LEGAL TECHNIQUE

AND LOGIC
(Case Digests: Week 6-14)

Bañarez, Marc Alvin A.

Camacho, Jaecenee A.
De Leon, Caren M.
Galindez, Niña Lyka DV.

S 1:00 PM – 3:00 PM

WEEK 6
Page 1 of 370
 The Dissenting Opinion
1. Tan v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 16613-47, November 20, 2006.
2. Li v. Spouses Reynaldo and Soliman, G.R. No. 165279, June 7, 2011.
3. People v. Lopez, G.R. No. L-1243, April 14, 1947.
4. Tolentino v. Ongsiako, G.R. No. L-17938, April 30, 1963.
5. Ruiz v. Ucol, G.R. No. L-45404, August 7, 1987.
6. Cola-cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc., Sales Force Union-PTGWO-BALAIS v. Coca-cola Bottlers
Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 155651, July 28, 2005.
7. National Union of Workers in Hotels, Restaurants, and Allied Industries v. The National Labor
Relations Commission, G.R. No. 125561, March 6, 1998.
8. Intestate Estate of Jose B. Banzon v. Banzon, G.R. No. 27296, October 8, 1927.
9. Eraña v. Vera, G.R. No. 48955, July 27, 1943, Bocobo, dissenting.
10. Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, G.R. Nos. 92191-92, July 30,
1991, Padilla, dissenting.
11. Bengson III v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 142840, May 7, 2001.
12. Vera v. Avelino, G.R. No. L-543, August 31, 1946.
13. Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010.
14. In the Matter of the Charges of Plagiarism, Etc., Against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del
Castillo, A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, October 12, 2010.
15. Arroyo v. de Lima, G.R. No. 199046, November 15, 2011.
16. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1986).
17. Victorino Salcedo II v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 135886, August 16, 1999.
18. Continental Cement Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 88586, April 27, 1990.
19. Guerra Enterprises Company, Inc. v. Court of First Instance of Lanao del Sur, G.R. No. L-
28310, April 17, 1970.
20. Citizens Surety and Insurance Company, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-48958, June
28, 1988.
21. Meralco v. Castro-Bartolome, G.R. No. L-49623, June 29, 1982.
22. Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 73002, December 29, 1986.
23. Llamado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 84850, June 29, 1989.
24. Sanoh Fulton Phils., Inc. v. Bernardo, G.R. No. 187214, August 14, 2013.
25. Colinares v. People, G.R. No. 182748, December 13, 2011.
26. Dumduma v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 182606, October 4, 2011.

Ratio Decidendi and Obiter Dictum

1. Dario v. Mison, G.R. No. 81954, August 8, 1989.
2. Intramuros Tennis Club, Inc. v. Philippine Tourism Authority, G.R. No. 135630, September
26, 2000.
3. Chamber of Agriculture and Natural Resources of the Philippines, Inc. v. Central Bank of the
Philippines, G.R. No. L-23244, June 30, 1965.
4. Delta Motors Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121075, July 24, 1997.

Page 2 of 370
5. City of Manila v. Entote, G.R. No. L-24776, June 28, 1974.
6. Equatorial Realty Dev., Inc. v. Mayfair Theater, Inc., G.R. No. 16063, November 21, 1996.
7. Morales v. Paredes, G.R. No. L-34428, December 29, 1930.
8. Reagan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. L-26379, December 27, 1969.
9. American Home Assurance Co. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 120043,
July 24, 1996.
10. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power Corporation, G.R. No. 187485,
February 12, 2013.
11. Office of the Ombudsman v. Lisondra, G.R. No. 174054, March 7, 2008.
12. Lee v. Court of Appeals and De Simeon, G.R. No. L-28126, November 28, 1975.
13. Land Bank of the Philippines v. Suntay, G.R. No. 188376, December 14, 2011.
14. Roxas & Company, Inc. v. DAMBA-NSFW, G.R. No. 149548, December 4, 2009.
15. Villanueva, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 142947, March 19, 2002.
16. Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. v. Central Bank, G.R. No. L-12610, October 25, 1963.
17. Oposa v. Factoran, G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993.
18. Arigo v. Swift, G.R. No. 206510, September 16, 2014.
19. Mercado v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 149375, November 26, 2002.
20. People v. Omotoy, G.R. No. 112719, January 29, 1997.
21. Lhuillier v. British Airways, G.R. No. 171092, March 15, 2010.
22. Santos III v. Northwest Orient Airlines, G.R. No. 101538, June 23, 1992.
23. Partido ng Manggagawa (PM) and Butil Farmers Party (BUTIL) v. Commission on Elections,
G.R. No. 164702, March 15, 2006.
24. Tadeja v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 145336, February 20, 2013.
25. Spouses Leonardo and Milagros Chua v. Ang et al., G.R. No. 156164, September 4, 2009.
26. Citizen’s Battle against Corruption v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 172103, April 13,
2007.
27. Provincial Assessor of Marinduque v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 170532, April 30, 2009.
28. In re Petition for Radio and Television Coverage of the Multiple Murder Cases against
Maguindanao Governor Zaldy Ampatuan, A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC, October 23, 2012.

Tan v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 16613-47, November 20, 2006.

Page 3 of 370
FACTS:
The complainants are from Negros Occidental province. Case involves petition
contesting the constitutionality of RA No. 885, An Act Creating a New Province in the Island of
Negros to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte, effective Dec. 3, 1985. Pursuant to
and in implementation of this law, the COMELEC scheduled a plebiscite for January 3, 1986 on
the proposed new province. The plebiscite resulted in the affirmative votes thus the
proclamation of the new province known as Negros del Norte.

ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not as residents of the parent province, the citizens should be included in
the plebiscite as the constitution provides that it should be conducted in the affected area?

(2)They also question the constitutionality of the law as the territory did not reach the
required minimum of 2500 sq.km?

RULINGS:
(1): The Supreme Court held the citizens of the parent province should also be included
in the plebiscite as they are also affected by the division of the province. This division will cause
an alteration to the parent province’s territorial boundaries, political units as well as may have
adverse economic effects.

(2): Based on records, it was proved that the territorial boundaries of the new province
will not reach the required minimum of 3500 sq.km. As such, the Supreme Court ruled that RA
No. 885 is unconstitutional.

Li v. Spouses Reynaldo and Soliman, G.R. No. 165279, June 7, 2011.

Page 4 of 370
FACTS:
On July 7, 1993, respondent’s 11-year old daughter, Angelica Soliman, underwent a
biopsy of the mass located in her lower extremity at the St. Lukes Medical Center (SLMC).
Results showed that Angelica was suffering fromosteosarcoma,osteoblastic type,a high-grade
(highly malignant) cancer of the bone which usually afflicts teenage children.Angelica’s right leg
was amputated by Dr. Jaime Tamayo in order to remove the tumor. As adjuvant treatment to
eliminate any remaining cancer cells, chemotherapy was suggested by Dr. Tamayo. Dr.
Tamayo referred Angelica to another doctor at SLMC, herein petitioner Dr. Rubi Li, a medical
oncologist.

On 1993, Angelica was admitted to SLMC. However, she died on September 1, 1993,
just eleven (11) days after the (intravenous) administration of the first cycle of the chemotherapy
regimen.

On 1994, respondents filed a damage suit against petitioner, Dr. Leo Marbella, Mr. Jose
Ledesma, a certain Dr. Arriete and SLMC. Respondents charged them with negligence and
disregard of Angelicas safety, health and welfare by their careless administration of the
chemotherapy drugs, their failure to observe the essential precautions in detecting early the
symptoms of fatal blood platelet decrease and stopping early on the chemotherapy, which
bleeding led to hypovolemic shock that caused Angelicas untimely demise.
On her part, Dr. Balmaceda declared that it is the physicians duty to inform and explain to the
patient or his relatives every known side effect of the procedure or therapeutic agents to be
administered, before securing the consent of the patient or his relatives to such procedure or
therapy. Dr. Balmaceda stressed that the patient or relatives must be informed of all known side
effects based on studies and observations, even if such will aggravate the patients condition.
In dismissing the complaint, the trial court held that petitioner was not liable for damages as she
observed the best known procedures and employed her highest skill and knowledge in the
administration of chemotherapy drugs on Angelica but despite all efforts said patient died.

ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner can be held liable for failure to fully disclose serious side effects
to the parents of the child patient.

RULING:
No. There are four essential elements a plaintiff must prove in a malpractice action
based upon the doctrine of informed consent: "(1) the physician had a duty to disclose material
risks; (2) he failed to disclose or inadequately disclosed those risks; (3) as a direct and
proximate result of the failure to disclose, the patient consented to treatment she otherwise
would not have consented to; and (4) plaintiff was injured by the proposed treatment." Informed
consent case requires the plaintiff to "point to significant undisclosed information relating to the
treatment that would alter her decision to undergo. The physician is not expected to give the
patient a short medical education, the disclosure rule only requires of him a reasonable general
explanation in nontechnical terms. Some justices wrote dissenting opinions and the reasons
thereof.

People v. Lopez, G.R. No. L-1243, April 14, 1947.

Page 5 of 370
FACTS:
Solicitor General Lorenzo M. Tañada, as head of the Office of Special Prosecutors, and
Prosecutors Juan R. Liwag and Pedro C. Quinto filed, in the name of the People of the
Philippines, a petition praying that a writ of prohibition be issued commanding Associate Judge
Eusebio M. Lopez, of the Second Division of the People's Court, "to desist from further
proceedings in, or further exercising his jurisdiction in the trial of, and from otherwise taking
further cognizance of criminal cases for treason against Benigno S. Aquino (No. 3527) and
against Antonio de las Alas (No. 3531), and other treason cases of the same nature actually
pending before the Second Division of the People's Court or in any other division where he may
hereafter be assigned, and declaring him disqualified to sit therein”.

On March 14, 1946, an information for treason was filed in criminal case No. 3534
against Guillermo B. Francisco. The accused entered his plea of not guilty and the case was
heard on diverse days in the months of June and July, 1946, before the Second Division of the
People's Court, composed of Associates Judges Salvador Abad Santos and Jose P. Veluz and
the Judge Eusebio Lopez.chanroble

IISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Lopez had shown an impartiality as regard the decision in the
pending case of his political collaborators?

RULING:
The action of Judge Lopez in accepting a position in the People's Court, entrusted to
enforce laws which he believes unforceable and to pass judgment on the guilt or innocence of
many accused whom he believed from the very beginning to be not guilty and hailed to be
patriots or heroes, is not beyond reproach and may give the implication that he accepted the
position to favor said accused, the drafters of the law creating the People's Court must have
foreseen the possibility of such a means of avoiding possible miscarriage of justice through
unipersonal judicial actuations.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Tolentino v. Ongsiako, G.R. No. L-17938, April 30, 1963.

Page 6 of 370
FACTS:
Esperidion Tolentino filed a complant on May 20, 1959, with the court of First Instance of
Nueva Ecija in attempt to cause the enforcement of the dissenting opinion rendered in the case
entitled “ Severino Domingo, et.al. V Ongsiako, et. al.

The decision in the case was promulgated by the Supreme Court on December 4, 1930,
and together with the dissenting opinion, appears in Volume 55 of the Philippine Reports,
starting on page 36. The records of the case were lost or destroyed during the war.

Tolentino, claiming to be successor-interest of the late Domingo Severino,, avers that

the decision of the majority of the Court was erroneous na dunjust, that the diseenting opinion is
the correct view of the case and should be enforced.

The lower court, on motion if the several defendants, dismissed the complaint of
Tolentno ( plaintiff-appellant) for lack of cause of action.

Not satisfied, the plaintiff-appellant interposed the present appeal and asserted that the
failure of service of copy of the decision upon the late Severino Domingo was a denial of due
process, which will invalidate the decision, and asks that the present case be heard coram
nobis.

ISSUE:
Whether or not an action for the enforcement of a dissenting opinion may be filed before
the court

 RULING:
No because a dissenting opinion merits no right or claim as it is just merely a dissent
from the majority decision of the case.(2) Appellant is barred from assailing the decision of the
court by res judicata and the decision has already been final and executory already.

Ruiz v. Ucol, G.R. No. L-45404, August 7, 1987.

Page 7 of 370
FACTS:
The petitioner’s laundrywoman filed an administrative complaint against the respondent
who alleged that the petitioner is using the laundrywoman in retaliation for the charges filed by
the respondent against petitioner. The case was dismissed by the court. The petitioner filed a
case of libel against the respondent which was likewise dismissed. The petitioner again filed for
damages based on the information in the case of libel which the court dismissed on grounds of
res judicata. On one hand, Ucol files an appeal for certiorari questioning the dissenting opinion
of the CA.

ISSUE:
WON an appeal may be filed questioning a court’s dissenting opinion?

RULING:
It would be elementary to know that a dissenting opinion is not the decision of the case.
What is subject to appeal or a special civil action would be the majority opinion of the court.

Cola-cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc., Sales Force Union-PTGWO-BALAIS v. Coca-cola

Bottlers Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 155651, July 28, 2005.

Page 8 of 370
FACTS:
Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals Decision
affirming the Decision of the panel of voluntary arbitrators (Panel) of the National Conciliation
Mediation Board (NCMB) for the reason that the Panel decision had already attained finality.

The Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. Sales Force Union-PTGWO is a legitimate labor
organization duly registered with the Department of Labor and Employment. On the other hand,
the respondent company is a domestic corporation duly organized and existing under the laws
of the Philippines and is engaged in the manufacture and distribution of its soft drink products.

The UNION staged a strike. Acting on it, the Board set the parties to a voluntary
settlement of the case via a Memorandum of Agreement signed by them as regards
remunerations. The respondent granted a fixed amount of P4,000.00 only, eliminating thereby
the said 50% employee's average commission for the last six months for members of the union.
With this, the union submitted its grievance to the respondent. No settlement was reached,
hence, the case was then referred to a Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators.

In denying the claim of the Union for the payment of the additional 50% of the average
commission for the last six months, the respondent argues that the said MOA is not applicable
since the company did not grant Christmas bonus in 1999.

After hearing and the submission of evidence and position papers, the Arbitration Panel
composed of Apron Mangabat and Noel Sanchez, as chairman and member, respectively,
denied petitioner's claim and declared that the P4,000.00 given as ex gratia is not a bonus,
while Arnel Dolendo, another member dissented.

A copy of this Decision dated 21 January 2001 was received by petitioner's counsel.
Petitioner filed an "Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation with Motion" where it essentially questioned
the validity of the decision, opining that "the Panel's decision without such dissenting and
separate opinion attached thereto makes the decision incomplete and prematurely issued

ISSUE:
Whether or not the dissenting was final even without dissenting opinion.

RULING:
The Decision of the Panel was in the form of a dismissal of petitioner's complaint.
Naturally, this dismissal was contained in the main decision and not in the dissenting opinion.
Thus, under Section 6, Rule VII of the same guidelines implementing Article 262-A of the Labor
Code, this Decision, as a matter of course, would become final and executory after ten (10)
calendar days from receipt of copies of the decision by the parties even without receipt of the
dissenting opinion unless, in the meantime, a motion for reconsideration or a Petition for Review
to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court is filed within the same 10-day
period. As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, a dissenting opinion is not binding on
the parties as it is a mere expression of the individual view of the dissenting member from the
conclusion held by the majority of the Court.

National Union of Workers in Hotels, Restaurants, and Allied Industries v. The National
Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 125561, March 6, 1998.

Page 9 of 370
FACTS:
The principal parties involved in this labor dispute are petitioner National Union of
Workers in Hotels, Restaurants and Allied Industries (NUWHRAIN) - The Peninsula Manila
Chapter (the Junta, for brevity); the NUWHRAIN - The Peninsula Manila Rank and File Chapter
(the Union, for short); and private respondent, The Peninsula Manila (hereafter, the Hotel). The
union members submitted a letter-petition which demands for the resignation of the incumbent
union officers on the ground that the latter were purportedly abusive and neglectful of their
duties. Due to this, a faction of the Union conducted what was ostensibly an impeachment
proceeding, causing the removal from office of the incumbent officers headed by Genato. The
faction proclaimed itself as the Interim Union Junta, now the petitioners in this case.
The Junta conducted the election resulting in the choice of a set of officers led by petitioner
Melvin Cowan, but which the supposedly impeached employees, the Union's national office,
and the Hotel refused to recognize.

On August 10, 1993, a notice of strike was filed by the Junta before the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) based on alleged acts of the Hotel consisting unfair
labor practice, particularly, discrimination, undue interference in the exercise of the right to self-
organization, and bias in favor of the impeached officers. The NCMB dismissed said notice on
the ground that the imputed ULP acts were mere conflicts between two sets of union officers or
intra-union disputes, and, being categorized under the nomenclature of "non-strikeable acts,"
fall under the jurisdiction of the appropriate office of the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE). The NCMB likewise ordered that the notice of strike be reduced to a preventive
mediation case to be subjected to conciliation and mediation proceedings.

The Union, headed by Genato, filed a petition for injunction in the DOLE to enjoin the
Junta from usurping the functions of the rightful officers. On the other hand, the Hotel filed a
petition for interpleader and declaratory relief so that it may be properly guided on which of the
two sets of officers, the Genato group or the Cowan group, it should recognize and deal with in
matters pertaining to the CBA

Junta filed a second notice of strike on September 9, 1993.  This notice of strike was
likewise dismissed by the NCMB as the grounds were found to be mere amplifications of those
alleged in the preceding notice which is unstrikable.

In a dissent from the decision of the majority, the opinion was advanced that the strike
was legal because it was premised on a valid ground, particularly, the belief of the workers in
good faith that there existed ULP acts constituting a cause to strike. 

ISSUE:
Whether or not the arbitration decision was final even without receipt of dissenting
opinion.

RULING:
A dissenting opinion is not binding as it is a mere expression of the individual view of a
commissioner who disagrees with the conclusion of the majority of the members of the NLRC
division concerned.

Intestate Estate of Jose B. Banzon v. Banzon, G.R. No. 27296, October 8, 1927.

FACTS:

Page 10 of 370
 This case is an appeal taken by Trinidad Gonzales, as judicial administratrix of the
intestate estate of Jose B. Banzon, from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Bataan
absolving the defendants from the complaint, with the exception of Mariano B. Banzon, who was
ordered to indemnify the plaintiff.

This controversy deals with two irrigation canals crossing a tract of land belonging to the
said intestate estate of Jose B. Banzon.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Mariano Banzon or Jose Banzon has the right to the easement.

RULING:
Mariano B. Banzon has complied with these requirements. It has been proved that he
was granted the use of 50 liters of water per second from the Talisay River, a sufficient amount
to irrigate his land; that the passage opened by him is the most convenient and least onerous to
third parties, and that he is willing to indemnify the intestate estate of Jose B. Banzon, owner of
the servient estate, as the courts may determine.chan

Mariano B. Banzon has the right, after paying the proper indemnity, to conduct water
from the Talisay River through the land known as lot No. 362 herein involved, belonging to the
intestate estate of Jose B. Banzon, by opening up a canal similar to the second one here in
question.cha

But it does not appear that the first canal was opened in accordance with the provisions
of article 558 in connection with article 557 of the Civil Code above quoted, and of article 118 of
the law of Waters if August 3, 1866. Nor has a counterclaim been filed with respect to it.ch

In the ruling, Justice Johns and Justice Malcom dissented and stated that “we are
conscious of the fact that our time is wasted in the writing of dissenting opinions. Be that as it
may, we are again forced to dissent.”

Eraña v. Vera, G.R. No. 48955, July 27, 1943, Bocobo, dissenting.

FACTS:

Page 11 of 370
 Respondent Marie Josephine Panzani was charged in the Court of First Instance of
Manila with the crime of murder committed against Dr. Francisco Eraña and with the crime of
frustrated murder committed against Bienvenido B. Eraña. In these two criminal cases, the
offended parties reserved their right to institute a separate civil action for the civil liability arising
from the two crimes charged. The same respondent was charged in the same court in another
criminal case with estafa wherein the right to institute a separate civil action was not waived nor
reserved by the offended persons.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a court, acting on a criminal case, has authority to grant preliminary
attachment.

RULING:
Judgment is, therefore, rendered declaring the respondent Court with authority to grant
preliminary writ of attachment in the estafa case wherein the civil action arising from the offense
charged is deemed instituted, and the respondent Court is hereby ordered to act upon the
merits of the motion for preliminary attachment filed therein by the offended parties. With
respect, however, to the criminal cases for murder and frustrated murder, the respondent is
declared to be without authority to issue preliminary writs of attachment therein, and,
accordingly, its order to that effect is valid.

Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, G.R. Nos. 92191-92, July 30,
1991, Padilla, dissenting.

FACTS:

Page 12 of 370
 Petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside and reversal of a decision of
the (HRET). HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and
a resident of Northern Samar Northern Samar for voting purposes.

On 1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar was held.
Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative are the petitioners, Sixto
Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong Jr.

Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of
Northern Samar.

Petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent premised on the
following grounds: Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines and not a
resident of the second district of Northern Samar

ISSUE:
Whether or not, in making that determination, the HRET acted with grave abuse of
discretion.

RULING:
The records show that in the year 1895, the private respondent's grandfather, Ong Te,
arrived in the Philippines from China.

To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when he

came of age is to ask for the unnatural and unnecessary.  The reason is obvious.  He was
already a citizen.  Not only was his mother anatural born citizen but his father had been
naturalized when the respondent was only nine (9) years old.

The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage.  He has
established his life here in the Philippines. For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent
who cannot be expected to have elected citizenship as they were already citizens, we apply the
In Re Mallare rule.

The filing of a sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirement for those who still
have to elect citizenship.  For those already Filipinos when the time to elect came up, there are
acts of deliberate choice which cannot be... less binding.  Entering a profession open only to
Filipinos, serving in public office where citizenship is a qualification, voting during election time,
running for public office, and other categorical acts of similar nature are themselves formal
manifestations... of choice for these persons.

We repeat that any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of the private respondent
would not only have been superfluous but it would also have resulted in an absurdity.  The
respondent HRET has an interesting view as to how Mr. Ong elected citizenship.  It observed
that "when protestee was only nine years of age, his father, Jose Ong Chuan became a
naturalized Filipino.  Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Act squarely applies its benefit to
him for he was then a minor residing in this country.  Concededly, it was the law itself that had...
already elected Philippine citizenship for protestee by declaring him as such.

Bengson III v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 142840, May 7, 2001.

FACTS:

Page 13 of 370
 The citizenship of Teodoro Cruz, a member of the HOR, is being questioned on the
ground that he is not a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.

Cruz was born in the Philippines in 1960, the time when the acquisition of citizenship
rule was still jus soli. However, he enlisted to the US Marine Corps and he was naturalized as
US citizen in connection therewith. He reacquired Philippine citizenship through repatriation
under RA 2630 and ran for and was elected as a representative. When his nationality was
questioned by petitioner, the HRET decided that Cruz was a natural born citizen of the
Philippines.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Cruz is a natural born citizen of the Philippines.

RULING:
Yes. Natural-born citizens "are those citizens of the Philippines from birth without having
to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship." On the other hand,
naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens through naturalization,
generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization
Law, which repealed the former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and by Republic Act No.
530.11 To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possesses all the qualifications12
and none of the disqualification.

Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the
manner provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three modes
by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2)
by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.

Vera v. Avelino, G.R. No. L-543, August 31, 1946.

FACTS:

Page 14 of 370
 The COMELEC submitted its report regarding the national elections to the President and
Congress. The report states that the voting in the provinces of Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Bulacan
and Tarlac did not reflect the true and free expression of the popular will because of the acts of
terrorism and violence. Consequently, Jose Vera, Ramon Diokno, and Jose Romero (the
petitioners), who had been included among the sixteen candidates for senator receiving the
highest number of votes shall not be sworn, nor seated, as members of the chamber. The
petitioners brought an action to compel the respondents to permit them to occupy their seats,
and to exercise their senatorial prerogatives.

ISSUE :
Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the case.

RULING:
No, because no court has ever held and will ever hold that it possesses power to direct
the Chief Executive or the Legislature or a branch thereof to take any particular action. The rule
is non-interference. The Court could not order one branch of the Legislative to reinstate a
member thereof. To do so would be to establish judicial predominance, and to upset the classic
pattern of checks and balances wisely woven into our institutional setup.

Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010.

FACTS:

Page 15 of 370
 Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock, non-profit organization
registered with the SEC, established for the purpose of providing aid to the victims of rape by
Japanese military forces in the Philippines during the Second World War.

Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached the Executive Department
through the DOJ, DFA, and OSG, requesting assistance in filing a claim against the Japanese
officials and military officers who ordered the establishment of the “comfort women” stations in
the Philippines. But officials of the Executive Department declined to assist the petitioners, and
took the position that the individual claims of the comfort women for compensation had already
been fully satisfied by Japan’s compliance with the Peace Treaty between the Philippines and
Japan.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Executive Department committed grave abuse of discretion in not
espousing petitioners’ claims for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan.

RULING:
Petition lacks merit. From a Domestic Law Perspective, the Executive Department has
the exclusive prerogative to determine whether to espouse petitioners’ claims against Japan.

From a municipal law perspective, certiorari will not lie. As a general principle, where
such an extraordinary length of time has lapsed between the treaty’s conclusion and our
consideration – the Executive must be given ample discretion to assess the foreign policy
considerations of espousing a claim against Japan, from the standpoint of both the interests of
the petitioners and those of the Republic, and decide on that basis if apologies are sufficient,
and whether further steps are appropriate or necessary.

In the international sphere, traditionally, the only means available for individuals to bring
a claim within the international legal system has been when the individual is able to persuade a
government to bring a claim on the individual’s behalf. By taking up the case of one of its
subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings on his behalf,
a State is in reality asserting its own right to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for the
rules of international law.

Within the limits prescribed by international law, a State may exercise diplomatic
protection by whatever means and to whatever extent it thinks fit, for it is its own right that the
State is asserting. Should the natural or legal person on whose behalf it is acting consider that
their rights are not adequately protected, they have no remedy in international law. All they can
do is resort to national law, if means are available, with a view to furthering their cause or
obtaining redress. All these questions remain within the province of municipal law and do not
affect the position internationally.

In the Matter of the Charges of Plagiarism, Etc., Against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del
Castillo, A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, October 12, 2010.

FACTS:

Page 16 of 370
 In the landmark decision of Vinuya vs. Executive Secretary, G.R. No.
162230, promulgated last April 28, 2010, the Supreme Court DISMISSED the petition filed by a
group of Filipino “comfort women” during the Japanese military occupation of the Philippines.
The Court, speaking through Justice Mariano C. del Castillo, held that the petition seeking to
compel the Executive Department to espouse the petitioners’ claims for official apology and
other forms of reparations against Japan before the International Court of Justice and other
international tribunals has NO MERIT because: (1) the prerogative to determine whether to
espouse petitioners’ claims against Japan belongs exclusively to the Executive Department; and
(2) the Philippines is not under any international obligation to espouse the petitioners’ claims.

Discontented with the foregoing decision, the petitioners in Vinuya filed a motion for
reconsideration. Subsequently, they also filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration, this
time accusing the Justice del Castillo of plagiarizing (copying without attribution) and twisting
passages from foreign legal articles to support the Court’s position in the Vinuya decision.

The Court then referred the charges against Justice Del Castillo to its Committee on

Ethics and Ethical Standards, chaired by Chief Justice Renato Corona, for investigation and
recommendation. After the proceedings before it, the Committee submitted its findings and
recommendations to the Court en banc, which then treated and decided the controversy as an
administrative matter.

ISSUE:
Whether or not  Justice Del Castillo, in writing the opinion for the Court in
the Vinuya case, plagiarize the published works of authors Tams, Criddle-Descent, and Ellis.

RULING:
NO, Justice Del Castillo, in writing the opinion for the Court in the Vinuya case, did NOT
plagiarize the published works of authors Tams, Criddle-Descent, and Ellis. Court believes that
whether or not the footnote is sufficiently detailed, so as to satisfy the footnoting standards of
counsel for petitioners is not an ethical matter but one concerning clarity of writing.  The
statement “See Tams, Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law (2005)” in
the Vinuya decision is an attribution no matter if Tams thought that it gave him somewhat less
credit than he deserved.  Such attribution altogether negates the idea that Justice Del Castillo
passed off the challenged passages as his own.   

The explanation came from one of Justice Del Castillo’s researchers, a court-employed
attorney. She explained how she accidentally deleted the attributions, originally planted in the
beginning drafts of her report to him, which report eventually became the working draft of the
decision.   She said that, for most parts, she did her research electronically.  For international
materials, she sourced these mainly from Westlaw, an online research service for legal and law-
related materials to which the Court subscribes. The researcher showed the Committee the
early drafts of her report in the Vinuya case and these included the passages lifted from the
separate articles of Criddle-Descent and of Ellis with proper attributions to these authors.  But,
as it happened, in the course of editing and cleaning up her draft, the researcher accidentally
deleted the attributions.

Arroyo v. de Lima, G.R. No. 199046, November 15, 2011.

FACTS:

Page 17 of 370
 On August 15, 2011, the Comelec and the DOJ issued Joint Order No. 001-2011
creating and constituting a Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team (Joint Panel) on the 2004
and 2007 National Elections electoral fraud and manipulation cases.

In its Initial Report, the Fact-Finding Team concluded that manipulation of the results in
the May 14, 2007 senatorial elections in the provinces of North and South Cotabato, and
Maguindanao was indeed perpetrated. The Fact-Finding Team recommended,that petitioner
Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr.be subjected to preliminary investigation for electoral sabotage for
conspiring to manipulate the election results in North and South Cotabato; that GMA and Abalos
for manipulating the election results in Maguindanao; and, that Mike Arroyo be subjected to
further investigation.

Senator Pimentel filed a Complaint Affidavit for Electoral Sabotage against petitioners
and twelve others, and several John Does and Jane Does.. Thereafter, petitioners filed before
the Court separate Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction assailing the creation
of the Joint Panel. The Joint Committee promulgated a Joint Resolution which was later
indorsed to the Comelec. The Comelec en banc issued a Resolution approving and adopting
the Joint Resolution subject to modifications. The Comelec resolved, among others, that an
information for electoral sabotage be filed against GMA and Abalos, while the charges against
Mike Arroyo be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the creation of Joint Panel is valid.

RULING:
Yes. This is not the first time that the Court is confronted with the issue of whether the
Comelec has the exclusive power to investigate and prosecute cases of violations of election
laws. In Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) Party-List
v. Commission on Elections, the constitutionality of Section 43of RA 9369 had already been
raised by petitioners therein and addressed by the Court. While recognizing the Comelecs
exclusive power to investigate and prosecute cases under Batas Pambansa Bilang 881 or the
Omnibus Election Code, the Court pointed out that the framers of the 1987 Constitution did not
have such intention. This exclusivity is thus a legislative enactment that can very well be
amended by Section 43 of RA 9369. Therefore, under the present law, the Comelec and other
prosecuting arms of the government, such as the DOJ, now exercise concurrent jurisdiction in
the investigation and prosecution of election offenses.

Comelec Resolution No. 3467 was issued when Section 265 of the Omnibus Election
Code was still effective, while Joint Order No. 001-2011 as well as Comelec Resolution Nos.
8733and 9057mentioned in the assailed decision but missed out by GMA in her motion, were
issued during the effectivity of Section 43 of RA 9369, giving the Comelec and other prosecuting
arms of the government the concurrent jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute election
offenses. This amendment paved the way for the discrepancy.

United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1986).

FACTS: 

Page 18 of 370
VMI was the sole single-sexed school among Virginia’s 15 public institutions. VMI’s mission is to
produce “citizen soldiers”, (male) leaders of the future. VMI achieves its mission through its
“adversative method”, which is characterized by physical rigor, mental stress, absolute equality
of treatment, absence of privacy, etc. At trial, the District Court acknowledged that women were
missing out on a unique educational opportunity, but upheld the school’s policy on the rationale
that admitting women could not be done without compromising the school’s adversative method.
Pursuant to a decision by the Court of Appeals, the State established the Virginia Women’s
Institute for Leadership (VWIL) for women. VWIL offered fewer courses than VMI and was run
without the adversative method.

ISSUE: 
Whether or not VMI represent a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause.

RULING:
Yes. The Fourth Circuit’s initial judgment is affirmed.

Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg (J. Ginsburg) stated that Virginia has shown no
“exceedingly persuasive justification” for excluding all women. “Benign” justifications offered in
defense of absolute exclusions will not be accepted automatically. The notion that admitting
women would downgrade VMI’s stature and destroy the school’s adversity system was hardly
proved.

Generalizations about the way women are or what is appropriate for them will no longer
serve to justify denying opportunity to those whose talents and capabilities make them
exceptions to the average description.

Moreover, VWIL does not qualify as VMI’s substitute. VWI’s student body, faculty,
course offerings and facilities do not match VMI’s.

Dissent. Justice Antonin Scalia (J. Scalia) said the virtue of a democratic system is that it
enables people over time to be persuaded that the things they took for granted are not so and to
change their laws accordingly. That system is destroyed if such types of decisions are removed
from the democratic process and written into our United States Constitution (Constitution).

Concurrence. Chief Justice William Rehnquist (J. Rehnquist) argued that while he
agreed with the Supreme Court’s conclusion, he disagreed with its analysis. The Supreme Court
says here for the first time the state must show an “exceedingly persuasive” justification for
gender-based classifications, thereby introducing uncertainty regarding the appropriate test. In
addition, VWIL only fails as a remedy because it is of inferior quality to VMI.

Victorino Salcedo II v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 135886, August 16, 1999.

FACTS:

Page 19 of 370
 On, 1968 Neptali P. Salcedo married Agnes Celiz. September 21, 1986. Without his first
marriage having been dissolved, Neptali P. Salcedo married private respondent Ermelita Cacao
in a civil ceremony. September 23, 1986. Two days later, Ermelita Cacao contracted another
marriage with a certain Jesus Aguirre.

Petitioner Victorino Salcedo II and private respondent Ermelita Cacao Salcedo both ran
for the position of mayor of the municipality of Sara, Iloilo in the May 11, 1998 elections.

Petitioner filed with the Comelec a petition seeking the cancellation of private

respondent’s COC on the ground that she had made a false representation therein by stating
that her surname was “Salcedo.

May 13, 1998. Private respondent was proclaimed as the duly elected mayor of Sara,
Iloilo. COMELEC’s Second Division ruled that the use by private respondent of the surname
Salcedo– constitutes material misrepresentation and is a ground for the cancellation of her
COC. The Division’s Resolution reads:

Respondent tries to create the impression that Neptali Salcedo and Jesus Aguirre are
one and the same persons. This Commission, however, holds the view that regardless of
whether Neptali Salcedo and Jesus Aguirre are the same persons, the fact remains irrefutable
that at the time respondent contracted marriage with Neptali Salcedo, the latter has a valid
existing marriage with Agnes Celiz. Respondent cannot seek refuge in her bare assumption that
since Agnes Celiz was declared as presumptively dead by the Regional Trial Court of Barotac
Viejo, Iloilo, she was free to marry Neptali Salcedo.

COMELEC en banc overturned its previous resolution ruling that as the municipal board
of canvassers proclaimed the respondent last May 13, 1998 as the duly elect mayor of the
municipality of Sara, any defect in the respondent’s certificate of candidacy should give way to
the will of the electorate.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the use of a specific surname constitutes a material misrepresentation
that can be a ground for the cancellation of COC under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code.

RULING:
A verified petition seeking to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy may
be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material misrepresentation contained
therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not
later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be
decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.This
conclusion is strengthened by the fact that the consequences imposed upon a candidate guilty
of having made a false representation in his certificate of candidacy are grave — to prevent the
candidate from running or, if elected, from serving, or to prosecute him for violation of the
election laws.

Continental Cement Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 88586, April 27, 1990.

FACTS:

Page 20 of 370
 Sometime in July 1990, petitioner Continental Cement Corporation (CCC), a corporation
engaged in the business of producing cement, obtained the services of respondents Asea
Brown Boveri, Inc. (ABB) and BBC Brown Boveri, Corp. to repair its 160 KW Kiln DC Drive
Motor (Kiln Drive Motor).

On October 23, 1991, due to the repeated failure of respondents to repair the Kiln Drive
Motor, petitioner filed with Branch 101 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City
a Complaint for sum of money and damages.

Respondents, however, claimed that under Clause 7 of the General Conditions, attached
to the letter of offer dated July 4, 1990 issued by respondent ABB to petitioner, the liability of
respondent ABB "does not extend to consequential damages either direct or indirect."
Moreover, as to respondent Eriksson, there is no lawful and tenable reason for petitioner to sue
him in his personal capacity because he did not personally direct the repair of the Kiln Drive
Motor.

The RTC rendered a Decision in favor of petitioner rejecting the defense of limited
liability interposed by respondents since they failed to prove that petitioner received a copy of
the General Conditions.

On appeal, the CA reversed the ruling of the RTC. The CA applied the exculpatory
clause in the General Conditions and ruled that there is no implied warranty on repair work;
thus, the repairman cannot be made to pay for loss of production as a result of the unsuccessful
repair.

ISSUE:
Whether or not implied warranty and warranty against hidden defect under the New Civil
Code is applicable.

RULING:
Clause 7 of the General Conditions their liability "does not extend to consequential
damages either direct or indirect." Is not binding on petitioner. Respondents failed to show that
petitioner was duly furnished with a copy of said General Conditions. Having breached the
contract it entered with petitioner, respondent ABB is liable for damages pursuant to Articles
1167, 1170, and 2201 of the Civil Code.

As per Purchase Order Nos. 17136-37, petitioner is entitled to penalties in the amount
ofP987.25 per day from the time of delay, August 30, 1990, up to the time the Kiln Drive Motor
was finally returned to petitioner.Under Article 1226of the Civil Code, the penalty clause takes
the place of indemnity for damages and the payment of interests in case of non-compliance with
the obligation, unless there is a stipulation to the contrary.In this case, since there is no
stipulation to the contrary, the penalty in the amount ofP987.25 per day of delay covers all other
damages (i.e.production loss, labor cost, and rental of the crane) claimed by petitioner.
The court ruled to deny petitioners claim to recover productionloss, labor costs and the rental of
crane, attorney’s fee.

Guerra Enterprises Company, Inc. v. Court of First Instance of Lanao del Sur,
G.R. No. L-28310, April 17, 1970.

Page 21 of 370
Facts:
This is petition for a writ of mandamus requiring the Court of First Instance of Lanao del
Sur to approve and certify the record of appeal filed by petitioner Guerra Enterprises Company,
Inc., in Civil Case No. 1496 of the said Court, under date of 9 December 1966.

On 8 October 1965, petitioner herein registered a complaint for damages and

preliminary injunction against herein private respondent, Pablo Luna, in the Court of First
Instance of Lanao. The court, on 21 January 1966, issued an order dismissing the complaint.
Plaintiff filed an "Urgent Motion for Reconsideration", which was denied by the court plaintiff, in
a motion of the same , stated that he was appealing to the Court of Appeals and prayed that he
be given 30 days, more specifically, up to 31 December 1966 to perfect his appeal. On 2
December 1966, the court entered an order granting plaintiff "an extension of 15 days from
receipt of this order" to file "an appeal bond and record of appeal", and copy whereof was
received by appellant on 7 December 1966.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the ruling is erroneous and improper which is contrary to law and
evidence.

RULING:
It must also be remembered that the disallowance of pro forma motions for
reconsideration or new trial is mainly predicated upon their being resorted to solely to gain time
and delay the proceedings. In the case at bar, the filing of the urgent motion to reconsider the
order of dismissal barely twelve (12) days after its receipt by counsel for the plaintiff strongly
argues against its use as a mere delaying tactic. It is enough to observe that since the record of
appeal was still within the control of the respondent court, all that was needed was to order
appellant to make the requisite amendments, and not to bar the appeal. It is not amiss to point
out that the date when appellant’s counsel received copy of the order to dismiss can be gleaned
from appellant’s notice of appeal dated 21 November 1966, which explicitly recites that on that
date — "counsel has just received copy of the order the Court dated October 20, 1966, denying
the motion for reconsideration". Private respondent’s objection to the verification of the petition
filed in this Court, on the ground that the same is done by counsel "to the best of my knowledge,
information and belief," is unmeritorious, since this Court has ruled that such a verification by
the attorney is adequate with Rule 7, Section 6, it being presumed that facts by him alleged are
true to his knowledge in view of the sanctions provided in Section 5 of the Rule.

Citizens Surety and Insurance Company, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,

G.R. No. L-48958, June 28, 1988. Page

Page 22 of 370
FACTS:
On December 4, 1959, the petitioner issued two surety bonds to the defendant to ensure
the compliance of the latter while he entered a transaction with Singer Sewing Machine Co. The
respondent also put up collaterals such as his lumber stock worthP400,000 and a second real
estate mortgage to reimburse the cost paid by the petitioner in case that the respondent will not
comply to the agreement. The respondent failed to comply with his obligations to Singer Sewing
Machine Co. and the petitioner paid payments as a result of non-compliance of the respondent.

The respondent failed to reimburse the petitioner due to the losses he encountered
thereby the petitioner filed a claim of the sum ofthe money against the estate of the respondent.
Respondent opposed the money claim by stating that the surety bonds and the indemnity
agreements had been extinguished by the execution of the deed of assignment. Thus, after the
trial, the lower declared that the collateral is jointly and severally liable to the petitioner, hereby,
requiring respondent to pay the required amount with 10% interest per annum. The decision of
the lower court was reversed by the Court of Appeals when the respondent appealed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not administrator’s obligation under the surety bonds agreements had been
extinguished through execution of the deed of assignment.

RULING:
Obligation under the surety bonds had not been extinguished by reason on the
execution of “deed of assignment.” The “deed of assignment” was intended as a collateral
security for the issuance of two (2) surety bonds by the petitioner towards respondent as
evidenced by the latter’s subsequent acts. These are partial payments made by respondent
after the execution the “deed of assignment” to pay his indebtedness. Moreover, with the
execution of the second mortgage by respondent, it follows that there is no extinguishment of
obligation since indemnity bonds still existed by virtue of its execution. Thus, upon the failure of
the respondent to comply with its obligation under the contract if sale of goods towards Singer
Sewing Machine Co., the petitioner is still adequately protected by the lumber collateral which
worth P400,000, more than enough to guaranty the obligations.

Here, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and money claim by the petitioner

Meralco v. Castro-Bartolome, G.R. No. L-49623, June 29, 1982.

FACTS:

Page 23 of 370
 Manila Electric Company, a domestic corporation organized under Philippine laws, more
than sixty percent of whose capital stock is owned by Filipino citizens, in its application filed on
December 1, 1976 in the Makati branch of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, prayed for the
confirmation of its title to two lots with a total area of one hundred sixty-five square meters,
located at Tanay, Rizal with an assessed value of P3,270 (LRC Case No. N-9485, LRC No. N-
50801).

The Republic of the Philippines opposed the application on the grounds that the
applicant, as a private corporation, is disqualified to hold alienable public lands and that the
applicant and its prredecessors-in-interest have not been in the open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the land for at least thirty years immediately preceding
the filing of the application.

The land was possessed by Olimpia ramos before the Pacific war which broke out in
1941. On July 3, 1947, Ramos sold the land to the spouses Rafael Piguing and MInerva
Inocencio (Exh. K). The Piguing sapouses constructed a house therereon. Because the Meralco
had installed the "anchor guy" of its steel post on the land, the Piguing spouses sold the lot to
the Meralco on August 13, 1976.

The lower court rendered a decision dismissing the application because in its opinion the
Meralco is not qualified to apply for the registration of the said land since under section 48(b) of
the Public Land Law only Filipino citizens or natural persons can apply for judicial confirmationof
their imperfect titles to public land. The Meralco is a juridical person. The trial court assumed
that the land which it seeks to register is public land. From that decision, the Meralco appealed
to this Court under Republic Act No. 5440.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the land is a public land.

RULING:
The court held that the land was still public and that it would become private “only upon
issuance of certificate of title to any Filipino citizen claiming it under the law. Since it was a
public land, MERALCO, being a juridical person,was disqualified to apply for its registration.

Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 73002, December 29, 1986.

FACTS:

Page 24 of 370
 Court of First Instance of Isabela, which ordered registration in favor of Acme Plywood &
Veneer Co., Inc. of five parcels of land measuring 481, 390 square meters, more or less,
acquired by it from Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat tribe. Acme Plywood &
Veneer Co., Inc., a corp. represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario, acquired from Mariano and Acer
Infiel, members of the Dumagat tribe 5 parcels of land. There was possession of the Infiels over
the land relinquished or sold to Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., dates back before the
Philippines was discovered by Magellan as the ancestors of the Infiels have possessed and
occupied the land from generation to generation until the same came into the possession of
Mariano Infiel and Acer Infie. The land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to RA
3872 granting absolute ownership to members of the non-Christian Tribes on land occupied by
them or their ancestral lands, whether with the alienable or disposable public land or within the
public domain However, Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more than P45M
worth of improvements. The ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered by
the applicant was duly recognized by the government when the Municipal Officials of
Maconacon, Isabela, have negotiated for the donation of the townsite from Acme Plywood &
Veneer Co., Inc.,

ISSUE:
Whether or not the constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private
corporations or associations applies.

RULING:  
No. IAC affirmed Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc. If it is accepted-as it must be-that
the land was already private land to which the Infiels had a legally sufficient and transferable
title on October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it from said owners, it must also be conceded
that Acme had a perfect right to make such acquisition

The only limitation then extant was that corporations could not acquire, hold or lease
public agricultural lands in excess of 1,024 hectares

Llamado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 84850, June 29, 1989.

FACTS:

Page 25 of 370
 Petitioner Ricardo A. Llamado was Treasurer of Pan Asia Finance Corporation. Together
with Jacinto N. Pascual, Sr., President of the same corporation, petitioner Llamado was
prosecuted for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 in Criminal Case No. 85-38653, Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 49. The two (2) had co-signed a postdated check payable to
private respondent Leon Gaw in the amount of P186,500.00, which check was dishonored for
lack of sufficient funds. Petitioner was sentenced to imprisonment for a period of one (1) year
of prision correccional and to pay a fine of P 200,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency. Petitioner was also required to reimburse respondent Gaw the amount of
P186,500.00 plus the cost of suit. Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals Manifestation and
Petition for Probation" enclosing a copy of the Petition for Probation that he had submitted to the
trial court. Petitioner asked the Court of Appeals to grant his Petition for Probation or, in the
alternative, to remand the Petition back to the trial court, together with the records of the
criminal case, for consideration and approval under P.D. No. 968, as amended. The Court of
Appeals, through Mr. Justice Magsino, denied the Petition for Probation. A dissenting opinion
was filed by Mr. Justice Bellosillo while Mr. Justice Santiago submitted a concurring opinion.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration which Motion was denied by the Court of Appeals on 23
August 1988, with another, briefer, dissenting opinion from Mr. Justice Bellosillo.

Petitioner now asks this Court to review and reverse the opinion of the majority in the
Court of Appeals and, in effect, to accept and adopt the dissenting opinion as its own.

ISSUE:
Whether or not dissenting opinion of Justice Bellosillo can be adopted in the given case.

RULING:
The court held that the dissenting opinion of Justice Bellosillo is unpersuasive. It ruled
that the probation law, the period during which probation may be applied for is the period for the
perfection for appeal. It was noted that liberal construction be given to penal laws could not
apply to the given case. The probation law is not a penal statute, and the terms in which its
provisions are couched in do not leave room for doubt or interpretation.

Sanoh Fulton Phils., Inc. v. Bernardo, G.R. No. 187214, August 14, 2013.

FACTS:

Page 26 of 370
 This is a petition for review seeking to annul the 23 January 2008 Decision and 13
March 2009 Resolution of the Court of Appeals which declared that petitioner Sanoh Fulton
Phils., Inc. (Sanoh) illegally dismissed respondent employees. Sanoh is a domestic corporation
engaged in the manufacture of automotive parts and wire condensers for home appliances. Its
Wire Condenser Department employed 61 employees. Respondents belonged to this
department.

In view of job order cancellations relating to the manufacture of wire condensers by

Matsushita, Sanyo and National Panasonic, Sanoh decided to phase out the Wire Condenser
Department. On 22 December 2003, the Human Resources Manager of Sanoh informed the 17
employees, 16 of whom belonged to the Wire Condenser Department, of retrenchment effective
22 January 2004. All 17 employees are union members. Sanoh on its part, filed a petition for
declaration of the partial closure of its Wire Condenser Department and valid retrenchment of
the 17 employees, docketed as NLRC Case No. RAB-IV-01-18762-04-C.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Sanoh is liable for illegally dismissing the employees.

RULING:
The Wire Condenser Department is still in operation and no business losses were
proven by Sanoh, the dismissal of respondents was unlawful. Resultingly, respondents are
entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to full
backwages, computed from the time the compensation was withheld up to the time of actual
reinstatement. Present law says that if reinstatement is not feasible, the payment of full
backwages shall be made from the date of dismissal until finality of judgment. Hence, Sanoh is
liable.

Colinares v. People, G.R. No. 182748, December 13, 2011.

FACTS:

Page 27 of 370
 Arnel Colinares was charged and found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of frustrated
homicide by the RTC of Camarines Sur. He was sentenced to suffer imprisonment from two
years and four months of prison correccional, as minimum, to six years and one day of prison
mayor, as maximum. Since the maximum probationable imprisonment under the law was only
up to six years, Arnel did not qualify for probation. On appeal by Colinares, the Court of Appeals
sustained the RTC’s decision. Unsatisfied with the Court of Appeal’s decision, petitioner then
appealed to the Supreme Court and took the position that he should be entitled to apply for
probation in case the Court metes out a new penalty on him that makes his offense
probationable, which was strongly opposed by the Solicitor General reiterating that under the
Probation Law, no application for probation can be entertained once the accused has perfected
his appeal from the judgment of conviction. The Supreme Court, however, found that Colinares
is guilty of attempted homicide and not of frustrated homicide.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Arnel Colinares may still apply for probation on remand of the case to the
trial court

RULING:
Yes, The Supreme Court ruled that Colinares may apply for probation upon remand of
his case to the RTC. Ordinarily, an accused would no longer be entitled to apply for probation,
he having appealed from the judgment of the RTC convicting him for frustrated homicide. But in
this case the Supreme Court ruled to set aside the judgment of the RTC and found him only
liable for attempted homicide, if the Supreme Court follows the established rule that no accused
can apply for probation on appeal, the accused would suffer from the erroneous judgment of the
RTC with no fault of his own, therefore defying fairness and equity.

Dumduma v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 182606, October 4, 2011.

FACTS:

Page 28 of 370
 Petitioner, a PNP Officer in Leyte, took the Career Service Professional Examination in
1998. In 1999, he filled out a Personal Data Sheet pursuant to his promotional appointment as
Police Inspector and stated that he passed the Career Service Professional Examination
Computer-Assisted Test in Quezon City with a rating of 81%. His appointment was forwarded to
the PNP-CSC for verification and approval where it was then discovered that he did not have
the proper civil service eligibility, contrary to what he disclosed in his PDS. His appointment was
disapproved on the ground of spurious eligibility and was charged with Dishonesty. Petitioner
denied the charged and alleged that a certain Dilodilo, who was allegedly a retired CSC director
promised him total support in his examination and that he was in good faith when he wrote the
information of his eligibility in his PDS. The CSC found him guilty of Dishonesty and imposed on
him the penalty of dismissal from service, forfeiture of retirement benefits and perpetual
disqualification from reemployment in government service. He reiterated his defense of good
faith in his appeal to the CA, but the appellate court was unconvinced. Hence,this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner may be dismissed from service for falsification of his eligibility for
appointment purposes.

RULING:
Yes. The Court agrees with the CSC and the CA that the undisputed facts, as revealed
by the evidence, make out a clear case of dishonesty against Dumduma. When Dumduma’s
claim of eligibility was contradicted by the CSC Register of Eligibles and the List of
Passing/Failing Examinees, it became incumbent upon Dumduma to explain why he made the
incorrect entry in his PDS. Unlike his PDS entry, the CSC records are presumed correct and
made in the regular course of official business. In explaining his action, however, Dumduma dug
a deeper hole from which he could not extricate himself. Dumduma’s contention is in start
contrast to his admissions and does not merit belief. The concept of good faith in administrative
cases such as this one is explained in a recent case in this wise: “Good faith is ordinarily used
to describe that state of mind denoting honesty of intention and freedom from knowledge of
circumstances which ought to put the holder upon inquire; an honest intention to abstain from
taking any unconscientious advantage of another, even through technicalities of law, together
with absence of all information, notice, or benefit or belief of facts which render a transaction
unconscientious. In short, good faith is actually a question of intention. Although this is
something internal, we can ascertain a person’s intention not from his own protestation of good
faith, which is self-serving, but from evidence of his conduct and outward acts.”

Dario v. Mison, G.R. No. 81954, August 8, 1989.

FACTS:

Page 29 of 370
 Pres. Aquino promulgated Proclamation No. 3, providing for the intention of the
President to, “completely reorganize the government, eradicate unjust and oppressive
structures, and all iniquitous vestiges of the previous regime.” Subsequently, Pres. Aquino
promulgated E.O. No. 127, “Reorganizing the Ministry of Finance”, where, in Sec. 59, it provided
for the reorganization of the Bureau of Customs. Pursuant to the reorganization,
Commissioner Mison issued separation notices to a total of 394 officials, including the petitioner,
Cesar Dario, in his capacity as Deputy Commissioner.

Thus, Cesar Dario petitioned for reinstatement on the ground that the Provisional Constitution
giving the power to dismiss public officials without cause ended on February 25, 1987, seeing
as the public officials enjoyed security of tenure under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution.
However, respondent Commissioner Mison contended that Sec. 16, Article XVIII (Transitory
Provisions) allows the reorganization of the Bureau of Customs under E.O. No. 127 (authorizing
separation without cause) to continue even after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution – citing
the case of Jose v. Arroyo, wherein the Court decided in favor of a similar notion. Thus, there
was no violation of security of tenure.

The Civil Service Commission, nevertheless, ordered the reinstatement of the petitioner.
Whereas, the respondent motioned for reconsideration.

ISSUE:
Does E.O. No. 127, providing reorganization, allow the “separation” of Dario from the
Bureau of Customs despite his right to security of tenure under the 1987 Constitution?

RULING:
No. The Court held that E.O. No. 127, providing reorganization, does not allow the
“separation” of Dario from the Bureau of Customs despite his right to security of tenure under
the 1987 Constitution.

In line with this, the Court maintains that reorganization entails that an office is

abolished, thus there actually no separation or dismissal such that these concepts imply that
there is an office to be separated from. However, the Court asserts that, reorganizations
abolishing an office would only be valid if it passes the test of good faith. A Reorganization
carried out in good faith must have for its purpose the efficiency of both the economy and
bureaucracy. In this case, there is lack of good faith such that there is no showing that legitimate
structural changes were made, only that personnel were reduced. Thus, it cannot be said that it
was done by reason of economy or redundancy of functions. Thus, since there is lack of good
faith, there is no valid reorganization that would allow the “separation” of the petitioners, in
keeping with their security of tenure. The act of reorganization of the Bureau of Customs
dismissing Dario is unconstitutional

Intramuros Tennis Club, Inc. v. Philippine Tourism Authority, G.R. No. 135630,
September 26, 2000.

Page 30 of 370
FACTS:
Private respondent Philippine Tourism Authority ("PTA") owns the Victoria Tennis Courts
by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 1763. In a Memorandum of Agreement ("MOA"), the PTA
transferred the management, operation, administration and development of the Victoria Tennis
Courts to petitioner Philippine Tennis Association ("PHILTA") for a period of ten years
commencing on June 15, 1987. Petitioner Intramuros Tennis Club, Inc. ("ITC") is an affiliate of
PHILTA and has for its members tennis players and enthusiasts who regularly use the facilities
of the Victoria Tennis Courts.

During the effectivity of the MOA, PTA wrote a letter to PHILTA demanding the
surrender of the possession of the Victoria tennis courts on or before July 25, 1995 and
requesting the latter to vacate the premises of said tennis courts to give way to PTA’s golf
course expansion program.

On May 7, 1996, petitioners instituted a case for "preliminary injunction, damages, and prayer
for temporary restraining order" with the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The temporary
restraining order was granted on May 22, 1996, and petitioners were allowed to retain
possession of the Victoria Tennis Courts.

Thereafter, the RTC also granted the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by
petitioners, based upon a finding that PTA in its golf course expansion was in effect unilaterally
pre-terminating the MOA. In the same order, it declared that "petitioner ITC is an affiliate of
PHILTA that has a right to be protected. RTC ruled to lift the writ of preliminary injunction and to
declare private respondent PTA entitled to the possession of Victoria Tennis Courts.

ISSUE:
Whether or not other parts of the decision may be resorted in order to determine ratio
decidendi?

RULING:
Petitioners’ argument that the dispositive portion of the RTC order dated August 5, 1997
only provides that private respondents’ motion to dismiss is granted and does not order private
respondents to regain possession of the Victoria Tennis Courts, suffice it to say that although as
a rule, execution must conform to the dispositive portion of a decision, the other parts of the
decision may be resorted to in order to determine the ratio decidendi of the court. 26 In fact, a
closer look at the RTC order shows that the dispositive portion consists of two paragraphs.

Accordingly, the writ of preliminary injunction was lifted and defendant is entitled to
possess the Victoria Tennis Court. Petitioners appealed to respondent court. In a resolution
dated July 9, 1998, respondent court took into consideration the ground advanced by private
respondents, i.e., that the Victoria Tennis Courts are ill-maintained by PHILTA. It granted the
motion for execution pending appeal, declaring that since the lease agreement under the MOA
had already expired and private respondents had made it clear that there will be no renewal of
the said agreement, PTA as lessor is entitled to exercise all its rights of ownership and
possession over the Victoria Tennis Courts. It also observed that the petitioners’ appeal from
the order of the RTC was merely dilatory, and that the outcome of the appeal will not in any way
alter the fact of private respondents’ entitlement to the possession and administration of the
Victoria Tennis Courts.

Chamber of Agriculture and Natural Resources of the Philippines, Inc. v. Central Bank of
the Philippines, G.R. No. L-23244, June 30, 1965.

FACTS:

Page 31 of 370
 Petitioners were a group of exporters who requested for a writ of prohibition to restrain
the Central Bank of the Philippines from continuing to enforce its Circulars Nos. 133 and 171,
requiring that 20% of export receipts be surrendered to the Central Bank at par value (P2.00 to
$1.00), and authorizing the sale of the other 80% at the prevailing free market rate.

On December 9, 1949, because of a foreign exchange crisis, the Monetary Board of the
Central Bank of the Philippines, claiming to act under section 74 of its Charter (Republic Act
265), and with the approval of the President, promulgated Circular No. 20, entitled "Restriction
on Gold and Foreign Transactions," restricting sales of exchange by the Central Bank,
subjecting all transactions in gold and foreign exchange to licensing, and requiring the surrender
of foreign exchange acquisitions to the authorized agents of the Central Bank.

On July 16, 1959, Republic Act No. 2609 was enacted to authorize the Central Bank to
establish a margin of not more than 40% over banks' selling rates of foreign exchange, up to
December 31, 1964 (section 10). Section 1 of this Act 

ISSUE:
Whether or not ratio decidendi can be a binding precedent.

RULING:
Petitioners proceed on the assumption that the pronouncement of the ponente, Mr.
Justice Labrador, in Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. vs. Central Bank, G.R. No. L-12610, October
25, 1963, to the effect that the Central Bank Act (R.A. 265); does not authorize it to require the
surrender (commander) of foreign exchange earned by exporters and pay for it the price fixed
by the Central Bank, was part of the ratio decidendi of the case and, therefore, a binding
precedent. This is a misconception of the actual ruling in the case. As it clear appears from the
text itself (Decision, p. 12), the pronouncements in question were the; personal views of the
writer, and he said so in express terms.

Delta Motors Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121075, July 24, 1997.

FACTS:

Page 32 of 370
 Private Respondent State Investment House. Inc. filed action against DELTA for a sum
of money at the RTC of Manila. Branch VI. DELTA was requied to pay P20M to the private
respondent. The above decision could not be served by DELTA due to its dissolution. It had
been taken over by Philippine National Bank (PNB) in the meantime. Dec. 1986: SIHI moved for
service of the decision by way of publication. It was published in the TUNDERER, a weekly
Manila newspaper Afterwards, SIHI moved for the execution, properties of DELTA in Iloiilo and
Bacolod City were Levied upon and sold. DELTA commenced a special civil action for certiorari
with the CA, alleging that a) the RTC did not aquire jurisdiction over DELTA since there was no
valid/proper service of summons rendering the decision void, and b) the decision never became
final and executory.

The CA ruled that against DELTA on the first ground. But ruled that the decision never
became executory because records show that the assailed judgment had never been properly
served against on PNB (which assumed DELTA’s operation upon its dissolution). DELTA filed a
petition with the SC for review on certiorari but it was denied.DELTA filed a Notice of Appeal
with the RTC indicating that it was appealing from the earlier decision and prayed that records
be elevated to the CA.

DELTA filed an Omnibus motion with the CA to declare all acts and proccedings relating
to the earlier decision as void. The CA issued a resolution on Jan. 5 1995. SIHI filed a motion
for clarification asking for a deletion of a portion of the relsolution for it being mere a obiter
dictum. CA decreed to amend its resolution and delete the assailed paragraph

ISSUE:
Whether or not the assailed paragraph in the CA’s resolution was obiter dictum.

RULING:
Yes, the assailed paragraph is considered obiter dictum. An obiter dictum has been
defined as an opinion expressed by a court upon some question of law which is not necessary
to the decision of the case before it. It is a remark made, or opinion expressed, by a judge, in his
decision upon a cause, "by the way," that is, incidentally or collaterally, and not directly Upon
the question before him, or upon a point not necessarily involved in the determination of the
caused, or introduced by way of illustration, or analogy or argument. Such are not binding as
precedent.

City of Manila v. Entote, G.R. No. L-24776, June 28, 1974.

FACTS:

Page 33 of 370
 This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by the City of Manila, the City Mayor and
the City Engineer, Fernando S. Vinzons and Dominga Vinzons-Cu as petitioners with Juan
Entote, respondent. Juan Entote is the registered owner of five (5) lots located in the City of
Manila covered by separate certificates of title, to wit: (a) Lot 2 (LRC) Pcs-232, 106.03 sq. m.,
T.C.T. 46840; (b) Lot 3 Pcs-2672, 202.4 sq. m., T.C.T. 45531; (c) Lot 1 Pcs-2672, 143.11 sq.
m., T.C.T. 45547; (d) Lot 12-D Pcs-5804, 142.8 sq. m., T.C.T. 45548, and (e) Lot 2 Psd-3665,
436.92 sq. m., T.C.T. 45531. All these five lots are contiguous to each other and form one
integrated parcel which abuts Padre Herrera Street, a public thoroughfare. When Entote
acquired Lot 3 Pcs-2672 which is the lot involved in this litigation and to which We shall refer
simply as Lot 3, the same was already subject to an easement of a right-of-way

ISSUE:
Whether or not civil case 33076 from which no appeal was taken by respondent Entote,
is now the law of the case "between the parties”.

RULING:
The Appellate Court rightly held that the quoted portion of the trial court's opinion in civil
case 33076 was but an obiter dictum because the right of the use of the private alley, Lot 3, was
never an issue in said case. What was put forth by intervenor Vinzons as his defense and
counterclaim in the case was his alleged right to an easement of right-of-way over Lot 3; he did
not invoke either in his defenses or counterclaim the right of the public in general to use alley.
Considering therefore that what was set up by intervenor Fernando Vinzons as his counterclaim
was his right-of-way easement over Lot 3, which however was, categorically dismissed in the
dispositive part of the decision, the Court of Appeals properly held that said decision in civil case
33076 was res judicata in favor of now respondent Entote as against intervenors herein insofar
as the easement over Lot 3 was concerned. It is a settled doctrine that the judgment of a case is
contained in the dispositive portion; statements made in the opinion are "informal expressions of
the view of the court and cannot prevail its final order or decision . A remark made, or opinion
expressed, by a judge, in his decision upon a cause, incidentally or collaterally, and not directly
upon the question before him, or upon the question before him, or upon a point not involved in
the determination of the cause, is an obiter dictum and as such it lacks the force of an
adjudication and is not to be regarded as such. In the aforecited civil case 33076 the alleged
right of the public to use Lot 3 as an approved private alley was not in issue and consequently
the statement of the trial court on that point was a mere expression of an opinion, an obiter
dictum with no binding force for purposes of res judicata.

Equatorial Realty Dev., Inc. v. Mayfair Theater, Inc., G.R. No. 16063, November 21, 1996.

FACTS:

Page 34 of 370
 Carmelo & Bauermann, Inc. owned a land, together with two 2-storey buildings at
Manila, and was covered by TCT No. 18529. On June 1, 1967, Carmelo entered into a Contract
of Lease with Mayfair Theater Inc. for 20 years. The lease covered a portion of the second floor
and mezzanine of a two-storey building with about 1,610 square meters of floor area.

On March 31, 1969, Mayfair entered into a second Lease with Carmelo for another
portion of the latter’s property this time. The Contract of Lease was likewise for a period of 20
years. Both leases contained a clause giving Mayfair a right of first refusal to purchase the
subject properties. Sadly, on July 30, 1978 - within the 20-year-lease term -- the subject
properties were sold by Carmelo to Equatorial Realty Development, Inc. for eleven million
smackers, without their first being offered to Mayfair.

Due to the sale, Mayfair filed a Complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Manila for
the recission of the Deed of Absolute Sale between Carmelo and Equatorial, specific
performance, and damages. RTC decided for Carmelo and Equatorial..
CA reversed and ruled for Mayfair. The SC denied a petition questioning the CA decision. What
happened is that the contract did get rescinded, Equatorial got its money back and asserted that
Mayfair have the right to purchase the lots for 11 million bucks.

Decision became final and executor. Mayfair deposited with the clerk the 11M (less
847grand withholding) payment for the properties (Carmelo somehow disappeared). Meanwhile,
on Sept 18, 1997, barely five months after Mayfair submitted its Motion for Execution, Equatorial
demanded from Mayfair backrentals and reasonable compensation for the Mayfair’s continued
use of the subject premises after its lease contracts expired. Remember that Mayfair was still
occupying the premises during all this hullabaloo.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Equatorial was the owner of the subject property and could thus enjoy
the fruits and rentals.

RULING:
No right of ownership was transferred from Carmelo to Equatorial since there was failure
to deliver the property to the buyer. Compound this with the fact that the sale was even
rescinded.
The court went on to assert that rent is a civil fruit that belonged to the owner of the property
producing it by right of accession. Hence, the rentals that fell due from the time of the perfection
of the sale to petitioner until its rescission by final judgment should belong to the owner of the
property during that period.

We remember from SALES that in a contract of sale, “one of the contracting parties
obligates himself to transfer ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing and the other to pay
therefor a price certain in money or its equivalent.”

Ownership of the thing sold is a real right, which the buyer acquires only upon delivery of
the thing to him “in any of the ways specified in articles 1497 to 1501, or in any other manner
signifying an agreement that the possession is transferred from the vendor to the vendee.” This
right is transferred, not by contract alone, but by tradition or delivery. There is delivery if and
when the thing sold “is placed in the control and possession of the vendee.” While execution of
a public instrument of sale is recognized by law as equivalent to the delivery of the thing sold,
such constructive or symbolic delivery is merely presumptive. It is nullified by the failure of the
vendee to take actual possession of the land sold.
Morales v. Paredes, G.R. No. L-34428, December 29, 1930.

FACTS:

Page 35 of 370
 Pedro, Rosendo, and Prudencio Gavino applied for the registration of a parcel of land
situated in the poblacion of the municipality of San Quintin, Pangasinan, and on June 23, 1930,
the application was granted and a decision to that effect rendered. Baltazar Morales now claims
to be the owner of the land, but he was not advised to the registration proceedings and was not
informed thereof until the early part of the month of September, 1930. He thereupon filed a
motion on September 18 in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan for the reconsideration of
the decision of June 23 and as far as the record shows the motion may still be pending. Without
dismissal of the motion mentioned, the movant brought the present action praying that the
aforesaid decision be set aside and that a new trial be granted in accordance with section 513
of the Code of Civil Procedure.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the case has a value of a precedent?

RULING:
There can no be no review until the final decree has been issued. This indication is
only obiter dictum and was not voted upon by the court; the determination of the case rested on
other grounds and the dictum was not taken into consideration by the court as a whole.
A dictum not necessarily involved in the case, lacks the force of an adjudication and should not
ordinarily be regarded as such.

The plaintiff's view of the extent of actions under section 513 of the Code of Civil
Procedure is erroneous. This court had no jurisdiction to reopen judgments under that section if
other adequate remedies are available, and such remedies are not lacking in the present case.

Reagan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. L-26379, December 27, 1969.

FACTS:

Page 36 of 370
 William C. Reagan, a civilian employee of an American corporation providing technical
assistance to the United States Air Force in the Philippines. He was citizen of the United States
and an employee of Bendix Radio, Division of Bendix Aviation Corporation, which provides
technical assistance to the United States Air Force, was assigned at Clark Air Base, Philippines,
on or about July 7, 1959. Nine (9) months thereafter and before his tour of duty expired, he
imported on April 22, 1960 a tax-free 1960 Cadillac car with accessories valued at $6,443.83,
including freight, insurance and other charges. More than two months after the car was
imported, petitioner requested the Clark Air Base Commander for a permit to sell the car. The
request was granted with the condition that he would sell it to a member of the United States
Armed Forces or an employee of the U.S. Military Bases.

                On July 11, 1960, petitioner sold the car to Willie Johnson for $6600, a private in US
Marine Corps, Sangby Point, Cavite as shown by a bill of sale executed at Clark Air Base. On
the same date William Johnson Jr. sold the car to Fred Meneses for P32,000 as evidence by a
deed of sale executed in Manila.

                The respondent after deducting the landed cost of the car and the personal exemption
which the petitioner was entitled, fixed as his net income arising from such transaction the
amount of P17912.34 rendering him liable for income tax of P2979.00. After paying the sum, he
sought refund from the respondent claiming that he is exempted. He filed a case within the
Court of Tax Appeals seeking recovery of the sum P2979.00 plus legal rate of interest.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the said income tax of P2979.00 was legally collected by respondent
from petitioner.

RULING:
The Philippine is an independent and sovereign country or state. Its authority may be
exercised over its entire domain. Its laws govern therein and everyone to whom it applies must
submit to its term. It does not prelude from allowing another power to participate in the exercise
of jurisdictional rights over certain portions of its territory. Such areas sustain their status as
native soil and still subject to its authority. Its jurisdiction may be diminished but it does not
disappear.

The Clark Air Base is one of he bases under lease to the American  armed forces by
virtue of the Military Bases Agreement which states that a “national of the US serving or
employed in the Philippines in connection with the construction, maintenance, operation, or
defense of the bases and residing in the Philippines only by reason such unemployment is not
to be taxed on his income unless derived in the bases which one clearly derived the Phil.

Therefore the Supreme Court sustained the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals
rendering the petitioner liable of the income tax arising from the sale of his automobile that have
taken place in Clark Air Field which is within our territory to tax.

American Home Issurance Co. Vs NLRC G.R. No. 120043. July 24, 1996

Facts:

Page 37 of 370
 Romeo F. de Leon was a branch manager of petitioner company’ s office in Caloocan
City He started working in the company and became the company’s branch manager of its
Caloocan office. Petitioners offered a Special Early Retirement Program to all its regular
employees. The program called for the voluntary separation/retirement of the employees in
exchange for cash payments consisting of two months basic salary for every year of service and
a lump sum. The Company, however, reserved for itself the sole discretion to approve or deny
applications under the program

A memorandum addressed to all employees of the company and signed by petitioner

Leslie J. Mouat was issued announcing the last and final re-opening of the SERP for the period
from December 19 to 31, 1989. The program was re-offered to the employees because it was
determined that "there still exists a limited number of redundancies in the organization resulting
from the recent restructuring of operations of American Home, PhilHome (another sister
company) and Philamgen" after a review of the manpower requirements of the company.

