and was granted. Before the trial court rendered
a decision, the prosecution moved for the re-opening of the case claiming the appellant
violated one of the above conditions when he refused to pay the stipulated amount and
paid a lesser one. Appellant then argued that the re-opening of the case was a
violation his right against double jeopardy.

ISSUE:

WON Appellant’s right against double jeopardy was violated

RULING:

No. The order approving the guilty plea to homicide, with conditions, was not a
judgment of conviction. The dispositive portion of the said order which in part reads
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this case is deemed submitted for decision,
clearly shows that the trial court still had to render a decision on the criminal and civil
liabilities of the appellant.

MAIN POINT: The said order merely approved the agreement between the parties
on the new plea to a lesser offense by the appellant and the conditions attached
to it. The trial court neither sentenced the accused nor made any ruling on the
civil indemnity in favor of the heirs of the victim.

1672. People v. Espinosa,

GR 153714, Aug. 15, 2003

TERMINATION OF JEOPARDY; EXISTENCE; NON-TERMINATION

FACTS:

Espinosa was charged with separate cases of estafa and attempted corruption of
a public officer. He filed a motion to travel with a condition that his once he accepts it,
he waives his right against double jeopardy. Nonetheless, he was granted of such and
was arraigned. Subsequently, the OMB moved to withdraw 2 cases against the
Espinosa but filed in the same court seven Informations for Malversation of Public
Funds against Espinosa and several others. Espinosa then argued that double
jeopardy had already attached, because (1) he had been arraigned in the previous
estafa cases; and (2) the Motion to Withdraw the two earlier ones had been granted
without his express consent.

ISSUE:

W/N Appellant’s right against double jeopardy was violated

RULING:

No. For the court not to lose jurisdiction over him, there was a condition that it
would be understood that he has waived his right against double jeopardy. If the
accused accepts these conditions for arraignment, then he is arraigned and allowed to
travel. In this instance, the accused is clearly aware of what is going on; at the time of
his arraignment, there is an explicit waiver against the protection against double
jeopardy as a condition for his travel.

MAIN POINT: A waiver of the constitutional right against double jeopardy must
be clear, categorical, knowing and intelligent

1673. Oriente V. People

513 SCRA 348
FACTS: Accused was charge conspiring with three other men when he killed a certain
Romulo Cario upon hitting him with a lead pipe. On the first decision, RTC charged him
with Homicide. However, RTC set aside the previous ruling because it claimed that
there were errors and was sentenced the accused to a longer term in prison. He
appealed to the CA and it modified the RTC’s decision. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON Appellant’s right against double jeopardy was violated
RULING: No. The Court finds that the change in the penalty by the RTC in the instant
case did not involve the consideration of any new evidence but a mere correction of the
penalty imposed to conform with the Revised Penal Code and the Indeterminate
Sentence Law. It is well settled that when an accused appeal from the sentence of the
trial court, he waives the constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy.
1674. Pacoy V. People
534 SCRA 338
FACTS: An Information for Homicide was filed in the RTC against petitioner Upon
arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge of Homicide. However, on the
same day and after the arraignment, respondent judge directed the trial prosecutor to
correct and amend the Information to Murder in view of the aggravating circumstance
of disregard of rank alleged in the Information which public respondent registered as
having qualified the crime to Murder. Counsel for petitioner objected on the ground that
the latter would be placed in double jeopardy, considering that his Homicide case had
been terminated without his express consent, resulting in the dismissal of the case.
Issue: WON the petitioner was placed in double jeopardy
Ruling: No. There is double jeopardy when the following requisites are present: (1) a
first jeopardy attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy has been validly
terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first.
The requisite of double jeopardy that the first jeopardy must have attached prior to the
second is not present, considering that petitioner was neither convicted nor acquitted;
nor was the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent.

1675. Summerville v. Eugenio

G.R. No. 163741 August 7, 2007 VELASCO, JR., J.

Article III, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution: Termination of Jeopardy; Existence;

Non-Termination

FACTS:

The instant petition originated from a complaint for unfair competition filed by
petitioner against private respondents Khos. DOJ issued a Resolution dismissing both
the complaint filed by petitioner and the counterclaim filed by private respondents.
Feeling aggrieved, petitioner immediately filed a motion for reconsideration of the
DOJ’s ruling. Then, the prosecution filed with the trial court a Motion to Withdraw
Information on the basis of the Resolution issued by DOJ. RTC issued the first assailed
Order, granting it. The trial court issued its last assailed Order holding that the revival
of the case is now barred by the impregnable wall of double jeopardy.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the re-filing or the reinstatement of the Information would

constitute double jeopardy.

RULING:

NO. Where the trial court’s order granting the withdrawal of the Information
was committed with grave abuse of discretion, then the accused was not
acquitted nor was there a valid and legal dismissal or termination of the case—
double jeopardy did not set in.

For double jeopardy to set in, the following requisites must concur: (1) there is a
valid complaint or information; (2) the complaint should be filed before a court of
competent jurisdiction; (3) the accused has pleaded to the charge; and (4) the accused
has been convicted, acquitted, or the case has been dismissed or terminated without
the express consent of the accused. Since SC held that the assailed Order granting
the withdrawal of the Information was committed with grave abuse of discretion, then
the accused was not acquitted nor was there a valid and legal dismissal or termination
of the case. Ergo, the fourth requisite on the conviction and acquittal of the accused in
the dismissal of the case, without the approval of the accused, was not met. Thus,
double jeopardy has not set in.

1676. Herrera v. Sandiganbayan

G.R. Nos. 119660-61 February 13, 2009 AZCUNA, J.

Article III, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution: Termination of Jeopardy; Existence;

Non-Termination

FACTS:
 Petitioners, who are police officers, were charged with three counts of murder in
the Sandiganbayan for killing Shi Shu Yang and George Go. It was alleged therein that
they conspired to kill the victims. Petitioners insist that Sandiganbayan erred in
convicting them for the crime of murder under the amended informations as they had
earlier been arraigned under the original informations for murder and their
rearraignment under the amended informations placed them in double jeopardy.

ISSUE:

Whether or not double jeopardy is applicable in this case.

RULING:

No. Section 4, Rule 117 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure states that if the
motion to quash is based on an alleged defect of the complaint or Information
which can be cured by amendment, the court shall order that an amendment be
made, and if it is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense, the prosecution shall be given by the court an opportunity to correct the
defect by amendment. In the case at bar, it was well-within the power of public
respondent Sandiganbayan to order the amendment of the two original Informations.
The motion shall be granted if the prosecution fails to make the amendment, or the
complaint or Information still suffers from the same defect despite the amendment.

1677. Javier v. Sandiganbayan – 599 SCRA 324

Termination of Jeopardy; Existence; Non-Termination
Facts:
Petitioner Javier was charged (separately) with violating R.A. 3019 (wherein she
pleaded not guilty) and malversation of public funds before the Sandiganbayan. Both
cases were ordered to be consolidated. Petitioner filed a motion to quash the
information by invoking her right against double jeopardy which was later on denied.
Issue:
Whether petitioner’s right against double jeopardy was violated when she was being
charged under two informations for a single act
Ruling:
No. It is elementary that for double jeopardy to attach, the case against the accused
must have been dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a
court of competent jurisdiction, upon valid information sufficient in form and substance
and the accused pleaded to the charge.
In the instant case, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the Information for violation of the
Anti-Graft Law. She was not yet arraigned in the criminal case for malversation of
public funds because she had filed a motion to quash the latter information. Double
jeopardy could not, therefore, attach considering that the two cases remain pending
before the Sandiganbayan and that herein petitioner had pleaded to only one in the
criminal cases against her.
Main Point: Double jeopardy could not attach considering that the two cases remain
pending before the Sandiganbayan and that the petitioner had pleaded to only one in
the criminal cases against her.

1678. Co v. Lim – 604 SCRA 702

Termination of Jeopardy; Existence; Non-Termination

FACTS:
Respondent Lim and his co-accused were charged by petitioner Co for violation of
Anti-Fencing Law when former cell cards that were stolen from her were being sold at
A-K Video Store which was owned by Go and Lim. Lim, who was found administering
the store at the time of the raid, was arrested. Respondents moved for the
consolidation of on the ground that these cases arose from the same series of
incidents, which was granted. Secretary of DOJ, Gutierrez, issued resolution directing
City Prosecutor of Manila to withdraw forthwith the informations for violation of PD No.
1612. On 11 February 2004, the date set by the RTC for the arraignment of the
respondents and for pre-trial, the respondents were arraigned, the defense counsel
orally moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground that the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Manila, had already filed a Motion to Withdraw Informations which was
granted. Petitioners file for MR which was denied by the RTC and now, appealed by
way of certiorari before CA.
ISSUE:
Whether his right against double jeopardy was violated by the present appeal by
certiorari considering that they expressly moved for the dismissal of the criminal cases
against them.
RULING:
No. The following requisites must be complied with for double jeopardy to set in: (1)
there is a valid complaint of information; (2) the complaint should be filed before a court
of competent jurisdiction; (3) the accused has pleaded to the charge; and (4) the
accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case has been dismissed or
terminated without the express consent of the accused. The Order dated 11 February
2004 of the RTC categorically stated that the defense counsel moved for the dismissal
of the cases against the respondents. Verily, respondents, through counsel, had given
their express consent to the termination of the case on 11 February 2004. Therefore,
the fourth requisite, which necessitates the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the
dismissal of the case without his or her approval, was not met. Undoubtedly, the rule
on double jeopardy is inapplicable to this case.

1679. Lejano v. People

639 SCRA 760
Termination of Jeopardy; Existence; Non-Termination

FACTS:
Court reversed the judgment of the CA and acquitted the accused-appellant Lejano,
among others of the charges of murder against them on the ground of lack of proof of
their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Complainant Vizconde, an immediate relative of
the victims, asked the Court to reconsider its decision, claiming that it “denied the
prosecution due process of law; seriously misappreciated the facts; unreasonably
regarded Alfaro as lacking credibility; issued a tainted and erroneous decision; decided
the case in a manner that resulted in the miscarriage of justice; or committed grave
abuse in its treatment of the evidence and prosecution witnesses.”
ISSUE:
Whether a reconsideration is proper.
RULING:
No. To reconsider a judgment of acquittal places the accused twice in jeopardy of
being punished for the crime of which he has already been absolved. There is reason
for this provision of the Constitution. In criminal cases, the full power of the State is
ranged against the accused. If there is no limit to attempts to prosecute the accused for
the same offense after he has been acquitted, the infinite power and capacity of the
State for a sustained and repeated litigation would eventually overwhelm the accused
in terms of resources, stamina, and the will to fight.
Ultimately, what the complainant actually questions is the Court’s appreciation of the
evidence and assessment of the prosecution witnesses’ credibility. He ascribes grave
error on the Court’s finding that Alfaro was not a credible witness and assails the value
assigned by the Court to the evidence of the defense. In other words, private
complainant wants the Court to review the evidence anew and render another
judgment based on such a re-evaluation. This is not constitutionally allowed as it is
merely a repeated attempt to secure accused, et al.’s conviction. The judgment
acquitting accused, et al. is final and can no longer be disturbed.
MAINPOINT: To reconsider a judgment of acquittal places the accused twice in
jeopardy of being punished for the crime of which he has already been absolved.

.
1680. Bangayon v. Bangayon,
GR 172777
Termination of Jeopardy; Existence; Non-Termination

FACTS:
Appellant Sally Bangayon, the wife, filed a complaint for the crime of bigamy against
her husband, respondent Benjamin Bangayon and Resally Delfin. The husband filed
his Demurrer to Evidence, praying that the criminal case for bigamy against him be
dismissed for failure of the prosecution to present sufficient evidence of his guilt.11 His
plea was anchored on two main arguments: (1) he was not legally married to Sally Go
because of the existence of his prior marriage to Azucena; and (2) the prosecution was
unable to show that he and the “Benjamin Z. Sojayco Jr.,” who married Resally, were
one and the same person. RTC dismissed the criminal case against Benjamin, Jr. and
Resally for insufficiency of evidence. Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the case to the CA
via a petition for certiorari which was granted.
ISSUE:
Whether CA’s decision was proper.
RULING:
No. A demurrer to evidence is filed after the prosecution has rested its case and the
trial court is required to evaluate whether the evidence presented by the prosecution is
sufficient enough to warrant the conviction of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. If
the court finds that the evidence is not sufficient and grants the demurrer to evidence,
such dismissal of the case is one on the merits, which is equivalent to the acquittal of
the accused. Well-established is the rule that the Court cannot review an order granting
the demurrer to evidence and acquitting the accused on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence because to do so will place the accused in double jeopardy.
MAINPOINT: An acquittal by virtue of a demurer to evidence is not appealable
because it will place the accused in double jeopardy.

IV. Rule on “Supervening Facts”

1681. Goodland v. Co, GR 196685, December 18, 2011
Facts: The 16 October 2008 Order[5] of the MeTC granted the Demurrer to
Evidence filed by Abraham Co (Co) and Christine Chan (Chan) (collectively,
respondents). The MeTC dismissed Criminal Case No. 332313 for failure of the
prosecution to present sufficient and competent evidence to rebut the
presumption of innocence in favor of respondents. The 13 January 2009 Order6
of the MeTC denied for utter lack of merit the Motion for Inhibition and Motion
for Reconsideration of the 16 October 2008 Order. After the prosecution
formally offered its evidence and rested its case, herein private respondents
filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File Demurrer to Evidence with attached
Demurrer to Evidence claiming that the prosecution failed to substantiate its
claim that they are guilty of the crime charged. Private respondents alleged that
the prosecution failed to establish the second and third elements of the crime
as the prosecution was unable to provide any proof that private respondents
caused it to appear in a document that Mr. Gilbert Guy participated in an act
and that the prosecution failed to establish that Mr. Gilbert Guy did not
participate in said act.

Issue: Whether Respondent Judge order dismissing Criminal Case No. 332313
for alleged insufficiency of evidence was made in violation of the prosecution'
right to due process, hence null and void. 

Ruling: Generally, any further prosecution of the accused after an acquittal

would violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy. (People v.
Laguio, Jr., G.R. No. 128587, 16 March 2007, 518 SCRA 393, 403.)
         
          It is settled that a judgment of acquittal cannot be recalled or
withdrawn by another order reconsidering the dismissal of the case,
(Catilo v. Abaya, 94 Phil. 1014 (1954) nor can it be modified except to eliminate
something which is civil or administrative in nature (People v. Yelo, 83 Phil. 618
(1949); People v. Bautista,, 96 Phil. 43 (1954).  x x x One exception to the rule
is when the prosecution is denied due process of law (Galman v.
Sandiganbayan, 228 Phil. 42 (1986). Another exception is when the trial court
commits grave abuse of discretion in dismissing a criminal case by granting the
accused’s demurrer to evidence (People v. Uy, 508 Phil. 637 (2005). If there is
 grave abuse of discretion, granting Goodland’s prayer is not tantamount to
putting Co and Chan in double jeopardy.
           
            We have explained “grave abuse of discretion” to mean thus:
          
           An act of a court or tribunal may only be considered as committed in
grave abuse of discretion when the same was performed in a capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The
abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at
all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion and personal hostility. (Litton Mills, Inc.
v. Galleon Trader, Inc., 246 Phil. 503, 509 (1988) cited in GOODLAND
COMPANY, INC. VS. ABRAHAM CO & CHRISTINE CHAN, G. R. NO. 196685,
DECEMBER 14, 2011, CARPIO, J.).

1682. Melo v. People - 85 PHIL. 766

Facts: Petitioner was charged in the CFI with frustrated homicide, for having
allegedly inflicted upon victim with a kitchen knife and with intent to kill, several
serious wounds on different parts of the body, requiring medical attendance for
a period of more than 30 days, and incapacitating him from performing his
habitual labor for the same period of time. On December 29, 1949, at eight
o’clock in the morning, the accused pleaded not guilty to the offense charged,
and at 10:15 in the evening of the same day Benjamin Obillo died from his
wounds. Evidence of death was available to the prosecution only on January 3,
1950, and on the following day, January 4, 1950, an amended information was
filed charging the accused with consummated homicide. The accused filed a
motion to quash the amended information alleging double jeopardy, motion that
was denied by the respondent court; hence, the instant petition for prohibition to
enjoin the respondent court from further entertaining the amended information.

Issue: Whether the amendment of the information charged against the accused
constitute Double Jeopardy.

Held: No, It must be noticed that the protection of the Constitution inhibition is
against a second jeopardy for the same offense, the only exception being, as
stated in the same Constitution, that “if an act is punished by a law and an
ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another
prosecution for the same act.” The phrase same offense, under the general
rule, has always been construed to mean not only the second offense charged
is exactly the same as the one alleged in the first information, but also that the
 two offenses are identical. There is identity between the two offenses when the
evidence to support a conviction for one offense would be sufficient to warrant a
conviction for the other. This so called “same-evidence test” which was found to
be vague and deficient, was restated by the Rules of Court in a clearer and
more accurate form. Under said Rules there is identity between two offenses
not only when the second offense is exactly the same as the first, but also when
the second offense is an attempt to commit the first or a frustration thereof, or
when it necessary includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in
the first information. In this connection, an offense may be said to necessarily
include another when some of the essential ingredients of the former as alleged
in the information constitute the latter. And vice-versa, an offense may be said
to be necessarily included in another when all the ingredients of the former
constitute a part of the elements constituting the latter. In other words, on who
has been charged with an offense cannot be again charged with the same or
identical offense though the latter be lesser or greater than the former. “As the
Government cannot be with the highest, and then go down step to step,
bringing the man into jeopardy for every dereliction included therein, neither can
it begin with the lowest and ascend to the highest with precisely the same
result.”

