Plaintiff: Ramon Rallos

Defendant: Felix Go Chan & Sons Realty Corporation

Facts: Concepcion and Gerundia Rallos were sisters and registered co-owners of a
parcel of land known as Lot No. 5983 of the Cadastral Survey of Cebu covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 11116 of the Registry of Cebu.They executed a special
power of attorney in favor of their brother, Simeon Rallos, authorizing him to sell such
land for and in their behalf.  After Concepcion died, Simeon Rallos sold the undivided
shares of his sisters Concepcion and Gerundia to Felix Go Chan & Sons Realty
Corporation for the sum of P10,686.90. New TCTs were issued to the latter. Petitioner
Ramon Rallos, administrator of the Intestate Estate of Concepcion filed a complaint
praying (1) that the sale of the undivided share of the deceased Concepcion Rallos in
lot 5983 be unenforceable, and said share be reconveyed to her estate; (2) that the
Certificate of ‘title issued in the name of Felix Go Chan & Sons Realty Corporation be
cancelled and another title be issuedin the names of the corporation and the “Intestate
estate of Concepcion Rallos” in equal undivided and (3) that plaintiff be indemnified by
way of attorney’s fees and payment of costs of suit.

Issues:

1) WON sale was valid although it was executed after the death of the principal,
Concepcion.

Held:Sale of land was null and void insofar as the one-half pro-indiviso share of
Concepcion Rallos Ordered the issuance of new TCTs to respondent corporation and
the estate of Concepcion in theproportion of ½ share each pro-indiviso and the payment
of attorney’s fees and cost of litigation Respondent filed cross claim against Simon
Rallos(*Simon and Gerundia died during pendency of case) juan T. Borromeo,
administrator of the Estate of Simeon Rallos was ordered to pay defendant the price of
the ½ share of the land (P5,343.45) plus attorney’s fees [Borromeo filed a third party
complaint against Josefina Rallos, special administratrix of the Estate of  Gerundia]
Dismissed without prejudice to filing either a complaint against the regular administrator
of the  Estate of Gerundia Rallos or a claim in the Intestate-Estate of Cerundia Rallos,
covering the  same subject-matter
Nielson & Company, Inc. v. Lepanto
DOMINGO DE LA CRUZ vs. NORTHERN THEATRICAL
ENTERPRISES INC., ET AL.

Facts:
1941, The Northern Theatrical Enterprises Inc., a domestic corporation
operated a movie house in Laoag, Ilocos Norte. Domingo De La Cruz was
employed whose duties were to guard the main entrance, to maintain peace
and order and to report the commission of disorders within premises. He
carried a revolver.
Benjamin Martin wanted to crash the gate or entrance of the movie house.
Infuriated by the refusal of De la Cruz to let him in without first providing
himself with a ticket, Martin attacked him with a bolo. De la Cruz defendant
himself as best he could until he was cornered, at which moment to save
himself he shot Martin, resulting in Benjamin Martin’s death.
De la Cruz was charged with homicide. After a re-investigation conducted by
the Provincial Fiscal the latter filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, which
was granted by the court. De la Cruz was again accused of the same crime of
homicide. After trial, he was finally acquitted of the charge.
He then demanded from former employer to repay the expenses but was
refused thus filed present action against the Northern Theatrical Enterprises
Inc company and to three members of its Board of Directors to recover
amounts he had paid his lawyers including moral damages said to have been
suffered due to his worry, neglect of his interests and his family as well in the
supervision of the cultivation of his land, a total of P 15,000.
Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte rejected the theory of De la Cruz
because he was an agent of Northern Theatrical Enterprises Inc. and that as
such agent he was entitled to compensate the expenses incurred by him in
connection with the agency.
The court found and decided that De La Cruz had no cause of action and
dismissed the complaint without costs.

Issue:
Whether or not an agent who’s in the line of duty performs an act that resulted
in his incurring expenses caused by a stranger. May the latter recover the said
expenses against his former employer.

Held:
No, because the relationship between the Northern Theatrical Enterprises Inc.
and plaintiff was not that of principal and agent because the principle of
representation as a characteristic of agency was in no way involved. Plaintiff
was not employed to represent corporation in its dealings with third parties.
Plaintiff is a mere employee hired to perform a certain specific duty or task,
that of acting as a special guard and staying at the main entrance of the movie
house to stop gate crashers and to maintain peace and order within the
premises.

\\
Shell Company of the Philippines vs Firemen’s Insurance

FACTS:On September 3, 1947, a Plymouth car owned by Salvador R. Sison was brought to the
ShellGasoline and Service Station located at the Marques de Camillas and Isaac Peral Streets,
inManila for washing, greasing, and spraying. The said gas station was operated by Porfino de
laFuente. De la Fuente and Sison agreed to do service upon payment of Php 8.00 by the latter.
Thecar was placed on a hydraulic lifter for greasing. Some parts of the car couldn’t be reached
by thegreasemen, the lifter was lowered. While being lowered, the car swung and fell from
theplatform. The said car was insured against loss or damage by Firemen’s Insurance Company
ofNewark, New Jersey and Commercial Casualty Insurance Company, jointly for the sum of
Php10,000.00. The insurance companies after paying the sum of Php 1,651.38 for the damage
andcharging the balance of Php 100.00 to Salvador Sison in accordance with the terms of
theinsurance contract filed this action together with Sison for the recovery of the total amount
of thedamage from the defendants on the ground of negligence.