It turned out that in an earlier letter, petitioners had prepared a notice of termination of
employment for private respondent based on the ground that his position as a branch manager
had been determined to be a duplication of another person’s job, for which reason his position
was declared redundant. In that notice, private respondent was informed that he would be
getting two months basic pay for every year of service as separation pay, but no mention was
made of the lump sum bonus under the program.

On or about the first week of May, petitioners again offered the SERP to its employees
but, by this time, private respondent was no longer with the company because of his prior
separation therefrom. Private respondent wrote once more to the company to reiterate his claim
for the SERP bonus. This claim of private respondent was denied by petitioners in a letter
wherein the company contended that the bonus was only effective and coterminous with the
SERP.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the NLRC abused its discretion under such attribution of error, the issue
to be determined is the entitlement of private respondent to the announced bonus.

RULING:
The phrase found in the SERP that "participation therein is subject to the sole discretion
and approval of the Company" does not and cannot necessarily mean absolute or unlimited
discretion. 26 Petitioners may not simply deny private respondent’s two applications for early
retirement with the corresponding benefits thereof and then later fire him on the ground of
redundancy, without thereby abusing their discretion or violating the principles of fair play and
justice. Petitioners themselves acknowledged the existence of redundancy in the company even
prior to the date of private respondent’s separation under Article 283. This is shown by the
phrase "there still exists a limited number of redundancies in the organization" contained in the
letter of petitioner Mouat 27 in offering for the second time the SERP to all employees of
petitioners.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power Corporation. 

G.R. No. 187485; February 12, 2013.

Page 38 of 370
FACTS: 
San Roque Power Corporation, Taganito Mining Corporation, and Philix Mining
Corporation, are all domestic corporations having their respective line of business. The petition
stemmed from the separate claims of the parties before the CIR for tax refund and/or credit. The
respective petitions were decided on the basis of their filing of such within the periods
prescribed by the law.

Thus, after review, the CTA En Banc rendered the following judgments: With respect to
San Roque Corporation, the CTA En Banc denied CIRs petition holding that San Roque's
judicial claim was not prematurely filed. As regards to Taganito Mining Corporation, the CTA En
Banc granted the CIRs petition on the fround that Taganitos judicial claim was prematurely filed.
As to Philex Mining Corporation, the CTA En Banc denied Philexs petition on the ground that its
judicial claim long after the expiration of the 120-day period.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the judicial claims for tax refund or credit were filed within the mandatory period
prescribed by law?

RULING:
Records show that a mere 13 days after it filed its amended administrative claim with the
Commissioner on 28 March 2003, San Roque filed a Petition for Review with the CTA docketed
as CTA Case No. 6647.

Clearly, San Roque failed to comply with the 120-day waiting period, the time expressly
given by law to the Commissioner to decide whether to grant or deny San Roque's application
for tax refund or credit. It is indisputable that compliance with the 120-day waiting period is
mandatory and jurisdictional. The waiting period, originally fixed at 60 days only, was part of the
provisions of the first VAT law, Executive Order No. 273, which took effect on 1 January 1988.
The waiting period was extended to 120 days effective 1 January 1998 under RA 8424 or the
Tax Reform Act of 1997. Thus, the waiting period has been in the statute books for more than
fifteen (15) years before San Roque filed its judicial claim.

Failure to comply with the 120-day waiting period violates a mandatory provision of law.
It violates the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and renders the petition
premature and thus without a cause of action, with the effect that the CTA does not acquire
jurisdiction over the taxpayers petition. Philippine jurisprudence is replete with cases upholding
and reiterating these doctrinal principles.

San Roque's failure to comply with the 120-day mandatory period renders its petition for
review with the CTA void. San Roque's void petition for review cannot be legitimized by the CTA
or this Court because Article 5 of the Civil Code states that such void petition cannot be
legitimized except when the law itself authorizes its validity. There is no law authorizing the
petitions validity.

For violating a mandatory provision of law in filing its petition with the CTA, San Roque
cannot claim any right arising from such void petition. Thus, San Roque's petition with the CTA
is a mere scrap of paper.

Office of the Ombudsman v. Lisondra, G.R. No. 174054, March 7, 2008

FACTS:

Page 39 of 370
 Administrative charges for dishonesty and grave misconduct were filed by complainant
Renato, Mayor of the Municipality of La Paz, Agusan del Sur, before the OMB against therein
respondents Milagros A. Orlandez, Rey C. Torralba, and Tomas B. Gomez. Complainant
alleged that on 5 December 2000, the Municipality of La Paz, Agusan del Sur, paid to Ronwood
Construction Supply the amount of P300,000.00 as payment for the delivery of 2,400 bags of
Portland cement intended to be used for the concreting of Morgadez Street (Poblacion-Hospital
Road Section). However, complainant, upon investigation of why the said project remained
unfinished and incomplete, discovered from Municipal Supply Officer (MSO) Teresita G. Sergio
and Municipal Planning Development Officer (MPDO) Lalineth A. Lisondra that there was
actually no delivery of 2,400 bags of Portland cement made by Ronwood Construction Supply to
the Municipality.

Acting on the foregoing complaint, the OMB, on 22 August 2002, issued an Order,
directing Orlandez, Torralba, and Gomez to file their respective counter-affidavits within a period
of 10 days reckoned from their receipt of said Order.

In her counter-affidavit, Orlandez asserted that the complaint against her is politically
motivated. She averred that the determination of whether or not there was actual delivery is not
within her duties and responsibilities as the Treasurer of the Municipality of La Paz, Agusan del
Sur. She claimed that her duty is confined solely to releasing appropriated amount for the
intended use after being satisfied with the sufficiency and validity of the supporting documents.
She further posited that it was MPDO Lisondra who issued and signed the Certificate of
Inspection relative to the delivery of 2,400 bags of cement by Ronwood Construction Supply.

ISSUE:
Court of Appeals correctly held that OMB has no power to impose penalty on public
officers?

RULING:
We held that under Republic Act No. 6770 and the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman
has the constitutional power to directly remove from government service an erring public official
other than a member of Congress and the Judiciary.

We hold that Sections 15, 21, 22 and 25 of Republic Act No. 6770 are constitutionally
sound. The powers of the Ombudsman are not merely recommendatory. His office was given
teeth to render this constitutional body not merely functional but also effective. Thus, we hold
that under Republic Act No. 6770 and the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman has the
constitutional power to directly remove from government service an erring public official other
than a member of Congress and the Judiciary.

Republic Act No. 6770. provides for the functional and structural organization of the
OMB. In passing Republic Act No. 6770, Congress deliberately endowed the OMB with the
power to prosecute offenses committed by public officers and employees to make him a more
active and effective agent of the people in ensuring accountability in public office. Moreover, the
Legislature has vested the OMB with broad powers to enable him to implement his own actions.

Lee v. Court of Appeals and De Simeon, G.R. No. L-28126, November 28, 1975

FACTS:

Page 40 of 370
 Emiliano Simeon and Alberta Vicencio, husband and wife, brought an action in the Court
of First Instance of Rizal to compel spouses Vita Uy Lee and Henry Lee to resell to them a
parcel of land situated in Sitio Parugan-Iba Barrio San Jose, Antipolo, Rizal. The land, a
homestead with an area of about 2.7342 hectares, is presently covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 57279 issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal in the names of defendants (now
petitioners) Vita Uy Lee and Henry Lee. Defendants (now petitioners) filed in due time their
answer with affirmative defenses.

Defendants (now petitioners) filed a motion for new trial and later an urgent motion for
reconsideration, which were both denied by the trial court in its orders of March 23, 1964 and
June 25, 1964. An appeal was thereafter filed to the Court of Appeals, but the decision of the
CFI of Rizal was affirmed in toto, the defendants undaunted appealed to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether the three letters sent by respondent Emiliano Simeon to petitioner Vita Uy Lee
before the lapse of the five-year period, and which were left unanswered, have preserved the
right of private respondents to repurchase the property.

RULING:
The rule that tender of payment of the repurchase price is necessary to exercise the
right of redemption finds support in civil law. Article 1616 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, in
the absence of an applicable provision in Commonwealth Act No. 141, furnishes the guide, to
wit: "The vendor cannot avail himself of the right of repurchase without returning to the vendee
the price of the sale .

It is clear that the mere sending of letters by vendor Simeon expressing his desire to
repurchase the property without an accompanying tender of redemption price fell short of the
requirements of law. Having failed to properly exercise his right of redemption within the
statutory five-year period, the right is lost and the same can no longer be revived by the filing of
an action to compel redemption after the lapse of the period.

Petitioner Vita Uy Lee was justified in ignoring the letters sent her by respondent
Emiliano Simeon because the mere mention therein of respondent's intention to redeem the
property, without making tender of payment, did not constitute a bona fide offer of repurchase.
The rule that tender of the repurchase price is dispensed with where the vendee has refused to
permit the repurchase, as enunciated in at least two cases (Gonzaga vs. Go, 69 Phil. 678 and
Laserna vs. Javier, 110 Phil. 172), is premised on the ground that under such circumstance the
vendee will also refuse the tender of payment. From petitioner Lee's silence which we have
shown above to be justified, no such deduction can be made. Unlike a flat refusal, her silence
did not close the door to respondent Simeon's subsequent tender of payment, had he wished to
do so, provided that the same was made within five-year period. Yet he neglected to tender
payment and, instead, merely filed an action to compel reconveyance after the expiration of the
period.

Land Bank of the Philippines v. Suntay, G.R. No. 188376, December 14, 2011.

FACTS:

Page 41 of 370
 Respondent Suntay owned land situated in Sta. Lucia, Sablayan, Occidental Mindoro
with a total area of 3,682.0285 hectares. In 1972, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
expropriated 948.1911 hectares of Suntay‘s land pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27.
Petitioner Land Bank and DAR fixed the value of the expropriated portion at P4,497.50/hectare,
for a total valuation of P4,251,141.68. Rejecting the valuation, however, Suntay filed a petition
for determination of just compensation in the Office of the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator
(RARAD) of Region IV, DARAB, docketed as DARAB Case No. V-0405-0001-00; his petition
was assigned to RARAD Miñas. After summary administrative proceeding, RARAD Miñas
rendered a decision fixing the total just compensation for the expropriated portion at
P157,541,951.30. Land Bank moved for a reconsideration, but RARAD Miñas denied its motion.
Land Bank brought a petition for the judicial determination of just compensation in the RTC
(Branch 46) in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro as a Special Agrarian Court, impleading Suntay
and RARAD Miñas. The petition essentially prayed that the total just compensation for the
expropriated portion be fixed at only P4,251,141.67. Suntay filed a motion to dismiss mainly on
the ground that the petition had been filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period as required
by Section 11, Rule XIII of the Rules of Procedure of DARAB. After the RTC granted the motion
to dismiss, Land Bank appealed to the CA, which sustained the dismissal. As a result, Land
Bank came to the Court (G.R. No. 157903)

ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC erred in dismissing the Land Bank‘s petition for the
determination of just compensation.

RULING:
The Court has declared that the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine just
compensation under Republic Act No. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, or CARL)
pertains to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) as a Special Agrarian Court; that any effort to transfer
such jurisdiction to the adjudicators of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB) and to convert the original jurisdiction of the RTC into appellate jurisdiction is void for
being contrary to the CARL; and that what DARAB adjudicators are empowered to do is only to
determine in a preliminary manner the reasonable compensation to be paid to the landowners,
leaving to the courts the ultimate power to decide this question. Thus, the RTC erred in
dismissing the Land Bank‘s petition. It bears stressing that the petition is not an appeal from the
RARAD final Decision but an original action for the determination of the just compensation for
respondent‘s expropriated property, over which the RTC has original and exclusive jurisdiction.
The procedure for the determination of just compensation cases under R.A. No. 6657, as
summarized in Landbank v. Banal, is that initially, the Land Bank is charged with the
responsibility of determining the value of lands placed under land reform and the compensation
to be paid for their taking under the voluntary offer to sell or compulsory acquisition
arrangement. The DAR, relying on the Land Bank‘s determination of the land valuation and
compensation, then makes an offer through a notice sent to the landowner. If the landowner
accepts the offer, the Land Bank shall pay him the purchase price of the land after he executes
and delivers a deed of transfer and surrenders the certificate of title in favor of the government.
In case the landowner rejects the offer or fails to reply thereto, the DAR adjudicator conducts
summary administrative proceedings to determine the compensation for the land by requiring
the landowner, the Land Bank and other interested parties to submit evidence as to the just
compensation for the land. A party who disagrees with the Decision of the DAR adjudicator may
bring the matter to the RTC designated as a Special Agrarian Court for the determination of just
compensation. In determining just compensation, the RTC is required to consider several
factors enumerated in Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657.

Roxas & Company, Inc. v. DAMBA-NSFW, G.R. No. 149548, December 4, 2009.

FACTS:

Page 42 of 370
 Congress passed Republic Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
(CARL) of 1988. Before the law's effectivity, on May 6, 1988, [Roxas & Co.] filed with
respondent DAR a voluntary offer to sell [VOS] Hacienda Caylaway pursuant to the provisions
of E.O. No. 229. Haciendas Palico and Banilad were later placed... under compulsory
acquisition by ... DAR in accordance with the CARL.

Nevertheless, on August 6, 1992, [Roxas & Co.], through its President, Eduardo J.
Roxas, sent a letter to the Secretary of DAR withdrawing its VOS of Hacienda Caylaway. The
Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu, Batangas allegedly authorized the reclassification of Hacienda
Caylaway from agricultural to non-agricultural. As a result, petitioner informed respondent DAR
that it was applying for conversion of Hacienda Caylaway from agricultural to other uses.

ISSUE:
Whether the subject lands are exempt from Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP) coverage.

RULING:
While the Court acknowledged the passage of the Tourism Act as another vehicle for
potential tourism areas to be exempted from CARP coverage, that did not in any way pronounce
as meritorious Roxas & Co.’s subsequent application with the TIEZA to declare its properties as
tourism enterprise zones. That is for the TIEZA, not this Court, to determine. Whatever decision
the TIEZA renders in Roxas & Co.’s application does not in any way affect the merits of these
consolidated cases.

Roxas & Co. is merely nitpicking on the issue. Since the DAR had initially issued CLOAs
to the farmer-beneficiaries of the nine parcels of land in Hacienda Palico, the assailed Decision
merely reiterated the original designation of the affected individuals as farmer-beneficiaries who
should be entitled to disturbance compensation before the cancellation of their respective
CLOAs is effected. This is in pursuance of the directive of DAR Administrative Order No. 6
(Series of 1994) which mandates the payment of disturbance compensation before Roxas &
Co.’s application for exemption may be completely granted. With regard [to] the allegation that
oppositors-movants are already CLOA holders of subject propert[ies] and deserve to be notified,
as owners, of the initiated questioned exemption application, is of no moment. The Supreme
Court in the case of Roxas [&] Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 321 SCRA 106, held:

"We stress that the failure of respondent DAR to comply with the requisites of due
process in the acquisition proceedings does not give this Court the power to nullify the CLOA’s
already issued to the farmer beneficiaries. x x x x. Anyhow, the farmer[-]beneficiaries hold the
property in trust for the rightful owner of the land."

Since subject landholding has been validly determined to be CARP-exempt, therefore,

the previous issuance of the CLOA of oppositors-movants is erroneous. Hence, similar to the
situation of the above-quoted Supreme Court Decision, oppositors-movants only hold the
property in trust for the rightful owners of the land and are not the owners of subject landholding
who should be notified of the exemption application of applicant Roxas & Company

Villanueva, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 142947, March 19, 2002

FACTS:

Page 43 of 370
 Petitioner Villanueva, Jr. filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against the Intercontinental
Broadcasting Corporation (IBC-13) where the labor arbiter ruled in favor of petitioner. IBC then
appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission with an appeal bond issued by the BF
General Insurance Company Inc. BF’s vice president supposedly confirmed the surety bond, but
the documents of the surety bond were subsequently found to be falsified. Petitioner then filed a
complaint of two (2) counts of falsification of public document against respondent Villadores and
Atty. Eulalio Diaz III but was dismissed by the city prosecutor’s office of Manila. The department
of Justice affirmed the dismissal against Diaz but ordered the inclusion of Villadores as an
accused in the two criminal cases. The original information’s were amended to include
Villadores among those charges. Respondent Villadores filed a petition for the disqualification of
Rico and Associates as private prosecutor for petitioner for he contended that the petitioner is
not the party in these cases and that it was IBC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellate court erred in failing to consider Francisco Villanueva Jr.,
as not party to the case, as a mere obiter dictum.

HELD:
No, the pronouncement of the appellate court in the falsification of public document
cases is not an obiter dictum as it touched upon a matter clearly raised the admission of the
Amended Information. Argument on whether petitioner Villanueva, Jr. was the offended party
was, thus clearly raised by respondent Villadores. An obiter dictum has been defined as an
opinion expressed by a court upon of law, which is not necessary to the decision of the case
before it. It is a remark made, or opinion expressed by a judge, in his decision upon a cause, “by
the way…” such are not binding as precedent. Thus the decision of the Court of Appeals was
affirmed.

Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. v. Central Bank, G.R. No. L-12610, October 25, 1963.

FACTS:

Page 44 of 370
 Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. (BMMC) sold and exported to Olavarria & Co., Inc. of New
York, US piculs of sugar for $416,640.00 U.S. currency, and drew against Olavarria 2 drafts
covering 95% of said purchase price as initial payment. The drafts were delivered to the
Philippine Bank of Commerce (PBC) for collection for the account of BMMC but PBC told
BMMC that under Circular 20 section 4 of the Central Bank, all exchange proceeds of the drafts
must be sold to the Central Bank authorities. BMMC, doubting the legality of such Exchange
control rule, filed an action for prohibition to stop the Central Bank from enforcing the exchange
control rule alleging that the forced sale of foreign exchange to the Central Bank is "ultra vires"
amounting to confiscation of private property. The Central Bank countered that Circular No. 20
was a valid exercise of their powers as it was issued during an exchange crisis.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the exchange control rule ordering the forced sale of foreign exchange to
the Central Bank is ultra vires.

RULING:
YES. While it is true that the Central Bank Charter authorizes the Bank to adopt such
remedial measures as are appropriate to maintain the international reserve to a desired level
when the international stability of peso is threatened, such remedial measures must be within
the powers granted under the provisions of the Central Bank Act. The commandeering of an
exporter's dollars for a price less by 50% than its value and the selling of said dollars to an
importer to the exclusion of the exporter himself cannot be said to be authorized even under the
pretext of an exchange crisis, by the provisions the Central Bank Act because the Bank's acts
taken to remedy an exchange crisis must be within the powers granted and exchange control is
not mere licensing of foreign exchange or the restriction thereof. The Central Bank Act merely
authorizes the Monetary Board to license or restrict or regulate foreign exchange; said Act does
not authorize it to commandeer foreign exchange earned by exporters and pay for it the price it
fixes, later selling it to importers at the same rate of purchase. That exchange control helped to
ward off the exchange crisis is true; but it was by no means the only way to do so. It was not
necessary for the Bank to commandeer all foreign exchange to maintain the international
monetary reserve. This could be done by mere licensing of the sale of foreign exchange,
directing those that earn the dollars, for example, to sell to those that are licensed to import the
foreign commodities needed by the country's population and economy.

Oposa v. Factoran, G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993.

Facts:

Page 45 of 370
 A taxpayer’s class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al., representing their
generation and generations yet unborn, and represented by their parents against Fulgencio
Factoran Jr., Secretary of DENR. They prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the
defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to:

1.Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country;

2.Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing, or appraising new TLAs;

and granting the plaintiffs “such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises.”
They alleged that they have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology
and are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as parens patriae. Furthermore, they
claim that the act of the defendant in allowing TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining
forests constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resources property he
holds in trust for the benefit of the plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:1.Plaintiffs have
no cause of action against him; 2.The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which
properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of the government.

ISSUE:
Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class suit to “prevent the
misappropriation or impairment of Philippine rainforests?”

RULING:
Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations
to come. The Supreme Court ruled that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation,
and for the succeeding generation, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of
succeeding generations is based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as
the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right considers the “rhythm
and harmony of nature” which indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition,
utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country’s forest, mineral, land, waters,
fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration,
development, and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as the future
generations.

Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that
rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little
differently, the minor’s assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes at the same
time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations
to come.

Arigo v. Swift, G.R. No. 206510, September 16, 2014.

FACTS:

Page 46 of 370
 The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the US Navy. In
December 2012, the US Embassy in the Philippines requested diplomatic clearance for the said
vessel “to enter and exit the territorial waters of the Philippines and to arrive at the port of Subic
Bay for the purpose of routine ship replenishment, maintenance, and crew liberty.” On January
6, 2013, the ship left Sasebo, Japan for Subic Bay, arriving on January 13, 2013 after a brief
stop for fuel in Okinawa, Japan.

On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its next port of call in
Makassar, Indonesia. On January 17, 2013 at 2:20 a.m. while transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship
ran aground on the northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs, about 80 miles east-
southeast of Palawan. No one was injured in the incident, and there have been no reports of
leaking fuel or oil.

Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations of the USS
Guardian cause and continue to cause environmental damage of such magnitude as to affect
the provinces of Palawan, Antique, Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental,
Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, which events violate their constitutional
rights to a balanced and healthful ecology.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners have legal standing.

RULING:
Yes, Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.”
Specifically, it is “a party’s personal and substantial interest in a case where he has sustained or
will sustain direct injury as a result” of the act being challenged, and “calls for more than just a
generalized grievance.” However, the rule on standing is a procedural matter which this Court
has relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers and legislators when the
public interest so requires, such as when the subject matter of the controversy is of
transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public
interest.

In the landmark case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., we recognized the “public right” of
citizens to “a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our constitutional history,
is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law.” We declared that the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology need not be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and
polittcal rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an
issue of transcendental importance with intergenerational implications. Such right carries with it
the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.

On the novel element in the class suit filed by the petitioners minors in Oposa, this Court
ruled that not only do ordinary citizens have legal standing to sue for the enforcement of
environmental rights, they can do so in representation of their own and future generations.

Mercado v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 149375, November 26, 2002.

FACTS:

Page 47 of 370
 Marvin Mercado with Rommel Flores, Michael Cummins, Mark Vasques, Enrile
Bertumen—carnapping (RA 6538- Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972) The petitioner along with the
other accused was charged with Carnapping of the Isuzu Trooper, whom they claim they had no
intention of stealing but just borrowed the car for joyride. The said car was abandoned in Baguio
City by the people accused. In order to gain access to the vehicle, the car’s quarter window
was broken. Thereby proving that force was used upon the property to gain access to it. In the
Lower court, the petitioner was sentenced to 12 years and 1 day minimum to 17 years and 4
months of reclusion temporal maximum. When the petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals,
the sentence increased to 17 years and 4 months to 30 years. Court of Appeals relying on
People vs. Omotoy (charged with arson, sentenced to reclusion perpetua as maximumcase
taken directly to Supreme Court) Carnapping is a special law (Anti-carnapping Act of 1972).
Thus, corresponding penalties are not provided under Revised Penal Code. The petitioner in
his appeal to the Court of Appeals also raised the issue of whether or not there was indeed
carnapping. However, upon review, the Appellate court affirmed the conviction.

ISSUE:
Whether the maximum sentence of 30 years given by the Court of Appeals is considered
to be within the range of reclusion perpetua which will enable the case to be certified in the
Supreme Court for a reevaluation of the facts and evidence.

Whether the increase in the sentence term of the penalty is correct as given by the Court
of Appeals.

Whether the sentence of 17 years and 4 months to 30 years rule of Sec. 13, Rule 124, of
the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure is applicable to the case at bar.

RULING:
The Supreme Court affirms the conviction of the petitioner but disagrees with the penalty
imposed. Although the Isuzu Trooper’s window was broken in order to gain access to it and
based on RA 6538, if violence/ force was used to gain access to the property, the penalty
should be by imprisonment for not less than seventeen years and four months and not more
than thirty years, this does not merit the full penalty. The petition of Marvin Mercado for review
in the Supreme Court is denied. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed with a
modification that the penalty to be imposed is reduced to indeterminate prison term of 17 years
and 4 months to 22 years, no costs.

People v. Omotoy, G.R. No. 112719, January 29, 1997

FACTS:

Page 48 of 370
 Accused are Ernesto Omotoy, together with several John Does who were not identified,
conspiring together and helping one another, with malice aforethought and with intent to
destroy, to punish and to cause damage, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
set fire on the house of the Said Rosario Mirafuente, the accused knowing that Rosario
Mirafuente and his family were actually occupying and inside their house at that time they set
fire on the said house; that, as a consequence, the said house of Rosario Mirafuente went into
flames and was completely burned and razed to ashes, including household belongings.
Omotoy was not arrested until January 24, 1990, some three and a half (3-½) years after the
crime; this, notwithstanding that, as he was later to testify, he never left his home during all the
time except for a period of some five (5) months when he stayed in the City of Manila. As
established by the prosecution Omotoy and several John Does were the one responsible for the
razing through fire on the house of the Mirafuente spouse. By virtue of the stated facts the trial
court convicted Omotoy to suffer a penalty of imprisonment, which ranges from Twelve (12)
Years of prision mayor maximum, as minimum, to reclusion perpetua.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower court erred in convicting the accused under section 3,
paragraph 2 of PD 1613 although the prosectution failed to present evidence that the accused
was a member of a criminal syndicate which may have foreign connections.

RULING:
The arguments is specious and must be rejected. Presidential Decree No. 1613
pronounces as guilty of arson any person who deliberately burns another person's property,
wherever located. The circumstances that the property burned is located in an urban, congested
or populated area merely qualifies the offense and converts it into "destructive arson"
punishable, under Section 2 (7) of the law, by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to
reclusion perpetua. On the other hand, under Section 4 (4) of the same law, the circumstance
that the perpetrator of the arson is a criminal syndicate merely serve as a special aggravating
circumstance.

Neither circumstance obtaining in this case, the provision properly applicable is Section
3 (2) of said Presidential Decree No. 1613 which imposes on the arsonist the penalty of
reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua if the property burned is an inhabited house or
dwelling. The elements of arson under this section are: (1) that there is intentional burning; and
(2) that what is intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling.These elements concur in
the case at bar. The prosecution having established beyond reasonable doubt that Omotoy had
deliberately set fire to the house occupied and inhabited by the Mirafuente family, although not
situated in an urban center, Omotoy's conviction is proper under said Section 3 (2) of
Presidential Decree No. 1613.

Lhuillier v. British Airways, G.R. No. 171092, March 15, 2010

FACTS:

Page 49 of 370
 She alleged that on February 28, 2005, she took respondent's flight 548 from London,...
United Kingdom to Rome, Italy. Once on board, she allegedly requested Julian Halliday
(Halliday), one of the respondent's flight attendants, to assist her in placing her hand-carried
luggage in the overhead bin. However, Halliday allegedly refused to help and assist her, and...
even sarcastically remarked that "If I were to help all 300 passengers in this flight, I would have
a broken back!"

Upon arrival in Rome, petitioner complained to respondent's ground manager and

demanded an apology. However, the latter declared that the flight stewards were "only doing
their job." Thus, petitioner filed the complaint for damages, praying that respondent be ordered
to pay P5 million as moral damages, P2 million as nominal damages, P1 million as exemplary
damages, P300,000.00 as attorney's fees, P200,000.00 as litigation expenses, and cost of the...
suit. respondent, by way of special appearance through counsel, filed a Motion to Dismiss on
grounds of lack of jurisdiction over the case and over the person of the respondent. Respondent
alleged that only the courts of London, United Kingdom... or Rome, Italy, have jurisdiction over
the complaint for damages pursuant to the Warsaw Convention, Article 28(1)

Thus, since a) respondent is domiciled in London; b) respondent's principal place of

business is in London; c) petitioner bought her ticket in Italy (through Jeepney Travel S.A.S, in
Rome); and d) Rome, Italy is petitioner's place of destination, then it... follows that the complaint
should only be filed in the proper courts of London, United Kingdom or Rome, Italy.

Likewise, it was alleged that the case must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the respondent because the summons was erroneously served on Euro-Philippine
Airline Services, Inc. which is not its resident agent in the Philippines.

ISSUE:
Whether Philippine courts have jurisdiction over a tortious conduct committed againsta a
filipino citizen and resident by airline personnel of a foreign carrier travelling beyond the
terrirorial limit of any foreign country and thus outside ambit the warsaw convention.

RULING:
It is settled that the Warsaw Convention has the force and effect of law in this country.
The Warsaw Convention applies... because the air travel, where the... alleged tortious conduct
occurred,... was between the United Kingdom... and Italy, which are both signatories... to the
Warsaw Convention.

Thus, when the place of departure and the place of destination in a contract of carriage
are situated within the territories of two High Contracting Parties, said carriage is deemed an
"international carriage". In the case at bench, petitioner's place of departure was London, United
Kingdom while her place of destination was Rome, Italy. Both the United Kingdom and Italy
signed and ratified the Warsaw Convention. As such, the transport of the petitioner is deemed to
be an "international carriage" within the contemplation of the Warsaw Convention.

Since the Warsaw Convention applies... in the instant case, then the jurisdiction... over
the subject matter of the action... is governed by the provisions of theWarsaw Convention. We
thus find that the RTC of Makati correctly ruled that it does not have jurisdiction over the case
filed by the petitioner. We held that the allegation of willful misconduct resulting in a tort is
insufficient to exclude the case from the realm of the Warsaw Convention.

Santos III v. Northwest Orient Airlines, G.R. No. 101538

FACTS:

Page 50 of 370
 The petitioner is a minor and a resident of the Philippines. Private respondent Northwest
Orient Airlines (NOA) is a foreign corporation with principal office in Minnesota, U.S.A. and
licensed to do business and maintain a branch office in the Philippines

On October 21, 1986, the petitioner purchased from NOA a round-trip ticket in San
Francisco. U.S.A., for his flight from San Francisco to Manila via Tokyo and back. The
scheduled departure date from Tokyo was December 20, 1986. No date was specified for his
return to San Francisco.

On December 19, 1986, the petitioner checked in at the NOA counter in the San
Francisco airport for his scheduled departure to Manila. Despite a previous confirmation and re-
confirmation, he was informed that he had no reservation for his flight from Tokyo to Manila. He
therefore had to be wait-listed.

On March 12, 1987, the petitioner sued NOA for damages in the RTC of Makati. On April
13, 1987, NOA moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, citing Article
28(1) of the Warsaw Convention, reading as follows:

Art. 28. (1) An action for damage must be brought at the option of the plaintiff, in the
territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, either before the court of the domicile of the
carrier or of his principal place of business, or where he has a place of business through which
the contract has been made, or before the court at the place of destination.

The private respondent contended that the Philippines was not its domicile nor was this
its principal place of business. Neither was the petitioner’s ticket issued in this country nor was
his destination Manila but San Francisco in the United States.
Lower court granted the dismissal, CA affirmed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Philippines has jurisdiction over the case. (Issue raised by the party
is WON the provision of the Warsaw convention was constitutional)

RULING:
No jurisdiction (the provision is constitutional) The Convention is a treaty commitment
voluntarily assumed by the Philippine government and, as such, has the force and effect of law
in this country. The petitioner’s allegations are not convincing enough to overcome this
presumption. Apparently, the Convention considered the four places designated in Article 28 the
most convenient forums for the litigation of any claim that may arise between the airline and its
passenger, as distinguished from all other places.

Partido ng Manggagawa (PM) and Butil Farmers Party (BUTIL) v. Commission on

Elections, G.R. No. 164702

FACTS

Page 51 of 370
 Several party-list participants sent queries to the respondent COMELEC regarding the
formula to be adopted in computing the additional seats for the party-list winners in the May 10,
2004 elections. In response, the respondent Commission issued Resolution No. 6835, adopting
the simplified formula of "one additional seat per additional two percent of the total party-list
votes." The resolution reads:

Considering that the simplified formula has long been the one adopted by the
Commission and is now the formula of choice of the Supreme Court in its latest resolution on
the matter, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to adopt the simplified
formula of one additional seat per additional two percent of the total party-list votes in the
proclamation of the party-list winners in the coming May 10, 2004 National and Local Elections.
Section 11(b) and Section 12 of R.A. 7941 (Party-List System Act) provide that "the parties,
organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the
party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each, provided that those garnering more than two
percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number
of votes xxx. The COMELEC shall tally all the votes for the parties, organizations, or coalitions
on a nationwide basis, rank them according to the number of votes received and allocate party-
list representatives proportionately according to the percentage of votes obtained by each party,
organization or coalition as against the total nationwide votes cast for the party-list system."

These provisions of [the] statute were transformed into the following formulas by the
Supreme Court in Veterans Federation Party vs. COMELEC (G.R. Nos. 136781, 136786 &
136795, October 6, 2000).

ISSUE:
Whetther or not respondent comelec en banc, as the national board of canvassers for
the party-list system, could be compelled by the honorable court to mechanically apply the
formula stated in its 25 june 2003 resolutionreiterated in the 20 November 2003 resolutionin ang
bagong bayani cases in the determination of qualified party-list organizations and in the
proclamation of their respective nominees.

RULING:
The formula in the landmark case of Veterans prevails. First, the June 25, 2003
Resolution of the Court in Ang Bagong Bayani referred to the Veterans case in determining the
number of seats due for the party-list winners. The footnote on said resolution in computing the
additional seats for the party-list winners states: "[f]or a discussion of how to compute additional
nominees for parties other than the first, see Veterans, supra, at pp. 280-282. x x x."The Court
likewise held that:

We also take this opportunity to emphasize that the formulas devised in Veterans for
computing the number of nominees that the party-list winners are entitled to cannot be
disregarded by the concerned agencies of government, especially the Commission on
Elections. These formulas ensure that the number of seats allocated to the winning party-list
candidates conform to the principle of proportional representation mandated by the law.

Second, in the November 20, 2003 Resolution in Ang Bagong Bayani, the Court gave an
additional seat to BUHAY only because it was similarly situated to APEC, BUTIL, CIBAC and
AKBAYAN which "had obtained more than four percent (4%) of the total number of votes validly
cast for the party-list system and obtained more than 0.50 for the additional seats." Well to note,
the grant of an additional seat to BUHAY was pro hac vice.
Tadeja v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 145336, February 20, 2013

FACTS:
The prosecution witnesses testified that they saw Ruben Bernardo on May 3, 1994 being

Page 52 of 370
hacked to death by the brothers Reynante, Ricky, Ricardo, and Ferdinand and their first cousin
Plaridel – all surnamed Tadeja (herein petitioners). As a result, Ruben died. On the other hand,
petitioners alleged that it was Ruben, together with his sons, who first attacked Reynante. On 15
July 1994, an Information for homicide for the death of Ruben was filed against Reynante,
Ricky, Ricardo, Ferdinand, and Plaridel. The RTC issued a decision finding herein petitioners
guilty of homicide. Except for Plaridel, who absconded, all the other accused (petitioners herein)
appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). CA sustained the decision. SC issued a Decision dated
21 July 2006 affirming the Decision of the CA. On 23 October 2006, SC denied the motion with
finality. On 6 November 2006, petitioners filed a Motion with Leave of Court to Vacate Judgment
to remand the case to the RTC for further reception of evidence. Later, petitioners filed a
Supplemental Motion to Motion with Leave of Court to Vacate Judgment Due to Supervening
Event alleging that on 29 November 2006, the police had finally arrested Plaridel. Attached was
a statement executed by Plaridel admitting therein that he had killed Ruben. SC treated the
motion as a second motion for reconsideration of the 21 July 2006 Decision and denied it on the
ground that it was a prohibited pleading under the Rules. In a letter addressed to then Chief
Justice Reynato S. Puno, Ferdinand prayed for the reopening of the case on the basis of the
confession of Plaridel.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there reopening of the case is permitted by law in the case at bar.

RULING:
No, it is not. We resolve to DENY petitioners’ motion to reopen the case for reception of
further evidence in the trial court. Section 1 of Rule 121 of the Rules of Court provides that a
new trial may only be granted by the court on motion of the accused, or motu proprio with the
consent of the accused "(a)t any time before a judgment of conviction becomes final." In this
case, petitioners’ judgment of conviction already became final and executory on 26 July 2007 –
the date on which the Decision of this Court denying the petition and affirming the ruling of the
CA was recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgments. Thus, pleas for the remand of this case
to the trial court for the conduct of a new trial may no longer be entertained. Furthermore,
petitioners premise their motion for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, i.e.
Plaridel’s extrajudicial confession. Newly discovered evidence refers to that which (a) is
discovered after trial; (b) could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the
exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or
impeaching; and (d) is of such weight that it would probably change the judgment if admitted.
The most important requisite is that the evidence could not have been discovered and produced
at the trial even with reasonable diligence; hence, the term "newly discovered." The confession
of Plaridel does not meet this requisite. He participated in the trial before the RTC and even
gave testimony as to his defense. It was only after he and petitioners had been convicted by the
trial court that he absconded. Thus, the contention that his confession could not have been
obtained during trial does not hold water.

Spouses Leonardo and Milagros Chua v. Ang et al., G.R. No. 156164, September 4, 2009.

FACTS:
Petitioners (as buyers) and Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. (FEPI, as developers) executed a

Page 53 of 370
Contract To Sell a condominium unit. Despite the lapse of three (3) years, FEPI failed to
construct and deliver the contracted condominium unit to the petitioners.

As a result, the petitioners filed on September 3, 2002 a Complaint-Affidavit before the

Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City accusing the private respondents, as officers and
directors of FEPI, of violating P.D. No. 957. The petitioners alleged that the private respondents
did not construct and failed to deliver the contracted condominium unit to them and did not
register the Contract to Sell with the Register of Deeds.

Of the seven (7) private respondents, only private respondent Alice Odchique-Bondoc
filed a Counter-Affidavit She countered that the City Prosecutor has no jurisdiction over the case
since it falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB).On November 4, 2002, Assistant City Prosecutor Dennis R. Pastrana and Pasig City
Prosecutor Jacinto G. Ang (public respondents), respectively issued and approved the
Resolution ismissing the complaint for being premature. The Resolution held that it is the
HLURB that has exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving real estate business and practices.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts

RULING:
On the non-observance of the principle of hierarchy of courts, it must be remembered
that this rule generally applies to cases involving conflicting factual allegations. Cases which
depend on disputed facts for decision cannot be brought immediately before us as we are not
triers of facts.A strict application of this rule may be excused when the reason behind the rule is
not present in a case, as in the present case, where the issues are not factual but purely legal.
In these types of questions, this Court has the ultimate say so that we merely abbreviate the
review process if we, because of the unique circumstances of a case, choose to hear and
decide the legal issues outright. In the present Petition forCertiorari, we find that there are four
(4) compelling reasons to allow the petitioners' invocation of our jurisdiction in the first instance,
even without prior recourse to a motion for reconsideration or to the exhaustion of administrative
remedies, and even in disregard of the principle of hierarchy of courts. First, the petitioners raise
a pure question of law involving jurisdiction over criminal complaints for violation of P.D. No.
957. Second, the present case requires prompt action because public interest and welfare are
involved in subdivision and condominium development, as the terms of P.D. Nos. 957 and 1344
expressly reflect. Third, considering that this case has been pending for nearly seven (7) years
(since the filing of the Complaint-Affidavit on September 3, 2002) to the prejudice not only of the
parties involved, but also of the subdivision and condominium regulatory system and its need for
the prompt determination of controversies, the interests of justice now demand the direct
resolution of the jurisdictional issue this proceeding poses. Fourth, the petition is meritorious.
The public respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the criminal
complaints for violation of P.D. No. 957 on the ground that jurisdiction lies with the HLURB.

Citizen’s Battle against Corruption v. Commission on Elections,

G.R. No. 172103, April 13, 2007.

FACTS:

Page 54 of 370
 The COMELEC, sitting en banc as the National Board of Canvassers for the Party-List
System, issued Resolution No. NBC 04-004 which proclaimed petitioner CIBAC as one of those
which qualified to occupy a seat in Congress having received the required two percent (2%) of
the total votes cast for the party-list representatives. Based on Party-List Canvass Report No.
19,[4] CIBAC received a total number of 493,546 votes out of the 12,627,852 votes cast for all
the party-list participants, which, by applying the formula adopted by the Supreme Court in
Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC,[5] resulted in a percentage of 3.9084.[6] In the
computation for additional seats for the parties, the COMELEC adopted a simplified formula of
one additional seat per additional 2%, thereby foreclosing the chances of CIBAC to gain an
additional seat under the party-list system for having received less than what was prescribed by
the poll body. petitioner CIBAC, together with Luzon Farmers Party (BUTIL) and Partido ng
Manggagawa (PM), filed a Joint Motion for Immediate Proclamation[8] entreating the
COMELEC en banc to recognize their entitlement to an additional seat and that their second
nominees be immediately proclaimed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner cibac, and other party-list groups similarly situated, are entitled
to one (1) additional seat based on the formula crafted by the supreme court in the cases of ang
bagong bayani and bayan muna.

RULING:
A careful perusal of the four corners of Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna betrays
petitioner‘s claim as it did not mention any revision or reshaping of the Veterans formula. As a
matter of fact, the Court had in mind the application of the original Veterans formula in Ang
Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna. This conclusion is based on the aforequoted formula in Ang
Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna, as follows: Applying the relevant formula in Veterans to
BUHAY.The phrase ―applying the relevant formula in Veterans to BUHAY admits of no other
conclusion than that the Court merely applied the Veterans formula to Ang Bagong Bayani and
Bayan Muna in resolving the additional seats by the other qualified party-list groups. However, it
appears that there was an inaccurate presentation of the Veterans formula as the Court used
the multiplier ―allotted seats for the first party in Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna instead
of the ―[number] of additional seats allocated to the first party prescribed in the Veterans
formula. It is apparent that the phrase ―[number] of additional‖ was omitted, possibly by
inadvertence from the phrase ―allotted seats for First Party. The disparity is material,
substantial, and significant since the multiplier ―[number] of additional seats allocated to the
First Party prescribed in the Veterans formula pertains to a multiplier of two (2) seats, while the
multiplier ―allotted seats for the first party in Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna formula can
mean a multiplier of maximum three (3) seats, since the first party can garner a maximum of
three (3) seats. Applying the Veterans formula in petitioner‘s case, we reach the conclusion that
CIBAC is not entitled to an additional seat. Party-List Canvass Report No. 20 contained in the
petition shows that the first party, Bayan Muna, garnered the highest number of votes, that is, a
total of 1,203,305 votes. Petitioner CIBAC, on the other hand, received a total of 495,190 votes.
It was proclaimed that the first party, Bayan Muna, was entitled to a maximum of three (3) seats
based on June 2, 2004 Resolution No. NBC 04-004 of the COMELEC. Unfortunately, it is the
Veterans formula that is sanctioned by the Court and not the Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan
Muna formula that petitioner alleges. Since petitioner CIBAC got a result of 0.82304986 only,
which is less than one (1), then it did not obtain or reach a whole number. Petitioner has not
convinced us to deviate from our ruling in Veterans that ―in order to be entitled to one
additional seat, an exact whole number is necessary. Clearly, petitioner is not entitled to an
additional seat.
Provincial Assessor of Marinduque v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 170532, April 30, 2009.

FACTS:
Petitioner issued against respondent an Assessment Notice, dated March 28, 1994, for

Page 55 of 370
real property taxes due on the latter’s real properties, including its Siltation Dam and Decant
System which was damaged by typhoon sometime in 1993. Respondent paid the tax
demanded, but appealed the assessment before the Local Board of Assessment Appeals
(LBAA) on the ground that the subject property is exempt from real property taxation under
Section 234(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991, which
provides for exemptions from Real Property Tax for “Machinery and equipment used for
pollution control and environmental protection.” The LBAA as well as the Central Board of
Assessment Appeals (CBAA) on appeal ruled against tax exemption. The Court of Appeals
reversed the rulings of LBAA and CBAA and held that the subject property was exempt from real
property taxation under Section 91 of R.A. No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995.

ISSUE:
Whether the Siltation Dam and Decant System of Marcopper Mining Corporation is
exempt from real property tax.

RULING:
No, The disputed assessment notice having taken effect on January 1, 1995, (by virtue
of Sec. 221 of R.A. No. 7160) its validity is determined by the provisions of R.A. No. 7160,
effective January 1, 1992. R.A. No. 7942 has no bearing on the matter, for this law came into
effect only on April 14, 1995. Hence, reference to R.A. No. 7942 by the CA and the respondent
are all out of place.Title II of R.A. No. 7160 governs the administration, appraisal, assessment,
levy and collection of real property tax. Section 234 thereof grants exemption from real property
taxation based on ownership, character or usage.

As held in Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. Marcos, the exemption granted
under Sec. 234(e) of R.A. No. 7160 to “[m]achinery and equipment used for pollution control
and environmental protection” is based on usage. The term usage means direct, immediate and
actual application of the property itself to the exempting purpose. Section 199 of R.A. No. 7160
defines actual use as “the purpose for which the property is principally or predominantly utilized
by the person in possession thereof.” It contemplates concrete, as distinguished from mere
potential, use. Thus, a claim for exemption under Sec. 234(e) of R.A. No. 7160 should be
supported by evidence that the property sought to be exempt is actually, directly and exclusively
used for pollution control and environmental protection.

The records yield no allegation or evidence by respondent that the subject property was
actually, directly and exclusively used for pollution control and environmental protection during
the period covered by the assessment notice under protest. Rather, the finding of the CBAA that
said property “apparently out of commission and not apt to its function as would control pollution
and protect the environment” stands undisputed; [and] that the siltation dam was damaged in
1993 when a typhoon hit Marinduque.

In re Petition for Radio and Television Coverage of the Multiple Murder Cases against
Maguindanao Governor Zaldy Ampatuan, A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC, October 23, 2012.

FACTS:

Page 56 of 370
 On November 23, 2009, 57 people including 32 journalists and media practitioners were
killed on their way to Shariff Aguak in Maguindanao. This tragic incident came to be known as
Maguindanao massacre´ spawned charges for 57 counts of murder and additional charges of
rebellion against 197 accused, commonly entitled People v. Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr., et al.

Following the transfer of venue and the reraffling of the cases, the cases are being tried
by Presiding Judge Jocelyn Solis-Reyes of Branch 221 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City. Almost a year later on November 19 2010, the National Union of Journalists of the
Philippines (NUJP), ABSCBN Broadcasting Corporation, GMA Network Inc., relatives of the
victims, individual journalists from various media entities and members of the academe filed a
petition before this court praying that live television and radio coverage of the trial in this criminal
cases be allowed, recording devises be permitted inside the court room to assist the working
journalists, and reasonable guidelines be formulated to govern the broadcast coverage and the
use of devices.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for radio and television coverage of the Maguindanao
Massacre should be allowed.

RULING:
The Court partially GRANTS pro hac vice petitioners’ prayer for a live broadcast of the
trial court proceedings, subject to guidelines. Respecting the possible influence of media
coverage on the impartiality of trial court judges, petitioners correctly explain that prejudicial
publicity insofar as it undermines the right to a fair trial must pass the totality of circumstances
test, applied in People v. Teehankee, Jr. and Estrada v. Desierto, that the right of an accused to
a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press, that pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to
the right of an accused to a fair trial, and that there must be allegation and proof of the impaired
capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision. Mere fear of possible undue influence is not
tantamount to actual prejudice resulting in the deprivation of the right to a fair trial.

The disallowing the live media broadcast of the trial is subject to the following guidelines
on audio visual recording and streaming of the video coverage: a.An audio-visual recording of
the Maguindanao massacre cases may be made both for documentary purposes and for
transmittal to specified closed-circuit viewing areas: (i) outside the courtroom, within the Camp
Bagong Diwa 's premises; and (ii) selected trial courts in Maguindanao, Koronadal, South
Cotabato, and General Santos City where the relatives of the accused and the victims reside.
Said trial courts shall be identified by the Office of the Court Administrator. These viewing areas
shall be under the control of trial court judges involved, subject to this Court's supervision. b.
The viewing area will be installed to accommodate the public who want to observe the
proceedings within the Camp Bagong Diwa premises. The streaming of this video coverage
within the different court premises in Mindanao will be installed so that the relatives of the
parties and the interested public can watch the proceedings in real time. c. A single fixed
compact camera shall be installed inconspicuously inside the courtroom to provide a single
wide-angle full-view of the sala of the trial court. No panning and zooming shall be allowed to
avoid unduly highlighting or downplaying incidents in the proceedings. The camera and the
necessary equipment shall be operated and controlled only by a duly designated official or
employee of the Supreme Court. d. The transmittal of the audio-visual recording from inside the
courtroom to the closed-circuit viewing areas shall be conducted in such a way that the least
physical disturbance shall be ensured in keeping with the dignity and solemnity of the
proceedings.
WEEK 7

Authorities

Page 57 of 370
1. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
2. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104151, March 10, 1997.
3. Government Service Insurance System v. Cadiz, G.R. No. 154093, July 8, 2003.
4. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104151, March 10, 1995.
5. Spouses Francisco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118749, April 25, 2003.
6. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Solidbank Corporation, G.R. No. 148191, November
25, 2003.
7. Bañas v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102967, February 10, 2000.
8. Philippine Health Care Providers, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No.
167330, September 18, 2009.
9. Sanders v. Veridiano II, G.R. No. L-46930, June 10, 1988.
10. Garcia v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 111511, October 5, 1993.
11. Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, G.R. No. 148208,
December 15, 2004.
12. Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., G.R. No. 167614, March 14, 2009.
13. Southern Cross Cement Corporation v. Cement Manufacturers Association of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 158540, August 3, 2005.
14. Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace
Panel on Ancestral Domain, G.R. No. 158540, August 3, 2005.
15. Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
16. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
17. Ganzon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 93252, August 5, 1991.
18. Salita v. Magtolis, G.R. No. 106429, June 13, 1994.
19.Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108763, February 13, 1997.
20. Antonio v. Reyes, G.R. No. 155800, March 10, 2006.

Legislation
1. Government of the Philippine Islands v. Springer, G.R. No. L-26979, April 1, 1927.
2. Ople v. Torres, G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998.
3. League of Cities of the Philippines v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 176951, February
15, 2011.
4. Mariano v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 118577, March 7, 1995.
5. National Power Corporation v. Province of Lanao del Sur, G.R. No. 96700, November 19,
1996.
6. Municipality of San Juan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125183, September 29, 1997.
7. La Bugal-B’laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, G.R. No. 127882, January 27, 2004.
8. Corpuz v. People, G.R. No. 180016, April 29, 2014.
9. Re: Vicente S.E. Veloso, A.M. No. 12-8-07-CA, June 16, 2015.
10. Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, G.R. No. 115455, August 25, 1994.
11. G.R. No. 196271, February 28, 2012.
12. Duarte v. Dade, 32 Phil. 36, 49 (1915).

Page 58 of 370
13. The City of Davao v. The Regional Trial Court, Branch XII, G.R. No. 127383, August 18,
2005.
14. Atitiw v. Zamora, G.R. No. 143374, September 30, 2005.
15. Government Service Insurance System v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 183905, April 16,
2009.
16. Republic v. Caguioa, G.R. No. 168584, Ovtober 15, 2007.
17. Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy, G.R. No. 124369, December 3, 1997.
18. Luz Farms v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 86889, December 4, 1990.
19. Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative v. La Trinidad Water District, G.R. No. 166471, March
22, 2011.
20. Betoy v. Board of Directors, National Power Corporation, G.R. No. 156556-57, October 4,
2011.
21. Pambansang Koalisyon ng mga Samahang Magsasaka at Manggagawa sa Niyugan v.
Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 147036-37, April 10, 2012.
22. Pimentel, Jr. v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 195770, July 17, 2012.
23. Lawyers against Monopoly and Poverty v. Secretary of Budget and Management, G.R. No.
164987, April 24, 2012.
24. Calilung v. Datumanon, G.R. No. 160869, May 11, 2007.
25. Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014.
26. Remman Enterprises, Inc. v. Professional Regulatory Board of Real Estate Service, G.R.
No. 197676, February 4, 2014.
27. Giron v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 188179, January 22, 2013.
28. Tobias v. Abalos, G.R. No. 114783, December 8, 1994.
29. Cordero v. Cabatuando, G.R. No. L-14542, October 31, 1962.
30. Cawaling, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 146319, October 26, 2001.
31. Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 177508, August 7, 2009.
32. Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, G.R. No. 115455, October 30, 1995.
33. Guro Party-List v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 168056, September 1, 2005.
34. G.R. No. 163583, April 15, 2009.
35. Fabian v. Desierto, G.R. No. 129742, September 16, 1998.
36. First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110571, October 7, 1994.
37. Macalintal v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 157013, July 10, 2003.
38. Abakada Guro Party-List v. Purisima, G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008.
39. Belgica v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013.
40. Abakada Guro Party List Officers v. Ermita, G.R. No. 168056, September 1, 2005.
41. Vivas v. The Monetary Board of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, G.R. No. 191414, August
7, 2013.
42. Francisco v. Toll Regulatory Board, G.R. No. 166910, October 19, 2010.
43. Equi-Asia Placement Inc. v. Department of Foreign Affairs, G.R. No. 152214, September 19,
2006.

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44. Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Torres, G.R. No. 101279, August 6,
1992.
45. Republic of the Philippines v. Drugmaker’s Laboratories, Inc., G.R. No. 190837, March 5,
2014.
46. Balmaceda v. Corominas & Company, Inc., G.R. No. L-21971, September 5, 1975. P
47. Macailing v. Andrada, G.R. No. L-21607, January 30, 1970.
48. Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. The Office of the Presidential Assistant for Legal Affairs, G.R.
No. 73705, August 27, 1987.
49. Cawad v. Abad, G.R. No. 207145, July 28, 2015.
50. Land Bank of the Philippines v. Obias, G.R. No. 184406, March 14, 2012.
51. Philippine International Trading Corporation v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 152688,
November 19, 2003.
52. United BF Homeowner’s Association and Home Insurance and Guaranty Corporation v. BF
Homes, Inc., G.R. No. 124873, July 14, 1999.
53. Granger Associates v. Microwave Systems, Inc., G.R. No. 79987, September 14, 1990.
54. Villegas v. Subido, G.R. No. L-26534, November 28, 1969.
55. Philippine Petroleum Corporation v. Municipality of Pililia, G.R. No. 90776, June 3, 1991.
56. Shell Philippines, Inc. v. Central Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. L-51353, June 27, 1998.
57. Smart Communications, Inc. v. National Telecommunications Commission, G.R. No.
151908, August 12, 2003.
58. Lokin v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 179431-32. June 22, 2010.
59. Holy Spirit Homeowners’ Association, Inc. v. Defensor, G.R. No. 163980, August 3, 2006.
60. Review Center Association of the Philippines v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 180046, April
2, 2009.

Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).

FACTS:

Page 60 of 370
 Petitioners sued the state of Florida, seeking to enforce good faith negotiation as
required under the Indian Gamin Regulatory Act. Respondent argues that as a sovereign state,
Congress cannot make it appear in federal court without abrogating its sovereign immunity.

ISSUE:
May Congress allow suit against a state under the Indian Commerce Clause, Art. I,
Section: 8, cl. 3?

RULING:
No. Holding affirmed. Congress made clear in the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act that it
intended to abrogate States’ sovereign immunity. However, it lacks the ability to do so under its
Article I powers. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment is the only authority Congress has to
authorize a private suit against a state.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104151, March 10, 1997

FACTS:

Page 61 of 370
 The Commissioner of Internal Revenue served two notices and demand for payment of
the respective deficiency ad valorem and buiness taxes for taxable years 1975 and 1976
against the respondent Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation (ACMDC). The
latter protested both assessments but the same were denied, hence it filed two separate
petitions for review in the Court of Tax Appeals. The CTA rendered a consolidated decision
holding, inter alia, that ACMDC was not liable for deficiency ad valorem taxes on copper and
silver for 1975 and 1976 thereby effectively sustaining the theory of ACMDC that in computing
the ad valorem tax on copper mineral, the refining and smelting charges should be deducted, in
addition to freight and insurance charges.

However, the tax court held ACMDC liable for the amount consisting of 25% surcharge
for late payment of the ad valorem tax and late filing of notice of removal of silver, gold and
pyrite extracted during certain periods, and for alleged deficiency manufacturer's sales tax and
such contractor's tax for leasing out of its personal properties. ACDMC elevated the matter to
the Supreme Court claiming that the leasing out was a mere isolated transaction, hence should
not be subjected to contractor's tax.

ISSUE:
Whether the claim of the private respondent, with respect to the contractor's tax,
impressed with merit?

RULING:
No. It is being held that ACMDC was not a manufacturer subject to the percentage tax
imposed by Section 186 of the tax code. However such conclusion cannot be made with respect
to the contractor's tax being imposed on ACMDC. It cannot validly claim that the leasing out of
its personal properties was merely an isolated transaction. Its book of accounts shows that
several distinct payments were made for the use of its personal properties such as its plane,
motor boat and dump truck. The series of transactions engaged in by ACMDC for the lease of
its aforesaid properties could also be deduced from the fact that during the period there were
profits earned and reported therefor. The allegation of ACMDC that it did not realize any profit
from the leasing out of its said personal properties, since its income therefrom covered only the
costs of operation such as salaries and fuel, is not supported by any documentary or substantial
evidence.
Assessments are prima facie presumed correct and made in good faith. Contrary to the
theory of ACMDC, it is the taxpayer and not the BIR who has the duty of proving otherwise. It is
an elementary rule that in the absence of proof of any irregularities in the performance of official
duties, an assessment will not be disturbed. All presumptions are in favor of tax assessments.
Verily, failure to present proof of error in assessments will justify judicial affirmance of said
assessment.

Government Service Insurance System v. Cadiz G.R. No. 154093, July 8, 2003.

FACTS:

Page 62 of 370
 Leo L. Cadiz was appointed as a Provincial Guard of Negros Oriental he entered the
police service and was promoted to several ranks until he became a Police Major. In 1991, he
was absorbed by the Philippine National Police (PNP), with a rank of Police Chief Inspector. On
July 17, 1992, respondents rank was adjusted to Police Chief Superintendent, the position he
held until his retirement on March 19, 1999 at the age of 55. The medical records of respondent
revealed that on October 11, 1996, he suffered a heart attack and was hospitalized at the San
Carlos Planters Hospital, San Carlos City. He was transferred to the Siliman University Medical
Center where he was diagnosed to be suffering from AF with CHF Class 1-E T/A Sec. to Cardio
embolic Sec. to AF, Chronic CAD, a heart ailment. Thereafter, respondent was also admitted at
the Negros Oriental Provincial Hospital for chest pain, palpitation and abnormal beats HP..., AF,
CHF Class I; Hypercholesterolemia. Consequently, he applied for early retirement due to an
ailment causing [paralysis of the] left hand and [slurred] speechrendering him unfit to discharge
further his duties and responsibilities as a police officer. Dr. Silahis Rosario, a cardiologist and
attending physician of respondent, testified before the National Police Commission that the
latters ailment is unstable angina and chronic atriol fibrillation, which means a chronic
irregularity of the heart causing a congestive heart failure. After its own examination of
respondent, the Medical and Dental Service, PNP, declared him UNFIT FOR POLICE
SERVICE. Hence, on March 19, 1999, he was retired from service and granted permanent total
disability benefits. Respondent filed a disability claim with the GSIS, attaching to his application
his service record and PNP General Order No. 641, stating that respondent retired from the
PNP due to a permanent total disability. Dr. Gervillana B. Estrada, Medical Officer of GSIS,
Dumaguete City, approved the claim and granted respondent permanent total disability benefits
starting March 19, 1999, and temporary total disability benefits. Dr. Estrada to revise her
recommendation, thus [k]indly revise your medical recommendation based on our criteria for
granting of disability. Based on your physical examination (8/23/99) done the degree of
claimants disability, does not satisfy the criteria for PTD.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is entitled to permanent total disability benefits.

RULING:
Eespondents entitlement to permanent total disability was established by his medical
records and by the investigation of the very agency he worked for, the PNP, which found him
UNFIT FOR POLICE SERVICE. Even the initial findings of Dr. Gervillana B. Estrada, Medical
Officer of the GSIS, Dumaguete City evinced that respondent is really qualified for permanent
total disability benefits. Most of all, the decision of the PNP to retire him at the age of 55 for
being unfit for police service is a clear indication that his heart ailment rendered him incapable
of effectively and competently performing his job as a Police Chief Superintendent without
serious discomfort or pain and without material injury or danger to his life. In a number of cases,
it was ruled that the early retirement of an employee due to a work-related ailment, as in the
case at bar, proves that he was really disabled totally to further perform his assigned task, and
to deny permanent total disability benefits when he was forced to retire would render inutile and
meaningless the social justice precept guaranteed by the Constitution.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104151, March 10, 1997

FACTS:

Page 63 of 370
 The Commissioner of Internal Revenue served two notices and demand for payment of
the respective deficiency ad valorem and buiness taxes for taxable years 1975 and 1976
against the respondent Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation (ACMDC). The
latter protested both assessments but the same were denied, hence it filed two separate
petitions for review in the Court of Tax Appeals. The CTA rendered a consolidated decision
holding, inter alia, that ACMDC was not liable for deficiency ad valorem taxes on copper and
silver for 1975 and 1976 thereby effectively sustaining the theory of ACMDC that in computing
the ad valorem tax on copper mineral, the refining and smelting charges should be deducted, in
addition to freight and insurance charges.

However, the tax court held ACMDC liable for the amount consisting of 25% surcharge
for late payment of the ad valorem tax and late filing of notice of removal of silver, gold and
pyrite extracted during certain periods, and for alleged deficiency manufacturer's sales tax and
such contractor's tax for leasing out of its personal properties. ACDMC elevated the matter to
the Supreme Court claiming that the leasing out was a mere isolated transaction, hence should
not be subjected to contractor's tax.

ISSUE:
Whether the claim of the private respondent, with respect to the contractor's tax,
impressed with merit.

RULING:
No. It is being held that ACMDC was not a manufacturer subject to the percentage tax
imposed by Section 186 of the tax code. However such conclusion cannot be made with respect
to the contractor's tax being imposed on ACMDC. It cannot validly claim that the leasing out of
its personal properties was merely an isolated transaction. Its book of accounts shows that
several distinct payments were made for the use of its personal properties such as its plane,
motor boat and dump truck. The series of transactions engaged in by ACMDC for the lease of
its aforesaid properties could also be deduced from the fact that during the period there were
profits earned and reported therefor. The allegation of ACMDC that it did not realize any profit
from the leasing out of its said personal properties, since its income therefrom covered only the
costs of operation such as salaries and fuel, is not supported by any documentary or substantial
evidence.

Assessments are prima facie presumed correct and made in good faith. Contrary to the
theory of ACMDC, it is the taxpayer and not the BIR who has the duty of proving otherwise. It is
an elementary rule that in the absence of proof of any irregularities in the performance of official
duties, an assessment will not be disturbed. All presumptions are in favor of tax assessments.
Verily, failure to present proof of error in assessments will justify judicial affirmance of said
assessment.

Spouses Francisco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118749, April 25, 2003.

FACTS:

Page 64 of 370
 On 3 February 1984, the spouses Lorenzo and Lorenza Francisco and Engineer
Bienvenido C. Mercado entered into a Contract of Development for the development into a
subdivision of several parcels of land in Pampanga. Under the Contract, respondent agreed to
undertake at his expense the development work for the Franda Village Subdivision. Respondent
committed to complete the construction within 27 months. Respondent also advanced
P200,000.00 for the initial expenses of the development work. In return, respondent would
receive 50% of the total gross sales of the subdivision lots and other income of the subdivision.
Respondent also enjoyed the exclusive and irrevocable authority to manage, control and
supervise the sales of the lots within the subdivision. The Contract required respondent to
submit to petitioners, within the first 15 days of every month, a report on payments collected
from lot buyers with copies of all the contracts to sell. However, respondent failed to submit the
monthly report. On 27 February 1987, respondent filed with the trial court an action to rescind
the Contract with a prayer for damages. Petitioners countered that respondent breached the
Contract by failing to finish the subdivision within the 27 months agreed upon, and therefore
respondent.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Mercado incurred delay.

RULING:
The petitioners breached the Contract by: (1) hiring Rosales to do development work on
the subdivision within the 27-month period exclusively granted to respondent; (2) interfering with
the latter's development work; and (3) stopping respondent from managing the sale of lots and
collection of payments. Because petitioners were the first to breach the Contract and even
interfered with the development work, respondent did not incur delay even if he completed only
28% of the development work. Further, the HSRC extended the Contract up to July 1987. Since
the Contract had not expired at the time respondent filed the action for rescission, petitioners'
defense that respondent did not finish the development work on time was without basis. The law
provides that delay may exist when the obligor fails to fulfill his obligation within the time
expressly stipulated. In this case, the HSRC extended the period for respondent to finish the
development work until 30 July 1987. Respondent did not incur delay since the period granted
him to fulfill his obligation had not expired at the time respondent filed the action for rescission
on 27 February 1987. Moreover, since petitioners stopped respondent from selling lots and
collecting payments from lot buyers, which was the primary source of development funds, they
in effect, rendered respondent incapable, or at least made it difficult for him, to develop the
subdivision within the Page 63 of 845 allotted period. In reciprocal obligations, neither party
incurs in delay if the other does not comply or is not ready to comply with what is incumbent
upon him. It is only when one of the parties fulfills his obligation that delay by the other begins.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Solidbank Corporation,

G.R. No. 148191, November 25, 2003.

Page 65 of 370
FACTS:
Solidbank filed its Quarterly Percentage Tax Returns reflecting gross receipts amounting
to P1,474,693.44. It alleged that the total included P350,807,875.15 representing gross receipts
from passive income which was already subjected to 20%final withholding tax (FWT).
The Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) held in Asian Ban Corp. v Commissioner, that the 20% FWT
should not form part of its taxable gross receipts for purposes of computing the tax.
Solidbank, relying on the strength of this decision, filed with the BIR a letter-request for the
refund or tax credit. It also filed a petition for review with the CTA where the it ordered the
refund.

The CA ruling, however, stated that the 20% FWT did not form part of the taxable gross
receipts because the FWT was not actually received by the bank but was directly remitted to the
government.

The Commissioner claims that although the FWT was not actually received by
Solidbank, the fact that the amount redounded to the bank’s benefit makes it part of the taxable
gross receipts in computing the Gross Receipts Tax. Solidbank says the CA ruling is correct.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the FWT forms part of the gross receipts tax.

RULING:
In a withholding tax system, the payee is the taxpayer, the person on whom the tax is
imposed. The payor, a separate entity, acts as no more than an agent of the government for the
collection of tax in order to ensure its payment. This amount that is used to settle the tax liability
is sourced from the proceeds constitutive of the tax base.
These proceeds are either actual or constructive. Both parties agree that there is no actual
receipt by the bank. What needs to be determined is if there is constructive receipt. Since the
payee is the real taxpayer, the rule on constructive receipt can be rationalized.

The Court applied provisions of the Civil Code on actual and constructive possession.
Article 531 of the Civil Code clearly provides that the acquisition of the right of possession is
through the proper acts and legal formalities established. The withholding process is one such
act. There may not be actual receipt of the income withheld; however, as provided for in Article
532, possession by any person without any power shall be considered as acquired when ratified
by the person in whose name the act of possession is executed.

In our withholding tax system, possession is acquired by the payor as the withholding
agent of the government, because the taxpayer ratifies the very act of possession for the
government. There is thus constructive receipt.

The processes of bookkeeping and accounting for interest on deposits and yield on
deposit substitutes that are subjected to FWT are tantamount to delivery, receipt or remittance.
Besides, Solidbank admits that its income is subjected to a tax burden immediately upon
“receipt”, although it claims that it derives no pecuniary benefit or advantage through the
withholding process.

There being constructive receipt, part of which is withheld, that income is included as
part of the tax base on which the gross receipts tax is imposed.

Bañas v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102967, February 10, 2000.

FACTS:

Page 66 of 370
 In February 20, 1976, petitioner Bibiano V. Bañas Jr. sold to Ayala
InvestmentCorporation 128,265 square meters of land in Muntinlupa for P2,308,770.00. AYALA
issued onepromissory note covering four equal annual installments. On the same day,
petitionerdiscounted the promissory note with AYALA. AYALA then issued 9 checks to
petitioner, all datedFebruary 20, 1976 with uniform amount of P205, 224.00 In his 1976 Income
Tax Return, petitioner reported the P461, 754 initial payment asincome from disposition of
capital asset. In the succeeding years, until 1979, petitioner reporteda uniform income of
P230,877.00 as gain from sale of capital asset. After an examination by thetax examiners,
Rodolfo Tuazon and Procopio Talon, on April 11, 1978, they recommended adeficiency of tax
assessment for P2,473,673.00.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the promissory note should be declared cash transaction for purposes of
taxation.

RULING:
Yes. A negotiable instrument is deemed a substitute for money and for value. According
to Sec. 25 of NIL: “value is any consideration sufficient to support a simple contract. An
antecedent or pre-existing debt constitutes value; and is deemed such whether the instrument is
payable on demand or at a future time”. Although the proceed of a discounted promissory note
is not considered part of the initial payment, it is still taxable income for the year it was
converted into cash.

Philippine Health Care Providers, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No.
167330, September 18, 2009.

Page 67 of 370
Facts: On January 27, 2000, the respondent CIR sent petitioner assessment of deficiency
taxes, both Value-Added Tax (VAT) and documentary stamp tax (DST) in the total amount of
P224,702,641.18 for taxable years 1996 and 1997. Petitioner protested such assessment in a
letter, but the respondent did not act on the protest which led the petitioner to file a petition in
the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) seeking the cancellation of said assessments. CTA partially
granted the petition wherein the petitioner is ordered to pay the deficiency VAT and set aside
the DST deficiency tax. Respondent appealed in Court of Appeals (CA) with regard to the
cancellation of DST assessment. CA granted the petition. The Court affirmed CA’s decision.
Hence, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is liable to pay the DST on its health care agreement
pursuant to Sec.185 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997.

Held: Petition granted. Petitioner is not contemplated to be included in “or other branch
insurance” covered by Section 185 of NIRC because it is a Health Maintenance Organization
(HMO) and not an insurance company. HMOs primary purpose is rendering service to its
member by lowering prices and reducing the cost rather than the risk of medical health. On the
other hand, insurance businesses undertakes for a consideration to indemnify its clients against
loss, damage or liability arising from unknown or contingent event. The term “indemnify” therein
presuppose that a liability or claim has already been incurred. In HMOs, there is no indemnity
precisely because the member merely avails of medical services to be paid or already paid in
advance at a pre-agreed price under the agreements. Moreover, HMOs play an important role in
society as partners of the State in achieving its constitutional mandate of providing citizens with
affordable health services. Also, the DST assessment of the petitioner for the years 1996 and
1997 became moot and academic since it availed tax amnesty under RA 9480 on December 10,
2007. Thus, petitioner is entitled to immunity from payment of taxes for taxable year 2005 and
prior years.

Sanders v. Veridiano II, G.R. No. L-46930, June 10, 1988.

Page 68 of 370
Facts: Petitioner Sanders was then the special services director of the U.S. Naval Station
(NAVSTA) in Olongapo City. Petitioner Moreau was the commanding officer of the Subic Naval
Base, which includes the said station. Private respondents were American citizens with
permanent address in the Phil and were both game room attendants of the NAVSTA.
Herein respondents were then advised that there employment was changed from permanent full
time to permanent part-time. They filed a case of the US Dept. of Defense then was gave a
recommendation for their reinstatement. The controversy of the case was when Sanders sent a
letter to Moreau that he disagrees with the recommendation. Because of the letters private
respondents filed a case with CFI of Zambales, the plaintiffs claim that the letters contains
libelous content and has caused them the prejudgment of the grievance proceedings.
The lower court ruled that the defendants acted maliciously and in bad faith. Motion to lift the
default order and motion for reconsideration of the denial on the motion to dismiss which was
subsequently denied by the respondent court.
Petition for certiorari, prohibition and preliminary injunction.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction and
whether or not petitioners were acting officially or only in their private capacities when they did
the acts where they are sued for damages.