1683. People v. Buling

107 PHIL. 712, G.R. No. L-13315 April 27, 1960 Labrador, J.;
Article III. Section 21. Rule on “Supervening Facts”

FACTS:
Buenaventura Buling was charged with the crime of less serious physical injuries for
inflicting wounds on a person which, according to the complaint, would require medical
attendance for a period from 10 to 15 days. Having pleaded guilty, he served his
sentence fully. Later, the Provincial Fiscal filed an information against Buling charging
him with serious physical injuries, the information alleging that the same wounds
inflicted by the accused would require medical attendance for a period from 1 1/2
months to 2 1/2 months. It appears that a different physician examined the offended
party anew, taking an X-ray picture of the arm of the offended party which had been
wounded, which method of examination was not adopted by the first physician. The
second physician’s certification was the basis of the second complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether the prosecution and conviction of the accused for less serious physical
injuries a bar to the second prosecution for serious physical injuries.

RULING:
Yes. It is a bar. If the X-ray examination disclosed the existence of a fracture
when the second examination was made, that fracture must have existed when the first
examination was made. There was, therefore, no new or supervening fact that could be
said to have developed or arisen since the filing of the original action, which would
justify application of the rule of double jeopardy.

V. Same Offenses
1684. People v. Tiozon
198 SCRA 368, G.R. No. 89823 June 19, 1991 Davide, Jr., J.;
Article III. Section 21. Same Offenses

FACTS:
Eutropio Tiozon was charged for violation of PD 1866 for possession of an
unlicensed firearm, “which firearm was used with treachery and evident premeditation
in shooting one Leonardo Bolima, which caused his death.”
He was found guilty for the crime of PD 1866 and murder based on the same
information charged.

ISSUE:
Whether separate prosecutions may arise from the same offense.

RULING:
Yes. It is a cardinal rule that the protection against double jeopardy may be
invoked only for the same offense or identical offenses. A simple act may offend
against two (or more) entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law, and if one
provision requires proof of an additional fact or element which the other does not, an
acquittal or conviction or a dismissal of the information under one does not bar
prosecution under the other. Phrased elsewise, where two different laws (or articles
of the same code) defines two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is no
obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although both offenses arise from the
same facts, if each crime involves some important act which is not an essential
element of the other.
In this case, since the Informations were for separate offense –– the first against
a person and the second against public peace and order — one cannot be pleaded as
a bar to the other under the rule on double jeopardy.
1685. Lamera v. CA - 198 SCRA 186
Fact: At around 8:30 o'clock in the evening of 14 March 1985, along Urbano Street,
Pasig, Metro Manila, an owner-type jeep, then driven by petitioner, allegedly "hit and
bumped" a tricycle then driven by Ernesto Reyes resulting in damage to the tricycle
and injuries to Ernesto Reyes and Paulino Gonzal. As a consequence thereof, two
informations were filed against petitioner: (a) an Information for reckless imprudence
resulting in damage to property with multiple physical injuries under Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code which was filed on 10 September 1985 with the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig, Metro Manila and docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 64294 and
assigned to Branch 68 thereof; and (b) an Information for violation of paragraph 2 of
Article 275 of the Revised Penal Code on Abandonment of one's victim which was filed
on 14 November 1985 with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig (Branch 71) and was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 2793.
On 29 June 1987 the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig rendered its decision in Criminal
Case No. 2793 finding the petitioner guilty of the crime of Abandonment of one's victim
as defined and penalized under paragraph 2 of Article 275 of the Revised Penal Code
and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment for a period of six (6) months of arresto
mayor and to pay the costs.

Issue: Whether double jeopardy is applicable

Ruling: No. It is a cardinal rule that the protection against double jeopardy may
be invoked only for the same offense or identical offenses. A simple act may
offend against two (or more) entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law,
and if one provision requires proof of an additional fact or element which the
other does not, an acquittal or conviction or a dismissal of the information under
one does not bar prosecution under the other. Phrased elsewhere, where two
different laws (or articles of the same code) defines two crimes, prior jeopardy as
to one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although both
offenses arise from the same facts, if each crime involves some important act
which is not an essential element of the other.
Since the informations were for separate offenses — the first against a person and the
second against public peace and order — one cannot be pleaded as a bar to the other
under the rule on double jeopardy. The two informations filed against petitioner are
clearly for separate offenses.1âwphi1 The first, Criminal Case No. 64294, for reckless
imprudence (Article 365), falls under the sole chapter (Criminal Negligence) of Title
Fourteen (Quasi Offenses) of Book Two of the Revised Penal Code. The second,
Criminal Case No. 2793, for Abandonment of one's victim (par. 2, Art. 275), falls under
Chapter Two (Crimes Against Security) of Title Nine (Crimes Against Personal Liberty
and Security) of Book Two of the same Code.
We cannot sustain the contention of the petitioner that par. 2 of Art. 275 of the Revised
Penal Code does not apply to him since the evidence allegedly shows that it was
Ernesto Reyes, the tricycle driver, who negligently caused the accident. Petitioner
misses the import of the provision. The provision punishes the failure to help or render
assistance to another whom the offender accidentally wounded or injured. Accidental
means that which happens by chance or fortuitously, without intention and design and
which is unexpected, unusual and unforeseen. Consequently, it is enough to show that
petitioner accidentally injured the passengers of the tricycle and failed to help or render
them assistance. There is no need to prove that petitioner was negligent and that it
was his negligence that caused the injury. If the factor of criminal negligence is
involved, Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code will come into play. The last paragraph
of Art. 365 provides that "the penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this
article shall be imposed upon the offender who fails to lend on the spot to the injured
party such help as may be in his bands to give." Petitioner was charged under par. 2 of
Art. 275 not under Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code
1686. Gonzales v. CA - 232 SCRA 667

Fact: A criminal complaint for qualified seduction (of private complainant Imelda
Caratao), following a preliminary investigation, was filed (docketed Criminal Case No.
2560) with the Municipal Trial Court of Obando, Bulacan, against herein petitioner
Apolinario Gonzales. The latter, upon arraignment, pleaded "not guilty" to the charge.
The presentation of evidence by the prosecution started in May 1983 and was
concluded in November 1988. Thereafter, the defense took its turn. When the defense
was about to rest its case, the prosecution filed a motion to instead commit the
accused to answer to a charge for rape since the evidence submitted indicated that
rape, not qualified seduction, was evidently committed. Following the dismissal of
Criminal Case No. 2560, the prosecution filed six (6) separate informations for rape,
alleged to have been committed on 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20 November 1982, before
different branches of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan.

Issue: Whether Double Jeopardy is applicable

Ruling: No. The accused cannot invoke double jeopardy; for that kind of jeopardy to
arise, the following requisites must be extant: (1) The previous complaint or information
or other formal charge is sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2)
The court has jurisdiction to try the case; (3) The accused has been arraigned and has
pleaded to the charge; and (4) The accused is convicted or acquitted or the case is
dismissed without his express consent.
When all the above elements concur, a second prosecution for (a) the same offense, or
(b) an attempt to commit the said offense, or (c) a frustration of the said offense, or (d)
any offense which necessarily includes, or is necessarily included in, the first offense
charged, can be rightly barred.
Here, there is no question that the Municipal Trial Court did not have the requisite
jurisdiction to try the offense of rape, a crime that lies instead within the province of the
Regional Trial Court to take cognizance of. Moreover, the dismissal of Criminal Case
No. 2560 for qualified seduction by the Municipal Trial Court not only was provisional
but likewise with the express consent of the accused (herein petitioner).
Then, too, rape and qualified seduction are not identical offenses. The elements of
rape — (1) that the offender has had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) that such
act is accomplished (a) by using force or intimidation, or (b) when the woman is
deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or (c) when the woman is under twelve
(12) years of age — substantially differ from the elements of qualified seduction. The
letter requires (1) that the offended party is a virgin, which is presumed if she is
unmarried and of good reputation; (2) that she must be over twelve (12) and under
eighteen (18) years of age; (3) that the offender has sexual intercourse with her; and
(4) that there is abuse of authority, confidence or relationship on the part of the
offender. While the two felonies have one common element, i.e., carnal knowledge of a
woman, they significantly vary in all other respects.

1687. PEOPLE vs. TURDA

G.R. Nos. 97044-46 July 6, 1994 Bellosillo, J.
FACTS:
 GENER TURDA alias "Boy" together with his wife Milagros Turda and Carmen
Manera, was charged with illegal recruitment and two (2) counts of estafa.
 However, Milagros Turda and Carmen Manera were never apprehended so that
only Gener Turda could be arraigned and tried.
 As the three (3) cases involve the same facts, they were jointly tried.
 Appellant was found guilty of illegal recruitment as well as estafa.
ISSUE:
Whether double jeopardy is present in this case?
RULING:
No. The Court ruled that the test for determining whether or not a prosecution for
one crime constitutes an obstacle to a subsequent action for another distinct crime
upon the same facts, is to inquire whether the facts alleged in the second information, if
proven, would have been sufficient to support the former information, of which the
accused may have been acquitted or convicted. The gist of the question is whether or
not the same evidence supports the two actions.
A single act may be an offense against two statutes, and, if each statute requires
proof of an additional act which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction under
either statute does not exempt the defendant from prosecution and punishment under
the other. And there is no doubt that it is within the power of the legislature to create
two or more offenses which may be committed by a single act, each of which is
punishable by itself. A conviction or acquittal in such case under either statute would
be no bar to a conviction under the other, for the accused would not be twice in
jeopardy for one offense, but only once in jeopardy for each offense.

MP: When an accused is charged under two different statute, a conviction or

acquittal under either statute would be no bar to a conviction under the other, for
the accused would not be twice in jeopardy for one offense, but only once in
jeopardy for each offense.
1688. PEOPLE vs. MANUNGAS
G.R. No. 91552-55 March 10, 1994 Nocon, J.
Legal Doctrine
FACTS:
 (Similar offenses with People v. Turda – Estafa and illegal recruitment)
 Accused-appellant Fernando Manungas, Jr. alias "Percy" was convicted for the
crime of illegal recruitment and estafa.
 3 complainants allege that Manungas collected from them a sum of money as
placement fee for their deployment as janitors in Saudi Arabia. However, despite
paying the placement fee, they were not deployed.
 After verifying with POEA, they found out that Manungas was not licensed to
recruit workers for abroad.
ISSUE:
Whether a conviction for two crimes with the same facts constitute double
jeopardy?
RULING:
No. The Court ruled that the accused can be charged and convicted separately
of illegal recruitment and estafa because illegal recruitment is a malum prohibitum
where the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for a conviction while estafa
is a malum in se where criminal intent of the accused is necessary for a conviction.

People v. Turda MP: When an accused is charged under two different statute, a
conviction or acquittal under either statute would be no bar to a conviction
under the other, for the accused would not be twice in jeopardy for one offense,
but only once in jeopardy for each offense.
1689 People v. Deunida 1689 People v. Deunida 
 231 SCRA 520
Art 3. Sec 21. Same offenses

FACTS: Deunida went to buy some things in preparation for the New Year. She saw
Felipe Ramos and he addressed Deunida who was inside the store. When Ramos saw
the gun aimed at him, he turned around and was about to run away when the gun fired
hitting Ramos at the back and causing his death. The defendant shot the victim with an
unlicensed firearm by reason of said ‘self defense’, he was charged with murder and
illegal possession of firearms in two separate information six months after his arrest of
the fatal shooting of Felipe Ramos. 

ISSUE:  WON the crime of murder or homicide is not absorb in the crime of illegal
Possession of Firearms

RULING: Yes. Murder is not absorbed in illegal possession of firearms, the former is
defined and penalized under the RPC while the latter is punished by a special law.
The killing of a person with the use of an unlicensed firearm may give rise to two
separate prosecutions: one for the violation of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 and another
for murder or homicide under Article 248 or Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. 
Therefore, it does not bar the simultaneous or subsequent prosecution of the latter
crime.

MP: the constitutional right against double jeopardy protects one against a second or
later prosecution for the same offense and that when the subsequent information
charges another and different offense, although arising from the same act or set of
acts, there is no double jeopardy. 

231 SCRA 520

Art 3. Sec 21. Same offenses

FACTS: Deunida went to buy some things in preparation for the New Year. She saw
Felipe Ramos and he addressed Deunida who was inside the store. When Ramos saw
the gun aimed at him, he turned around and was about to run away when the gun fired
hitting Ramos at the back and causing his death. The defendant shot the victim with an
unlicensed firearm by reason of said ‘self defense’, he was charged with murder and
illegal possession of firearms in two separate information six months after his arrest of
the fatal shooting of Felipe Ramos.
ISSUE: WON the crime of murder or homicide is not absorb in the crime of illegal
Possession of Firearms

RULING: Yes. Murder is not absorbed in illegal possession of firearms, the former is
defined and penalized under the RPC while the latter is punished by a special law.
The killing of a person with the use of an unlicensed firearm may give rise to two
separate prosecutions: one for the violation of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 and another
for murder or homicide under Article 248 or Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. 
Therefore, it does not bar the simultaneous or subsequent prosecution of the latter
crime.

MP: the constitutional right against double jeopardy protects one against a second or
later prosecution for the same offense and that when the subsequent information
charges another and different offense, although arising from the same act or set of
acts, there is no double jeopardy. 

1690 People v. Fernandez

239 SCRA 174
Art 3. Sec 21. Same offenses

FACTS:
During the fiesta of Brng Tanabag, Puerto Princesa, Marianito Merced died of
internal hemorrhage caused by multiple gunshot wounds inflicted by accused-appellant
Alfredo Fernandez. Accused-appellant Fernandez was found guilty of the crimes of
Homicide and for violation of Presidential Decree (P.D.) 1866 (Illegal Possession of
Firearm). He invoke the rule of double jeopardy and procedural due process. He urges
that the right against double jeopardy proscribes simultaneous prosecution for several
offenses made out of the same act.

ISSUE:
WON his right against double jeopardy was violated

RULING:
No. The two (2) Informations against accused-appellant charged him with two (2)
distinct offenses, i.e., murder and illegal possession of firearm. The first crime is
punished by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code while the second crime is punished
by a special law, P.D. 1866. The charge for Illegal Possession of Firearm is not
necessarily included in the charge of Murder. Accused-appellant cannot
therefore complain that he has been charged with two (2) offenses on the basis
of the same act.

MP:
Murder and Illegal possession of firearm does not fall under the same act, there
is no double jeopardy, both separate crime was committed.
1691. 11691.People v. Quijada – 259 SCRA 191
Art III Sec 21- Same offenses

FACTS: Quijada and Diosdado was in a fist fight because the defendant was
constantly annoying and pestering the victim’s sister. Later, A benefit dance/disco was
held in the basketball court in bohol which was attended by the parties. After dancing,
the appellant fired his revolver at the victim which caused his instant death. Quijada
was charged with two separate information; murder under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code and illegal possession of firearm in its aggravated form under P.D. No.
1866. The appellant contended that the crime arose in only one offense, thus what he
was charged with was in in violation of his right against double jeopardy

ISSUE: WON there was a violation of his right against double jeopardy

RULING: no. The one who kills another with the use of an unlicensed firearm commits
two separate offenses of (1) either homicide or murder under the Revised Penal Code,
and (2) aggravated illegal possession of firearm under the second paragraph of
Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, we sustain the decision of the trial court finding the
appellant guilty of two separate offenses of murder in Criminal Case No. 8178 and of
aggravated illegal possession of firearm in Criminal Case No. 8179. one who kills
another with the use of an unlicensed firearm is guilty of two separate offenses
of (1) either homicide or murder under the Revised Penal Code and (2)
aggravated illegal possession of firearm under P.D. No. 1866, 1, par. 2.
MP: the constitutional right against double jeopardy protects one against a second or
later prosecution for the same offense, and that when the subsequent information
charges another and different offense, although arising from the same act or set of
acts, there is no prohibited double jeopardy

1692. 11692.People v Ballabare

Art III Sec 21- Same offenses
FACTS: Asenita testified that she heared and saw Edito Ballabare boxing Miason, a
farmhand of her father. Gerry Ballabare, the accused in this case, fired at Miason’s
companions, Leonardo, hitting him on the upper chest. The trial court found Asenita’s
testimony credible thus charged appellant guilty of illegal possession and two counts of
murder. Accused-appellant contends that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in
finding him guilty of murder and illegal possession of firearm. He points out that both
offenses arose out of a single incident and that as a result of the decision finding him
guilty of separate crimes, he was placed in double jeopardy

ISSUE: WON the trial court acted with GAD in proceeding against the crime of murder
and illegal possession of firearm in violation of his right against double jeopardy

RULING: No. Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition does not absorb
the crime of homicide or murder under the Revised Penal Code and therefore does
not bar the simultaneous or subsequent prosecution for the latter crime. When a
person who commits homicide or murder through the use of an illegally possessed
firearm, is liable solely for the aggravated form of illegal possession of a firearm as
defined in P.D. No. 1866, 1, par. 2.
MP BOLD

1693. People v Callonzo

FACTS: Reydante Calonzo was charged with illegal recruitment in Large Scale and
five counts of Estafa by Miranda, and 5 others. The RTC Pasig found the accused
guilty as charged. Accused Appellant in this appeal assails his conviction and claimed
that the trial court erred in disregarding the testimony of Nenita Mercado, an employee
of POEA who categorically stated that their records indicated that Calonzo never
processed complainants’ applications for employment abroad. He concludes from the
fact that he cannot be deemed to have engaged in the recruitment of workers for
employment abroad and as regards to the estafa cases, he contended that the court
erred in giving credence to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses considering that
the amounts claimed to have been collected did not correspond to the amounts
presented by the complaining witnesses. 