ISSUE:Whether De la Fuente, is an agent or independent contractor of the company?

HELD:The finding of the Court of Appeals that the operator was an agent of the company and
not anindependent contractor should not be disturbed.De la Fuente was merely an agent of the
station “by grace” of the defendant company whichcould and did remove him as it pleased;
that all the equipment needed to operate the station wasone owned by the company which
took charge of their proper care and maintenance despite thefact that they were loaned to
him; the company did not leave the fixing price for the gasoline tohim and the service station
belonged to the company and bore its trade name and the operator(De la Fuente) sold its
products. As the act of the agent or his employees acting within the scopeof authority, is the act
of the principal, the breach of undertaking by an agent makes the principalliable. The company
must answer for the negligent acts of its mechanic.
Africa, et al. v. Caltex Phils
G.R. No. L-12986, March 31, 1966, 16 SCRA 448

FACTS:

On March 18, 1948 a fire broke out at the Caltex service station at the corner of Antipolo street and
Rizal Avenue, Manila St. all started while a gasoline was being hosed from a tank truck into the
underground storage, right at the opening of the receiving tank where the nozzle of the hose was
inserted. The fire spread to and burned several neighboring house. The spouse Bernabe and heirs
of Domingo Ong herein petitioner, sued respondents Caltex (phils), Inc. and Mateo Boquiren on
negligence on the part of both of tyhem was attributed as the cause of the fire.

In the polioce and fire report they started that during the transferring of gasoline to the tank truck an
unknown Filipino Citizen lighted a cigarette and threw the burning match stick near the main valve of
the of the paid underground tank. Due to gasoline fumes, fire suddenly blazed. The respondents
contend that it is not their negligence why the fire broke. But there was no evidence presented to
prove this theory and no other explanation can be had as to the reason for the fire. Apparently also,
Caltex and the branch owner failed to install a concrete firewall to contain fire if in case one
happens.

ISSUE:

 WON Boquiron acts as an agent of Caltex, which therefore makes the latter
liable for the damages caused to appellants

RULING:

Caltex admits that it owned the gasoline station as well as the equipment
therein, but claims that the business conducted at the service station in
question was owned and operated by Boquiren. But Caltex did not present any
contract with Boquiren that would reveal the nature of their relationship at the
time of the fire. But there must have been one in existence at that time.
Instead, what was presented was a license agreement manifestly tailored for
purposes of this case, since it was entered into shortly before the expiration of
the one-year period it was intended to operate. This so-called license
agreement was executed on November 29, 1948, but made effective as of
January 1, 1948 so as to cover the date of the fire, namely, March 18, 1948.
This retroactivity provision is quite significant, and gives rise to the conclusion
that it was designed precisely to free Caltex from any responsibility with
respect to the fire, as shown by the clause that Caltex “shall not be liable for
any injury to person or property while in the property herein licensed, it being
understood and agreed that LICENSEE (Boquiren) is not an employee,
representative or agent of LICENSOR (Caltex).”

But even if the license agreement were to govern, Boquiren can hardly be
considered an independent contractor. Under that agreement Boquiren would
pay Caltex the purely nominal sum of P1.00 for the use of the premises and all
the equipment therein. He could sell only Caltex Products. Maintenance of the
station and its equipment was subject to the approval, in other words control,
of Caltex. Boquiren could not assign or transfer his rights as licensee without
the consent of Caltex. The license agreement was supposed to be from January
1, 1948 to December 31, 1948, and thereafter until terminated by Caltex upon
two days prior written notice. Caltex could at any time cancel and terminate
the agreement in case Boquiren ceased to sell Caltex products, or did not
conduct the business with due diligence, in the judgment of Caltex.
Termination of the contract was therefore a right granted only to Caltex but
not to Boquiren. These provisions of the contract show the extent of the
control of Caltex over Boquiren. The control was such that the latter was
virtually an employee of the former.

Taking into consideration these facts, the finding of the CA that the operator
was an agent of the company and not an independent contractor should not be
disturbed.

To determine the nature of a contract courts do not have or are not bound to
rely upon the name or title given it by the contracting parties, should thereby a
controversy as to what they really had intended to enter into, but the way the
contracting parties do or perform their respective obligations stipulated or
agreed upon may be shown and inquired into, and should such performance
conflict with the name or title given the contract by the parties, the former
must prevail over the latter
De la Peña v. Hidalgo,
Jai-Alai Corp vs BPI

FACTS:
Petitioner deposited 10 checks in its current account with BPI.  The checks which were
acquired by petitioner from Ramirez, a sales agent of the Inter-Island Gas were all
payable to Inter-Island Gas Service, Inc. or order.  After the checks had been submitted
to Inter-bank clearing, Inter-Island Gas discovered that all the indorsements made on
the checks purportedly by its cashiers were forgeries.  BPI thus debited the value of the
checks against petitioner's current account and forwarded to the latter the checks
containing the forged indorsements which petitioner refused to accept.
        
ISSUE:
Whether BPI had the right to debit from petitioner's current account the value of the
checks with the forged indorsements.

RULING:
BPI acted within legal bounds when it debited the petitioner's account.  Having indorsed
the checks to respondent bank, petitioner is deemed to have given the warranty
prescribed in Section 66 of the NIL that every single one of those checks "is genuine
and in all respects what it purports to be."  Respondent which relied upon the
petitioner's warranty should not be held liable for the resulting loss.