Held: Since the facts lead to that the petitioners are acting in the discharge of their official
duties, the petitioners are being sued as gov’t. Officials of USA. If the trial will proceed damages
will not be on the petitioner’s personal capacity but of the petitioner’s principal. The USA
government. thus making the action a suit against that government without its consent. The
government of the United States has not given its consent to be sued for the official acts of the
petitioners, who cannot satisfy any judgment that may be rendered against them. It is
abundantly clear in the present case that the acts for which the petitioners are sued by are acts
in the discharge of their official duties. Sanders, as director of the special services department of
NAVSTA had supervision of its personnel and matters relating to their work and employment. As
for Moreau, what he is claimed to have done was write the Chief of Naval Personnel for
concurrence with the conversion of the private respondent’s type of employment even before
the grievance proceedings had even commenced.

Garcia v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 111511, October 5, 1993.

Page 69 of 370
Facts: Enrique T. Garcia was elected governor of Bataan in the 1992 elections. Some mayors,
vice-mayors and members of the Sangguniang Bayan of the twelve (12) municipalities of the
province constituted themselves into a Preparatory Recall Assembly to initiate the recall election
of petitioner Garcia. They issued Resolution No. 1 as formal initiation of the recall proceedings.
COMELEC scheduled the recall election for the gubernatorial position of Bataan.
Petitioners then filed  a petition for certiorari and prohibition with writ of preliminary injunction to
annul the Resolution of the COMELEC because the PRAC failed to comply with the "substantive
and procedural requirement" laid down in Section 70 of R.A. 7160 (Local Government Code
1991). They pointed out the most fatal defect of the proceeding followed by the PRAC in
passing the Resolution: the deliberate failure to send notices of the meeting to 65 members of
the assembly.
Issue: Whether or not the people have the sole and exclusive right to initiate recall proceedings
and whether or not the procedure for recall violated the right of elected local public officials
belonging to the political minority to equal protection of the law.
Held: No. There is nothing in the Constitution that will remotely suggest that the people have
the "sole and exclusive right to decide on whether to initiate a recall proceeding." The
Constitution did not provide for any mode, let alone a single mode, of initiating recall elections.
The mandate given by section 3 of Article X of the Constitution is for Congress to "enact a local
government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government
structure through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and
referendum . . ." By this constitutional mandate, Congress was clearly given the power to
choose the effective mechanisms of recall as its discernment dictates. What the Constitution
simply required is that the mechanisms of recall, whether one or many, to be chosen by
Congress should be effective. Using its constitutionally granted discretion, Congress deemed it
wise to enact an alternative mode of initiating recall elections to supplement the former mode of
initiation by direct action of the people. The legislative records reveal there were two (2)
principal reasons why this alternative mode of initiating the recall process thru an assembly was
adopted, viz: (a) to diminish the difficulty of initiating recall thru the direct action of the people;
and (b) to cut down on its expenses. No. Under the Sec. 70 of the LGC, all mayors, vice-mayors
and sangguniang members of the municipalities and component cities are made members of
the preparatory recall assembly at the provincial level. Its membership is not apportioned to
political parties. No significance is given to the political affiliation of its members. Secondly, the
preparatory recall assembly, at the provincial level includes all the elected officials in the
province concerned. Considering their number, the greater probability is that no one political
party can control its majority. Thirdly, sec. 69 of the Code provides that the only ground to recall
a locally elected public official is loss of confidence of the people. The members of the PRAC
are in the PRAC not in representation of their political parties but as representatives of the
people. By necessary implication, loss of confidence cannot be premised on mere differences in
political party affiliation. Indeed, our Constitution encourages multi-party system for the
existence of opposition parties is indispensable to the growth and nurture of democratic system.
Clearly then, the law as crafted cannot be faulted for discriminating against local officials
belonging to the minority. Moreover, the law instituted safeguards to assure that the initiation of
the recall process by a preparatory recall assembly will not be corrupted by extraneous
influences. We held that notice to all the members of the recall assembly is a condition sine qua
non to the validity of its proceedings. The law also requires a qualified majority of all the
preparatory recall assembly members to convene in session and in a public place. Needless to
state, compliance with these requirements is necessary, otherwise, there will be no valid
resolution of recall which can be given due course by the COMELEC.

Page 70 of 370
 Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas,
G.R. No. 148208,
December 15, 2004

FACTS:

The Central Bank (now BSP) Employees Association Inc, filed a Petition for Prohibition against
BSP and the Executive Secretary of the Office of the President, to restrain respondents from
further implementing the last provisio in Section 15 (c), Article II of RA No 7653, on the ground
that it is unconstitutional.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the last paragraph of Section 15 (c), Article II of RA No 7653, runs afoul of the
constitutional mandate that “No person shall be … denied equal protection of the laws”

HELD:

The last paragraph of Section 15 (c), Article II of RA No 7653, is unconstitutional.

RULING:

With the passage of the subsequent laws amending the charter of the other government
financial institutions (GFIs), the continued operation of the last provisio of Sec 15 (c), Art II of RA
No 7653, constitutes invidious discrimination on the 2,994 rank-and-file employees of Banko
Sentral ng Pilipinas.

The prior view on the constitutionality of RA 7653 was confined to an evaluation of its
classification between the rank-and-file and the officers of the BSP, found reasonable because
there were substantial distinction that made real differences between the 2 classes.
The subsequent enactments, however, constitute significant changes in circumstance that
considerably alter the reasonability of the continued operation of the last provisio of Sec 15 (c),
Art II of RA No 7653. This relates to the constitutionality of classifications between the rank-and-
file of the BSP and the 7 other GFIs. The classification must not only be reasonable, but must
also apply equally to all members of the class. The provisio may be fair on its face and impartial
in appearance but it cannot be grossly discriminatory in its operation, so as practically to make
unjust distinctions between persons who are without differences.

The inequality of treatment cannot be justified on the mere assertion that each exemption rests
on the policy determination by the legislature. The policy determination argument may support
the inequality of treatment between the rank-and-file and the officers of the BSP, but it cannot
justify the inequality of treatment between the rank-and-file of the BSP and the 7 other GFIs who
are similarly situated. The issue is not the declared policy of the law per se, but the oppressive
results of Congress inconsistent and unequal policy towards the rank-and-file of the BSP and
the 7 other GFIs. The challenge to the constitutionality of Sec 15 (c), Art II of RA No 7653 is
premised precisely on the irrational discriminatory policy adopted by Congress in its treatment of
persons similarly situated. In the field of equal protection, the guarantee that “no person shall be
denied the equal protection of the laws” includes the prohibition against enacting laws that allow
invidious discrimination, directly or indirectly.
The equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality but it requires that all persons
shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to priveleges conferred
and liabilities enforced. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principles
is that equal protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstance which, if
not identical are analogous.

Page 71 of 370
 Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc.,
G.R. No. 167614,
March 14, 2009.

FACTS:

Petitioner was hired by Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Ltd.
(respondents) under a Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA)-approved
Contract of Employment with the following terms and conditions: Duration of contract 12
months, Position Chief Officer, Basic monthly salary US$1,400.00
,Hours of work 48.0 hours per week, Overtime US$700.00 per month,Vacation leave with pay
7.00 days per month. On March 19, 1998, the date of his departure, petitioner was constrained
to accept a downgraded employment contract for the position of Second Officer with a monthly
salary of US$1,000.00, upon the assurance and representation of respondents that he would be
made Chief Officer by the end of April 1998. Respondents did not deliver on their promise to
make petitioner Chief Officer. Hence, petitioner refused to stay on as Second Officer and was
repatriated to the Philippines on May 26, 1998. Petitioner’s employment contract was for a
period of 12 months or from March 19, 1998 up to March 19, 1999, but at the time of his
repatriation on May 26, 1998, he had served only two (2) months and seven (7) days of his
contract, leaving an unexpired portion of nine (9) months and twenty-three (23) days. Petitioner
filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a Complaint against respondents for constructive dismissal and
for payment of his money claims in the total amount of US$26,442.73. The LA rendered a
Decision dated July 15, 1999, declaring the dismissal of petitioner illegal and awarding him
monetary benefits.

ISSUES:

Whether Section 10 (par 5) of RA 8042 is unconstitutional

RULING:

Does the subject clause violate Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, and Section 18, Article II
and Section 3, Article XIII on Labor as protected sector?

The answer is in the affirmative.

Section 1, Article III of the Constitution guarantees:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the law. Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII
accord all members of the labor sector, without distinction as to place of deployment, full
protection of their rights and welfare.
To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing constitutional provisions translate
to economic security and parity: all monetary benefits should be equally enjoyed by workers of
similar category, while all monetary obligations should be borne by them in equal degree; none
should be denied the protection of the laws which is enjoyed by, or spared the burden imposed
on, others in like circumstances. Imbued with the same sense of “obligation to afford protection
to labor,” the Court in the present case also employs the standard of strict judicial scrutiny, for it
perceives in the subject clause a suspect classification prejudicial to OFWs.
Upon cursory reading, the subject clause appears facially neutral, for it applies to all OFWs.
However, a closer examination reveals that the subject clause has a discriminatory intent
against, and an invidious impact on OFWs The subject clause does not state or imply any
definitive governmental purpose; and it is for that precise reason that the clause violates not just
petitioner’s right to equal protection, but also her right to substantive due process under Section
1, Article III of the Constitution.

Page 72 of 370
 Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe,
530 U.S. 290 (2000)
FACTS:
Prior to 1995, a student elected as Santa Fe High School's student council chaplain delivered a
prayer over the public address system before each home varsity football game. Respondents,
Mormon and Catholic students or alumni and their mothers, filed a suit challenging this practice
and others under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. While the suit was
pending, petitioner school district (District) adopted a different policy, which authorizes two
student elections, the first to determine whether "invocations" should be delivered at games,
and the second to select the spokesperson to deliver them. After the students held elections
authorizing such prayers and selecting a spokesperson, the District Court entered an order
modifying the policy to permit only nonsectarian, nonproselytizing prayer. The Fifth Circuit held
that, even as modified by the District Court, the football prayer policy was invalid.
RULING:
The District's policy permitting student-led, student-initiated prayer at football games violates the
Establishment Clause.
(a) The Court's analysis is guided by the principles endorsed inLeev.Weisman,505 U. S. 577.
There, in concluding that a prayer delivered by a rabbi at a graduation ceremony violated the
Establishment Clause, the Court held that, at a minimum, the Constitution guarantees that
government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise, or
otherwise act in a way that establishes a state religion or religious faith, or tends to do so,id.,at
587. The District argues unpersuasively that these principles are inapplicable because the
policy's messages are private student speech, not public speech. The delivery of a message
such as the invocation here-on school property, at school-sponsored events, over the school's
public address system, by a speaker representing the student body, under the supervision of
school faculty, and pursuant to a school policy that explicitly and implicitly encourages public
prayer-is not properly characterized as "private" speech. Although the District relies heavily on
this Court's cases addressing public forums,e. g., Rosenbergerv.Rector and Visitors of Univ. of
Va.,515 U. S. 819, it is clear that the District's pregame ceremony is not the type of forum
discussed in such cases. The District simply does not evince an intent to open its ceremony to
indiscriminate use by the student body generally, see,e. g., Hazelwood School
Dist.v.Kuhlmeier,484 U. S. 260, 270, but, rather, allows only one student, the same student for
the entire season, to give the invocation, which is subject to particular regulations that confine
the content and topic of the student's message. The majoritarian process implemented by the
District guarantees, by definition, that minority candidates will never prevail and that their views
will be effectively silenced. SeeBoard of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Systemv.Southworth,529 U. S.
217, 235. Moreover, the District has failed to divorce itself from the invocations' religious
content. The policy involves both perceived and actual endorsement of religion, seeLee,505 U.
S., at 590, declaring that the student elections take place because the District "has chosen to
permit" student-delivered invocations, that the invocation "shall" be conducted "by the high
school student council" "[u]pon advice and direction of the high school principal," and that it
must be consistent with the policy's goals, which include "solemniz[ing] the event." A religious
message is the most obvious method of solemnizing an event. Indeed, the only type of
message expressly endorsed in the policy is an "invocation," a term which primarily describes
an appeal for divine assistance and, as used in the past at Santa Fe High School, has always
entailed a focused religious message. A conclusion that the message is not "private speech" is
also established by factors beyond the policy's text, including the official setting in which the
invocation is delivered, see,e. g., Wallacev.Jaffree,472 U. S. 38, 73, 76, by the policy's sham
secular purposes, seeid.,at 75, and by its history, which indicates that the District intended to
preserve its long-sanctioned practice of prayer before football games.

Page 73 of 370
 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992)

FACTS:
Faced with a looming shortage of disposal sites for low level radioactive waste in 31 States,
Congress enacted the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, which,
among other things, imposes upon States, either alone or in "regional compacts" with other
States, the obligation to provide for the disposal of waste generated within their borders, and
contains three provisions setting forth "incentives" to States to comply with that obligation. The
first set of incentives-the monetary incentives-works in three steps: (1) States with disposal sites
are authorized to impose a surcharge on radioactive waste received from other States; (2) the
Secretary of Energy collects a portion of this surcharge and places it in an escrow account; and
(3) States achieving a series of milestones in developing sites receive portions of this fund. The
second set of incentives-the access incentives-authorizes sited States and regional compacts
gradually to increase the cost of access to their sites, and then to deny access altogether, to
waste generated in States that do not meet federal deadlines. The so-called third "incentive"-the
take title provision-specifies that a State or regional compact that fails to provide for the disposal
of all internally generated waste by a particular date must, upon the request of the waste's
generator or owner, take title to and possession of the waste and become liable for all damages
suffered by the generator or owner as a result of the State's failure to promptly take possession.
Petitioners, New York State and two of its counties, filed this suit against the United States,
seeking a declaratory judgment that,inter alia,the three incentives provisions are inconsistent
with the Tenth Amendment-which declares that "powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States" -and with the
Guarantee Clause of Article IV, § 4-which directs the United States to "guarantee to every State
a Republican Form of Government." The District Court dismissed the complaint, and the Court
of Appeals affirmed.
RULING:
1. The Act's monetary incentives and access incentives provIsIOns are consistent with the
Constitution's allocation of power between the Federal and State Governments, but the take title
provision is not. Pp. 155-183.
(a) In ascertaining whether any of the challenged provisions oversteps the boundary between
federal and state power, the Court must determine whether it is authorized by the affirmative
grants to Congress contained in Article 1's Commerce and Spending Clauses or whether it
invades the province of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment. Pp. 155-159; (b)
Although regulation of the interstate market in the disposal of low level radioactive waste is well
within Congress' Commerce Clause authority, cf.Philadelphiav.New Jersey,437 U. S. 617, 621-
623, and Congress could, if it wished, pre-empt entirely state regulation in this area, a review of
this Court's decisions, see,e. g., Hodelv.Virginia Surface Mining&Reclamation Assn., Inc.,452 U.
S. 264, 288, and the history of the Constitutional Convention, demonstrates that Congress may
not commandeer the States' legislative processes by directly compelling them to enact and
enforce a federal regulatory program, but must exercise legislative authority directly upon
individuals. (c) Nevertheless, there are a variety of methods, short of outright coercion, by which
Congress may urge a State to adopt a legislative program consistent with federal interests. As
relevant here, Congress may, under its spending power, attach conditions on the receipt of
federal funds, so long as such conditions meet four requirements. See,e. g., South
Dakotav.Dole,483 U. S. 203, 206-208, and n. 3. Moreover, where Congress has the authority to
regulate private activity under the Commerce Clause, it may, as part of a program of
"cooperative federalism," offer States the choice of regulating that activity according to federal
standards or having state law pre-empted by federal regulation. See,e. g., Hodel, supra,at 288,
289. Pp. 166-169.; (d) This Court declines petitioners' invitation to construe the Act's provision
obligating the States to dispose of their radioactive wastes as a separate mandate to regulate
according to Congress' instructions. That would upset the usual constitutional balance of federal
and state powers, whereas the constitutional problem is avoided by construing the Act as a
whole to comprise three sets of incentives to the States. pp. 169-170.

Page 74 of 370
 Ganzon v. Court of Appeals
GRN 93252,
Aug. 5, 1991

FACTS:
A series of administrative complaints, ten in number, were filed before the Department of Local
Government against petitioner Mayor Rodolfo T. Ganzon by various city officials sometime in
1988 on various charges, among them, abuse of authority, oppression, grave misconduct, etc.
Finding probable grounds, the respondent Secretary of the Department of Local Government
Luis T. Santos issued successive suspensions. The petitioner then instituted an action for
prohibition against the secretary in the RTC of Iloilo City where he succeeded in obtaining a writ
of preliminary injunction. He also instituted actions for prohibition before the Court of Appeals
but were both dismissed. Thus, this petition for review with the argument that the respondent
Secretary is devoid, in any event, of any authority to suspend and remove local officials as the
1987 Constitution no longer allows the President to exercise said power.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the President, acting thru the Secretary of Local Government, has the power to
suspend, remove, or both, local officials.

HELD:
Yes. It is the considered opinion of the Court that notwithstanding the change in the
Constitutional language, the charter did not intend to divest the legislature of its right-or the
President of her prerogative as conferred by existing legislation to provide administrative
sanction against local officials. The Constitution did not…intend

Page 75 of 370
 JOSELITA SALITA vs. HON. DELILAH MAGTOLIS
G.R. No. 106429,
June 13, 1994

FACTS:
Erwin Espinosa and Joselita Salita were married at the Roman Catholic Church in Ermita,
Manila. A year later, their union turned sour. They separated in fact. Subsequently, Erwin sued
for annulment on the ground of Joselita’s psychological incapacity which incapacity existed at
the time of the marriage although the same became manifest only thereafter. Dissatisfied with
the allegation in the petition, Joselita moved for a bill of particulars which the trial court granted.
Subsequently, in his Bill of Particulars, Edwin specified thatat the time of their marriage, Joselita
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of their
marriage in that she was unable to understand and accept the demands made by his profession
— that of a newly qualified Doctor of Medicine — upon his time and efforts so that she
frequently complained of his lack of attention to her even to her mother, whose intervention
caused petitioner to lose his job.
Still petitioner was not contented with the Bill of Particulars. She insists that the allegations in
the Bill of Particulars constitute a legal conclusion, not an averment of ultimate facts, and fail to
point out the specific essential marital obligations she allegedly was not able to perform, and
thus render the Bill of Particulars insufficient if not irrelevant to her husband’s cause of action.
She rationalizes that her insistence on the specification of her particular conduct or behavior
with the corresponding circumstances of time, place and person does not call for information on
evidentiary matters because without these details she cannot adequately and intelligently
prepare her answer to the petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the allegations in the petition for annulment of marriage and the subsequent bill
of particulars filed in amplification of the petition is sufficient.

HELD:
Ultimate facts are important and substantial facts which either directly from the basis of the
primary right and duty, or which directly make up the wrongful acts or omission of the defendant.
It refers to acts which the evidence on trial will prove, and not the evidence which will be
required to prove the existence of those facts. The Supreme Court ruled that on the basis of the
allegations, it is evident that petitioner can already prepare her responsive pleading or for trial.
Private respondent has already alleged that petitioner was unable to understand and accept the
demands made by his profession. To demand for more details would indeed be asking for
information on evidentiary facts — facts necessary to prove essential or ultimate facts.The
additional facts called for by petitioner regarding her particular acts or omissions would be
evidentiary, and to obtain evidentiary matters is not the function of a motion for bill of particulars.
WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error, the instant petition is DENIED and the
questioned Resolution of respondent Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

Page 76 of 370
 Republic v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 108763, 13 February 1997
FACTS:
Spouses Roridel and Reynaldo Molina were married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin
Church in Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was born.After a year of marriage, Reynaldo
showed signs of immaturity and irresponsibility as a husband and a father since he preferred to
spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he squandered his money; that he
depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to
their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them.
Sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, and since then Roridel
had been the sole breadwinner of the family; that in October 1986 the couple had a very intense
quarrel, as a result of which their relationship was estranged; that in March 1987, Roridel
resigned from her job in Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City; that a few
weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned them.
Reynaldo had shown that he was psychologically incapable of complying with essential marital
obligations and was a highly immature and habitually quarrelsome individual who thought of
himself as a king to be served; and that it would be to the couples best interest to have their
marriage declared null and void in order to free them from what appeared to be an incompatible
marriage from the start.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage is void on the ground of psychological incapacity.
RULING:
No, the marriage between Roridel and Reynaldo subsists and remains valid. In the case at bar,
there is no showing that his alleged personality traits were constitutive of psychological
incapacity existing at the time of marriage celebration. While some effort was made to prove
that there was a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial impressions of thoughtfulness and gentleness on
Reynaldo’s part and of being conservative, homely and intelligent on the part of Roridel, such
failure of expectation is not indicative of antecedent psychological incapacity.
Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines, “A marriage contracted by any party who, at the
time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with his obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.”
The following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code are
hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity; (2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically
or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d)
clearly explained in the decision; (3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of
the celebration” of the marriage; (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in
regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex; (5)
Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage; (6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced
by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles
220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied
marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the
text of the decision; (7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of
the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great
respect by our courts; (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless
the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating
therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.

Page 77 of 370
 Antonio vs. Reyes, GR No. 155800, March 10, 2006

FACTS:
Leonilo Antonio, 26 years of age, and Marie Ivonne Reyes, 36 years of age met in 1989.
Barely a year after their first meeting, they got married at Manila City Hall and then a
subsequent church wedding at Pasig in December 1990. A child was born but died 5 months
later. Reyes persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income,
educational attainment and other events or things. She even did not conceal bearing an
illegitimate child, which she represented to her husband as adopted child of their family. They
were separated in August 1991 and after attempt for reconciliation, he finally left her for good in
November 1991. Petitioner then filed in 1993 a petition to have his marriage with Reyes
declared null and void anchored in Article 36 of the Family Code.

ISSUE:
Whether Antonio can impose Article 36 of the Family Code as basis for declaring their
marriage null and void.

RULING:
Psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the obligations of
marriage as opposed to a mere inability to comply with them. The petitioner, aside from his own
testimony presented a psychiatrist and clinical psychologist who attested that constant lying and
extreme jealousy of Reyes is abnormal and pathological and corroborated his allegations on his
wife’s behavior, which amounts to psychological incapacity. Respondent’s fantastic ability to
invent, fabricate stories and letters of fictitious characters enabled her to live in a world of make-
believe that made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving
meaning and significance to her marriage. The root causes of Reyes’ psychological incapacity
have been medically or clinically identified that was sufficiently proven by experts. The gravity
of respondent’s psychological incapacity was considered so grave that a restrictive clause was
appended to the sentence of nullity prohibited by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
from contracting marriage without their consent. It would be difficult for an inveterate
pathological liar to commit the basic tenets of relationship between spouses based on love, trust
and respect. Furthermore, Reyes’ case is incurable considering that petitioner tried to reconcile
with her but her behavior remain unchanged.

Hence, the court conclude that petitioner has established his cause of action for
declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Page 78 of 370
LEGISLATION
1. Government of the Philippine Islands v. Springer, G.R. No. L-26979, April 1, 1927
Facts:
Spinger, Costas and Hilario were elected to be the directors of the Nat'l Coal Company
by the legislative members (Senate President and Speaker of the HoR) of the committee
created by Acts. No. 2705(Sec 4) and 2822 (Sec 2). The GPI instituted an original action of quo
warranto against the newly appointed directors, assailing the validity of the said acts which
provide: "The voting power of all such stock (in the National Coal Company) owned by the
Government of the Philippine Islands shall be vested exclusively in a committee consisting of
the Governor-General, the President of the Senate, and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives."
Reference was made therein that the provisions of the statutes passed by the Phil.
Legislature creating a voting committee or board of control, and enumerating the duties and
powers thereof with respect to certain corporation in which the Philippine Gov is the owner of
stock, are nullities.
Issue:
Whether or not the Phil Legislature has the power to appoint officials.
RULING:
Sec. 22 of the Organic Act, "That all executive functions of the government must be
directly under the Governor-General or within one of the executive departments under the
supervision and control of the Governor-General." At the very least, the performance of duties
appurtenant to membership in the voting committee is an executive function on the
Government, which the Organic Act requires must be subject to the unhampered control of the
Government-General. The administrative domination of a governmentally organized and
controlled corporation is clearly not a duty germane to the law-making power

Page 79 of 370
 2. Ople v. Torres, G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998

Fact:
The petitioner seek the attention of the court to prevent the shrinking of the right to
privacy, Petitioner prays that the court  invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 entitled
“Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System” on two important
constitutional grounds, viz: one, it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and two,
it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry’s protected zone of privacy.
Issue:
Whether the implementation of AO No. 308 violates the Rights to Privacy enshrined in
the constitution?
Held:  
Yes, A.O. No. 308 cannot pass constitutional muster as an administrative legislation
because facially it violates the right to privacy. The essence of privacy is the “right to be let
alone.” The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition independently of its identification
with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional protection. The potential for misuse of
the data to be gathered under A.O. No. 308 cannot be underplayed. The right to privacy is one
of the most threatened rights of man living in a mass society. The threats emanate from various
sources — governments, journalists, employers, social scientists, etc.  In the case at bar, the
threat comes from the executive branch of government which by issuing A.O. No. 308 pressures
the people to surrender their privacy by giving information about themselves on the pretext that
it will facilitate delivery of basic services. Given the record-keeping power of the computer, only
the indifferent fail to perceive the danger that A.O. No. 308 gives the government the power to
compile a devastating dossier against unsuspecting citizens. It is timely to take note of the well-
worded warning of Kalvin, Jr., “the disturbing result could be that everyone will live burdened by
an unerasable record of his past and his limitations. In a way, the threat is that because of its
record-keeping, the society will have lost its benign capacity to forget.” 89 Oblivious to this
counsel, the dissents still say we should not be too quick in labelling the right to privacy as a
fundamental right. We close with the statement that the right to privacy was not engraved in our
Constitution for flattery

Page 80 of 370
 3. League of Cities of the Philippines v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 176951,
February 15, 2011
Fact:
During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into
cities. However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities.
During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009), which
took effect on 30 June 2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by
increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20
million to P100 million. The rationale for the amendment was to restrain, in the words of Senator
Aquilino Pimentel, “the mad rush” of municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger
share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable of fiscal
independence. After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th
Congress adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, which sought to exempt from the P100 million
income requirement in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved in
the 11th Congress. However, the 12th Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint
Resolution No. 29. During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint
Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate for approval.
However, the Senate again failed to approve the Joint Resolution. Following the advice of
Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual
cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting all the 16
municipalities from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009. On 22 December 2006,
the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The Senate also approved the
cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on 7 June 2007.
The cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws) on various dates from March to July 2007
without the President’s signature. The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to
determine whether the voters in each respondent municipality approve of the conversion of their
municipality into a city. Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws
unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of
the equal protection clause. Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of
municipalities into cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment
because more cities will share the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under
Section 285 of the Local Government Code.
Issue:
1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; and
2. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.
Held:
We grant the petitions.The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the
Constitution, and are thus unconstitutional. First, applying the P100 million income requirement
in RA 9009 to the present case is a prospective, not a retroactive application, because RA 9009
took effect in 2001 while the cityhood bills became law more than five years later. Second, the
Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the criteria for the creation of a city in the
Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws. Third, the
Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution because they prevent a fair and
just distribution of the national taxes to local government units. Fourth, the criteria prescribed in
Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, for converting a
municipality into a city are clear, plain and unambiguous, needing no resort to any statutory
construction.Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain municipalities
from the coverage of RA 9009 remained an intent and was never written into Section 450 of the
Local Government Code.Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved
bills or resolutions are not extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in the 13th Congress.
Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the Local
Government Code, the exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal
protection clause.

Page 81 of 370
 4. Mariano v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 118577, March 7, 1995
Facts:
Two petitions are filed assailing certain provisions of RA 7854, An Act Converting The
Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati, as
unconstitutional.
Section 52 of RA 7854 is said to be unconstitutional for it increased the legislative district
of Makati only by special law in violation of Art. VI, Sec. 5(4) requiring a general
reapportionment law to be passed by Congress within 3 years following the return of every
census. Also, the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with Sec. 5(3),
Art. VI of the Constitution for as of the 1990 census, the population of Makati stands at only
450,000.
Issue:
Whether or not the addition of another legislative district in Makati is unconstitutional
Held:
Reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law, such as in
the charter of a new city. The Constitution clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of
not more than 250 members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the Constitution
did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a
general reapportionment law. This is exactly what was done by Congress in enacting RA 7854
and providing for an increase in Makati’s legislative district. Moreover, to hold that
reapportionment can only be made through a general apportionment law, with a review of all the
legislative districts allotted to each local government unit nationwide, would create an
inequitable situation where a new city or province created by Congress will be denied legislative
representation for an indeterminate period of time. The intolerable situations will deprive the
people of a new city or province a particle of their sovereignty.
Petitioner cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in
accord with Sec. 5(3), Art. VI of the Constitution for as of the 1990 census, the population of
Makati stands at only 450,000. Said section provides that a city with a population of at least
250,000 shall have at least one representative. Even granting that the population of Makati as of
the 1990 census stood at 450,000, its legislative district may still be increased since it has met
the minimum population requirement of 250,000.

Page 82 of 370
 5. National Power Corporation v. Province of Lanao del Sur, G.R. No. 96700,
November 19, 1996.
Facts:

The province of Albay sought to sell Napocor properties in order for the proceeds to be
applied to the real property taxes Napocor allegedly owned the Albay provincial government.
Napocor opposed alleging that it was immune from taxes citing Resolution 17-87 of the Fiscal
Incentives Review Board (FIRB).

Issue:
Whether the granting of exemption by the FIRB constituted undue delegation of taxing
power

RULING:

Yes, it is undue delegation. It has no authority to impose taxes or revoke existing ones,
which, after all, under the
constitution, only the legislature may accomplish. 

Page 83 of 370
 6. Municipality of San Juan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125183, September 29, 1997
Facts:
On February 17, 1978, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1716
reserving for Municipal Government Center Site Purposes certain parcels of land of the public
domain located in the Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila. Considering that the land covered
by the above-mentioned proclamation was occupied by squatters, the Municipality of San Juan
purchased an 18-hectare land in Taytay, Rizal as resettlement center for the said squatters.
After hundreds of squatter families were resettled, the Municipality of San Juan started to
develop its government center On October 6, 1987, after Congress had already convened on
July 26, 1987, former President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 164, amending
Proclamation No. 1716. Said amendatory proclamation pertinently reads as follows:... together
with other parcels of land not covered by Proclamation No. 1716 but nevertheless occupied for
residential purposes, open to disposition under the provisions of the Public Land Act,... On June
1, 1988, the Corazon de Jesus Homeowners Association, Inc., one of herein private
respondents, filed with the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region (Pasig,
Branch 159) a petition for prohibition with urgent prayer for restraining order against... the
Municipal Mayor and Engineer of San Juan and the Curator of Pinaglabanan Shrine, to enjoin
them from either removing or demolishing the houses of the association members who were
claiming that the lots they occupied have been awarded to them by Proclamation No. 164.The
regional trial court dismissed the petition, ruling that the property in question is being utilized by
the Municipality of San Juan for government purposes and thus, the condition set forth in
Proclamation No. 164 is absent. The appeal before the Court of Appeals was dismissed This
decision became final and the said judgment was duly entered Disregarding the ruling of the
court in this final judgment, private respondents hired a private surveyor to make consolidation-
subdivision plans of the land in question. To prevent DENR from issuing any grant to private
respondents, petitioner municipality filed a petition for prohibition with prayer for issuance of a
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction against respondent DENR and private
respondent Corazon de Jesus Homeowners Association. The regional trial court sustained
petitioner municipality, enjoining the DENR from disposing and awarding the parcels of land
covered by Proclamation No. 164. The Court of Appeals reversed. Petitioner municipality
assails the decision of the Court of Appeals by hammering on the issue of res judicata in view of
the fact that an earlier judgment, which had become final and executory, had already settled the
respective rights of the parties under Proclamation No. 164.
Issues:
Whether or not the issue of res judicata insofar as the particular area covered by Proclamation
No. 164, which was the subject matter of the earlier case, Proclamation No. 1716 and
Proclamation No. 164 are valid act of legislation?
Ruling:
The existence of the first three elements cannot be disputed. As to identity of parties, we have
ruled that only substantial identity is required and not absolute identity of parties The addition of
public respondent DENR in the second case will thus be of no moment. Likewise, there is
identity of cause of action... all remain to be the same in both the first and the second actions
despite the fact that in the first action, private respondents were the plaintiff while in the second
action, they were the respondents. Reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals would be
justified Proclamation No. 1716 was issued by the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos on
February 17, 1978 in the due exercise of legislative power vested upon him by Amendment No.
6 introduced in 1976. Being a valid act of legislation, said Proclamation may only be amended
by an equally valid act of legislation Proclamation No. 164 is obviously not a valid act of
legislation. President Corazon Aquino took the reins of power under a revolutionary
government. Proclamation No. 164, amending Proclamation No. 1716 was issued on October 6,
1987 when legislative power was already solely on Congress this unauthorized act by the then
president constitutes a direct derogation of the most basic principle in the separation of
powers.We, therefore, hold that the issuance of Proclamation No. 164 was an invalid exercise of
legislative power. Consequently, said Proclamation is hereby declared NULL and VOID.

Page 84 of 370
 7. La Bugal-B’laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, G.R. No. 127882, January 27,
2004
FACTS:
RA 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act) took effect on April 9, 1995. Before the effectivity of RA
7942, or on March 30, 1995, the President signed a Financial and Technical Assistance
Agreement (FTAA) with WMCP. On August 15, 1995, the Environment Secretary Victor Ramos
issued DENR Administrative Order 95-23, which was later repealed by DENR Administrative
Order 96-40, adopted on December 20, 1996.nPetitioners prayed that RA 7942, its
implementing rules, and the FTAA between the government and WMCP be declared
unconstitutional on ground that they allow fully foreign owned corporations like WMCP to
exploit, explore and develop Philippine mineral resources in contravention of Article XII Section
2 paragraphs 2 and 4 of the Charter.In January 2001, WMC – a publicly listed Australian mining
and exploration company – sold its whole stake in WMCP to Sagittarius Mines, 60% of which is
owned by Filipinos while 40% of which is owned by Indophil Resources, an Australian company.
DENR approved the transfer and registration of the FTAA in Sagittarius‘ name but Lepanto
Consolidated assailed the same. The latter case is still pending before the Court of Appeals.
EO 279, issued by former President Aquino on July 25, 1987, authorizes the DENR to
accept, consider and evaluate proposals from foreign owned corporations or foreign investors
for contracts or agreements involving wither technical or financial assistance for large scale
exploration, development and utilization of minerals which upon appropriate recommendation of
the (DENR) Secretary, the President may execute with the foreign proponent. WMCP likewise
contended that the annulment of the FTAA would violate a treaty between the Philippines and
Australia which provides for the protection of Australian investments.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the Philippine Mining Act is unconstitutional for allowing fully foreign-owned
corporations to exploit the Philippine mineral resources.
HELD:
The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAAs is an exception to the
rule that participation in the nation‘s natural resources is reserved exclusively to Filipinos.
Accordingly, such provision must be construed strictly against their enjoyment by non-Filipinos.
Therefore, RA 7942 is invalid insofar as the said act authorizes service contracts. Although the
statute employs the phrase ―financial and technical agreements in accordance with the 1987
Constitution, its pertinent provisions actually treat these agreements as service contracts that
grant beneficial ownership to foreign contractors contrary to the fundamental law.
The underlying assumption in the provisions of the law is that the foreign contractor manages
the mineral resources just like the foreign contractor in a service contract. By allowing foreign
contractors to manage or operate all the aspects of the mining operation, RA 7942 has, in
effect, conveyed beneficial ownership over the nation‘s mineral resources to these contractors,
leaving the State with nothing but bare title thereto.
When parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and connected as conditions,
considerations, inducements or compensations for each other as to warrant a belief that the
legislature intended them as a whole, then if some parts are unconstitutional, all provisions that
are thus dependent, conditional or connected, must fail with them.
Under Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Charter, foreign owned corporations are limited only to
merely technical or financial assistance to the State for large scale exploration, development
and utilization of minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils.
These contractual stipulations and related provisions in the FTAA taken together, grant
WMCP beneficial ownership over natural resources that properly belong to the State and are
intended for the benefit of its citizens. These stipulations are abhorrent to the 1987 Constitution.
They are precisely the vices that the fundamental law seeks to avoid, the evils that it aims to
suppress. Consequently, the contract from which they spring must be struck down.

Page 85 of 370
 8. Corpuz v. People, G.R. No. 180016, April 29, 2014
Facts:
Accused Corpuz received from complainant Tangcoy pieces of jewelry with an obligation
to sell the same and remit the proceeds of the sale or to return the same if not sold, after the
expiration of 30 days.The period expired without Corpuz remitting anything to Tangcoy. When
Corpuz and Tangcoy met, Corpuz promised that he will pay, but to no avail. Tangcoy filed a
case for estafa with abuse of confidence against Corpuz. Corpuz  argued as follows:
a. The proof submitted by Tangcoy (receipt) is inadmissible for being a mere photocopy.
b. The information was defective because the date when the jewelry should be returned and the
date when crime occurred is different from the one testified to by Tangcoy.
c. Fourth element of estafa or demand is not proved.
d. Sole testimony of Tangcoy is not sufficient for conviction 
Issues:
Can the court admit as evidence a photocopy of document without violating the best
evidence rule (only original documents, as a general rule, is admissible as evidence)?
Is the date of occurrence of time material in estafa cases with abuse of confidence?
Ruling:
1. Yes. The established doctrine is that when a party failed to interpose a timely
objection to evidence at the time they were offered in evidence, such objection shall be
considered as waived.
Here, Corpuz never objected to the admissibility of the said evidence at the time it was
identified, marked and testified upon in court by Tangcoy. Corpuz also failed to raise an
objection in his Comment to the prosecution’s formal offer of evidence and even admitted
having signed the said receipt.
2. No.  It is true that the gravamen of the crime of estafa with abuse of confidence
under Article 315, paragraph 1, subparagraph (b) of the RPC is the appropriation or conversion
of money or property received to the prejudice of the owner and that the time of occurrence is not
a material ingredient of the crime. Hence, the exclusion of the period and the wrong date of the
occurrence of the crime, as reflected in the Information, do not make the latter fatally defective.

Further, the following satisfies the sufficiency of information:

1. The designation of the offense by the statute;
2. The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense;
3. The name of the offended party; and
4. The approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense
was committed.
The 4th element is satisfied. Even though the information indicates that the time of
offense was committed “on or about the 5th of July 1991,” such is not fatal to the prosecution’s
cause considering that Section 11 of the same Rule requires a statement of the precise time
only when the same is a material ingredient of the offense.
What is the form of demand required in estafa with abuse of confidence?
Note first that the elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are as follows:
(a) that money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make
delivery of, or to return the same;
(b) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender or
denial on his part of such receipt;
(c) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and
(d) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender.

Page 86 of 370
9. Re: Vicente S.E. Veloso, A.M. No. 12-8-07-CA, June 16, 2015
Facts:
Petitioner Francisco Veloso was the owner of a parcel of land situated in the district of
Tondo, Manila, with an area of 177 square meters. The title was registered in the name of
Francisco A. Veloso. The said title was subsequently cancelled and a new one issued in the
name of Aglaloma B. Escario, married to Gregorio L. Escario, on May 24, 1988.  

On August 24, 1988, petitioner Veloso filed an action for annulment of documents,
reconveyance of property with damages and preliminary injunction and/or restraining order.
Petitioner alleged therein that he was the absolute owner of the subject property and he never
authorized anybody, not even his wife, to sell it. He alleged that he was in possession of the title
but when his wife, Irma, left for abroad, he found out that his copy was missing. He then verified
with the Registry of Deeds of Manila and there he discovered that his title was already canceled
in favor of defendant Aglaloma Escario. 

The transfer of property was supported by a General Power of Attorney dated November
29, 1985 and Deed of Absolute Sale, dated November 2, 1987, executed by Irma Veloso, wife
of the petitioner and appearing as his attorney-in-fact, and defendant Aglaloma Escario. 

Petitioner Veloso, however, denied having executed the power of attorney and alleged
that his signature was falsified. He also denied having seen or even known Rosemarie Reyes
and Imelda Santos, the supposed witnesses in the execution of the power of attorney. He
vehemently denied having met or transacted with the defendant. Thus, he contended that the
sale of the property, and the subsequent transfer thereof, were null and void. 

Defendant Aglaloma Escario in her answer alleged that she was a buyer in good faith
and denied any knowledge of the alleged irregularity. She allegedly relied on the general power
of attorney of Irma Veloso which was sufficient in form and substance and was duly notarized. 

Issue:
Whether there was a valid sale of the subject property

Ruling:

Yes, the sale of the subject property is valid

The Supreme Court held that an examination of the records showed that the assailed
power of attorney was valid and regular on its face. It was notarized and as such, it carries the
evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution. While it is true that it was
denominated as a general power of attorney, a perusal thereof revealed that it stated an
authority to sell.

Respondent Aglaloma relied on the power of attorney presented by petitioner's wife,

Irma. Being the wife of the owner and having with her the title of the property, there was no
reason for the private respondent not to believe, in her authority. Thus, having had no inkling on
any irregularity and having no participation thereof, private respondent was a buyer in good
faith. It has been consistently held that a purchaser in good faith is one who buys property of
another, without notice that some other person has a right to, or interest in such property and
pays a full and fair price for the same, at the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of
the claim or interest of some other person in the property.

Page 87 of 370
 10. Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, G.R. No. 115455, August 25, 1994
Facts:
The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and
properties as well as on the sale or exchange of services. RA 7716 seeks to widen the tax base
of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal
Revenue Code. There are various suits challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on various
grounds.
  One contention is that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution, because it is in fact the
result of the consolidation of 2 distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. There is also a
contention that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings as required by the Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not RA 7716 violates Art. VI, Secs. 24 and 26(2) of the Constitution
Held:
The argument that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as
required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the
law but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to originate exclusively in the
House of Representatives. To insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated
the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially be the same
as the House bill would be to deny the Senate’s power not only to concur with amendments but
also to propose amendments. Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative
for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills
and bills of local application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that,
elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more
sensitive to the local needs and problems. Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the
Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as
action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill.
The next argument of the petitioners was that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings on
separate days as required by the Constitution because the second and third readings were
done on the same day. But this was because the President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent.
The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of
reading the bill on separate days. That upon the certification of a bill by the President the
requirement of 3 readings on separate days and of printing and distribution can be dispensed
with is supported by the weight of legislative practice.

Page 88 of 370
11. Kida vs Senate of the Philippines G.R. No. 196271 February 28, 2012
Facts:
 We resolve: (a) the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners Datu Michael Abas
Kida, et al. in G.R. No. 196271; (b) the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Rep. Edcel
Lagman in G.R. No. 197221; (c) the ex abundante ad cautelam motion for reconsideration filed
by petitioner Basari Mapupuno in G.R. No. 196305; (d) the motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioner Atty. Romulo Macalintal in G.R. No. 197282; (e) the motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioners Almarim Centi Tillah, Datu Casan Conding Cana and Partido Demokratiko Pilipino
Lakas ng Bayan in G.R. No. 197280; (f) the manifestation and motion filed by petitioners
Almarim Centi Tillah, et al. in G.R. No. 197280; and (g) the very urgent motion to issue
clarificatory resolution that the temporary restraining order (TRO) is still existing and effective.
These motions assail our Decision dated October 18, 2011, where we upheld the
constitutionality of Republic Act (RA) No. 10153. Pursuant to the constitutional mandate of
synchronization, RA No. 10153 postponed the regional elections in the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) (which were scheduled to be held on the second Monday of August
2011) to the second Monday of May 2013 and recognized the President’s power to appoint
officers-in-charge (OICs) to temporarily assume these positions upon the expiration of the terms
of the elected officials.
Issues: 
(a) Does the Constitution mandate the synchronization of ARMM regional elections with national
and local elections?
lections in ARMM?
(e) Does granting the President the power to appoint OICs violate the elective and
representative nature of ARMM regional legislative and executive offices?
(f) Does the appointment power granted to the President exceed the President’s supervisory
powers over autonomous regions?
Held:
 YES. Synchronization mandate includes ARMM elections
The Court was unanimous in holding that the Constitution mandates the synchronization
of national and local elections. While the Constitution does not expressly instruct Congress to
synchronize the national and local elections, the intention can be inferred from the following
provisions of the Transitory Provisions. President, which may be simultaneous with the election
of the Members of the Congress. It shall include the election of all Members of the city or
municipal councils in the Metropolitan Manila area.

Page 89 of 370
12. Duarte v. Dade, 32 Phil. 36, 49 (1915)
Facts:
Petitioner, Pedro M. Duarte, was tried in the first instance  over his  objection by the
court of appeals of the Island of Guam on the 1st day of March, 1915, and sentenced to 
fourteen years  eight months and  one day of  cadena temporal, to the  accessory penalties
provided by law, to  indemnify the Government of the United States in the sum of $40,944.20,
and to the payment of the costs  of the cause for the crime of misappropriation of public funds
while postmaster at  Guam.   The governor of Guam mitigated the term of imprisonment to ten 
years and, under an agreement with  the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands,
designated Bilibid  Prison, in the city of Manila, Philippine Islands, "as the place of the execution
of so much of the sentence as relates to confinement."   Subsequent thereto the petitioner was
sent to Manila and turned over to  the respondent to be confined in Bilibid Prison, where he now
is. T
Issues:
This case presents only two questions.  (1)  Had the court  of appeals of the Island of
Guam jurisdiction legally to try and sentence the petitioner in the manner and  form above set
forth?   (2) Is the respondent authorized to hold the petitioner in confinement  in Bilibid Prison,
Philippine Islands?  The  petitioner  insists that both these questions should be answered in the
negative.
Held:
During the consideration of this case, it was suggested that this Supreme Court has no
authority to inquire whether the court of appeals  of Guam had jurisdiction to try the petitioner or
not, because Guam and the Philippine Islands are separate and distinct governmental entities
and  it is our duty to accept  without question the judgments of the courts of that Island.

Page 90 of 370
13. The City of Davao v. The Regional Trial Court, Branch XII, G.R. No. 127383, August 18,
2005
Facts:
Davao City imposed realty taxes against GSIS. Because GSIS failed to pay from 1992-1994, a
Notice of Public Auction scheduling the public bidding of GSIS properties was issued. GSIS also
received Warrants of Levy and Notices of Levy on three parcels of land it owned. Thus, GSIS
filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus and/or Declaratory Relief before the RTC
on the ground that it is exempt from taxes. PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: LGC, particulary
Secs 193 and 294, has withdrawn the exemption previously granted to GOCCs including the
GSIS. Under Sec 534 (f) of the LGC, even special laws such as the GSIS Charter, which are
inconsistent with the LGC are repealed or modified accordingly. RESPONDENT’S
CONTENTION: Its exemption was not withdrawn by the LGC. Under Sec 33 of PD 1146 (GSIS
Charter), as amended by PD 1981, the following conditions must be met in order for the GSIS
tax exemption be effectively withdrawn:
That Sec 33 be expressly and categorically repealed by law; and,
That a provision be enacted to substitute the declared policy of exemption from any and
all taxes as an essential factor for the solvency of the GSIS fund.
GSIS contended that had it been the intention of the legislature to repeal Sec 33 through the
LGC, LGC should have included the appropriate retraction in its repealing clause in Sec 534 (f).
However, Sec 534 is a general repealing provision which is afforded less weight in light of the
rule that implied repeals are not favored.
RTC ruled for GSIS, holding that the LGC failed to satisfy both conditions. It also gave
weight to the legal opinion of the Sec of Justice concluding that Sec 33 was not repealed by the
LGC and a memo from the Office of the President expressing the same opinion.
Issues:
Whether or not the LGC has effectively repealed Sec 33 of PD 1146, as amended by PD 1981,
thus GSIS is no longer exempt from realty taxes

Held:
YES. The conditions set forth in Sec 33 cannot be given effect for they are in the form of
the prohibited irrepealable laws.
RATIO: PD 1146 was enacted in 1977 by Pres. Marcos in the exercise of his legislative
powers. Sec 33 merely provided a general rule exempting GSIS from all taxes. Then, he
enacted PD 1931 which withdrew all tax exemptions granted to GOCCs. But Pres. Marcos
immediately reconsidered the withdrawal of exemptions on the GSIS and thus enacted PD 1146
which expressly stated that GSIS remained tax exempt despite the passage of PD 1931. But PD
1146 did not merely restore GSIS’s previous exemptions but also proscribed future attempts to
alter the tax-exempt status of GSIS by imposing unorthodox conditions1 for its future repeal.
Thus, reading together Sections 133, 232, and 234 of the LGC, we conclude that as a
general rule, as laid down in Section 133, the taxing powers of local government units cannot
extend to the levy of, inter alia, "taxes, fees and charges of any kind on the National
Government, its agencies and instrumentalities, and local government units"; however, pursuant
to Section 232, provinces, cities, and municipalities in the Metropolitan Manila Area may impose
the real property tax except on, inter alia, "real property owned by the Republic of the
Philippines or any of its political subdivisions except when the beneficial use thereof has been
granted, for consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person," as provided in item (a) of the first
paragraph of Section 234.

Page 91 of 370
14. Atitiw v. Zamora, G.R. No. 143374, September 30, 2005
Facts:
The ratification of the 1987 Constitution ordains the creation of autonomous regions in
Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras mandating the Congress to enact organic acts pursuant
to section 18 of article X of the Constitution. Thus, by virtue of the residual powers of President
Cory Aquino she promulgated E.O 220 creating CAR. Then the congress enacted R.A 6766, an
act providing for organic act for the cordillera autonomous region, a plebiscite was cast but was
not approve by the people. The court declared that E.O 220 to be still in force and effect until
properly repealed or amended. Later on February 15, 2000, President Estrada signed the
General Appropriations Act of 2000 (GAA 2000) which includes the assailed special provisions,
then issued an E.O 270 to extend the implementation of the winding up of operations of the
CAR and extended it by virtue of E.O 328.
The petitioners seek the declaration of nullity of paragraph 1 of the special provisions of
RA 870 (GAA 2000) directing that the appropriation for the CAR shall be spent to wind up its
activities and pay the separation and retirement benefits of all the affected members and
employees.
Issues:
Whether the Philippine Government, through Congress, can unilaterally amend/repeal
EO 220.
Ruling:
The contention that Congress cannot amend or repeal E.O 220 is rejected, there is no
such thing as an irrepealable law. And nothing could prevent the Congress from amending or
repealing the E.O. 220 because it is no different from any other law.

Page 92 of 370
15. Government Service Insurance System v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 183905, April
16, 2009.
Facts:
GSIS, a major shareholder in Meralco, was distressed over the proxy validation
proceedings and the resulting certification of proxies in favor of the Meralco Management. The
proceedings were presided over by Meralco’s assistant corporate secretary and chief legal
counsel instead of the person duly designated by Meralco’s Board of Directors. Thus, GSIS
moved before the SEC to declare certain proxies, those issued to herein private respondents,
as invalid. Private respondents contend that dispute in the validity of proxies is an election
contest which falls under the trial court’s jurisdiction. GSIS argues there was no election yet at
the time it filed its petition with the SEC, hence no proper election contest over which the regular
courts may have jurisdiction.
Issue:
Whether or not the proxy challenge is an election contest cognizable by the regular
courts.
Ruling: 
YES.
Section 2, Rule 6 of the Interim Rules broadly defines the term “election contest” as
encompassing all plausible incidents arising from the election of corporate directors, including:
(1) any controversy or dispute involving title or claim to any elective office in a stock or non-
stock corporation, (2) the validation of proxies, (3) the manner and validity of elections and (4)
the qualifications of candidates, including the proclamation of winners.
Under Section 5(c) of Presidential Decree No. 902-A, in relation to the SRC, the
jurisdiction of the regular trial courts with respect to election-related controversies is specifically
confined to “controversies in the election or appointment of directors, trustees, officers or
managers of corporations, partnerships, or associations.” Evidently, the jurisdiction of the
regular courts over so-called election contests or controversies under Section 5(c) does not
extend to every potential subject that may be voted on by shareholders, but only to the election
of directors or trustees, in which stockholders are authorized to participate under Section 24 of
the Corporation Code. The power of the SEC to investigate violations of its rules on proxy
solicitation is unquestioned when proxies are obtained to vote on matters unrelated to the cases
enumerated under Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A. However, when proxies are
solicited in relation to the election of corporate directors, the resulting controversy, even if it
ostensibly raised the violation of the SEC rules on proxy solicitation, should be properly seen as
an election controversy within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the trial courts by virtue of
Section 5.2 of the SRC in relation to Section 5(c) of Presidential Decree No. 902-A.
That the proxy challenge raised by GSIS relates to the election of the directors of
Meralco is undisputed. The controversy was engendered by the looming annual meeting, during
which the stockholders of Meralco were to elect the directors of the corporation. GSIS very well
knew of that fact.

Page 93 of 370
16. Republic v. Caguioa, G.R. No. 168584, October 15, 2007
Facts:
Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A) No. 7227 or the Bases Conversion and Development Act
of 1992 which created the Subic Special Economic and Freeport Zone (SBF) and the Subic
Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA). Section 12 of R.A No. 7227 of the law provides that no
taxes, local and national, shall be imposed within the Subic Special Economic Zone. Pursuant to
the law, Indigo Distribution Corporation, et al., which are all domestic corporations doing
business at the SBF, applied for and were granted Certificates of Registration and Tax
Exemption by the SBMA. Congress subsequently passed R.A. No. 9334, which provides that all
applicable taxes, duties, charges, including excise taxes due thereon shall be applied
to cigars and cigarettes, distilled spirits, fermented liquors and wines brought directly into the
duly chartered or legislated freeports of the Subic Economic Freeport Zone. On the basis of
Section 6 of R.A. No. 9334, SBMA issued a Memorandum declaring that, all importations
of cigars, cigarettes, distilled spirits, fermented liquors and wines into the SBF, shall be treated
as ordinary importations subject to all applicable taxes, duties and charges, including excise
taxes. Upon its implementation, Indigo et al., sought for a reconsideration of the directives on
the imposition of duties and taxes, particularly excise taxes by the Collector of Customs and the
SBMA Administrator. Their request was subsequently denied prompting them to file with the
RTC of Olongapo City a special civil action for declaratory relief to have certain provisions of
R.A. No. 9334 declared as unconstitutional. They prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and preliminary mandatory injunction.
The same was subsequently granted by Judge Ramon Caguioa. The injunction bond was
approved at One Million pesos (P1,000,000).
Issues:
Whether or not public respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess in jurisdiction in peremptorily and unjustly issuing the injunctive writ in favor of
private respondents despite the absence of the legal requisites for its issuance
Held:
One such case of grave abuse obtained in this case when Judge Caguioa issued his
Order of May 4, 2005 and the Writ of Preliminary Injunction on May 11, 2005 despite the
absence of a clear and unquestioned legal right of private respondents. In holding that the
presumption of constitutionality and validity of R.A. No. 9334 was overcome by private
respondents for the reasons public respondent cited in his May 4, 2005 Order, he disregarded
the fact that as a condition sine qua non to the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction,
private respondents needed also to show a clear legal right that ought to be protected. That
requirement is not satisfied in this case. To stress, the possibility of irreparable damage without
proof of an actual existing right would not justify an injunctive relief. Indeed, Sections 204 and
229 of the NIRC provide for the recovery of erroneously or illegally collected taxes which would
be the nature of the excise taxes paid by private respondents should Section 6 of R.A. No. 9334
be declared unconstitutional or invalid.
The Court finds that public respondent had also ventured into the delicate area which courts are
cautioned from taking when deciding applications for the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction. Having ruled preliminarily against the prima facie validity of R.A. No. 9334, he
assumed in effect the proposition that private respondents in their petition for declaratory relief
were duty bound to prove, thereby shifting to petitioners the burden of proving that R.A. No.
9334 is not unconstitutional or invalid. In the same vein, the Court finds Judge Caguioa to have
overstepped his discretion when he arbitrarily fixed the injunction bond of the SBF enterprises at
only P1million. Rule 58, Section 4(b) provides that a bond is executed in favor of the party
enjoined to answer for all damages which it may sustain by reason of the injunction. The
purpose of the injunction bond is to protect the defendant against loss or damage by reason of
the injunction in case the court finally decides that the plaintiff was not entitled to it, and the
bond is usually conditioned accordingly.

Page 94 of 370
17. Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy, G.R. No. 124369, December 3, 1997
Facts:
The petitioner question the constitutionality of RA No. 8180 “An Act Deregulating the
Downstream Oil Industry and For Other Purposes.” The deregulation process has two phases:
(a) the transition phase and the (b) full deregulation phase through EO No. 372.
The petitioner claims that Sec. 15 of RA No. 8180 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative
power to the President and the Sec. of Energy because it does not provide a determinate or
determinable standard to guide the Executive Branch in determining when to implement the full
deregulation of the downstream oil industry, and the law does not provide any specific standard
to determine when the prices of crude oil in the world market are considered to be declining nor
when the exchange rate of the peso to the US dollar is considered stable.
Issues:
Whether or not Sec 5(b) of R.A. 8180 violates the one title one subject requirement of
the Constitution.
Whether or not Sec 15 of R.A. 8180 violates the constitutional prohibition on undue
delegation of power.
Rulings:
The Court does not concur with this contention. The Court has adopted a liberal
construction of the one title – one subject rule. The Court hold that section 5(b) providing for
tariff differential is germane to the subject of R.A. No. 8180 which is the deregulation of the
downstream oil industry. The section is supposed to sway prospective investors to put up
refineries in our country and make them rely less on imported petroleum. [20] We shall,
however, return to the validity of this provision when we examine its blocking effect on new
entrants to the oil market.
Sec 15 of R.A. 8180 can hurdle both the completeness test and the sufficient standard
test. It will be noted that Congress expressly provided in R.A. No. 8180 that full deregulation will
start at the end of March 1997, regardless of the occurrence of any event. Full deregulation at
the end of March 1997 is mandatory and the Executive has no discretion to postpone it for any
purported reason. Thus, the law is complete on the question of the final date of full deregulation.
The discretion given to the President is to advance the date of full deregulation before the end
of March 1997. Section 15 lays down the standard to guide the judgment of the President. He is
to time it as far as practicable when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world
market are declining and when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is
stable.
Section 19 of Article XII of the Constitution allegedly violated by the aforestated
provisions of R.A. No. 8180 mandates: “The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when
the public interest so requires. No combinations in restraint of trade or unfair competition shall
be allowed.”

Page 95 of 370
18.Luz Farms v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 86889, December 4, 1990
Facts:
On 10 June 1988, RA 6657 was approved by the President of the Philippines, which
includes, among others, the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage.
Petitioner Luz Farms, a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry business, avers
that it would be adversely affected by the enforcement of sections 3(b), 11, 13, 16 (d), 17 and
32 of the said law. Hence, it prayed that the said law be declared unconstitutional. The
mentioned sections of the law provies, among others, the product-sharing plan, including those
engaged in livestock and poultry business.
Luz Farms further argued that livestock or poultry raising is not similar with crop or tree
farming. That the land is not the primary resource in this undertaking and represents no more
than 5% of the total investments of commercial livestock and poultry raisers. That the land is
incidental but not the principal factor or consideration in their industry. Hence, it argued that it
should not be included in the coverage of RA 6657 which covers “agricultural lands”.
Issue:
Whether or not certain provisions of RA 6657 is unconstitutional for including in its
definition of “Agriculture” the livestock and poultyr industry?
Ruling:
The Court held YES.
Looking into the transcript of the Constitutional Commission on the meaning of the word
“agriculture”, it showed that the framers never intended to include livestock and poultry industry
in the coverage of the constitutionally mandated agrarian reform program of the government.
Further, Commissioner Tadeo pointed out that the reasin why they used the term
“farmworkers” rather than “agricultural workers” in the said law is because “agricultural workers”
includes the livestock and poultry industry, hence, since they do not intend to include the latter,
they used “farmworkers” to have distinction.
Hence, there is merit on the petitioner’s argument that the product-sharing plan applied
to “corporate farms” in the contested provisions is unreasonable for being consficatory and
violative of the due process of law.

Page 96 of 370
19. Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative v. La Trinidad Water District, G.R. No. 166471,
March 22, 2011.
Facts:

Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative (TMPC) is a cooperative, organized to provide

domestic water services in Barangay Tawang, La Trinidad, Benguet. La Trinidad Water District
(LTWD) is a local water utility created under Section 47 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 198, as
amended. It is authorized to supply water for domestic, industrial and commercial purposes
within the municipality of La Trinidad, Benguet.

TMPC filed with the National Water Resources Board (NWRB) an application for a
certificate of public convenience (CPC) to operate and maintain a waterworks system in
Barangay Tawang. LTWD opposed TMPCs application, arguing that its franchise is exclusive as
provided under PD 198. A CPC is however granted. LTWD filed a motion for reconsideration but
the same was denied by NWRB. LTWD then appealed to the RTC where it court set aside the
NWRB decision. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the petition may be granted

Held:
Yes. RTC Decision Set Aside.

Political Law- No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a
public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or
associations organized under the laws of the Philippines, at least sixty per centum of whose
capital is owned by such citizens,nor shall such franchise, certificate or authorizationbe
exclusive in characteror for a longer period than fifty years.

Plain words do not require explanation. The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions are clear
franchises for the operation of a public utility cannot be exclusive in character. The 1935, 1973
and 1987 Constitutions expressly and clearly state that,"nor shall such franchise x x x be
exclusive in character."There is no exception.

When the law is clear, there is nothing for the courts to do but to apply it. The duty of
the Court is to apply the law the way it is worded. What cannot be legally done directly cannot
be done indirectly. This rule is basic and, to a reasonable mind, does not need explanation.
Indeed, if acts that cannot be legally done directly can be done indirectly, then all laws would
be illusory.

Indeed, the President, Congress and the Court cannot create directly franchises that
are exclusive in character. What the President, Congress and the Court cannot legally do
directly they cannot do indirectly. Thus, the President, Congress and the Court cannot create
indirectly.

In PD No. 198, as amended, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos (President Marcos)

created indirectly franchises that are exclusive in character by allowing the BOD of LTWD and
the LWUA to create directly franchises that are exclusive in character.

In case of conflict between the Constitution and a statute, the Constitution always
prevails because the Constitution is the basic law to which all other laws must conform to. The
duty of the Court is to uphold the Constitution and to declare void all laws that do not conform
to it.

Page 97 of 370
 20. Betoy v. Board of Directors, National Power Corporation, G.R. No. 156556-57,
October 4, 2011
Facts:

Petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari and supplemental petition

for mandamus, specifically assailing National Power Board Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No.
2002-125, as well as Sections 11, 34, 38, 48, 52 and 63 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9136,
otherwise known as the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA). Also assailed is
Rule 33 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of the EPIRA.

On June 8, 2001, the EPIRA was enacted by Congress with the goal of restructuring the
electric power industry and privatization of the assets of the National Power Corporation (NPC).

On November 18, 2002, pursuant to Section 63 of the EPIRA and Rule 33 of the IRR,
the NPB passed NPB Resolution No. 2002-124 which, among others, resolved that all NPC
personnel shall be legally terminated on January 31, 2003and shall be entitled to separation
benefits.

As a result of the foregoing NPB Resolutions, petitioner Enrique U. Betoy, together with
thousands of his co-employees from the NPC were terminated.
However, amongst the petitions raised – it is noteworthy that petitioners argued that Section 11,
Section 48 and Section 52 of RA 9136 (EPIRA) for being violative of Section 13, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution and, therefore, unconstitutional.
Issue:
Whether or not the designation of secretaries as board of directors of National Power
Corporation valid.
Held:
The delegation of the said official to the respective Board of Directors were designation
by Congress of additional functions and duties to the officials concerned, i.e., they were
designated as members of the Board of Directors.
Designation connotes an imposition of additional duties, usually by law, upon a person
already in the public service by virtue of an earlier appointment. Designation does not entail
payment of additional benefits or grant upon the person so designated the right to claim the
salary attached to the position.Without an appointment, a designation does not entitle the officer
to receive the salary of the position. The legal basis of an employee’s right to claim the salary
attached thereto is a duly issued and approved appointment to the position, and not a mere
designation.
This Court, therefore, finds the designation of the respective members of the Cabinet, as ex-
officio members of the NPB, valid.

Page 98 of 370
21. Pambansang Koalisyon ng mga Samahang Magsasaka at Manggagawa sa Niyugan v.
Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 147036-37, April 10, 2012
Facts:

On June 19, 1971 Congress enacted R.A. 6260 that established a Coconut Investment
Fund (CI Fund) for the development of the coconut industry through capital financing. Coconut
farmers were to capitalize and administer the Fund through the Coconut Investment Company
(CIC) whose objective was, among others, to advance the coconut farmers interests. For this
purpose, the law imposed a levy ofP0.55on the coconut farmers first domestic sale of every 100
kilograms of copra, or its equivalent, for which levy he was to get a receipt convertible into CIC
shares of stock. In November 2000 then President Joseph Estrada issued Executive Order
(E.O.) 312, establishing a Sagip Niyugan Program which sought to provide immediate income
supplement to coconut farmers and encourage the creation of a sustainable local market
demand for coconut oil and other coconut products. At about the same time, President Estrada
issued E.O. 313, which created an irrevocable trust fund known as the Coconut Trust Fund (the
Trust Fund).This aimed to provide financial assistance to coconut farmers, to the coconut
industry, and to other agri-related programs.The shares of stock of SMC were to serve as the
Trust Funds initial capital.These shares were acquired with CII Funds and constituted
approximately 27% of the outstanding capital stock of SMC.E.O. 313 designated UCPB, through
its Trust Department, as the Trust Funds trustee bank.The Trust Fund Committee would
administer, manage, and supervise the operations of the Trust Fund. The Committee would
designate an external auditor to do an annual audit or as often as needed but it may also
request the Commission on Audit (COA) to intervene.
On January 26, 2001, however, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the
suspension of E.O.s 312 and 313. This notwithstanding, on March 1, 2001 petitioner
organizations and individuals brought the present action in G.R. 147036-37 to declare E.O.s
312 and 313 as well as Article III, Section 5 of P.D. 1468 unconstitutional.On April 24, 2001 the
other sets of petitioner organizations and individuals instituted G.R. 147811 to nullify Section 2
of P.D. 755 and Article III, Section 5 of P.D.s 961 and 1468 also for being unconstitutional.

Issues:
Whether or not coco levy fund are public funds?
Whether or not petitioners have legal standing to bring the same to court?
Held: 
Coco-levy funds are public funds. The Court was satisfied that the coco-levy funds were raised
pursuant to law to support a proper governmental purpose.They were raised with the use of the
police and taxing powers of the State for the benefit of the coconut industry and its farmers in
general. The COA reviewed the use of the funds.The BIR treated them as public funds and the
very laws governing coconut levies recognize their public character.
Section 2 of P.D. 755, Article III,Section 5of P.D. 961, and Article III, Section 5 of P.D. 1468
completely ignore the fact that coco-levy funds are public funds raised through taxation.And
since taxes could be exacted only for a public purpose, they cannot be declared private
properties of individuals although such individuals fall within a distinct group of persons.

These assailed provisions,which removed the coco-levy funds from the general funds of
the government and declared them private properties of coconut farmers,do not appear to have
a color of social justice for their purpose.The levy on copra that farmers produce appears, in the
first place, to be a business tax judging by its tax base.The concept of farmers-businessmen is
incompatible with the idea that coconut farmers are victims of social injustice and so should be
beneficiaries of the taxes raised from their earnings.

Page 99 of 370
22. Pimentel v. Executive Secretary Digest G.R. No. 158088 July 6, 2005
Facts:
The petitioners filed a petition for mandamus to compel the Office of the Executive Secretary
and the Department of Foreign Affairs to transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court  to the Senate of the Philippinesfor its concurrence pursuant to Sec.
21, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution.
The Rome Statute established the Int'l Criminal Court which will have jurisdiction over the most
serious crimes as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and crimes of aggression as
defined by the Statute. The Philippines through the Chargie du Affairs in UN. The provisions of
the Statute however require that it  be subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the
signatory state. 
Petitioners contend that ratification of a treaty, under both domestic and international law, is a
function of the Senate, hence it is the duty of the Executive Department to transmit the signed
copy to the senate to allow it to exercise its discretion. 
Issue:
Whether or not the Exec. Secretary and the DFA have the ministerial duty to transmit to the
Senate the copy of the Rome Statute signed by a member of the Philippine mission to the U.N.
even without the signature of the President.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held NO. 
1. The President as the head of state is the sole organ and authorized in the external relations
and he is also the country's sole representative with foreign nations, He is the mouthpiece with
respect to the country's foreign affairs.
2. In treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states and enter
into treaties but this power is limited by the Constitution with the 2/3 required vote of all the
members of the Senate for the treaty to be valid. (Sec. 21, Art VII).
3. The legislative branch part is essential to provide a check on the executive in the field of
foreign relations, to ensure the nation's pursuit of political maturity and growth.

Page 100 of 370

23. Lawyers against Monopoly and Poverty v. Secretary of Budget and Management, G.R.
No. 164987, April 24, 2012
Facts:
For consideration of the Court is an original action for certiorari assailing the
constitutionality and legality of the implementation of the Priority Development Assistance Fund
(PDAF) as provided for in Republic Act (R.A.) 9206 or the General Appropriations Act for 2004
(GAA of 2004). Petitioner Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty(LAMP), a group of lawyers
who have banded together with a mission of dismantling all forms of political, economic or social
monopoly in the country.For LAMP, this situation runs afoul against the principle of separation of
powers because in receiving and, thereafter, spending funds for their chosen projects, the
Members of Congress in effect intrude into an executive function. Further, the authority to
propose and select projects does not pertain to legislation. “It is, in fact, a non-legislative
function devoid of constitutional sanction,”8 and, therefore, impermissible and must be
considered nothing less than malfeasance.
RESPONDENT’S POSITION: the perceptions of LAMP on the implementation of PDAF must
not be based on mere speculations circulated in the news media preaching the evils of pork
barrel.
Issues:
whether or not the implementation of PDAF by the Members of Congress is unconstitutional and
illegal.
Ruling:
The Members of Congress are then requested by the President to recommend projects
and programs which may be funded from the PDAF. The list submitted by the Members of
Congress is endorsed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives to the DBM, which
reviews and determines whether such list of projects submitted are consistent with the
guidelines and the priorities set by the Executive.”33 This demonstrates the power given to the
President to execute appropriation laws and therefore, to exercise the spending per se of the
budget.
As applied to this case, the petition is seriously wanting in establishing that individual
Members of Congress receive and thereafter spend funds out of PDAF. So long as there is no
showing of a direct participation of legislators in the actual spending of the budget, the
constitutional boundaries between the Executive and the Legislative in the budgetary process
remain intact.