ISSUE: WON the court erred in separately charging accused with illegal recruitment
and estafa violative of his right against double jeopardy

RULING: No. Accused-appellant can be charged and convicted separately of illegal

recruitment and estafa.  The filing of two (2) separate Informations for illegal
recruitment under the Labor Code and for estafa by means of deceit for the same act is
not violative of the principle against double jeopardy. A person convicted of illegal
recruitment under the Labor Code may, for the same act, be separately convicted of
estafa by means of deceit. 
1694. People v. Benemerito

Facts: in this case, it is an appeal by accused-appellant Alexander Alex Benemerito

from a Joint Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. convicting him of
illegal recruitment and three counts of estafa. In the case at bar, the accused appellant
contended that imposition of criminal liability is improper.

Issue: Whether or not the imposition of criminal liability on the appellant, insofar as he
is convicted of illegal recruitment and estafa, is proper.

Ruling:  Yes. The decision of the lower court is affirmed. It is settled in our jurisdiction
that a person who commits illegal recruitment may be charged and convicted
separately of illegal recruitment and estafa under paragraph 2(a), Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code, as the former is malum prohibitum where the criminal intent of
the accused is not necessary for conviction, while estafa is malum in se where the
criminal intent of the accused is necessary for conviction. In short, a conviction for
offenses under the Labor Code does not bar punishment for offenses punishable by
other laws.

1695. People v. Tobias- 266 SCRA 229

FACTS: This is a Petition for Certiorari of the Order issued by the RTC which directed
the release from detention of herein private respondent. The trial court opined that
private respondent had already completed the service of his sentence in the previous
case for illegal possession of a low-powered firearm. After evaluating the evidence and
the testimony of the prosecution witnesses in the pending murder case, it ruled that he
could post bail therein. Thus, it ordered his release from custody after he had posted
the required bail bond. Petitioners aver that the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it granted bail to the
accused. On the other hand, private respondent counters that he cannot be tried anew
for a crime for which he has already been convicted.
ISSUE: Whether or not in this case, the accused may still be prosecuted for a crime for
which he has already been convicted.
RULING: Yes. The crime for which private respondent was convicted by the RTC was
committed when the applicable law at the time was PD 1866, which prescribed the
death penalty if homicide or murder was committed with the use of an unlicensed
firearm. The death penalty was, however, suspended by the 1987 Constitution. Thus,
the penalty next lower in degree reclusión perpetua was imposed by the Court. When
RA 8294 took effect nearly six months after the affirmation of private respondent’s
conviction under PD 1866, the use of an unlicensed firearm was considered merely an
aggravating circumstance. Hence, the use of an unlicensed firearm in killing a person
"may no longer be the source of a separate conviction for the crime of illegal
possession of a deadly weapon." Only one felony may be charged, murder in this
instance. True, private respondent has been convicted of illegal possession of firearm.
But his sentence has been effectively cancelled when the trial court reduced the
penalty therefor. Hence, he was effectively given the benefit of the new law which
decriminalized his offense.
However, private respondent may still be prosecuted for murder -- a crime that has not
been decriminalized and is completely different from that for which he was convicted
earlier. Evidently, the requisites of double jeopardy, which are (1) a first jeopardy
must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have
terminated; (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the
first, are not present here.

1696. People v. Mañozca 269 SCRA 513

FACTS: Accused-appellant Nestor Manozca y Almario was charged in the RTC with
the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale in violation of the Labor Code, as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 2018; and with two (2) counts of estafa punished
under Article 315, paragraph (2)(a), of the Revised Penal Code. The Court eventually
rendered its decision finding the appellant guilty of the charges beyond reasonable
doubt, Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the judgment of the lower court must be affirmed.
RULING: Yes. The appealed judgment of the lower court is AFFIRMED in toto. The
essential elements of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale were met in this
case. The Court likewise affirms the conviction of appellant for estafa as all the
elements of estafa are present.
MP: It is settled in our jurisdiction that a person who commits illegal recruitment may be
charged and convicted separately of illegal recruitment and estafa as the former is
malum prohibitum where the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for
conviction, while estafa is malum in se where the criminal intent of the accused is
necessary for conviction. In short, a conviction for offenses under the Labor Code does
not bar punishment for offenses punishable by other laws.
Nota: Main Point was just extracted from People v. Benemerito (Case No. 1638).
Nothing with regard to the issue on double jeopardy was expressly mentioned in this
case. Infer from ruling.
1697. People vs. Tan Tiong Meng
G.R. No. 120835-40 Date: April 10, 1997 Ponente:
Padilla, J.
Topic: Same offenses
Legal Doctrine: Constitutional precept that a person convicted for illegal recruitment
can also be convicted for estafa
FACTS:
 Herein accused-appellant Tan Tiong Meng, a Singaporean national, was charged
with the crime of Illegal recruitment in large scale with six counts of estafa.
 Tan Tiong Meng pleaded not guilty in all cases. Trial ensued.
 The trial court rendered its decision finding Tan Tiong Meng guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal recruitment in large scale as well as guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of six counts of estafa.
 Hence, the current petition.
ISSUE:
 W/N double jeopardy is involved when accused Tan Tiong Meng is convicted
both for the crimes of Illegal recruitment and estafa.
RULING:
 NO. A person convicted for illegal recruitment can also be convicted for
estafa. The Supreme Court held that in People v. Calonzo, the Court reiterated
the rule that a person convicted for illegal recruitment under the Labor Code
can be convicted for violation of the Revised Penal Code provisions on
estafa provided the elements of the crime are present. In People v. Romero
the elements of the crime were stated thus:
a) that the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means
of deceit, and
b) that damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to
the offended party or third person.
 Both elements have been proven in this case.
1698. People vs. Sadiosa
G.R. No. 107084 Date: May 15, 1998 Ponente:
Romero, J.
Topic: Same Offenses
Legal Doctrine: Constitutional precept that that a person who has committed illegal
recruitment may be charged and convicted separately of illegal recruitment under the
Labor Code and estafa under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. In other words, a
person convicted under the Labor Code may be convicted of offenses punishable by
other laws.
FACTS:
 Herein accused- appellant Delia Sadiosa was charged with the crime of Illegal
recruitment.
 Sadiosa pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued.
 The prosecution provides that it was Sadiosa who ensured four applicants before
him that they would be dispatched to Kuwait. However, not a single one left for
Kuwait. When they asked for the return of their money, accused-appellant
refused and ignored their demand. Consequently, the four filed the complaint for
illegal recruitment against accused-appellant.
 The trial court found Sadiosa guilty of the crime of illegal recruitment.
 Hence, the current petition alleging that there was a violation of the constitutional
mandate that a judgment of conviction must state clearly and distinctly the facts
and the law on which it is based. With regard to the information filed against her,
appellant contends that it did not substantially conform to the prescribed form,
particularly as to the designation of the offense and cause of accusation. It
should be observed in the information that its caption indicates that she is
being charged with illegal recruitment only while the allegations therein
substantiate the crimes of illegal recruitment and estafa committed by
fraud or deceit.
ISSUE:
 W/N double jeopardy is involved when Sadiosa was charged with the crime of
illegal recruitment whereas the information substantiates illegal recruitment and
estafa.
RULING:
 NO. The Supreme Court held that it is incorrect for accused-appellant to maintain
that the information filed against her contained conflicting and irreconcilable
charges of illegal recruitment, estafa under Article 315 par. 1(b) of the Revised
Penal Code and estafa under the same article but under par. 2 (a) thereof. While
on its face the allegations in the information may constitute estafa, this
Court agrees with the Solicitor General that it merely describes how
accused-appellant was able to consummate the act of illegal recruitment -
through false and fraudulent representation by pretending that she was a duly-
licensed recruiter who could secure employment for complainants in Kuwait.
1699. People v. Sanchez
291 SCRA 333

FACTS:

Accused, representing himself to have the capacity to contract, enlist and hire
and transport Filipino workers for employment abroad, did unlawfully, for a fee, recruit
and promise employment/job placement without first securing or obtaining license or
authority from the proper government agency. Herein appellant Sanchez was
charged for the crimes of illegal recruitment in large scale, and 3 counts of
estafa. The accused in all the charges brought up against him pleaded not guilty
when arraigned. Since the cases involved a common factual background, a joint
trial was conducted. Accused contends that his right against double jeopardy is
violated for convicting him for the same offense more than once.

ISSUE:

WON conviction of the crime of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code
precludes punishment under other statutes.

RULING:

No. A person convicted for illegal recruitment may also be convicted for the crime
of estafa. The principal reason for this is that the former offense is malum prohibitum
where the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction, while estafa is
malum in se where the criminal intent of the accused is an additional element for
conviction. A single criminal act may give rise to a multiplicity of offenses. What
the rule on double jeopardy prohibit refers to identity of elements in the 2
offenses. Otherwise stated, prosecution for the same act is NOT prohibited.
What is forbidden is prosecution for the same offense.

MP in Bold

Omar
1700. People v. Saley

G.R. No. 121179 July 2, 1998 Vitug, J.

FACTS:

The case before the Court focuses on the practice of some "illegal recruiters"
who would even go to the extent of issuing forged tourist visas to aspiring overseas
contract workers. These unsuspecting job applicants are made to pay exorbitant
"placement" fees for nothing really since, almost invariably, they find themselves
unable to leave for their purported country of employment or, if they are able to, soon
find themselves unceremoniously repatriated. Appellant Antonine B. Saley, a.k.a.
Annie B. Saley, seeks a reversal of the verdict finding her guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of eleven counts of estafa punishable under the Revised Penal
Code and six counts of illegal recruitment, one committed in large scale,
proscribed by the Labor Code.

ISSUE:

WON conviction of the crime of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code
precludes punishment under other statutes.

RULING:

No. Conviction for offenses under the Labor Code does not bar the punishment
of the offender for estafa. Illegal recruitment is a malum prohibitum offense where
criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction while estafa is malum in
se which requires criminal intent to warrant conviction. The elements of estafa have
sufficiently been shown in the case at bar. Recruitment of persons for overseas
employment without the necessary recruitment permit or authority from the
POEA constitutes illegal recruitment and where some other crimes or felonies
are committed in the process, conviction under the Labor Code does not
preclude punishment under other statutes.

MP in Bold
Omar

1701. PEOPLE vs. JUEGO

G.R. No. 123162 October 13, 1988 Bellosillo, J.

Sec. 21. Same Offenses

FACTS:

Nenita Juego was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Manila with Illegal
Recruitment in Large Scale by twenty-six (26) individual complainants. In addition, she
was also charged with three (3) counts of Estafa by three (3) of the twenty-six (26)
offended parties. The Trial court found her guilty of the crime of illegal recruitment and
estafa.

ISSUE:

Does conviction under the Labor Code preclude punishment under other
statutes?

RULING:

No. A person who commits illegal recruitment may be charged and convicted
separately of illegal recruitment and estafa under par. 2 (a), Art. 315, of The Revised
Penal Code, as the offense of illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum where the
criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction, while estafa is malum in
se where the criminal intent of the accused is crucial for conviction. In other words, a
conviction for offenses under the Labor Code does not bar punishment for
offenses punishable by other laws.

1702. PEOPLE vs. GANADEN

G.R. No. 125441 November 27, 1988 Bellosillo, J.

Sec. 21. Same Offenses

FACTS:

Felipe and Myrna Ganaden and spouses Gerry and Emma Ganaden, together
with one Polly Guillermo, offered private complainants jobs as domestic helpers in
Switzerland. They required them to furnish a fee of Php 50,000. They eventually found
out the Ganadens were not authorized nor licensed to recruit workers for deployment
abroad. Felipe Ganaden was then charged with Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale and
four counts of Estafa. The others remained at large. The Trial Court found him guilty.

ISSUE:

Does conviction under the Labor Code preclude punishment under other
statutes?

RULING:

No. Conviction under the Labor Code does not preclude conviction under other
statutes. Particularly, a person found guilty of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale may,
at the same time, be convicted of Estafa. The Labor Code renders illegal all
recruitment activities without the necessary license or authority from the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration. Also, the Court is sufficiently convinced that
Felipe Ganaden is guilty of Estafa. 

(1703.) People v. Balasa

GR 106357, September 1998

ARTICLE III, SECTION 21: Same Offenses

FACTS: Similar informations were filed against the same persons in Criminal Cases
8749 and 8751. The complainant in Criminal Case 8749, Shiela San Juan, was
allegedly defrauded of P25,800.00 while in Criminal Case 8751, the amount of
P6,800.00 was allegedly defrauded from Benjamin Yangco. In like manner, similarly
worded informations in Criminal Cases 8734 and 8428, raffled off to Branch 50, alleged
that Elisia Mensias was defrauded in the amount of P4,500.00 and Alfonso and
Prescilla Lacao defrauded in the amount of P58,850.00, respectively. After the filing of
the informations, warrants for the arrest of the defendants in the corresponding criminal
cases were issued. However, only Priscilla Balasa, Normita Visaya, Guillermo
Francisco, Norma Francisco and Analina Francisco were arrested, the rest of the
defendants having gone into hiding. On arraignment, the arrested defendants all
pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged. Judgment is rendered convicting all the
accused in the above cases guilty as principals of the crime of estafa.

ISSUE: Whether the trial court erred in convicting appellants despite their prior
conviction for the same offense.

RULING: Even if several cases arose out of the same scheme, if the fraudulent
acts charged were committed against different persons, they do not constitute
the same offense. Appellants cannot raise the defense of double jeopardy for which
the following requisites must concur: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the
second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; (3) the second
jeopardy must be for the same offense, or the second offense includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt to
commit the same or a frustration thereof. In the instant case, the offense charged in
Criminal Case No. 8429 is different from the offense charged in the other cases. While
these cases arose out of the same scheme, the fraudulent acts charged were
committed against different persons, hence they do not constitute the same offense.

(1704). Palu-ay vs. CA

293 SCRA 358
Art III Sec 21, Same Offenses

Facts: Palu-ay, close friends, and his family were having drinks. Pulmones accidentally
shot Palu-ay. Due to timely medical treatment, his face was only paralyzed. An
information was filed against Pulmones for frustrated murder. However, he was only
held to be guilty with the crime of serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence. He did not appeal, and this decision became final and executory.
Petitioner now assails the decision for Pulmones was charged of a crime not in the
information thus violating due process.
Issue: Whether the right against double jeopardy is applicable?
Ruling: Yes. A review of the question raised by the petition for annulment of
judgment at the instance of the prosecution would violate the right of the
accused against being placed in double jeopardy of punishment for the same
act.

1705. People v. Mercado

304 SCRA 504, G.R. Nos. 108440-42. March 11, 1999

Art. III, Sec. 21: Same Offenses

FACTS:

Petitioner Mercado, in 3 information filed by prosec with RTC-Manila, was

charged with illegal recruitment (1 info) committed in large scale and estafa (2 info)
upon conspiring with persons still unknown in recruiting and promising employment for
a fee Antonio Bragado and 7 others without first having secured the required license
from DOLE.

RTC ruled on the guilt of petitioner in illegal recruitment case and in one estafa
case, but dismissed the other estafa case for lack of evidence. On appeal petitioner
claimed that the evidence presented by prosec was inadequate to suffice his guilt and
that he can’t be convicted of illegal recruitment and estafa at the same time.

ISSUE:

WON the simultaneous conviction to an offense of estafa and of illegal

recruitment under LC runs afoul double jeopardy rule?

RULING:

YES. A person convicted of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code can be
convicted of violation of the Revised Penal Code provisions on estafa, provided the
elements of the crime are present. There is no problem of double jeopardy because
illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum, in which the criminal intent is not necessary,
whereas estafa is malum in se in which the criminal intent of the accused is necessary.

1706. People v. Yabut

G.R. No. 115719, October 5, 1999

Art III, Sec 21: Same Offenses

FACTS:

Appellant Yabut was charged with 8 counts of estafa and illegal recruitment in
large scale. The trial court acquitted him of the 8 counts of estafa but convicted him of
illegal recruitment in large scale. He appealed his conviction to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

WON the appellant be convicted of illegal recruitment in large scale despite his
acquittal of the crime of estafa?

Held:

NO. a person who commits illegal recruitment may be charged and convicted
separately of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code and estafa under par. 2 (a) of
Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code. The offense of illegal recruitment is malum
prohibitum where the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction,
while estafa is malum in se where the criminal intent of the accused is crucial for
conviction. Conviction for offenses under the Labor Code does not bar conviction for
offenses punishable by other laws. Conversely, conviction for estafa under par. 2 (a) of
Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code does not bar a conviction for illegal recruitment
under the Labor Code. It follows that one’s acquittal of the crime of estafa will not
necessarily result in his acquittal of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale, and
vice versa.

1707. People V. Ong

GR No. 119594 January 18, 2000
Facts: Sometime in November, 1993 & January, 1994 accused defrauded 9 persons,
who came to be plaintiffs, and pretended to have capacity hire and transport Filipino
workers for employment abroad promised employment, for a fee, to 9 persons in
Taiwan, w/o first obtaining license from DOLE.
He was charged with both illegal recruitment and estafa.
Issue: WON there is double jeopardy
Ruling:
No. It is settled that a person who is convicted of illegal recruitment may, in addition, be
convicted of estafa under Art. 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code. There is no
problem of double jeopardy because illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum, in which
the criminal intent is not necessary, whereas estafa is malum in se in which the
criminal intent of the accused is necessary.

1708. People v. Meris,

GR 117145-50, March 28, 2000 KAPUNAN, J
Facts:
Meris was charged with large-scale illegal recruitment and six counts of estafa when
meris together with three still unknown individuals represented themselves to have the
capacity to contract, enlist and transport Filipino workers for employment abroad.
Issue: WON there is double jeopardy in charging the accused with illegal recruitment
and estafa for the same act.
Ruling:
No. A person who has committed illegal recruitment may be charged and
convicted separately of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code and estafa under
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. 

1709. People v. Logan

G.R. No. 135030-33 July 20, 2001 DE LEON, JR., J.

Article III, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution: Same Offenses

FACTS:
 Appellant, by means of deceit, was able to include a certain Rodrigo to give her
the amount of P65k to her own benefit but to the damage of said victim. The
representation she made to induce Rodrigo was that she had the power and capacity
to recruit and employ factory and construction worker for Japan and could facilitate the
processing of the pertinent papers if given the necessary amount to meet the
requirements thereof. Consequently, the appellant is found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crimes of three (3) counts of estafa and one count of illegal recruitment in
large scale.

ISSUE:

Whether or not for the same act, appellant may be convicted of two different
charges (estafa and illegal recruitment in large scale)

RULING:

Yes. The Court ruled that a person who has committed illegal recruitment
may be charged and convicted separately of the crime of illegal recruitment
under the Labor Code and estafa under paragraph 2(a) of Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code. The reason for the rule is that the crime of illegal recruitment is
malum prohibitum where the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for
conviction, while the crime of estafa is malum in se where the criminal intent of the
accused is necessary for conviction. In other words, a person convicted under the
Labor Code may also be convicted of offenses punishable by other laws.

1710. Potot v. People

G. R. No. 143547 June 26, 2002 SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.

Article III, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution: Same Offenses

FACTS:
 Petitioner was charged with homicide (killed a certain Rodolfo) before the RTC.
Potot relayed that he has no intention to appeal from the said decision. Hence the
decision has become final. However, the wife of the victim filed a petition to have the
case be heard again for alleged irregularities (that is to include other accused in the
information). The trial court granted the wife’s motion and ordered the records
remanded to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for re-evaluation of the evidence
and to file the corresponding charge. Petitioner contends that the trial court has no
jurisdiction to issue the order as the Decision had become final, and that the said order
would place the accused in double jeopardy. The trial court reasoned out that the State
is not bound by the error or negligence of its prosecuting officers, hence, jeopardy does
not attach.

ISSUE:

Whether or not jeopardy has attached in this case.

RULING:

Yes. The Court ruled that only the accused may ask for a modification or
setting aside of a judgment of conviction, and this he must do before the said
judgment becomes final or before he perfects his appeal. Such judgment becomes final
in any of the following ways: (a) when no appeal is seasonably filed by the accused,
except in case of automatic review of the decision imposing the capital penalty; (b)
when he has partially or totally served his sentence; (c) when he expressly waives his
right to appeal the judgment, except when the death penalty is imposed; or (d) when
he applies for probation. When one of these circumstances is present, the trial court
which rendered the judgment of conviction loses jurisdiction to alter, modify or revoke
it.

In the case at bar, records show that petitioner was charged with homicide under
a valid information before the trial court which has jurisdiction over it. He was arraigned
and pleaded guilty to the charge. On the basis of his plea, petitioner was convicted and
meted the corresponding penalty. As petitioner has been placed in jeopardy for the
crime of homicide, he cannot be prosecuted anew for the same offense, or any offense
which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the first offense charged.

1711. People Vs. CA

G. R. No. 142051
Same Offense

FACTS:

Petioners herein were charged with Murder for the fatal shooting of one Marcial Boyet
Azada. On appeal, the trial court’s decision was reversed and respondents Francisco
and Pacao were acquitted of the crime charged. The prosecution, represented by the
Office of the Solicitor General, challenges the acquittal. Simply put, Assailed in this
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the judgment of acquittal
rendered by the Court of Appeals which reversed the Decision of the RTC of Pili,
Camarines Sur, convicting private respondents Claudio Francisco y Recto and Rudy
Pacao y Parone of the crimes of homicide and attempted murder, respectively.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an appeal of the judgment of acquittal by the Court of Appeals violates
the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution.

RULING:
Yes, Verdicts of acquittal are to be regarded as absolutely final and irreviewable. The
finality-of-acquittal doctrine is a safeguard against double jeopardy. The fundamental
philosophy behind the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy is to afford
the defendant, who has been acquitted, final repose and safeguard him from
government oppression through the abuse of criminal processes. In the absence of a
finding of mistrial, i.e., the criminal trial was a sham, a judgment of acquittal is final and
unappealable on the ground of double jeopardy, whether it happens at the trial court
level or at the Court of Appeals. The State with all its resources and power should not
be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense,
thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to
live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility
that even though innocent, he may be found guilty.
1712. Ramiscal Vs. Sandiganbayan
499 SCRA 375
Same Offense

FACTS:
In 1998, the Senate Committees on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigation
(Blue Ribbon) and on National Defense and Security (collectively, Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee) carried out an extensive joint inquiry into the "coup rumors and the alleged
anomalies" in the Armed Forces of the Philippines-Philippine Retirement Benefits
Systems (AFP-RSBS).There were found anomalies in the acquisition of lots in 5 cities
by the AFP-RSBS, and the modus operandi’s motivation was to evade payment of the
correct taxes to the government and save money for the sellers, brokers and who
knows, probably even for the kickbacks going to certain officials of RSBS, the buyer.
B/Gen. Jose Ramiscal, Jr., may be charged with falsification of public documents and
violation of Section 3 of R.A. No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft Law. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner may be prosecuted for both estafa through falsification of a
public document and violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 without violating his
right against double jeopardy.

RULING:

No, we agree with the contention of respondents that the crimes committed by public
officers and employees in relation to their offices defined and penalized under the Anti-
Graft Law do not exclude prosecution for felonies defined and penalized under the
Revised Penal Code and vice versa. Section 3 of R.A. No. 3019 reads: Section 3.
Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers
already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any
public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: It is clear then that one may be
charged of violation of R.A. No. 3019 in addition to a felony under the Revised
Penal Code for the same delictual act, that is, either concurrently or subsequent
to being charged with a felony under the Code. Charging him for both violation
of RA 3019 and estafa under the Revised Penal Code will be a violate his right
against double jeopardy.

1713. People v. Comila

517 SCRA 153
Same Offense

FACTS:
An Information for Illegal Recruitment committed in large scale by a syndicate was filed
against Charlie Comila, Aida Comila and one Indira Ram Singh Lastra. On the same
date and in the same court, 12 separate Informations for Estafa were filed against the
same accused at the instance of the same complainants.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused’s right against double jeopardy was violated.

RULING:

NO. It is well-established in jurisprudence that a person may be charged and convicted

for both illegal recruitment and estafa. It has been sufficiently proven that both
appellants represented themselves to the complaining witnesses to have the capacity
to send them to Italy for employment, even as they do not have the authority or license
for the purpose. It is this misrepresentation that induced the complainants to part with
their hard-earned money for placement and medical fees. Such act on the part of the
appellants clearly constitutes estafa.

MAIN POINT: The reason therefor is not hard to discern: illegal recruitment is malum
prohibitum, while estafa is malum in se. In the first, the criminal intent of the accused is
not necessary for conviction. In the second, such an intent is imperative.

1714. Diaz v. Davao

520 SCRA 481
Same Offenses

FACTS:

Respondent initiated two separate criminal actions against petitioner, one for theft of
electricity under the RPC, and the other, for Violation of P.D. 401 (Penalizing the
Unauthorized Installation of Water, Electrical or Telephone Connections, the Use of
Tampered Water or Electrical Meters, and other acts) for the hotel’s unpaid electric
consumption bill amounted to ₱190,111.02.

ISSUE:

Whether the respondent may initiate 2 separate criminal actions against petitioner for a
single criminal act

RULING:
Yes, While the institution of separate criminal actions under the provisions of P.D. 401
and under RPC on theft may refer to identical acts committed by petitioner, the
prosecution thereof cannot be limited to one offense because a single criminal act may
give rise to a multiplicity of offenses

MAIN POINT: Where there is variance or difference between the elements of an

offense in one law and another law, as in the case at bar, there will be no double
jeopardy because what the rule on double jeopardy prohibits refers to identity of
elements in the two (2) offenses. Otherwise stated, prosecution for the same act is not
prohibited; what is forbidden is prosecution for the same offense.

1715. Merencillo v People | 521 scra 31

March 02, 2013
 
 
Facts: Juanito Merencillo was charged of violation of Sec. 3 (b) of RA 3019 and Direct
bribery. Petitioner demanded from private complainant Ma. Angeles Ramasola Cesar
P20,000.00 in exchange for the approval of the Certificate Authorizing Registration
(CAR). Due to the repeated demand of the petitioner and delaying the release of CAR,
private complainant seek the help of the authorities. As a result, petitioner was caught
in the entrapment instituted by the police. After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty as
charged. Petitioner appealed the decision to the Sandiganbayan which was denied
affirming the RTC decision. Hence, this petition for review of certiorari, contending that
he was twice in jeopardy when he was prosecuted for violation of Sec. 3 (b) of RA
3019 and for direct bribery.
 
Issue: WON the petitioner was placed in double jeopardy.
 
Holding: No. Section 3(b) of RA 3019 begins with the following statement: Sec.3
In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing
law, the following acts shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and
are hereby declared unlawful: XXX XXX
        One may therefore be charged with violation of RA 3019 in addition to a felony
under the RPC for the same delictual act, that is, either concurrently or subsequent to
being charged with a felony under the RPC. There is no double jeopardy if a person is
charged simultaneously of successively for violation of the Sec.3 of RA 3019 and the
RPC. The rule against double jeopardy prohibits twice placing a person in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense. The test is whether one offense is identical with the
other or is an attempt to commit it or a frustration thereof; or whether one offense
necessarily includes or os necessarily included in the other, as provided in Sec.7 of
Rule 117 of the Rules of Court. An offense charged necessarily includes that which is
proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in
the complaint, constitute the latter; and an offense charged is necessarily included in
an offense proved when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form a part
of those constituting the latter.
      A comparison of the elements of the crime of direct bribery defined and punished
under RPC and those violation of Sec.3 (b) of RA 3019 shows that there is neither
identity nor necessary inclusion between the two offenses although the two charges
against the petitioner stemmed from the same transaction, the same act gave rise to
two separate and distinct offense.

1716.  Lapasaran v. People – 578 SCRA 658      

Doctrine:
It is well established in jurisprudence that a person may be convicted of both illegal
recruitment and estafa. The reason, therefore, is not hard to discern: illegal recruitment
is malum prohibitum, while estafa is malum in se. In the first, the criminal intent of the
accused is not necessary for conviction. In the second, such an intent is imperative.

Facts:
In September 2001, private complainant Menardo Villarin (Menardo) and his sister
Vilma
Villarin (Vilma) met petitioner Arlene N. Lapasaran, who worked at Silver Jet Travel
Tours
Agency (Silver Jet) at SIMCAS Building, Makati. For a fee of P85,000.00, petitioner
undertook
the processing of the papers necessary for the deployment (under a tourist visa) and
employment of Menardo in South Korea. Petitioner informed Menardo that he would be
employed as “factory worker,” which was, subsequently, changed to “bakery worker.”
Thereafter, Menardo paid the said fee in installments.

After two postponements in his flight schedule, Menardo finally left for South Korea on
November 25, 2001. Unfortunately, he was incarcerated by South Korean immigration
authorities and was immediately deported to the Philippines because the travel
documents
issued to him by the petitioner were fake. He immediately contacted petitioner and
informed
her of what happened. Thereupon, petitioner promised to send him back to South
Korea, but
the promise was never fulfilled. Consequently, Menardo and his sister Vilma demanded
the
return of the money they paid, but petitioner refused and even said, “Magkorte na lang
tayo.”
It was later found out that petitioner was no longer connected with Silver Jet.

Issue:    
Whether or not the petioner was place in double jeopardy?
HELD: NO, the two cases filed is applicable to this.
Illegal recruitment is committed when it is shown that petitioner gave the complainant
the
distinct impression that she had the power or ability to send the complainant abroad for
work,
such that the latter was convinced to part with his money in order to be employed. To
be
engaged in the practice of recruitment and placement, it is plain that there must, at
least, be
a promise or an offer of employment from the person posing as a recruiter whether
locally or
abroad. Petitioner’s misrepresentations concerning her purported power and authority
to
recruit for overseas employment, and the collection from Menardo of various amounts,
clearly
indicate acts constitutive of illegal recruitment.

1717. Ivler v. Modesto –

635 SCRA 191, G.R. No. 172716; November 17, 2010; Carpio, J.
Article III. Section 21. Same Offenses

FACTS:
Following a vehicle collision, Jason Ivler was charged with (1) Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuires for the imjuries sustained by
Evangeline Ponce, and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage
to Property for the death of Nestor Ponce and damage to the spouse’ vehicle. He was
meted with the penalty of public censure for the first criminal charge; thus, he moved to
quash the second criminal charge contending that it placed him in jeopardy of second
punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.

ISSUE:
Whether petitioner’s constitutional right under the double jeopardy clause bars
further proceedings.

RULING:
 Yes. The accused’s negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense" protects him from, among others,
post-conviction prosecution for the same offense, with the prior verdict rendered
by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid information.
In this case, while petitioner’s conviction in the first criminal charge was rendered
by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid charge, the second criminal charge
involves the same offense. Stated differently, the two charges against Ivler, arising
from the same facts, were prosecuted under the same provision of the Revised Penal
Code, which is Reckless Imprudence. The Court held that Reckless Imprudence is
a Single Crime; its consequences on persons and property are material only to
determine the penalty. Thus, the conviction from the first criminal offense
prevents the prosecution of the second criminal charge, where both charges are
derived from the consequences of one and the same offense, because the
second accusation places the appellant in second jeopardy for the same offense.
1718. People v. Ocden
650 SCRA 124, G.R. No. 173198; June 1, 2011; Leonardo-De Castro, J.
Article III. Section 21. Same Offenses

FACTS:
Dolores Ocden was found guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale under RA
8042 in relation with PD 442 (Labor Code), and of the crime of estafa under the RPC.
She was alleged to have recruited and promised employment as factory workers in
Italy more than three (3) persons. She also collected sums of money as fees for the
processing of the employment.

ISSUE:
Whether petitioner’s constitutional right under the double jeopardy clause bars
separate prosecutions arising from the same offense.

RULING:
 No. The Court affirmed the conviction of Ocden for the crime of estafa as the
very same evidence proving Ocden's liability for illegal recruitment also established her
liability for estafa. It is settled that a person may be charged and convicted
separately of illegal recruitment under Republic Act No. 8042 in relation to the
Labor Code, and estafa under the Revised Penal Code. The offense of illegal
recruitment is malum prohibitum where the criminal intent of the accused is not
necessary for conviction, while estafa is malum in se where the criminal intent of
the accused is crucial for conviction. Conviction for offenses under the Labor
Code does not bar conviction for offenses punishable by other laws.
Conversely, conviction for estafa does not bar a conviction for illegal
recruitment. It follows that one's acquittal of the crime of estafa will not
necessarily result in his acquittal of the crime of illegal recruitment in large
scale, and vice versa.
1719. People v. Lalli, GR 195419, October 12, 2011 (trafficking in person)

Facts: Case filed against the accused-appellants lalli for the crimes of Illegal
Recruitment and Trafficking in Persons. The contention he should only be convicted for
illegal recruitment and not trafficking in persons because only conspired to illegally
recruit the victim to prostitute.
Issue: Whether the contention was proper.
Ruling: No. Trafficking in Persons under Sections 3(a) and 4 of RA 9208 is not only
limited to transportation of victims, but also includes the act of recruitment of victims for
trafficking. In this case, since it has been sufficiently proven beyond reasonable doubt,
as discussed in Criminal Case No. 21930, that all the three accused (Aringoy, Lalli and
Relampagos) conspired and confederated with one another to illegally recruit Lolita to
become a prostitute in Malaysia, it follows that they are also guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Qualified Trafficking in Persons committed by a syndicate under
RA 9208 because the crime of recruitment for prostitution also constitutes trafficking.
MP: When an act or acts violate two or more different laws and constitute two
different offenses, a prosecution under one will not bar a prosecution under the
other. The constitutional right against double jeopardy only applies to risk of
punishment twice for the same offense, or for an act punished by a law and an
ordinance. The prohibition on double jeopardy does not apply to an act or series
of acts constituting different offenses.
VI. No Appeal from Acquittal; Instances of Void Acquittal
1720. People v. Sandiganbayan, 376 SCRA 74
Facts: Respondent Velasco, then Minister of Energy was charged for violation of
Section 3(e) of RA3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). Upon arraignment,
Velasco pleaded not guilty. After the prosecution rested its case, the accused filed,
with leave of a Demurrer to Evidence on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.
However, it was denied by the Sandiganbayan. Velasco filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which was granted by the Sandiganbayan Consequently, the case
was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. Petitioner contends that respondent
Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, when it granted respondent Velasco’s motion for reconsideration and
dismissed case. According to petitioner, respondent Velasco cannot invoke the rule on
double jeopardy since the assailed Resolution is null and void for failure of the
Sandiganbayan to state therein a summary of the facts proved by the prosecution’s
evidence, in violation of Section 14 (1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution and Section
2, Rule 120 of the ROC.
Issue: Whether the petitioner’s contention is with merit.
Ruling: No. Under Section 23, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, as amended, the trial court may dismiss the action on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence upon a demurrer to evidence filed by the accused with
or without leave of court. Thus, in resolving the accused’s demurrer to evidence, the
court is merely required to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient evidence
to sustain the indictment or support a verdict of guilt. The grant or denial of a demurrer
to evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial court, and its ruling on the matter
shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of discretion. Significantly, once
the court grants the demurrer, such order amounts to an acquittal; and any further
prosecution of the accused would violate the constitutional proscription on double
jeopardy. This constitutes an exception to the rule that the dismissal of a criminal case
made with the express consent of the accused or upon his own motion bars a plea of
double jeopardy.
MP: The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound discretion
of the trial court, and its ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed in the
absence of a grave abuse of discretion; Once the court grants the demurrer,
such order amounts to an acquittal, and any further prosecution of the accused
would violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy.