Page 101 of 370

24. AASJS MEMBER - HECTOR GUMANGAN CALILUNG v. SIMEON DATUMANONG, GR
No. 160869, 2007-05-11
Facts:
Petitioner avers that Rep. Act No.9225 is unconstitutional as it violates Section 5, Article
IV of the 1987 Constitution that states, "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national
interest and shall be dealt with by law. Petitioner contends that Rep. Act No. 9225 cheapens
Philippine citizenship. He avers that Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, together, allow dual
allegiance and not dual citizenship. Petitioner maintains that Section 2 allows all Filipinos, either
natural-born or... naturalized, who become foreign citizens, to retain their Philippine citizenship
without losing their foreign citizenship. Section 3 permits dual allegiance because said law
allows natural-born citizens of the Philippines to regain their Philippine citizenship by simply...
taking an oath of allegiance without forfeiting their foreign allegiance.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) claims that Section 2 merely declares as a
state policy that "Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed
not to have lost their Philippine citizenship. The OSG further claims that the oath in Section 3...
does not allow dual allegiance since the oath taken by the former Filipino citizen is an effective
renunciation and repudiation of his foreign citizenship.The fact that the applicant taking the oath
recognizes and accepts the supreme authority of the Philippines is an... unmistakable and
categorical affirmation of his undivided loyalty to the Republic. Petitioner likewise advances the
proposition that although Congress has not yet passed any law on the matter of dual allegiance,
such absence of a law should not be justification why this Court could not rule on the issue.  He
further contends that while it is true that... there is no enabling law yet on dual allegiance, the
Supreme Court, through Mercado v. Manzano,[6] already had drawn up the guidelines on how
to distinguish dual allegiance from dual citizenship.
Issues:
Is Rep. Act No. 9225 unconstitutional?
Does this Court have jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of dual allegiance?
Whether Rep. Act No. 9225 would allow dual allegiance
Ruling:
From the above excerpts of the legislative record, it is clear that the intent of the
legislature in drafting Rep. Act No. 9225 is to do away with the provision in Commonwealth Act
No. 63[5] which takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-born
Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other countries.
On its face, it... does not recognize dual allegiance. By swearing to the supreme
authority of the Republic, the person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship. The OSG
counters that pursuant to Section 5, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution, dual allegiance shall be
dealt with by law. Thus, until a law on dual allegiance is enacted by Congress, the Supreme
Court is without any jurisdiction to entertain issues regarding dual allegiance.
In Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, the framers were not concerned... with dual
citizenship per se, but with the status of naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to
their countries of origin even after their naturalization.
Petitioner misreads Mercado. That case did not set the parameters of what constitutes
dual... allegiance but merely made a distinction between dual allegiance and dual citizenship.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Page 102 of 370

25. Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014
Facts:
          Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354,
otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH
Law), challengers from various sectors of society came knocking on the doors of the Court,
beckoning it to wield the sword that strikes down constitutional disobedience. Aware of the
profound and lasting impact that its decision may produce, the Court now faces the controversy,
as presented in fourteen (14) petitions and two (2) petitions-in-intervention.
          The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared unconstitutional.

Issues:
After a scrutiny of the various arguments and contentions of the parties, the Court has
synthesized and refined them to the following principal issues:
PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the
controversy.
● Power of Judicial Review
● Actual Case or Controversy
● Facial Challenge
● Locus Standi
● Declaratory Relief
● One Subject/One Title Rule
● thority to the FDA
● Autonomy of Local Governments / ARMM
RULING:
Before delving into the constitutionality of the RH Law and its implementing rules, it
behooves the Court to resolve some procedural impediments.
 The petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative
branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in
fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. “The question thus posed is judicial rather than
political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is
upheld. Once a controversy as to the application or interpretation of constitutional provision is
raised before this Court (as in the instant case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court is
bound by constitutional mandate to decide. In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court
Justice Florentino Feliciano, “judicial review is essential for the maintenance and enforcement of
the separation of powers and the balancing of powers among the three great departments of
government through the definition and maintenance of the boundaries of authority and control
between them.” To him, judicial review is the chief, indeed the only, medium of participation – or
instrument of intervention – of the judiciary in that balancing operation. Lest it be misunderstood,
it bears emphasizing that the Court does not have the unbridled authority to rule on just any and
every claim of constitutional violation. Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of
judicial review is limited by four exacting requisites, viz : (a) there must be an actual case or
controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality
must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis
mota of the case.
Even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial
duty. In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that the
same is ripe for judicial determination. Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules
have already taken effect and that budgetary measures to carry out the law have already been
passed, it is evident that the subject petitions present a justiciable controversy. When an action
of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it not only
becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute.
The Court is not persuaded. In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial challenge,
also known as a First Amendment Challenge, is one that is launched to assail the validity of
statutes concerning not only protected speech, but also all other rights in the First Amendment.

Page 103 of 370

These include religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of the people to peaceably
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. After all, the fundamental
right to religious freedom, freedom of the press and peaceful assembly are but component
rights of the right to one’s freedom of expression, as they are modes which one’s thoughts are
externalized. In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been
generally maintained, albeit with some modifications. While this Court has withheld the
application of facial challenges to strictly penal statues, it has expanded its scope to cover
statutes not only regulating free speech, but also those involving religious freedom, and other
fundamental rights. Verily, the framers of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever
vigilant with its duty to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.
The transcendental importance of the issues involved in this case warrants that we set
aside the technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One cannot
deny that the issues raised herein have potentially pervasive influence on the social and moral
well being of this nation, specially the youth; hence, their proper and just determination is an
imperative need. This is in accordance with the well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure
are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the
administration of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities
that tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice, must always be
eschewed. Considering that it is the right to life of the mother and the unborn which is primarily
at issue, the Court need not wait for a life to be taken away before taking action.
Where the case has far-reaching implications and prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court
may consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65.
The RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. It is well-settled that the “one
title-one subject” rule does not require the Congress to employ in the title of the enactment
language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute
details therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to
include the general object which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons
interested are informed of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its
operation. Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical
construction of the rule “so as not to cripple or impede legislation.” In this case, a textual
analysis of the various provisions of the law shows that both “reproductive health” and
“responsible parenthood” are interrelated and germane to the overriding objective to control the
population growth.

Page 104 of 370

 26. Remman Enterprises, Inc. v. Professional Regulatory Board of Real Estate Service,
G.R. No. 197676, February 4, 2014
Facts:
This case involves a petition for review under Rule 45 on the subject of the Real Estate Service
Act of the Philippines. R.A. 9646 (Real Estate Service Act of the Philippines) was passed. Its
purpose is to professionalize the real estate service sector under regulatory scheme of
licensing, registration and supervision of real estate service practitioners. The supervision was
likewise lodged under the authority of the Professional Regulatory Commission (PRC). The law
required that companies providing real estate services must transact with the employ of duly
licensed real estate brokers. Petitioner assails the constitutionality of the law, alleging that it
violates the due process clause and infringes the ownership rights of real estate developers
enshrined in Art. 428 of the Civil Code. Furthermore, they claim that it violates the equal
protection clause as owners of private properties are allowed to sell their properties without the
need of a licensed real estate broker. The provisions in question are – o Section 29. Prohibition
Against the Unauthorized Practice of Real Estate Service. o Section 32. Corporate Practice of
the Real Estate Service. The RTC denied the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.

ISSUE:
Whether the assailed provisions are in violation of the due process clause, particularly
substantive due process.

RULING:
No. The requirements for substantive due process are – 1. Lawful government purpose; and 2.
Reasonable means necessary for the accomplishment of the lawful purpose. • The lawful
purpose of R.A. 9646 is to professionalize the real estate service and increase its standards. §
The law recognizes the role of real estate practitioners in spearheading the continuous flow of
capital, in boosting investor confidence, and in promoting national progress. • The requirement
of employing a duly licensed real estate broker for transactions is reasonable as it merely
regulates the conduct of business, and does not curtail the exercise of petitioners’ ownership
rights. [YAP, K.] C2020 | 2 • Lastly, there is a substantial distinction between real estate
developers and owners of private who want to sell their private property. § Unlike individuals or
entities having isolated transactions over their own property, real estate developers sell lots,
houses and condominium units in the ordinary course of business, a business which is highly
regulated by the State to ensure the health and safety of home and lot buyers.

Page 105 of 370

 27. Giron v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 188179, January 22, 2013

Facts:
Petitioner Henry Giron (Giron) and petitioners-in-intervention assail the constitutionality
of Section 12 (Substitution of Candidates) and Section 14 (Repealing Clause) of Republic Act
No. (R.A.)9006, otherwise known as the Fair Election Act.

Giron asserts that the insertion of Sections 12 and 14 in the Fair Election Act violates
Section 26(1), Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution, which specifically requires: “Every bill passed by
the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.” He
avers that these provisions are unrelated to the main subject of the Fair Election Act: the lifting
of the political ad ban. Section 12 refers to the treatment of the votes cast for substituted
candidates after the official ballots have been printed, while Section 14 pertains to the repeal of
Section 67 (Candidates holding elective office) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known
as the Omnibus Election Code. Section 67 of this law concerns the ipso facto resignation of
elective officials immediately after they file their respective certificates of candidacy for an office
other than that which they are currently holding in a permanent capacity. 

ISSUE:
Whether or not the inclusion of Sections 12 and 14 in the Fair Election Act violates
Section 26(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, or the “one subject-one title” rule?

HELD:
The petition must fail.

POLITICA LAW:
“one subject-one title” rule
It is a well-settled rule that courts are to adopt a liberal interpretation in favor of the
constitutionality of a legislation, as Congress is deemed to have enacted a valid, sensible, and
just law. Because of this strong presumption, the one who asserts the invalidity of a law has to
prove that there is a clear, unmistakable, and unequivocal breach of the Constitution; otherwise,
the petition must fail.

The Court finds that the present case fails to present a compelling reason that would
surpass the strong presumption of validity and constitutionality in favor of the Fair Election Act.

Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not be
so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. The requirement that the
subject of an act shall be expressed in its title should receive a reasonable and not a technical
construction. It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the
general object which a statute seeks to effect, without expressing each and every end and
means necessary or convenient for the accomplishing of that object. Mere details need not be
set forth. The title need not be an abstract or index of the Act.

Moreover, the avowed purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill
should be embraced in its title is to apprise the legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope
of its provisions, and prevent the enactment into law of matters which have not received the
notice, action and study of the legislators and the public.

DISMISSED.

Page 106 of 370

28. Tobias v. Abalos, G.R. No. 114783, December 8, 1994
Facts:
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as
"An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known
as the City of Mandaluyong.” Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the municipalities of
Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one legislative district. The petitioners contend on
the following:
(1) Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 contravenes from the "one subject-one bill" rule
provided in the Constitution by involving 2 subjects in the bill namely (1) the conversion of
Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city; and (2) the division of the congressional district of
San Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts.
(2) The division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate congressional districts under
Section 49 of the assailed law has resulted in an increase in the composition of the House of
Representatives beyond that provided in Article VI, Sec. 5(1) of the Constitution.
(3) The said division was not made pursuant to any census showing that the subject
municipalities have attained the minimum population requirements.
(4) That Section 49 has the effect of preempting the right of Congress to reapportion legislative
districts pursuant to Sec. 5(4) of the Constitution stating that “within three years following the
return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based
on the standard provided in this section
Issue:
WON the RA No. 7675 is unconstitutional.
Ruling:
The court ruled that RA No. 7675 followed the mandate of the "one city-one
representative" proviso in the Constitution stating that each city with a population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative" (Article VI,
Section 5(3), Constitution). Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the creation of a separate
congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of
its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of its
conversion into a highly urbanized city.
As to the contention that the assailed law violates the present limit on the number of
representatives as set forth in the Constitution, a reading of the applicable provision, Article VI,
Section 5(1), as aforequoted, shows that the present limit of 250 members is not absolute with
the phrase "unless otherwise provided by law."
As to the contention that Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 in effect preempts the right of
Congress to reapportion legislative districts, it was the Congress itself which drafted, deliberated
upon and enacted the assailed law, including Section 49 thereof. Congress cannot possibly
preempt itself on a right which pertains to itself.
Hence, the court dismissed the petition due to lack of merit.

Page 107 of 370

 29. Cordero v. Cabatuando, G.R. No. L-14542, October 31, 1962
Facts:
Republic Act No. 1199 is the Agricultural Tenancy Act of thePhilippines.Section 54 of
this act expressed that indigent tenants should berepresented by Public Defendant of
Department of Labor.Congress then amended this in Republic Act No. 2263: An ActAmending
Certain Sections of Republic Act No. 1199. Section 19of the amendatory act says that mediation
of tenancy disputesfalls under authority of Secretary of Justice. Section 20 alsoprovides that
indigent tenants shall be represented by trialattorney of the Tenancy Mediation Commission.
Issues:
Whether or not Sections 19 and 20 of Rep. Act No. 2263 is unconstitutionalbecause of
the constitutional provision that No bill which may beenacted into law shall embrace more than
one subject which shallbe expressed in the title of the bill
Held:
Sections 19 and 20 are constitutional.The constitutional requirement is complied with as
long the lawhas a single general subject, which is the Agricultural TenancyAct, and the
amendatory provisions no matter how diverse theymay be, so long as they are not inconsistent
with or foreign to thegeneral subject, will be regarded as valid. Constitutional provisions relating
to subject matter and titles of statutes shouldnot be so narrowly construed as to cripple or
impede proper legislation.

Page 108 of 370

30. Cawaling vs. Executive Secretary G.R. No. 146342, October 26, 2001
Facts:
On August 16, 2000, former President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law R.A. No. 8806, an "Act
Creating The City Of Sorsogon By Merging The Municipalities Of Bacon And Sorsogon In The
Province Of Sorsogon, And Appropriating Funds Therefor." The COMELEC a plebiscite in the
Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon and submitted the matter for ratification proclaimed the
creation of the City of Sorsogon as having been ratified and approved by the majority of the
votes cast in the plebiscite. Invoking his right as a resident and taxpayer, the petitioner filed the
present petition for certiorari seeking the annulment of the plebiscite on the following grounds:

A. The December 16, 2000 plebiscite was conducted beyond the required 120-day period from
the approval of R.A. 8806, in violation of Section 54 thereof; and
B. Respondent COMELEC failed to observe the legal requirement of twenty (20) day extensive
information campaign in the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon before conducting the
plebiscite.
Petitioner instituted another petition declaring enjoin R.A. No. 8806 unconstitutional
,contending, in essence, that:
1. The creation of Sorsogon City by merging two municipalities violates Section 450(a) of the
Local Government Code of 1991 (in relation to Section 10, Article X of the Constitution) which
requires that only "a municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component
city"; and
2. R.A. No. 8806 contains two (2) subjects, namely, the (a) creation of the City of Sorsogon and
the (b) abolition of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon, thereby violating the "one subject-
one bill" rule prescribed by Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution.
Petitioner contends that under Section 450(a) of the Code, a component city may be
created only by converting "a municipality or a cluster of barangays," not by merging two
municipalities, as what R.A. No. 8806 has done.
Issue:
1. WON a component city may be created by merging two municipalities.
2. WON R.A. No. 8806 violatethe "one subject-one bill" rule enunciated in Section 26 (1),
Article VI of the Constitution

Held:
1.Yes. Petitioner's constricted reading of Section 450(a) of the Code is erroneous. The
phrase "A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city" is not
a criterion but simply one of the modes by which a city may be created. Section 10, Article X of
the Constitution allows the merger of local government units to create a province city,
municipality or barangay in accordance with the criteria established by the Code. the creation of
an entirely new local government unit through a division or a merger of existing local
government units is recognized under the Constitution, provided that such merger or division
shall comply with the requirements prescribed by the Code.
2.No. There is only one subject embraced in the title of the law, that is, the creation of
the City of Sorsogon. The abolition/cessation of the corporate existence of the Municipalities of
Bacon and Sorsogon due to their merger is not a subject separate and distinct from the creation
of Sorsogon City. Such abolition/cessation was but the logical, natural and inevitable
consequence of the merger. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive
enough as to include the general object which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here,
the persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed
law and its operation.

Page 109 of 370

31. Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency v. Commission
on Elections, G.R. No. 177508
FACTS:
Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) party list
petitioned in Court for the constitutionality of RA 9369, enjoining respondent Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) from implementing the statute. RA 9369 is a consolidation of Senate Bill
No. 2231 and House Bill No. 5352. Petitioner also assailed the constutionality of Sections 34,
37, 38, and 43 of the said Republic Act and alleged that they were of questionable application
and their validity was doubtful. Petitioner raised the issue whether RA 9369, RA 7166 as
amended, being a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 2231 and House Bill No. 5352, violated
Section 26(1) of Article VI of the Constitution which states that "Every bill passed by the
Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof." BANAT
also questioned the validity of Sections 37 and 38, whether or not it violated Section 17 or
Article VI of the Constitution which specifies that the Senate and the House of Representatives
should each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all election, returns, and
qualification contests relating to its Members. Petitioner alleged that the title of RA 9369 is
misleading because it speaks of poll automation but contains substantial provisions dealing with
the manual canvassing of election returns. Petitioner also alleged that Sections 34, 37, 38, and
43 are neither embraced in the title nor pertaining to the subject matter of RA 9369.
ISSUE
Do Sections 37 and 38 of RA 7166 not violate Section 17, Article VI?
HELD:
No. It is settled that every statute is presumed to be constitutional. The presumption is
that the legislature intended to enact a valid, sensible and just law. Those who petition the Court
to declare a law unconstitutional must show that there is a clear an unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, not merely a doubtful, speculative or argumentative one. Otherwise, the petition
must fail. Section 37 and 38 do not violate Section 17, Article VI. The COMELEC maintained
that the amendments introduced by Section 37 pertained only to the adoption and application of
the procedures on the pre-proclamation controversies. It did not provide Congress and the
COMELEC "en banc" may entertain pre-proclamation cases for national elective posts.

Page 110 of 370

32. Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, G.R. No. 115455, October 30, 1995
Facts:
The Philippine Press Institute, Inc. (PPI) contends that by removing the exemption of
the press from the VAT while maintaining those granted to others, the law discriminates against
the press. At any rate, it is averred, “even nondiscriminatory taxation of constitutionally
guaranteed freedom is unconstitutional”, citing in support of the case of Murdock v.
Pennsylvania. Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations, Invc., (CREBA), on the other
hand, asserts that R.A. No. 7716 (1) impairs the obligations of contracts, (2) classifies
transactions as covered or exempt without reasonable basis and (3) violates the rule that taxes
should be uniform and equitable and that Congress shall “evolve a progressive system of
taxation”. Further, the Cooperative Union of the Philippines (CUP), argues that legislature was
to adopt a definite policy of granting tax exemption to cooperatives that the present Constitution
embodies provisions on cooperatives. To subject cooperatives to the VAT would, therefore, be
to infringe a constitutional policy.

Issue:
Whether or not, based on the aforementioned grounds of the petitioners, the Expanded Value-
Added Tax Law should be declared unconstitutional.

RULING:
No. With respect to the first contention, it would suffice to say that since the law granted the
press a privilege, the law could take back the privilege anytime without offense to the
Constitution. The reason is simple: by granting exemptions, the State does not forever waive the
exercise of its sovereign prerogative. Indeed, in withdrawing the exemption, the law merely
subjects the press to the same tax burden to which other businesses have long ago been
subject. The PPI asserts that it does not really matter that the law does not discriminate against
the press because “even nondiscriminatory taxation on constitutionally guaranteed freedom is
unconstitutional.” Anent the first contention of CREBA, it has been held in an early case that
even though such taxation may affect particular contracts, as it may increase the debt of one
person and lessen the security of another, or may impose additional burdens upon one class
and release the burdens of another, still the tax must be paid unless prohibited by the
Constitution, nor can it be said that it impairs the obligation of any existing contract in its true
legal sense. It is next pointed out that while Section 4 of R.A. No. 7716 exempts such
transactions as the sale of agricultural products, food items, petroleum, and medical and
veterinary services, it grants no exemption on the sale of real property which is equally
essential. The sale of food items, petroleum, medical and veterinary services, etc., which are
essential goods and services was already exempt under Section 103, pars. (b) (d) (1) of the
NIRC before the enactment of R.A. No. 7716. Petitioner is in error in claiming that R.A. No.
7716 granted exemption to these transactions while subjecting those of petitioner to the
payment of the VAT. Finally, it is contended that R.A. No. 7716 also violates Art. VI, Section
28(1) which provides that “The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress
shall evolve a progressive system of taxation”. Nevertheless, equality and uniformity of taxation
mean that all taxable articles or kinds of property of the same class be taxed at the same rate.
The taxing power has the authority to make reasonable and natural classifications for purposes
of taxation. To satisfy this requirement it is enough that the statute or ordinance applies equally
to all persons, firms, and corporations placed in similar situation. Furthermore, the Constitution
does not really prohibit the imposition of indirect taxes which, like the VAT, are regressive. What
it simply provides is that Congress shall “evolve a progressive system of taxation.” The
constitutional provision has been interpreted to mean simply that “direct taxes are . . . to be
preferred [and] as much as possible, indirect taxes should be minimized.”

Page 111 of 370

33. Guro Party-List v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 168056, September 1, 2005
Facts:
Petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List challenged the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9337
particularly Sections 4, 5 and 6, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the
National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). These questioned provisions contain a
uniform proviso authorizing the President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, to
raise the VAT rate to 12%, effective January 1, 2006, after any of the following conditions have
been satisfied, to wit:
That the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, shall,
effective January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-added tax to twelve percent (12%), after any of
the following conditions has been satisfied:
(i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous
year exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%); or
(ii) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and
one-half percent (1 ½%).
Petitioners argue that the law is unconstitutional, as it constitutes abandonment by
Congress of its exclusive authority to fix the rate of taxes under Article VI, Section 28(2) of the
1987 Philippine Constitution. They further argue that VAT is a tax levied on the sale or
exchange of goods and services and cannot be included within the purview of tariffs under the
exemption delegation since this refers to customs duties, tolls or tribute payable upon
merchandise to the government and usually imposed on imported/exported goods. They also
said that the President has powers to cause, influence or create the conditions provided by law
to bring about the conditions precedent. Moreover, they allege that no guiding standards are
made by law as to how the Secretary of Finance will make the recommendation. They claim,
nonetheless, that any recommendation of the Secretary of Finance can easily be brushed aside
by the President since the former is a mere alter ego of the latter, such that, ultimately, it is the
President who decides whether to impose the increased tax rate or not.
Issues:
Whether or not R.A. No. 9337 has violated the provisions in Article VI, Section 24, and
Article VI, Section 26 (2) of the Constitution.
Whether or not there was an undue delegation of legislative power in violation of Article
VI Sec 28 Par 1 and 2 of the Constitution.
Whether or not there was a violation of the due process and equal protection under
Article III Sec. 1 of the Constitution. 
Ruling:
Basing from the ruling of Tolentino case, it is not the law, but the revenue bill which is
required by the Constitution to “originate exclusively” in the House of Representatives, but
Senate has the power not only to propose amendments, but also to propose its own version
even with respect to bills which are required by the Constitution to originate in the House. the
Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills
authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come
from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the
members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems.
On the other hand, the senators, who are elected at large, are expected to approach the same
problems from the national perspective. Both views are thereby made to bear on the enactment
of such laws.
In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it
is usual to inquire whether the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left
the hands of the legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of any other appointee or
delegate of the legislature.
The equal protection clause under the Constitution means that “no person or class of
persons shall be deprived of the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or
other classes in the same place and in like circumstances,

Page 112 of 370

34. BRITISH AMERICAN TOBACCO v. JOSE ISIDRO N. CAMACHO, GR No. 163583, 2009-
04-15
Facts:
On August 20, 2008, the Court rendered a Decision partially granting the petition
PARTIALLY GRANTED and the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 61, in
Civil Case No. 03-1032, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION... petitioner insists that the assailed
provisions (1) violate the equal protection and uniformity of taxation clauses of the Constitution,
(2) contravene Section 19,[1] Article XII of the Constitution on unfair competition,... and (3)
infringe the constitutional provisions on regressive and inequitable taxation.
Petitioner further argues... entitled to a downward reclassification of Lucky Strike from
the premium-priced to the... high-priced tax bracket.
Congress was unequivocal in its unwillingness to... delegate the power to periodically
adjust the excise tax rate and tax brackets as well as to periodically resurvey and reclassify the
cigarette brands based on the increase in the consumer price index to the DOF and the BIR.
RA 9334 did not alter this classification freeze provision of RA 8240 the basis for the tax
classification of a new brand shall be the current net retail price and not the suggested gross
retail price.

Issues:
Whether or not the delegation of power is valid?

Ruling:
The classification freeze provision uniformly applies to all cigarette brands whether
existing or to be introduced in the market at some future time. It does not purport to exempt any
brand from its operation nor single out a brand for the purpose of imposition of excise taxes.
The argument lacks merit.
At any rate, even if we were to relax this rule, as previously stated, the evidence
presented before the trial court is insufficient to establish the alleged violation of the
constitutional proscription against unfair competition.

Page 113 of 370

35. Fabian v. Desierto, G.R. No. 129742, September 16, 1998

Facts: 
Petitioner Teresita G. Fabian was the major stockholder and president of PROMAT
Construction Development Corporation (PROMAT) which participated in the bidding for
government construction projects including those under the First Manila Engineering District
(FMED), and private respondent Nestor V. Agustin, incumbent District Engineer, reportedly
taking advantage of his official position, inveigled petitioner into an amorous relationship. After
misunderstandings and unpleasant incidents, Fabian eventually filed the aforementioned
administrative case against Agustin in a letter-complaint. The Graft Investigator of the
Ombudsman issued a resolution finding private respondent guilty of grave misconduct and
ordering his dismissal from the service with forfeiture of all benefits under the law. On a motion
for reconsideration, Agustin was exonerated of the administrative charges.
In the present appeal, petitioner argues that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770
(Ombudsman Act of 1989) pertinently provides that —
In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten
(10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the
motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Emphasis
supplied)
 
Issue#1: Can the Court resolve the constitutionality of Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 not
raised in the trial?
Held#1: YES.
Constitutional questions, not raised in the regular and orderly procedure in the trial are
ordinarily rejected unless the jurisdiction of the court below or that of the appellate court is
involved in which case it may be raised at any time or on the court’s own motion.  The Court ex
mero motu may take cognizance of lack of jurisdiction at any point in the case where that fact is
developed. The court has a clearly recognized right to determine its own jurisdiction in any
proceeding.
Issue#2:
Is Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 unconstitutional?
Held#2:
YES.
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to this Court
from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It
consequently violates the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law
which increases the appellate jurisdiction of this Court. No countervailing argument has been
cogently presented to justify such disregard of the constitutional prohibition which, as correctly
explained in First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. vs. The Court of Appeals, et al.  was intended to give
this Court a measure of control over cases placed under its appellate jurisdiction. Otherwise, the
indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily
burden the Court.
As a consequence of our ratiocination that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 should
be struck down as unconstitutional, and in line with the regulatory philosophy adopted in
appeals from quasi-judicial agencies in the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, appeals
from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be
taken to the Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43.

Page 114 of 370

36. First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110571, October 7, 1994
FACTS:
This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Second Division sustaining the
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over appeals from the decisions of the Board of Investments
and, consequently, dismissing the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioner.
ISSUE:
WON the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over appeals from the decisions of the Board
of Investments.
RULING:
Yes. The authority of the Court of Appeals to decide cases appealed to it by the BOI
must be deemed to have been conferred by B.P. Blg. 129, Sec. 9, to be exercised by it in
accordance with the procedure prescribed by Circular No. 1-91.

Page 115 of 370

37. Macalintal v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 157013, July 10, 2003

FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Romulo B. Macalintal, a member of the
Philippine Bar, seeking a declaration that certain provisions of Republic Act No. 9189 (The
Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) suffer from constitutional infirmity. Claiming that he has
actual and material legal interest in the subject matter of this case in seeing to it that public
funds are properly and lawfully used and appropriated, petitioner filed the instant petition as a
taxpayer and as a lawyer. Petitioner posits that Section 5(d) is unconstitutional because it
violates Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution which requires that the voter must be a
resident in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place where he proposes to vote for at
least six months immediately preceding an election. Petitioner cites the ruling of the Court in
Caasi vs. Court of Appeals to support his claim. In that case, the Court held that a green card
holder immigrant to the United States is deemed to have abandoned his domicile and residence
in the Philippines.Petitioner further argues that Section 1, Article V of the Constitution does not
allow provisional registration or a promise by a voter to perform a condition to be qualified to
vote in a political exercise; that the legislature should not be allowed to circumvent the
requirement of the Constitution on the right of suffrage by providing a condition thereon which in
effect amends or alters the aforesaid residence requirement to qualify a Filipino abroad to vote.
He claims that the right of suffrage should not be granted to anyone who, on the date of the
election, does not possess the qualifications provided for by Section 1, Article V of the
Constitution.

ISSUE:

Is RA 9189 [Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003], valid & constitutional?

RULING:

Contrary to petitioner’s claim that Section 5(d) circumvents the Constitution, Congress enacted
the law prescribing a system of overseas absentee voting in compliance with the constitutional
mandate. Such mandate expressly requires that Congress provide a system of absentee voting
that necessarily presupposes that the “qualified citizen of the Philippines abroad” is not
physically present in the country.

The petition was partly GRANTED. The following portions of R.A. No. 9189 are declared VOID
for being UNCONSTITUTIONAL:

a) The phrase in the first sentence of the first paragraph of Section 17.1, to wit: “subject to the
approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee;”
b) The portion of the last paragraph of Section 17.1, to wit: “only upon review and approval of
the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee;”
c) The second sentence of the first paragraph of Section 19, to wit: “The Implementing Rules
and Regulations shall be submitted to the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created by
virtue of this Act for prior approval;” and
d) The second sentence in the second paragraph of Section 25, to wit: “It shall review, revise,
amend and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Commission”
of the same law;
for being repugnant to Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution mandating the independence of
constitutional commission, such as COMELEC.

Pursuant to Section 30 of R.A. No. 9189, the rest of the provisions of said law continues to be in
full force and effect.

Page 116 of 370

 38. ABAKADA GURO PARTYLIST V PURISIMA (G.R. No. 166715 August 14, 2008)
FACTS: 
The petition for prohibition was filed to prevent respondents from implementing and
enforcing Republic Act (RA) 93352 (Attrition Act of 2005).RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the
revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the
Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees
to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the
creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation
Board (Board). It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six
months of service, regardless of employment status. Petitioners, invoking their right as
taxpayers filed this petition challenging the constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax reform legislation.
They contend that, by establishing a system of rewards and incentives, the law "transform[s] the
officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and bounty hunters" as they
will do their best only in consideration of such rewards. Thus, the system of rewards and
incentives invites corruption and undermines the constitutionally mandated duty of these
officials and employees to serve the people with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and
efficiency.Petitioners assert that the law unduly delegates the power to fix revenue targets to the
President as it lacks a sufficient standard on that matter. While Section 7(b) and (c) of RA 9335
provides that BIR and BOC officials may be dismissed from the service if their revenue
collections fall short of the target by at least 7.5%, the law does not, however, fix the revenue
targets to be achieved. Instead, the fixing of revenue targets has been delegated to the
President without sufficient standards. It will therefore be easy for the President to fix an
unrealistic and unattainable target in order to dismiss BIR or BOC personnel.
ISSUES: 
Whether or not the scope of the system of rewards and incentives limitation to officials and
employees of the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection
HELD: 
1. NO. The equal protection clause recognizes a valid classification, that is, a
classification that has a reasonable foundation or rational basis and not arbitrary.With respect to
RA 9335, its expressed public policy is the optimization of the revenue-generation capability and
collection of the BIR and the BOC. Since the subject of the law is the revenue- generation
capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC, the incentives and/or sanctions provided in the
law should logically pertain to the said agencies. Moreover, the law concerns only the BIR and
the BOC because they have the common distinct primary function of generating revenues for
the national government through the collection of taxes, customs duties, fees and charges. Both
the BIR and the BOC are bureaus under the DOF. They principally perform the special function
of being the instrumentality through which the State exercises one of its great inherent
functions–taxation. Indubitably, such substantial distinction is germane and intimately related to
the purpose of the law. Hence, the classification and treatment accorded to the BIR and the
BOC under RA 9335 fully satisfy the demands of equal protection. 2.No. RA 9335 adequately
states the policy and standards to guide the President in fixing revenue targets and the
implementing agencies in carrying out the provisions of the law under Sec 2 and 4 of the said
Act.Moreover, the Court has recognized the following as sufficient standards: “public interest,”
“justice and equity,” “public convenience and welfare” and “simplicity, economy and welfare.”33
In this case, the declared policy of optimization of the revenue-generation capability and
collection of the BIR and the BOC is infused with public interest. 3.The court declined
jurisdiction on this case. The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee in RA 9335 was created
for the purpose of approving the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) formulated by the
DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC. On May 22, 2006, it approved the said IRR. From then
on, it became functus officio and ceased to exist. Hence, the issue of its alleged encroachment
on the executive function of implementing and enforcing the law may be considered moot and
academic. 

Page 117 of 370

39. Belgica v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013
FACTS:
The so-called pork barrel system has been around in the Philippines since about 1922.Pork
Barrel is commonly known as the lump-sum, discretionary funds of the members ofthe
Congress. It underwent several legal designations from “Congressional Pork Barrel ”to thelatest
“Priority Development Assistance Fund ” or PDAF. The allocation for the porkbarrel is integrated
in the annualGeneral Appropriations Act (GAA).Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has
been done in the following manner:
a.P70 million: for each member of the lower house; broken down to – P40 million for “hard
projects” (infrastructure projects like roads, buildings, schools, etc.), and P30million for “soft
projects ” (scholarship grants, medical assistance, livelihood programs, IT
development, etc.)L
b.P200 million: for each senator; broken down to –P100 million for hard projects,P100 million for
soft projects;
c.P200 million: for the Vice-President; broken down to – P100 million for hard projects,P100
million for soft projects.
The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide forrealignment of funds whereby certaincabinet
members may request for the realignment of funds into their departmentprovided that the
request for realignment is approved or concurred by the legislatorconcerned.
ISSUES:
1.       Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws
similar thereto are unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional
provisions on (a) separation of powers; (b) non-delegability of legislative power; (c) checks and
balances; (d) accountability; (e) political dynasties; and (f) local autonomy.
2.       Whether or not the phrases (under Section 8 of PD 910,116 relating to the Malampaya
Funds, and under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, relating to the Presidential
Social Fund, are unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue delegations of legislative
power.
HELD:
1.       Yes, the PDAF article is unconstitutional. The post-enactment measures which govern the
areas of project identification, fund release and fund realignment are not related to functions of
congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that
properly belong to the sphere of budget execution. This violates the principle of separation of
powers. Congress‘role must be confined to mere oversight that must be confined to:  (1)
scrutiny and (2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws. Any action or step
beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the constitution.
Thus, the court declares the 2013 pdaf article as well as all other provisions of law which
similarly allow legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation or
enforcement of the budget, unrelated to congressional oversight, as violative of the separation
of powers principle and thus unconstitutional.
2.       Yes. Sec 8 of PD 910- the phrase “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter
directed by the President”‖ constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it
does not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the President‘s
authority with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. It gives the
President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct and,
in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law.”

Page 118 of 370

40. Abakada Guro Party List Officers v. Ermita, G.R. No. 168056, September 1, 2005
Facts:
Petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List challenged the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9337
particularly Sections 4, 5 and 6, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the
National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). These questioned provisions contain a
uniform proviso authorizing the President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, to
raise the VAT rate to 12%, effective January 1, 2006, after any of the following conditions have
been satisfied, to wit:
That the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, shall,
effective January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-added tax to twelve percent (12%), after any of
the following conditions has been satisfied:
(i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous
year exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%); or
(ii) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and
one-half percent (1 ½%). Petitioners argue that the law is unconstitutional, as it constitutes
abandonment by Congress of its exclusive authority to fix the rate of taxes under Article VI,
Section 28(2) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. They further argue that VAT is a tax levied on
the sale or exchange of goods and services and cannot be included within the purview of tariffs
under the exemption delegation since this refers to customs duties, tolls or tribute payable upon
merchandise to the government and usually imposed on imported/exported goods. They also
said that the President has powers to cause, influence or create the conditions provided by law
to bring about the conditions precedent. Moreover, they allege that no guiding standards are
made by law as to how the Secretary of Finance will make the recommendation. They claim,
nonetheless, that any recommendation of the Secretary of Finance can easily be brushed aside
by the President since the former is a mere alter ego of the latter, such that, ultimately, it is the
President who decides whether to impose the increased tax rate or not.
 
Issues:
Whether or not R.A. No. 9337 has violated the provisions in Article VI, Section 24, and
Article VI, Section 26 (2) of the Constitution.
Whether or not there was an undue delegation of legislative power in violation of Article
VI Sec 28 Par 1 and 2 of the Constitution.
 
Ruling:
R.A. No. 9337 has not violated the provisions. The revenue bill exclusively originated in
the House of Representatives, the Senate was acting within its constitutional power to introduce
amendments to the House bill when it included provisions in Senate Bill No. 1950 amending
corporate income taxes, percentage, excise and franchise taxes. Verily, Article VI, Section 24 of
the Constitution does not contain any prohibition or limitation on the extent of the amendments
that may be introduced by the Senate to the House revenue bill.
There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the
execution of a law. This is constitutionally permissible. Congress does not abdicate its functions
or unduly delegate power when it describes what job must be done, who must do it, and what is
the scope of his authority; in our complex economy that is frequently the only way in which the
legislative process can go forward.

Page 119 of 370

41. Vivas v. The Monetary Board of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, G.R. No. 191414,
August 7, 2013.
Facts:
Petitioner Vivas and his principals acquired the controlling interest in Rural Bank Faire, a
bank whose corporate life has already expired. BSP authorized extending the banks’ corporate
life and was later renamed to EuroCredit Community Bank (ECBI). Through a series of
examinations conducted by the BSP, the findings bore that ECBI was illiquid, insolvent, and was
performing transactions which are considered unsafe and unsound banking practices.
Consequently ECBI was placed under receivership. Petitioner contends that the implementation
of the questioned resolution was tainted with arbitrariness and bad faith, stressing that ECBI
was placed under receivership without due and prior hearing in violation of his and the bank’s
right to due process.
Issue:
Whether or not ECBI was entitled to due and prior hearing before its being placed under
receivership.
Ruling: 
YES.
In the case of Bangko Sentral Ng Pilipinas Monetary Board v. Hon. Antonio-Valenzuela,
the Court reiterated the doctrine of “close now, hear later,” stating that it was justified as a
measure for the protection of the public interest. Thus:
The “close now, hear later” doctrine has already been justified as a measure for the
protection of the public interest. Swift action is called for on the part of the BSP when it finds that
a bank is in dire straits. Unless adequate and determined efforts are taken by the government
against distressed and mismanaged banks, public faith in the banking system is certain to
deteriorate to the prejudice of the national economy itself, not to mention the losses suffered by
the bank depositors, creditors, and stockholders, who all deserve the protection of the
government.
In Rural Bank of Buhi, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the Court also wrote that
x x x due process does not necessarily require a prior hearing; a hearing or an opportunity to be
heard may be subsequent to the closure. One can just imagine the dire consequences of a prior
hearing: bank runs would be the order of the day, resulting in panic and hysteria. In the process,
fortunes may be wiped out and disillusionment will run the gamut of the entire banking
community.
The doctrine is founded on practical and legal considerations to obviate unwarranted
dissipation of the bank’s assets and as a valid exercise of police power to protect the
depositors, creditors, stockholders, and the general public. Swift, adequate and determined
actions must be taken against financially distressed and mismanaged banks by government
agencies lest the public faith in the banking system deteriorate to the prejudice of the national
economy.

Page 120 of 370

Francisco v. Toll Regulatory Board
G.R. No. 166910
October 19, 2010

Facts:
DPWH, TRB, PNCC, Benpres Holdings Corp. and First Philippine Holding Corp.
executed on MOV to open the door for rehabilitation, expansion and extension over: (1) South
Metro Manila Skyway project; (2) NLEX expansion program; (3) SLEX project. The MOV made
way for several supplemental toll operators agreements. The TRB and the PNCC some of the
provisions in the STOA are clause 11.7 and 8.08 (2) and (3). The clauses stated that TRB must
compensate the MNTC for issues due to non-implementation of toll fee adjustments if it is not
the fault of the operator. Petitioners, Francisco et.al. lodged a complaint before the JC
regarding the constitutionality of the STOA's entered into by TRB.
Issue:
Whether or not can TRB constitutionally warrant to compensate MNTC with revenue
resulting from the non-implementation of the toll fee adjustments?
Ruling:
No. The clause 11.7 and 8.08 (2) and (3) are declared unconstitutional because it is
simple disadvantageous to the government. The following reasons are the basis for the
decision: (1) PD 112 expressly prohibits the guarantee of a security in the financing of the toll
operator pursuant to its toll way project. (2) Article VI, Section 29 (1) of the constitution
mandates that there must be a law passed by congress before public money can be used for
purposes other than general public purpose.

Page 121 of 370

Equi-Asia Placement Inc. v. Department of Foreign Affairs,
G.R. No. 152214, September 19, 2006
Facts:
On September 2000, Manny dela Rosa Razon, a native of Lemery, Batangas and an
overseas Filipino worker, died of acute cardiac arrest while asleep (bangungot) at the dormitory
of the Samsong Textile Processing Factory in South Korea. Informed thereof, the Philippine
Overseas Labor Office (POLO) at South Korea immediately relayed the incident to the
Philippine Embassy in South Korea. Forthwith, the [Labor] Attaché of the Philippine Embassy
dispatched a letter to Eleuterio Gardiner, administrator of the Overseas Workers Welfare
Administration (OWWA), telling him about what happened and to inform the relatives of Razon.
In turn, the OWWA indorsed the matter, for appropriate action, to Director R. Casco of the
Welfare Employment Office of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (WEO-
POEA). Upon verification by the WEO-POEA on its data base, it was discovered that Manny
Razon was recruited and deployed by Equi-Asia Placement, and was sent to South Korea in
April 2000 to work-train at Yeongjin Machinery, Inc. CA rendered a Decision dismissing the
petition.CA stated that petitioner was mainly accusing the POEA of grave abuse of discretion
when it ordered petitioner to pay, in advance, the costs for the repatriation of the remains of
Razon.

Issue:
Whether or not CA erred in dismissing the petition

Ruling:
No. The repatriation of the worker, or his/her remains, and the transport of his/her
personal effects shall be the primary responsibility of the principal or agency which recruited or
deployed him/her abroad. All costs attendant thereto shall be borne by the principal or the
agency concerned. Every contract for overseas employment shall provide for the primary
responsibility of agency to advance the cost of plane fare, and the obligation of the worker to
refund the cost thereof in case his/her fault is determined by the Labor Arbiter.
Petitioner's argument that Section 15 does not provide that it shall be primarily
responsible for the repatriation of a deceased OFW is specious and plain nitpicking. While
Republic Act No. 8042 does not expressly state that petitioner shall be primarily obligated to
transport back here to the Philippines the remains of Razon, nevertheless, such duty is
imposed upon him as the statute clearly dictates that "the repatriation of remains and transport
of the personal belongings of a deceased worker and all costs attendant thereto shall be borne
by the principal and/or the local agency." The mandatory nature of said obligation is
characterized by the legislature's use of the word "shall." That the concerned government
agencies opted to demand the performance of said responsibility solely upon petitioner does
not make said directives invalid as the law plainly obliges a local placement agency to bear the
burden of repatriating the remains of a deceased OFW with or without recourse to the principal
abroad.

Page 122 of 370

Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Torres
G.R. No. 101279
August 6, 1992
Facts:
DOLE Dept. Order No. 16 temporarily suspends the recruitment by private employment
agencies of Filipino DH going to Hong Kong in view of the need to establish mechanisms that
will enhance the protection for the same.
The DOLE, through POEA took over the business of deploying such HK-bound workers.
Pursuant to the above order, POEA issued memorandum circular no. 30 providing guidelines on
the government processing and deployment of Filipino domestic helpers to HK and the
accreditation of HK recruitment agencies intending to hire Filipino domestic helpers, and the
memorandum circular No. 30, pertaining to the processing of employment contracts of domestic
workers for HK.
Petitioner contends that respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in
excess of their rule-making authority in issuing said circulars.
Issue:
WON the take-over of the business deploying DH to HK by DOLE and POEA through an
administrative order and circular is valid

Held:
Yes. Article 36 of the Labor Code grants the Labor Secretary the power to restrict and
regulate recruitment and placement activities. The challenge administrative issuance discloses
that the same fall within the administrative and police powers expressly or by necessary
implication conferred upon the respondents.

Page 123 of 370

Republic of the Philippines v. Drugmaker’s Laboratories, Inc.,
G.R. No. 190837
March 5, 2014
Facts: 
The FDA was created pursuant to RA 3720, otherwise known as the “Food, Drug and
Cosmetics Act” primarily in order to establish safety or efficacy standards and quality measure
of foods, drugs and devices and cosmetics products. On March 15, 1989, the Department of
Health, thru then Secretary Alfredo RA Bengzon issued AO 67 s. 1989, entitled Revised Rules
and Regulations on Registration of Pharmaceutical products. Among others, it required drug
manufacturers to register certain drug and medicine products with FDA before they may release
the same to the market for sale. In this relation, a satisfactory bioavailability/bioequivalence
(BA/BE) test is needed for a manufacturer to secure a CPR for these products. However, the
implementation of the BA/BE testing requirement was put on hold because there was no local
facility capable of conducting the same. The issuance of circulars no. 1 s. of 1997 resumed the
FDA’s implementation of the BA/BE testing requirement with the establishment of BA/BE testing
facilities in the country. Thereafter, the FDA issued circular no. 8 s. of 1997 which provided
additional implementation details concerning the BA/BE testing requirement on drug products.

Issue: Whether or not the circular issued by FDA are valid.

Held: Yes. Administrative agencies may exercise quasi-legislative or rule-making power only if

there exist a law which delegates these powers to them. Accordingly, the rules so promulgated
must be within the confines of the granting statutes and must not involve discretion as to what
the law shall be, but merely the authority to fix the details in the execution or enforcement of the
policy set out in the law itself, so as to conform with the doctrine of separation of powers and as
an adjunct, the doctrine of non-delegability of legislative powers.

An administrative regulation may be classified as a legislative rule, an interpretative rule

or a contingent rule. Legislative rules are in the nature of subordinate legislation a designed to
implement a primary legislation by providing the details thereof. Finally, contingent rules are
those issued by an administrative authority based on the existence of certain facts or things
upon which the enforcement of the law depends.
In general, an administrative regulation needs to comply with the requirements laid down by EO
292 s. of 1988 otherwise known as the administrative code of 1987 on prior notice, hearing and
publication in order to be valid and binding except when the same is merely an interpretative
rule. This is because when an administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature its
applicability needs nothing further than its bare issuance, for it gives no real consequence more
than what the law itself has already prescribed.

On the other hand, circulars no. 1 and 8 s. of 1997 cannot be considered as

administrative regulations because they do not: a.) implement a primary legislation by providing
the details thereof; b.) Interpret, clarify or explain existing statutory regulation under which FDA
operates and/or; c.) Ascertain the existence of certain facts or things upon which the
enforcement of RA 3720 depends. In fact, the only purpose of these is for FDA to administer
and supervise the implementation of the provisions of AO 67 s. of 1989 including those covering
the BA/BE testing requirement consistent with and pursuant to RA 3720. Therefore, the FDA
has sufficient authority to issue the said circulars and since they would not affect the substantive
rights of the parties that they seek to govern – as they are not, strictly speaking, administrative
regulations in the first place – no prior hearing, consultation and publication are needed for their
validity.

Page 124 of 370

Balmaceda v. Corominas & Company, Inc.,
G.R. No. L-21971
September 5, 1975
Facts:
Respondent exported to Japan 20,000 metric tons of Rhodesian corn, valued at US$
1,575,100, under a barter permit issued pursuant to Sec. 1 (d), Republic Act 1410 ("straight
barter system"). The permit authorized respondent to import into the Philippines commodities
with like value, but was encumbered by the limitation set forth in Sec. 5, par B(1) of the
Consolidated Rules and Regulations of the defunct No-Dollar Import Office, "that is no case
shall non-essentials be more that 10% of the total imports." After the Japanese buyer
commenced to pay the goods in U.S. dollars, but before he could complete the payment, the
Japanese government refused him further remittance of dollars but allowed him to pay in
commodities the balance of US$485,030.33. On request of respondent, the then Acting
Undersecretary of Commerce and Industry granted the importation of goods up to the collectible
balance of US$485,030.33, subject to the percentages provided under the permit. After the
respondent had imported US$103,233.44 worth of non-essentials. it was informed that said
importation exceeded 10% of the authorized total imports of US$485,030.00.

Hence, respondent instituted a complaint to compel the Secretary of Commerce and Industry to
release the imported goods. The lower court found for respondent and ordered the Secretary to
issue the corresponding release certificates, which order was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Issue:
Whether or not rules issue by administrative authorities to implement stature have the
force of law

Ruling:
The Supreme Court reversed the appealed judgment and held that the percentage
provided under the permit should be based not on the extensive permit value of $1,575,100,
which was not actually imported, but on the value of the goods actually imported which is
$485,030.33. Respondent’s excess importation of "non-essential items" was declared illegal and
liable for confiscation by the Government pursuant to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 1410.
A "rule (or a ‘regulation’ — a term used interchangeably with ‘rule’) is the product of rule
making, and rule making is the part of the administrative process that resembles a legislature’s
enactment of a statute." In this jurisdiction, administrative authorities are vested with the power
to promulgate rules and regulation to implement a given statute and to effectuate its policies and
when promulgated, such administrative rules and regulations become laws.

Page 125 of 370

Macailing v. Andrada
G.R. No. L-21607
January 30, 1970
FACTS:
A dispute over four (4) parcels of land in Lebak, Cotabato, arose between plaintiffs,
settlers thereon occupying four hectares each, and Salvador Andrada, sales applicant of a
bigger parcel, which includes the lands occupied by plaintiffs. The District Land Officer of
Cotabato decided in plaintiffs' favor. The Director of Lands, however, reversed, declared that the
portions adjudged to the four plaintiffs shall be restored to the heirs (of Salvador Andrada) who
should include them proportionately in the new application to be filed by them respectively.
The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, on October 27, 1956, reversed the
Director of Lands by awarding to plaintiffs the lands they claimed. Defendants sought
reconsideration. On May 30, 1957, the Secretary denied. Defendants moved once more to
reconsider. On September 12, 1957, the Secretary rejected the reconsideration. The Secretary
ruled that the Office has no more jurisdiction to entertain the said motion. The Secretary
categorically stated that the case was considered a closed matter insofar as this Office is
concerned.
On October 23, 1957, defendants appealed to the Office of the President. Assistant
Executive Secretary Enrique C. Quema, by authority of the President reversed the decision of
the Secretary and declared that the lands involved should be restored to the heirs of Andrada to
be included in their individual applications.
Plaintiffs started the present suit in the Cotabato court. They raised the issue of finality of
the decision of the Secretary.
Defendants appealed direct to this Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the Office of the President was valid despite the finality
of the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
RULING:
No. In the matter of judicial review of administrative decisions, some statutes especially
provide for such judicial review; others are silent. Mere silence, however, does not necessarily
imply that judicial review is unavailable. Modes of judicial review vary according to the statutes;
appeal, petition for review or a writ of certiorari. No general rule applies to all the various
administrative agencies. Where the law stands mute, the accepted view is that the extraordinary
remedies in the Rules of Court are still available. Therefore, the plaintiffs' appropriate remedy is
certiorari, not an ordinary civil action.
Although in injunctive or prohibitory writs, courts must have jurisdiction over the
Corporation, Board, Officer or person whose acts are in question and not the jurisdiction over
the SM of the case, the doctrines invoked in support of the theory of non-jurisdiction are
inapplicable. Here the sole point in issue is whether the decision of the respondent public
officers was legally correct or not, and, without going into the merits of the case, we see no
cogent reason why this power of judicial review should be confined to the courts of first instance
of the locality where the offices of respondents are maintained, to the exclusion of the courts of
first instance in those localities where the plaintiffs reside, and where the questioned decisions
are being enforced."

Page 126 of 370

Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. The Office of the Presidential Assistant for Legal Affairs G.R.
No. 73705, August 27, 1987
FACTS:

On April 28, 1981, the Iloilo Port Manager of Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) wrote
Victorias Milling requiring it to (1) have its tugboats and barges undergo harbor formalities, (2)
pay entrance/clearance fees as well as berthing fees effective May 1, 1981, (3) secure a permit
for cargo handling operations at its Da-an Banua wharf, and (4) remit 10% of its gross income
for said operations as the government's share.

To these demands, Victorias Milling sent two letters wherein it maintained that it was
exempt from paying PPA any fee or charge because: (1) the wharf and its facilities were built
and installed in its land; (2) repair and maintenance thereof were solely paid by it; (3) even the
dredging and maintenance of the Malijao River Channel from Guimaras Strait up to said private
wharf were being done by its equipment and personnel; (4) at no time had the government ever
spent a single centavo for such activities; and (5) the wharf was being used mainly to handle
sugar purchased from district planters pursuant to existing milling agreements.

Victorias Milling filed a petition before the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) but it was
dismissed on the ground that it had no jurisdiction. The CTA recommended that the appeal be
addressed to the Office of the President (OP). Victorias Milling elevated the case to the
Supreme Court (SC) but it was likewise denied. Thereafter, it appealed to the OP but it was
denied on the ground that the appeal was filed beyond the reglementary period. Hence, the
instant petition.

Victorias Milling maintained and submitted that there was no basis for the PPA to assess
and impose the dues and charges it was collecting since the wharf was private, constructed and
maintained at no expense to the government, and that it existed primarily so that its tugboats
and barges would ferry the sugarcane of its Panay planters.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the requirement to remit 10% of its gross income for its arrastre and
stevedoring operations is valid

RULING:

Yes. The requirement to remit 10% of its gross income for its arrastre and stevedoring
operations is valid.

 Section 6B-(ix) of the Presidential Decree No. 857 authorized the PPA "To levy dues,
rates, or charges for the use of the premises, works, appliances, facilities, or for services
provided by or belonging to the Authority, or any organization concerned with port operations."
This 10% government share of earnings of arrastre and stevedoring operators is in the nature of
contractual compensation to which a person desiring to operate arrastre service must agree as
a condition to the grant of the permit to operate.

As correctly stated by the Solicitor General, the fees and charges PPA collects are not
for the use of the wharf that petitioner owns but for the privilege of navigating in public waters, of
entering and leaving public harbors and berthing on public streams or waters.

Page 127 of 370

Cawad v. Abad
G.R. No. 207145
July 28, 2015
Facts:
On March 26, 1992, RA 7305, aka The Magna Carta of Public Health Workers was
signed into law. On September 3, 2012, the respondents DBM and CSC issued DBM-CSC Joint
Circular No. 1, Series of 2012, to prescribe rules on the grant of Step Increments. The joint
circular provided that “an official or employee authorized to be granted longevity pay under an
existing law is not eligible for the grant of Step Increment due to length of service.” Then on
November 29, 2012, DBM and DOH issued DBM-DOH Joint Circular No. 1 Series of 2012,
which provided for the definition of hazard pay and that it may only be granted to public health
workers (PHWs) if the nature of their duties and responsibilities actually expose them to danger.
It also stated that the longevity pay should be granted only when the following criteria are met:
a. The PHW holds a position in the agency plantilla of regular positions; and
b. He/She has rendered at least satisfactory performance and has not been found guilty of any
administrative or criminal case within all rating periods covered by the 5-year period. In short,
the joint circulars diminished and limited the benefits granted by the Magna Carta to PHWs.
According to Section 35 of RA 7305, the rules and regulations implementing the
provisions of the act should take effect only after thirty days after publication in a newspaper of
general circulation. The DBM-DOH joint circular was made effective on January 1, 2013, just
three days after it was published in a newspaper of general circulation on December 29, 2012.
Issue:
Whether or not the joint circular valid despite it not meeting the publication requirement of RA
7305?
Ruling:
Yes. The joint circular did not modify, amend, or supplant the revised IRR. It gave no real
consequences to what the law itself has already prescribed. As an exception to the rule on
publication, interpretative regulations which “need nothing further than their bare issuance for
they give no real consequence more than what the law itself already prescribed” need not be
published. These kinds of regulations do not need to be published to be effective since they do
not add anything to the law and do not affect substantial rights of any person.

Page 128 of 370

Land Bank of the Philippines v. Obias, G.R. No. 184406, March 14, 2012

FACTS: Pursuant to the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) Program of P.D. No. 27, an aggregate
area of 34.6958 hectares composing three parcels of agricultural land located at Himaao, Pili,
Camarines Sur owned by Perfecto, Nellie, OFe, Gil, Edmundo and Nelly, all surnamed Obias,
(landowners) were distributed to the farmers-beneficiaries namely: Victor Bagasina, Sr., Elena
Benosa, Sergio Nagrampa, Claudio Galon, Prudencio Benosa, Santos Parro, Guillermo
Breboneria, Flora Villamer, Felipe de Jesus, Mariano Esta, Benjamin Bagasina, Andres Tagum,
Pedro Galon, Clara Padua, Rodolfo Competente, Roberto Parro, Melchor Brandes, Antonio
Buizon, Rogelio Montero, Maria Villamer, Claudio Resari, Victor Bagasina, Jr., Francisco
Montero and Pedro Montero. As a result, the owners had to be paid just compensation for the
property taken. The Department of Agrarian Reform, using the formula under P.D. 27 and E.O.
228, came up with a computation of the value of the acquired property atP1,
397,578.72.However, the amount was contested by the landowners as an inadequate
compensation for the land. Thus, they filed a complaint for determination of just compensation
before the RTC of Naga City, as the assigned Special Agrarian Court (SAC). To ascertain the
amount of just compensation, a committee was formed by the trial court.The Provincial
Assessor recommended the above average value ofP40,065.31 per hectare as just
compensation;LBP Representative Edgardo Malazarte recommended the amount
ofP38,533.577 per hectare; andthe representative of the landowners, Atty. Fe Rosario P.
Buevasubmitted aP180,000.00 per hectare valuation of the land.
However, none of these recommendations was adopted in the 3 October 2000 judgment of the
trial court in fixing the just compensation at (P91,657.50) per hectare or in the total amount of
P3,180,130.29. thus, directing the LBP to pay the said amount.Both the landowners and LBP
appealed before the CA. On 31 January 2008, the appellate court vacated the decision of the
trial court. It relied heavily on the Gabatin v. Land Bank of the Philippines (G.R. No. 148223, 25
November 2004) ruling wherein the Court fixed the rate of the government support price (GSP)
for one cavan of palay at P35.00, the price of the palay at the time of the taking of the land.
Following the formula,Land Value= 2.5 multiplied by the Average Gross Production (AGP)
multiplied by the Government Support Price (GSP),provided by P.D. No. 27 and E.O. 228, the
value of the total area taken will beP371,015.20 plus interest thereon at the rate of 6% interest
per annum, compounded annually, starting 21 October 1972,until fully paid.

ISSUE: Did the CA err in ruling that the payment of interest shall be made until full payment of
compensation?

HELD: It is correct that rules and regulations issued by administrative bodies to interpret the law
which they are entrusted to enforce, have the force of law, and are entitled to great respect.
Administrative issuances partake of the nature of a statuteand have in their favor a presumption
of legality.And a literal reading of A.O. No. 13, as amended, will be in favor of the LBP.
However, these administrative issuances or orders, though they enjoy the presumption of
legalities, are still subject to the interpretation by the Supreme Court pursuant to its power to
interpret the law. While rules and regulation issued by the administrative bodies have the force
and effect of law and are entitled to great respect, courts interpret administrative regulations in
harmony with the law that authorized them and avoid as much as possible any construction that
would annul them as invalid exercise of legislative power. Further, the deliberations of the 1986
Constitutional Commission on this subject reveal that just compensation should not do violence
to the Bill of Rights, but should also not make an insurmountable obstacle to a successful
agrarian reform program. Hence, the landowner's right to just compensation should be balanced
with agrarian reform. The mandate of determination of just compensation is a judicial function.
Hence, the Court will exert all efforts to consider and interpret all the applicable laws and
issuances in order to balance the right of the farmers to own a land subject to the award the
proper and just compensation due to the landowners. The decision of the Court of Appeals is
affirmed,

Page 129 of 370

Philippine International Trading Corporation v. Commission on Audit
G.R. No. 152688, November 19, 2003

FACTS:

In accordance with DO 79 of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) then Secretary
Jose Trinidad Pardo granted, subject to the availability of savings of the respective
bureaus/offices/GOCCs, a Staple Food Incentive (SFI) in the maximum amount of 7.2k each to
the officials and employees of DTI bureaus, attached agencies and government owned and
controlled corporations (GOCCs), in accordance with Rule 10 of the Omnibus Civil Service
Rules. D.O. No. 79 further provided that in case of disallowance, the employee shall refund the
incentive through salary deduction. Consequently, PITC released the total amount of 1.094M as
SFI for the year 1998, pursuant to the department order, in favor of its employees.
On April 29, 1999, the Resident Auditor of PITC issued a Notice of Suspension
disallowing the grant of the SFI and requiring the PITC to submit the approval of such grant by
the Department of Budget and Management, in accordance with Section 12 of RA 6758, or the
Salary Standardization Law. PITC appealed to the Director, Corporate Audit Office II, who
sustained the disallowance of the SFI. PITC elevated the matter to the COA which affirmed the
questioned disallowance because the grant of SFI by PITC was an illegal disbursement of
public funds under Section 12 of R.A. No. 6758.
Hence, PITC filed the instant petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether the nullity of the IRR issued by DBM affects the validity of the statutory law

HELD:
NO. There is no merit in the claim of PITC that R.A. No. 6758, particularly Section 12
thereof is void because DBM-Corporate Compensation Circular No. 10, its implementing rules,
was nullified in the case of De Jesus v. Commission on Audit, for lack of publication. The basis
of COA in disallowing the grant of SFI was Section 12 of R.A. No. 6758 and not DBM-CCC No.
10. Moreover, the nullity of DBM-CCC No. 10, will not affect the validity of R.A. No. 6758. It is a
cardinal rule in statutory construction that statutory provisions control the rules and regulations
which may be issued pursuant thereto. Such rules and regulations must be consistent with and
must not defeat the purpose of the statute. The validity of

R.A. No. 6758 should not be made to depend on the validity of its implementing rules.
Notwithstanding the validity of the disallowance by the COA, however, the officers and
employees of PITC cannot be obliged to refund the SFI received by them in good faith.

Page 130 of 370

United BF Homeowner’s Association and Home Insurance and Guaranty Corporation v.
BF Homes, Inc., G.R. No. 124873, July 14, 1999
Facts:
In 1988 because of financial difficulties, the Securities and Exchange Commission place
respondent under receivership to undergo a 10 year rehabilitation program appointing Atty.
Orendain as receiver. Preliminary to the rehabilitation, Atty. Orendain entered in to tripartite
agreement with the BF Parañaque Homes Owners Association and the Confideration Homes
Owners Association which resulted in the creation of the united home owners association and
was registered with the Home insurance guaranty corporation. Respondent through its receiver
turn over to the petitioner the administration and operation of the subdivision club house at 37
Pilar street and a strip of open space in Concha Cruz garden row. On 1994, the first receiver
was relief and a new committee of receivers was appointed and based on the Bfi’s title on the
main road, the newly appointed committee of receivers sent a letter to the different Home
owners association informing them that they are now responsible for the security of the
subdivision as a basic requirements for its rehabilitation. Petitioner filed a petition for mandamus
with a preliminary injunction with the Higc against the respondent who issue a temporary
restraining order enjoining the respondent from taking over the clubhouse at 37 Pilar street.
Respondent filed a petition for prohibition for the issuance of the temporary restraining order.
Before the Court of Appeals who grant the petition and all denied the motion for reconsideration
of the petitioner. Petitioner filed a petition for certitorari before the supreme court.
Issue:
Whether or not, the Higc was correct in promulgating the rules of procedure in the
settlements of the home owner’s dispute.
Ruling:
According to the Supreme Court, the Home insurance guaranty corporation went beyond
its authority as provided for by the law when it promulgated the revised rules of procedure
because an administrative agency cannot amend an act of congress. So the Supreme Court
denied the petition for certiorari.

Page 131 of 370

Granger Associates v. Microwave Systems, Inc.
G.R. No. 79987, September 14, 1990
FACTS:
Granger Associates is a foreign corporation which was organized in the United States
and has no license to do business in this country.   Microwave Systems, Inc., is a domestic
corporation which has been sued for recovery of a sum equivalent to US$900,633.30 allegedly
due from it to the petitioner.
The claim arose from a series of agreements concluded between the two parties, giving
MSI the license to manufacture and sell its products in the Philippines and extended to the latter
certain loans, equipment and parts.  Payment of these contracts not having been made as
agreed upon, Granger filed a complaint against MSI and the other private respondents in the
Regional Trial Court.
MSI alleged the affirmative defense that the plaintiff had no capacity to sue, being an
unlicensed foreign corporation, and moved to dismiss.
Motion to dismiss was granted by RTC which was affirmed by the CA.
In this petition, Granger seeks the reversal of the respondent court on the ground that
MSI has failed to prove its affirmative allegation that Granger was transacting business in the
Philippines

ISSUE:

Whether or not Granger Associates was doing business in the Philippines

RULING:

YES.  It can be shown that the parties entered into a series of agreements, as in
successive sales of the foreign company's regular products, that company shall be deemed as
doing business in the Philippines. The quoted stipulations show that Granger had extended its
personality in the Philippines and would receive orders for its products and discharge its
warranty obligations through the agency of MSI It would even appear that Granger intended to
transact business in the Philippines through the instrumentality of MSI not only for the sale and
warranty of its products in this country.
The purpose of the rule requiring foreign corporations to secure a license to do business
in the Philippines is to enable us to exercise jurisdiction over them for the regulation of their
activities in this country, If a foreign corporation operates in the Philippines without submitting to
our laws, it is only just that it not be allowed to invoke them in our courts when it should need
them later for its own protection. While foreign investors are always welcome in this land to
collaborate with us for our mutual benefit, they must be prepared as an indispensable condition
to respect and be bound by Philippine law in proper cases, as in the one at bar.

Page 132 of 370

Villegas v. Subido, G.R. No. L-26534, November 28, 1969

FACTS:
Commissioner directed that petitioners Barbers, Paralejas and Lazaro be replaced as
station commanders of the three police precincts of Manila as their continued employment as
such was illegal, the eligibility required being that of an inspector first class, allegedly not
possessed by them.
Mayor: to disregard said directive, it being in excess of the authority vested in [the Civil
Service] Commission." As noted in such communication: "This Office is not aware of any
provision of law requiring that Precinct or Station Commanders should be at least a Police or
Detective Major or an Inspector First Class. Paragraph 4, Section 23 of Republic Act No. 2260,
ISSUE: Can the CSC direct the mayor
HELD:
No ,The reliance of then respondent Commissioner was not on any law or rule but
simply on his own concept of what policy to pursue, in this instance in accordance with his own
personal predilection. Here he appeared to be unalterably convinced that to allow women
laborers to work outside their offices as street sweepers would run counter to Filipino tradition.
A public official must be able to point to a particular provision of law or rule justifying the
exercise of a challenged authority. Nothing is better settled in the law than that a public official
exercises power, not rights. The government itself is merely an agency through which the will of
the state is expressed and enforced. Its officers therefore are likewise agents entrusted with the
responsibility of discharging its functions. As such there is no presumption that they are
empowered to act. There must be a delegation of such authority, either express or implied. In
the absence of a valid grant, they are devoid of power. What they do suffers from a fatal
infirmity. That principle cannot be sufficiently stressed. In the appropriate language of Chief
Justice Hughes: ‘It must be conceded that departmental zeal may not be permitted to outrun the
authority conferred by statute.’ Neither the high dignity of the office nor the righteousness of the
motive then is an acceptable substitute. Otherwise the rule of law becomes a myth. Such an
eventuality, we must take all pains to avoid.
The question, to repeat, is one of power. What is clear is that it is petitioner City Mayor
that could so designate the other petitioners to assume the position of station commanders.
That power is his, and his alone. He is not required by law to share it with respondent
Commissioner, who must justify by the valid conferment of authority the action taken by him in
requiring that the City Mayor replace the other petitioners. Power is not to be presumed, it must
be shown. Respondent Commissioner failed to do so. It was not surprising therefore that the
lower court ruled against him. As set forth at the outset, the Supreme Court sustain the lower
court and affirm the judgment appealed.

Page 133 of 370

Philippine Petroleum Corporation v. Municipality of Pililla
G.R. No. 90776
June 3, 1991
Facts: Philippine Petroleum Corporation (PPC for short) is a business enterprise engaged in the
manufacture of lubricated oil basestock which is a petroleum product, with its refinery plant
situated at Malaya, Pililla, Rizal.
Secretary of Finance issued Provincial Circular No. 26-73 dated December 27, 1973,
directed to all provincial, city and municipal treasurers to refrain from collecting any local tax
imposed in old or new tax ordinances in the business of manufacturing, wholesaling, retailing, or
dealing in petroleum products subject to the specific tax under the National Internal Revenue
Petitioner PPC contends that: (a) Provincial Circular No. 26-73 declared as contrary to
national economic policy the imposition of local taxes on the manufacture of petroleum products
as they are already subject to specific tax under the National Internal Revenue Code; (b) the
above declaration covers not only old tax ordinances but new ones, as well as those which may
be enacted in the future; (c) both Provincial Circulars (PC) 26-73 and 26 A-73 are still effective,
hence, unless and until revoked, any effort on the part of the respondent to collect the
suspended tax on business from the petitioner would be illegal and unauthorized; and (d)
Section 2 of P.D. 436 prohibits the imposition of local taxes on petroleum products.
Issue: whether or not petitioner PPC whose oil products are subject to specific tax under the
NIRC, is still liable to pay (a) tax on business and (b) storage fees, considering Provincial
Circular No. 6-77; and mayor's permit and sanitary inspection fee unto the respondent
Municipality of Pililla, Rizal, based on Municipal Ordinance No. 1.
Held:
The exercise by local governments of the power to tax is ordained by the present Constitution.
To allow the continuous effectivity of the prohibition set forth in PC No. 26-73 (1) would be
tantamount to restricting their power to tax by mere administrative issuances. Under Section 5,
Article X of the 1987 Constitution, only guidelines and limitations that may be established by
Congress can define and limit such power of local governments.
As to the authority of the mayor to waive payment of the mayor's permit and sanitary inspection
fees, the trial court did not err in holding that "since the power to tax includes the power to
exempt thereof which is essentially a legislative prerogative, it follows that a municipal mayor
who is an executive officer may not unilaterally withdraw such an expression of a policy thru the
enactment of a tax." The waiver partakes of the nature of an exemption. It is an ancient rule that
exemptions from taxation are construed instrictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally in
favor of the taxing authority. Tax exemptions are looked upon with disfavor.
However, since the Local Tax Code does not provide the prescriptive period for collection of
local taxes, Article 1143 of the Civil Code applies. Said law provides that an action upon an
obligation created by law prescribes within ten (10) years from the time the right of action
accrues. The Municipality of Pililla can therefore enforce the collection of the tax on business of
petitioner PPC due from 1976 to 1986, and NOT the tax that had accrued prior to 1976. The
assailed DECISION is hereby AFFIRMED.

Page 134 of 370

Shell Philippines, Inc. v. Central Bank of the Philippine
G.R. No. L-51353
June 27, 1998
Facts:
 
On May 1, 1970, Congress approved the Act imposing a stabilization tax on consignments
abroad (RA 6125), in which there shall be imposed, assessed and collected a stabilization tax
on the gross F.O.B. peso proceeds, based on the rate of exchange prevailing at the time of
receipt of such proceeds.
 
In August, 1970, the Central Bank, through its Circular No. 309 provided that: the stabilization
tax shall begin to apply on January 1st following the calendar year during which such export
products shall have reached the aggregate F.O.B. value of more than US $5 million, and the
applicable tax rates shall be the rates prescribed in Schedule (b) of Section 1 of Republic Act
No. 6125 for the fiscal year following the reaching of the said aggregate value.
 