1721. YUCHENGCO vs. CA

G.R. No. 139768 February 07, 2002 De Leon, Jr., J.

FACTS:
 Alfonso Yuchengco filed a complaint for libel against two writers of the Inquirer.
 The RTC of Makati would find the two writers guilty for the crime of libel.
 However, on appeal with the CA, the ruling of the RTC was reversed and they
were acquitted.
 Alfonso Yuchengco would appeal the decision of the CA through certiorari under
Rule 65 (GADALEJ).
ISSUE:
Whether a judgement of acquittal in a criminal proceeding is appealable?
RULING:
No. The Court ruled that a judgment of acquittal in criminal proceedings is
final and unappealable whether it happens at the trial court level or before the
Court of Appeals. This means that a review of alleged errors in the said judgment
arising from misappreciation of facts and the evidence adduced cannot be made
without trampling upon the right of the accused against double jeopardy which is firmly
established in this jurisdiction.
In this case, Yuchengco failed to show that the CA acted with grave abuse of
discretion. His appeal was merely anchored on possible errors in the appreciation of
evidence purportedly committed by the respondent appellate court.

Exception to the General Rule: By way of exception, a judgment of acquittal in a

criminal case may be assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court but only upon a clear showing by the petitioner that the lower court, in acquitting
the accused, committed not merely reversible errors of judgment but also grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due process, thus
rendering the assailed judgment void.

1722. SAN VICENTE vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 132081 November 26, 2002 Ynares-Santiago, J.

FACTS:
 Petitioner was charged with homicide for killing the victim Wong after the latter
allegedly attempted to rob him of a large amount of cash which he had just
withdrawn from the automatic teller machine.
 After arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty.
 Petitioner filed a demurrer to evidence after the prosecution adduced its evidence
and rested its case. The trial court subsequently dismissed the case after finding
that the evidence presented by the prosecution was insufficient to support the
charge against petitioner.
 The prosecution would file a motion for reconsideration but this was denied on
the ground that upon dismissal of the case, double jeopardy would set in.
ISSUE:
Whether an acquittal on a motion for demurrer is appealable?
RULING:
No. The Court rule that once the court grants the demurrer, such order
amounts to an acquittal and any further prosecution of the accused would
violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy. This constitutes an
exception to the rule that the dismissal of a criminal case made with the express
consent of the accused or upon his own motion bars a plea of double jeopardy.

1723 People v. CA
GR 132396, Sept. 23, 2002
Art 3. Sec 21. No appeal from acquittal; instances of void acquittal
FACTS:
Deutsch was charged with Estafa by Wilson. The trial court found the accused
guilty but the said decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals since her guilt not
been proven beyond reasonable doubt. Wilson alleges that the acquittal of Deutsch
was “unfounded, arbitrary, unjust, and constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction.”

ISSUE:
Whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion by the CA; thus,
allowing an appeal by Wilson.

RULING:
NO. A tribunal, board or officer is said to have acted with grave abuse of
discretion when it exercised its power in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
erosion or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of
law. In acquitting Deutsch, the Court of Appeals merely interpreted the evidence
presented before the trial court, as it deemed fit. Note, however, that the acquittal
of Deutsch is based only on lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt. Hence,
considering the circumstances, it is without prejudice to whatever civil action might be
appropriately taken by petitioner Wilson in regard to respondent Deutsch.

MAIN POINT:
While it is true that double jeopardy will attach in case the prosecution appeals a
decision acquitting the accused, it is likewise true that an acquittal rendered in grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction does not really “acquit”
and therefore does not terminate the case.

1724 People v. Sandiganbayan

491 SCRA 185
Art 3. Sec 21. No appeal from acquittal; instances of void acquittal
FACTS:
Dominator Balac (then Provincial Governor of Kalinga), and Noe Dannang (then
Provincial Budget Officer) were charged with falsification of an official document for
making it appear that P1,500,000.00 was appropriated under Appropriation Ordinance
“97-04” for the purchase of Belac’s service vehicle, when no such ordinance was
passed, and the A.O. 97-04 actually pertains to the ordinance for the salaries of the
officials and personnel of the Province of Kalinga. However, the Sandiganbayan
absolved the accused as Dannang explained that the entry “97-04” was clearly an
ordinary mistake due to reliance on templates embedded in computer software. Hence,
the instant case. Petitioner prays that another judgment be rendered finding private
respondents guilty.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the State may seek a review of the case.

RULING:
NO. Section 1, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that any party
may appeal from a judgment or final order unless the accused will thereby be placed in
double jeopardy. The judgment that may be appealed by the aggrieved party
envisaged in the Rule is a judgment convicting the accused, and not a judgment
of acquittal. The State is barred from appealing such judgment of acquittal by a
petition for review. Such acquittal is final and unappealable on the ground of
double jeopardy whether it happens at the trial court or on appeal at the CA.
When a reversal rests upon the ground that the prosecution has failed to
produce sufficient evidence to prove its case, the Double Jeopardy Clause bars
the prosecutor from making a second attempt at conviction. Unless grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction is shown, the errors committed by
the trial court in the exercise of its jurisdiction or even the legal soundness of
such decision, errors of judgment, mistakes in its findings and conclusions, are
not proper subjects of appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. In the present
case, the only errors ascribed by petitioner to the Sandiganbayan pertained to alleged
errors in its appreciation of the evidence on record, and the probative weight and the
sufficiency thereof to prove the elements of the crime charged. 

1725.People v. CA – 516 SCRA 383

ART III SEC 21. NO APPEAL FROM ACQUITTAL. INSTANCES OF VOID

ACQUITTAL

FACTS: Ramon Galicia was charged with the crime of homicide for conspiring with
Roberto Ureta, Jojo Manito, Jun Banang, Merlin and Nestor Vicente to kill Thelmo
Abenir. However, Ramon Galicia was acquitted for the prosecution’s failure to prove
that he conspired with the others. Hence, the instant petition. The OSG asserts that CA
erred in acquitting Ramon as his guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt.

ISSUE: Whether or not the review of the acquittal of Galicia would constitute double
jeopardy.

RULING & MP (in bold): YES. A verdict of acquittal is immediately final and a
reexamination of the merits of such acquittal, even in the appellate courts, will
put the accused in jeopardy for the same offense. The finality-of-acquittal
doctrine prevents the State from using its criminal processes as an instrument
of harassment to wear out the accused by a multitude of cases with accumulated
trials.  This is not to say that the constitutional guarantee against double
jeopardy is without exceptions. For there are two recognized exceptions: (1)
Where there has been deprivation of due process and where there is a finding of
a mistrial, or (2) Where there has been a grave abuse of discretion under
exceptional circumstances. However, in this case, we find that the exceptions do not
exist. Hence, it cannot be disputed that the verdict of the Court of Appeals acquitting
Ramon Galicia is now final and irreviewable.

1726.People v. Laguio
ART III SEC 21. NO APPEAL FROM ACQUITTAL.INSTANCES OF VOID
ACQUITTAL

FACTS: 3 charges were filed against Lawrence Wang: (1) for violation of Dangerous
Drugs Act; (2) for violation of PD 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearm; (3) for violation of
COMELEC Gun Ban. Wang filed his Demurrer to Evidence, praying his acquittal for
lack of valid arrest and search warrants and the inadmissibility of the prosecution’s
evidence against him. Respondent judge granted the Demurrer to Evidence and
acquitted Wang. Hence, the petition.

ISSUE: Whether the prosecution may appeal the trial court’s resolution granting
Wang’s Demurrer to Evidence and acquitting him of all the charges against him without
violating the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy

RULING & MP (in bold): NO. An order granting an accused’s demurrer to evidence is
a resolution of the case on the merits, and it amounts to an acquittal. Generally, any
further prosecution of the accused after an acquittal would violate the constitutional
proscription on double jeopardy. To this general rule, however, the Court has
previously made some exceptions, to wit: (1) when the prosecution is denied due
process of law; (2) when the trial court commits grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
a criminal case by granting the accused’s demurrer to evidence. By this time, it is
settled that the appellate court may review dismissal orders of trial courts
granting an accused’s demurrer to evidence. This may be done via the special
civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 based on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Such dismissal order,
being considered void judgment, does not result in jeopardy. Thus, when the
order of dismissal is annulled or set aside by an appellate court in an original
special civil action via certiorari, the right of the accused against double
jeopardy is not violated. Unfortunately, what petitioner People of the Philippines
filed with the Court in the present case is an appeal by way of a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 raising a pure question of law, which is different from a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65.

1727. People v. Dumlao

FACTS: The accused Dumlao, Canlas, Clave, Cruz, Jr., and Ver, being then the
members of the Board of Trustees of the GSIS, unlawfully entered into a contract of
lease-purchase with Lao, a private person whereby the GSIS agreed to sell to said
Lao, a GSIS acquired property consisting of three parcels of land. Respondent Dumlao
filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense. The Sandiganbayan, basing its resolution on the Pre-trial Stipulation entered
into by the prosecution and respondent Dumlao, dismissed the case against the latter,
since it found that the GSIS Board of Trustees failed to approve or validly pass the
Lease-Purchase Agreement. The Office of the Ombudsman filed a petition for certiorari
seeking the reversal and setting aside of the Sandiganbayan Resolution dismissing the
case against respondent Dumlao.

ISSUE: Whether or not giving due course to Ombudsman’s petition to reverse and set
aside the resolution of the Sandiganbayan will place respondent in double jeopardy. 

RULING: NO. This case is a VOID ACQUITTAL. Double jeopardy has not yet set in.
The first jeopardy has not yet attached. There is no question that four of the five
elements of legal jeopardy are present. However, the last element which is the valid
conviction, acquittal, dismissal or termination of the case is absent. Respondent
Dumlao would not be placed in double jeopardy because, from the very beginning, the
Sandiganbayan had acted without jurisdiction. Precisely, any ruling issued without
jurisdiction is, in legal contemplation, necessarily null and void. Otherwise put, the
dismissal of the case was invalid for lack of a fundamental prerequisite, that is, due
process. This being the case, the prosecution is allowed to appeal because it was not
given its day in court.

1728. Tiu v. CA
FACTS: The instant controversy stemmed from a criminal charge for slight physical
injuries filed by respondent Postanes against Pasion before the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Pasay City. On the other hand, petitioner Tiu filed a criminal charge for grave
threats against Postanes. In its Decision, the MeTC dismissed both criminal cases. Tiu,
through his counsel, filed a petition for certiorari with the RTC of Pasay City. The RTC
rendered a Decision declaring void the judgment of the MeTC. Postanes filed with the
CA a petition for certiorari, challenging the decision of the RTC. The CA reversed the
RTC Decision and affirmed the dismissal of the criminal cases. 

ISSUE: Whether or not there was double jeopardy when Tiu filed a petition for certiorari
questioning the acquittal of Postanes by the MeTC. 

RULING: YES. These elements were attendant: (1) the Information filed in against
Postanes was sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the MeTC
had jurisdiction over Criminal Case; (3) Postanes was arraigned and entered a non-
guilty plea; and (4) the MeTC dismissed Criminal Case on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence amounting to an acquittal from which no appeal can be had. Further, as
found by the Court of Appeals, there is no showing that the prosecution or the State
was denied of due process resulting in loss or lack of jurisdiction on the part of the
MeTC, which would have allowed an appeal by the prosecution from the order of
dismissal of the criminal case.

1729. People v. De Grano – 588 scra 550

FACTS: An Information for murder was filed against Joven and Armando De Grano,
and Lacaba together with their co-accused Landicho and Domingo Landicho, and
Genil who were at-large. RTC rendered a Decision finding several accused guilty of the
offense as charged. Respondents, thru counsel, then filed a Joint Motion for
Reconsideration. Acting on respondents’ motion for reconsideration, the RTC issued
an Order modifying its earlier decision by acquitting Joven and Armando and
downgrading the conviction of Domingo and Estanislao from murder to homicide.
Petitioner alleged that it had no other plain, adequate, and speedy remedy, considering
that the State could not appeal a judgment of acquittal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the State can appeal a judgment of acquittal.
RULING: YES. By way of exception, a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case
may be assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
but only upon a clear showing by the petitioner that the lower court, in
acquitting the accused, committed not merely reversible errors of judgment but
also grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or to
a denial of due process, thus rendering the assailed judgment void. In which
event, the accused cannot be considered at risk of double jeopardy—the revered
constitutional safeguard against exposing the accused to the risk of answering twice for
the same offense.

1730. People v Nazareno – 595 SCRA 438

NO APPEAL FROM ACQUITTAL; INSTANCES OF VOID ACQUITTAL
FACTS: The Sandiganbayan acquitted the respondents Cesar Nazareno, Everlino
Nartatez and Nicasio Ma. Custodio (collectively, the respondents) of the charge of
violating Section 3(g) of Republic Act No. 3019 (RA 3019) or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. People filed an appeal to the acquittal to which the respondents objected
mainly because the review sought violates their constitutional right against double
jeopardy.
ISSUE: WON the petitioner may file an appeal to the acquittal of the respondents.
RULING: No. The Constitution has expressly adopted the double jeopardy policy
and thus bars multiple criminal trials, thereby conclusively presuming that a
second trial would be unfair if the innocence of the accused has been confirmed
by a previous final judgment. Further prosecution via an appeal from a judgment of
acquittal is likewise barred because the government has already been afforded a
complete opportunity to prove the criminal defendant’s culpability.
MP: A judgment of acquittal is final and is no longer reviewable. It is also immediately
executory, and the State may not seek its review without placing the accused in double
jeopardy.

1731. People vs. Duca [void acquittal]

G.R. No. 171175 Date: October 30, 2009 Ponente:
Leonardo De-Castro, J.
Topic: No Appeal from Acquittal; Instances of Void Acquittal
Legal Doctrine: Constitutional doctrine adhered to by the Supreme Court is that a
decision rendered without due process is void ab initio and may be attacked directly or
collaterally. A decision is void for lack of due process if, as a result, a party is deprived
of the opportunity to be heard.
FACTS:
● Herein respondent Arturo Duca, together with his mother, was charged with the
crime of Falsification of Public Documents punished under the Revised Penal
 Code for forging the signature of his brother, Aldrin Duca at the back of a
property index. Due to such forgery, they were able to secure a TRO against the
Sheriff and policemen who were evicting them from their alleged property.
● Both accused pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued.
● The MCTC rendered its decision finding Duca guilty of the crime of Falsification
of Public Documents punished under the Revised Penal Code. The RTC affirmed
the decision of the MCTC.
● The CA, however, reversed the ruling of the prior courts holding that Arturo’s
brother, Aldrin Duca stated in an affidavit that he had executed a special power
of attorney instructing Arturo to secure the tax declaration on his behalf as he
was abroad. Thus, Arturo Duca was acquitted of the crime charged.
● Hence, the current petition alleging that that once the case is elevated to the CA
or the Supreme Court, it is only the Solicitor General who is authorized to bring or
defend actions on behalf of the People. Thus, the CA gravely abused its
discretion when it acted on respondent’s appeal without affording the prosecution
the opportunity to be heard. Consequently, the decision of the CA acquitting
respondent should be considered void for being violative of due process.
ISSUE:
● W/N the decision of the CA acquitting Arturo Duca is void considering that the
prosecution was not given the opportunity to be heard.
RULING:
● YES. The Supreme Court held that in criminal proceedings on appeal in the
Court of Appeals or in the Supreme Court, the authority to represent the People
is vested solely in the Solicitor General. Indeed, in criminal cases, as in the
instant case, the Solicitor General is regarded as the appellate counsel of the
People of the Philippines and as such, should have been given the opportunity to
be heard on behalf of the People. The records show that the CA failed to require
the Solicitor General to file his Comment on Duca’s petition. A copy of the CA
Resolution dated May 26, 2004 which required the filing of Comment was served
upon Atty. Jaime Dojillo, Sr. (counsel for Duca), Atty. Villamor Tolete (counsel for
private complainant Calanayan) and RTC Judge Crispin Laron. Nowhere was it
shown that the Solicitor General had ever been furnished a copy of the said
Resolution. The failure of the CA to require the Solicitor General to file his
Comment deprived the prosecution of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove
its case.
● The doctrine consistently adhered to by this Court is that a decision
rendered without due process is void ab initio and may be attacked directly
or collaterally. A decision is void for lack of due process if, as a result, a
party is deprived of the opportunity to be heard. The assailed decision of
the CA acquitting the respondent without giving the Solicitor General the
chance to file his comment on the petition for review clearly deprived the
State of its right to refute the material allegations of the said petition filed
before the CA. The said decision is, therefore, a nullity.
1732. Mupas vs. People [void order on demurrer]
G.R. No. 189365 Date: October 12, 2011 Ponente:
Sereno, J.
Topic: No Appeal from Acquittal; Instances of Void Acquittal
Legal Doctrine: Constitutional precept that as a general rule, an order granting the
accused’s demurrer to evidence amounts to an acquittal. There are certain exceptions,
however, as when the grant thereof would not violate the constitutional proscription on
double jeopardy. For instance, this Court ruled that when there is a finding that there
was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in dismissing a criminal case
by granting the accused’s demurrer to evidence, its judgment is considered void
FACTS:
 Two criminal informations were then filed by the Ombudsman against private
petitioner Carmelita Zafra and her co-accused, one for violation of RA 3019 and
another for malversation. The accused pleaded not guilty on both cases.
 During the trial, Zafra filed a motion for demurrer of evidence alleging that the
prosecution failed to present proof that she and her co-accused had wilfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously caused the withdrawal of the 200 cases of Bear Brand
Powdered Milk and appropriated these for themselves to the prejudice of DSWD.
Thus, she concluded that the prosecution failed to establish the elements of the
crime of malversation under Art. 217 of the Revised Penal Code.
 Petitioner Judge Mupas granted the demurrer to evidence of Zafra. Judge Mupas
ruled that after evaluating the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution, he
found them substantially insufficient to warrant the conviction of petitioner Zafra
under the charges filed against her by the Ombudsman. With the grant of her
demurrer to evidence, Zafra was acquitted.
 The CA, however, revoked the lower courts’ order of granting Zafra’s demurrer to
evidence holding that the prosecution sufficiently proved the elements of the
crime against Zafra.
 Hence, the current petition
ISSUE:
 W/N
RULING:
 NO. The Supreme Court held that the CA’s disquisition that the lower court’s
grant of the demurrer to evidence of petitioner Zafra was attended by grave
abuse of discretion. The prosecution’s evidence was, prima facie, sufficient
to prove the criminal charges filed against her for her inexcusable
 negligence, subject to the defense that she may present in the course of a
full-blown trial. The lower court improperly examined the prosecution’s evidence
in the light of only one mode of committing the crimes charged; that is, through
positive acts. The appellate court correctly concluded that the crime of
malversation may be committed either through a positive act of
misappropriation of public funds or passively through negligence by
allowing another to commit such misappropriation.
 In the instant case, having affirmed the CA finding grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the trial court when it granted the accused’s demurrer to evidence, we
deem its consequent order of acquittal void.

VII. Parties
1733. Metrobank v. Veridiano

G.R. No. 118251 July 29, 2001 De Leon, Jr, J.

FACTS:

 Dominador Ong, Treasurer of the Sun Ray Metal, was convicted for violation of
the Trust Receipts Law for defrauding the Metrobank. Sun Ray purchased brass
metals and aluminum wires through 2 letters of credit issued by the Metrobank in
favor of the supplier of the raw materials. Ong, in his capacity as treasurer of Sun
Ray Metal, executed two 2 trust receipts in favor of the Metrobank. However,
despite repeated demands, the Ong failed to pay Metrobank the proceeds of the
sale of the raw materials or to turn over the said materials in case of his failure to
sell the same.
 In his defense, Ong signed the trust receipts in blank and that he was acting only
in his capacity as treasurer. He also claimed that the contract between Sun Ray
and the Metrobank had been novated (substituted for a new obligation for an old
one) when a representative of the bank verbally proposed to restructure the
obligation under the trust receipts, to which he agreed. RTC acquitted Ong.
  Petitioner bank contended that there was a grave abuse of discretion committed
by the judge, thus, filing of petition for certiorari falls under the exception of
double jeopardy.

ISSUE:

WON the petition has merit.

RULING:

No. In the case at bar, a hearing was held during which the prosecution and the
defense were heard on their evidence. Thereafter, judgment was rendered on the basis
of the evidence presented. Consequently, any error made by the trial court in the
appreciation of the evidence was only an error of judgment but not of jurisdiction so
as to render the judgment void.

The exception to the double jeopardy rule attaches only when the trial court
commits grave abuse of discretion due to a violation of due process—if there is
no denial of due process, there can be no grave abuse of discretion that would
merit the application of the exception to the double jeopardy rule.

MP in Bold

Omar

1734. People v. Relova

G.R. No. L-45129 March 26, 1987 Feliciano, J.

FACTS:

 Batangas police legally searched and examined the premises of the Opulencia
Carpena Ice Plant owned by Manuel Opulencia. They discovered electric wiring
devices have been installed without authority from the city. Said devices are
designed purposely to lower or decrease the readings of electric current
 consumption in the plant’s electric meter. The case was dismissed due to
prescription
 Another case was filed against Mr. Opulencia by the Asst. City Fiscal for a
violation of a Batangas Ordinance regarding unauthorized electrical installations
with resulting damage and prejudice to City of Batangas. Before arraignment,
Opulencia filed a motion to quash on the ground of double jeopardy. The Asst.
fiscal’s claimed that it was not double jeopardy because the first offense was
punishable by an ordinance, where in the case was dismissed, as opposed to the
second offense which was theft of electricity which is punishable by the RPC
making it a different crime charged against the 1st complaint against
Mr.Opulencia. Respondent Judge Hon. Relova ordered to quash an information
for theft filed against Mr. Opulencia on the ground of double jeopardy and denied
the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE:

WON the accused Opulencia can invoke double jeopardy as defense to the
second offense charged against him

RULING:

Yes. Claim of double jeopardy is available even if prior offense charged

under an ordinance is different from subsequent offense charged in a statute
where both offenses spring from the same set of acts.

The bill of rights give two instances or kinds of double jeopardy. The first would
be that “No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense” and the second sentence states that “If an act is punishable by a law or
an ordinance, the conviction or acquittal shall bar to another prosecution for the
same act”. In the case at bar, it was very evident that the charges filed against
Opulencia falls on the 2nd kind or definition of double jeopardy wherein it contemplates
double jeopardy of punishment for the same act. MP in Bold

Omar
VIII. Applied to Impeachment
1735. ESTRADA vs. DESIERTO

G.R. No. 146710-15 and GR 146738 March 2, 2001 Puno, J.

Sec. 21. Applied to Impeachment

FACTS:

This case involves the impeachment trial of former President Estrada. During the
hearing, the prosecutors walked out when by a vote of 11-10, the Senator-judges
refused to open the second envelope allegedly containing the P3.3 billion deposit of
Erap in a secret bank account. The next day, the public prosecutors resigned. This
resulted to the suspension of the impeachment trial. Before the House could resolve
the issue of resignation of its prosecutors, Erap relinquished the presidency. Thus, the
Senate passed Resolution No. 83 declaring that the impeachment court is functus
officio. Several criminal cases where then filed against Erap. He filed a petition for
prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction, arguing that he must first be
convicted in the impeachment proceedings before he could be criminally prosecuted.
He explains ‘failure to prosecute’ as the “failure of the prosecution to prove the case,
hence dismissal on such grounds is a dismissal on the merits.” He then concludes that
dismissal of a case for failure to prosecute amounts to an acquittal for purposes of
applying the rule against double jeopardy.

ISSUE:

Is conviction in impeachment proceedings a condition precedent for criminal

prosecution?

Can he invoke double jeopardy?

RULING:
 No. The impeachment trial of Erap was aborted by the walkout of the prosecutors
and by the events that led to his loss of the presidency. Since the Impeachment Court
is now functus officio, it is untenable for him to demand that he should first be
impeached and then convicted before he can be prosecuted. The Constitutional
Commission makes it clear that when impeachment proceedings have become
moot due to the resignation of the President, the proper criminal and civil cases
may already be filed against him.

No. Prescinding from the facts of the previous case, he cannot invoke double
jeopardy. Double jeopardy attaches only: (1) upon a valid complaint; (2) before a
competent court; (3) after arraignment; (4) when a valid plea has been entered; and (5)
when the defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without the express consent of the accused. Assuming arguendo that the
first four requisites of double jeopardy were complied with, he failed to satisfy the fifth
requisite for he was not acquitted nor was the impeachment proceeding dismissed
without his express consent. His claim of double jeopardy cannot be predicated on
prior conviction for he was not convicted by the impeachment court. The
impeachment proceeding was closed only after the he had resigned from the
presidency, thereby rendering the impeachment court functus officio. By resigning from
the presidency, he more than consented to the termination of the impeachment case
against him, for he brought about the termination of the impeachment proceedings.
The court has consistently ruled that when the dismissal or termination of the case
is made at the instance of the accused, there is no double jeopardy.

1736. PEOPLE vs. LOGAN

G.R. No. 135030-33 July 20, 2001 De Leon, Jr., J.

Sec. 21. Applied to Impeachment (under the syllabus, but no mention of impeachment
in full text)
FACTS:

Mercy Logan charged Php 65,000 to allegedly facilitate the processing of the
pertinent papers for Rodrigo Acorda’s employment as a factory or construction worker
in Japan; he paid. She was convicted of the crimes of Estafa under RPC and Illegal
Recruitment in Large Scale under Article 38(b) in relation to Article 39(a) of the Labor
Code of the Philippines.

ISSUE:

Does conviction under the Labor Code preclude punishment under other laws?

RULING:

No. It is well-settled that a person who has committed illegal recruitment may be
charged and convicted separately of the crime of illegal recruitment under the Labor
Code and estafa under paragraph 2(a) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. The
reason for the rule is that the crime of illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum where the
criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction, while the crime of estafa
is malum in se where the criminal intent of the accused is necessary for conviction. In
other words, a person convicted under the Labor Code may also be convicted of
offenses punishable by other laws.

JUDGMENT AND POST-JUDGMENT REMEDIES

(1737). People v. De Grano –Rule 120-Judgement

FACTS: On November 28, 1991, an Information for murder was filed with the RTC
against Joven de Grano (Joven), Armando de Grano (Armando), and Estanislao
Lacaba (Estanislao), together with their co-accused Leonides Landicho (Leonides),
Domingo Landicho (Domingo), and Leonardo Genil (Leonardo), who were at-large.
Duly arraigned, Joven, Armando, and Estanislao pleaded “not guilty” to the crime as
charged; while their co-accused Leonides, Leonardo, and Domingo remained at-large.
Thereafter, respondents filed a motion for bail contending that the prosecution’s
evidence was not strong. RTC found the accused guilty of the offenses charged. In
2004 an order was issued that modified the previous decision, from murder the case
was downgraded to homicide. However, Joven, Armando, and Domingo was not
present during promulgation. They maintained that while they were not present during
the promulgation of the RTC Decision, Estanislao, who was under police custody,
attended the promulgation. Thus according to them, when they filed their Joint Motion
for Reconsideration, which included that of Estanislao, the RTC was not deprived of its
authority to resolve the joint motion.

ISSUE: Whether or not RTC erred in taking cognizance of the joint motion for
reconsideration despite the absence of the other accused during the promulgation of
judgment?

RULING: Yes. Section 14(2),[59] Article III of the Constitution, authorizing trials in
absentia, allows the accused to be absent at the trial but not at certain stages of the
proceedings, to wit: (a) at arraignment and plea, whether of innocence or of guilt; (b)
during trial, whenever necessary for identification purposes; and (c) at the promulgation
of sentence, unless it is for a light offense, in which case, the accused may appear by
counsel or representative. At such stages of the proceedings, his presence is required
and cannot be waived.

When the Decision dated April 25, 2002 was promulgated, only Estanislao Lacaba was
present. Subsequently thereafter, without surrendering and explaining the reasons for
their absence, Joven, Armando, and Domingo joined Estanislao in their Joint Motion for
Reconsideration. In blatant disregard of the Rules, the RTC not only failed to cause the
arrest of the respondents who were at large, it also took cognizance of the joint motion.

(1738). Rimando v. Aldaba –Rule 120-Judgement

FACTS: Rimando was charged of estafa before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
charging Rimando of the crime of estafa. Allegedly, Rimando enticed Sps. Aldaba to
invest in her business by executing three (3) postdated checks. On the date of maturity
of the checks, Sps. Aldaba attempted to encash the same but were dishonored for
being drawn against insufficient funds. Rimando failed to make good of the checks.
Meanwhile the spouse filed a criminal case against Rimando for violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang (BP) 22 before the Metropolitan Trial Court. Rimando was acquitted
in the BP 22 cases on the ground of reasonable doubt, with a declaration that the act
or omission from which liability may arise does not exist. However, the RTC acquitted
Rimando of the crime of estafa, but found her civilly liable to Sps. Aldaba. The RTC
ruled that as an accommodation party to one of the checks she issued to Sps. Aldaba
on behalf of Multitel, Rimando should be held liable to Sps. Aldaba. Rimando appealed
to the CA where she contended that her acquittal and exoneration from the civil liability
in the BP 22 cases should have barred Sps. Aldaba from claiming civil liability from her
in the estafa case.

ISSUE: Whether Rimandos civil liability in the estafa case despite her acquittal and
exoneration from civil liability.

RULING: No. It is well-settled that the acquittal of the accused does not automatically
preclude a judgment against him on the civil aspect of the case. The extinction of the
penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability where: (a) the
acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required;
(b) the court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil
liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the
accused is acquitted. However, the civil action based on delict may be deemed
extinguished if there is a finding on the final judgment in the criminal action that the act
or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist or where the accused
did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him.In this case, Rimandos civil liability
did not arise from any purported act constituting the crime of estafa as the RTC clearly
found that Rimando never employed any deceit on Sps. Aldaba to induce them to
invest money in Multitel. Rather, her civil liability was correctly traced from being an
accommodation party to one of the checks she issued to Sps. Aldaba on behalf of
Multitel.

1739. Suero vs. People

G.R. No. 156408. January 31, 2005

Rule 120 - Judgment

FACTS:

Herein petitioner, being then the Administrative Officer of the DECS with salary
grades below grade 27, was earlier accused of the crime of Falsification of Public
Document. Criminal case commenced before the RTC but was suspended when the
Court a quo.
 The petitioner was acquitted from the criminal case case before the
Sandiganbayan for the violation of RA 3019. Thereafter, the Respondent
OMBUDSMAN wrote a letter to the Clerk of Court of the Respondent JUDGE regarding
the acquittal, expressing their decision in refiling the information and request that the
same be entered in the docket of the criminal case with a new case number assigned
to it’ attaching thereto the Criminal Information.

ISSUE:

WON the case constitute double jeopardy?

RULING:

No. The instant case does not constitute double jeopardy, for which the following
requisites must concur: (1) the first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second;
(2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy
must be for the same offense as that in the first.

It is undisputed that the two charges stem from the same transaction. However, it
has been consistently held that the same act may give rise to two or more separate
and distinct offenses. No double jeopardy attaches, as long as there is a variance
between the elements of the offenses charged. The constitutional right against
double jeopardy protects from a second prosecution for the same offense, not
for a different one.

Section 5 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court further provides:

“When an offense includes or is included in another.—An offense charged

necessarily includes that which is proved, when some of the essential elements or
ingredients of the former, as this is alleged in the complaint or information, constitute
the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved, when
the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form a part of those constituting the
latter.”
1740. People v. Sevilla

G.R. No. 194390. August 13, 2014.

Rule 120 – Judgment

FACTS:

Sevilla was a newly elected councilor in Malabon City, charged with falsification
of documents as he did not disclose that he had a criminal case for assault in his
Personal Data Sheet. He contended that he cannot be filed Falsification through
Reckless Imprudence when the information filed was Intentional Falsification.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Sevilla may be convicted of Falsification of Public Documents?

RULING:

YES. Variance between the allegation and proof exists. Sections 4 and 5 of
Rule 120 of the Rules of Court govern the variance between them, providing that
the offense charged must be included in the offense proved and vice versa. In
the case, SC ruled that reckless imprudence resulting in falsification of documents is
inherent in the willful act of falsification of public documents. Thus, he can be convicted
of reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public documents.

ARTICLE III, SECTION 22 OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION

A. Ex Post Facto Laws and Bills of Attainder

1741. People v. Ferrer

48 SCRA 382
FACTS: A criminal complaint for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act was filed
against the private respondent. The accused feloniously became an officer and/or
ranking leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines, an outlawed and illegal
organization aimed to overthrow the Government of the Philippines.
v Meanwhile, another criminal complaint was filed with the same court, sharing the
respondent Nilo Tayag and 5 others with subversion. The trial court, under the decision
of Hon. Ferrer declared the statute void on the grounds that it is a bill of attainder
because it has expressly created a presumption of organizational guilt which the
accused can never hope to overthrow. He dismissed the informations against the 2
accused. The Government appealed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Anti-Subversion Law is a bill of attainder.
RULING: NO. When the Act is viewed in its actual operation, it will be seen that it does
not specify the Communist Party of the Philippines or the members thereof for the
purpose of punishment. What it does is simply to declare the Party to be an organized
conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government for the purposes of the prohibition,
stated in section 4, against membership in the outlawed organization. Its focus is not
on individuals but on conduct.
A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without trial. Its essence
is the substitution of a legislative for a judicial determination of guilt.