During 1971, appellee Shell, Philippines, Inc. exported seria residues, a by-product of petroleum
refining, to an extent reaching $5 million. On January 7, 1972, the Monetary Board issued its
Resolution No. 47 "subjecting petroleum pitch and other petroleum residues" to the stabilization
tax effective January 1, 1972. Under the Central Bank Circular No. 309, implemented by
Resolution No. 47, appellee had to pay the stabilization tax beginning January 1, 1972, which it
did under protest.
 
On September 14, 1972, appellee filed suit against the Central Bank before the Court of First
Instance of Manila, praying that Monetary Board Resolution No. 47 be declared null and void,
and that Central Bank be ordered to refund the stabilization tax it paid during the first semester
of 1972. Its position was that, pursuant to the provisions of RA 6125, it had to pay the
stabilization tax only from July 1, 1972.
 
The lower court sustained appellee, and it declared Monetary Board Resolution No. 47 as void
and it ordered refund of the stabilization tax paid by appellee during the period January 1 to
June 30, 1972. Central Bank has appealed from the judgment.
 
Issue:
 
Whether the Central Bank has the authority to promulgate such rules
 
Held:
 
Yes. The Central Bank was given the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement
the statutory provision in question, we reiterate the principle that this authority is limited only to
carrying into effect what the law being implemented provides.
 
The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to
carry into effect the law as it has been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or
expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules
that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned.

The rule or regulation should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the
legislature to the administrative agency. In case of discrepancy between the basic law and a
rule or regulation issued to implement said law, the basic law prevails because said rule or
regulation cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law.

Page 135 of 370

Smart Communications, Inc. v. National Telecommunications Commission
G.R. No. 151908, August 12, 2003

FACTS: Pursuant to its rule-making and regulatory powers, the National Telecommunications

Commission issued a Memorandum Circulars on the billing of telecommunications services and
on measures in minimizing, if not eliminating, the incidence of stealing of cellular phone unit. 
Isla Communications Co., Inc. (IslaCom) and Pilipino Telephone Corporation (PilTel) filed an
action for the declaration of nullity of the memorandum circulars, alleging that NTC has no
jurisdiction to regulate the sale of consumer goods as stated in the subject memorandum
circulars.  Such jurisdiction belongs to the DTI under the Consumer Acts of the Philippines. 
Soon thereafter, Globe Telecom, Inc. and Smart Communications, Inc. filed a joint motion for
leave to intervene and to admit complaint-in-intervention.  This was granted by the trial court.
 
The trial court issued a TRO enjoining NTC from implementing the MCs. NTC filed a Motion to
Dismiss, on the ground that petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies.  The
defendant's MD is denied for lack of merit.  NTC filed a MR but was later on denied by the trial
court.  The CA, upon NTC's filing of a special action for certiorari and prohibition, reversed the
decision of the lower court.  Hence this petition.
 
ISSUE: W/N the CA erred in holding that the private respondents failed to exhaust
administrative remedies
 
RULING: Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and quasi-
judicial or administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is the
power to make rules and regulations which results in delegated legislation that is within the
confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers.
 
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies only where the administrative agency exercises its
quasi-judicial or adjudicatory function. Thus, in cases involving specialized disputes, the practice
has been to refer the same to an administrative agency of special competence pursuant to the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction. The objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide a
court in determining whether it should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after an
administrative agency has determined some question or some aspect of some question arising
in the proceeding before the court. It applies where the claim is originally cognizable in the
courts and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues
which, under a regulatory scheme, has been placed within the special competence of an
administrative body; in such case, the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such
issues to the administrative body for its view.
 
However, where what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued
by the administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular
courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same. The determination of whether a specific rule or
set of rules issued by an administrative agency contravenes the law or the constitution is within
the jurisdiction of the regular courts. Indeed, the Constitution vests the power of judicial review
or the power to declare a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree,
order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation in the courts, including the regional trial courts. This
is within the scope of judicial power, which includes the authority of the courts to determine in an
appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political departments. Judicial power includes
the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government.

Page 136 of 370

Lokin v. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 179431-32
June 22, 2010
FACTS:
Citizens' Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) manifested their intent in joining the 2007
elections. They submitted their 5 nominees which should be chosen if they obtain required
number of votes and these were 1) Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva; (2) herein petitioner Luis K.
Lokin, Jr.; (3) Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales; (4) Sherwin Tugna; and (5) Emil L. Galang. The
nominees' certificates of acceptance were attached to the certificate of nomination filed by
CIBAC. The list of nominees was later published in two newspapers of general circulation.
Prior to the election, CIBAC, filed certificate of nomination, substitution and amendment of the
list of nominees whereby it withdrew the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang and
substituted Armi Jane R. Borje as one of the nominees.

ISSUES: Whether or not the Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 issued by the COMELEC
passed the test of validity of administrative rules and regulations

RULING:
NO. To be valid, therefore, the administrative IRRs must comply with the following
requisites to be valid:
1. Its promulgation must be authorized by the Legislature; CHEIcS
2. It must be within the scope of the authority given by the Legislature;
3. It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure;
and
4. It must be reasonable.
The COMELEC failed on the second and fourth requisites. The COMELEC did not
merely reword or rephrase the text of Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941, because it established
an entirely new ground not found in the text of the provision.

Holy Spirit Homeowners’ Association, Inc. v. Defensor

Page 137 of 370

G.R. No. 163980
August 3, 2006
Facts: :

A number of presidential issuances prior to the passage of R.A. No. 9207, authorized
the creation and development of what is now known as the National Government Center (NGC).
On March 5, 1972, former President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1826,
reserving a parcel of land in Constitution Hills, Quezon City, covering a little over 440 hectares
as a national government site to be known as the NGC.
On August 11, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 137,
excluding 150 of the 440 hectares of the reserved site from the coverage of Proclamation No.
1826 and authorizing instead the disposition of the excluded portion by direct sale to the bona
fide residents therein.
In view of the rapid increase in population density in the portion excluded by
Proclamation No. 137 from the coverage of Proclamation No. 1826, former President Fidel
Ramos issued Proclamation No. 248 on September 7, 1993, authorizing the vertical
development of the excluded portion to maximize the number of families who can effectively
become beneficiaries of the government’s socialized housing program.
On May 14, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law R.A. No. 9207.
Petitioner Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. (Association) is a homeowners association
from the West Side of the NGC. It is represented by its president, Nestorio F. Apolinario, Jr.,
who is a co-petitioner in his own personal capacity and on behalf of the association. The instant
petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, seeks to prevent
respondents from enforcing the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No.
9207, otherwise known as the "National Government Center (NGC) Housing and Land
Utilization Act of 2003."

Issue :
Whether or not in issuing the questioned IRR of R.A. No. 9207, the Committee was not
exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial function and should be declared null and void for
being arbitrary, capricious and whimsical.

Held:
Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and quasi-
judicial or administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is the
power to make rules and regulations which results in delegated legislation that is within the
confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers.
In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an
administrative agency, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies before going to court.
This principle, however, applies only where the act of the administrative agency concerned was
performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when the assailed act pertained to its
rule-making or quasi-legislative power.
The assailed IRR was issued pursuant to the quasi-legislative power of the Committee
expressly authorized by R.A. No. 9207.
Since the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the assailed IRR
issued by the Committee in the exercise of its quasi-legislative power, the judicial course to
assail its validity must follow the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Although the Supreme Court,
Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such
concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum.

Review Center Association of the Philippines v. Executive Secretary

Page 138 of 370

G.R. No. 180046
April 2, 2009
FACTS:
- A cheating incident during the 2006 nursing board exam occurred wherein a handwritten
copy of the questions and answers were passed around by examinees of RA Gapuz
Reviewing center during the examination period. Upon investigation, PRC confirmed that
said incident happened.
- CHED issued an IRR with respect to the said EO (Commission on Higher Education
Memorandum Order No. 30)
- Review Center Association of the Philippines (petitioner), asked the CHED to "amend, if
not withdraw" the IRR arguing that giving permits to operate a review center to Higher
Education Institutions (HEIs) or consortia of HEIs and professional organizations will
effectively abolish independent review centers.
- A dialogue between the CHED chair Carlito S. Puno and Review Centers’
representatives. The IRR was revised.
- It stated that "No review center or similar entities shall be established and/or operate
review classes without the favorable expressed endorsement of the CHED and without
the issuance of the necessary permits or authorizations to conduct review classes. x x x"
- To exclude the review centers would be going against the EO issued.
- On 26 October 2007, petitioner filed a petition for Prohibition and Mandamus before the
SC praying for the annulment of the RIRR, the declaration of EO 566 as invalid and
unconstitutional, and the prohibition against CHED from implementing the RIRR.

ISSUES:
Whether EO 566 is an unconstitutional exercise by the Executive of legislative power as
it expands the CHED’s jurisdiction. – YES
Whether the RIRR is an invalid exercise of the Executive’s rule-making power. – YES.
RULING:
EO 566 is an invalid exercise of legislative power. Powers of CHED include: monitor and
evaluate the performance of programs and institutions of higher learning for appropriate
incentives as well as the imposition of sanctions such as, but not limited to, diminution or
withdrawal of subsidy, recommendation on the downgrading or withdrawal of accreditation,
program termination or school closure; and promulgate such rules and regulations and exercise
such other powers and functions as may be necessary to carry out effectively the purpose and
objectives of this Act.
The RIRR is also an invalid exercise of the CHED’s quasi-legislative power.
Administrative agencies exercise their quasi-legislative or rule-making power through the
promulgation of rules and regulations. The CHED may only exercise its rule-making power
within the confines of its jurisdiction under RA 7722. The RIRR covers review centers and
similar entities which are neither institutions of higher education nor institutions offering degree-
granting programs which as already stated, runs counter to RA 7722. Hence the IRR is also
invalid.
Executive Order No. 566 and Commission on Higher Education Memorandum Order No.
30, series of 2007 declared VOID for being unconstitutional.

WEEK 9

Page 139 of 370

 Statutory Construction
1. Caltex V. Palomar, G.R. No. L-19650, September 29, 1966.
2. Daoang v. Municipal Judge, G.R. No. L-34568, March 28, 1988.
3. Montelibano v. Ferrer, G.R. No. L-7899, June 23, 1955.
4. Miramar Fish Co., Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 185432, June 4, 2014.
5. Social Security System v. Favila, G.R. No. 170195, March 28, 2011.
6. Relox v. People, G.R. No. 195694, June 11, 2014.
7. Carpio v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 96409, February 14, 1992.
8. De la Cruz v. Paraz, G.R. Nos. L-42571-72, July 25, 1983.
9. People v. Derilo, G.R. No. 117818, April 18, 1997.
10. Marcelino v. Cruz, G.R. No. L-42428, March 18, 1983.
11. General v. Barrameda, G.R. No. 29906, January 30, 1976.
12. Salazar v. Meneses, G.R. No. 15378, July 31, 1963.
13. Molina v. Rafferty, G.R. No. 11988, April 4, 1918.
14. Endencia v. David, G.R. No. L-6355-56, August 31, 1953.
15. Angara v. Electoral Commission, G.R. No. L-45081, July 15, 1936.

Aids of Construction
1. Ebarle v. Sucaldito, G.R. No. L-33628, December 29, 1987.
2. Commissioner of Customs v. Relunta, G.R. No. L-11860, May 29, 1959.
3. Municipality of Nueva Era v. Municipality of Marcos, G.R. No. 169435, February 27, 2008.
4. People v. Purisima, G.R. No. L-42050-66, November 20, 1978.
5. Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 132601, January 19, 1999.
6. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. TMX Sales, Inc., G.R. No. 83736, January 15, 1992.
7. In re Johnson, G.R. No. 16727, November 16, 1918.
8. Aquino III v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189793, April 7, 2010.
9. Veterans Federation Party v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 136781, 136786, 136795,
October 6, 2000.
10. Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 147589, 147613, June 26, 2001.
11. Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 203766, April 2, 2013.
12. Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, G.R. No. L-25326, May 29, 1970.
13. Greater Balanga Development Corporation v. Municipality of Balanga, Baraan, G.R. No.
83987, December 24, 1997.
14. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Philippine Airlines, G.R. No. 160528, October 9, 2006.
15. Del Mar v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Association, G.R. No. 138298, November 29,
2000.
16. Commissioner of Customs v. Esso Standard Eastern, Inc., G.R. No. L-28329, August 7,
1975.
17. People v. Muñoz, G.R. No. 38969-70, February 9, 1989.
18. People v. Degamo, G.R. No. 121211, April 30, 2003.
19. Alhambra Cigar & Cigarette Manufacturing Company v. Securities and Exchange
Commission, G.R. No. L-23606, July 29, 1968.
20. Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103882, November 25, 1998.
21. Vera v. Avelino, G.R. No. L-543, August 31, 1946.
22. Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 83896, February 22, 1991.
23. Southern Cross Cement Corporation v. Philippine Cement Manufacturers Corp., G.R. No.
158540, July 8, 2004.
24. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. SM Prime Holdings, Inc., G.R. No. 183505, February
26, 2010.
25. Laurel v. Abrogar, G.R. No. 155076, February 27, 2006.
26. Navarro v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 180050, April 12, 2011.
27. Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 160675, June 16, 2006.
28. Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas v. Abugan, G.R. No. 168892, March 24, 2008.

Page 140 of 370

29. Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Garin, G.R. No. 130230, April 15, 2005.
30. Song Kiat Chocolate Factory v. Central Bank, G.R. No. L-8888, November 29, 1957. Pa
31. Francisco v. Bosier, G.R. No. 137677, May 31, 2000.
32. Buenaseda v. Flavier, G.R. No. 106719, September 21, 1993.
33. People v. Yadao, G.R. No. L-6835, March 30, 1954.
34. Nilo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-34586, L-36625, April 2, 1984.
35. AFP General Insurance Corporation v. Molina, G.R. No. 151133, June 30, 2008.
36. In re Frank Stanley Allen, G.R. No. 1455, October 29 1903.
37. Energy Regulatory Board v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113079, April 20, 2001.
38. Philippine Scout Veterans Security & Investigation Agency, Inc. (PSVSAI) v. National Labor
Relations Commission, G.R. No. 99859, September 20, 1996.
39. Bank of Commerce v. Planters Development Bank, G.R. No. 154470-71, September 24,
1996.
40. Nestle Philippines Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 86738, November 13, 1991.
41. Adasa v. Abalos, G.R. No. 168617, February 19, 2007.
42. Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123784, June 18, 1996.
43. Domingo v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 112371, October 7, 1998.
44. Schmid & Oberly, Inc. v. RJL Martinez Fishing Corporation, G.R. No. 75198, October 18,
1988.
45. Gallego v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. L-57841, July 30, 1982.
46. Flores v. People of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 93411-12, July 20, 1992.
47. Valderama v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 98239, April 25, 1996.
48. Greater Balanga Development Corporation v. Balanga, G.R. No. 83987, December 27,
1994.
49. Tano v. Socrates, G.R. No. 110249, August 21, 1997.

Caltex v. Palomar

Page 141 of 370

G.R. No. L-19650
September 29, 1966
 
Facts:
 
Caltex conceived a promotional scheme which will increase its patronage for oil products
called “Caltex Hooded Pump Contest.” The contest calls for participants to estimate the number
of liters a hooded gas pump at each Caltex station will dispense during a specified period. To
participate, entry forms are only needed which can be made available upon request at each
Caltex station. No fee is required to be paid nor purchase has to be made prior to participating.
Foreseeing the extensive use of mails to publicize the promotional scheme, Caltex made
representations with the postal authorities to secure advanced clearance for mailing. Caltex,
through its counsel, posited that  the contest does not violate anti-lottery provisions of the Postal
Law. The Postmaster General Palomar declined the grant of the requested clearance. Caltex
sought a reconsideration. Palomar maintained that if the contest was pursued, a fraud order will
be issued against Caltex. Thus, this case at bar.
 
Issues:
 
Whether or not the construction should be employed in this case and
Whether or not the contest violates the provisions of the Postal Law

Ruling:
 
       Yes. Construction of a law is in order if what is in issue is an inquiry into the intended
meaning of the words used in a certain law. As defined in Black's Law Dictionary: Construction
is the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the author of
the law with respect to a given case, where that intention is rendered doubtful, amongst others,
by reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law. In the present
case, the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law inescapably require an inquiry into the
intended meaning of the words therein. This is as much as question of construction or
interpretation as any other. The Court is tasked to look beyond the fair exterior, to the
substance, in order to unmask the real element and pernicious tendencies that the law is
seeking to prevent.
     
Lottery extends to all schemes for the distribution of prize by chance. The three essential
elements of a lottery are: (1) consideration, (2) prize, and (3) chance. Gift enterprise is
commonly applied to a sporting artifice under which goods are sold for their market value but by
way of inducement, each purchaser is given a chance to win a prize. Gratuitous distribution of
property by lot or chance does not constitute lottery. In the present case, the element of
consideration is not observed. No payment or purchase of a merchandise was required for the
priviledge to participate.
 

Daoang v. Municipal Judge

Page 142 of 370

G.R. No. L-34568
March 28, 1988

Facts:
On 23 March 1971, the respondent spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy filed a petition
with the Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, seeking the adoption of the minors
Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos. On 22 April 1971, the minors Roderick and Rommel
Daoang, assisted by their father and guardian ad litem, the petitioners herein, filed an opposition
to the aforementioned petition for adoption, claiming that the spouses Antero and Amanda
Agonoy had a legitimate daughter named Estrella Agonoy, oppositors’ mother, who died on 1
March 1971, and therefore, said spouses were disqualified to adopt under Art. 335 of the Civil
Code.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent spouses Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos-Agonoy
are disqualified to adopt under paragraph (1), Art. 335 of the Civil Code.
The pertinent provision of law reads, as follows:
Art. 335. The following cannot adopt:
(1) Those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural
children, or children by legal fiction;
Ruling:
The words in the paragraph (1) of the Article 335 of the Civil Code, in enumerating the
persons who cannot adopt, are clear and unambiguous. When the New Civil Code was
adopted, it changed the word “descendant”, found in the Spanish Civil Code to which the New
Civil Code was patterned, to “children”. The children thus mentioned have a clearly defined
meaning in law and do not include grandchildren. Well known is the rule of statutory
construction to the effect that a statute clear and unambiguous on its face need not be
interpreted. The rule is that only statutes with an ambiguous or doubtful meaning may be
subjects of interpretation. In the present case, Roderick and Rommel Daoang , the
grandchildren of Antero and Amanda Agonoy, cannot assail the adoption of Quirino Bonilla and
Wilson Marcos by the Agonoys. The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the
judgement of the Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte,declaring that henceforth Quirino
Bonilla and Wilson Marcos be, to all legitimate intents and purposes, the children by adoption of
the joint petitioners Antero Agonoy and Amanda R. Agonoy and that the former be freed from
legal obedience and maintenance by their respective parents, Miguel Bonilla and Laureana
Agonoy for Quirino Bonilla and Modesto Marcos and Benjamina Gonzales for Wilson Marcos
and their family names ‘Bonilla’ and ‘Marcos’ be changed with “Agonoy”, which is the family
name of the petitioners, without pronouncements as to costs

Montelibano v. Ferrer

Page 143 of 370

G.R. No. L-7899
June 23, 1955

Facts:

In 1940, the Subdivision Inc, of which Montelibano is the president and general
manager, leased a lot to Benares for five years, with an option in favor of Benares of another
five crop years. On 1951, the Subdivision instituted against Benares an unlawful detainer case
which rendered a decision ordering him to eject from the said lot. However, Benares
continued planting on the said lot, instead of delivering it to Subdivision. Acting upon
Montelibano, his co-petitioners cleared the land of sugarcane planted by Benares. Hence, a
criminal case was filed by Benares against petitiioners. A warrant of arrest was then filed to the
petitioners. Monteibano and his companions filed a motion to quash the complaint and warrant
of arrest  A civil case against Municipal Judge and Benares was filed alleging that the said judge
had o jurisdiction to take cognizance of the criminal case.

Issue:

Whether or not the municipal court may entertain the criminal case relying upon CA 326,
section 22 (Charter of the City of Bacolod) which provides that the City Attorney shall charge of
the prosecution of all crimes, misdemeanors, and violations of city ordinances, in the Court of
First Instance and the Municipal Court of Bacolod.

Ruling:

No, the Judge of Municipal Court has no jurisdiction over the case.

In the interpretation of reenacted statutes the court will follow the construction which they
received when previously in force. The legislature will be presumed to know the effect which
such status originally had, and by reenactment to intend that they should again have the same
effect.

Two statutes with a parallel scope, purpose and terminology should, each in its own
field, have a like interpretation, unless in particular instances there is something peculiar in the
question under consideration, or dissimilar in the terms of the act relating thereto, requiring a
different conclusion.

In the case at bar, the same provisions were contested in Sayo v. Chief of Police
wherein it was held that in the City of Manila, criminal complaints may be filed only with the City
Fiscal who is given the exclusive authority to institute criminal cases in the different courts of
said city, under the provisions of its Charter found in Sec 39 of Act  # 183. The provisions of the
Charter of City of Bacolod which are substantially identical to that of Manila should then be
interpreted the same.

Therefore, the decision appealed is reversed and the warrant of arrest issued by the

judge shall be annulled.

Miramar Fish Co., Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

Page 144 of 370

G.R. No. 185432
June 4, 2014
Facts:

Petitioner is a duly organized corporation under Philippine laws. It is registered with the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and Board of Investments (BOI). Miramar filed its
administrative claim for refund in years 2003 and 2004 with the BIR. The latter did not take
action on the claims; hence Miramar filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Tax Appeals
(CTA) on March 30 2004.
The CTA denied the petition stating that Miramar failed to imprint the word “zero-rated”
on the invoices or receipts.

Issue:

Whether or not Miramar entitled to the issuance of a tax credit certificate (TCC)

Ruling:

The SC ruled that petitioner filed its judicial claim for refund insofar as to the four
quarters of taxable year 2002 beyond the 30-day period. The Court explained:

“We summarize the rules on the determination of the prescriptive period for filing a tax
refund or credit of unutilized input VAT as provided in Section 112 of the 1997 Tax Code, as
follows:

“(1) An administrative claim must be filed with the CIR within two years after the
close of the taxable quarter when the zero-rated or effectively zero-rated sales were
made.

“(2) The CIR has 120 days from the date of submission of complete documents
in support of the administrative claim within which to decide whether to grant a refund or
issue a tax credit certificate. The 120-day period may extend beyond the two-year period
from the filing of the administrative claim if the claim is filed in the later part of the two-
year period. If the 120-day period expires without any decision from the CIR, then the
administra-tive claim may be considered to be denied by in action.

“(3) A judicial claim must be filed with the CTA within 30 days from the receipt of
the CIR’s decision denying the administrative claim or from the expiration of the 120-day
period without any action from the CIR. “(4) All taxpayers, how-ever, can rely on BIR
Ruling No. DA-489-03 from the time of its issuance on 10 December 2003 up to its
reversal by this Court in Aichi on 6 October 2010, as an exception to the mandatory and
jurisdictional 120+30 day periods.”

In denying the Petition for Review on Certiorari, the Court stressed:

“By way of reiteration, the CTA has no jurisdiction over petitioner’s judicial appeal
covering its refund claim for taxable year 2002 on the ground of prescription, consistent
with the ruling in the San Roque case. While as to its refund claim for taxable year 2003,
the same shall likewise be denied for failure of petitioner to comply with the mandatory
invoicing requirements provided for under Section 113 of the NIRC of 1997, as
amended.

Social Security System v. Favila

Page 145 of 370

G.R. No. 170195
March 28, 2011
Facts:
Teresa Favila filed a petition before SSC, averring therein that she is married to Florante
Favila who designated Teresa as her sole beneficiary. When they begot children, Florante
likewise designated his children as beneficiaries. When he died, his pension benefits were given
only to his minor child, Florante II until the latter was emancipated at 21. As the surviving legal
spouse, Teresa believed that she was entitled to death benefits.
SSC Ruling: Teresa filed a claim with SSC but it was denied. SSC held that surviving
spouses’ entitlement to SSS members’ death benefits is dependent on two factors which must
concur at the time of the latter’s death: (1) legality of the marital relationship; (2) dependency for
support. These are affected by separation de facto/infidelity/etc. sufficient to disinherit a spouse
under the law. SSC ruled that although Teresa was the legal wife, she was not dependent on
Florante at the time of his death due to marital infidelity. Teresa filed MR, but was denied.
CA Ruling: She elevated to CA. CA reversed SSC’s decision, averring that Teresa is
undoubtedly the legal wife and that she is the primary beneficiary entitled to his pension
benefits. Her illicit affair with another man was never established nor corroborated with
substantial evidence.
SSC contended that the word spouse is qualified by the word dependent. Fact of
dependency is required by law, otherwise, law could’ve just stated, spouse without the
descriptive word ‘dependent’. SSC’s investigation revealed that Teresa was separated in fact
with Favila until the time of his death because of her adulterous relationship. SSC filed for
reconsideration but it was denied. It elevated to SC.
Issue:
Whether or not Teresa is entitled to Florante’s death benefits, in contemplation of the SS
Law
Ruling: NO. SS Law Sec. 8 defines dependent as the legitimate spouse dependent for support
upon the employee; beneficiaries = dependent spouse. The law’s purpose is plain and simple. A
beneficiary must not only be a legitimate spouse, but also dependent for a spouse to qualify as
primary beneficiary. If a statute is plain and clearly free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal
meaning and applied without intended interpretation. “verba legis non est recedendum”, from
the words of a statute, there must be no departure.
SC finds untenable Teresa’s assertion that being the legal wife, she is presumed to be a
primary dependent. In Aguas, SC clearly concluded thata wife separated de fact from her
husband cannot be said to be dependent for support upon the husband. Wife-claimant had
burden to show proof that all requirements were complied with. Teresa did not present any
evidence to prove that she was dependent upon the support of Florante until his death.

Page 146 of 370

Relox v. People
G.R. No. 195694
June 11, 2014

Facts:

That on or about October 19, 2011, in the municipality of Camalaniugan, province of

Cagayan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, without any legal
authority thereof, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver, dispense,
give away one (1) [piece] of heat sealed transparent plastic sachet containing crystalline
substance which gave POSITIVE results to the tests for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a
dangerous drug, locally known as SHABU, weighing an aggregate of 0.02 gram to a poseur
buyer of the elements of the Philippine National Police force stationed in Camalaniugan,
Cagayan, said accused knowing fully well and aware that it is prohibited for any person to sell,
deliver, dispense, give away to another or transport any dangerous drugs regardless of the
quantity or, purity thereof, unless authorized by law.
The RTC convicted accused-appellant Malana of the crime charged.
The CA affirmed the RTC's conviction of accused-appellant Malana, holding that the
prosecution was able to prove the elements of the crimes charged. The CA declared that the
elements of illegal sale of dangerous drugs were properly established as "RA 9165 and its
implementing rules do not require strict compliance with the rule on chain of custody."
Issue:Whether or not the RTC and the CA erred in convicting accused-appellant Malana of the
crime charged
Ruling: The appeal is meritorious. The Court acquits accused-appellant Malana for failure of
the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Section 21 of RA 9165 the phrase "immediately after seizure and confiscation" means that the
physical inventory and photographing of the drugs were intended by the law to be made
immediately after, or at the place of apprehension. It is only when the same is not practicable
that the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 allow the inventory and
photographing to be done as soon as the buy-bust team reaches the nearest police station or
the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team. In this connection, this also means that the
three required witnesses should already be physically present at the time of apprehension.
Section 21, RA 9165 was unequivocal in its requirement: that the inventory must be done "in the
presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized,
or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the [DOJ], and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a
copy thereof."

The law is plain and clear. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there
should be no departure.

Carpio v. Executive Secretary

Page 147 of 370

G.R. No. 96409
February 14, 1992
Facts:

Petitioner Antonio Carpio as citizen, taxpayer and member of the Philippine Bar, filed this
petition, questioning the constitutionality of RA 6975 with a prayer for TRO.

RA 6875, entitled “AN ACT ESTABLISHIGN THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE UNDER A
REORGANIZED DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES,” allegedly contravened Art. XVI, sec. 6 of the 1986 Constitution: “The
State shall establish and maintain one police force, which shall be national in scope and civilian
in character, to be administered and controlled by a national police commission. The authority of
local executives over the police units in their jurisdiction shall be provided by law.”

Issues:
Whether or not RA 6975 is contrary to the Constitution
Whether or not Sec. 12 RA 6975 constitutes an “encroachment upon, interference with, and an
abdication by the President of, executive control and commander-in-chief powers”

Ruling:

SC held that the President has control of all executive departments, bureaus, and offices. This
presidential power of control over the executive branch of government extends over all
executive officers from Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerk. In the landmark case of Mondano
vs. Silvosa, the power of control means “the power of the President to alter or modify or nullify
or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former with that of the latter.” It is said to be at the very “heart of
the meaning of Chief Executive.”

As a corollary rule to the control powers of the President is the “Doctrine of Qualified Political
Agency.” As the President cannot be expected to exercise his control powers all at the same
time and in person, he will have to delegate some of them to his Cabinet members.

Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, “all executive and
administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various
executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases
where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the
exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and
administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive
departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated
in the regular course of business, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, are
presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.

Page 148 of 370

De la Cruz v. Paraz
G.R. Nos. L-42571-72
July 25, 1983
Facts:
Vicente De La Cruz, one of the petitioners, is an owner of clubs and cabarets in Bulacan.
Jointly, de la Cruz and the other club owner-petitioners assailed the constitutionality of
Ordinance No. 84 (series of 1975) known as a prohibition and closure ordinance which was
based on Republic Act No. 938 as amended (but was originally enacted on June 20, 1953).
Then on May 21, 1954, the first section was amended to include not merely the power to
regulate, but likewise "prohibit." The title, however, remained the same. It is worded exactly as
Republic Act No. 938.
On November 5, 1975, two cases for prohibition with preliminary injunction were filed on
the grounds that (1) Ordinance No. 84 is null and void as a municipality has no authority to
prohibit a lawful business, occupation or calling; (2) Ordinance No. 84 is violative of the
petitioners' right to due process and the equal protection of the law, as the license previously
given to petitioners was in effect withdrawn without judicial hearing; and (3)That under
Presidential Decree No. 189 (as amended, by Presidential Decree No. 259 the power to license
and regulate tourist-oriented businesses including night clubs, has been transferred to the
Department of Tourism.
The respondent Judge issued a restraining order on November 7, 1975. Then came on
January 15, 1976 the decision upholding the constitutionality and validity of Ordinance No. 84
and dismissing the cases. Hence, this petition for certiorari by way of appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not a municipal corporation, can prohibit the exercise of a lawful trade, the
operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful occupation, such clubs employing hostesses
 
Ruling:

The SC held that municipal corporations cannot prohibit the operation of night clubs. They
may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their business. The writ of certiorari is
granted and the decision of the lower court dated January 15, 1976 reversed, set aside, and
nullified. Ordinance No. 84, Series of 1975 of the Municipality of Bocaue is declared void and
unconstitutional.

Since there is no dispute as the title limits the power to regulating, not prohibiting, it would
result in the statute being invalid if, as was done by the Municipality of Bocaue, the operation of
a night club was prohibited.

A refusal to grant licenses, because no such businesses could legally open, would be
subject to judicial correction. That is to comply with the legislative will to allow the operation and
continued existence of night clubs subject to appropriate regulations.

There is thus support for the view advanced by petitioners that to construe Republic Act
No. 938 as allowing the prohibition of the operation of night clubs would give rise to a
constitutional question. The Constitution mandates: "Every bill shall embrace only one subject
which shall be expressed in the title thereof."

People v. Derilo

Page 149 of 370

G.R. No. 117818
April 18, 1997

Facts:
On January 1, 1982 at Sitio Palaspas, Taft, Eastern Samar, Roman Derilo, Isidro
Baldimo y Quillo, Lucas Doños, Alejandro Cofuentes and one John Doe, shot and stabbed
Perpetua Adalim inflicting injuries which caused her death. Of the five accused, only the
appellant, Isidro Q. Baldimo (Baldimo) was apprehended. Baldimo initially pleaded not guilty;
however, by the time the court had finished presenting its evidence, he manifested his intention
to withdraw his earlier plea of not guilty and substitute the same with one of guilty.
Consequently, a re-arraignment was order and the appellant’s voluntariness and
comprehension of the consequences in making his new plea of guilty. Once satisfied, the trial
convicted him of crime of murder defined and punished under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code. The lower court qualified the killing of Perpetua Adalim to murder by treachery.
Considering the evidence presented by the prosecution and the appellant’s belated admission
of guilt, the court sentenced the appellant to suffer the supreme penalty of death and to
indemnify and pay damages to the heirs of the victim.

Issues:

Whether or not a plea of guilty alone sufficient to prove the aggravating circumstance of
pre-meditated approval
Whether or not the penalty of death be imposed considering the conflicting application of
two penal laws

Ruling:

No. When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a
searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea
and require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree culpability. The accuse
may also present evidence in his behalf. Hence, since the prosecution failed to provide
evidence proving the guilt of the accused, the appellant’s plead of guilt is not sufficient to prove
the aggravating circumstance of pre-meditated approval.

No. Republic Act No. 7659 repealed Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code by imposing a
heavier penalty of death for murder. As a rule, a new law shall be applied prospectively, except
where the new law established conditions more lenient or favorable to the accused. In the case
provided, Derilo was sentenced to death according to the Revised Penal Code effective at the
time the verdict was made; however, the ratification of the 1987 Constitution reduced the
sentence for capital crimes from death to reclusion perpetua. This is an example of the
exception to the principle of prospective application of new laws. Consequently, when Republic
Act No. 7659 that imposes death penalty on heinous crimes was passed on December 1993,
such may not be applied on the crime of murder committed in 1982, based on the principle of
prospectivity of penal laws.

Marcelino v. Cruz
G.R. No. L-42428

Page 150 of 370

March 18, 1983

Facts:
Bernardino Marcelino was charged for the crime of rape. On August 4, 1975, the
prosecution finished presenting evidence against Marcelino and rested its case.
On the same date, the attorneys of both parties in the criminal case moved for time
within which to submit their respective memoranda.
The presiding judge, Fernando Cruz, Jr., gave them 30 days or until September 4, 1975.
Only Marcelino submitted a memoranda.
On November 28, 1975, Judge Cruz filed with the Clerk of Court a copy of his decision,
his decision bears the same date of November 28, 1975. The promulgation of the decisions was
scheduled in January 1976.
Marcelino is now contending that the court can no longer promulgate judgment because
by January 1976, the 3-month period (90 day period) within which lower courts must decide on
cases had already lapsed, thus, the lower court lost its jurisdiction over the case.

Issue:

Whether or not Judge Cruz had resolved the case within the allotted period

Ruling:
Yes, he did resolve such case within the allotted period.

The case is deemed submitted for decision on September 4, 1975 (date of last day of
filing of the memoranda by the respective parties). From that day, the 3-month period begins to
run so Judge Cruz had until December 4, 1975 to rule on the case. Judge Cruz made a
rendition of his decision on November 28, 1975.
The date of rendition is the date of filing of the decision with the clerk of court. Hence, Judge
Cruz was able to rule on the case within the 3-month period because November 28, 1975 was
merely the 85th day from September 4, 1975.
The date of promulgation of a decision, in this case it was set in January 1976, could not
serve as the reckoning date because the same necessarily comes at a later date.
Section 11 (1), Art 10 of the 1973 Constitution provides that “upon the effectivity of this
constitution, the maximum period within which case or matter shall be decided or resolved from
the date of its submission shall be; 18 months for the Supreme Court, 12 months for the inferior
courts and 3 months for lower courts.”
In practice, the Supreme Court is liberal when it comes to this provision. The provision is
mandatory, it’s merely directive. Extensions can be granted in meritorious cases.
To interpret such provision as mandatory will only be detrimental to the justice system.
Nevertheless, the SC warned lower court judges to resolve cases within the prescribed period
and not take this liberal construction as an excuse to dispose of cases at later periods.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby dismissed; and the Restraining Order dated
January 16, 1976 issued by this Court is lifted.
Since respondent Judge Fernando Cruz, Jr. is already deceased, his successor is hereby
ordered to decide Criminal Case No. C-5910 on the basis of the record thereof within ninety [90]
days from the time the case is raffled to him.

General v. Barrameda

Page 151 of 370

G.R. No. 29906
January 30, 1976.
Facts:
For failure of mortgagor, respondent herein, to pay in full the installments as they fall
due, the mortgagee, Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) foreclosed extrajudicially the
mortgage pursuant to Act 3135. On April 23, 1962, the provincial sheriff conducted an auction
sale in which the mortgagee, as the highest bidder, bought the mortgaged property for
P7,271.22. On May 13, 1963, the sheriff executed a final deed of sale in favor of the DBP and
the DBP executed an affidavit of consolidation of ownership. Upon the registration of the sale
and affidavit on September 2, 1963, the Transfer Certificate of Title in the name of respondent
was cancelled and a new title issued to the DBP. On September 3, 1963, petitioners purchased
the land from the DBP. The sale in their favor was annotated on November 26, 1963 only. Prior
to the date last mentioned, or on November 20, 1963, petitioner had offered to redeem the land.
In view of the refusal of the DBP to allow the redemption, plaintiff commenced this suit. The
original complaint was filed in court on November 23, 1963. On August 12, 1964, plaintiff
deposited with the clerk of court the sum of P7,271.22.

The trial court held that the one-year period of redemption, when the sale at public auction was
held. The Court of Appeal reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance.
Issue:
Whether or not the one year period of redemption reckoned from the date of auction sale
Ruling:
In the interpretation and application of Section 31, Commonwealth Act 459 (Law that
created the Agricultural and Industrial Bank, now Development Bank of the Philippines) which
"The mortgagor or debtor to the Agricultural and Industrial Bank whose real property was sold at
public auction, judicially or extra-judicially, for the full or partial payment of an obligation to said
bank shall, within one year from the date of the auction sale, have the right to redeem the real
property.
The one-year period of redemption should start from the time of the registration of sale
and not from the date of auction sale. This ruling would better serve the ends of justice and
equity especially in a case where the mortgagee, as the highest bidder, acquired the mortgaged
property at a low price, which was simply the unpaid balance of the mortgage debt.
The Supreme Court sustained the Court of Appeals holding that the registration of the
deed of conveyance for properties brought under the Torrens System is the operative act to
transfer title to property, and therefore the one year period of redemption should start from the
registration of the sale, and not from the date of the auction sale

Salazar v. Meneses

Page 152 of 370

G.R. No. 15378
July 31, 1963
Facts:
On May 29, 1950, Antonio Dizon, married to Teresa de los Reyes, and registered owner
of a parcel of land and its improvements situated at M. Natividad St., Manila covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 76223 of the Registry of Deeds of said city, mortgaged the same
in favor of Flor de Lis Meneses to secure the payment of a loan of P6,000.00. When this amount
was increased to P7,000.00, he executed a supplementary mortgage on the same property on
June 6, 1950. Both mortgages, duly registered on June 1 and June 9, 1950, respectively,
contained an irrevocable special power of attorney authorizing the mortgage, in the event of
foreclosure, to sell the property and execute deeds in connection therewith.

As the mortgagor failed to pay the principal obligation upon maturity, the mortgagee foreclosed
the mortgage extrajudicially and the property was sold by the Sheriff of Manila at public auction
on October 29, 1954 to Flor de Lis Meneses herself, the highest bidder.

On May 24, 1956, no redemption of the mortgaged property having been made, the mortgagee-
purchaser, as attorney-in-fact of the deceased mortgagor, executed an absolute deed of sale of
the property in her favor and of her husband, Avelino Sebastian, which deed was registered on
May 26 of the same year.

On October 1, 1956, the Salazar spouses commenced Civil Case No. 30767 in the Court of
First Instance of Manila against Flor de Lis Meneses and her husband, Avelino Sebastian, the
heirs of the deceased Antonio Dizon and the Philippine Trust Co., as administrator of his estate,
to annul the deed of sale executed by Flor de Lis Meneses in her favor and to compel her to
permit them to redeem the mortgaged property.

After due trial, the Court rendered judgment dismissing their complaint. Hence this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the lower court erred in not holding that the period of redemption in this
case, as far as appellants are concerned, started only on May 26, 1956
Ruling:
The decision appealed from is reversed and, as a result, the final Deed of Sale executed
by Flor de lis Meneses in her favor and in that of her husband, mentioned heretofore, is
annulled, and said party is ordered to permit appellants to redeem the property, which right the
latter should exercise within thirty (30) days from the time the present decision has become final
and executory. With costs.
 Where a mortgage on registered land is foreclosed extrajudicially and the property sold
at public auction, the one-year period of redemption starts not from the date of the sale but from
the date when the certification of sale issued by the sheriff was registered in the office of the
register of deeds.

Page 153 of 370

Molina v. Rafferty
G.R. No. 11988
April 4, 1918
Facts:
The present case was a rehearing granted to the appellee for a trail court decision on
Feb 1, 1918. The petition was granted and oral argument of the motion was permitted. Jacinto
Molina was the owner of various fish ponds in Bulacan. He was required to pay the merchant’s
tax required by the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Molina protested that he was an agriculturist
and not a merchant and therefore exempt from the taxes imposed by the Internal Revenue Law
upon the gross sales of merchants. Plaintiff contends that the fish produced by him are to be
regarded as an “agricultural product” within the meaning of the term  used in paragraph (c) of
Section 41 of Act No. 2339 (Now section 1460 of the Administrative Code of 1917), enforced
when the disputed tax was levied and that he is exempt from the percentage tax on merchants’
sales established by section 40 of Act No. 2339. In the Trial Court, the Honorable Jose Abreu in
a carefully prepared decision ordered defendant to refund the P71.81 paid by plaintiff as
internal-revenue taxes and penalties under protest, with legal interest thereon from November
26, 1915, the date of such payment under protest.
Issue:
Whether or not fish produced as were those upon which the tax in question was levied
are an agricultural product
Ruling:
Decision set aside. Judgment of lower court affirmed. With regard to the question that
that the fish artificially grown and fed in a confined area are agricultural products and therefore
exempt, the Court looked deeper. It said that a man might cultivate the surface of a tract of land
patented to him under the mining law, but the products of such soil would not for that reason be
any the less "agricultural products." Conversely, the admission that the land upon which these
fishponds are constructed is not to be classified as mineral or forest land, does not lead of
necessity to the conclusion that everything produced upon them is for that reason alone to be
deemed an "agricultural product" within the meaning of the statute under consideration.
Exempting agricultural products from the tax the farming industry would be favored and the
development of the resources of the country encouraged.
Another distinction was made between fishermen and the people artificially growing fish
in ponds so as to delineate the scope of the occupation tax. Fishermen were made liable to the
occupation tax. The ones growing fish in ponds were not included.

Endencia v. David

Page 154 of 370

G.R. No. L-6355-56
August 31, 1953
Facts:

Saturnino David, then Collector of Internal Revenue, ordered the taxing of Justice Pastor
Endencia’s and Justice Fernando Jugo’s salary pursuant to Sec 13 of RA 590 which provides
that “SEC. 13.   No salary wherever received by any public officer of the Republic of the
Philippines shall be considered as exempt from the income tax, payment of which is hereby
declared not to be a diminution of his compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law.”
According to the brief of the Solicitor General on behalf of appellant Collector of Internal
Revenue, the decision in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, was not received favorably by
Congress, because immediately after its promulgation, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 590.
To bring home his point, the Solicitor General reproduces what he considers the pertinent
discussion in the Lower House of House Bill No. 1127 which became Republic Act No. 590.

Issue:
Whether or not the imposition of an income tax upon the salaries of Justice Endencia
and Justice Jugo and other members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts
amount to a diminution

Ruling:
On the issue of imposition of income tax upon the salaries of the judges, in a rather
exhaustive and well considered decision found and held under the doctrine laid down by the
court in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, 85 Phil 552, Judge Higinio B. Macadaeg held that the
collection of income taxes from the salaries of Justice Jugo and Justice Endencia was in
violation of the Constitution of the Philippines, and so ordered the refund of said taxes. On the
issue of whether Section 13 of Republic Act No. 590 is constitutional, the court believes that this
is a clear example of interpretation or ascertainment of the meaning of the phrase “which shall
not be diminished during their continuance in office,” found in section 9, Article VIII of the
Constitution, referring to the salaries of judicial officers. By legislative fiat as enunciated in
section 13, Republic Act No. 590, Congress says that taxing the salary of a judicial officer is not
a decrease of compensation. This act of interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof by the
Legislature is an invasion of the well-defined and established province and jurisdiction of the
Judiciary. “The rule is recognized elsewhere that the legislature cannot pass any declaratory
act, or act declaratory of what the law was before its passage, so as to give it any binding
weight with the courts. A legislative definition of a word as used in a statute is not conclusive of
its meaning as used elsewhere; otherwise, the legislature would be usurping a judicial function
in defining a term.
The court reiterates the doctrine laid down in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, to the
effect that the collection of income tax on the salary of a judicial officer is a diminution thereof
and so violates the Constitution. Further, the court holds that the interpretation and application
of the Constitution and of statutes is within the exclusive province and jurisdiction of the judicial
department, and that in enacting a law, the Legislature may not legally provide therein that it be
interpreted in such a way that it may not violate a Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the
hands of the courts in their task of later interpreting said statute, especially when the
interpretation sought and provided in said statute runs counter to a previous interpretation
already given in a case by the highest court of the land. Thus the court holds that judgment is
affirmed, that Section 13, Republic Act 590 in so far as it provides that taxing of the salary of a
judicial officer shall be considered “not to be a diminution of his compensation fixed by the
Constitution or by law”, constitutes and invasion of the province and jurisdiction of the judiciary.

Angara v. Electoral Commission

Page 155 of 370

G.R. No. L-45081
July 15, 1936
Facts:

In the elections of Sept. 17, 1935, petitioner Jose A. Angara and the respondents Pedro
Ynsua, Miguel Castillo, and Dionisio Mayor were candidates for the position of members of the
National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas.
On Oct. 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara as member-elect
of the National Assembly and on Nov. 15, 1935, he took his oath of office.
On Dec. 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed Resolution No. 8, which in effect, fixed
the last date to file election protests.
On Dec. 8, 1935, Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest"
against Angara and praying, among other things, that Ynsua be named/declared elected
Member of the National Assembly or that the election of said position be nullified.
On Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution (No. 6) stating that last
day for filing of protests is on Dec. 9.  Angara contended that the Constitution confers exclusive
jurisdiction upon the Electoral Commission solely as regards the merits of contested elections to
the National Assembly and the Supreme Court therefore has no jurisdiction to hear the case. 

Issue:

Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and
the subject matter of the controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative,

Ruling:

The court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the
present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope, and extent of the
constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly." The Electoral
Commission was created to transfer in its totality all the powers previously exercised by the
legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its members, to an independent and
impartial tribunal. The express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied
denial in the exercise of that power by the National Assembly. And thus, it is as effective a
restriction upon the legislative power as an express prohibition in the Constitution.Therefore,
the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive
power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in
the Electoral Commission.

The petition for a writ of prohibition against the electoral commission is hereby denied,
with cost against the petitioner. 

Ebarle v. Sucaldito

Page 156 of 370

G.R. No. L-33628
December 29, 1987
Facts:

Petitioner Bienvenido Ebarle was then provincial Governor of Zamboanga and a candidate
for re-election in the 1971 local elections. Anti-Graft League of the Phils. filed different
complainst with the City Fiscal against the petitioner for violations of provisions of the Anti-Graft
Law (RA 3019) as well as Arts. 171, 182, 183, 213 & 318 of the Revised Penal Code
o on the bidding for the supply of gravel and sand for the province of Zamboanga
del Sur in favour of Tabiliran Trucking Company
o on the collection of advances under the trucking contract of Tabiliran Trucking
Company, making it appear that it was collected by Teoson Trucking Company,
who held the subsisting contract
o on the bidding for the construction of the right wing portion of the Capitol Building
of the Province of Zamboanga del Sur, in favour of supposed winning bidder who
is the brother-in-law of Ebarle
o on petitioner’s testifying falsely under oath that he acquired a certain lot by
purchase but the lot was in fact owned by the provincial government of
Zamboanga del Sur (where the provincial jail is located)
o on the simulated bidding in favour of Tabiliran Trucking Company
o on appointments of people related to Ebarle to different positions in the
government
Petitioner claims that the prosecutions were politically motivated, initiated by his rivals

Issues:
 WoN respondents had to comply with the provisions of EO 264
 WoN Anti-Graft League had standing to commence the series of prosecutions
 WoN the complaints are politically motivated and thus should be dismissed

Ruling:

Petitions dismissed.

The petitioner’s reliance upon the provisions of EO 264 has no merit. It is plain from the
very wording of the Order that it has exclusive application to administrative, and not criminal
complaints EO 264 was promulgated under the 1935 Constitution in which the legislative power
was vested exclusively in Congress, if the EO was to be considered law, SC would be forced to
say that it is an amendment to RA 5180 which would give rise to a Constitutional anomaly

Challenge against the personality of Anti-Graft League has no merit. A complaint filed
with the fiscal prior to a judicial action may be filed by any person. The TRO issued in G.R. No.
33628 does not embrace the complaint subject of G.R. No. 34162 because the charges are not
identical to one another. The proper venue for determining whether the cases were filed to
harass petitioner is the preliminary wishes he wishes to block.

Page 157 of 370

Commissioner of Customs v. Relunta
G.R. No. L-11860
May 29, 1959
Facts:
 
On December 10 1953, the RPS “MISAMIS ORIENTAL” a unit of the Philippine Navy
was dispatched to Japan to transport contingents of the 14th BCT bound for Pusan Korea and
carry Christmas gifts for our troops there. It seems thereafter, it was used for transportation
purposes in connection with the needs of Filipino Soldiers in Korea.
 
While in Japan it loaded 180 cases containing various articles subject to custom duties.
Upon arrival in the Philippines all theses articles were then declared forfeit by the Collector of
Customs of Manila for violations of the customs law.
 
Issue:
 
Whether or not the RPS MISAMIS ORIENTAL being a Navy vessel required to have a
manifest?
 
Ruling:

Yes, Because although the law prescribes that only vessels engaged in foreign trade are
required to present a manifest, the interpretation of the court all vessels whether private or
government owned including ships of the Philippine Navy, coming from a foreign port with the
possible exception of war vessels or vessels employed by any foreign government not engaged
in the transportation of merchandise by way of trade, as provided for in the 2nd paragraph of
sec. 1221 of the Revised Administrative Code, are required to prepare and present a manifest
to the customs authorities upon arrival at any Philippine Port.
 

Municipality of Nueva Era v. Municipality of Marcos

Page 158 of 370

G.R. No. 169435
February 27, 2008

Facts:
The Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Marcos passed a resolution claiming a
portion of Nueva Era due to the creation of Marcos Town in the Province of Ilocos Norte
pursuant to the description of Marcos' eastern boundaries as stated in the second paragraph of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3753. Marcos submitted its claim to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Ilocos Norte.
Petitioner Nueva Era, contended that its entire land area was an ancestral domain of
the "tinguians," an indigenous cultural community, which must be protected and therefore must
be preserved as part of Nueva Era. In addition, according to petitioner, Marcos was created out
of the territory of Dingras only and since R.A. No. 3753 specifically mentioned seven (7) barrios
of Dingras to become Marcos, the area which should comprise Marcos should not go beyond
the territory of said barrios.
The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Ilocos Norte ruled in favor of Nueva Era. On appeal
by Marcos, the RTC affirmed the decision of the SP. Uncontented, Marcos filed a petition for
review of the RTC decision before the CA, which reversed and set aside the decision of the SP
and RTC.
ISSUE:
WON THE MODE OF APPEAL ADOPTED BY MARCOS IN BRINGING THE CASE TO
THE CA IS PROPER
RULING:
Yes, Marcos correctly appealed the RTC judgment via petition for review under Rule 42.
Under Section 118 (b) of the Local Government Code, "boundary disputes involving two (2) or
more municipalities within the same province shall be referred for settlement to the sangguniang
panlalawigan concerned." The dispute shall be formally tried by the said sanggunian in case the
disputing municipalities fail to effect an amicable settlement. The SP of Ilocos validly took
cognizance of the dispute between the parties. The appeal of the SP judgment to the RTC was
likewise properly filed by Marcos before the RTC. The problem, however, lies in whether the
RTC judgment may still be further appealed to the CA. The CA pronounced that the RTC
decision on the boundary dispute was not appealable to it. It ruled that no further appeal of the
RTC decision may be made pursuant to Section 119 of the Local Government Code. However,
the SC ruled that the CA erred in declaring that only the RTC has appellate jurisdiction over the
judgment of the SP.
Appeal is a purely statutory right and it cannot be exercised unless it is expressly granted by
law. Nevertheless, the CA can pass upon the petition for review precisely because the law
allows it. B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, which is supplemented by Rule 42 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, gives the CA the authority to entertain appeals of such judgments and final orders
rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.

Page 159 of 370

People v. Purisima
G.R. No. L-42050-66
November 20, 1978
FACTS:
There are twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review filed by the People of the Philippines
represented, respectively, by the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila, the Office of the Provincial
Fiscal of Samar, and joined by the Solicitor General, are consolidated in this one Decision as
they involve one basic question of law.
Before those courts, Informations were filed charging the respective accused with "illegal
possession of deadly weapon" in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9. On a motion to quash
filed by the accused, the three Judges mentioned above issued in the respective cases filed
before them — the details of which will be recounted below — an Order quashing or dismissing
the Informations, on a common ground, viz, that the Information did not allege facts which
constitute the offense penalized by Presidential Decree No. 9 because it failed to state one
essential element of the crime.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Informations filed by the People sufficient in form and substance to
constitute the offense of "illegal possession of deadly weapon" penalized under Presidential
Decree (PD for short) No. 9
RULING:
There are two elements to the the offense: first, the carrying outside one's residence of
any bladed, blunt, or pointed weapon, etc. not used as a necessary tool or implement for a
livelihood; and second, that the act of carrying the weapon was either in furtherance of, or to
abet, or in connection with subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality,
chaos, or public disorder.
The petitioner by having one particular stand of the carrying of any dangerous weapon outside
of the residence w/o regard to motive or intent makes this a case of statutory construction.

COURT DISMISSED ALL MOTIONS MADE BY THE PETITIONER AND AFFIRMS ALL
DECISIONS MADE BY THE RESPONDENT JUDGES.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION LESSON:
The problem of determining what acts fall within the purview of a statute, it becomes necessary
to inquire into the intent and spirit of the decree and this can be found among others in the
preamble or, whereas" clauses which enumerate the facts or events which justify the
promulgation of the decree and the stiff sanctions stated therein.
It is a salutary principle in statutory construction that there exists a valid presumption that
undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative measure, and that a
construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all
objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil, and injurious consequence.

Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice

Page 160 of 370

G.R. No. 132601
January 19, 1999
Facts:

Upon conviction of Echegaray in People v. Echegaray, the SC temporarily restrained the

execution of its own decision. The respondents claim that SC has no more jurisdictions over the
case because judgment has become final and it cannot restrain the execution of its decision.

Issue:
Whether or not SC has no more jurisdictions over the case

Ruling:

The rule on finality of judgment cannot divest the SC of its jurisdiction to execute and
enforce the same judgment. Notwithstanding the order of execution and the executory nature
thereof on the date set, the date can be postponed. The power to control the execution of its
decision is an essential aspect of jurisdiction – supervening events may change the
circumstance of the parties and compel the courts to intervene and adjust the rights of the
litigants to prevent unfairness. The SC did not restrain the effectivity of the law enacted by the
Congress. It merely restrained the execution of its judgment to give reasonable time to check its
fairness in light of supervening events in Congress.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. TMX Sales, Inc.,

Page 161 of 370

G.R. No. 83736
January 15, 1992
Facts:
TMX Sales Inc. filed its quarterly income tax for the 1st quarter of 1981. It declared
P571,174.31 and paying an income tax  of P247,019 on May 13, 1981. However, during the
subsequent quarters, TMX suffered losses. On April 15, 1982, when TMX filed its Annual
Income Tax Return for the year ended in December 31, 1981, it declared a net loss of
P6,156,525. On July 9, 1982, TMX filed with the Appellate Division of BIR for refund in the
amount of P247,010 representing overpaid income tax. His claim was not acted upon by the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue. On May 14, 1984, TMX Sales filed a petition for review
before the Court of Tax Appeals against CIR, praying that the CIR be ordered to refund to TMX
the amount of P247,010. The CIR averred that TMX is already barred for claiming the refund
since more than 2 years has elapsed between the payment (May 15, 1981) and the filing of the
claim in court (March 14, 1984). The Court of Tax Appeals rendered a decision granting the
petition of TMX Sales and ordered CIR to refund the amount mentioned. Hence, this appeal of
CIR.
 
Issue:
Whether or not TMX Sales Inc. is entitled to a refund considering that two years gas
already elapsed since the payment of the tax
 
Ruling:
Yes. Petition denied.
Sec. 292, par. 2 of the National Internal Revenue Code stated that “in any case, no such
suit or proceeding shall be begun after the expiration of two years from the date of the payment
of the tax or penalty regardless of any supervening cause that may arise after payment.” This
should be interpreted in relation to the other provisions of the Tax Code. The most reasonable
and logical application of the law would be to compute the 2-year prescriptive period at the time
of the filing of the Final Adjustment Return or the Annual Income Tax Return, where it can finally
be ascertained if the tax payer has still to pay additional income tax or if he is entitled to a
refund of overpaid income tax. Since TMX filed  the suit on March 14, 1984, it is within the 2-
year prescriptive period starting from April 15, 1982 when they filed their  Annual Income Tax
Return.

In re Johnson, G.R. No. 16727,

Page 162 of 370

 November 16, 1918
Facts:
On February 4, 1916, Emil H. Johnson, a native of Sweden and a naturalized citizen of
the United States, died in the city of Manila. He left a will disposing an estate with an estimated
amount of P231,800. The will was written in the testator’s own handwriting, and is signed by
himself and two witnesses only, instead of three witnesses required by section 618 of the Code
of Civil Procedure. This will, therefore, was not executed in conformity with the provisions of law
generally applicable to wills executed by inhabitants of these Islands, and hence could not have
been proved under section 618. On February 9, 1916, however, a petition was presented in the
Court of First Instance of the city of Manila for the probate of this will, on the ground that 1)
Johnson was, at the time of his death, a citizen of the State of Illinois, United States of America;
2) that the will was duly executed in accordance with the laws of that State; and hence could
properly be probated here pursuant to section 636 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Petitioner
alleged that the law is inapplicable to his father’s will
 
Issue: Whether or not there was deprivation of due process on the part of the petition
 
Held: No.
 
Ratio: Due publication was made pursuant to this order of the court through the three-week
publication of the notice in Manila Daily Bulletin. The Supreme Court also asserted that in view
of the statute concerned which reads as “A will made within the Philippine Islands by a citizen or
subject of another state or country, which is executed in accordance with the law of the state or
country of which he is a citizen or subject, and which might be proved and allowed by the law of
his own state or country, may be proved, allowed, and recorded in the Philippine Islands, and
shall have the same effect as if executed according to the laws of these Islands” the “state”,
being not capitalized, does not mean that United States is excluded from the phrase (because
during this time, Philippines was still a territory of the US).

Aquino III v. COMELEC

Page 163 of 370

G.R. No. 189793
April 7, 2010

FACTS:
The said case was filed by the petitioners by way of a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. It was addressed to nullify and declared as
unconstitutional, R.A. 9716 entitled “An Act Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st)
and Second Legislative Districts (2nd) in the province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a
New Legislative District from such Reapportionment.”

Said Act originated from House Bill No. 4264, and it was enacted by President Macapagal-
Arroyo. Effectuating the act, it has divided the existing four districts, and apportioned districts
shall form additional district where the new first district shall be composed of 176,383 population
count.

Petitioners contend that the reapportionment runs afoul of the explicit constitutional standard
with a minimum population of 250,000 for the creation of a legislative district under Section 5
(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. It was emphasized as well by the petitioners that if
population is less than that provided by the Constitution, it must be stricken-down for non-
compliance with the minimum population requirement, unless otherwise fixed by law.

Respondents have argued that the petitioners are guilty of two fatal technical effects: first, error
in choosing to assail R.A. 9716 via the Remedy of Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court. And second, petitioners have no locus standi to question the constitutionality
of R.A. 9716.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Republic Act No. 9716 is unconstitutional and therefore null and void, or whether
or not a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation of
a new legislative district in a province.

RULING::
The Court ruled that the said Act is constitutional. The plain and clear distinction between a city
and a province was explained under the second sentence of Section 5 (3) of the Constitution. It
states that a province is entitled into a representative, with nothing was mentioned about a
population. While in cities, a minimum population of 250,000 must first be satisfied. In 2007,
CamSur had a population of 1,693,821 making the province entitled to two additional districts
from the present of four. Based on the formulation of Ordinance, other than population, the
results of the apportionment were valid. And lastly, other factors were mentioned during the
deliberations of House Bill No. 4264.

Page 164 of 370

Veterans Federation Party v. Commission on Elections
G.R. Nos. 136781, 136786, 136795
October 6, 2000
FACTS:
COMELEC proclaimed 14 party-list representatives from 13 parties which obtained at least 2%
of the total number of votes cast for the party-list system as members of the House of
Representatives. Upon petition for respondents, who were party-list organizations, it proclaimed
38 additional party-list representatives although they obtained less than 2% of the total number
of votes cast for the party-list system on the ground that under the Constitution, it is mandatory
that at least 20% of the members of the House of Representatives come from the party-list
representatives.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in Section
5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? In other words, should
the twenty percent allocation for party-list solons be filled up completely and all the time?

RULING:
It is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for the party-list seats in the House of
Representatives. The Constitution vested Congress with the broad power to define and
prescribe the mechanics of the party-list system of representatives. In the exercise of its
constitutional prerogative, Congress deemed it necessary to require parties participating in the
system to obtain at least 2% of the total votes cast for the party list system to be entitled to a
party-list seat. Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties having a sufficient number of
constituents deserving of representation are actually represented in Congress.

Page 165 of 370

Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 203766
April 2, 2013

FACTS:
52 party-list groups and organizations assailing the Resolutions issued by the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) disqualifying them from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list
elections, either by denial of their petitions for registration under the party-list system, or
cancellation of their registration and accreditation as party-list organizations. In a Resolution
dated 5 December 2012, the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the COMELEC Second Division’s
resolution to grant Partido ng Bayan ng Bida’s (PBB) registration and accreditation as a political
party in the National Capital Region. However, PBB was denied participation in the 13 May
2013 party-list elections because PBB does not represent any "marginalized and
underrepresented" sector; 13 petitioners were not able to secure a mandatory injunction from
this Court. The COMELEC, on 7 January 2013 issued Resolution No. 9604, and excluded the
names of these 13 petitioners in the printing of the official ballot for the 13 May 2013 party-list
elections. Pursuant to paragraph 2 of Resolution No. 9513, the COMELEC En Banc scheduled
summary evidentiary hearings to determine whether the groups and organizations that filed
manifestations of intent to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections have continually
complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 7941 and Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v.
COMELEC (Ang Bagong Bayani), which COMELEC later disqualified several groups. 39
petitioners were able to secure a mandatory injunction from this Court, directing the COMELEC
to include the names of these 39 petitioners in the printing of the official ballot for the 13 May
2013 party-list elections. Petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction. This Court issued Status Quo Ante Orders in all petitions.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the criteria for participating as party-list system laid down in Ang Bagong Bayani
and BANAT should be applied by the Comelec in the coming May 2013 party-list elections

RULING:
No. Political parties need not align themselves with sectoral groups or organizations, and the
nominees thereof need not come from that sector itself, provided that he can show that he has a
proven track record for advocating the cause of the organization he seeks to represent. The
recognition that national and regional parties, as well as sectoral parties of professionals, the
elderly, women and the youth, need not be "marginalized and underrepresented" will allow small
ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who lack "well-defined political constituencies" a
chance to win seats in the House of Representatives. On the other hand, limiting to the
"marginalized and underrepresented" the sectoral parties for labor, peasant, fisher folk, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other
sectors that by their nature are economically at the margins of society, will give the
"marginalized and underrepresented" an opportunity to likewise win seats in the House of
Representatives. Belonging to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector does not mean
one must "wallow in poverty, destitution or infirmity." It is sufficient that one, or his or her sector,
is below the middle class or those who fall in the low income group as classified by the National
Statistical Coordination Board.

Page 166 of 370

Hidalgo v. Hidalgo
G.R. No. L-25326
May 29, 1970

FACTS:
Policarpio Hidalgo was until the time of the execution of the deeds of sale on September 27,
1963 and March 2, 1964 in favor of his seven above-named private co-respondents, the owner
of the 22,876-square meter and 7,638-square meter agricultural parcels of land situated in
Lumil, San Jose, Batangas.

In Case L-25326, Policarpio sold the 22,876-square meter parcel of land, together with two
other parcels of land for P4,000.00. Igmidio Hidalgo and Martina Resales, as tenants thereof,
alleging that the parcel worked by them as tenants is fairly worth P1,500.00, "taking into account
the respective areas, productivities, accessibilities, and assessed values of three lots, seek by
way of redemption the execution of a deed of sale for the same amount of P1,500.00 by
Policarpio in their favor.

In Case L-25327, Policarpio sold the 7,638-square meter parcel of land for P750.00, and Hilario
Aguila and Adela Hidalgo as tenants thereof, seek by way of redemption the execution of a
deed of sale for the same price of P750.00 by Policarpio in their favor.

The Igmidio and others have for several years been working on the lands as share tenants. No
90-day notice of intention to sell the lands for the exercise of the right of pre-emption prescribed
by section 11 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code (Republic Act No. 3844, enacted on August
8, 1963) was given by Policarpio to petitioners-tenants. Subsequently, the deeds of sale
executed by Policarpio-vendor were registered by respondents register of deeds and provincial
assessor of Batangas in the records of their respective offices notwithstanding the non-
execution by Policarpio-vendor of the affidavit required by section 13 of the Land Reform Code.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the plaintiffs as share tenants are entitled to redeem the parcel of land they are
working form the purchases thereof, where no notice was previously given to them by the
vendor, who was their landholder of the latter's intention to sell the property and where the
vendor did not execute the affidavit required by Section 13 of RA 3844 before the registration of
the deed of sale. Or, is the right of redemption granted by Section 12 of RA 3844 applicable to
share tenants?

RULING:
The code intended to afford the farmers' who transitionally continued to be share tenants after
its enactment but who inexorably would be agricultural lessees by virtue of the Code's
proclaimed abolition of tenancy, the same priority and preferential right as those other share
tenants, who upon the enactment of the Code or soon thereafter were earlier converted by
fortuitous circumstance into agricultural lessees, to acquire the lands under their cultivation in
the event of their voluntary sale by the owner or of their acquisition, by expropriation or
otherwise, by the Land Authority. It then becomes the court's duty to enforce the intent and will
of the Code, for "... (I)n fact, the spirit or intention of a statute prevails over the letter thereof.'
(Tañada vs. Cuenco, L-10520, Feb. 23, 1957, citing 82 C.J.S., p. 526.) A statute 'should be
construed according to its spirit or intention, disregarding as far as necessary, the letter of the
law.' (Lopez & Sons, Inc. vs. Court of Tax Appeals, 100 Phil. 855.) By this, we do not correct the
act of the Legislature, but rather ... carry out and give due course to 'its intent.
Therefore, the decision of Agrarian Court is reversed and the petitions to redeem the subject
landholdings are granted. In case L-25326 however the case is remanded to the agrarian court
to determine the reasonable price to be paid by petitioners therein to Policarpio Hidalgo for
redemption of the landholding in accordance with the observations made.

Page 167 of 370

Greater Balanga Development Corporation v. Municipality of Balanga, Bataan
G.R. No. 83987
December 24, 1997

FACTS:
On January 1988, the petitioner applied with the office of the Mayor of Balanga for a business
permit to engage in the business in the said area. The mayor granted the petitioner the privilege
of a “real estate dealer/privately-owned public market operator” under the trade name of
Balanga Central Market. In February 1988, the Sangguniang Bayan passed a resolution
annulling the mayor’s permit issued to petitioner and advising the mayor to revoke the permit “to
operate a public market” in which the mayor did by passing an executive order. Because of
which, the petitioner filed a petition for the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction which the
court denied. Petitioner argues that it had not violated any law or ordinance; hence, there was
no reason for the respondents to revoke the Mayor’s permit issued to it. Respondents claims
that petitioner had violated an existing municipal ordinance when it failed to disclose the true
status of the area involved in the permit and when it did not secure separate permits for its two
businesses, i.e., one as "real estate dealer" and another as "privately-owned public market
operator." Respondents referred to Section 3A-06(b) of the Balanga Revenue Code which, inter
alia, enjoins an applicant for a Mayor's permit from making a false statement in his application
and provides for the penalties for violation of any existing ordinance regulating business
establishments.

ISSUE:
Whetehr or not petitioner’s applying for two business permit is a ground for revocation

RULING:
The permit should not have been issued without the required information given in the application
form itself. Revoking the permit, however, because of a false statement in the application form
cannot be justified under the aforementioned provision. There must be proof of willful
misrepresentation and deliberate intent to make a false statement. Good faith is always
presumed, and as it happened, petitioner did not make any false statement in the pertinent
entry. Neither was petitioner's applying for two businesses in one permit a ground for
revocation. The second paragraph of Section 3A-06(b) does not expressly require two permits
for their conduct of two or more businesses in one place, but only that separate fees be paid for
each business. The powers of municipal corporations are to be construed in strictissimi juris and
any doubt or ambiguity must be construed against the municipality

Granting, however, that separate permits are actually required, the application form does not
contain any entry as regards the number of businesses the applicant wishes to engage
in.Respondents insinuated bad faith on the part of petitioner in failing to supply the pertinent
information in the application form and for taking advantage of the fact that Mayor Banzon was
then newly installed as Mayor of Balanga. The absence of the material information in the
application form was nonetheless supplied in the face of the permit signed and issued by Mayor
Banzon himself.

Page 168 of 370

Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Philippine Airlines
G.R. No. 160528
October 9, 2006
FACTS:
On November 5, 1997, [respondent's] AVP-Revenue Operations and Tax Services Officer, Atty.
Edgardo P. Curbita, filed with the Office of the then Commissioner of Internal Revenue, a written
request for refund of the amount of P2,241,527.22 which represents the total amount of 20%
final withholding tax withheld from the [respondent] by various withholding agent banks, and
which amount includes the 20% final withholding tax withheld by the UCPB and RCBC for the
period starting March 1995 through February 1997. On December 4, 1997, the [respondent's]
AVP-Revenue Operations and Tax Services Officer again filed with [petitioner] CIR another
written request for refund of the amount of P1,048,047.23, representing the total amount of 20%
final withholding tax withheld by various depository banks of the [respondent] which amount
includes the 20% withholding tax withheld by PNB, EBC, and JPSMB for the period starting
March 1995 through November 1997. The CTA ruled that Respondent PAL was not entitled to
the refund. Section 13 of Presidential Decree No. 1590, PAL's franchise, allegedly gave
respondent the option to pay either its corporate income tax under the provisions of the NIRC or
a franchise tax of two percent of its gross revenues. Payment of either tax would be in lieu of all
"other taxes." The Court of Appeals reversed the Decision of the CTA. The CA held that PAL
was bound to pay only the corporate income tax or the franchise tax. Section 13 of Presidential
Decree No. 1590 exempts respondent from paying all other taxes, duties, royalties and other
fees of any kind. Respondent chose to pay its basic corporate income tax, which, after
considering the factors allowed by law, resulted in a zero tax liability.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred on a question of law ruling that the 'in lieu of all other
taxes' provision in Section 13 of PD No. 1590 applies even if there were in fact no taxes paid
under any of subsections (A) and (B) of the said decree

RULING:
The fallacy of the CIR's argument is evident from the fact that the payment of a measly sum of
one peso would suffice to exempt PAL from other taxes, whereas a zero liability arising from its
losses would not. There is no substantial distinction between a zero tax and a one-peso tax
liability.