1742. Virata v. Sandiganbayan –

G.R. No. 86926. October 15, 1991 DAVIDE, JR., J.
Facts: On 31 July 1987, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
Presidential Commission on Good Government(PCGG), assisted by the Solicitor
General, filed a complaint with the respondent Sandiganbayan against
Benjamin(Kokoy) Romualdez and 44 others for recovery of "ill-gotten wealth consisting
of funds and other property which they unlawfully had acquired and accumulated in
flagrant breach of trust and of their fiduciary obligations as public officers, with grave
abuse of rights and power and in brazen violation of the Constitution and laws of the
Republic of the Philippines, thus resulting in their unjust enrichment during Defendant
Ferdinand E. Marcos' 20 years of rule. The Court Rules in favor of the people and
Romuldez in a petitioner for certiorari appealed to the Supreme court for review:
Issue: Whether or not the EOs creating the PCGG is an ex post facto/bill of attainder
law.
Ruling: No. The PCGG Charter (composed of Executive Orders Nos. 1, 2, and 14) is
not a bill of attainder or an ex post facto law. The disquisitions in BASECO vs. PCGG,
supra., and PCGG vs. Peña, supra., unequivocally sustain and affirm the
constitutionality of the PCGG Charter. The SC held that the executive orders in
question are not bill of attainder. A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts
punishment without judicial trial. Its essence is the substitution of a legislative for a
judicial determination of guilt. In the first place, nothing in the executive orders can be
reasonably construed as a determination or declaration of guilt. On the contrary, the
executive orders, inclusive of Executive Order No. 14, make it perfectly clear that any
judgment of guilt in the amassing or acquisition of ‘ill-gotten wealth’ is to be handed
down by a judicial tribunal, in this case the Sandiganbayan, upon complaint filed and
prosecuted by the PCGG.

1743. Trinidad v. CA

G.R. No. 75579 September 30, 1991 PARAS, J.

Article III, Section 22 of the 1987 Constitution: Ex Post Facto Laws and Bills of
Attainder

FACTS:

Petitioner, Atty. Tomas Trinidad, was charged with violation of Presidential

Decree 957 for non-delivery of title of a certain parcel of land. Herein petitioner
maintains that P.D. 957 impairs the obligations of the vendee (Ms. Dimabuyu) in the
contract to sell and that it is an ex post facto law as the provision thereof provides
retroactive effect.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Presidential Decree 957 is an ex-post facto law.

RULING:
No, Presidential Decree 957 is not ex post facto law. The act made
punishable thereunder is the failure of the owner-developer or administrator to deliver
the title of the lot or unit to the buyer upon full payment, not the execution of a deed of
sale or contract to sell over such lot or unit before the passage of the law. In the instant
case, although the contract to sell was executed long before the enactment of P.D.
957, the failure of appellant (herein petitioner) to deliver the title over the lot upon full
payment transpired when the decree was already in effect. Such law is not ex post
facto for the simple reason that what is being punished is the failure to deliver such title
after the enactment of the Decree on July 12, 1976.
1744. People v. Taguba

G.R. No. 95207-17 January 10, 1994 CRUZ, J.

Article III, Section 22 of the 1987 Constitution: Ex Post Facto Laws and Bills of
Attainder

FACTS:

Appellants Enrique Taguba and Mirafe Taguba were both charged with eight
counts of illegal recruitment and three counts of estafa in separate informations. The
appellants also contend that the penalty of life imprisonment for illegal recruitment
committed on a large scale is not applicable to them because the presidential decree
imposing this penalty was published in the Official Gazette only on February 10, 1986.
P.D. 2018 was thus not yet effective at the time of the alleged commission of the
crimes imputed to them and that the appellants can only be held guilty of eight counts
of illegal recruitment and penalized in accordance with Sec. 39 (c) of the Labor Code.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Presidential Decree 2018 is an ex-post facto law.

RULING:
Yes. P.D. 2018 cannot apply to the appellants retroactively as it would be
an ex post facto law to them. A law is ex post facto if it refers to a criminal act,
punishes an act which was innocent when done, and retroacts to the
disadvantage of the accused. In the case at bar, prior to the said date, recruiting on a
large scale was not yet punished with the penalty imposed in the said decree. The
Court agrees that the appellants cannot be convicted of illegal recruitment on a large
scale because only two of the complainants categorically testified that their recruitment
came after February 10, 1986. This was the date when P.D. 2018, the law defining and
penalizing illegal recruitment in a large scale, took effect.
1745. People vs. Sandiganbayan
211 SCRA 241
Ex Post Facto Laws and Bills of Attainder

Facts:

Ceferino Paredes, a provincial attorney, was alleged to have violated the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act for his actions during 1976. The information was only filed in
1989 and he argues that prescription of 10 years has already passed. However, in
1982, BP 195 was passed increasing the prescription to 15 years.

Issue:

Whether or not BP 195 is applicable to Paredes?

Ruling:

No. To apply BP 195 to Paredes would make it an ex post facto law for it would alter
his situation to his disadvantage by making him criminally liable for a crime that had
already been extinguished under the law existing when it was committed.
Main Point: An ex post facto law is a law passed after the occurrence of a fact or
commission of an act, which restrospectively changes the legal consequences or
relations of such fact or deed.

1746. Co vs. CA
Ex Post Facto Laws and Bills of Attainder
Facts:
Albino Co delivered to the salvaging firm a postdated check in 1983. When it was
deposited, the check was dishonored to closed account. The salvage company filed a
complaint for BP 22. The case eventuated in Co's conviction of the crime charged. He
argued on appeal that at the time of the issuance of the check on 1983, some 4 years
prior to the promulgation of the judgment in Que v. People on 1987, the delivery of a
"rubber" or "bouncing" check as guarantee for an obligation was not considered a
punishable offense, an official pronouncement made in a Circular of the Ministry of
Justice.
Issue:
Whether the SC decision can be applied retroactively to his prejudice?
Ruling:
No. Pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code "judicial decisions applying or interpreting
the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines." But
while our decisions form part of the law of the land, they are also subject to Article 4 of
the Civil Code which provides that "laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the
contrary is provided." This is expressed in the familiar legal maxim lex prospicit, non
respicit, the law looks forward not backward.
Main Point: The rationale against retroactivity is easy to perceive. The retroactive
application of a law usually divests rights that have already become vested or impairs
the obligations of contract and hence, is unconstitutional.

1747. Rosales vs. CA

Ex Post Facto Laws and Bills of Attainder
Facts:
Buensalida and Bulan were walking and the latter stopped at the fishbond of Leovigildo
Rosales to defecate. When Rosales saw this, he shot Bulan resulting to his death. This
happened in 1982. He was then charged with the crimes of Murder and Illegal
Possession of Firearms. However, after a year from said act, PD 1886 was passed
which increased the penalty for Illegal Possession of Firearms from reclusion temporal
to reclusion perpetua. Rosales invoked self-defense. The lower court dismissed his
defense for lack of unlawful aggression.
Issue:
Whether or not PD 1886 can apply to Rosales?
Ruling:
No. PD 1866 prescribing the higher penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum
period to reclusion perpetua approved on 29 June 1983 cannot be retroactively applied
in this case which transpired on 26 September 1982 inasmuch as this law is
unfavorable to the accused. SC affirms the penalty for murder but reduces the 2 nd
penalty to reclusion temporal.
Main Point: The increase of penalties is also considered to be an ex post facto law.

1748. Subido v. Sandiganbayan

266 SCRA 379
Ponente: Justice Davide, Jr.

Facts:
 Bayani Subido, Jr. (then a Commissioner of the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation) and Rene Parina (then a BID Special Agent), while in the
 performance of their official functions, caused the issuance and implementation
of a warrant of arrest against James J. Maksimuk, knowing full well that the BID
Decision requiring Maksimuk’s deportation had not yet become final and
executory considering the pendency of a Motion for Reconsideration. Maksimuk
was detained for 43 days, causing him undue injury.
 Subido and Parina were charged in the Sandiganbayan with Arbitrary Detention
for detaining Maksimuk.
 Subido and Parina filed a Motion to Quash, contending that in view of the
effectivity of R.A. No. 7975 (An Act to Strengthen the Functional and Structural
Organization of the Sandiganbayan, Amending for that Purpose Presidential
Decree No. 1606, as Amended) on May 6, 1995, amending P.D. No. 1606
(Revising Presidential Decree No. 1486 Creating a Special Court to be Known as
‘Sandiganbayan’ and for Other Purposes), the Sandiganbayan had no
jurisdiction over both the offense charged and the persons of the accused.
 R.A. No. 7975 should have been given prospective application; at the time
the case was filed, Subido was already a private person since he was
separated from the service, and Parina did not hold a position
corresponding to salary grade “27”.
 Petitioners contended that Subido was separated from the service before the
effectivity of R.A. No. 7975, hence retroactive application thereof would be
prejudicial to him. And at the time the information was filed, Parina was not
occupying a position corresponding to salary grade “27” or higher, as prescribed
by R.A. No. 6758 (Compensation and Classification Act of 1989).
 However, the prosecution argued that the basis of the Sandiganbayan’s
jurisdiction over the case was the position of the accused when the crime was
committed, not when the information was filed. Subido’s position as a
Commissioner of the Bureau of Immigration was classified even higher than
grade “27” under the Compensation and Classification Act of 1989.
Issue:
WON R.A. No. 7975 should be given retroactive application
Ruling:
Petitioners’ invocation of the prohibition against the retroactivity of penal laws is
misplaced. R.A. No. 7975 is NOT a penal law. Penal laws or statutes are those acts of
the legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violation;
define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for their punishment. R.A. No. 7975, in
further amending P.D. No. 1606 as regards the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction,
mode of appeal and other procedural matters, is clearly a PROCEDURAL law, i.e.
one which prescribes rules and forms of procedure of enforcing rights or obtaining
redress for their invasion, or those which refer to rules of procedure by which courts
applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice. As a procedural and
curative statute, R.A. No. 7975 may validly be given retroactive effect, there
being no impairment of contractual or vested rights.
1749. RAUL H. SESBREÑO, Petitioner, v. CENTRAL BOARD OF ASSESSMENT
APPEALS and THE CITY G.R. No. 106588. March 24, 1997
ASSESSOR OF CEBU CITY, Respondents.
Raul S. Sesbreño in his own behalf.
The Solicitor General for Respondents.

FACTS:

On April 3, 1980, petitioner purchased from Estrella Benedicto Tan two (2) parcels of
land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-55917 issued by the Register of
Deeds of Cebu City 3 and described in the deed of sale as follows: 

"A parcel of land (Lot 308 of the Cadastral Survey of Cebu), with the improvements
thereon, situated in the City of Cebu (formerly Municipality of Cebu), containing an area
of Forty Nine (49) square meters, more or less . . .

A parcel of land (Lot 309 of the Cadastral Survey of Cebu), with the improvements
thereon, situated in the City of Cebu, containing an area of Forty Eight (48) square
meters, more or less . . ."

The conveyance included "a residential house of strong materials constructed on the
lots above-mentioned" located in Cebu City.

Thereafter, petitioner declared the real property constructed on the said lots for
purposes of tax assessment as a residential house of strong materials with a floor area
of sixty (60) square meters. Effective in the year 1980, the declared property was
assessed by Respondent City Assessor of Cebu City under Tax Declaration No. 02-
20454 at a market value of P60,000.00 and an assessed value of P36,900.00. 

During a tax-mapping operation conducted in February 1989, the field inspectors of the
Cebu City Assessor discovered that the real property declared has excess portion not
declared by the petitioner that's why when they re-assessed the property value, it
increased to P499,860.00, of which the petitioner protested for being "excessive and
unconscionable".

The petitioner claims that Respondent CBAA err in considering the issue of back taxes,
the same being closely related to an error properly raised. The Respondent CBAA
applied Section 25 of PD 464 which had authorized the imposition of back taxes. 

The petitioner claims that Section 25 of PD 464 "refers solely to real estate declared for
the first time and does not apply to the area which, upon revision, has been shown to
be in excess of that which was formerly declared." The CBAA held that the area in
excess of that declared by the taxpayer was deemed declared for the first time upon its
discovery.
ISSUE:

WON P.D. 464 IS EX POST FACTO LAW?

HELD:

YES, 

Section 24 is the only applicable provision in cases where a taxpayer has eluded the
payment of the correct amount of taxes for more than nine (9) years, as in this case,
Section 25 of PD 464 which requires the payment of back taxes will be rendered
superfluous and nugatory. Such interpretation could not have been intended by the
law. It is a familiar rule in statutory construction that" (t)he legal provision being
therefore susceptible of two interpretations, we adopt the one in consonance with the
presumed intention of the legislature to give its enactments the most reasonable and
beneficial construction, the one that will render them operative and effective and
harmonious with other provisions of law."

Section 24 merely lays down the general rule that assessments under PD 464 are to
be given prospective application. It cannot be construed in such a manner as to
eliminate the imposition of back taxes. If Section 24, instead of Section 25, were made
to apply as suggested by petitioner, he would in effect be excused from the payment of
back taxes on the undeclared excess area of his property. The Court, clearly, cannot
allow a taxpayer to evade his obligation to the government by letting him pay taxes on
a property based on its gross undervaluation at P60,000.00, when the same had then
a current market value of P449,860.00.

WHERE A LEGAL PROVISION IS SUSCEPTIBLE OF TWO INTERPRETATIONS,

ONE WHICH IS IN CONSONANCE WITH THE PRESUMED INTENTION OF THE
LEGISLATURE SHOULD BE ADOPTED.

If Section 24 is the only applicable provision in cases where a taxpayer has

eluded the payment of the correct amount of taxes for more than nine (9) years, as in
this case, Section 25 of PD 464 which requires the payment of back taxes will be
rendered superfluous and nugatory. Such interpretation could not have been intended
by the law. It is a familiar rule in statutory construction that "the legal provision being
therefore susceptible of two interpretations, we adopt the one in consonance with the
presumed intention of the legislature to give its enactments the most reasonable and
beneficial construction, the one that will render them operative and effective and
harmonious with other provisions of law."
SECTION 25 THEREOF NOT PENAL IN CHARACTER, HENCE MAY NOT BE
CONSIDERED AN EX POST FACTO LAW.

When both Public Respondents CBAA and City Assessor imposed back taxes on
petitioner’s property, they did not violate the rule that laws shall have only prospective
applicability. Respondents were only applying PD 464 which had been in effect since
1974. Besides, Section 25 of PD 464 is not penal in character; hence, it may not be
considered as an ex post facts law.

1750People v Burton
268 SCRA 531 | February 19, 1997 | Panganiban
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE: People of the Philippines
ACCUSED-APPELLANT: William Robert Burton
FACTS:
British National William Burton was checked in at NAIA for his flight to Sydney,
Australia. When his luggage bags were being examined through the x-ray machine,
airport personnel saw that the sidings and bottom of the bags are darker in color which
made them doubt that something illegal was inside them. At the Customs Office at
NAIA, his bags were slashed and there 5.6 kilograms of hashish (a derivative of
marijuana) was found. During investigation, 4 blocks of the same substance was found
to be hidden in his shoes. The Trial Court convicted Burton of attempting to transport
prohibited drugs under Section 4, in relation to Section 21 of RA 6425. He was
sentenced to life imprisonment and a fine of P20,000.
In this current petition, Burton claims that that it was not proven that he knew that the
bags he had checked in at the airport contained a prohibited drug. The Court rejected
his defense and held that he did not successfully rebut the existence of animus
possidendi or knowledge of possession on his part when he was found to be in
possession of the hashish. The Court also held that the penalties imposed by the
Trial Court was correct because the retrospective application of Republic Act No.
7659, the heinous crimes law would prove more burdensome upon the accused
and would contradict the basic principle that all penal laws shall be interpreted
in favor of the accused.
ISSUE? W/N BURTON PLACE IN EXPOST FATO LAW ?–
RULING: NO
 The crime was committed on December 26, 1992 or about a year before
Republic Act No. 7659 (which imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death) came into effect on December 31, 1993.
  Retroactive application of said law would not be advantageous to the
accused in view of the increased range of penalty and conjunctive fine
prescribed, where the quantity of prohibited drugs is 750 grams or more.
o First, cases wherein life imprisonment is, unlike reclusion perpetua,
does not carry accessory penalties. In the event that Republic Act No.
7659 is applied retrospectively to the accused, he has to suffer not
only reclusion perpetua but also the accessory penalties.
o Second, the fine imposed upon appellant is the minimum imposable of
twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00), whereas if he were penalized
under the new law, he would have to bear the minimum fine of
P500,000.00. 
 Thus, retrospective application of Republic Act No. 7659, the heinous
crimes law would prove more burdensome upon the accused and would
contradict the basic principle that all penal laws shall be interpreted in
favor of the accused.
 MAIN POINT:IN THE CASE AT BAR: The crime was committed on
December 26, 1992 or about a year before Republic Act No. 7659 (which
imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death) came into effect on
December 31, 1993. Retroactive application of said law would not be
advantageous to the accused in view of the increased range of penalty and
conjunctive fine prescribed: 
o First, cases wherein life imprisonment is, unlike reclusion perpetua,
does not carry accessory penalties. In the event that Republic Act No.
7659 is applied retrospectively to the accused, he has to suffer not
only reclusion perpetua but also the accessory penalties.

1751. Lacson v. Executive Secretary,

GR 128096; January 20, 1999; Martinez, J.
Article III. Section 22. Ex Post Facto Laws and Bills of Attainder

FACTS:
Eleven (11) persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang
were slain by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group. Panfilo
Lacson was among those charged as principal in the information for murder before the
Sandiganbayan. He questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249
(defines the jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan), including Section 7 thereof which provides
that the said law "shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has not
begun as to the approval hereof.” He argued that the retroactive application of R.A.
8249 to the Kuratong Baleleng cases constitutes an ex post facto law for they are
deprived of their right to procedural due process as they can no longer avail of the two-
tiered appeal under RA 7975.