The Court is bound to effectuate the lawmakers' intent, which is the controlling factor in
interpreting a statute.

While the Court recognizes the general rule that the grant of tax exemptions is strictly construed
against the taxpayer and in favor of the taxing power,31 Section 13 of the franchise of
respondent leaves no room for interpretation. Its franchise exempts it from paying any tax other
than the option it chooses: either the "basic corporate income tax" or the two percent gross
revenue tax. Determining whether this tax exemption is wise or advantageous is outside the
realm of judicial power. This matter is addressed to the sound discretion of the lawmaking
department of government.

Page 169 of 370

 Del Mar v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Association
G.R. No. 138298
November 29, 2000
FACTS:
On May 6, 1999, petitioner Raoul B. del Mar initially filed in G.R. No. 138298 a Petition for
Prohibition to prevent respondent PAGCOR from managing and/or operating the jai-alai or
Basque pelota games, by itself or in agreement with Belle Corporation, on the ground that the
controverted act is patently illegal and devoid of any basis either from the Constitution or
PAGCOR’s own Charter. However, on June 17, 1999, respondent PAGCOR entered into an
Agreement with private respondents Belle Jai Alai Corporation (BELLE) and Filipinas Gaming
Entertainment Totalizator Corporation (FILGAME) wherein it was agreed that BELLE will make
available to PAGCOR the required infrastructure facilities including the main fronton, as well as
provide the needed funding for jai-alai operations with no financial outlay from PAGCOR, while
PAGCOR handles the actual management and operation of jai-alai. Thus, on August 10, 1999,
petitioner Del Mar filed a Supplemental Petition for Certiorari questioning the validity of said
Agreement on the ground that PAGCOR is without jurisdiction, legislative franchise, authority or
power to enter into such Agreement for the opening, establishment, operation, control and
management of jai-alai games. A little earlier, or on July 1, 1999, petitioners Federico S.
Sandoval II and Michael T. Defensor filed a Petition for Injunction, docketed as G.R. No.
138982, which seeks to enjoin respondent PAGCOR from operating or otherwise managing the
jai-alai or Basque pelota games by itself or in joint venture with Belle Corporation, for being
patently illegal, having no basis in the law or the Constitution, and in usurpation of the authority
that properly pertains to the legislative branch of the government. In this case, a Petition in
Intervention was filed by Juan Miguel Zubiri alleging that the operation by PAGCOR of jai-alai is
illegal because it is not included in the scope of PAGCOR’s franchise which covers only games
of chance. Petitioners Raoul B. del Mar, Federico S. Sandoval II, Michael T. Defensor, and
intervenor Juan Miguel Zubiri, are suing as taxpayers and in their capacity as members of the
House of Representatives representing the First District of Cebu City, the Lone Congressional
District of Malabon-Navotas, the Third Congressional District of Quezon City, and the Third
Congressional District of Bukidnon, respectively.

ISSUE:
Whether or not PAGCOR by its Charter to operate and manage jai-alai frontons in the country

RULING:
A statute is ambiguous when it is capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed
persons in either of two or more senses. In the cases at bar, it is difficult to see how a literal
reading of the statutory text would unerringly reveal the legislative intent. To be sure, the term
"jai-alai" was never used and is nowhere to be found in the law. The conclusion that it is
included in the franchise granted to PAGCOR cannot be based on a mere cursory perusal of
and a blind reliance on the ordinary and plain meaning of the statutory terms used such as
"gaming pools" and "lotteries." Sutherland tells us that a statute is "ambiguous", and so open to
explanation by extrinsic aids, not only when its abstract meaning or the connotation of its terms
is uncertain, but also when it is uncertain in its application to, or effect upon, the fact-situation of
the case at bar.

Page 170 of 370

Commissioner of Customs v. Esso Standard Eastern, Inc.
G.R. No. L-28329
August 7, 1975

FACTS:
Respondent ESSO is the holder of Refining Concession No. 2, issued by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources on December 9, 1957, and operates a petroleum refining
plant in Limay Bataan. Under Article 103 of Republic Act No. 387 which provides: "During the
five years following the granting of any concession, the concessionaire may import free of
customs duty, all equipment, machinery, material, instruments, supplies and accessories,"
respondent imported and was assessed the special import tax (which it paid under protest).
Petitioner contends that the special import tax under Republic Act No. 1394 is separate and
distinct from the customs duty prescribed by the Tariff and Customs Code, and that the
exemption enjoyed by respondent ESSO from the payment of customs duties under the
Petroleum net of 1949 does not include exemption from the payment of the special import tax
provided in R.A. No. 1394.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the exemptions enjoyed by respondent ESSO under R.A. No. 387 have been
abrogated by R.A. No. 1394

RULING:
The history of the enactment of the statute and purpose of the legislature in employing a clause
or provision in the law had been applied in determining the true intent of the lawmaking body,
We are convinced that R.A. No. 387, The Petroleum Act of 1949, was intended to encourage
the exploitation, exploration and development of the petroleum resources of the country by
giving it the necessary incentive in the form of tax exemptions. This is the raison d etre for the
generous grant of tax exemptions to those who would invest their financial resources towards
the achievement of this national economic goal.

On the contention of herein petitioner that the exemptions enjoyed by respondent ESSO under
R.A. No. 387 have been abrogated by R.A. No. 1394, We hold that repeal by implication is not
favored unless it is manifest that the legislature so intended. As laws are presumed to be
passed with deliberation and with full knowledge of all existing ones on the subject, it is logical
to conclude that in passing a statute it was not intended to interfere with or abrogate any former
law relating to the same matter, unless the repugnancy between the two is not only
irreconcilable but also clear and convincing as a result of the language used, or unless the latter
act fully embraces the subject matter of the earlier.

Page 171 of 370

People v. Muñoz
G.R. No. 38969-70
February 9, 1989

FACTS:
On June 30, 1972 in Balite Sur, San Carlos City, Pangasinan, Feliciano Muñoz, Marvin Millora,
Tomas Tayaba, Jose Mislang, and the other seven unidentified men, went out in a jeep at the
behest of one of them who had complained of having been victimized by cattle rustlers. Having
found their supposed quarry, they proceeded to execute each one of them in cold blood without
further ado and without mercy. Mauro Bulatao was shot in the mouth and died instantly as his
son and daughter looked on in horror. Alejandro Bulatao was forced to lie down on the ground
and then shot twice, also in the head, before his terrified wife and son. Aquilino Bulatao, who
was only sixteen years old, was kicked in the head until he bled before he too had his brains
blown out. The four identified accused were convicted for the crime of murder qualified by
treachery. The penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code was reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to death, but this was modified by Article III, Section 19(l) of the
1987 Constitution which provides that excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel,
degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. It further provides that neither shall death penalty be
imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter
provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 19(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution, abolish the death penalty.
RULING:

A reading of Section 19(l) of Article III will readily show that there is really nothing therein which
expressly declares the abolition of the death penalty. The provision merely says that the death
penalty shall not be imposed unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes the
Congress hereafter provides for it and, if already imposed, shall be reduced to reclusion
perpetua. The language, while rather awkward, is still plain enough. And it is a settled rule of
legal hermeneutics that if the language under consideration is plain, it is neither necessary nor
permissible to resort to extrinsic aids, like the records of the constitutional convention, for its
interpretation. Thus, Article III, Section 19(l) does not change the periods of the penalty
prescribed by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code except only insofar as it prohibits the
imposition of the death penalty and reduces it to reclusion perpetua. The range of the medium
and minimum penalties remains unchanged.

Page 172 of 370

People v. Degamo
G.R. No. 121211
April 30, 2003

FACTS:
A complaint was filed before the trial court charging Roneto “Roy’’ Degamo with a crime of rape
to which, upon arraignment, pleaded not guilty. Before the start of the trial proper the court
allowed the complaint to be amended to include the allegation that by reason of the incident of
rape, the victim has become insane. Upon arraignment, Roy pleaded not guilty to the charge.
Trial ensued.

The prosecution’s version of evidence alleged that Roy raped Ellen Vertudazo on October 1,
1994, at around 1:00 in the morning inside her house by forcing his way inside the house and
poked a knife at the complainant’s neck. She tried to move away from Roy but he grabbed her
and told her that he would kill her if she will not accede to his demands. Roy then told her to put
off the light, strip off her clothes and not make any noise. Thereafter, Roy had a sexual
intercourse with her. Due to her traumatic experience, complainant suffered from Psychosis,
which is a form of mental disorder, technical term for insanity, induced by an overwhelming
trauma secondary to rape.

The version of Roy is based on his lone testimony. He admits that he and complainant were
neighbors but claims that they were lovers, and they had sexual intercourse without him having
to use force. Therefore, the trial court rendered a decision finding Roy guilty of rape. Hence, this
petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the qualifying circumstance of insanity of the victim by reason or on occasion of
the rape committed against complainant should likewise be considered in the imposition of the
proper penalty

RULING:
There is no jurisprudence yet, however, which construed the provision has become insane.
Though there is no doubt that the death penalty shall be imposed if the victim becomes
permanently insane, there is no ruling yet whether temporary insanity by reason of rape (when
the victim responded to psychiatric treatment as in the present case) still falls within the purview
of the same provision.

For the guidance of the Bench and the Bar, we deem it proper to resolve what should be the
correct construction of the provision has become insane by reason or on occasion of the rape
committed.

It is a hornbook doctrine in statutory construction that it is the duty of the court in construing a
law to determine legislative intention from its language.33 The history of events that transpired
during the process of enacting a law, from its introduction in the legislature to its final validation
has generally been the first extrinsic aid to which courts turn to construe an ambiguous
act.34cräläwvirtualibräry

Republic Act No. 263235 is the first law that introduced the qualifying circumstance of insanity
by reason or on occasion of rape, amending Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. An
examination of the deliberation of the lawmakers in enacting R.A. No. 2632, convinces us that
the degree of insanity, whether permanent or temporary, is not relevant in considering the same
as a qualifying circumstance for as long as the victim has become insane by reason or on
occasion of the rape.

Page 173 of 370

Alhambra Cigar & Cigarette Manufacturing Company v. Securities and Exchange
Commission
G.R. No. L-23606
July 29, 1968

FACTS:
Alhambra Cigar and Cigarette Manufacturing Company, Inc. was duly incorporated under
Philippine laws on January 15, 1912. By its corporate articles it was to exist for fifty (50) years
from incorporation. Its term of existence expired on January 15, 1962. On that date, it ceased
transacting business, entered into a state of liquidation. Thereafter, a new corporation,
Alhambra Industries, Inc., was formed to carry on the business of Alhambra. On June 20, 1963,
within Alhambra's three-year statutory period for liquidation, RA 3531 was enacted into law. It
amended Section 18 of the Corporation Law empowering domestic private corporations to
extend their corporate life beyond the period fixed by the articles of incorporation for a term not
to exceed fifty years in any one instance. Previous to RA 3531, the maximum non-extendible
term of such corporations was fifty years. On July 15, 1963, at a special meeting, Alhambra's
board of directors resolved to amend paragraph "Fourth" of its articles of incorporation to extend
its corporate life for an additional fifty years, or a total of 100 years from its incorporation.
Alhambra's articles of incorporation as so amended certified correct by its president and
secretary and a majority of its board of directors, were then filed with SEC. SEC, however,
returned said amended articles of incorporation to Alhambra's counsel with the ruling that RA
3531 "which took effect only on June 20, 1963, cannot be availed of by the said corporation, for
the reason that its term of existence had already expired when the said law took effect in short,
said law has no retroactive effect."

ISSUE:
Whether or not a corporation can extend its life by amendment of its articles of incorporation
effected during the three-year statutory period for liquidation when its original term of existence
had already expired.

RULING:
The situation here presented is not one where the law under consideration is ambiguous, where
courts have to put in harness extrinsic aids such as a look at another statute to disentangle
doubts. It is an elementary rule in legal hermeneutics that where the terms of the law are clear,
no statutory construction may be permitted. Upon the basic conceptual scheme under which
corporations operate, and with Section 77 of the Corporation Law particularly in mind, we find
no vagueness in Section 18, as amended by Republic Act 3531. As we view it, by directing
attention to Republic Act 1932, Alhambra would seek to create obscurity in the law; and, with
that, ask of us a ruling that such obscurity be explained. This, we dare say, cannot be done.

The pari materia rule of statutory construction, in fact, commands that statutes must be
harmonized with each other.14 So harmonizing, the conclusion is clear that Section 18 of the
Corporation Law, as amended by Republic Act 3531 in reference to extensions of corporate
existence, is to be read in the same light as Republic Act 1932. Which means that domestic
corporations in general, as with domestic insurance companies, can extend corporate existence
only on or before the expiration of the term fixed in their charters.

Page 174 of 370

Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 103882
November 25, 1998

FACTS:

On June 22, 1957, RA 1899 was approved granting authority to all municipalities and chartered
cities to undertake and carry out at their own expense the reclamation by dredging, filling, or
other means, of any foreshore lands bordering them, and to establish, provide, construct,
maintain and repair proper and adequate docking and harbor facilities as such municipalities
and chartered cities may determine in consultation with the Secretary of Finance and the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications. Pursuant to the said law, Ordinance No. 121
was passed by the city of Pasay for the reclamation of foreshore lands within their jurisdiction
and entered into an agreement with Republic Real Estate Corporation for the said project.
Republic questioned the agreement. It contended, among others, that the agreement between
RREC and the City of Pasay was void for the object of the contract is outside the commerce of
man, it being a foreshore land.

Pasay City and RREC countered that the object in question is within the commerce of man
because RA 1899 gives a broader meaning on the term “foreshore land” than that in the
definition provided by the dictionary. RTC rendered judgment in favour of Pasay City and
RREC, and the decision was affirmed by the CA with modifications.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Ordinance passed by Pasay City is valid

RULING:

The Court ruled that, it is erroneous and unsustainable is the opinion of respondent court that
under RA 1899, the term "foreshore lands" includes submerged areas. As can be gleaned from
its disquisition and rationalization aforequoted, the respondent court unduly stretched and
broadened the meaning of "foreshore lands", beyond the intentment of the law, and against the
recognized legal connotation of "foreshore lands". Well entrenched, to the point of being
elementary, is the rule that when the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no
reason for interpretation or construction, but only for application. So also, resort to extrinsic aids,
like the records of the constitutional convention, is unwarranted, the language of the law being
plain and unambiguous.

The duty of the court is to interpret the enabling Act, RA 1899. In so doing, we cannot broaden
its meaning; much less widen the coverage thereof. If the intention of Congress were to include
submerged areas, it should have provided expressly. That Congress did not so provide could
only signify the exclusion of submerged areas from the term “foreshore lands.”
It bears stressing that the subject matter of Pasay City Ordinance No. 121, as amended by
Ordinance No. 158, and the Agreement under attack, have been found to be outside the
intendment and scope of RA 1899, and therefore ultra vires and null and void.

Page 175 of 370

Vera v. Avelino
G.R. No. L-543
August 31, 1946

FACTS:
Commission on Elections submitted last May 1946 to the President and the Congress of the
Philippines a report regarding the national elections held the previous month. It stated that by
reason of certain specified acts of terrorism and violence in the province of Pampanga, Nueva
Ecija, Bulacan and Tarlac, the voting in said region did not reflect the true and free expression
of the popular will.

During the session, when the senate convened on May 25, 1946, a pendatum resolution was
approved referring to the report ordering that Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose E. Romero
– who had been included among the 16 candidates for senator receiving the highest number of
votes, proclaimed by the Commissions on Elections – shall not be sworn, nor seated, as
members of the chamber, pending the termination of the of the protest lodged against their
election.

Petitioners thus immediately instituted an action against their colleagues responsible for the
resolution, praying for an order to annul it and compelling respondents to permit them to occupy
their seats and to exercise their senatorial prerogative. They also allege that only the Electoral
Tribunal had jurisdiction over contests relating to their election, returns and qualifications.
Respondents assert the validity of the pendatum resolution.

ISSUE:
Whether the Commission on Elections has the jurisdiction to determine whether or not votes
cast in the said provinces are valid.

RULING:
.
The Supreme Court refused to intervene, under the concept of separation of powers, holding
that the case was not a “contest”, and affirmed the inherent right of the legislature to determine
who shall be admitted to its membership.

The theory has been proposed — modesty aside — that the dissenting members of this Court
who were delegates to the Constitutional Convention and were "co-authors of the Constitution"
"are in a better position to interpret" that same Constitution in this particular litigation. There is
no doubt that their properly recorded utterances during the debates and proceedings of the
Convention deserve weight, like those of any other delegate therein. Note, however, that the
proceedings of the Convention "are less conclusive of the power construction of the instrument
than are legislative proceedings of the proper construction of a statute; since in the latter case it
is the intent of the legislature we seek, while in the former we are endeavoring to arrive at the
intent of the people through the discussions and deliberations of their representatives.

The proceedings of the Convention "are less conclusive of the power construction of the
instrument than are legislative proceedings of the proper construction of a statute; since in the
latter case it is the intent of the legislature we seek, while in the former we are endeavoring to
arrive at the intent of the people through the discussions and deliberations of their
representatives.Their writings (of the delegates) commenting or explaining that instrument,
published shortly thereafter,the book of Delegate Aruego, supra, and of others — have
persuasive force

Page 176 of 370

 Southern Cross Cement Corporation v. Philippine Cement Manufacturers Corp.
G.R. No. 158540
July 8, 2004
FACTS:
Petitioner Southern Cross Cement Corporation (Southern Cross) is a domestic corporation
engaged in the business of cement manufacturing, production, importation and exportation.
Private respondent Philippine Cement Manufacturers Corporation (Philcemcor) is an association
of domestic cement manufacturers. DTI accepted an application from Philcemcor, alleging that
the importation of gray Portland cement in increased quantities has caused declines in domestic
production, capacity utilization, market share, sales and employment; as well as caused
depressed local prices. Accordingly, Philcemcor sought the imposition a definitive safeguard
measures on the import of cement pursuant to the Safeguard Measures Act. The Tariff
Commission received a request from the DTI for a formal investigation to determine whether or
not to impose a definitive safeguard measure on imports of gray Portland cement Tariff
Commission’s report: The elements of serious injury and imminent threat of serious injury not
having been established, it is hereby recommended that no definitive general safeguard
measure be imposed on the importation of gray Portland cement. After reviewing the report,
then DTI Secretary Manuel Roxas II (DTI Secretary) disagreed with the conclusion of the Tariff
Commission that there was no serious injury to the local cement industry caused by the surge of
imports. In view of this disagreement, the DTI requested an opinion from the Department of
Justice (DOJ) on the DTI Secretarys scope of options in acting on the Commissions
recommendations.

Subsequently, then DOJ Secretary Hernando Perez rendered an opinion stating that Section 13
of the SMA precluded a review by the DTI Secretary of the Tariff Commissions negative finding,
or finding that a definitive safeguard measure should not be imposed. DTI then denied
application for safeguard measures against the importation of gray Portland cement. Philcemcor
received a copy of the DTI Decision on 12 April 2002. Ten days later, it filed with the Court of
Appeals a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus seeking to set aside the DTI
Decision, as well as the Tariff Commissions Report. On the other hand, Southern Cross filed its
Comment arguing that the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction over Philcemcors Petition, for it
is on the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) that the SMA conferred jurisdiction to review rulings of the
Secretary in connection with the imposition of a safeguard measure.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the DTI Secretary may impose general safeguard measures in the absence of a
positive final determination by the Tariff Commission.
RULING:
The plain meaning of Section 5 emphasizes that only if the Tariff Commission renders a positive
determination could the DTI Secretary impose a safeguard measure. Resort to the
congressional records to ascertain legislative intent is not warranted if a statute is clear, plain
and free from ambiguity. The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to have
used words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in
the statuteMinority or solitary views, anecdotal ruminations, or even the occasional crude
witticisms, may improperly acquire the mantle of legislative intent by the sole virtue of their
publication in the authoritative congressional record. Hence, resort to legislative deliberations is
allowable when the statute is crafted in such a manner as to leave room for doubt on the real
intent of the legislature. Section 5 plainly evinces legislative intent to restrict the DTI Secretary's
power to impose a general safeguard measure by preconditioning such imposition on a positive
determination by the Tariff Commission. Such legislative intent should be given full force and
effect, as the executive power to impose definitive safeguard measures is but a delegated
power¾the power of taxation, by nature and by command of the fundamental law, being a
preserve of the legislature

Page 177 of 370

Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. SM Prime Holdings, Inc.
G.R. No. 183505
February 26, 2010

FACTS:
Several CTA cases, the BIR sent SM Prime and First Asia a Preliminary Assessment Notice for
VAT deficiency on cinema ticket sales for taxable year 2000 (SM), 1999 (First Asia), 2000 (First
Asia), 2002 (First Asia), and 2003 (First Asia). SM and First Asia filed for protest but the BIR just
denied them and sent them Letter of Demand subsequently. All the PANs were subjected to
Petition for Review file by SM and First Asia to CTA. The CTA First Division ruled that there
should only be one business tax applicable to theater and movie houses, the 30% amusement
tax. Hence, CIR is wrong in collecting VAT from the ticket sales. The CIR appealed the case to
the CTA En banc. The latter affirmed the ruling of the CTA First Division.

ISSUE:
W1hether the gross receipts derived by operators or proprietors of cinema/theater houses from
admission tickets are subject to VAT

RULING:

When the intent of the law is not apparent as worded, or when the application of the law would
lead to absurdity or injustice, legislative history is all important. In such cases, courts may take
judicial notice of the origin and history of the law, the deliberations during the enactment, as well
as prior laws on the same subject matter3 to ascertain the true intent or spirit of the law.

A cursory reading of the foregoing provision clearly shows that the enumeration of the "sale or
exchange of services" subject to VAT is not exhaustive. The words, "including," "similar
services," and "shall likewise include," indicate that the enumeration is by way of example
only.Among those included in the enumeration is the "lease of motion picture films, films, tapes
and discs." This, however, is not the same as the showing or exhibition of motion pictures or
films. Since the activity of showing motion pictures, films or movies by cinema/ theater operators
or proprietors is not included in the enumeration, it is incumbent upon the court to the determine
whether such activity falls under the phrase "similar services." The intent of the legislature must
therefore be ascertained.The legislature never intended operators or proprietors of
cinema/theater houses to be covered by VAT

Page 178 of 370

Laurel v. Abrogar
G.R. No. 155076
February 27, 2006

FACTS:
Laurel was charged with engaging in International Simple Resale (ISR) or the unauthorized
routing and completing of international long distance calls using lines, cables, antennae, and/or
air wave frequency and connecting these calls directly to the local or domestic exchange
facilities of the country where destined.

PLDT alleges that the “international phone calls” which are “electric currents or sets of electric
impulses transmitted through a medium, and carry a pattern representing the human voice to a
receiver,” are Personal properties which may be the subject of theft. Art. 416(3) deems “forces
of nature” (which includes electricity” which are brought under the control by science, are
personal property.
Laurel claims that a telephone call is a conversation on the phone or a communication carried
out using the telephone. It is not synonymous to electric currents or impulses. Hence, it may not
be considered as personal property susceptible of appropriation. Laurel claims that the analogy
between generated electricity and telephone calls is misplaced. PLDT does not produce or
generate telephone calls. It only Provides the facilities or services for the transmission and
switching of the calls. He also insists that “business” is not personal property. It is not the
“business” that is protected but the “right to carry a business.” This right is what is considered as
property. Since the services of PLDT cannot be considered as “property,” the same may not be
the subject of theft.
ISSUE:
Whether or not international telephone calls using Bay Super Orient Cards through the
telecommunication services provided by PLDT for such calls, or, in short, PLDT’s business of
providing said telecommunication services, are proper subjects of theft under Article 308 of the
Revised Penal Code
RULING:
The Court find and so hold that the international telephone calls placed by Bay Super Orient
Card holders, the telecommunication services provided by PLDT and its business of providing
said services are not personal properties under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code. The
construction by the respondents of Article 308 of the said Code to include, within its coverage,
the aforesaid international telephone calls, telecommunication services and business is contrary
to the letter and intent of the law.

The rule is that, penal laws are to be construed strictly. Such rule is founded on the tenderness
of the law for the rights of individuals and on the plain principle that the power of punishment is
vested in Congress, not in the judicial department. It is Congress, not the Court, which is to
define a crime, and ordain its punishment.44 Due respect for the prerogative of Congress in
defining crimes/felonies constrains the Court to refrain from a broad interpretation of penal laws
where a "narrow interpretation" is appropriate. The Court must take heed to language,
legislative history and purpose, in order to strictly determine the wrath and breath of the conduct
the law forbids. However, when the congressional purpose is unclear, the court must apply the
rule of lenity, that is, ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in
favor of lenity.

Penal statutes may not be enlarged by implication or intent beyond the fair meaning of the
language used; and may not be held to include offenses other than those which are clearly
described, notwithstanding that the Court may think that Congress should have made them
more comprehensive. Words and phrases in a statute are to be construed according to their
common meaning and accepted usage.

Page 179 of 370

Navarro v. Executive Secretary
G.R. No. 180050
April 12, 2011
FACTS:
Petitioners Navarro, Bernal, and Medina brought this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to
nullify Republic Act No. 9355, An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands, for being
unconstitutional. Based on the NSO 2000 Census of Population, the population of the Province
of Dinagat Islands is 106,951. A special census was afterwards conducted by the Provincial
Government of Surigao del Norte which yielded a population count of 371,576 inhabitants with
average annual income for calendar year 2002-2003 of P82,696,433.23 and with a land area of
802.12 square kilometers as certified by the Bureau of Local Government Finance.
Under Section 461 of R.A. No. 7610, The Local Government Code, a province may be created if
it has an average annual income of not less than P20 million based on 1991 constant prices as
certified by the Department of Finance, and a population of not less than 250,000 inhabitants as
certified by the NSO, or a contiguous territory of at least 2,000 square kilometers as certified by
the Lands Management Bureau. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two or
more islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities, which do not contribute to the income
of the province. Thereafter, the bill creating the Province of Dinagat Islands was enacted into
law and a plebiscite was held subsequently yielding to 69,943 affirmative votes and 63,502
negative. With the approval of the people from both the mother province of Surigao del Norte
and the Province of Dinagat Islands, Dinagat Islands was created  into a separate and distinct
province. Respondents argued that exemption from the land area requirement is germane to the
purpose of the Local Government Code to develop self-reliant political and territorial
subdivisions. Thus, the rules and regulations have the force and effect of law as long as they
are germane to the objects and purposes of the law.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the provision in Article 9(2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code of 1991 valid

RULING:
The matters raised during the said Bicameral Conference Committee meeting clearly show the
manifest intention of Congress to promote development in the previously underdeveloped and
uninhabited land areas by allowing them to directly share in the allocation of funds under the
national budget. It should be remembered that, under Sections 284 and 285

of the LGC, the IRA is given back to local governments, and the sharing is based on land area,
population, and local revenue.

Elementary is the principle that, if the literal application of the law results in absurdity,
impossibility, or injustice, then courts may resort to extrinsic aids of statutory construction, such
as the legislative history of the law, or may consider the implementing rules and regulations and
pertinent executive issuances in the nature of executive and/or legislative construction.
Pursuant to this principle, Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR should be deemed incorporated in the
basic law, the LGC.

It is well to remember that the LGC-IRR was formulated by the Oversight Committee consisting
of members of both the Executive and Legislative departments, pursuant to Section 53332 of
the LGC. As Section 533 provides, the Oversight Committee shall formulate and issue the
appropriate rules and regulations necessary for the efficient and effective implementation of any
and all provisions of this Code, thereby ensuring compliance with the principles of local
autonomy as defined under the Constitution.

Page 180 of 370

 Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 160675
June 16, 2006

FACTS:
The Office of the Ombudsman filed the instant petition for review on certiorari assailing the
Decision1 dated October 30, 2003 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 69313,
which had declared that the Office of the Ombudsman has no power to impose the penalty of
suspension. According to the appellate court, its power is limited only to the recommendation of
the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer or
employee found to be at fault.By declaring that the Office of the Ombudsman can only
recommend, but cannot directly impose, the penalty in administrative cases, the appellate court
allegedly, in effect, nullified and invalidated the provisions of Republic Act No. 6770 relating to
its administrative disciplinary powers. Stated in another manner, the appellate court has
allegedly deemed that the Office of the Ombudsman cannot make a determination of guilt for an
administrative offense; it cannot assess a penalty; and it cannot cause its decisions to be
implemented. Petitioner stresses that the grant of administrative disciplinary authority to the
Office of the Ombudsman is not prohibited by, or inconsistent with, the Constitution. It invokes
the legislative history of Republic Act No. 6770 to buttress its claim that it was the intention of
the lawmakers to provide for an independent constitutional body that would serve as "the
protector of the people" with "real powers."

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman only has the power to recommend, but not to
impose, the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a public
officer or employee

RULING:
The Court rejected the argument that the power of the Office of the Ombudsman is only
advisory or recommendatory in nature. It cautioned against the literal interpretation of Section
13(3), Article XI of the Constitution which directs the Office of the Ombudsman to "recommend"
to the officer concerned the removal, suspension demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of any
public official or employee at fault. Notwithstanding the term "recommend," according to the
Court, the said provision, construed together with the pertinent provisions in Republic Act No.
6770, is not only advisory in nature but is actually mandatory within the bounds of law.

The legislative history of Republic Act No. 6770 thus bears out the conclusion that the Office of
the Ombudsman was intended to possess full administrative disciplinary authority, including the
power to impose the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of
a public officer or employee found to be at fault. The lawmakers envisioned the Office of the
Ombudsman to be "an activist watchman," not merely a passive on

Page 181 of 370

Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Garin
G.R. No. 130230
April 15, 2005

FACTS:
Dante O. Garin, a lawyer, who was issued a traffic violation receipt (TVR) and his driver's
license confiscated for parking illegally along Binondo. Shortly before the expiration of the TVR's
validity, the respondent addressed a letter to then MMDA Chairman Prospero Oreta requesting
the return of his driver's license, and expressing his preference for his case to be filed in court.
Receiving no immediate reply, Garin filed a complaint before the RTC contending that in the
absence of any implementing rules and regulations, Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 grants the
MMDA unbridled discretion to deprive erring motorists of their licenses, pre-empting a judicial
determination of the validity of the deprivation, thereby violating the due process clause of the
Constitution. The respondent further contended that the provision violates the constitutional
prohibition against undue delegation of legislative authority. In filing this petition, the MMDA
reiterates and reinforces its argument in the court below and contends that a license to operate
a motor vehicle is neither a contract nor a property right, but is a privilege subject to reasonable
regulation under the police power in the interest of the public safety and welfare. The petitioner
further argues that revocation or suspension of this privilege does not constitute a taking without
due process as long as the licensee is given the right to appeal the revocation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the MMDA has the authority to confiscate and suspend or revoke driver’s
licenses in the enforcement of traffic laws and regulations

RULING:
The legislative history of Rep. Act No. 7924 creating the MMDA, we concluded that the MMDA
is not a local government unit or a public corporation endowed with legislative power, and,
unlike its predecessor, the Metro Manila Commission, it has no power to enact ordinances for
the welfare of the community. Thus, in the absence of an ordinance from the City of Makati, its
own order to open the street was invalid. We restate here the doctrine in the said decision as it
applies to the case at bar: police power, as an inherent attribute of sovereignty, is the power
vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish all manner of
wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not
repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the
commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same.

Having been lodged primarily in the National Legislature, it cannot be exercised by any group or
body of individuals not possessing legislative power. The National Legislature, however, may
delegate this power to the president and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies
of municipal corporations or local government units (LGUs). Once delegated, the agents can
exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body.
Our Congress delegated police power to the LGUs in the Local Government Code of 1991. A
local government is a "political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and
has substantial control of local affairs.” Local government units are the provinces, cities,
municipalities and barangays, which exercise police power through their respective legislative
bodies.
Clearly, the MMDA is not a political unit of government. The power delegated to the MMDA is
that given to the Metro Manila Council to promulgate administrative rules and regulations in the
implementation of the MMDA's functions. There is no grant of authority to enact ordinances and
regulations for the general welfare of the inhabitants of the metropolis. Therefore, insofar as
Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 is understood by the lower court and by the petitioner to grant the
MMDA the power to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers' licenses without need of any
other legislative enactment, such is an unauthorized exercise of police power.

Page 182 of 370

Song Kiat Chocolate Factory v. Central Bank
G.R. No. L-8888
November 29, 1957.
FACTS:
During the period from January 8, 1953 to October 9, 1953, the plaintiff appellant imported sun
dried cocoa beans for which it paid the foreign exchange tax of 17 per cent totalling P74,671.04.
Claiming exemption from said tax under section 2 of same Act, it sued the Central Bank that
had exacted payment; and in its amended complaint it included the Treasurer of the Philippines.
The suit was filed in the Manila Court of First Instance, wherein defendants submitted in due
time a motion to dismiss on the grounds: first, the complaint stated no cause of action because
cocoa beans were not "chocolate"; and second, it was a suit against the Government without
the latter's consent

ISSUE:
Whether or not cocoa beans may be considered as "chocolate" for the purposes of exemption
from the foreign exchange tax imposed by Republic Act No. 601 as amended

RULING:
The quotations refer to "cocoa" as chocolate nut" "chocolate bean" or "chocolate tree." And the
legal exemption refers to "chocolate" not the bean, nor the nut nor the tree.In view of the
foregoing, and having in mind the principle of strict construction of statutes exempting from
taxation, we are of the opinion and so hold, that the exemption for "chocolate" in the above
section 2 does not include "cocoa beans". The one is raw material, the other manufactured
consumer product; the latter is ready for human consumption; the former is not.

Parts of the Congressional record quoted in the briefs would seem to show that in approving
House Bill No. 2576, the Congress agreed to exempt "cocoa beans" instead of chocolate with a
view to favoring local manufacturers of chocolate products.6 A change of legislative policy, as
appellees contend7 — not a declaration or clarification of previous Congressional purpose. In
fact, as indicating, the Government's new policy of exempting for the first time importations of
"cocoa beans," there is the President's proclamation No. 62 of September 2, 1954 issued in
accordance with Republic Act No. 1197 specifying that said exemption (of cocoa beans) shall
operate from and after September 3, 1954 — not before. As a general rule, it may be added,
statutes operate prospectively.

Page 183 of 370

Francisco v. Bosier
G.R. No. 137677
May 31, 2000
FACTS:

Petitioner Adalia B. Francisco and three of her sisters, Ester, Elizabeth and Adeluisa, were co-
owners of four parcels of registered lands. On August 5, 1992, petitioner received summons
filed by respondent demanding her share in the rentals being collected by petitioner from the
tenants of the building. Petitioner then informed respondent that she was exercising her right of
redemption as a co-owner of the subject property. 

On August 8, 1986, without the knowledge of the other co-owners, Adela Blas sold her 1/5
share for P10,000.00 to respondent Zenaida Boiser who is another sister of petitioner.

On September 14, 1995, petitioner filed a suit before the Regional Trial Court in Caloocan City.
She alleged that the 30-day period for redemption under Art. 1623 of the Civil Code had not
begun to run against her since the vendor, Adela Blas, never informed her and the other owners
about the sale to respondent. She learned about the sale only on August 5, 1992, after she
received the summons together with the complaint. Respondent, on the other hand, contended
that petitioner knew about the sale as early as May 30, 1992, because, on that date, she wrote
petitioner a letter2 informing the latter about the sale, with a demand that the rentals
corresponding to her 1/5 share of the subject property be remitted to her.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the letter of May 30, 1992 sent by respondent to petitioner notifying her of the
sale on August 8, 1986 of Adela Blas' 1/5 share of the property to respondent, containing a copy
of the deed evidencing such sale, can be considered sufficient as compliance with the notice
requirement of Art. 1623 for the purpose of legal redemption

RULING:

Art. 1623 of the Civil Code is clear in requiring that the written notification should come from the
vendor or prospective vendor, not from any other person. There is, therefore, no room for
construction. Indeed, the principal difference between Art. 1524 of the former Civil Code and
Art. 1623 of the present one is that the former did not specify who must give the notice, whereas
the present one expressly says the notice must be given by the vendor. Effect must be given to
this change in statutory language.

In the present case, as previously discussed, receipt by petitioner of summons in Civil Case No.
15510 on August 5, 1992 amounted to actual knowledge of the sale from which the 30-day
period of redemption commenced to run. Petitioner had until September 4, 1992 within which to
exercise her right of legal redemption, but on August 12, 1992 she deposited the P10,000.00
redemption price. As petitioner's exercise of said right was timely, the same should be given
effect.

Page 184 of 370

Buenaseda v. Flavier
G.R. No. 106719
September 21, 1993

FACTS:
The petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction or
Temporary Restraining Order, under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, seeks to nullify the
Order of the Ombudsman directing the preventive suspension of petitioners Dr. Brigida S.
Buenaseda et.al. The questioned order was issued in connection with the administrative
complaint filed with the Ombudsman (OBM-ADM-0-91-0151) by the private respondents against
the petitioners for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The Supreme Court
required respondent Secretary to comply with the aforestated status quo order. The Solicitor
General, in his comment, stated that (a) “The authority of the Ombudsman is only to
recommend suspension and he has no direct power to suspend;” and (b) “Assuming the
Ombudsman has the power to directly suspend a government official or employee, there are
conditions required by law for the exercise of such powers; [and] said conditions have not been
met in the instant case”

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Ombudsman has the power to suspend government officials and employees
working in offices other than the Office of the Ombudsman, pending the investigation of the
administrative complaints filed against said officials and employees

RULING:
When the constitution vested on the Ombudsman the power “to recommend the suspension” of
a public official or employees (Sec. 13 [3]), it referred to “suspension,” as a punitive measure. All
the words associated with the word “suspension” in said provision referred to penalties in
administrative cases, e.g. removal, demotion, fine, censure. Under the rule of noscitur a sociis,
the word “suspension” should be given the same sense as the other words with which it is
associated. Where a particular word is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct
construction may be made specific by considering the company of terms in which it is found or
with which it is associated.

Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which grants the Ombudsman the power to preventively suspend
public officials and employees facing administrative charges before him, is a procedural, not a
penal statute. The preventive suspension is imposed after compliance with the requisites therein
set forth, as an aid in the investigation of the administrative charges.

Page 185 of 370

People v. Yadao
G.R. No. L-6835
March 30, 1954
FACTS:
An information for violation of Section 1 of Republic Act No 145 was filed against repondent
Yadao, alleging that defendants conspiring together, willfully did "offer to assist one Floverto
Jazmin in the prosecution and expeditious approval of his legitimate claim of $2,207 for benefits
under the laws of the United States administered in the Philippines by the United States
Veterans Administration, and as consideration for which, said accused directly solicited and/or
charged said Floverto Jazmin as fee or compensation the sum of P800 which is in excess of the
lawful charge of P20 in any one claim."

ISSUE:
Whether or not the information filed against defendant-appellees in the Court of First Instance
of Rizal sufficiently describes a violation of section 1 of Republic Act No. 145

RULING:
The Court explained that one who offers to assist, but does not assist, is not included within the
penal prohibition, which by its nature must be restrictively interpreted, or strictly construed
against the government. Although there was an attempt to commit the offense described by
Republic Act No. 145. But the said statute does not expressly punish attempts to commit the
offense, and the provisions of the Penal Code about attempts (tentativas) do not apply.

The prosecution relies upon Sanchez vs. U.S., to wit: wherein this was said:

A showing that an excessive fee was solicited, contracted for, charged or received for
assistance in preparation and execution of necessary papers in any application to Veterans'
Administration will support a conviction of violation of fee limitation for assistance in such
application regardless of whether such assistance was in fact rendered.

But such adjudication is not conclusive, because the statute therein construed differs materially
from ours. It punishes "any person who shall directly or indirectly contract for, charge or receive,
or who shall attempt to solicit, contract for excessive compensation." The section does not
contain the phrase "assisting a claimant" after the words "any person" and before the words
"who shall etc". That phrase conditions each and every violation of section 1 of Republic Act No.
145. The appealed decision quashing the indictment is, therefore, affirmed, without costs.

Page 186 of 370

Nilo v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-34586, L-36625
April 2, 1984
FACTS:
These petitions are jointly heard to question the effectivity of of RA 6839, which amended Sec
36 (1) of RA 3844 allowing a landowner to eject an agricultural lessee or tenant on the ground
that the owner shall personally cultivate the land himself. 

GR No L-34586: Respondent Almario Gatchalian is the owner of a parcel of riceland at Barrio

San Roque, San Rafael, Bulacan with an area of two (2) hectares covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-76791 of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan. Petitioner Hospicio Nilo has
been the agricultural share-tenant of Gatchalian since agricultural year 1964-65. On March 7,
1968, Gatchalian flied an ejectment suit against petitioner on the ground of personal cultivation
under Sec. 36 (1) of Republic Act No. 3844. Nilo alleged by way of affirmative defense that the
ejectment suit was but an act of reprisal and retaliation because he elected the leasehold
system, The RTC and CA ruled in favor of private respondents. Upon MOR to the CA, the
petitioner "personal cultivation as a ground for ejectment of an agricultural lessee has been
eliminated under Republic Act No. 6389. The CA denied the motion resolving that Republic Act
No. 6389 has no retroactive application.

GR No. L-36625: This is an appeal raised by petitioner Fortunato Castro to the Court of
Appeals from the decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations dismissing his complaint for the
ejectment of his tenant, respondent Juan Castro, on the ground of personal cultivation. The
landowner wants to personally cultivate the land owned by him located in Pulilan, Bulacan with
an area of 6,941 square meters. Petitioner Fortunato Castro questioned the constitutionality of
Section 7 of Republic Act No. 6389 which amended Section 36(l) of Republic Act No. 3844.
After the enactment of Republic Act No. 6389 on September 10, 1971, the respondent moved
for the dismissal of petitioner's complaint on the ground that the new law eliminated personal
cultivation by the landowmer as a ground for the ejectment of an agricultural tenant. The Court
of Agrarian Relation dismissed the complaint.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the amendment in R.A. 6389 should be given retroactive effect to cover cases
that were filed during the effectivity of the repealed provision

RULING:
Legislative debates are expressive of the views and motives of individual members and are not
always safe guides and, hence, may not be resorted to, in ascertaining the meaning and
purpose of the lawmaking body. It is impossible to determine with certainty what construction
was put upon an act by the members of the legislative body that passed the bill, by resorting to
the speeches of the members thereof. Those who did not speak, may not have agreed with
those who did; and those who spoke, might differ from each other.
The petitioner-tenant in G.R. No. L-34586 contends that since Republic Act No. 6389 is a social
legislation and passed under the police power of the State, it should be liberally interpreted in
favor of the tenants. The law in question is social legislation. But social justice is not for tenants
alone. The disputed land in L-36625 is only 6,941 square meters. The area of the land in L-
34586 is slightly bigger, about two (2) hectares. A person with only one or two hectares of land
to his name is equally deserving of social justice.
A majority of the landowners affected by the repeal of "personal cultivation" as a ground for the
ejectment of a tenant own small landholdings. The records of Senate Bill No. 478 which
eventually became Republic Act No. 6389 reveal that the repeal has affected an estimated 75%
of landowners in the country who own tenanted lands of less than 3 hectares, 40% of those who
own 5 hectares or less and 96% of landowners who own an area of less than 10 hectares each.

Page 187 of 370

AFP General Insurance Corporation v. Molina
G.R. No. 151133
June 30, 2008
FACTS:
The private respondents are the complainants in a case for illegal dismissal filed against Radon
Security & Allied Services Agency and/or Raquel Aquias and Ever Emporium, Inc. Labor Arbiter
ruled that the private respondents were illegally dismissed and ordered Radon Security to pay
them separation pay, backwages, and other monetary claims. Radon Security appealed the
Labor Arbiter's decision to public respondent NLRC and posted a supersedeas bond, issued by
herein petitioner AFPGIC as surety. NLRC affirmed with modification the decision of the Labor
Arbiter. By virtue of the writ of execution, the NLRC Sheriff issued a Notice of Garnishment
against the supersedeas bond. AFPGIC entered the fray by filing before the Labor Arbiter an
Omnibus Motion to Quash Notice/Writ of Garnishment and to Discharge AFPGIC's Appeal Bond
on the ground that said bond "has been cancelled and thus non-existent in view of the failure of
Radon Security to pay the yearly premiums." However, both Labor Arbiter and NLRC denied the
motion. In dismissing the appeal of AFPGIC, the NLRC pointed out that AFPGIC's theory that
the bond cannot anymore be proceeded against for failure of Radon Security to pay the
premium is untenable, considering that the bond is effective until the finality of the decision. The
NLRC stressed that a contrary ruling would allow respondents to simply stop paying the
premium to frustrate satisfaction of the money judgment.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the bond was already cancelled for non-payment of premium

RULING:
The bond remains enforceable and under the jurisdiction of the NLRC until it is discharged.
Rule VI, Section 6 of the Revised NLRC Rules of Procedure is a contemporaneous construction
of Article 223 by the NLRC. As an interpretation of a law by the implementing administrative
agency, it is accorded great respect by this Court.30 Note that Rule VI, Section 6 categorically
states that the cash or surety bond posted in appeals involving monetary awards in labor
disputes "shall be in effect until final disposition of the case." This could only be construed to
mean that the surety bond shall remain valid and in force until finality and execution of
judgment, with the resultant discharge of the surety company only thereafter, if we are to give
teeth to the labor protection clause of the Constitution. To construe the provision any other way
would open the floodgates to unscrupulous and heartless employers who would simply forego
paying premiums on their surety bond in order to evade payment of the monetary judgment. The
Court cannot be a party to any such iniquity.

The petitioner contends that under Section 64 of the Insurance Code, which is deemed written
into every insurance contract or contract of surety, an insurer may cancel a policy upon non-
payment of the premium. Said cancellation is binding upon the beneficiary as the right of a
beneficiary is subordinate to that of the insured. Hence, according to petitioner, the Court of
Appeals committed a reversible error in not holding that under Section 77 of the Insurance
Code, the surety bond between it and Radon Security was not valid and binding for non-
payment of premiums, even as against a third person who was intended to benefit therefrom.
According to the SC, the petitioner's reliance on Sections 64 and 77 of the Insurance Code is
misplaced. The said provisions refer to insurance contracts in general. The instant case pertains
to a surety bond; thus, the applicable provision of the Insurance Code is Section 177, which
specifically governs suretyship. It provides that a surety bond, once accepted by the obligee
becomes valid and enforceable, irrespective of whether or not the premium has been paid by
the obligor. The private respondents, the obligees here, accepted the bond posted by Radon
Security and issued by the petitioner. Hence, the bond is both valid and enforceable.

Page 188 of 370

 In re Frank Stanley Allen
G.R. No. 1455
October 29 1903
FACTS:
The petitioner, Frank Stanley Allen, who is an alien, claims that he is unlawfully detained and
restrained of his liberty in Manila, P.I., by W. Morgan Shuster, as Collector of Customs for the
Philippine Archipelago, who threatens to deport the petitioner from the Islands for the reason
that said Collector claims that the petitioner is a prohibited alien contract laborer whose
importation is forbidden by the act of Congress approved March 3, 1903, entitled "An act to
regulate the immigration of aliens into the United States."

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Collector of Customs for the Philippine Archipelago lawful authority to
execute, or cause to be executed, so much of said act of Congress as provides for the detention
and deportation of prohibited aliens

RULING:
In promulgating this act of Congress in these Islands, Governor Taft stated that it had been
decided by the legal adviser of the Secretary of War that while this law, in its restrictions upon
the admission of aliens into the United States, applies to the Philippines, the provisions therein
made for the enforcement of the law by the Secretary of the Treasury Department of the United
States and the Commissioner-General of Immigration do not apply here, and that the new
immigration law should be enforced in the same manner in these Islands as the previous law on
the same subject was enforced — that is, through the Collector of Customs and his subordinate
officers. The Secretary of the Treasury must also have given a similar construction of this law,
otherwise he would, without doubt, have appointed immigration inspectors and established
immigration stations in the Islands long ago — in fact, as far back as April 29, 1902, when the
Chinese exclusion act was made applicable to the Philippines, he being then charged with its
enforcement.

It follows that these two Departments of the Government, the two Departments concerned in the
enforcement of the immigration and exclusion laws, have held that the duty of the administering
these laws in the Philippines was to be continued in the customs department of the Islands, and
by its immigration inspectors.Much weight is always given by courts to the contemporaneous
exposition of statutes, and the construction of the departments affected by an act may be
restored to in determining the meaning, scope, and intent of the statute.

The principle that the contemporaneous construction of a statute by the executive officers of the
government, whose duty is to execute it, is entitled to great respect, and should ordinarily
control the construction of the statute by the courts, is so firmly embedded in our jurisprudence
that no authorities need be cited to support it.It follows, then, that to give this act a literal
construction, such as the court is asked to give it, is to hold that Congress meant to leave the
ports of these Islands open and free of access to all the objectionable and prohibited classes
mentioned in the act for a period of at least a month, and for such further period as the
Secretary of the Treasury might see fit to remain inactive

Page 189 of 370

Energy Regulatory Board v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 113079, April 20, 2001
FACTS:
On June 30,1983, Shell filed with the quondam Bureau of Energy Utilization (BEU) an
application for authority to relocate its Shell Service Station at Tambo, Parañaque, Metro
Manila, to Imelda Marcos Avenue of the same municipality. Petroleum Distributors and Service
Corporation, who owned a Caltex station nearby, opposed such application on the grounds that:
There are adequate service stations in the area; ruinous competition will result from such
actions; and there is a decline in sales in the area. The BEU case was remanded to the ERB
that rendered the decision allowing Shell to establish the service station. PDSC elevated its
cause to the CA that reversed the judgment.
ISSUE:
Whether CA gravely erred in making findings of facts contrary to those of the ERB whose
findings were based on substantial evidence
Whether the CA gravely erred in passing judgment and making pronouncements on purely
economic and policy issues on petroleum business, which are within the realm of the ERB
which has a recognized expertise in oil economics
RULING:
The interpretation of an administrative government agency like the ERB, which is tasked to
implement a statute, is accorded great respect and ordinarily controls the construction of the
courts. A long line of cases establish the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters
which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the
regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such
agencies.When an administrative agency renders an opinion or issues a statement of policy, it
merely interprets a pre-existing law and the administrative interpretation is at best advisory for it
is the courts that finally determine what the law means. Thus, an action by an administrative
agency may be set aside by the judicial department if there is an error of law, abuse of power,
lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with the letter and spirit of the
law. However, there is no cogent reason to depart from the general rule because the findings of
the ERB conform to, rather than conflict with, the governing statutes and controlling case law on
the matter. Prior to Republic Act No. 8479, the downstream oil industry was regulated by the
ERB and from 1993 onwards, the Energy Industry Regulation Board. These regulatory bodies
were empowered, among others, to entertain and act on applications for the establishment of
gasoline stations in the Philippines. The ERB, which used to be the Board of Energy (BOE), is
tasked with the following powers and functions by Executive Order No. 172, which took effect
immediately after its issuance on May 8, 1987. A distinct worldwide trend towards economic
deregulation has been evident in the past decade. Both developed and developing countries
have seriously considered and extensively adopted various measures for this purpose. The
country has been no exception. Indeed, the buzzwords of the third millenium are "deregulation",
"globalization" and "liberalization." It need not be overemphasized that this trend is reflected in
our policy considerations, statutes and jurisprudence. Tested against the foregoing legal
yardsticks, it becomes readily apparent that the reasons relied upon by the appellate court in
rejecting petitioner's application to set up a gasoline service station becomes tenuous. This is
especially clear in the face of such recent developments in the oil industry, in relation to
controlling case law on the matter recently promulgated to address the legal issues spawned by
these events. In other words, recent developments in the oil industry as well as legislative
enactments and jurisprudential pronouncements have overtaken and rendered stale the view
espoused by the appellate court in denying Shell's application to put up the gasoline station.
On the contrary, the record discloses that the ERB Decision approving Shell's application in
ERB Case No. 89-57 was based on hard economic data on developmental projects, residential
subdivision listings, population count, public conveyances, commercial establishments, traffic
count, fuel demand, growth of private cars, public utility vehicles and commercial vehicles, etc.,
rather than empirical evidence to support its conclusions.

Page 190 of 370

Philippine Scout Veterans Security & Investigation Agency, Inc. (PSVSAI) v. National
Labor Relations Commission
G.R. No. 99850
September 20, 1996
FACTS:
Private respondent worked for the petitioner as a security guard since September 1963 until his
retirement at the age of 60 on March 20, 1989, with a monthly salary of P1,480.00. He formally
requested petitioner for payment of his retirement pay, but petitioner refused, stating that it
would give him financial assistance instead, without specifying the amount, which offer was
refused by the private respondent. On May 11, 1989, private respondent filed a complaint for
non-payment of retirement benefits against petitioner. Petitioner in its position paper alleged that
private respondent was not entitled to retirement pay since there was no company policy which
provided for nor any collective bargaining agreement granting it. On September 19, 1989, the
arbiter rendered his decision in favor of private respondent. NLRC affirmed the arbiter’s
decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondent is legally entitled to retirement benefits

RULING:
The fact that respondent Commission had a prior ruling in a similar case granting retirement
benefits is of no moment. Although it may be true that the contemporaneous construction of a
statute by executive officers tasked to enforce and implement said statute should be given great
weight by the courts, nevertheless, is such construction is erroneous or is clearly shown to be
in conflict with the governing statute or the Constitution or other laws, the same must be
declared null and void. "It is the role of the Judiciary to refine and, when necessary, correct
constitutional (and/or statutory) interpretation, in the context of the interactions of the three
branches of the government."

It has been held that "(i)t is axiomatic that retirement laws are liberally construed and
administered in favor of the persons intended to be benefited. All doubts as to the intent of the
law should be resolved in favor of the retiree to achieve its humanitarian purposes. The intention
is to provide for the retiree's sustenance and hopefully even comfort, when he no longer has the
stamina to continue earning his livelihood. Unfortunately, such interpretation cannot be made in
this case in the light of the clear lack of consensual and statutory basis of the grant of retirement
benefits to private respondent.
Bank of Commerce v. Planters Development Bank
G.R. No. 154470-71
September 24, 1996
FACTS:
RCBC owned two sets of Central Bank Bills (CB Bills): (1) 7 CB Bills worth 70Million; and (2) 2
CB Bills worth 20Million. The first set was sold to BOC which the latter in turn sold to PDB.
PDB, in turn, sold to the BOC Treasury Bills worth P 70 million, with maturity date of June 29,
1994. The second set of CB Bills was sold by RCBC to PDB and subsequently acquired by
BOC. All in all, the BOC acquired the first and Second sets of CB bills. On June 30, 1994, upon
learning of the transfers involving the CB bills, PDB requested the BSP to record its claim in the
BSP’s books, explaining that its non-possession of the CB bills is "on account of imperfect
negotiations thereof and/or subsequent set off or transfer." BSP denied the request, invoking
Section 8 of CB Circular No. 28 (Regulations Governing Open Market Operations, Stabilization
of the Securities Market, Issue, Servicing and Redemption of the Public Debt) which requires
the presentation of the bond before a registered bond may be transferred on the books of the
BSP.In light of these BSP responses and the impending maturity of the CB bills, the PDB filed
with the RTC two separate petitions for Mandamus, Prohibition and Injunction with prayer for
Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order.

Page 191 of 370

The BOC filed its Answer, praying for the dismissal of the petition. It argued that the PDB has no
cause of action against it since the PDB is no longer the owner of the CB bills. On the other
hand, the BSP countered that the PDB cannot invoke Section 10 (d) 4 of CB Circular No. 28
because this section applies only to an "owner" and a "person presenting the bond," of which
the PDB is neither.

ISSUE:
Whether or not BSP or PDB has a better right over the subject CB bills

RULING:
A general reading of the two circulars shows that the second instance of implied repeal is
present in this case. CB Circular No. 28, entitled "Regulations Governing Open Market
Operations, Stabilization of Securities Market, Issue, Servicing and Redemption of Public Debt,"
is a regulation governing the servicing and redemption of public debt, including the issue,
inscription, registration, transfer, payment and replacement of bonds and securities representing
the public debt. On the other hand, CB Circular No. 769-80, entitled "Rules and Regulations
Governing Central Bank Certificate of Indebtedness," is the governing regulation on matters (i)
involving certificate of indebtedness issued by the Central Bank itself and (ii) which are similarly
covered by CB Circular No. 28.

The CB Monetary Board issued CB Circular No. 28 to regulate the servicing and redemption of
public debt, pursuant to Section 124 (now Section 119 of Republic Act R.A. No. 7653) of the old
Central Bank law which provides that "the servicing and redemption of the public debt shall also
be effected through the Bangko Sentral." However, even as R.A. No. 7653 continued to
recognize this role by the BSP, the law required a phase-out of all fiscal agency functions by the
BSP, including Section 119 of R.A. No. 7653. In other words, even if CB Circular No. 28 applies
broadly to both government-issued bonds and securities and Central Bank-issued evidence of
indebtedness, given the present state of law, CB Circular No. 28 and CB Circular No. 769-80
now operate on the same subject – Central Bank-issued evidence of indebtedness. Under
Section 1, Article XI of CB Circular No. 769-80, the continued relevance and application of CB
Circular No. 28 would depend on the need to supplement any deficiency or silence in CB
Circular No. 769-80 on a particular matter.

In the present case, both CB Circular No. 28 and CB Circular No. 769-80 provide the BSP with
a course of action in case of an allegedly fraudulently assigned certificate of indebtedness.
Under CB Circular No. 28, in case of fraudulent assignments, the BSP would have to "call upon
the owner and the person presenting the bond to substantiate their respective claims" and, from
there, determine who has a better right over the registered bond. On the other hand, under CB
Circular No. 769-80, the BSP shall merely "issue and circularize a ‘stop order’ against the
transfer, exchange, redemption of the [registered] certificate" without any adjudicative function
(which is the precise root of the present controversy). As the two circulars stand, the patent
irreconcilability of these two provisions does not require elaboration. Section 5, Article V of CB
Circular No. 769-80 inescapably repealed Section 10 (d) 4 of CB Circular No. 28.

Page 192 of 370

 Nestle Philippines Inc. v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 86738,
November 13, 1991
FACTS:
Sometime in February 1983, the authorized capital stock of petitioner Nestle Philippines Inc.
("Nestle") was increased from P300 million divided into 3 million shares with a par value of
P100.00 per share, to P600 million divided into 6 million shares with a par value of P100.00 per
share. Nestle underwent the necessary procedures involving Board and stockholders approvals
and effected the necessary filings to secure the approval of the increase of authorized capital
stock by respondent Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), which approval was in fact
granted. Nestle has only two (2) principal stockholders: San Miguel Corporation and Nestle S.A

On 16 December 1983, the Board of Directors and stockholders of Nestle approved resolutions
authorizing the issuance of 344,500 shares out of the previously authorized but unissued capital
stock of Nestle, exclusively to San Miguel Corporation and to Nestle S.A. San Miguel
Corporation subscribed to and completely paid up 168,800 shares, while Nestle S.A. subscribed
to and paid up the balance of 175,700 shares of stock. On 28 March 1985, petitioner Nestle filed
a letter signed by its Corporate Secretary, M.L. Antonio, with the SEC seeking exemption of its
proposed issuance of additional shares to its existing principal shareholders, from the
registration requirement of Section 4 of the Revised Securities Act and from payment of the fee
referred to in Section 6(c) of the same Act.

The Commission then advised petitioner to file the appropriate request for exemption and to pay
the fee required under Section 6 (c) of the statute, which provides: (c) A fee equivalent to one-
tenth of one per centum of the maximum aggregate price or issued value of the securities shall
be collected by the Commission for granting a general or particular exemption from the
registration requirements of this Act.

ISSUE:
Whether or not that there is a need to file a petition for exemption under Section 6(b) of the
Revised Securities Act with respect to the issuance of the said 344,600 additional shares to
their existing stockholders out of their unissued capital stock

RULING:
The reading by the SEC of the scope of application of Section 6(a) (4) permits greater
opportunity for the SEC to implement the statutory objective of protecting the investing public by
requiring proposed issuers of capital stock to inform such public of the true financial conditions
and prospects of the corporation.When capital stock is issued in the course of and in
compliance with the requirements of increasing its authorized capital stock under Section 38 of
the Corporation Code, the SEC as a matter of course examines the financial condition of the
corporation, and hence there is no real need for exercise of SEC authority under the Revised
Securities Act.

In contrast, under the ruling issued by the SEC, an issuance of previously authorized but still
unissued capital stock may, in a particular instance, be held to be an exempt transaction by the
SEC under Section 6(b) so long as the SEC finds that the requirements of registration under the
Revised Securities Act are "not necessary in the public interest and for the protection of the
investors" by reason, inter alia, of the small amount of stock that is proposed to be issued or
because the potential buyers are very limited in number and are in a position to protect
themselves. The principle that the contemporaneous construction of a statute by the executive
officers of the government, whose duty is to execute it, is entitled to great respect, and should
ordinarily control the construction of the statute by the courts, is so firmly embedded in our
jurisdiction that no authorities need be cited to support it.

Page 193 of 370

 Adasa v. Abalos
G.R. No. 168617
February 19, 2007
FACTS:
Cecille Abalos filed two complaints against Bernadette Adasa for Estafa. The Office of the City
Prosecutor found probable cause and filed two criminal cases against petitioner. The Trial Court
ordered reinvestigation, but the prosecutor maintained that there is probable cause. After
Adasa’s arraignment where she entered an unconditional plea of not guilty, Adasa filed a
Petition for Review in the DOJ. The Secretary of Justice reversed the prosecutor’s resolution
and ordered the withdrawal of the case, which the trial court granted upon motion of the
prosecutor. The Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal of the Trial Court claiming that Circular
No. 70 expressly prohibits the Secretary of Justice from taking cognizance of a Petition for
Review filed AFTER the accused has already been arraigned. The Supreme Court upheld the
CA’s judgment and denied Adasa’s claim that Section 7 and 12 should be construed as granting
the Secretary of Justice discretion on whether to take cognizance of an appeal or not. The
mandate of Section 7 and 12 are clear, and there is no conflict between the two provisions. As
such, both must be followed according to their letter. Therefore, the DOJ should not have taken
cognizance of Adasa’s appeal which she filed AFTER she had already unconditionally pleaded
not guilty. She is deemed to have waived the right to preliminary investigation and the right to
question any irregularity that surrounds it, which is applicable in cases of reinvestigation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the DOJ can take cognizance of an appeal or petition for review (of the
resolution of the Office of the Prosecutor) filed AFTER arraignment of an accused.

RULING:
Contemporaneous interpretation or construction by the officers charged with the enforcement of
the rules and regulations it promulgated is entitled to great weight by the court in the latter’s
construction of such rules and regulations. That does not, however, make such a construction
necessarily controlling or binding. For equally settled is the rule that courts may disregard
contemporaneous construction in instances where the law or rule construed possesses no
ambiguity, where the construction is clearly erroneous, where strong reason to the contrary
exists, and where the court has previously given the statute a different interpretation.

If through misapprehension of law or a rule an executive or administrative officer called upon to

implement it has erroneously applied or executed it, the error may be corrected when the true
construction is ascertained. If a contemporaneous construction is found to be erroneous, the
same must be declared null and void. Such principle should be as it is applied in the case at
bar.

Petitioner’s posture on a supposed exception to the mandatory import of the word "shall" is
misplaced. It is petitioner’s view that the language of Section 12 is permissive and therefore the
mandate in Section 7 has been transformed into a matter within the discretion of the DOJ.

Page 194 of 370

Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 123784
June 18, 1996
FACTS:
On 1 April 1990, acting on an information that a huge stockpile of narra flitches, shorts, and
slabs were seen inside the lumberyard of the petitioner in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, DENR
organized a team of foresters and policemen and sent it to conduct surveillance at the said
lumberyard. In the course thereof, the team members saw coming out from the lumberyard the
petitioner's truck, loaded with lauan and almaciga lumber of assorted sizes and dimensions.
Since the driver could not produce the required invoices and transport documents, the team
seized the truck together with its cargo and impounded them at the DENR compound at Visayas
Avenue, Quezon City. The team was not able to gain entry into the premises because of the
refusal of the owner.

On 3 April 1990, the team was able to secure a search warrant from Executive Judge Adriano
R. Osorio of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. By virtue thereof, the
team seized on that date from the petitioner's lumberyard four truckloads of narra shorts,
trimmings, and slabs; a negligible number of narra lumber; and approximately 200,000 board
feet of lumber and shorts of various species including almaciga and supa.

On 4 April 1990, the team returned to the premises of the petitioner's lumberyard in Valenzuela
and placed under administrative seizure the remaining stockpile of almaciga, supa, and lauan
lumber with a total volume of 311,000 board feet because the petitioner failed to produce upon
demand the corresponding certificate of lumber origin, auxiliary invoices, tally sheets, and
delivery receipts from the source of the invoices covering the lumber to prove the legitimacy of
their source and origin.

The petitioner's question the seizure contending that the possession of lumber, as opposed to
timber, is not penalized in Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and even granting
arguendo that lumber falls within the purview of the said section, the same may not be used in
evidence against him for they were taken by virtue of an illegal seizure.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the contention of the petitioner is correct that lumber is different from timber

RULING:
The Supreme Court held that the Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either timber
or lumber.While the former is included in forest products as defined in paragraph (q) of Section
3, the latter is found in paragraph (aa) of the same section in the definition of "Processing plant."

Lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw material.

The Code uses the term lumber in its ordinary or common usage. In the 1993 copyright edition
of Webster's Third New International Dictionary, lumber is defined, inter alia, as "timber or logs
after being prepared for the market."

Simply put, lumber is a processed log or timber. It is settled that in the absence of legislative
intent to the contrary, words and phrases used in a statute should be given their plain, ordinary,
and common usage meaning. And insofar as possession of timber without the required legal
documents is concerned, Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, makes no distinction
between raw or processed timber. Neither should we.

Page 195 of 370

Domingo v. Commission on Audit
G.R. No. 112371
October 7, 1998
FACTS:
Aida Domingo (Domingo) was appointed as President of Regional Director,Region 5
of the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), and she assumed office as
such. Several government vehicles were endorsed to the personnelof the entire Region 5
DSWD.Regional Auditor Manuel Canares (Canares) sent a notice to Domingo
thatofficials who were provided vehicles were still collecting transportation
allowances.Canares requested her to instruct all personnel to cease collecting
transportation allowances.Domingo asked for reconsideration stating that she should
get transportation allowance on days that she did not use the government vehicles. Canares
denied the petition on the grounds that he followed the Commission on Audit's (CoA) prior
decision where which held that government officials which have been allotted vehicles cannot
collect transportation allowances whether or not he/she uses the vehicles.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Domingo can collect transportation allowances despite having been allotted
vehicles for their office.

RULING:

When the law is clear and categorical, there is no room for construction or
interpretation, only implementation is needed. According to the General Appropriations Act
(GAA) of 1991:"The transportation allowance herein authorized shall not be granted to officials
assigned a government vehicle or use of government motor transportation." (underline
provided)This provision is categorical in providing that those who use government vehicles and
government motor transportation cannot avail transportation allowances. The use of the words
"assigned" and not "used" means that it is not necessary for the vehicles to be used by said
persons. It is of no moment that the vehicles assigned were for the whole Region 5 DSWD, and
not specifically for Domingo

Page 196 of 370

 Schmid & Oberly, Inc. v. RJL Martinez Fishing Corporatio
G.R. No. 75198
October 18, 1988
FACTS:
RJL Martinez Fishing Corporation is engaged in deep-sea fishing. In the course of its business,
it needed electrical generators for the operation of its business. Schmid and Oberly sells
electrical generators with the brand of “Nagata”, a Japanese product. D. Nagata Co. Ltd. of
Japan was Schmid’s supplier. Schmid advertised the 12 Nagata generators for sale and RJL
purchased 12 brand new generators. Through an irrevocable line of credit, Nagata shipped to
the Schmid the generators and RJL paid the amount of the purchase price. (First sale = 3
generators; Second sale = 12 generators).

Later, the generators were found to be factory defective. RJL informed the Schmid that it shall
return the 12 generators. 3 were returned. Schmid replaced the 3 generators subject of the first
sale with generators of a different brand. As to the second sale, 3 were shipped to Japan and
the remaining 9 were not replaced.

RJL sued the defendant on the warranty, asking for rescission of the contract and that Schmid
be ordered to accept the generators and be ordered to pay back the purchase money as well as
be liable for damages. Schmid opposes such liability averring that it was merely the indentor in
the sale between Nagata Co., the exporter and RJL Martinez, the importer. As mere indentor, it
avers that is not liable for the seller’s implied warranty against hidden defects, Schmid not
having personally assumed any such warranty.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the second transaction between the parties was a sale or an indent transaction

RULING:
The SC held it to be an indent transaction. An indentor is a middlemen in the same class as
commercial brokers and commission merchants. A broker is generally defined as one who is
engaged, for others, on a commission, negotiating contracts relative to property with the custody
of which he has no concern; the negotiator between other parties, never acting in his own name
but in the name of those who employed him; he is strictly a middleman and for some purpose
the agent of both parties. There are 3 parties to an indent transaction, (1) buyer, (2) indentor,
and (3) supplier who is usually a non-resident manufacturer residing in the country where the
goods are to be bought. The chief feature of a commercial broker and a commercial merchant is
that in effecting a sale, they are merely intermediaries or middle-men, and act in a certain sense
as the agent of both parties to the transaction.

RJL MARTINEZ admitted that the generators were purchased “through indent order.” RJL
admitted in its demand letter previously sent to SCHMID that 12 of 15 generators “were
purchased through your company, by indent order and three (3) by direct purchase.” The
evidence also show that RJL MARTINEZ paid directly NAGATA CO, for the generators, and that
the latter company itself invoiced the sale and shipped the generators directly to the former. The
only participation of Schmid was to act as an intermediary or middleman between Nagata and
RJL, by procuring an order from RJL and forwarding the same to Nagata for which the company
received a commission from Nagata.

Page 197 of 370

 Gallego v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. L-57841
July 30, 1982
FACTS:
An information was filed in the Sandiganbayan by Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor Mariflor
Punzalan-Castillo against Ramon Deseo, Bernardo Gallego, Herminio Erorita and Felix
Agoncillo, for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known
as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Petitioners Bernardo Gallego and Felix Agoncillo
filed a motion to quash the information against them on the following grounds: the facts alleged
do not constitute an offense; or, in the alternative; and the information charges more than one
offense.

Petitioners claim that the information charges the accused with three (3) distinct offenses, to wit:
"(a) the giving of 'unwarranted' benefits through manifest partiality; (b) the giving of
'unwarranted' benefits through evident bad faith; and (c) the giving of 'unwarranted' benefits
through gross inexcusable negligence" while in the discharge of their official and/or
administrative functions; that the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against them is violated because they are left to guess... which of the three, if not
all, offenses they are being prosecuted. The motion to quash was opposed by the prosecution
alleging that the term "unwarranted"' in Section 3(e) of Republic Act 3019 is clear, unambiguous
and unequivocal and is presumed to have been used in its primary and general acceptation;
that the objection by petitioners on... the clarity of the term "unwarranted" does not suffice for
the courts to declare said section unconstitutional; that said Section 3(e) of Republic Act 3019 is
valid unless otherwise held by final judgment of a competent court. With respect to petitioners'
allegation that the information charges more than one offense, the prosecution avers that what
is charged in the information "is the giving of unwarranted benefits to the owners of Test
Booklets Nos. 839 and 144, while manifest partiality, evident... bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence are only the means of commission." Respondent Sandiganbayan sustained the
prosecution and denied the motion to quash.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act is null and void because
it is unconstitutionally vague

RULING:
We hold that Section 3(e) of the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act does not suffer from the
constitutional defect of vagueness. The phrases "manifest partiality," "evident bad faith" and
"gross inexcusable negligence merely describe the different modes by which the offense
penalized in Section 3(e) of the statute may be committed, and the use of all these phrases in
the same information does not mean that the indictment charges three distinct offenses.

The information definitely states the names of the parties, the tune, place, manner of
commission and designation of the offense. The argument that failure in the information to state
the reasons why the benefits bestowed are unwarranted renders it defective is without merit
informations need only state the ultimate facts; the reasons therefor could be proved during the
trial.

Page 198 of 370

Flores v. People of the Philippines
G.R. Nos. 93411-12
July 20, 1992
FACTS:
Private complainant Pedro Oval went to the residence of petitioner on 15 February 1986 to
inquire if she could send people abroad to work, to which inquiry petitioner replied in the
affirmative but on condition that money first be given to her. On the same occasion, Oval met
one Pacifico de Jesus who was likewise in petitioner’s house for the same purpose. On 20
March 1986, Oval gave P2,000.00 for his passport to the petitioner who received the amount.
On 26 March 1986, petitioner demanded P13,000.00 from Oval to enable him to leave for his
job as can maker in Japan. Again, Oval gave the amount demanded. No receipts were issued to
him by the petitioner for both amounts. Petitioner was able to secure a passport and a visa for
Oval. However, Oval was not able to leave for the job in Japan because what was issued to him
was a tourist visa and not a work visa. For this reason, Oval demanded that petitioner return his
money. Petitioner then gave Oval P1,000.00 and promised to return the balance on 15 August
1986. Pacifico de Jesus underwent a similar experience regarding petitioner’s commitment that
she would be able to send him abroad to work and, consequently, he gave petitioner money in
consideration of the overseas employment promised him. Because of their frustration in not
being able to work overseas as promised by petitioner and because of her failure to return their
money, Oval and de Jesus reported the matter to the police authorities. Two (2) policemen
brought petitioner to the police detachment at the Cultural Center of the Philippines (CCP) on
Roxas Boulevard for investigation. There, petitioner acknowledged her obligation to Oval and de
Jesus and signed a promissory note in the amount of P23,000.00 representing the amounts
they gave her, payable to both Oval and de Jesus on or before 15 August 1986. When petitioner
failed to return his money as promised, Oval filed against the petitioner the complaints for Illegal
Recruitment and Estafa defined under par. 2(a), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. In due
course, informations for Illegal Recruitment (Criminal Case No. 86-48113) and Estafa (Criminal
Case No. 86-48114) were filed against the petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch XLI. On 22 August 1988, the trial court rendered a consolidated decision convicting
petitioner Encarnacion Flores of the crimes charged. On appeal to the respondent court, the
decision of the a quo was affirmed in toto.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the term “recruiter” cannot be applied to her
RULING:
The term "recruit" or "recruitment" must be understood in the light of what the law contemplates
and not how a dictionary defines it. As aptly explicated by respondent court — "The crime of
illegal recruitment is defined in Art. 38 (a) of PD No. 442, otherwise known as the Labor Code of
the Philippines as amended, which is quoted as follows: "Article 38. Illegal Recruitment — a)
The following recruitment activities are deemed illegal and punishable as provided herein; 1.
Those undertaken in any form or manner by non-licensees or non-holders of authority; . . .
Article 13. Definition — b) Recruitment and placement — refers to any act of canvassing,
enlisting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services,
promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not. Provided,
that any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two
or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement. We agree with the
respondent court that there is evidence that accused-petitioner had represented to Oval that she
could send the latter abroad for employment as a can maker in Japan. And because of this
representation, Oval and his companion, Pacifico de Jesus, gave her money in consideration of
the same representation. Petitioner’s defense that she did not recruit Oval for employment
abroad is beside the point. The undisputable fact is that she gave Oval the distinct impression
that she had the power or ability to send people abroad for work so that he was convinced to
give her the money she demanded to enable him to be employed as a can maker in Japan.

Page 199 of 370

Valderama v. National Labor Relations Commission
G.R. No. 98239
April 25, 1996
FACTS:
In 1983, Saavedra filed a complaint against COMMODEX Inc, Valderrama (owner), and other
executives of the corporation. The Labor Arbiter ruled in her favor and held that she was illegally
dismissed, hence she is entitled to backpay wages.

A writ of execution was granted bu it was returned and unsatisfied since the corporation had
ceased operation, and the respondents too k the position that the writ could not be enforced
against them on the ground that the dispositive portion mentioned only COMMODEX. Saavedra
then filed a motion for clarification, in which she prayed that the executives be held liable. The
petitioner filed an opposition, saying that the decision cannot be amended since it’s already final
and executory. Saavedra replied that it was not an amendment she sought, but merely a
clarification.

NLRC granted Saavedra’s motion. This is an appeal by Valderrama.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the decision can be amended or clarified

RULING:
The rule that once a judgment becomes final, it can no longer be disturbed, altered, or modified,
is not an inflexible one. It admits of exceptions, as where facts and circumstances transpire after
a judgment has become final and executory which render its execution impossible of unjust. In
such a case, the modification may be sought and alter the judgment to harmonize it with justice
and the facts.

In the case at bar, modification of the judgment is appropriate considering that the company is
no longer in operation and there is no showing that it has filed bankruptcy proceedings in which
private respondent might file a claim and pursue her remedy under Article 110 of the Labor
Code. Holding petitioner personally liable for the judgment in this case is eminently just and
proper considering that, although the dispositive portion of the decision mentions only the
“respondent company,” the text repeatedly mentions “respondents” in assessing liability for the
illegal dismissal of private respondent. For indeed petitioner and others were respondents
below and there can be no doubt of their personal liability. The mere happenstance that only
the company is mentioned should not, therefore, be allowed to obscure the fact that in the text
of the decision petitioner and her corespondents below were found guilty of having illegally
dismissed private respondent and of claiming that private respondent’s employment was
terminated because of retrenchment, when the truth was that she was dismissed for pregnancy.
Hence they should be held personally liable for private respondent’s reinstatement with
backwages.

Page 200 of 370

Tano vs Socrates
G.R. No. 110249, August 21, 1997
J. DAVIDE JR.

Facts:
On Dec 15, 1992, the Sangguniang Panglungsod ng Puerto Princesa enacted an ordinance
banning the shipment of all live fish and lobster outside Puerto Princesa City from January 1,
1993 to January 1, 1998. Subsequently the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Provincial Government
of Palawan enacted a resolution prohibiting the catching, gathering, possessing, buying, selling,
and shipment of a several species of live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms for 5 years, in
and coming from Palawan waters.

Petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, praying that the court declare
the said ordinances and resolutions as unconstitutional on the ground that the said ordinances
deprived them of the due process of law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the
practice of their trade, in violation of Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of
the 1987 Constitution.

Issue:
Are the challenged ordinances unconstitutional?

Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court found the petitioners contentions baseless and held that the challenged
ordinances did not suffer from any infirmity, both under the Constitution and applicable laws.
There is absolutely no showing that any of the petitioners qualifies as a subsistence or marginal
fisherman. Besides, Section 2 of Article XII aims primarily not to bestow any right to subsistence
fishermen, but to lay stress on the duty of the State to protect the nation’s marine wealth. The
so-called “preferential right” of subsistence or marginal fishermen to the use of marine
resources is not at all absolute. In accordance with the Regalian Doctrine, marine resources
belong to the state and pursuant to the first paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution, their “exploration, development and utilization...shall be under the full control and
supervision of the State.

In addition, one of the devolved powers of the LCG on devolution is the enforcement of fishery
laws in municipal waters including the conservation of mangroves. This necessarily includes the
enactment of ordinances to effectively carry out such fishery laws within the municipal waters. In
light of the principles of decentralization and devolution enshrined in the LGC and the powers
granted therein to LGUs which unquestionably involve the exercise of police power, the validity
of the questioned ordinances cannot be doubted.

Page 201 of 370

WEEK 10

Interpretation of Words and Phrases

1. Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, G.R. No. 20479, February 6, 1925.
2. De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010.
3. Estrada v, Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001.
4. Perez v. LPG Refillers Association of the Philippines, G.R. No. 159149, August 28, 2007.
5. Matuguina Integrated Wood Products, Inc. (MIWPI) v, Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 98310,
October 24, 1996.
6. Secretary of Justice v. Koruga, G.R. No. 166199, April 24, 2009.
7. Tan v. People, 115507, May 19, 1998.
8. Bernardo v. Bernardo, G.R. No. L-5872, November 29, 1954.
9. Malanyaon v. Lising, G.R. No. L-56028, July 30, 1981.
10. People v. Salico, G.R. No. L-1567, October 13, 1949.
11. Coca-cola Bottlers Phils., Inc. v. Gomez, G.R. No. 154491, November 14, 2008.
12. Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012.
13. People v. Delantar, G.R. No. 169143, February 2, 2007.
14. Aisporna v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-39419, April 12, 1982.
15. Dai-Chi Electronics Manufacturing Corporation v. Villarama, Jr., G.R. No. 112940,
November 21, 1994.
16. Benguet State University v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 169637, June 8, 2007.
17. Guzman v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 182380, August 28, 2009.
18. Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corporation, Inc., G.R. No. 111097, July 20, 1994.
19. Philippine Basketball Association (PBA) v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119122, August 8,
2000.
20. Republic v. Santua, G.R. No. 155703, September 8, 2008.
21. Nasipit Integrated Arraste and Stevedoring Services, Inc. v. Nasipit Employees Labor Union,
G.R. No.162411, June 27, 2008.
22. Dazon v. Yap and People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 157095, January 15, 2010.
23. Sterling Selections Corporation v. Laguna Lake Development Authority, G.R. No. 171427,
March 30, 2011.
24. Catu v. Rellosa, A.C. No. 5738, February 19, 2008.
25. Centeno v. Villalon-Pornillos, G.R. No. 113092, September 1, 1994.
26. Malinias v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 146943, October 4, 2002.
27. San Pablo Manufacturing Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No.
147749, June 22, 2006.
28. Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 168062, June 29, 2010.
29. PAGCOR v. Bureau of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 172087, March 15, 2011.
30. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Seagate Technology (Philippines), G.R. No. 153866,
February 11, 2005.
31. Garvida v. Sales, G.R. No. 124893, April 18, 1997.

Page 202 of 370

32. Commission on Audit of the Province of Cebu v. Province of Cebu, G.R. No. 141386,
November 29, 2001.
33. People v. Manantan, G.R. No. L-14129, July 31, 1982.
34. Spouses Delfino v. St. James Hospital, Inc., G.R. No. 166735, November 23, 2007.
35. Philippine British Assurance Co., Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72005, May
29, 1987.
36. Daes v. We Ko, G.R. No. 48817, January 22, 1943.
37. Pillar v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 115245, July 11, 1995.
38. People v. Evaristo, G.R. No. 93828, December 11, 1992.
39. Ramirez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 93833, September 28, 1995.
40. Dabalos v. Regional Trial Court, G.R. No. 193960, January 7, 2013.
41. MTRCB v. ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, G.R. No. 155282, January 17, 2005.
42. Iglesia ni Cristo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119673, July 26, 1996.
43. Tiangco v. Uniwide Sales Warehouse Club, Inc., G.R. No.168697, December 14, 2009.
44. Rubberworld (Phils.), Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 126773, April 14, 1999.
45. People v. Tamani, G.R. Nos. L-22160-61, January 21, 1974.
46. City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005.
47. Exconde v. Capuno, G.R. No. 10134, June 29, 1957.
48. Amadora v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-47745, April 15, 1988.
49. Department of Environment and Natural Resources v. United Planners Consultants, Inc.,
G.R. No. 212081, February 23, 2015.
50. Chua v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 88979, February 7, 1992.
51. Sugbuanon Rural Bank, Inc. v. Laguesma, G.R. No. 116194, February 2, 2000.
52. National Association of Trade Union-Republic Planters Bank Supervisors Chapter v. Torres,
G.R. No. 93468, December 29, 1994.
53. Bulletin Publishing Corporation v. Sanchez, G.R. No. 74425, October 7, 1986.
54. Golden Farms Inc. v. Ferrer-Calleja, G.R. No. 78755, July 19, 1989.
55. Mercado v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 79869, September 5, 1991.
56. Benedicto v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125359, September 4, 2001.
57. Estrada v, Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148556, November 19, 2001.
58. National Power Corporation v. City of Cabanatuan, G.R. No. 149110, April 9, 2003.
59. Marcos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126594, September 5, 1997.

Construction of Statute as a Whole

1. Fort Bonifacio Development Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No.
158885, October 2, 2009.
2. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, Inc. v. City of Davao, G.R. No. 143867,
August 22, 2001.
3. AT&T Communications Services Phils., Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No.
185969, November 19, 2014.
4. Leynes v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 143596, December 11, 2003.

Page 203 of 370

5. Alpha Investigation and Security Agency, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R.
No. 111722, May 27, 1997.
6. JMM Promotions & Management, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No.
109835, November 22, 1993.
7. Sajonas v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102377, July 5, 1996.

Page 204 of 370

Yu Cong Eng et al vs. Trinidad
GR No. L-20479 | Feb. 6, 1925
J. MALCOLM

Facts:
The petitioner, Yu Cong Eng, was charged by information in the court of first instance of Manila,
with a violation of Act 2972, which provides that (Section 1) it shall be unlawful for any person,
company, or partnership or corporation engaged in commerce, industry or any other activity for
the purpose of profit in the Philippine Islands, in accordance with existing law, to keep its
account books in any language other than English, Spanish or any local dialect. He was
arrested, his books were seized, and the trial was about to proceed, when he and the other
petitioner, Co Liam, on their own behalf, and on behalf of all the other Chinese merchants in the
Philippines, filed the petition against the fiscal, or prosecuting attorney of Manila, and the
collector of internal revenue engaged in the prosecution, and against the judge presiding.

Issue:
Whether or Not Act 2972 is unconstitutional.

Ruling:
Yes. The Philippine government may make every reasonable requirement of its taxpayers to
keep proper records of their business transactions in English or Spanish or Filipino dialect by
which an adequate measure of what is due from them in meeting the cost of government can be
had. But we are clearly of opinion that it is not within the police power of the Philippine
Legislature, because it would be oppressive and arbitrary, to prohibit all Chinese merchants
from maintaining a set of books in the Chinese language, and in the Chinese characters, and
thus prevent them from keeping advised of the status of their business and directing its conduct.

Page 205 of 370

De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council
G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010
J. BERSAMIN

Facts:
This is a Motion for Reconsideration on the March 17, 2010 decision of the Court. The said
decision directs the Judicial and Bar Council to resume its proceedings for the nomination of
candidates to fill the vacancy created by the compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S.
Puno by May 17, 2010, and to prepare the short list of nominees and submit it to the incumbent
President. Movants argue that the disputed constitutional provision, Art. VII, Sec. 15 and Art.
VIII, Sec. 4(1), clearly intended the ban on midnight appointments to cover the members of the
Judiciary, and they contended that the principle of stare decisis is controlling, and insisted that
the Court erred in disobeying or abandoning the Valenzuela ruling.

Issue:
Did the Constitutional Commission extend to the Judiciary the ban on presidential appointments
during the period stated in Sec. 15, Article VII?

Ruling:
The Constitutional Commission did not extend to the Judiciary the ban on presidential
appointments during the period stated in Sec. 15, Art. VII. The deliberations that the dissent of
Justice Carpio Morales quoted from the records of the Constitutional Commission did not
concern either Sec. 15, Art. VII or Sec. 4(1), Art. VIII, but only Sec. 13, Art. VII, a provision on
nepotism.

Election ban on appointments does not extend to the Supreme Court. The Court upheld its
March 17, 2010 decision ruling that the prohibition under Art. VII, Sec. 15 of the Constitution
against presidential appointments immediately before the next presidential elections and up to
the end of the term of the outgoing president does not apply to vacancies in the Supreme Court.

Page 206 of 370

Estrada v, Sandiganbayan,
G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001
J. BELLOSILLO

Facts:
Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act
Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder) as amended by RA 7659. Estrada wishes to
impress the Court that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but
distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionality infirm. That there was a clear
violations of the fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation.

Issue:
Whether or not the Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague.

Ruling:
No. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used
therein, or because of the employment of terms without defining them. There is no positive
constitutional or statutory command requiring the legislature to define each and every word in
an enactment. Congress’ inability to so define the words employed in a statute will not
necessary result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear,
or at least, can be gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder
Law.

It is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in

their natural, plain, and ordinary acceptation and signification, unless it is evident that the
legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words.

Every provision of the law should be construed in relation and with reference to every other part.

There was nothing vague or ambiguous in the provisions of R.A. 7080

Page 207 of 370

Perez v. LPG Refillers Association of the Philippines
G.R. No. 159149, August 28, 2007
J. QUISUMBING

Facts:
Batas Pambansa Blg. 33, as amended, penalizes illegal trading, hoarding, overpricing,
adulteration, underdelivery, and underfilling of petroleum products, as well as possession for
trade of adulterated petroleum products and of underfilled liquefied petroleum gas (LPG)
cylinders. The said law sets the monetary penalty for violators to a minimum of P20,000 and a
maximum of P50,000. Respondent LPG Refillers Association of the Philippines, Inc. asked the
DOE to set aside the Circular for being contrary to law. The DOE, however, denied the request
for lack of merit. Respondent then filed a petition for prohibition and annulment with prayer for
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction before the trial court.

After trial on the merits, the trial court nullified the Circular on the ground that it introduced new
offenses not included in the law.6 The court intimated that the Circular, in providing penalties on
a per cylinder basis for each violation, might exceed the maximum penalty under the law. In
view of the foregoing, this Court renders judgment declaring DOE Circular No. 2000-06-010 null
and void and prohibits the respondent from implementing the same.
The trial court denied for lack of merit petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether Circular No. 2000-06-10 is invalid for exceeding the provisions of B.P. 33

Ruling:
No. The Circular is valid as the DOE merely filled up the details and the manner through which
B.P. 33, as amended may be carried out. A criminal statute is not rendered uncertain and void
because general terms are used therein. The lawmakers have no positive constitutional or
statutory duty to define each and every word in an enactment, as long as the legislative will is
clear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole act, as distinctly expressed in B.P. 33
(amended) Thus, the respondent’s reliance on the “void for vagueness” doctrine is misplaced.
Moreover, the violation on a per cylinder basis falls within the phrase “any act” as mandated in
Sec. 4 of B.P. 33. To provide for the same penalty regardless of the number of cylinders would
be indiscriminate, oppressive and impractical.

Page 208 of 370

G.R. No. 98310 October 24, 1996
MATUGUINA INTEGRATED WOOD PRODUCTS, INC., petitioner,
vs. The HON. COURT OF APPEALS, DAVAO ENTERPRISES CORPORATION, The HON.
MINISTER, (NOW SECRETARY) of NATURAL RESOURCES AND PHILLIP CO,

Facts:
On June 28, 1973, the Acting Director of the Bureau of Forest Development issued Provisional
Timber LicensemNo. 30, covering an area of 5,400 hectares to Ms. Milagros Matuguina who
was then doing business under the name of MLE, a sole proprietorship venture. A portion,
covering 1,900 hectares, of the said area was located within the territorial boundary of Gov.
Generoso in Mati, Davao Oriental, and adjoined the timber concession of Davao Enterprises
Corporation, the private respondent in this case. On July 10, 1974, petitioner Matuguina
Integrated Wood Products, Inc. was incorporated, having an authorized capital stock of Ten
Million Pesos. Milagros Matuguina became the majority stockholder of MIWPI on September 24,
1974, when the latter's Board of Directors approved by Resolution the transfer of 1,000,000
shares from Henry Wee to Milagros Matuguina, thus giving her seventy percent (70%) stock
ownership of MIWPI. In an undated letter to the Director of Forest Development (BFD) on
November 26, 1974, Milagros Matuguina requested the Director for a change of name and
transfer of management of PTL No. 30 from a single proprietorship under her name, to that of
MIWPI. This request was favorably endorsed on December 2, 1974 3 by the BFD's Acting
Director, Jose Viado to respondent Secretary of Natural Resources, who approved the same.
After investigation of DAVENCOR's complaint, the Investigating Committee which looked into
DAVENCOR's complaint submitted its report to the Director, finding that MLE had encroached
on the concession area of DAVENCOR. In line with this, the Director of Forest Development
issued an Order 6 on July 15, 1981, finding and declaring MLE to have encroached upon, and
conducted illegal logging operations within the licensed or concession area of DAVENCOR.
MLE appealed the Order to the Ministry of Natural Resources, which appealed and affirmed the
earlier decision.

Issue:
Whether or not the transfer of the obligations mean all the obligations acquired previously by the
transferee.

Ruling:
No. Even if it is mandated in the provision that "the transferee shall assume all the obligations of
the transferor" this does not mean that all obligations are assumed, indiscriminately.

Invariably, it is not the letter, but the spirit of the law and intent of the legislature that is
important. When the interpretation of a statute according to the exact and literal import of its
words would lead to absurdity, it should be construed according to the spirit and reason,
disregarding if necessary the letter of the law.

In construing statutes, the terms used therein are generally to be given their ordinary meaning,
that is, such meaning which is ascribed to them when they are commonly used, to the end that
absurdity in the law must be avoided. The term "obligations" as used in the final clause of the
second paragraph of Section 61 of P.D. 705 is construed to mean those obligations incurred by
the transferor in the ordinary course of business. It cannot be construed to mean those
obligations or liabilities incurred by the transferor as a result of transgressions of the law, as
these are personal obligations of the transferor, and could not have been included in the term
"obligations" absent any modifying provision to that effect.

Page 209 of 370

G.R. No. 166199 April 24, 2009
THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE vs. CHRISTOPHER KORUGA

Facts:
Sometime in August 2001, then BI Commissioner Andrea Domingo received an anonymous
letter requesting the deportation of respondent as an undesirable alien for having been found
guilty of Violation of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act in the State of Washington, United
States of America for attempted possession of cocaine sometime in 1983. On September 17,
2001, respondent was arrested and charged before the Board of Special Inquiry for violation of
Section 37(a)(4) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended. The case was docketed
as BSI-D.C. No. ADD-01-126. On September 17, 2001, at about 10:00 A.M., respondent was
arrested by Intelligence operatives at his residence, located at 1001 MARBELLA
CONDOMINIUM II, Roxas Boulevard, Malate, Manila, pursuant to Mission Order No. ADD-01-
162; That respondent was convicted and/or sentenced for Uniform Controlled Substance Act in
connection with his being Drug Trafficker and/or Courier of prohibited drugs in the State of
Washington, United States of America, thus, making him an undesirable alien and/or a public
burden in violation of Sec. 37(4) [sic] of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended.
After filing for bail and was granted provisionally released. Respondent filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but it was denied by the BOC. On April 1, 2003, then DOJ Secretary Simeon A.
Datumanong rendered a Resolution dismissing the appeal. On April 15, 2003, respondent filed
a Motion for Reconsideration which he subsequently withdrew18 on April 23, 2003. Respondent
filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition. he CA rendered a Decision20 setting aside the
Resolution dated April 1, 2003 of the DOJ Secretary and the Judgment dated February 11, 2002
of the BOC and dismissing the deportation case filed against respondent. The CA held that
there was no valid and legal ground for the deportation of respondent since there was no
violation of Section 37(a)(4) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, because
respondent was not convicted or sentenced for a violation of the law on prohibited drugs since
the U.S. Court dismissed the case for violation of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act in the
State of Washington, USA filed against respondent.
Issue:
Whether or not the use of the definite article "the" immediately preceding the phrase "law on
prohibited drugs" emphasizes not just any prohibited drugs law but the law applicable in this
jurisdiction, at that time, the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
Ruling:
No. The general rule in construing words and phrases used in a statute is that in the absence of
legislative intent to the contrary, they should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage
meaning. However, a literal interpretation of a statute is to be rejected if it will operate unjustly,
lead to absurd results, or contract the evident meaning of the statute taken as a whole.34 After
all, statutes should receive a sensible construction, such as will give effect to the legislative
intention and so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion. Indeed, courts are not to give
words meanings that would lead to absurd or unreasonable consequences. Were the Court to
follow the letter of Section 37(a)(4) and make it applicable only to convictions under the
Philippine prohibited drugs law, the Court will in effect be paving the way to an absurd situation
whereby aliens convicted of foreign prohibited drugs laws may be allowed to enter the country
to the detriment of the public health and safety of its citizens. It suggests a double standard of
treatment where only aliens convicted of Philippine prohibited drugs law would be deported,
while aliens convicted of foreign prohibited drugs laws would be allowed entry in the country.
The Court must emphatically reject such interpretation of the law. Certainly, such a situation
was not envisioned by the framers of the law, for to do so would be contrary to reason and
therefore, absurd. Over time, courts have recognized with almost pedantic adherence that what
is contrary to reason is not allowed in law.

Page 210 of 370

G.R. No. 115507 May 19, 1998
ALEJANDRO TAN, ISMAEL RAMILO and FRED MORENO, petitioners,
vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
J. PANGANIBAN

Facts:
On October 26, 1989, about 6:30 p.m., in the town proper of Cajidiocan, Sibuyan Island,
Romblon, Forest Guards Joseph Panadero and Eduardo Rabino intercepted a dump truck
loaded with narra and white lauan lumber. The truck was driven by Petitioner Fred Moreno, an
employee of A & E Construction. Again, about 8:00 p.m. on October 30, 1989, this time in
Barangay Cambajao, Forest Guards Panadero and Rabino apprehended another dump truck
with Plate No. DEK-646 loaded with tanguile lumber. Said truck was driven by Crispin Cabudol,
also an employee of A & E Construction. Both motor vehicles, as well as the construction firm,
were owned by Petitioner Alejandro Tan. In both instances, no documents showing legal
possession of the lumber were, upon demand, presented to the forest guards; thus, the pieces
of lumber were confiscated.

That on or about the 26th day of October, 1989, at around 6:30 o clock in the evening, in the
Poblacion, municipality of Cajidiocan, province of Romblon, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in their possession
and under their custody and control 13 pieces narra lumber about 171 board feet and 41 pieces
tanguile lumber about 834 board feet valued at P8,724.00, Philippine currency, to the damage
and prejudice of the government in the aforestated amount.

In another Information, Tan and Ramilo, together with Crispin Cabudol, were also charged for
the same violation in connection with the October 30, 1989 incident. On April 26, 1990, all the
accused, assisted by counsel, were arraigned on the basis of the aforementioned Informations;
each pleaded not guilty. The cases were thence jointly tried, pursuant to Section 14, Rule 119 of
the Rules of Court. RTC convicted them for violation of Forestry Reform Code. CA affirmed.

Issue:
Whether lumber is excluded from the coverage of Section 68 of PD 705

Ruling:
The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either timber or lumber. While the former is
included in forest products as defined in paragraph (q) of Section 3, the latter is found in
paragraph (aa) of the same section in the definition of Processing plant, which reads:

(aa) Processing plant is any mechanical set-up, machine or combination of machine used for
the processing of logs and other forest raw materials into lumber, veneer, plywood, wallboard,
blackboard, paper board, pulp, paper or other finished wood products.

This simply means that lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw material. Clearly, the
Code uses the term lumber in its ordinary or common usage. In the 1993 copyright edition of
Websters Third New International Dictionary, lumber is defined, inter alia, as timber or logs after
being prepared for the market. Simply put, lumber is a processed log or timber.

It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, words and phrases used in a
statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning. And insofar as
possession of timber without the required legal documents is concerned, Section 68 of P.D. No.
705, as amended, makes no distinction between raw or processed timber. Neither do we. Ubi
lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire debemus.

Page 211 of 370

G.R. No. L-5872 November 29, 1954
ENRIQUE BERNARDO, ET AL., petitioners,
vs. CRISOSTOMO S. BERNARDO and the COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
J. JBL REYES

Facts:
Enrique Bernardo the petitioner sold his lot to the respondent Crisostomo S. Bernardo. That lot
also found that the house of the petitioner since July 13, 1944; that because of family
relationship the petitioners "were able to remain in the premises due to the tolerance of, and out
of charity from, the appellee (respondent Crisostomo Bernardo) and his deceased parents who
were the rightful lessees of the lot in question."

Due to his long stay in that parcel of land; the petitioner argue that he is a bona fide occupants
thereof because of his long stay in said parcel of land.

Issue:
Whether or not the terms "actual bona fide settlers and occupants", plainly indicating that
"actual" and "bona fide" are synonymous based on the existing laws.

Ruling:
No. The law provides that the terms "actual bona fide settlers and occupants", plainly indicating
that "actual" and "bona fide" are not synonymous, while the Commonwealth acts deleted the
term "actual" and solely used the words "bona fide occupant", thereby emphasizing the
requirement that the prospective beneficiaries of the acts should be endowed with legitimate
tenure.

Page 212 of 370

G.R. No. L-56028 : July 30, 1981
NILO A. MALANYAON, Petitioner-Appellant, vs. HON. ESTEBAN M. LISING, as Judge of
the CFI of Camarines Sur, Br. VI, and CESARIO GOLETA, as Municipal Treasurer of Bula,
Camarines Sur, Respondents-Appellees.
J. ABAD SANTOS

Facts:
Mayor Pontanal was charged with violation of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).
He was suspended from office but he died during his incumbency, and while the case was
pending. The case was dismissed due to his death. Petitioner sought the payment of the
Mayor's salary during his period of suspension pursuant to Section 13 of RA 3019 which
provides - should a public officer be convicted by final judgement he shall lose all retirement or
gravity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to
the salaries and benefits to which he failed to receive during his suspension. Malanyaon was a
member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Bula, Camarines Sur. He filed an action to declare illegal
the disbursement made by Goleta as Municipal Treasurer to the widow of Mayor Pontanal a
portion of the salary of the late Mayor as such Mayor of such municipality during the period of
his suspension from August 16, 1977 up to November 28, 1979. However, Judge Lising
dismissed the action on the ground that the criminal case against Mayor Pontanal due to his
death amounted to acquittal.

Issue:
Whether or not the dismissal of the case due to the death of the accused constitutes acquittal.

Ruling:
No. It is obvious that the statute speaks of the suspended officer being "acquitted". It means that
after due hearing and consideration of the evidence against him the court is of the opinion that
his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. Dismissal of the case against the
suspended officer will not suffice because dismissal does not amount to acquittal.

Page 213 of 370

G.R. No. L-1567 October 13, 1949
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. OSCAR SALICO, Defendant-
Appellee.
J. FERIA

Facts:
This an appeal by the provincial fiscal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Occidental
Negros which, upon the petition of the defendant before the latter has presented his evidence,
dismissed the criminal action against the defendant charged with homicide on the ground that
the fiscal was not able to prove that the offense was committed within the territorial jurisdiction
of the court, or that the town or municipality of Victorias in which it was committed is within the
Province of Negros Occidental.

It is obvious that the lower court erred in not taking judicial notice as it ought to of the political
subdivisions or municipalities of the Province of Occidental Negros, that is, that the municipality
or town of Victorias was within that province, and therefore the offense charged was committed
within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros.

Issue:
Whether or not the appeal by the prosecution from the order of the Court of First Instance in the
present case would place the defendant in double jeopardy.

Ruling:
No. First, because by the dismissal of the case by the court below upon motion of the
defendant, the latter has not been in jeopardy; Second, because the appeal by the prosecution
in the present case would not place the defendant in double jeopardy. And Third, because
assuming arguendo that the defendant had been already in jeopardy in the court below and
would be placed in the double jeopardy by the appeal, the defendant has waived his
constitutional right not to be put in danger of being convicted twice for the same offense. But
when the case id dismissed with the express consent of the defendant, the dismissal will not be
a bar to another prosecution for the same offense; because, his action in having the case
dismissed constitutes a waiver of his constitutional rights or privilege, for the reason that he
thereby prevents the court from proceeding to the trial on the merits and rendering a judgment
of conviction against him.

Page 214 of 370

G.R. No. 154491 November 14, 2008
COCA-COLA BOTTLERS, PHILS., INC. (CCBPI), Naga Plant, petitioner,
vs. QUINTIN J. GOMEZ, a.k.a. "KIT" GOMEZ and DANILO E. GALICIA, a.k.a. "DANNY
GALICIA", respondents.
J. Brion

Facts:
On July 2, 2001, Coca-Cola applied for a search warrant against Pepsi for hoarding Coke empty
bottles in Pepsi's yard in Concepcion Grande, Naga City, an act allegedly penalized as unfair
competition under the IP Code. Coca-Cola claimed that the bottles must be confiscated to
preclude their illegal use, destruction or concealment by the respondents. Coca-Cola submitted
the sworn statements of three witnesses: Naga plant representative Arnel John Ponce said he
was informed that one of their plant security guards had gained access into the Pepsi
compound and had seen empty Coke bottles; acting plant security officer Ylano A. Regaspi said
he investigated reports that Pepsi was hoarding large quantities of Coke bottles by requesting
their security guard to enter the Pepsi plant and he was informed by the security guard that
Pepsi hoarded several Coke bottles; security guard Edwin Lirio stated that he entered Pepsi's
yard on July 2, 2001 at 4 p.m. and saw empty Coke bottles inside Pepsi shells or cases. MTC
issued search warrants. The respondents also filed motions for the return of their shells and to
quash the search warrant. MTC denied as well as the motion for reconsideration. Before RTC
the warrants were voided for lack of probable cause and the non-commission of the crime of
unfair competition, even as it implied that other laws may have been violated by the
respondents. Hence this petition.

Issue:
Is the hoarding of a competitor's product containers punishable as unfair competition under the
Intellectual Property Code that would entitle the aggrieved party to a search warrant against the
hoarder?

Ruling:
No. What unfair competition is, is further particularized under Section 168.3 when it provides
specifics of what unfair competition is "without in any way limiting the scope of protection
against unfair competition." Part of these particulars is provided under Section 168.3(c)... which
provides the general "catch-all" phrase that the petitioner cites. Under this phrase, a person
shall be guilty of unfair competition "who shall commit any other act contrary to good faith of a
nature calculated to discredit the goods, business or services of... another."

The critical question, however, is not the intrinsic unfairness of the act of hoarding; what is...
critical for purposes of Section 168.3 (c) is to determine if the hoarding, as charged, "is of a
nature calculated to discredit the goods, business or services" of the petitioner. Under all the
above approaches, we conclude that the "hoarding" - as defined and charged by the petitioner -
does not fall within the coverage of the IP Code and of Section 168 in particular. It does not
relate to any patent, trademark, trade name or service mark that the... respondents have
invaded, intruded into or used without proper authority from the petitioner.

In this light, hoarding for purposes of destruction is closer to what another law - R.A. No. 623
If it serves any purpose at all in our discussions, it is to show that the underlying factual situation
of the present case is in fact covered by another law, not by the IP Code that the petitioner cites.
Viewed in this light, the lack of probable cause to support the disputed search warrant at once
becomes apparent.

Page 215 of 370

G.R. No. 202242 April 16, 2013
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner vs. JUDICIALAND BAR COUNCIL
Facts:
In 1994, instead of having only 7 members, an eighth member was added to the JBC as two
representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC – one from the House of
Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, the
JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the representatives
from the Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote each. Senator Francis Joseph
G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC
as representatives of the legislature. It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this
petition. Respondents argued that the crux of the controversy is the phrase “a representative of
Congress.” It is their theory that the two houses, the Senate and the House of Representatives,
are permanent and mandatory components of “Congress,” such that the absence of either
divests the term of its substantive meaning as expressed under the Constitution. Bicameralism,
as the system of choice by the Framers, requires that both houses exercise their respective
powers in the performance of its mandated duty which is to legislate. Thus, when Section 8(1),
Article VIII of the Constitution speaks of “a representative from Congress,” it should mean one
representative each from both Houses which comprise the entire Congress.
Issue:
Is the JBC’s practice of having members from the Senate and the House of Representatives
making 8 instead of 7 sitting members unconstitutional?
Ruling:
One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute
are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without
attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of constitutional construction that the
language employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where
technical terms are employed. As much as possible, the words of the Constitution should be
understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the
provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it,
based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Verba legis non
est recedendum – from the words of a statute there should be no departure. Applying the
foregoing principle to this case, it becomes apparent that the word “Congress” used in Article
VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic sense. No particular allusion
whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or the House of Representatives is being referred
to, but that, in either case, only a singular representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC. It is
worthy to note that the seven-member composition of the JBC serves a practical purpose, that
is, to provide a solution should there be a stalemate in voting. This underlying reason leads the
Court to conclude that a single vote may not be divided into half (1/2), between two
representatives of Congress, or among any of the sitting members of the JBC for that matter.
This unsanctioned practice can possibly cause disorder and eventually muddle the JBC’s voting
process, especially in the event a tie is reached. The aforesaid purpose would then be rendered
illusory, defeating the precise mechanism which the Constitution itself createdWhile it would be
unreasonable to expect that the Framers provide for every possible scenario, it is sensible to
presume that they knew that an odd composition is the best means to break a voting deadlock.
The respondents insist that owing to the bicameral nature of Congress, the word “Congress” in
Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution should be read as including both the Senate and the
House of Representatives. They theorize that it was so worded because at the time the said
provision was being drafted, the Framers initially intended a unicameral form of Congress.
Then, when the Constitutional Commission eventually adopted a bicameral form of Congress,
the Framers, through oversight, failed to amend Article VIII, Section 8 of the Constitution. It is
evident that the definition of “Congress” as a bicameral body refers to its primary function in
government – to legislate. In the passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit in the distinction of
the role of each house in the process.

Page 216 of 370

G.R. No. 169143 February 2, 2007
[Formerly G.R. No. 138328] PEOPLE OF THE PHLIPPINES, Appellee
vs. SIMPLICIO DELANTAR, Appellant.
J. Tinga

Facts:
On 27 August 1996, an information for violation of Section 5, Article III of Republic Act No.
76101 was filed against appellant Simplicio Delantar y Redondo. Docketed as Criminal Case
No. 96-91752 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, the information was amended on 3
September 1996.3 The accusatory portion of the Amended Information reads:

That sometime and during the period from 1994 to August 1996, in Pasay City, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
SIMPLICIO DELANTAR Y REDONDO, through coercion and influence, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously promote, facilitate and induce AAA, a female child below 12
years of age, to indulge in sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct for money, profit and other
consideration. Appellant assisted by counsel de parte, entered a plea of not guilty and informed
the court that he did not want a pre-trial. After trial RTC convicted Delantar.

Issue:
Whether or not accused falls under the father as defined in the Code

Ruling:
No. We thus hold that the birth certificate of AAA is prima facie evidence only of the fact of her
birth and not of her relation to appellant. After all, it is undisputed that appellant is not AAA’s
biological father.

At best, appellant is AAA’s de facto guardian. Now, would this circumstance justify the
imposition of the higher penalty on him? We think not. We apply, by analogy, the ruling of this
Court in People v. Garcia,85 where we held that the restrictive concept of guardian, legal or
judicial, is required by Sec. 11 of R.A. No. 7659. Said provision, by way of amending Art. 335 of
the Revised Penal Code, ordains that where the victim of the crime of rape is under eighteen
years of age and the offender is, inter alia, a guardian of the victim, the death penalty shall be
imposed.

The law requires a legal or judicial guardian since it is the consanguineous relation or the
solemnity of judicial appointment which impresses upon the guardian the lofty purpose of his
office and normally deters him from violating its objectives. Such considerations do not obtain in
appellant’s case or, for that matter, any person similarly circumstanced as a mere custodian of a
ward or another’s property. The fiduciary powers granted to a real guardian warrant the exacting
sanctions should he betray the trust.

Further, according to the maxim noscitur a sociis, the correct construction of a word or phrase
susceptible of various meanings may be made clear and specific by considering the company of
words in which it is found or with which it is associated. Section 31(c) of R.A. No. 7610 contains
a listing of the circumstances of relationship between the perpetrator and the victim which will
justify the imposition of the maximum penalty, namely when the perpetrator is an "ascendant,
parent, guardian, stepparent or collateral relative within the second degree of consanguinity or
affinity." It should be noted that the words with which "guardian" is associated in the provision all
denote a legal relationship. From this description we may safely deduce that the guardian
envisioned by law is a person who has a legal relationship with a ward. This relationship may be
established either by being the ward’s biological parent (natural guardian) or by adoption (legal
guardian). Appellant is neither AAA’s biological parent nor is he AAA’s adoptive father. Clearly,
appellant is not the "guardian" contemplated by law.

Page 217 of 370

G.R. No. L-39419 April 12, 1982
MAPALAD AISPORNA, petitioner vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:
Petitioner Aisporna was charged in the City Court of Cabanatuan for violation of Section 189 of
the Insurance Act on November 21, 1970. A Policy was issued by Perla thru its author
representative, Rodolfo S. Aisporna, for a period of twelve (12) months with beneficiary as Ana
M. Isidro, and for P5,000.00; apparently, insured died by violence during lifetime of policy,
information was filed against the wife of Rodrigo because allegedly she unlawfully acted as an
agent in the solicitation of the insurance without having been first secured a certificate of
authority to act as an agent from the office of the Insurance Commission. The People of the
Philippines presented evidence that aforementioned policy was issued with active participation
of appellant wife of Rodolfo, against which appellant in her defense sought to show that being
the wife of true agent, Rodolfo, she naturally helped him in his work, as clerk, and that policy
was merely a renewal and was issued because Isidro had called by telephone to renew, and at
that time, her husband, Rodolfo, was absent and so she left a note on top of her husband’s desk
to renew. RTC and CA find the accused guilty and fined petitioner 500.00 with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency for the violation of the Insurance Act. Solicitor General was
made to comment on the case and the same said that the petitioner is not guilty because she
does not fall under the definition of agent as provided under par. 2 of the sec. 189 of the
Insurance Act.
Issue:
Whether or not a person can be convicted of having violated the first paragraph of Section 189
of the Insurance Act without reference to the second paragraph of the same section?
Ruling:
No. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, the definition of an insurance agent as
found in the second paragraph of Section 189 is intended to define the word “agent” mentioned
in the first and second paragraphs of the aforesaid section. More significantly, in its second
paragraph, it is explicitly provided that the definition of an insurance agent is within the intent of
Section 189. Hence —
Any person who for compensation … shall be an insurance agent within the intent of this
section, … Patently, the definition of an insurance agent under the second paragraph holds true
with respect to the agent mentioned in the other two paragraphs of the said section. The second
paragraph of Section 189 is a definition and interpretative clause intended to qualify the term
“agent” mentioned in both the first and third paragraphs of the aforesaid section. Legislative
intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole. The particular words,
clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole
and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in
order to produce harmonious whole. Considering that the definition of an insurance agent as
found in the second paragraph is also applicable to the agent mentioned in the first paragraph,
to receive a compensation by the agent is an essential element for a violation of the first
paragraph of the aforesaid section. The appellate court has established ultimately that the
petitioner-accused did not receive any compensation for the issuance of the insurance policy of
Eugenio Isidro. Under the Texas Penal Code 1911, Article 689, making it a misdemeanor for
any person for direct or indirect compensation to solicit insurance without a certificate of
authority to act as an insurance agent, an information, failing to allege that the solicitor was to
receive compensation either directly or indirectly, charges no offense. It must be noted that the
information, in the case at bar, does not allege that the negotiation of an insurance contracts by
the accused with Eugenio Isidro was one for compensation. This allegation is essential, and
having been omitted, a conviction of the accused could not be sustained. It is well-settled in Our
jurisprudence that to warrant conviction, every element of the crime must be alleged and
proved.

Page 218 of 370

G.R. No. 112940 November 21, 199
DAI-CHI ELECTRONICS MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs. HON. MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR., Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 156,
Pasig, Metro Manila and ADONIS C. LIMJUCO, respondents.
J. QUIASON

Facts:
On July 29, 1993, the petitioner Daichi electronics filed a complaint for damages with RTC
branch 156 for an employee’s (Limjuco) violation of their contract in 1990 which stipulated that
the termination of service of an employee restricted him from working in a company which has a
similar set of products or ventures for a span of 2 years following the termination of service. The
petitioner claimed that respondent became an employee of such a company called Angel Sound
with the same position as head of material management control before the 2 years was up.

The petitioner sought to claim 100k in damages and prevent the former employee from working
in the rival business within the 1 year timespan. The respondent court under Villarama claimed
that it had no jurisdiction because the complaint was for damages from labor-employee relations
and should be adjudicated under the Labor Arbiter under Art 217 s 4 of the LC. The petitioner
asked for reversal because the case was recognizable under the regular courts and that the
cause of action didn’t arise from employee-employer relationships even if the claim was in the
employee’s contract.

Issue:
Is the petitioner’s claim for damages one arising from employee-employer relations?

Ruling:
No. Article 217 Section 4 of the Labor Code stipulated that Labor Arbiters have exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide cases for workers with claims for actual, moral, exemplary and
other forms of damages arising from employer-employee relations.
The court held that the cuase of action was under Civil Law, not the labor code. Why?
The petitioner sought to recover damages agreed upon in the contract as redress for
respondent’s breach of his contractual obligation to its damage and prejudice. He also didn’t ask
for relief under the Labor Code. The applicable case law was Singapore airlines v Pano where
the employer’s claim for damages was based on wanton failure and refusal without just cause to
report to duty coupled with the averment that the employee maliciously and with bad faith
violated the contract. The employee didn’t report for duty as a course of convention training
which is a quasi-delict.
There must be a causal connection for claims provided in the Article 217 Section 4 of the Labor
Code. Only when there is such a connection with other claims can damages be considered as
arising from employer-employee relations. Further the use of noscitur a sociis wherein the entire
universe of family claims asserted by workers has been observed into the exclusive jurisdiction
of labor arbiters. Nos a soc was also used to limit par 3 (par 4 in the present labor code) of art
217 wherein it was read in relation to par 1 (unfair labor practices), par 2 (terms and conditions
of employment), par 4 (household services) and par 5 (restrictions on activities of employees
and employers) There was a unifying element which referred to cases out of employer-
employee relations. Money claims that didn’t arise out of such relations was to be taken in by
regular courts. The claims should have a causal connection with employer-employee relations.

Page 219 of 370

G.R. No. 169637 June 8, 2007
BENGUET STATE UNIVERSITY represented by its President ROGELIO D. COLTING,
petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent.
J. NACHURA

Facts:
Congress passed Republic Act No. 8292 entitled An Act Providing for the Uniform Composition
and Powers of the Governing Boards, the Manner of Appointment and Term of Office of the
President of Chartered State Universities and Colleges, and for Other Purposes, commonly
known as the Higher Education Modernization Act of 1997. Pursuant to Section 4 (d) of the said
law, the Board of Regents of BSU passed and approved Board Resolution No. 794 on October
31, 1997, granting rice subsidy and health care allowance to BSUs employees. The sums were
taken from the income derived from the operations of BSU and were given to the employees at
different periods in 1998. A Notice of Disallowance was issued stating that RA 8292 does not
provide for the grant of said allowance to employees and officials of the University. BSU
requested the lifting of the disallowance with COA Regional Office but was denied. It held that
the grant of said allowances lacked statutory basis, transgressed the constitutional proscription
on additional, double, or indirect compensation and ran counter to the provisions of the Salary
Standardization Law.

Issue:
Whether or not granting rice subsidy and health care allowance to BSU employees is repugnant
to Section 8 of Article 9 of the 1987 Constitution

Ruling:
COA ruling is upheld.

Under the principle of ejusdem generis, where a statute describes things of a particular kind
accompanied by words of a generic character, the generic word will usually be limited to things
os a similar nature with those particularly enumerated, unless there be something in the context
of a statute which would repel such inference.

COA correctly rules that the "other programs/projects" under RA 8292 and its implementing
rules should be of the same nature as instruction, research, and extension. In BSU's case, the
disbursements were for rice subsidy and health care allowances which are in no way intended
for academic programs similar to instruction, research, or extension. Section 4 cannot therefore,
be relied upon by BSU as the legal basis for the grant of the allowances.

Further, a reading of the entire provision supports COA's interpretation that the authority given
to the Governing Board of state universities and colleges is not plenary and absolute and is
subject to limitations contrary to its claim.

Page 220 of 370

G.R. No. 182380 August 28, 2009
ROBERT P. GUZMAN, Petitioner,
vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MAYOR RANDOLPH S. TING AND SALVACION
GARCIA, Respondents.
J. BERSAMIN

Facts:
On March 31, 2004, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Tuguegarao City passed Resolution No.
048-2004 to authorize City Mayor Ting to acquire two parcels of land for use as a public
cemetery of the City. Pursuant to the resolution, City Mayor Ting purchased the two parcels of
land, identified as Lot Nos. 5860 and 5861 and located at Atulayan Sur, Tuguegarao City, with
an aggregate area of 24,816 square meters (covered by Transfer Certificates of Title [TCT] No.
T-36942 and TCT No. T-36943 of the Register of Deeds in Tuguegarao City), from Anselmo
Almazan, Angelo Almazan and Anselmo Almazan III. As payment, City Treasurer Garcia issued
and released Treasury Warrant No. 0001534514 dated April 20, 2004 in the sum of
P8,486,027.00. On May 5, 2004, the City Government of Tuguegarao caused the registration of
the sale and the issuance of new certificates in its name (i.e., TCT No. T-144428 and TCT No.
T-144429). Based on the transaction, the petitioner filed a complaint in the Office of the
Provincial Election Supervisor of Cagayan Province against City Mayor Ting and City Treasurer
Garcia, charging them with a violation of Section 261, paragraphs (v) and (w), of the Omnibus
Election Code, for having undertaken to construct a public cemetery and for having released,
disbursed and expended public funds within 45 days prior to the May 9, 2004 election, in
disregard of the prohibitions under said provisions due to the election ban period having
commenced on March 26, 2004 and ended on May 9, 2004. City Mayor Ting denied the
accusations in his counter-affidavit but City Treasurer Garcia opted not to answer. After
investigation, the Acting Provincial Election Supervisor of Cagayan recommended the dismissal
of the complaint. COMELEC en banc dismissed the complaint.

Issue:
Whether or not acquisition of Lots 5860 And 5881 during the Period of the Election Ban, not
considered as "Public Works" in Violation of Sec. 261 (v), Omnibus Election Code

Ruling:
Yes. It is a general rule of statutory construction that where general words follow an
enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and specific meaning, such general
words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to
persons or things of the same general kind or class as those specifically mentioned. But this
rule must be discarded where the legislative intention is plain to the contrary.

Accordingly, absent an indication of any contrary legislative intention, the term public works as
used in Section 261 (v) of the Omnibus Election Code is properly construed to refer to any
building or structure on land or to structures (such as roads or dams) built by the Government
for public use and paid for by public funds. Public works are clearly works, whether of
construction or adaptation undertaken and carried out by the national, state, or municipal
authorities, designed to subserve some purpose of public necessity, use or convenience, such
as public buildings, roads, aqueducts, parks, etc.; or, in other words, all fixed works constructed
for public use.12

It becomes inevitable to conclude, therefore, that the petitioner's insistence − that the acquisition
of Lots 5860 and 5881 for use as a public cemetery be considered a disbursement of the public
funds for public works in violation of Section 261(v) of the Omnibus Election Code − was
unfounded and unwarranted.

Page 221 of 370

G.R. No. 111097 July 20, 1994
MAYOR PABLO P. MAGTAJAS & THE CITY OF CAGAYAN DE ORO, petitioners,
vs. PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION, INC. & PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND
GAMING CORPORATION, respondents.
J. CRUZ

Facts:
PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City. It leased a portion of
a building belonging to Pryce Properties Corporations, Inc., renovated & equipped the same,
and prepared to inaugurate its casino during the Christmas season.

Civil organizations angrily denounced the project. Petitioners opposed the casino’s opening and
enacted Ordinance No. 3353, prohibiting the issuance of business permit and canceling existing
business permit to the establishment for the operation of the casino, and Ordinance No. 3375-
93, prohibiting the operation of the casino and providing a penalty for its violation.

Respondents assailed the validity of the ordinances on the ground that they both violated
Presidential Decree No. 1869. Petitioners contend that, pursuant to the Local Government
Code, they have the police power authority to prohibit the operation of casino for the general
welfare.

Issue:
Whether or not the ordinance is valid

Ruling:
No. Cagayan de Oro City, like other local political subdivisions, is empowered to enact
ordinances for the purposes indicated in the Local Government Code. It is expressly vested with
the police power under what is known as the General Welfare

Local Government Code, local government units are authorized to prevent or suppress, among
others, "gambling and other prohibited games of chance." Obviously, this provision excludes
games of chance which are not prohibited but are in fact permitted by law.
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that to be
valid, an ordinance must conform to the following substantive requirements:
1) It must not contravene the constitution or any statute.
2) It must not be unfair or oppressive.
3) It must not be partial or discriminatory.
4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade.
5) It must be general and consistent with public policy.
6) It must not be unreasonable.
The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is obvious.
Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a statute that cannot
be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance. Local councils exercise only delegated legislative
powers conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot
be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to
suggest that the local government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have
derived their power in the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the
statute.Hence, it was not competent for the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City
to enact Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings for the operation of a casino and
Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the operation of casinos. For all their praiseworthy motives,
these ordinances are contrary to P.D. 1869 and the public policy announced therein and are
therefore ultra vires and void.

Page 222 of 370

G.R. No. 119122 August 8, 2000
PHILIPPINE BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION, petitioner,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS, COURT OF TAX APPEALS, AND COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents.
J. PURISIMA

Facts:
On June 21, 1989, the petitioner received an assessment letter from the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue for the payment of deficiency amusement tax. petitioner contested the
assessment by filing a protest with respondent Commissioner who denied the same on
November 6, 1989. On January 8, 1990, petitioner filed a petition for review with the Court of
Tax Appeals questioning the denial by respondent Commissioner of its tax protest. On
December 24, 1993, respondent CTA dismissed petitioner's petition. Petitioner presented a
motion for reconsideration4 of the said decision but the same was denied by respondent CTA in
a resolution ALF dated April 8, 1994. Thereafter and within the reglementary period for
interposing appeals, petitioner appealed the CTA decision to the Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals rendered its questioned Decision, affirming the decision of the CTA and dismissing
petitioner's appeal. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of said decision but to no avail.
The same was denied by the Court of Appeals

Issue:
Whether or not the term gross receipts' embraces all the receipts of the proprietor, lessee or
operator of the amusement place.

Ruling:
Yes. For the purpose of the amusement tax, the term gross receipts' embraces all the receipts
of the proprietor, lessee or operator of the amusement place. Said gross receipts also include
income from television, radio and motion picture rights, if any. A person, or entity or association
conducting any activity subject to the tax herein imposed shall be similarly liable for said tax with
respect to such portion of the receipts derived by him or it.

From the foregoing it is clear that the "proprietor, lessee or operator of professional basketball
games" is required to pay an amusement tax equivalent to fifteen per centum (15%) of their
gross receipts to the Bureau of Internal Revenue, which payment is a national tax. The said
payment of amusement tax is in lieu of all other percentage taxes of whatever nature and
description.

While Section 13 of the Local Tax Code mentions "other places of amusement", professional
basketball games are definitely not within its scope. Under the principle of ejusdem generis,
where general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and
specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to
be held as applying only to persons or things of the same kind or class as those specifically
mentioned.9 Thus, in determining the meaning of the phrase "other places of amusement", one
must refer to the prior enumeration of theaters, cinematographs, concert halls and circuses with
artistic expression as their common characteristic. Professional basketball games do not fall
under the same category as theaters, cinematographs, concert halls and circuses as the latter
basically belong to artistic forms of entertainment while the former caters to sports and gaming.

Page 223 of 370

G.R. No. 155703 September 8, 2008
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. DOMINADOR SANTUA
Facts:
On February, 16, 1999, respondent Dominador Santua filed with the RTC of Calapan, Oriental
Mindoro, a petition for judicial reconstitution of Transfer Certificate of Title. Respondent alleged
that he is the registered owner of certain parcels of land with an area of 3,306 square meters,
situated in Poblacion, Victoria, Oriental Mindoro, and covered by TCT No. T-22868; the original
copy of TCT No. T-22868 was among those destroyed by the fire that completely razed the
Capitol Building then housing the Office of the Register of Deeds of Oriental Mindoro on August
12, 1977. The names and addresses of the adjoining property owners were enumerated in the
petition. Attached to the petition were a tax declaration, survey plan, and technical description of
each lot. The RTC issued an Order setting the initial hearing of the case. It also directed the
publication of the order in the Official Gazette, its posting at the main entrance of the Capitol
Building and in the Municipal Building of Victoria, Calapan City, and sending of copies thereof to
all adjoining owners mentioned in the petition, the Register of Deeds, Provincial Prosecutor,
Director of Lands, Solicitor General and the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority.
RTC granted the petition. The OSG filed a Notice of Appeal, which was given due course by the
RTC. On September 23, 2002, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not tax declarations, technical descriptions and lot plans are sufficient bases for
reconstitution of lost or destroyed certificate of titles.
Ruling:
The reconstitution of a certificate of title denotes restoration in the original form and condition of
a lost or destroyed instrument attesting the title of a person to a piece of land. It partakes of a
land registration proceeding. Thus, it must be granted only upon clear proof that the title sought
to be restored was indeed issued to the petitioner. In this regard, Section 3 of Republic Act No.
26 enumerates the documents regarded as valid and sufficient bases for reconstitution of a
transfer certificate of title: SEC. 3. Transfer certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such of
the sources hereunder enumerated as may be available, in the following order: (a) The owner’s
duplicate of the certificate of title; (b) The co-owner’s, mortgagee’s or lessee’s duplicate of the
certificate of title; (c) A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by the register of
deeds or by a legal custodian thereof; (d) The deed of transfer or other document on file in the
registry of deeds, containing the description of the property, or an authenticated copy thereof,
showing that its original had been registered, and pursuant to which the lost or destroyed
transfer certificate of title was issued; (e) A document, on file in the registry of deeds, by which
the property the description of which is given in said documents, is mortgaged, leased or
encumbered, or an authenticated copy of said document showing that its original had been
registered; and (f) Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and
proper basis for reconstituting the lost or destroyed certificate of title. The instant petition for
reconstitution is anchored on Section 3(f) of RA No. 26, with respondent proffering three
significant documents - a tax declaration, survey plan and technical descriptions of each lot.
The Court has already settled in a number of cases that, following the principle of ejusdem
generis in statutory construction, "any document" mentioned in Section 3 should be interpreted
to refer to documents similar to those previously enumerated therein. As aptly observed by the
petitioner, the documents enumerated in Section 3(a), (b), (c), (d) and (e) are documents that
had been issued or are on file with the Register of Deeds, thus, highly credible. Moreover, they
are documents from which the particulars of the certificate of title or the circumstances which
brought about its issuance could readily be ascertained. After all, the purpose of reconstitution
proceedings under RA No. 26 is the restoration in the original form and condition of a lost or
destroyed instrument attesting the title of a person to a piece of land. Consequently, a
petitioner’s documentary evidence should be able to establish that the lost or destroyed
certificate of title has, in fact, been issued to the petitioner or his predecessor-in-interest and
such title was in force at the time it was lost or destroyed.

Page 224 of 370

G.R. NO. 162411 June 30, 2008
NASIPIT INTEGRATED ARRASTRE AND STEVEDORING SERVICES, INC. (NIASSI),
represented by RAMON M. CALO, Petitioner, v. NASIPIT EMPLOYEES LABOR UNION
(NELU)-ALU-TUCP, represented by DONELL P. DAGANI, Respondent.
J. VELASCO JR.

Facts:
NIASSI is a domestic corporation with office at Talisay, Nasipit, Agusan del Norte. Respondent
Nasipit Employees Labor Union was and may still be the collective bargaining agent of the rank-
and-file employees of NIASSI and is a local chapter of the Associated Labor Union.

The dispute started when, in October 1999, the Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity
Board (Wage Board) of Caraga Region in Northeastern Mindanao issued Wage Order No. (WO)
RXIII-02 which granted an additional PhP 12 per day cost of living allowance to the minimum
wage earners in that region. Owing allegedly to NIASSI's failure to implement the wage order,
the Union filed a complaint before the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) Caraga
Regional Office for the inspection of NIASSI's records and the enforcement of WO RXIII-02. A
DOLE inspection team was accordingly dispatched to NIASSI. In its reports dated May 30, 2000
and November 28, 2000, the inspection team stated that WO RXIII-02 was not applicable to
NIASSI's employees since they were already receiving a wage rate higher than the prescribed
minimum wage. Upon motion by the Union, the DOLE Regional Director indorsed the case to
the National Labor Relations Commission Regional Arbitration Branch for further hearing. On
May 18, 2001, Executive Labor Arbiter Rogelio P. Legaspi, in turn, referred the case to the
National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) for voluntary arbitration. The case was,
accordingly, referred to the NCMB which docketed the same as VA Case No. 0925-XIII-08-003-
01A. Voluntary Arbitrator Jesus G. Chavez rendered a decision granting the Union's prayer for
the implementation of WO RXIII-02 on the rationale that WO RXIII-02 did not specifically prohibit
the grant of wage increase to employees earning above the minimum wage. Following the
denial of its motion for reconsideration, NIASSI filed with the CA a Petition for Review under
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court to nullify the February 22, 2002 Decision of Chavez.

Issue:
Whether WO RXIII-02 may be made to apply and cover Nasipit's employees who, at the time of
the issuance and effectivity of the wage order, were already receiving a wage rate higher than
the prevailing minimum wage.

Ruling:
It is abundantly clear from the above quoted provisions of WO RXIII-02 and its IRR that only
minimum wage earners are entitled to the prescribed wage increase. Expressio unius est
exclusio alterius. The express mention of one person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all
others. The beneficent, operative provision of WO RXIII-02 is specific enough to cover only
minimum wage earners. Necessarily excluded are those receiving rates above the prescribed
minimum wage. The only situation when employees receiving a wage rate higher than that
prescribed by the WO RXIII-02 may still benefit from the order is, as indicated in Sec. 1 (c) of
the IRRs, through the correction of wage distortions. Clearly then, only employees receiving
salaries below the prescribed minimum wage are entitled to the wage increase set forth under
WO RXIII-02, without prejudice, of course, to the grant of increase to correct wage distortions
consequent to the implementation of such wage order. Considering that NIASSI's employees
are undisputedly already receiving a wage rate higher than that prescribed by the wage order,
NIASSI is not legally obliged to grant them wage increase.

Page 225 of 370

G.R. No. 157095 : January 15, 2010
MA. LUISA G. DAZON, PETITIONER, VS. KENNETH Y. YAP AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.
J. Del Castillo

Facts:
Kenneth Y. Yap was the president of Primetown Property Group, Inc., the developer of Kiener
Hills Mactan Condominium, a low-rise condominium project. In November 1996, petitioner Ma.
Luisa G. Dazon entered into a contract with Primetown for the purchase of Unit No. C-108 of the
said condominium project. Petitioner made a down payment and several installment payments
Primetown, However, failed to finish the condominium project. Petitioner filed a criminal
complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Lapu-Lapu City against respondent.
Meanwhile, respondent, in connection with the resolution finding probable cause filed a Petition
for Review with the Department of Justice.  On June 14,2002, the DOJ rendered a Resolution
ordering the trial prosecutor to cause the withdrawal... of the Information. Hence, the prosecutor
filed a Motion to Withdraw Information with the RTC. The RTC granted the withdrawal of the
motion. Thereafter, a motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not a regional trial court has jurisdiction over a criminal action arising from violation
of PD 957

Ruling:
Jurisdiction over criminal actions arising from violations of PD 957 is vested in the regular
courts.

It is a settled rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one thing in the law
means the exclusion of others not expressly mentioned. This rule is expressed in the familiar
maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited
to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to others. The rule
proceeds from the premise that the legislature would not have made specified enumerations in
a statute had the intention been not to restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to statute had
the intention been not to restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to those expressly
mentioned. Noticeably, cases that are criminal in nature are not mentioned in the enumeration
quoted above. The primordial function of the HLURB, after all, is the regulation of the real
estate trade and business and not the conviction and punishment of criminals. Administrative
agencies being tribunals of limited jurisdiction can only wield such powers as are specifically
granted to them by their enabling statutes. PD 957 makes the following specific grant of powers
to the NHA (now HLURB) for the imposition of administrative fines, and it also mentions
penalties for criminal cases... the power in relation to criminal liability mentioned in the
immediately succeeding provision, to impose, upon conviction, fines above ten thousand pesos
and/or imprisonment, was not conferred on it.

Page 226 of 370

G.R. No. 171427: March 30, 2011
STERLING SELECTIONS CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY (LLDA) and JOAQUIN G. MENDOZA, in his capacity as General Manager of
LLDA, Respondents.
NACHURA, J.:

Facts:
Petitioner is a company engaged in the fabrication of sterling silver jewelry. Its products are
manufactured in the home of its principal stockholders, Asuncion Maria and Juan Luis
Faustmann, located in Barangay Mariana, New Manila, Quezon City. For creating loud
unceasing noise and emitting toxic fues coming from the plant, one of petitioners neighbors filed
a complaint with the Barangay. During conciliation proceedings, petitioners management
undertook to relocate its operations within a month. The parties signed an Agreement to that
effect. However, petitioner failed to abide by the undertaking and continued to manufacture its
products in its Brgy. Alicia P. Maceda, another neighbor filed a complaint before the barangay
and a formal complaint with the DENR. After, investigation a Notice of Violation and a Cease
and Desist Order were served on petitioner after it was found that it was operating without an
LLDA Clearance and Permit, as required by Republic Act No. 4850. Petitioner then filed a
petition for mandamus before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City. Contending that, as a
cottage industry, its jewelry business is exempt from the requirement to secure a permit from
the LLDA. The RTC denied the petition. Upon denial of its motion for reconsideration, petitioner
appeals to the CA. The CA however dismissed the appeal. Petitioner moved for the
reconsideration of the Decision, but the CA denied the same. Hence, petitioner filed this petition
for review before the High Court.

Issue:
Whether petitioner is exempted from complying with the requirement to obtain a clearance from
the LLDA to operate its business.

Ruling:
No. CA Decision Affirmed. Assets consist of property of all kinds, real and personal, tangible
and intangible, including, inter alia, for certain purposes, patents and causes of action which
belong to any person, including a corporation and the estate of a decedent. In view of the
emphasis in law after law on the capitalization or asset requirements, it is crystal clear that the
same is a defining element in determining if an enterprise is a cottage industry.

Assets consist of property of all kinds, real and personal, tangible and intangible, including, inter
alia, for certain purposes, patents and causes of action which belong to any person, including a
corporation and the estate of a decedent. It is the entire property of a person, association,
corporation, or estate that is applicable or subject to the payment of his, her, or its debts.
Petitioner cannot insist on using merely its paid-up capital as basis to determine its assets. The
law speaks of total assets. Petitioners own evidence, i.e., balance sheets prepared by CPAs it
commissioned itself, shows that it has assets other than its paid-up capital. According to the
Consolidated Balance Sheet presented by petitioner, it had assets amounting to P4,628,900.80
by the end of 1998, and P1,746,328.17 by the end of 1997. Obviously, these amounts are over
the maximum prescribed by law for cottage industries.
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that petitioner cannot be considered a cottage industry.
Therefore, it is not exempted from complying with the clearance requirement of the LLDA.

Page 227 of 370

A.C. No. 5738 February 19, 2008
WILFREDO M. CATU, complainant, vs. ATTY. VICENTE G. RELLOSA, respondent.
J. Corona

Facts:
Complainant Wilfredo M. Catu is a co-owner of a lot and the building erected thereon located in
Manila. His mother and brother contested the possession of Elizabeth C. Diaz-Catu and Antonio
Pastor of one of the units in the building. The latter ignored demands for them to vacate the
premises. Thus, a complaint was initiated against them in the Lupong Tagapamayapa of
Barangay. Respondent, as punong barangay, summoned the parties to conciliation meetings.
When the parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement, respondent issued a certification for
the filing of the appropriate action in court.Respondent entered his appearance as counsel for
the defendants in the subsequent ejectment case. Complainant filed the instant administrative
complaint, claiming that respondent committed an act of impropriety as a lawyer and as a public
officer when he stood as counsel for the defendants despite the fact that he presided over the
conciliation proceedings between the litigants as punong barangay.

Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Rellosa violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Ruling:
Yes. Respondent suspended for six (6) months. Respondent was found guilty of professional
misconduct for violating his oath as a lawyer and Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. A civil service officer or employee whose responsibilities do not
require his time to be fully at the disposal of the government can engage in the private practice
of law only with the written permission of the head of the department concerned in accordance
with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules. Respondent was strongly
advised to look up and take to heart the meaning of the word delicadeza.

Page 228 of 370

G.R. No. 113092 September 1, 1994
MARTIN CENTENO, petitioner, vs.
HON. VICTORIA VILLALON-PORNILLOS, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 10, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
J. Regalado

Facts:
This petition is an appeal on the decision of the Trial Court convicting Centeno and Yco for
violating P.D. 1564 known as the Solicitation Permit Law when they both solicited money for the
renovation of their chapel without a permit from the DSWD. In 1985, the petitioners, officers of
Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikay, launched a fund drive for the renovation of their
chapel in Bulacan. The petitioners approached and solicited from Judge Adoracion G. Angeles,
a resident of Tikay, a contribution of P1,500.00. The solicitation was made without a permit from
the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD). Hon. Angeles filed a complaint
against the petitioners for violation of P.D. 1564 known as the Soliciation Permit Law. In 1992,
the trial court found the petitioners guilty of violating the Solicitation Permit Law.
In this instant case, the petitioners assert among others that the term “religious purpose” is not
expressly included in the provisions of the statute, hence what the law does not include, it
excludes.
Issue: 
Whether or not the phrase “charitable purposes” should be construed in the broadest sense so
as to include a religious purpose.

Ruling:
The 1987 Constitution and other statutes treat the words “charitable” and “religious” separately
and independently of each other. In P.D. 1564, it merely stated “charitable or public welfare
purposes” which means that it was not the intention of the framers of the law to include
solicitations for religious purposes. The world “religious purpose” is not interchangeable with the
expression “charitable purpose”.

The acts of the petitioners cannot be punished under the said law because the law does not
contemplate solicitation for religious purposes. The solicitation for religious purposes may be
subject to proper regulation by the State in the exercise of police power. However, in the case at
bar, considering that solicitations intended for a religious purpose are not within the coverage of
Presidential Decree No. 1564, as earlier demonstrated, petitioner cannot be held criminally
liable therefor. The decision appealed from is reversed and set aside, and petitioner Martin
Centeno is acquitted of the offense charged.

Page 229 of 370

G.R. No. 146943 October 4, 2002
SARIO MALINIAS, petitioner, vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, TEOFILO CORPUZ, ANACLETO TANGILAG and
VICTOR DOMINGUEZ, respondents.
J. CARPIO

Facts:
On July 31, 1998, Sario Malinias and Roy S. Pilando, who were candidates for governor and
congress representative positions, respectively, filed a complaint with the COMELEC's Law
Department against Victor Dominguez, Anacleto Tangilag and others for their violation of the
following laws: 1. Section 25 of R.A. No. 6646; and 2. Sections 232 and 261 (i) of B.P. Blg. 881.
Dominguez was then the incumbent Congressman of Poblacion, Sabangan, Mountain Province.
Corpuz was then the Provincial Director of the Philippine National Police in Mountain Province
while Tangilag was then the Chief of Police of the Municipality of Bontoc, Mountain Province.
The petitioners said that due to said violations, their supporters were deprived from participating
in the canvassing of election returns as they were blocked by a police checkpoint in the course
of their way to the canvassing site at the Provincial Capitol Building in Bontoc, Mountain
Province. Among the private respondents, only Corpuz and Tangilag submitted their joint
Counter-Affidavit, wherein they admitted that they ordered the establishment of checkpoints all
over the province to enforce the COMELEC Gun Ban and its other pertinent rules pursuant to
COMELEC Res. No.2968 purposive of the maintenance of peace and order around the vicinity
of the canvassing site. Also, they said that the presence of the policemen within the said area is
to prevent some groups who were reportedly had the intention to disrupt the canvass
proceedings. They claimed that such a response was not unwarranted as this has already
happened in the past, wherein, in fact, the petitioners were among them.
Issue:
Did COMELEC abuse its discretion in dismissing the complaint?
Ruling:
After investigating the allegations, COMELEC ruled to dismiss the petition against
the respondents for insufficiency of evidence to establish probable cause. Malinias filed an MR
but it was also denied for failure of adducing additional evidence thereon. Not satisfied with the
same, Malinias filed to SC a petition for review on certiorari on this case. SC AFFIRMED the
decision of COMELEC and found the conduct of its investigation and ruling on the case to be
in accord with its jurisdiction and duties under the law. In this case, COMELEC did not commit
any grave abuse of discretion as there is nothing capricious or despotic in the manner of their
resolution of the said complaint, hence, SC cannot issue the extraordinary writ of certiorari.