ISSUE:
Whether RA 8249 is an ex postt facto law.

RULING:
No. Ex post facto law, generally, prohibits retrospectivity of penal laws.
R.A. 8249 is not penal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not
penal in character. Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain
acts and establish penalties for their violations; or those that define crimes, treat of
their nature, and provide for their punishment. R.A 7975, which amended P.D. 1606
as regards the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other
procedural matters, has been declared by the Court as not a penal law, but
clearly a procedural statute, i.e. one which prescribes rules of procedure by which
courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice. Not being a penal
law, the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as
unconstitutional.

Note: An ex post facto law is one:

(a) which makes an act done criminal before the passing of the law and which
was innocent when committed, and punishes such action; or
(b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when it was committed; or
(c) which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law
annexed to the crime when it was committed;
 (d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or different
testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense in
order to convict the defendant;
(e) every law which, in relation to the offense or its consequences, alters the
situation of a person to his disadvantage:
(f) that which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only but in effect
imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right which when done was lawful; and
(g) deprives a person accused of crime of some lawful protection to which he has
become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a
proclamation of amnesty.

1752. People v. Nitafan

GR 107964-66; February 1, 1999; Martinez, J.
Article III. Section 22. Ex Post Facto Laws and Bills of Attainder

FACTS:
Three (3) criminal Informations for violation of Central Bank (CB) Circular were
filed against Imelda Marcos. Panel of Prosecutors and the Solicitor General petitioned
to have the cases consolidated with twenty-one (21) other pending cases alleging that
the indictable acts form part of and is related to the transactions devised by President
Marcos and Imelda to hide their ill-gotten wealth.
Without Imelda’s action or filing of any motion to quash, Judge Nitafan issued an
order requiring petitioners to show cause why the 3 new criminal charges should not be
dismissed on the ground that they violate Imelda’s right against ex post facto law.
Judge Nitafan subsequently dismissed the charges on the ground that the subject CB
Circular is an ex post facto law.

ISSUE:
 Whether the CB Circular is an ex post facto law.

RULING:
No. The Court ruled that every law carries with it the presumption of
constitutionality until otherwise declared. In this case, to rule that the CB
Circular is an ex post facto law is to say that it is unconstitutional. However,
neither Imelda Marcos nor the Solicitor General challenged it. The Supreme
Court, much more the lower courts, will not pass upon the constitutionality of a
statute or rule nor declare it void unless directly assailed in an appropriate
action.

1753. Fajardo v. CA, GR 128508 February 1, 1999

Ex Post Facto Laws and Bills of Attainder

Facts: The case is an appeal via certiorari taken by petitioner from a decision of the

Court of Appeals that denied due course to his motion for probation in Criminal Case
No. 14196 of the RTC arising from his conviction of violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22, for which he was sentenced to imprisonment of 8 months. During the
commission of the offense in 1981, application for probation is still allowed even upon
appeal based on PD No. 968. In 1986, PD 1990 amended PD 968 which prohibits
probation if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction. In
1988, the trial court convicted Fajardo of the crime charged and sentenced him to
suffer the penalty of PD 1990. Fajardo, however, still appealed his conviction. When he
lost the appeal, he filed motion for probation before the trial court contending that he
was eligible for probation because at the time he committed the offense in 1981, an
accused who had appealed his conviction was still qualified to apply for probation and
that the law that barred an application for probation of an accused who had interposed
an appeal was ex post facto in its application and hence, not applicable to him. The
trial court denied Fajardo’s motion for probation and so did CA.
Issue: Whether PD 1990 is an ex post facto law
Ruling: No. Presidential Decree No. 1990, is valid and the court upholds its
constitutionality. Presidential Decree No. 1990, enacted on October 5, 1985, “was
printed in Volume 81 of the Official Gazette dated December 30, 1985 but said
issue was released for circulation only on July 1, 1986 hence, PD 1990 became
effective after fifteen (15) days from July 1, 1986, in accordance with Article 2 of
the Civil Code, or on July 16, 1986.” It is not ex post facto in its application.
The law applies only to accused convicted after its effectivity. An ex post facto
law is one that punishes an act as a crime which was innocent at the time of its
commission. Presidential Decree No. 1990, like the Probation Law that it amends, is
not penal in character. It may not be considered as an ex post facto law.

1754.People v. Valdez, GR 127663 March 11, 1999

Ex Post Facto Laws and Bills of Attainder –

Facts: Accused was charged with the crime of murder committed on September 17,
1995. Trial court then rendered a decision convicting him of another crime of illegal
possession of firearms. On appeal, accused alleged that it should only be an
aggravating circumstance pursuant to RA8924 which was published on July 21, 1997.
RA No. 8294 took effect on July 6, 1997, Section 1 of RA No. 8294, which in part,
provides:
If homicide or murders is committed with the use of unlicensed firearm, such of
an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.

Issue: Whether the said law can be made applicable to the case at bar

Ruling: Yes, RA No. 8294 took effect on July 21, 1997. The crimes involved in the
case at bar were committed on September 17, 1995. As in the case of any penal
law, the provisions of Republic Act No. 8294 will generally have prospective
application. In cases, however, where the new law will be advantageous to the
accused, the law may be given retroactive application (Article 22, Revised Penal
Code). Insofar as it will spare accused-appellant in the case at bar from a
separate conviction for the crime of illegal possession of firearms, Republic Act
No. 8294 may be given retroactive application in case for Illegal Possession of
Firearm subject of this present review.
1755. PEOPLE vs. RINGOR
G.R. No. 123918, December 09, 1999

FACTS:
 Accused was charged with the crime of murder and illegal possession of firearm.
 Upon arraignment, he pleaded not guilty to both charges.
 During pendency of the case, R.A 8294 was enacted which provides that illegal
possession of firearm as an aggravating circumstance for the crime of murder or
homicide.
 After trial, the trial court would impose the maximum penalty of death for the
crime of murder with the aggravating circumstance of illegal possession of
firearm.
ISSUE:
Whether R.A. 8924 is an ex post facto law?
RULING:
Yes. The Court ruled that when the crime was committed by the accused, no law
provided for the raising of the punishment of murder from reclusion perpetua to death.
R.A. 8924 cannot be applied to the case of the accused as it would be an ex post facto
law.

1756. PEOPLE vs. MAGBANUA

G.R. No. 128888 December 03, 1999 Kapunan, J.

FACTS:
 Chraito Magbanua was charged with the crime of rape against his own daughter.
 The information filed against him would mention that the crime was committed
“sometime on the year 1991 and the days thereafter”.
  Upon his arraignment, he pleaded not guilty.
 During pendency of the case, R.A. 7659 (Death Penalty Law) was enacted.
 Magbanua was found guilty as charge and sentenced to death.
 He contends that the trial court erred when it applied RA 7659 retroactively.
ISSUE:
Whether RA 7659 is an ex post facto law?
RULING:
Yes. The Court ruled that RA 7659 cannot be applied retroactively because, to
do so, would go against the constitutional prohibition on ex post facto laws. For this
reason, in order for the death penalty to be imposable, it is incumbent upon the
prosecution to establish beyond a shadow of doubt that the case of the accused is
already covered by Republic Act No. 7659.
In this case, since the information alleges the crime was committed in 1991, RA
7659 cannot be applied to the case of the accused.

1757 Republic v. Desierto

GR 136506, Aug. 23, 2001
Art 3. Sec 22. Ex post facto laws and bills of attainder

FACTS:
Respondents were charged of violating RA3019 in which the alledged acts was
done before the enactment of the 1987 Constitution. The case was subsequently
dismissed by the OMB on the grounds of prescription. The OSG then filed an MR
alleging that the offense charged in the complaint falls within the category of an ill-
gotten wealth case which under the Constitution is imprescriptible pursuant to Sec. 15,
Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUE:
W/N ill-gotten wealth cases are imprescriptible

RULING:
No. Section 15 of Article XI of the Constitution applies only to civil actions for
recovery of ill-gotten wealth, and not to criminal cases such as the complaint against
the respondents in OMB-0-90-2808. Conversely, prescription of criminal cases are
governed by special laws on prescription. Furthermore, to construe Section 15,
Article XI of the 1987 Constitution to give it retroactive application to the private
respondents will run counter to another constitutional provision, that is, Section
22, Article III which provides that "No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall
be enacted."

1758. 1758 People v Torres

501 SCRA 591
Art 3. Sec 22. Ex post facto laws

FACTS
Torres was charged with violation of (R.A.) No. 6425, as amended, for unlawful
possession of marijuana (831.91 grams) and shabu(0.26 grams) in 2001. In 2002, RA
9165 amended RA 6425. The RTC rendered a joint decision convicting Dexter of the
offenses charged 2003. CA deleted the penalty imposed by RA 9165 and followed the
penalty in RA 6425

ISSUE
Whether or not RA 9165 application in this case is constitutional.

RULING
No. RA 9165(2002), increased the penalty for illegal possession of less than five
(5) grams of shabu to imprisonment of (12) years and (1) day to and a fine
(P300,000.00) to (P400,000.00). However, since this law is not favorable to appellant,
it cannot be given retroactive application in the instant case. The same law also
changed the penalty for illegal possession of 500 grams or more of marijuana to life
imprisonment to death, and a fine ranging from P500,000.00 to P10,000,000.00.
Obviously, the amendment of the penalty from reclusion perpetua to life imprisonment
to death in R.A. No. 9165 cannot, likewise, be applied retroactively to the present case
since it would also be unfavorable to appellant. 

MAIN POINT
Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the persons
guilty of felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of
Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws a final
sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.

1759.Salvador v. Mapa [2008]

Article III Section 22 – Ex post facto law and bills of attainders

FACTS
 When there were allegations of loans, guarantees, and other forms of financial
accommodations granted, directly or indirectly, by government-owned and controlled
bank, at the behest, command, or urging by previous government officials to the
disadvantage and detriment of the Philippine government, Pres. Ramos created an Ad-
Hoc FACT FINDING COMMITTEE ON BEHEST LOANS through AO 13 and expanded
its functions through Memorandum Order No. 61. Mapa, being one of the accused in
violation of RA 3019, assailed the orders on grounds of prescription, claiming that they
are ex post facto laws

ISSUE
Whether Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61 are ex
post facto laws.

RULING/MAIN POINT
No. The constitutional doctrine that outlaws an ex post facto law generally
prohibits the retrospectivity of penal laws. Penal laws are those acts of the
legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violations; or
those that define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for their punishment. The
subject administrative and memorandum orders clearly do not come within the shadow
of this definition. Administrative Order No. 13 creates the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-
Finding Committee on Behest Loans, and provides for its composition and functions. It
does not mete out penalty for the act of granting behest loans. Memorandum Order No.
61 merely provides a frame of reference for determining behest loans. Not being penal
laws, Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61 cannot be
characterized as ex post facto laws.

1760.ARepublic vs. Eugenio 545 SCRA 384

Art III Sec 22: Ex Post Facto Laws and Bills of Attainder

FACTS: Respondent Lilia Cheng argues that the Anti-Money Laundering Act, being a
substantive penal statute, has no retroactive effect and the bank inquiry order could not
apply to deposits or investments opened prior to the effectivity of Rep. Act No. 9160, or
on 17 October 2001. Thus, she concludes, her subject bank accounts, opened
between 1989 to 1990, could not be the subject of the bank inquiry order lest there be
a violation of the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws.

ISSUE: Whether or not the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws is
applicable with AMLA.

RULING and MAIN POINT: YES.

As applied to the AMLA, it is plain that no person may be prosecuted under the penal
provisions of the AMLA for acts committed prior to the enactment of the law on 17
October 2001. As much was understood by the lawmakers since they deliberated upon
the AMLA, and indeed there is no serious dispute on that point. This rule even
applies to the provision in the AMLA which merely authorizes the inspection of
suspect accounts and deposits.

1761. Virata vs. Sandiganbayan

Facts: the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Presidential Commission on

Good Government(PCGG), assisted by the Solicitor General, filed a complaint with the
respondent Sandiganbayan against Benjamin(Kokoy) Romualdez and 44 others for
recovery of "ill-gotten wealth consisting of funds and other property which they
unlawfully had acquired and accumulated in flagrant breach of trust and of their
fiduciary obligations as public officers, with grave abuse of rights and power and in
brazen violation of the Constitution and laws of the Republic of the Philippines, thus
resulting in their unjust enrichment during Defendant Ferdinand E. Marcos' 20 years of
rule. The Court Rules in favor of the people and Romuldez in a petitioner for certiorari
appealed to the Supreme court for review:

Issue: Whether or not the EOs creating the PCGG is an ex post facto/bill of attainder
law.

Ruling: No. The PCGG Charter (composed of Executive Orders Nos. 1, 2, and 14) is
not a bill of attainder or an ex post facto law. Our disquisitions in BASECO vs. PCGG,
supra., and PCGG vs. Peña, supra., unequivocally sustain and affirm the
constitutionality of the PCGG Charter. The SC held that the executive orders in
question are not bill of attainder. A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts
punishment without judicial trial. Its essence is the substitution of a legislative for a
judicial determination of guilt. In the first place, nothing in the executive orders can be
reasonably construed as a determination or declaration of guilt. On the contrary, the
executive orders, inclusive of Executive Order No. 14, make it perfectly clear that any
judgment of guilt in the amassing or acquisition of ‘ill-gotten wealth’ is to be handed
down by a judicial tribunal, in this case the Sandiganbayan, upon complaint filed and
prosecuted by the PCGG.

1762. Valeroso vs. People 546 SCRA 450

FACTS: Petitioner Valeroso was charged with the crime of illegal possession of
firearms and ammunition under the first paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as
amended. P.D. No. 1866 was the governing law at the time petitioner committed the
offense on July 10, 1996.  However, R.A. No. 8294 amended P.D. No. 1866 on July 6,
1997 during the pendency of the case in the trial court. It amended the penalty FROM
reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua TO prison correctional
in its maximum period and a fine of not less than P15,000. 
ISSUE: Whether or not the R.A. No. 8294 amending P.D. 1866 of the case shall apply
notwithstanding the crime being committed prior the amendment. 

RULING: YES. 
Although an additional fine of P15,000.00 is imposed by R.A. No. 8294, the same is
still advantageous to the accused, considering that the imprisonment is lowered to
prision correccional in its maximum period from reclusion temporal in its maximum
period to reclusion perpetua under P.D. No. 1866. 

MAIN POINT: As a general rule, penal laws should not have retroactive application,
lest they acquire the character of an ex post facto law. An exception to this rule,
however, is when the law is advantageous to the accused. 

1763. Presidential Ad Hoc Finding vs. Desierto 548 SCRA 295

Ex Post Facto Laws and Bills of Attainder
FACTS: The Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, as
created by Administrative Order No. 13 in 1992 by President Fidel Ramos, determined
questionable loan transactions by t the Members of the DBP Board of Governors and
the Directors and Officers of Integrated Circuits Philippines, Inc. (ICPI). Loans were
allegedly undercollateralized and was granted despite insufficiency of paid-up capital of
their recipients. The OMB however dismissed the case for insufficiency of probable
cause. The OMB added that the Admin Order No. 13 creating the Presidential Ad Hoc
Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans and related memorandums may not be
retroactively applied to the questioned transactions which took place in 1980 because
to do so would be tantamount to an ex post facto law which is proscribed by the
Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the OMB is correct in applying the rule of ex post facto law in
Admin Order No. 13 creating the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on
Behest Loans.
RULING: NO. Administrative Order No. 13 does not mete out a penalty for the act of
granting behest loans. It merely creates the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding
Committee on Behest Loans and provides for its composition and functions. Not being
a penal law, Administrative Order No. 13 cannot be characterized as ex post facto law.
MAIN POINT: The constitutional proscription of ex post facto laws is aimed against the
retrospectivity of PENAL LAWS.
1764. PCGG vs. Carpio Morales- 740 SCRA 368 (2014)
No Ex Post Facto Law or Bill of Attainder shall be passed
FACTS: It was discovered in January 4, 1993 that some loans of the RHC from DBP
bear the characteristics of a behest loan. PCGG, filed a Complaint on January 6, 2003
with the Office of the Ombudsman, against respondent directors and officers of RHC
and the directors of DBP for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Acting on the motion, the Ombudsman dismissed the complaint on the ground of
prescription, effectively denying the motion for reconsideration. In the said Order, the
Ombudsman stated that: In as much as the record indicates that the instant complaint
was filed with this office more than ten (10) years from the time the crimes were
discovered, the offenses charged herein had already prescribed. Aggrieved, petitioner
seeks recourse from this Court, arguing that contrary to the decision of the
Ombudsman, the offense has not yet prescribed. That Section 11 of RA 3019 sets the
prescription of offenses under said law at fifteen (15) years, 5 not ten (10) as held by
the Ombudsman.
ISSUE: WON respondent Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the Affidavit-Complaint dated January 6, 2003 on the ground of prescription.
RULING: NO. RA 3019, Section 11 provides that all offenses punishable under said
law shall prescribe in ten (10) years. This period was later increased to fifteen (15)
years with the passage of Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 195, which took effect on March
16, 1982. This does not mean, however, that the longer prescriptive period shall apply
to all violations of RA 3019. Following Our pronouncements in People v. Pacificador,
the rule is that "in the interpretation of the law on prescription of crimes, that
which is more favorable to the accused is to be adopted." As such, the longer
prescriptive period of 15 years pursuant to BP Blg. 195 cannot be applied to crimes
committed prior to the effectivity of the said amending law on March 16, 1982.