Page 230 of 370

G.R. No. 147749 June 22, 2006
SAN PABLO MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent.
CJ Corona

Facts:
San Pablo Manufacturing Corporation is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of
milling, manufacturing and exporting of coconut oil and other allied products. It was assessed
and ordered to pay by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue miller’s tax and manufacturer’s
sales tax, among other deficiency taxes, for taxable year 1987 particularly on SPMC’s sales of
crude oil to United Coconut Chemicals, Inc. while the deficiency sales tax was applied on its
sales of corn and edible oil as manufactured products. SPMC opposed the assessments. The
Commissioner denied its protest. SPMC appealed the denial of its protest to the Court of Tax
Appeals by way of a petition for review. docketed as CTA Case No. 5423. It insists on the liberal
application of the rules because, on the merits of the petition, SPMC was not liable for the 3%
miller’s tax. It maintains that the crude oil which it sold to UNICHEM was actually exported by
UNICHEM as an ingredient of fatty acid and glycerine, hence, not subject to miller’s tax
pursuant to Section 168 of the 1987 Tax Code. Since UNICHEM, the buyer of SPMC’s milled
products, subsequently exported said products, SPMC should be exempted from the miller’s
tax.
Issue:
Whether or not SPMC’s sale of crude coconut oil to UNICHEM was subject to the 3%
miller’s task.

Ruling:
NO. Petition was denied. The language of the exempting clause of Section 168 of the 1987 Tax
Code was clear. The tax exemption applied only to the exportation of rope, coconut oil, palm oil,
copra by-products and dessicated coconuts, whether in their original state or as an ingredient or
part of any manufactured article or products, by the proprietor or operator of the factory or by
the miller himself.
Where the law enumerates the subject or condition upon which it applies, it is to be construed
as excluding from its effects all those not expressly mentioned. Expressio unius est exclusio
alterius. Anything that is not included in the enumeration is excluded therefrom and a meaning
that does not appear nor is intended or reflected in the very language of the statute cannot be
placed therein. The rule proceeds from the premise that the legislature would not have made
specific enumerations in a statute if it had the intention not to restrict its meaning and confine its
terms to those expressly mentioned.

The rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius is a canon of restrictive interpretation. Its
application in this case is consistent with the construction of tax exemptions in strictissimi
juris against the taxpayer. To allow SPMC’s claim for tax exemption will violate these
established principles and unduly derogate sovereign authority.

Page 231 of 370

G.R. No. 168062 : June 29, 2010
VICTORIAS MILLING CO., INC., PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND
INTERNATIONAL PHARMACEUTICALS, INC. RESPONDENTS.
J. DEL CASTILLO

Facts:
Petitioner Victorias Milling Co. filed a complaint for unlawful detainer and damages against
respondent IPI before the MCTC of E.B. Magalona-Manapla, docketed as Civil Case No. 392-M.
On March 10, 2004, the sheriff served the summons upon Danilo Maglasang, IPI's Human
Relations Department Manager. On March 19, 2004, IPI filed its Answer with express
reservation that said Answer should not be construed as a waiver of the lack of jurisdiction of
the MCTC over the person of IPI, for non-service of summons on the proper person. It then filed
an Omnibus Motion for Hearing of Affirmative Defenses raised in the Answer and moved for the
suspension of proceedings. On August 30, 2004, the MCTC issued an Order [2] denying the
suspension of the proceedings of the case sought by IPI. The motion for reconsideration was
denied. Thus IPI filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, Cebu City to question the jurisdiction
of the MCTC over its person. On February 22, 2005, the CA directed VMC to file its comment, to
which IPI filed its reply. VMC thereafter filed its rejoinder. In the meantime, in the MCTC, during
the scheduled preliminary conference, IPI moved for the deferment of the preliminary
conference while VMC moved for the termination of the same. The said preliminary conference
was terminated and the parties were directed to submit the affidavits of their witnesses and
other evidence together with their position papers. The parties subsequently submitted the
required position papers with the MCTC.[4]
On May 6, 2005, the CA issued the assailed Resolution which states that the petitioner is not
entitled thereto, let a WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION be issued enjoining the public
respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court of E. B. Magalona-Manapla, Municipality of Magalona
from proceeding with Civil Case No. 392-M and disturbing the possession of the petitioner over
the leased premises during the pendency of this petition until further orders from this Court.
VMC no longer filed a motion for reconsideration of the CA's Resolution, on the ground that the
questioned CA Resolution is patently null and void and due to the urgency of VMC's
predicament. It instead immediately filed the present petition for certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not the petition for certiorari filed by IPI assailing the MCTC's interlocutory order in
an ejectment case is clearly and specifically prohibited under Section 13 of Rule 70 of the Rules
of Court as well as the Rule on Summary Procedure.
Ruling:
Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, on forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, provides: Sec. 13.
Prohibited pleadings and motions.-The following petitions, motions, or pleadings shall not be
allowed: 7. Petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against any interlocutory order
issued by the court. Although it is alleged that there may be a technical error in connection with
the service of summons, there is no showing of any substantive injustice that would be caused
to IPI so as to call for the disregard of the clear and categorical prohibition of filing petitions
for certiorari. It must be pointed out that the Rule on Summary Procedure, by way of exception,
permits only a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter but
it does not mention the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person. It is a settled rule of
statutory construction that the express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of all
others. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. From this it can be gleaned that allegations on the
matter of lack of jurisdiction over the person by reason of improper service of summons, by
itself, without a convincing showing of any resulting substantive injustice, cannot be used to
hinder or stop the proceedings before the MCTC in the ejectment suit. With more reason, such
ground should not be used to justify the violation of an express prohibition in the rules
prohibiting the petition for certiorari.

Page 232 of 370

G.R. No. 168062 : June 29, 2010
VICTORIAS MILLING CO., INC., PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND
INTERNATIONAL PHARMACEUTICALS, INC. RESPONDENTS.
J. DEL CASTILLO

Facts:
Petitioner further seeks to prohibit the implementation of Bureau of Internal Revenue
Revenue Regulations No. 16-2005 for being contrary to law. With the enactment of R.A.
No. 9337 on May 24, 2005, certain sections of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997
were amended.
Different groups came to this Court via petitions for certiorari and prohibition assailing
the validity and constitutionality of R.A. No. 933710% Value Added Tax on sale of goods
and properties, 10% VAT on importation of goods, 10% VAT on sale of services and use
or lease of properties the Court dismissed all the petitions and upheld the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 9337.
On the same date, respondent BIR issued Revenue Regulations No. 16-2005, specifically
identifying PAGCOR as one of the franchisees subject to 10% VAT imposed under
Section 108 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997, as amended by R.A. No. 9337.
Furthermore, according to the OSG, public respondent BIR exceeded its statutory
authority when it enacted RR No. 16-2005, because the latter's provisions are contrary to
the mandates of P.D. No. 1869 in relation to R.A. No. 9337.

Issues:
Whether or not PAGCOR is still exempt from VAT with the enactment of R.A. No. 9337.

Ruling:
No. Anent the validity of RR No. 16-2005, the Court holds that the provision subjecting
PAGCOR to 10% VAT is invalid for being contrary to R.A. No. 9337.  Nowhere in R.A. No.
9337 is it provided that petitioner can be subjected to VAT.  R.A. No. 9337 is clear only as
to... the removal of petitioner's exemption from the payment of corporate income tax,
which was already addressed above by this Court.

As pointed out by the OSG, R.A. No. 9337 itself exempts petitioner from VAT pursuant to
Section 7 (k) thereof... the following transactions shall be exempt from the value-added
tax: Transactions which are exempt under international agreements to which the
Philippines is a signatory or under special laws.

Petitioner is exempt from the payment of VAT, because PAGCOR's charter, P.D. No. 1869,
is a special law that grants petitioner exemption from taxes. Moreover, the exemption of
PAGCOR from VAT is supported by Section 6 of R.A. No. 9337

The following services performed in the Philippines by VAT-registered persons shall be

subject to zero percent (0%) rate; Services rendered to persons or entities whose
exemption under special laws subjects the supply of such services to zero percent (0%)
rate... although R.A. No. 9337 introduced amendments to Section 108 of R.A. No. 8424 by
imposing VAT on other services not previously covered, it did not amend the portion of
Section 108 (B) (3) that subjects to zero percent rate services performed by VAT-
registered persons to persons or entities whose exemption under special laws or
international agreements to which the Philippines is a signatory effectively subjects the
supply of such services to 0% rate.

Page 233 of 370

G.R. No. 153866             February 11, 2005
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner, 
vs. SEAGATE TECHNOLOGY (PHILIPPINES), respondent.
J. Panganiban

Facts:
A VAT-registered enterprise, STP has principal office address at the new Cebu Township One,
Special Economic Zone, Barangay Cantao-an, Naga, Cebu. STP is registered with the
Philippine Export Zone Authority and certified to engage in the manufacture of recording
components primarily used in computers for export. VAT returns were filed for the period 1 April
1998 to 30 June 1999. With supporting documents, a claim for refund of VAT input taxes in the
amount of 28 million pesos (inclusive of the 12-million VAT input taxes subject of this Petition for
Review) was filed on 4 October 1999. CIR did not act promptly upon STP's claim so the latter
elevated the case to the CTA for review in order to toll the running of the two-year prescriptive
period. On appeal, CIR asserted that by virtue of the PEZA registration alone of STP, the latter
is not subject to the VAT. According to CIR, STP's sales transactions intended for export are not
exempt.

Issue:
Whether or not a BIR Regulation in effect amended the law additionally requiring an approved
prior application for effective zero rating.

Ruling:
No. The BIR regulations additionally requiring an approved prior application for effective zero
rating cannot prevail over the clear VAT nature of respondent’s transactions. The scope of such
regulations is not "within the statutory authority x x x granted by the legislature.

First, a mere administrative issuance, like a BIR regulation, cannot amend the law; the former
cannot purport to do any more than interpret the latter. The courts will not countenance one that
overrides the statute it seeks to apply and implement. Other than the general registration of a
taxpayer the VAT status of which is aptly determined, no provision under our VAT law requires
an additional application to be made for such taxpayer’s transactions to be considered
effectively zero-rated. An effectively zero-rated transaction does not and cannot become exempt
simply because an application therefor was not made or, if made, was denied. To allow the
additional requirement is to give unfettered discretion to those officials or agents who, without
fluid consideration, are bent on denying a valid application. Moreover, the State can never be
estopped by the omissions, mistakes or errors of its officials or agents.

Page 234 of 370

GR No. 124893 April 18, 1997
LYNETTE G. GARVIDA, petitioner, vs. FLORENCIO G. SALES, JR., THE HONORABLE
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ELECTION OFFICER DIONISIO F. RIOS and PROVINCIAL
SUPERVISOR NOLI PIPO, respondents.
J. PUNO

Facts:
Petitioner Garvida applied for registration as member and voter of the Katipunan ng Kabataan of
a certain barangay. However the Board of election tellers denied her application on the ground
that she is already 21 years and 10 months old. She already exceeded the age limit for
membership as laid down in Sec 3(b) of COMELEC resolution no. 2824. The municipal circuit
trial court found her to be qualified and ordered her registration as member and voter in the
Katipunan ng Kabataan. The Board of Election Tellers appealed to the RTC, but the presiding
judge inhibited himself from acting on the appeal due to his close association with petitioner.
However, private respondent Sales a rival candidate, filed with the COMELEC en banc a
“Petition of Denial and/or Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy” against Garvida for falsely
representing her age qualification in her certificate of candidacy. He claimed that Garvida is
disqualified to become a voter and a candidate for the SK for the reason that she will be more
than twenty-one (21) years of age on May 6, 1996; that she was born on June 11, 1974 as can
be gleaned from her birth certificate.
Issue:
Whether or not Garvida can assume office as the elected SK official

Ruling:
No. In the case at bar, petitioner was born on June 11, 1974. On March 16, 1996, the day she
registered as voter for the May 6, 1996 SK elections, petitioner was twenty-one (21) years and
nine (9) months old. On the day of the elections, she was 21 years, 11 months and 5 days old.
When she assumed office on June 1, 1996, she was 21 years, 11 months and 20 days old and
was merely ten (10) days away from turning 22 years old. Petitioner may have qualified as a
member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan but definitely, petitioner was over the age limit for
elective SK officials set by Section 428 of the Local Government Code and Sections 3 [b] and 6
of Comelec Resolution No. 2824.Thus, she is ineligible to run as candidate for the May 6, 1996
Sangguniang Kabataan elections.

Page 235 of 370

G.R. No. 141386. November 29, 2001
THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT OF THE PROVINCE OF CEBU, Represented by Provincial
Auditor ROY L. URSAL,, Petitioner, v. PROVINCE OF CEBU, Represented by Governor
PABLO P. GARCIA, respondent.
J. YNARES-SANTIAGO

Facts:
In the audit of accounts conducted by the Commission on Audit of the Province of Cebu, it
appeared that the salaries and personnel-related benefits of the teachers appointed by the
province for the extension classes were charged against the provincial SEF.  Likewise charged
to the SEF were the college scholarship grants of the province.  Consequently, the COA issued
Notices of Suspension to the province of Cebu, saying that disbursements for the salaries of
teachers and scholarship grants are not chargeable to the provincial SEF.

Issue:
Whether or not the salaries and personnel-related benefits of public school teachers appointed
by local chief executives in connection with the establishment and maintenance of extension
classes; as well as the expenses for college scholarship grants, may be charged to the Special
Education Fund (SEF) of the local government unit concerned.

Ruling:
Undoubtedly, the legislature intended the SEF to answer for the compensation of teachers
handling extension classes. Under the doctrine of necessary implication, the allocation of the
SEF for the establishment and maintenance of extension classes logically implies the hiring of
teachers who should, as a matter of course be compensated for their services.  Every statute is
understood, by implication, to contain all such provisions as may be necessary to effectuate its
object and purpose, or to make effective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction which it grants,
including all such collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred
from its terms.  Ex necessitate legis. Verily, the services and the corresponding compensation of
these teachers are necessary and indispensable to the establishment and maintenance of
extension classes.

Indeed, the operation and maintenance of public schools is lodged principally with the
DECS. The SEF may be expended only for the salaries and personnel-related benefits of
teachers appointed by the local school boards in connection with the establishment and
maintenance of extension classes. With respect, however, to college scholarship grants, a
reading of the pertinent laws of the Local Government Code reveals that said grants are not
among the projects for which the proceeds of the SEF may be appropriated.  

Page 236 of 370

G.R. No. 14129             July 31, 1962
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, 
vs. GUILLERMO MANANTAN, defendant-appellee.
J. REGALA

Facts:
Defendant Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation Section 54 of the Revised Election
Code in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. The defense moved to dismiss the
information on the ground that as justice of the peace the defendant is one of the officers
enumerated in Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. The lower court denied the said
motion. A second motion was filed by defense counsel who cited in support thereof the decision
of the Court of Appeals in People vs. Macaraeg applying the rule of “expressio unius, est
exclusion alterius”. The lower court dismissed the information against the accused upon the
authority of the ruling in the case cited by the defense. The issue was raised to the Supreme
Court.
Issue:
Whether or not a justice of the peace was included in the prohibition of Section 54 of the
Revised Election Code.
Ruling:
Yes. The order of dismissal entered by the trial court should be set aside and this case was
remanded for trial on the merits. The application of the rule of casus omissus does not proceed
from the mere fact that a case is criminal in nature, but rather from a reasonable certainty that a
particular person, object or thing has been omitted from a legislative enumeration. In the present
case, and for reasons already mentioned, there has been no such omission. There has only
been a substitution of terms. On law reason and public policy, defendant-appellee’s contention
that justices of the peace are not covered by the injunction of Section 54 must be rejected. To
accept it is to render ineffective a policy so clearly and emphatically laid down by the legislature.
Although it was observed that both the Court of Appeals and the trial court applied the rule of
“expressio unius, est exclusion alterius” in arriving at the conclusion that justices of the peace
are not covered by Section 54, the rule has no application. If the legislature had intended to
exclude a justice of the peace from the purview of Section 54, neither the trial court nor the
Court of Appeals has given the reason for the exclusion. Indeed, there appears no reason for
the alleged change. Hence, the rule of expressio unius est exclusion alterius has been
erroneously applied.

Page 237 of 370

G.R. No. 166735               November 23, 2007
SPS. NEREO & NIEVA DELFINO, Petitioners,
vs. ST. JAMES HOSPITAL, INC., and THE HONORABLE RONALDO ZAMORA, EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT. Respondents.
J. CHICO-NAZARIO

Facts:
Respondent now claims that the legislative history of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance shows that
commercial and institutional uses were expressly allowed in Sec. 2, par. 1 of said Ordinance as
it retained uses that are commercial and institutional as well as recreational in character and
those for the maintenance of ecological balance. Thus, respondent postulates that even if parks,
playgrounds and recreation centers which were expressly provided for in the 1981 Zoning
Ordinance under letters (h) and (k) were excluded in the enumeration in the 1991 Zoning
Ordinance, the same cannot, by any stretch of logic, be interpreted to mean that they are no
longer allowed. On the contrary, respondent explains that what appears is the fact that parks,
playgrounds, and recreation centers are deemed to have been covered by Sec. 2, par. 1 of the
1991 Zoning Ordinance which speaks of "x x x other spaces designed for recreational pursuit
and maintenance of ecological balance x x x." Hence, respondent concludes that the same
reading applies in the non-inclusion of the words hospitals, clinics, school, churches and other
places of worship, and drugstores which cannot be interpreted to mean that the aforesaid uses
are to be deemed non-conforming under the 1991 Zoning Ordinance as these uses are
allegedly covered by the clause allowing for institutional and commercial uses.
Arising from this interpretation, respondent maintains that the Court erred in applying Sec. 1 of
Article X of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance which pertains only to existing non-conforming uses and
buildings, since, according to respondent, the St. James Hospital and its expansion are
consistent with the uses allowed under the zoning ordinance.

Issue:
Whether or not parks, playgrounds and recreation centres are included in the zoning ordinance

Ruling:
Whatever meaning the legislative body had intended in employing the word "institutional" must
be discerned in light of the restrictive enumeration in the said article. Under the legal
maxim expression unius est exclusion alterius, the express mention of one thing in a law,
means the exclusion of others not expressly mentioned. Thus, in interpreting the whole of
Section 2, Article VI, it must be understood that in expressly enumerating the allowable uses
within a residential zone, those not included in the enumeration are deemed excluded. Hence,
since hospitals, among other things, are not among those enumerated as allowable uses within
the residential zone, the only inference to be deduced from said exclusion is that said hospitals
have been deliberately eliminated from those structures permitted to be constructed within a
residential area in Santa Rosa, Laguna.

Furthermore, according to the rule of casus omissus in statutory construction, a thing omitted
must be considered to have been omitted intentionally. Therefore, with the omission of the
phrase "hospital with not more than ten capacity" in the new Zoning Ordinance, and the
corresponding transfer of said allowable usage to another zone classification, the only logical
conclusion is that the legislative body had intended that said use be removed from those
allowed within a residential zone. Thus, the construction of medical institutions, such as St.
James Hospital, within a residential zone is now prohibited under the 1991 Zoning Ordinance.
Having concluded that the St. James Hospital is now considered a non-conforming structure
under the 1991 Zoning Ordinance, we now come to the issue of the legality of the proposed
expansion of said hospital into a four-storey, forty-bed medical institution. We shall decide this
said issue in accordance with the provisions of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance relating to non-
conforming buildings, the applicable law at the time of the proposal

Page 238 of 370

G.R. No. 72005 May 29, 1987
PHILIPPINE BRITISH ASSURANCE CO., INC., petitioner,
vs. HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT; SYCWIN COATING & WIRES,
INC., and DOMINADOR CACPAL, CHIEF DEPUTY SHERRIF OF MANILA, respondents.
J. GANCAYCO

Facts:
Private respondent Sycwin Coating & Wires, Inc., filed a complaint for collection of a sum of
money against Varian Industrial Corporation before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
During the pendency of the suit, private respondent succeeded in attaching some of the
properties of Varian Industrial Corporation upon the posting of a supersedeas bond. The latter in
turn posted a counterbond in the sum of P1,400,000.00 thru petitioner Philippine British
Assurance Co., Inc., so the attached properties were released. The trial court rendered
judgment in favor of Sycwin. Varian Industrial Corporation appealed the decision to the
respondent Court. Sycwin then filed a petition for execution pending appeal against the
properties of Varian in respondent Court. The respondent Court granted the petition of Sycwin.
Varian, thru its insurer and petitioner herein, raised the issue to the Supreme Court. A
temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from enforcing the order complaint of was
issued.
Issue:
Whether or not an order of execution pending appeal of any judgment maybe enforced on the
counterbond of the petitioner.

Ruling:
YES. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit and the restraining order dissolved with costs
against petitioner. It is well recognized rule that where the law does not distinguish, courts
should not distinguish. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus. The rule, founded
on logic, is a corollary of the principle that general words and phrases in a statute should
ordinarily be accorded their natural and general significance. The rule requires that a general
term or phrase should not be reduced into parts and one part distinguished from the other so as
to justify its exclusion from the operation of the law. In other words, there should be no
distinction in the application of a statute where none is indicated. For courts are not authorized
to distinguish where the law makes no distinction. They should instead administer the law not as
they think it ought to be but as they find it and without regard to consequences.

Page 239 of 370

G.R. No. 48817. January 22, 1943
JUANA YAP DAES ET AL., Petitioners, v. WE KO (alias KUA), Respondent.
J. BOCOBO

Facts:
The petitioners, who are respectively the widow and children of Pedro Basa, brought an action
under Act No. 1874 for damages in the amount of P2,000 for the death of said Basa while
working for the Respondent. It appears that the respondent was having some repairs done on
his house. He engaged Basa to take from the river to his residence four logs which were
needed, at a compensation of P1.20 per log. The deceased engaged three persons to help
-him. They succeeded in loading three of the logs on carts furnished by the respondent, but as
they were trying to load the fourth log, it slipped down, and hit Basa, killing him.

The Court of First Instance of Zambales dismissed the action. The Court of Appeals held that
Basa was not an "employee" of respondent within the purview of Act No. 1874, and dismissed
the case. Basa had been engaged to do one particular thing and was not subject to
respondent’s direction, the Court of Appeals said. That Court also held it was immaterial that at
other times Basa had performed odd jobs for respondent and that latter had loaned the
deceased two carts on which to load the logs. We believe the Court of Appeals erred. Act No.
1874 does not require that the work should be more or less permanent. It is enough that the
laborer is engaged to do any job for another person. The temporary or occasional character of
the work is immaterial, for two reasons: 1. Act No. 1874 uses the term "employee" without any
distinction between occasional or permanent employees. Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos
distinguere debemus. It is significant that while the Workmen’s Compensation Act (No. 3428)
specifically excludes purely casual employment, Act No. 1874 on the other hand does not. It is
thus plain that Act No. 1874 which applies only to mishaps in small industries and other
activities in which the gross annual income is less than P20,000, is intended to safeguard all
laborers, regardless of the duration or character of their employment. Finespun distinctions
would fritter away the salutary substance of this law. 2. Act No. 1874 being remedial legislation,
envisaged to protect laborers, its scope must not be so limited as to defeat this paramount
objective, unless its terms clearly warrant such restrictive interpretation.

Issue:
Whether or not Act No. 1874 require that the work should be more or less permanent.

Ruling:
No. Act No. 1874 does not require that the work should be more or less permanent. It is enough
that the laborer is engaged to do any job for another person. The temporary or occasional
character of the work is immaterial, for two reasons: In the first place, Act No. 1874 uses the
term "employee" without any distinction between occasional or permanent employees. Ubi lex
non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemus. It is significant that while the Workmen’s
Compensation Act (No. 3428) specifically excludes purely casual employment, Act No. 1874 on
the other hand does not. It is thus plain that Act No. 1874 which applies only to mishaps in small
industries and other activities in which the gross annual income is less than P20,000, is
intended to safeguard all laborers, regardless of the duration or character of their employment.
Finespun distinctions would fritter away the salutary substance of this law. And, in the second
place, Act No. 1874 being remedial legislation, envisaged to protect laborers, its scope must not
be so limited as to defeat this paramount objective, unless its terms clearly warrant such
restrictive interpretation.

Therefore, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is hereby reversed, but the case shall be
remanded to that court which should make findings as above indicated, and render decision
accordingly, without special pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.

Page 240 of 370

G.R. No. 115245 July 11, 1995
JUANITO C. PILAR, petitioner,
vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
J. QUIASON

Facts:
On March 22, 1992, petitioner Juanito C. Pilar filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of
member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Isabela. On March 25, 1992,
petitioner withdrew his certificate of candidacy. In M.R. Nos. 93-2654 and 94-0065 dated
November 3, 1993 and February 13, 1994 respectively, the COMELEC imposed upon petitioner
the fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) for failure to file his statement of contributions
and expenditures. In M.R. No. 94-0594 dated February 24, 1994, the COMELEC denied the
motion for reconsideration of petitioner and deemed final M.R. Nos. 93-2654 and 94-0065.
Petitioner went to the COMELEC En Banc (UND No. 94-040), which denied the petition in a
Resolution dated April 28, 1994. Petition for certiorari was subsequently filed to the Supreme
Court.

Petitioner argues that he cannot be held liable for failure to file a statement of contributions and
expenditures because he was a “non-candidate,” having withdrawn his certificates of candidacy
three days after its filing. Petitioner posits that “it is clear from the law that candidate must have
entered the political contest, and should have either won or lost” under Section 14 of R.A. 7166
entitled “An Act Providing for Synchronized National and Local Elections and for Electoral
Reforms, Authorizing Appropriations Therefor, and for Other Purposes”.
Issue:
Whether or not Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166 excludes candidates who already withdrew their
candidacy for election.
Ruling:
No. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit. Well-recognized is the rule that where the law does
not distinguish, courts should not distinguish, ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere
debemus. In the case at bench, as the law makes no distinction or qualification as to whether
the candidate pursued his candidacy or withdrew the same, the term “every candidate” must be
deemed to refer not only to a candidate who pursued his campaign, but also to one who
withdrew his candidacy. Also, under the fourth paragraph of Section 73 of the B.P. Blg. 881 or
the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines, it is provided that “[t]he filing or withdrawal of
certificate of candidacy shall not affect whatever civil, criminal or administrative liabilities which a
candidate may have incurred.” Petitioner’s withdrawal of his candidacy did not extinguish his
liability for the administrative fine.

Page 241 of 370

G.R. No. 93828, December 11, 1992
People of the Philippines
vs. Santiago Evaristo and Noli Carillo
J. PADILLA

Facts:
Peace officers composed of Sgt. Eladio Romeroso and CIC Edgardo Vallarta of Philippine
Constabulary together with Sgt. Daniel Maligaya and 2 other members of the Integrated
National Police were on routine patrol duty in Barangay III, Mendez, Cavite. At 5:00 in the
afternoon, the officers heard a successive burst of gunfire and they came upon Barequiel
Rosillo who was firing a gun into the air.

Seeing the patrol, Rosillo ran to the nearby house of Evaristo prompting the lawmen to pursue
him. Upon approaching the immediate perimeter of the house, the patrol chanced upon Evaristo
and Carillo. They inquired as to the whereabouts of Rosillo. The police patrol members were
told that he had already escaped through a window of the house. Vallarta noticed a bulge
around the waist of Carillo and upon being frisked he admitted the same to be a  revolver.

As the patrol was still in pursuit of Rosillo, Sgt. Romeroso sought Evaristo’s permission to scour
through the house which was granted. Romaroso found a number of firearms and paraphernalia
supposedly used in the repair and manufacture of firearms. Evaristo and Carillo were ound
guilty of illegal possession of firearms.

Issue:
Whether or not the evidence obtained without warrant in accidental discovery of evidence is
admissible.

Ruling:
According to Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution which provides: Section 2: The right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purposes shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. Also Section 3 (1);
(2)Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for
any purpose in any proceeding.

It is to be noted that what the above constitutional provisions prohibit are unreasonable
searches and seizures. For a search to be reasonable under the law, there must, as a rule, be a
search warrant validly issued by an appropriate judicial officer. Yet, the rule that searches and
seizures must be supported by a valid search warrant is not an absolute and inflexible rule, for
jurisprudence has recognized several exceptions to the search warrant requirement. Among
these exceptions is the seizure of evidence in plain view.

The records in this case show that Sgt. Romerosa was granted permission by the appellant
Evaristo to enter his house. The officer’s purpose was to apprehend Rosillo whom he saw had
sought refuge therein. Therefore, it is clear that the search for firearms was not Romerosa’s
purpose in entering the house, thereby rendering his discovery of the subject as inadvertent and
even accidental.

With respect to the firearms seized from the appellant Carillo, the Court sustains the validly of
the firearm’s seizure and admissibility in evidence, based on the rule on authorized warrantless
arrests.

Page 242 of 370

G.R. No. 93833 September 28, 1995
SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ, petitioner,
vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and ESTER S. GARCIA, respondents.
J. KAPUNAN

Facts:
Petitioner made a secret recording of the conversation that was part of a civil case filed in the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City alleging that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, vexed,
insulted and humiliated her in a “hostile and furious mood” and in a manner offensive to
petitioner’s dignity and personality,” contrary to morals, good customs and public policy.”.
Private respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for
violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled “An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other
related violations of private communication, and other purposes.” Petitioner filed a Motion to
Quash the Information. The trial court granted the said motion. The private respondent filed a
Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme Court, which referred the case to the Court of
Appeals in a Resolution. Respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its decision declaring the
trial court’s order as null and void, after subsequently denied the motion for reconsideration by
the petitioner.

Issue:
Whether or not the applicable provision of Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a
private conversation by one of the parties to the conversation.
Ruling:
No. Petition denied. Legislative intent is determined principally from the language of the statute.
The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken together with the above-quoted
deliberations from the Congressional Record, therefore plainly supports the view held by the
respondent court that the provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the private
communications. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish. Petitioner’s
contention that the phrase “private communication” in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include
“private conversations” narrows the ordinary meaning of the word “communication” to a point of
absurdity.

Page 243 of 370

G.R. No. 193960               January 7, 2013
KARLO ANGELO DABALOS y SAN DIEGO, Petitioner, 
vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,BRANCH 59, ANGELES CITY (PAMPANGA), REPRESENTED
BY ITS PRESIDING JUDGE MA. ANGELICA T. PARAS-QUIAMBAO; THE OFFICE OF THE
CITY PROSECUTOR, ANGELES CITY (PAMPANGA); AND ABC, Respondents.
J. PERLAS-BERNABE

Facts:
Dabalos had willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously used personal violence against the
complainant whom he had a dating relationship with. The said violence constituted the pulling of
hair, punching the complainant's back, shoulder, and left eye which have demeaning and
degrading effects on the complainant's intrinsic worth and dignity as a human being, in violation
of Section 5 (a) of the Republic Act 9262. In Dabalos' defense, he averred that the relationship
had already ceased at the time of the alleged incident.

Issue:
Whether or not RA 9262 be construed when the dating relationship was not the proximate
cause of the violence?

Ruling:
Yes. The law provides that any act can be considered as a crime of violence against women
through physical harm when it is committed against a woman or her child and the woman is the
offender's wife, former wife, or with whom he has or had sexual or dating relationship or with
whom he has a common child, and when it results in or is likely to result in physical harm or
suffering.

Applying the rule on statutory construction that when the law does not distinguish, neither
should the courts, the punishable acts refer to all acts of violence against women with whom the
offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship. It did not distinguish that the act of violence
should be a consequence of such relationship.

Page 244 of 370

MOVIE AND TELEVISION REVIEW AND CLASSIFICATION BOARD MOVIE AND
TELEVISION REVIEW AND CLASSIFICATION BOARD vs. ABS-CBN
BROADCASTING CORPORATION
G.R. No. 155282. January 17, 2005.
Facts:
On October 15, 1991, at 10:45 in the evening, respondent ABS-CBN aired
"Prostituition," an episode of the television (TV) program "The Inside Story" produced and
hosted by respondent Legarda. It depicted female students moonlighting as prostitutes to
enable them to pay for their tuition fees. In the course of the program, student prostitutes,
pimps, customers, and some faculty members were interviewed. The Philippine Women's
University (PWU) was named as the school of some of the students involved and the
facade of PWU Building at Taft Avenue, Manila conspicuously served as the background
of the episode. The showing of "The Inside Story" caused uproar in the PWU community.
Dr. Leticia P. de Guzman, Chancellor and Trustee of the PWU, and the PWU Parents
and Teachers Association led letter-complaints 3 3 with petitioner MTRCB. Both
complainants alleged that the episode besmirched the name of the PWU and resulted in
the harassment of some of its female students. In their answer, respondents explained
that the "The Inside Story" is a "public affairs program, news documentary and sociopolitical
editorial," the airing of which is protected by the constitutional provision on
freedom of expression and of the press. Accordingly, petitioner has no power, authority
and jurisdiction to impose any form of prior restraint upon respondents.
Issue:
Whether or not the “The Inside Story is a television program, within the jurisdiction
of the MTRCB over which it has power of review”.
Held:
YES. The only exceptions from the MTRCB's power of review are those expressly
mentioned in Section 7 of P.D. No. 1986, such as (1) television programs imprinted or
exhibited by the Philippine Government and/or its departments and agencies, and (2)
newsreels. Apparently, the newsreels are straight presentations of events. They are
depictions of actual realities. Correspondingly, the MTRCB Rules and Regulations,
implementing P.D. No. 1986 defines newsreels as "straight news reporting, as
distinguished from new analyses, commentaries and opinions. Talk shows on a given
issue are not considered newsreels. Clearly, the “The Inside Story” cannot be considered
a newsreel. It is more of a public affairs program which is described as a variety of news
treatment; a cross between pure television news and news-related commentaries,
analysis and/or exchange of opinions. Certainly, such kind of programs are within the
petitioner’s review power.

Page 245 of 370

IGLESIA NI CRISTO vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 119673. July 26, 1996.
Facts:
Petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo, a duly organized religious organization, has a television
program entitled "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" aired on Channel 2 every Saturday and on
Channel 13 every Sunday. The program presents and propagates petitioner's religious
beliefs, doctrines and practices often times in comparative studies with other religions.
Sometime in the months of September, October and November 1992, petitioner
submitted to the respondent Board of Review for Motion Pictures and Television the VTR
tapes of its TV program Series Nos. 116, 119, 121 and 128. The Board classified the
series as "X" or not for public viewing on the ground that they "offend and constitute an
attack against other religions which is expressly prohibited by law."
Issue:
Whether the respondent Board has the power to review petitioner's TV program
"Ang Iglesia ni Cristo”.
Held:
YES. We thus reject petitioner's postulate that its religious program is per se
beyond review by the respondent Board. Its public broadcast on TV of its religious
program brings it out of the bosom of internal belief. Television is a medium that reaches
even the eyes and ears of children. The Court iterates the rule that the exercise of
religious freedom can be regulated by the State when it will bring about the clear and
present danger of some substantive evil which the State is duty bound to prevent, i.e.,
serious detriment to the more overriding interest of public health, public morals, or public
welfare. A laissez faire policy on the exercise of religion can be seductive to the liberal
mind but history counsels the Court against its blind adoption as religion is and continues
to be a volatile area of concern in our country today. Across the sea and in our shore, the
bloodiest and bitterest wars fought by men were caused by irreconcilable religious
differences. Our country is still not safe from the recurrence of this stultifying strife
considering our warring religious beliefs and the fanaticism with which some of us cling
and claw to these beliefs. Even now, we have yet to settle the near century old strife in
Mindanao, the roots of which have been nourished by the mistrust and misunderstanding
between our Christian and Muslim brothers and sisters. The bewildering rise of weird
religious cults espousing violence as an article of faith also proves the wisdom of our rule
rejecting a strict let alone policy on the exercise of religion. For sure, we shall continue to
subject any act pinching the space for the free exercise of religion to a heightened scrutiny
but we shall not leave its rationale exercise to the irrationality of man. For when religion
divides and its exercise destroys, the State should not stand still.

Page 246 of 370

GINA M. TIANGCO vs. UNIWIDE SALES WAREHOUSE CLUB, INC. G.R. No. G.R.
No. 168697. December 14, 2009.
Facts:
Petitioners Gina M. Tiangco and Salvacion Jenny Manego were employees of
respondent Uniwide Sales Warehouse Club, Inc., a domestic corporation. Respondent
Jimmy N. Go was the president of the corporation. Petitioner Tiangco was employed by
respondent USWCI on June 10, 1997 as concession manager. In 1998, she was
designated as group merchandising manager for the fashion and personal care
department with a monthly salary of P45,000. On the other hand, petitioner Manego was
initially employed as buyer on January 16, 1984 but was promoted as senior category
head with a monthly salary of P25,000. On July 5, 2001 and July 13, 2001, petitioners
Tiangco and Manego respectively led separate complaints for illegal dismissal, payment
of separation pay as well as award of moral and exemplary damages in the National Labor
Relations Commission.
Issue:
Whether the consolidated illegal dismissal cases can be reopened at this point of
the SEC proceedings for respondent USWCI's rehabilitation.
Held:
YES. The term "claim," as contemplated in Section 6 (c), refers to debts or
demands of a pecuniary nature. It is the assertion of rights for the payment of money.
Here, petitioners have pecuniary claims — the payment of separation pay and moral and
exemplary damages. Section 1, Rule 2 of the Interim Rules defines "claims" as follows:
"Claim" shall include all claims or demands of whatever nature or character against a
debtor or its property, whether for money or otherwise. Thus, labor claims are included
among the actions suspended upon the placing under rehabilitation of employercorporations.
Article 217 of the Labor Code 26 26 should be construed not in isolation but
in harmony with PD 902-A, according to the basic rule in statutory construction that
implied repeals are not favored. Indeed, it is axiomatic that each and every statute must
be construed in a way that would avoid conflict with existing laws. True, the NLRC has
the power to hear and decide labor disputes, but such authority is deemed suspended
when PD 902-A is put into effect by the SEC. This Court notes that PD 902-A itself does
not provide for the duration of the automatic stay. Neither does the Order of the SEC.
Furthermore, the suspensive effect has no time limit and remains in force as long as
reasonably necessary to accomplish the purpose of the Order. Herewith, considering that
respondent USWCI's SARP had already been approved before then, the 2000 Interim
Rules still govern this case. In sum, when the labor arbiter proceeded with the
consolidated cases despite the SEC suspension order, he exceeded his jurisdiction to
hear and decide illegal dismissal cases and the CA correctly reversed his June 16, 2004
order.

Page 247 of 370

RUBBERWORLD (PHILS.), INC vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
G.R. No. 126773. April 14, 1999.
Facts:
By virtue of a SEC Order, all actions for claims against Rubberworld Phil., Inc.,
pending before any court, tribunal, office, body or board were suspended. Consequently,
all pending incidents for preliminary injunctions, attachments, foreclosures and the like
were rendered moot and academic. Meanwhile, private respondents who are employees
of Rubberworld led against the latter their respective complaints for illegal dismissal,
unfair labor practice, damages and payment of separation pay, retirement benefits, 13th
month pay and service incentive pay. Rubberworld moved to suspend the proceedings in
the labor cases on the strength of the SEC Order, but the same was denied. Hence, this
petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the preference of credit granted the worker or employees under
Article 110 of the Labor Code is applicable.
Held:
NO. It must be noted that, upon petition of Rubberworld with the SEC, the latter
ordered the creation of a management committee and the suspension of all actions for
claims against Rubberworld. Thus, the applicable law here is P.D. 902-A, as amended.
No exception in favor of labor claims is mentioned in the law. Thus, allowing labor cases
to proceed clearly defeats the purpose of the automatic stay and severely encumbers the
management committee's time and resources, whose primary and urgent duty is to work
towards rehabilitating the corporation and making it viable again. Besides, even if the
NLRC awards the claims of private respondents, as it did, its ruling could not be enforced
as long as the petitioner is under the management committee. True the NLRC has the
power to hear and decide labor disputes but such authority is deemed suspended when
P.D. 902-A was put also effect by the SEC. Further, the preferential right of workers and
employees under Article 110 of the Labor Code may be invoked only upon the institution
of insolvency or judicial liquidation proceedings. The present case involves the
rehabilitation, not the liquidation of the corporation.

Page 248 of 370

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
TEODORO TEODORO TAMANI
G.R. Nos. L-22160 & L-22161. January 21, 1974.
Facts:
There is no dispute that sometime after twilight on the night of June 11, 1953 in
the place called Centro at the commercial street of Angadanan, Isabela, a man names
Jose Siyang, the town assistant sanitary inspector, was mortally wounded by gunfire.
Death resulted from internal hemorrhage caused by the following four (4) through and
through gunshot wounds. By means of the same gunfire, an attempt was made to kill
Mayor Eduardo Domingo. He sustained a through and through wound in the palm of his
right hand which caused his confinement in the Isabela Provincial Hospital from June 11
to 22, 1953. He confessed to have made the crime, however, during the trial, he
repudiated his confession. He assailed its voluntariness. He set up the defense of alibi.
Through his principal witness, Francisco Siyang, the father of the deceased Jose Siyang,
he endeavored to prove that the latter was shot by Policemen Gaspar Ibarra and Melchor
Tumaneng. Thus, a simple case, where the extrajudicial confession is corroborated by
evidence of the corpus delicti, became controversial, complicated and perplexing.
Issue:
Whether or not the guilt of the accuse was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Held:
YES. Appellant Tamani's defense of alibi, which can be fabricated with facility,
cannot be given serious consideration. Assuming that he was in Barrio Aniog in the
afternoon and night of June 11th, it was physically possible for him to be at the scene of
the shooting at the time that it was perpetrated and return to the house of Vice-Mayor
Tamani in Barrio Aniog. That place was only two kilometers from the store of Pedro Pua.
The victims were shot in front of the store. The settled rule is that an alibi, to be tenable,
must be such as to preclude the possibility of the presence of the accused at the scene
of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. Lesions graves is not
well-taken. As already pointed out, the killing of Siyang cannot be characterized as
homicide. It was qualified by treachery. There was intent to kill in the shooting of the
mayor. So, the wound inflicted on him cannot be regarded as a mere physical injury. It
was an overt act manifesting the willful design of the accused to liquidate the mayor. The
infliction of the four fatal gunshot wounds on Siyang and of the wound in the palm of the
mayor's right hand was not the result of a single act. The injuries were the consequences
of two volleys of gunshots. Hence, the assaults on Siyang and the mayor cannot be
categorized as a complex crime. To convict the accused of the complex crime of murder
with attempted murder would result in the imposition of the death penalty. That eventuality
would be worse for him.

Page 249 of 370

CITY OF MANILA vs. HON. PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO
G.R. No. 118127. April 12, 2005.
Facts:
Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation is a corporation
engaged in the business of operating hotels, motels, hostels and lodging houses. It built
and opened Victoria Court in Malate which was licensed as a motel although duly
accredited with the Department of Tourism as a hotel. On 28 June 1993, MTDC led a
Petition for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or
Temporary Restraining Order with the lower court impleading as defendants, herein
petitioners City of Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim , Hon. Joselito L. Atienza, and the members
of the City Council of Manila. MTDC prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes
motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and
unconstitutional. On the other hand, petitioners City of Manila and Lim maintained that
the City Council had the power to "prohibit certain forms of entertainment in order to
protect the social and moral welfare of the community" as provided for in Section 458 (a)
4 (vii) of the Local Government Code.
Issue:
Whether or not there was a valid exercise of power by the City Councils
Held:
NO. The police power of the City Council, however broad and far-reaching, is
subordinate to the constitutional limitations thereon and is subject to the limitation that its
exercise must be reasonable and for the public good. In the case at bar, the enactment
of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated power as it is unconstitutional and
repugnant to general laws. To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the
rationale for the enactment of the Ordinance, and to free it from the imputation of
constitutional infirmity, not only must it appear that the interests of the public generally,
as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private
rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of
the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The object of the Ordinance
was, accordingly, the promotion and protection of the social and moral values of the
community. Granting for the sake of argument that the objectives of the Ordinance are
within the scope of the City Council's police powers, the means employed for the
accomplishment thereof were unreasonable and unduly oppressive. The Ordinance
seeks to legislate morality but fails to address the core issues of morality. Try as the
Ordinance may to shape morality, it should not foster the illusion that it can make a moral
man out of it because immorality is not a thing, a building or establishment; it is in the
hearts of men. The City Council instead should regulate human conduct that occurs inside
the establishments, but not to the detriment of liberty and privacy which are covenants,
premiums and blessings of democracy.

Page 250 of 370

SABINA EXCONDE vs. DELFIN CAPUNO and DANTE CAPUNO
G.R. No. L-10134. June 29, 1957.
Facts:
It appears that Dante Capuno was a member of the Boy Scouts Organization and
a student of the Balintawak Elementary School situated in a barrio in the City of San Pablo
and on March 31, 1949. He attended a parade in honor of Dr. Jose Rizal in said city upon
instruction of the city school's supervisor. From the school, Dante, with other students,
boarded a jeep and when the same started to run, he took hold of the wheel and drove it
while the driver sat on his left side. They have not gone far when the jeep turned turtle
and two of its passengers, Amado Ticzon and Isidoro Caperiña, died as a consequence.
It further appears that Delfin Capuno, father of Dante, was not with his son at the time of
the accident, nor did he know that his son was going to attend a parade. He only came to
know it when his son told him after the accident that he attended the parade upon
instruction of his teacher.
Issue:
Whether defendant Delfin Capuno can be held civilly liable, jointly and severally
with his son Dante, for damages resulting from the death of Isidoro Caperiña caused by
the negligent act of minor Dante Capuno.
Held:
It is true that under the law above quoted, "teachers or directors of arts and trades
are liable for any damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under
their custody", but this provision only applies to an institution of arts and trades and not
to any academic educational institution. Here Dante Capuno was then a student of the
Balintawak Elementary School and as part of his extracurricular activity, he attended the
parade in honor of Dr. Jose Rizal upon instruction of the city school's supervisor. And it
was in connection with that parade that Dante boarded a jeep with some companions and
while driving it, the accident occurred. In the circumstances, it is clear that neither the
head of that school, nor the city school's supervisor, could be held liable for the negligent
act of Dante because he was not then a student of an institution of arts and trades as
provided for by law. The civil liability which the law imposes upon the father, and, in case
of his death or incapacity, the mother, for any damages that may be caused by the minor
children who live with them, is obvious. This is a necessary consequence of the parental
authority they exercise over them which imposes upon the parents the "duty of supporting
them, keeping them in their company, educating them and instructing them in proportion
to their means", while, on the other hand, gives them the "right to correct and punish them
in moderation. The only way by which they can relieve themselves of this liability is if they
prove that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the
damage.

Page 251 of 370

JOSE S. AMADORA vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-47745. April 15, 1988.
Facts:
The basic undisputed facts are that Alfredo Amadora went to the San
JoseRecoletos on April 13, 1972, and while in its auditorium was shot to death by Pablito
Daffon, a classmate. The petitioners contend that their son was in the school to nish his
physics experiment as a prerequisite to his graduation; hence, he was then under the
custody of the private respondents. The private respondents submit that Alfredo Amadora
had gone to the school only for the purpose of submitting his physics report and that he
was no longer in their custody because the semester had already ended. Daffon was
convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence. 2 2 Additionally, the herein petitioners,
as the victim's parents, led a civil action for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code
against the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rector, the high school principal, the dean
of boys, and the physics teacher, together with Daffon and two other students, through
their respective parents.
Issue:
Whether or not the there is sufficient evidence to make the respondents liable.
Held:
No. After an exhaustive examination of the problem, the Court has come to the
conclusion that the provision in question should apply to all schools, academic as well as
non-academic. Where the school is academic rather than technical or vocational in
nature, responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach to the teacher in
charge of such student, following the first part of the provision. This is the general rule.
However, the court held that, at the time Alfredo Amadora was fatally shot, he was still in
the custody of the authorities of Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos notwithstanding that the
fourth year classes had formally ended. It was immaterial if he was in the school
auditorium to finish his physics experiment or merely to submit his physics report for what
is important is that he was there for a legitimate purpose. The rector, the high school
principal and the dean of boys cannot be held liable because none of them was the
teacher-in-charge. Each of them was exercising only a general authority over the student
body and not the direct control and influence exerted by the teacher placed in charge of
particular classes or sections and thus immediately involved in its discipline. Furthermore,
assuming that he was the teacher-in-charge, there is no showing that Dicon was negligent
in enforcing discipline upon Daffon or that he had waived observance of the rules and
regulations of the school or condoned their nonobservance. Lastly, the Colegio de San
Jose-Recoletos cannot be held directly liable under the article because only the teacher
or the head of the school of arts and trades is made responsible for the damage caused
by the student or apprentice.

Page 252 of 370

DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES vs. UNITED
PLANNERS CONSULTANTS, INC
G.R. No. 212081. February 23, 2015.
Facts:
On July 26, 1993, petitioner, through the Land Management Bureau, entered into
an Agreement for Consultancy Services with respondent United Planners Consultants,
Inc. in connection with the LMB's Land Resource Management Master Plan Project.
Under the Consultancy Agreement, petitioner committed to pay a total contract price of
P4,337,141.00, based on a predetermined percentage corresponding to the particular
stage of work accomplished. In December 1994, respondent completed the work
required, which petitioner formally accepted on December 27, 1994. However, petitioner
was able to pay only 47% of the total contract price in the amount of P2,038,456.30. On
October 25, 1994, the Commission on Audit (COA) released the Technical Services
Office Report finding the contract price of the Agreement to be 84.14% excessive. This
notwithstanding, petitioner, in a letter dated December 10, 1998, acknowledged its liability
to respondent in the amount of P2,239,479.60 and assured payment at the soonest
possible time.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in applying the provisions of the Special ADR Rules,
resulting in the dismissal of petitioner's special civil action for certiorari.
Held:
NO. Republic Act No. (RA) 9285, 54 otherwise known as the Alternative Dispute
Resolution Act of 2004," institutionalized the use of an Alternative Dispute Resolution
System in the Philippines. The Act, however, was without prejudice to the adoption by the
Supreme Court of any ADR system as a means of achieving speedy and efficient means
of resolving cases pending before all courts in the Philippines. Accordingly, A.M. No. 07-
11-08-SC was created setting forth the Special Rules of Court on Alternative Dispute
Resolution that shall govern the procedure to be followed by the courts whenever judicial
intervention is sought in ADR proceedings in the specific cases where it is allowed. In the
case at bar, the Consultancy Agreement contained an arbitration clause. Hence,
respondent, after it led its complaint, moved for its referral to arbitration which was not
objected to by petitioner. By its referral to arbitration, the case fell within the coverage of
the Special ADR Rules. However, with respect to the arbitration proceedings itself, the
parties had agreed to adopt the CIAC Rules before the Arbitral Tribunal in accordance
with Rule 2.3 of the Special ADR Rules. From the foregoing, the settlement of
respondent's money claim is still subject to the primary jurisdiction of the COA despite
finality of the confirmed arbitral award by the RTC pursuant to the Special ADR Rules.
Hence, the respondent has to first seek the approval of the COA of their monetary claim.

Page 253 of 370

LYDIA O. CHUA vs. THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
G.R. No. 88979. February 7, 1992.
Facts:
Pursuant to the policy of streamlining and trimming the bureaucracy, Republic Act
No. 6683 was approved on 2 December 1988 providing for benefits for early retirement
and voluntary separation from the government service as well as for involuntary
separation due to reorganization. Petitioner Lydia Chua believing that she is qualified to
avail of the benefits of the program, led an application on 30 January 1989 with
respondent National Irrigation Administration (NIA) which, however, denied the same;
instead, she was offered separation benefits equivalent to one half (1/2) month basic pay
for every years of service commencing from 1980. A recourse by petitioner to the Civil
Service Commission yielded negative results.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to the benefits granted by law.
Held:
YES. Co-terminous or project personnel, on the other hand, who have rendered
years of continuous service should be included in the coverage of the Early Retirement
Law, as long as they led their application prior to the expiration of their term, and as long
as they comply with CSC regulations promulgated for such purpose. In this connection,
Memorandum Circular No. 14, Series of 1990 implementing Rep. Act No. 6850, requires,
as a condition to qualify for the grant of eligibility, an aggregate or total of seven (7) years
of government service which need not be continuous, in the career or non-career service,
whether appointive, elective, casual, emergency, seasonal, contractual or co-terminous,
including military and police service, as evaluated and confirmed by the Civil Service
Commission. A similar regulation should be promulgated for the inclusion in Rep. Act No.
6683 of co-terminous personnel who survive the test of time. This would be in keeping
with the coverage of "all social legislations enacted to promote the physical and mental
well-being of public servants." After all, co-terminous personnel are also obligated to the
government for GSIS contributions, medicare and income tax payments, with the general
disadvantage of transience. In fine, the Court believes, and so holds, that the denial by
the respondents NIA and CSC of petitioner's application for early retirement benefits
under Rep. Act No. 6683 is unreasonable, unjustified, and oppressive, as petitioner had
led an application for voluntary retirement within a reasonable period and she is entitled
to the benefits of said law. While the application was led after expiration of her term, we
can give allowance for the fact that she originally led the application on her own without
the assistance of counsel. In the interest of substantial justice, her application must be
granted; after all she served the government not only for two (2) years — the minimum
requirement under the law but for almost fifteen (15) years in four (4) successive
governmental projects.

Page 254 of 370

SUGBUANON RURAL BANK, INC vs. BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA
G.R. No. 116194. February 2, 2000.
Facts:
On October 26, 1993, the SRBI-Association of Professional, Supervisory, Oce, and
Technical Employees Union, a union in petitioner Sugbuanon Rural Bank (SRB), led a
petition for certification election of the supervisory employees of SRBI. On October 28,
1993, the Med-Arbiter gave due course to the petition, but SRBI led a motion to dismiss
the union's petition. It sought to prevent the holding of a certification election on the
grounds that the members of APSOTEU-TUCP were in fact managerial or confidential
employees and ALU-TUCP was representing the union. The union led its opposition to
the motion to dismiss arguing that its members were not managerial but merely
supervisory employees. On December 9, 1993, the Med-Arbiter denied petitioner's
motion to dismiss. SRBI appealed the Med-Arbiter's decision to the Secretary of Labor
and Employment, but the appeal was denied. On December 22, 1993, petitioner
proceeded to file a petition with the DOLE Regional Office seeking the cancellation of the
respondent union's registration. It averred that APSOTEU-TUCP members were actually
managerial employees who were prohibited by law from joining or organizing unions. On
April 22, 1994, the respondent DOLE Undersecretary denied SRBI's appeal for lack of
merit. SRBI moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied. Hence, the instant
petition.
Issue:
Whether or not Undersecretary Laguesma acted with grave abuse of discretion.
Held:
NO. The Supreme Court found the petition bereft of merit. The Court ruled that
the Undersecretary of Labor committed no reversible error or grave abuse of discretion
when he found the order of the Med-Arbiter scheduling a certification election in order.
The list of employees eligible to vote in said certification was also found in order, for none
of the members of the respondent union came into the rank-and-file employees of the
bank. Likewise, the claim that the members of respondent union are managerial are not
true as the Cashiers, Accountants and Acting Chiefs of the Loans Department of the
petitioner did not possess the managerial powers or duties. Neither of the respondent
employees' fell under the category of confidential employees prohibited from joining the
union as not one of them had any duties specifically connected to labor relations.
Accordingly, the instant petition was dismissed.

Page 255 of 370

REPUBLIC NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF TRADE vs. HON. RUBEN D. TORRES
G.R. No. 93468. December 29, 1994.
Facts:
On 17 March 1989, NATU led a petition for certification election to determine the
exclusive bargaining representative of respondent Bank's employees occupying
supervisory positions. On 24 April 1989, the Bank moved to dismiss the petition on the
ground that the supposed supervisory employees were actually managerial and/or
confidential employees thus ineligible to join, assist or form a union, and that the petition
lacked the 20% signatory requirement under the Labor Code. Respondent Bank appealed
the order to the Secretary of Labor on the main ground that several of the employees
sought to be included in the certification election, particularly the Department Managers,
Branch Managers/OICs, Cashiers and Controllers were managerial and/or confidential
employees and thus ineligible to join, assist or form a union. It presented annexes
detailing the job description and duties of the positions in question and affidavits of certain
employees. It also invoked provisions of the General Banking Act and the Central Bank
Act to show the duties and responsibilities of the bank and its branches.
Issue:
Whether the Department Managers, Assistant Managers, Branch Managers/OICs,
Cashiers and Controllers of respondent Bank are managerial and/or confidential
employees hence ineligible to join or assist the union of petitioner.
Held:
YES. The grave abuse of discretion committed by public respondent is at once
apparent. Art. 212, par. (m), of the Labor Code is explicit. A managerial employee is (a)
one who is vested with powers or prerogatives to lay down and execute management
policies, or to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline
employees; (b) one who is vested with both powers or prerogatives. A supervisory
employee is different from a managerial employee in the sense that the supervisory
employee, in the interest of the employer, effectively recommends such managerial
actions, if the exercise of such managerial authority is not routinary in nature but requires
the use of independent judgment. In fine, only the Branch Managers/OICs, Cashiers and
Controllers of respondent Bank, being confidential employees, are disqualified from
joining or assisting petitioner Union, or joining, assisting or forming any other labor
organization. But this ruling should be understood to apply only to the present case based
on the evidence of the parties, as well as to those similarly situated. It should not be
understood in any way to apply to banks in general.

Page 256 of 370

BULLETIN PUBLISHING CORPORATION BULLETIN PUBLISHING CORPORATION
vs. HON. HON. AUGUSTO S. SANCHEZ
G.R. No. 74425. October 7, 1986.
Facts:
Petitioner corporation has been engaged in the business of newspaper and
magazine publishing for over half a century. Its current publications include the national
daily "Bulletin Today" (now Manila Daily Bulletin), the tabloid "Tempo", and a weekly
magazine called "Panorama". The total number of the personnel complement of the said
firm, constituting the rank-and-file regular members, is said to be over three hundred
persons. The supervisory employees number forty-eight. About three hundred employees
belonging to the rank-and-file had previously formed the Bulletin Employees Union. This
labor organization (BEU) presently administers their current Collective Bargaining
Agreement which began on July 15, 1984 and remain effective up to July 15, 1987. Ever
since, there has been only one bargaining unit in the petitioner company and this is the
BEU — the union of the rank-and-file employees. Supervisory employees were never
included in said bargaining unit nor had they ever sought inclusion in the said BEU labor
union, much less registered any protest or challenged to their non-inclusion therein.
Issue:
Whether or not supervisors in petitioner company may, for purposes of collective
bargaining, form a union separate and distinct from the existing union organized by the
rank-and-file employees of the same company.
Held:
NO. We are constrained to hold that the supervisory employees of petitioner firm
may not, under the law, form a supervisor’s union, separate and distinct from the existing
bargaining unit (BEU), composed of the rank-and-le employees of the Bulletin Publishing
Corporation. It is evident that most of the private respondents are considered managerial
employees. Also, it is distinctly stated in Section 11, Rule II, of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code, that supervisory unions are presently no longer recognized
nor allowed to exist and operate as such. Also, Article 246 of the Labor Code explicitly
excludes managerial employees from the right of self-organization, the right to form, join
and assist labor organizations. Their responsibilities inherently require the exercise of
discretion and independent judgment as supervisors. They possess the power and
authority to lay down or exercise management policies. Managerial employees are those
vested with powers or prerogatives to lay down and execute management policies and/or
to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees, or to
effectively recommend such managerial actions. All employees not falling within this
definition are considered rank-and le employees.

Page 257 of 370

GOLDEN FARMS, INC. GOLDEN FARMS, INC. vs. DIRECTOR PURA FERRERCALLEJA,
BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS
G.R. No. 78755. July 19, 1989.
Facts:
Petitioner is a corporation engaged in the production of bananas for export. Private
respondent Union represents the employees/workers of petitioner corporation, who were
the same signatories to an earlier Petition for Certification Election led in 1984 before the
Ministry of Labor. The said Petition for Direct Certification Election or Recognition led by
herein private respondent in behalf of certain office employees and foremen before
Regional Office No. XI, Davao City of the Ministry of Labor and Employment. Petitioner
herein opposed said petition on the ground among others that a perusal of the names
allegedly supporting the said petition showed that said persons by the nature of their jobs
are performing managerial functions and/or occupying confidential positions such that
they cannot validly constitute a separate or distinct group from the existing collective
bargaining unit also represented by private respondent.
Issue:
Whether or not may supervisors, cashiers, foremen, and employees holding
confidential/managerial function compel management to enter into a collective bargaining
agreement with them.
Held:
NO. If these managerial employees would belong to or be affiliated with a Union,
the latter might not be assured of their loyalty to the Union in view of evident conflict of
interests or that the Union can be company-dominated with the presence of managerial
employees in Union membership. A managerial employee is defined under Art. 212 (k) of
the new Labor Code as "one who is vested with powers or prerogatives to lay down and
execute management policies and/or to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge,
assign or discipline employees, or to effectively recommend such managerial actions. All
employees not falling within this definition are considered rank-and-file employees for
purposes of this Book." This rationale holds true also for confidential employees such as
accounting personnel, radio and telegraph operators, who having access to confidential
information, may become the source of undue advantage. Said employees may act as a
spy or spies of either party to a collective bargaining agreement. This is especially true in
the present case where the petitioning Union is already the bargaining agent of the rankand-
le employees in the establishment. As to the company foremen, while in the
performance of supervisory functions, they may be the extension or alter ego of the
management. Adversely, the foremen, by their actuation, may inuence the workers under
their supervision to engage in slow down commercial activities or similar activities
detrimental to the policy, interest or business objectives of the company or corporation,
hence they also cannot join.

Page 258 of 370

FORTUNATO MERCADO vs. NATIONAL LABOR NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION
G.R. No. 79869. September 5, 1991.
Facts:
This petition originated from a complaint for illegal dismissal, underpayment of
wages, non-payment of overtime pay, holiday pay, service incentive leave benefits,
emergency cost of living allowances and 13th month pay, led by above-named petitioners
against private respondents Aurora L. Cruz, Francisco Borja, Leticia C. Borja and Sto.
Niño Realty Incorporated, with Regional Arbitration Branch No. III, National Labor
Relations Commission in San Fernando, Pampanga. Petitioners alleged in their complaint
that they were agricultural workers utilized by private respondents in all the agricultural
phases of work on the 7 1/2 hectares of rice land and 10 hectares of sugar land owned
by the latter; that Fortunato Mercado, Sr. and Leon Santillan worked in the farm of private
respondents since 1949, Fortunato Mercado, Jr. and Antonio Mercado since 1972 and
the rest of the petitioners since 1960 up to April 1979, when they were all allegedly
dismissed from their employment.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners are regular and permanent farm workers and therefore
entitled to the benefits which they pray for.
Held:
NO. Policy Instruction No. 12 of the Department of Labor and Employment
discloses that the concept of regular and casual employees was designed to put an end
to casual employment in regular jobs, which has been abused by many employers to
prevent so-called casuals from enjoying the benefits of regular employees or to prevent
casuals from joining unions. The same instructions show that the proviso in the second
paragraph of Art. 280 was not designed to stifle small-scale businesses nor to oppress
agricultural land owners to further the interests of laborers, whether agricultural or
industrial. What it seeks to eliminate are abuses of employers against their employees
and not, as petitioners would have us believe, to prevent small-scale businesses from
engaging in legitimate methods to realize profit. Hence, the proviso is applicable only to
the employees who are deemed "casuals" but not to the "project" employees nor the
regular employees treated in paragraph one of Art. 280. Clearly, therefore, petitioners
being project employees, or, to use the correct term, seasonal employees, their
employment legally ends upon completion of the project or the season. The termination
of their employment cannot and should not constitute an illegal dismissal.

Page 259 of 370

ROBERTO S. BENEDICTO and HECTOR T. RIVERA ROBERTO S. BENEDICTO and
HECTOR T. RIVERA vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 125359. September 4, 2001.
Facts:
In 1991 to 1992, petitioners, together with former First Lady Imelda Marcos, were
charged with 25 information at the RTC for dollar salting (violation of Central Bank Circular
No. 960). The complaints alleged that petitioners maintained foreign exchange abroad
without prior authorization from and failed to report earnings or receipts to the CB.
Petitioners posted bail, entered pleas and led various motions and pleadings. On
November 3, 1990, petitioners entered into a compromise agreement with the
government Tanodbayan (PhilAsia), and PCGG. Meanwhile, CB Circular No. 1318
revised the rules governing non-trade foreign exchange transactions and Circular No.
1353 deleted the requirement of prior Central Bank approval for foreign exchange-funded
expenditures obtained from the banking system. Both circulars contained a saving clause
exempting from its coverage pending criminal actions involving violations of Circular No.
960 and Circular No. 1318, respectively. Motions to quash were then led on grounds of
lack of jurisdiction, forum shopping, irregular conduct of preliminary investigation,
extinction of criminal liability and the grant of absolute immunity as a result of the
compromise agreement. It was alleged that the dollar-salting charges were violations of
the Anti-Graft Law (R.A. 3019) falling under the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
and that the act of receiving interest earnings on Treasury Notes is an element of the
offense of prohibited transactions. On certiorari, the Court of Appeals dismissed the same
for lack of merit, hence, the present recourse.
Issue:
Whether or not the subsequent law extinguished the criminal liability of the accuse.
Held:
Jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is determined by the law in force at the
time the action is instituted. The cases led against petitioners were punishable by
imprisonment of not more than six years. Under P .D. No. 1606, the Sandiganbayan has
no jurisdiction over cases where the imposable penalty is less than six (6) years The rule
that absolute repeal of a penal law has the effect of depriving a court of its authority to
punish a person charged with violation of the old law prior to its repeal is subject to
exceptions, one of which is the inclusion of a saving clause in the repealing law, which is
present in the case at bar. Thus, the pending cases of petitioners are not affected by the
repeal. The period of recovery of ill-gotten wealth, pursuant to the explicit command of
the Provisional Constitution, commenced to run only after the EDSA Revolution of
February, 1986. The criminal actions against petitioners were led in 1991-92, a period
well within the eight (8)-year prescriptive period. The compromise agreement entered into
by petitioner with the government refers only to cases specifically mentioned therein.

Page 260 of 370

JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 148560. November 19, 2001
Facts:
The Court armed the constitutionality of RA 7080, otherwise known as the Plunder
Law, as amended by RA 7659. The Plunder Law contained ascertainable standards and
well-defined parameters which would enable the accused to determine the nature of his
violation. Indeed, it can be understood that what the assailed statute punishes is the act
of a public officer in amassing ill-gotten wealth of at least P50,000,000 through a series
or combination of acts enumerated in the Plunder Law. Petitioner bewailed the failure of
the law to provide statutory definitions of the terms used.
Issue:
Whether or not the Plunder Law is unconstitutional.
Held:
NO. Petitioner's reliance on the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine is misplaced. A
statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men
of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application.
In such instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects — it
violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it,
fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in
carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.
But the doctrine does not apply as against legislations that are merely couched in
imprecise language but which nonetheless specify a standard though defectively
phrased; or to those that are apparently ambiguous yet fairly applicable to certain types
of activities. The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is
whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct
when measured by common understanding and practice. It must be stressed, however,
that the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the
statute to be upheld — not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner
seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as
the metes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid
merely because it might have been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its
provisions, especially where, because of the nature of the act, it would be impossible to
provide all the details in advance as in all other statutes. In dismissing the petition, this
Court held that Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act does not suffer
from the constitutional defect of vagueness. The phrases "manifest partiality," "evident
bad faith," and "gross and inexcusable negligence" merely describe the different modes
by which the offense penalized in Sec. 3, par. (e), of the statute may be committed, and
the use of all these phrases in the same Information does not mean that the indictment
charges three (3) distinct offenses.

Page 261 of 370

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs. CITY OF CABANATUAN
G.R. No. 149110. April 9, 2003.
Facts:
Petitioner is a government owned and controlled corporation created under
Commonwealth Act No. 120, as amended. For many years, petitioner sold electric power
to the residents of Cabanatuan City. Pursuant to a 1992 ordinance, the respondent
assessed the petitioner a franchise tax. In refusing to pay the tax assessment, petitioner
argued that the respondent had no authority to impose tax on government entities like
itself and that it was a tax exempt entity by express provisions of law. Hence, respondent
led a collection suit demanding payment of the assessed tax due alleging that petitioner's
exemption from local taxes has been repealed. The trial court dismissed the case and
ruled that the tax exemption privileges granted to petitioner still subsists. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's order. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration
was denied by the appellate court. Hence, this petition for review led before the Supreme
Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the tax exemption of the said corporation is valid.
Held:
NO. In recent years, the increasing social challenges of the times expanded the
scope of state activity, and taxation has become a tool to realize social justice and the
equitable distribution of wealth, economic progress and the protection of local industries
as well as public welfare and similar objectives. Taxation assumes even greater
significance with the ratification of the 1987 Constitution. Thenceforth, the power to tax is
no longer vested exclusively on Congress; local legislative bodies are now given direct
authority to levy taxes, fees and other charges pursuant to Article X, Section 5 of the 1987
Constitution. This paradigm shift results from the realization that genuine development
can be achieved only by strengthening local autonomy and promoting decentralization of
governance. The Supreme Court denied this petition and armed the decision of the Court
of Appeals. According to the Court, one of the most significant provisions of the Local
Government Code (LGC) is the removal of the blanket exclusion of instrumentalities and
agencies of the national government from the coverage of local taxation. Although as a
general rule, Local Government Units (LGU) cannot impose taxes, fees or charges of any
kind on the National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities, this rule now admits
an exception, i.e ., when specific provisions of the LGC authorize the LGU to impose
taxes, fees or charges on the aforementioned entities. In the case at bar, Section 151 in
relation to Section 137 of the LGC clearly authorized the respondent city government to
impose on the petitioner the franchise tax in question.

Page 262 of 370

IMELDA R. MARCOS IMELDA R. MARCOS vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS
G.R. No. 126594. September 5, 1997.
Facts:
Nearly six years after the 1986 EDSA Revolution which toppled the Marcos regime,
petitioner was charged with violations of Sections 4 and 10 of CB Circular 960 before the
RTC of Manila for allegedly opening and maintaining foreign exchange accounts abroad
without prior authorization from the CB or otherwise allowed by CB regulations, and for
allegedly failing to submit a report of the foreign exchange earnings from abroad and/or
to register with the Foreign Exchange Department of the CB within the period mandated
by Section 10 of CB Circular No. 960. During the pendency of these cases, CB Circular
No. 1318 (Revised Manual of Rules and Regulations Governing Non-Trade Foreign
Exchange Transactions) dated January 3, 1992 and CB Circular No. 1353 (Further
Liberalizing Foreign Exchange Regulations) dated August 24, 1992 were issued by the
CB. CB Circular No. 1318 repealed insofar as inconsistent therewith all existing provisions
of CB Circular No. 960, among other circulars, while CB Circular No. 1353 repealed all
the provisions of Chapter X of CB Circular No. 1318 only insofar as they are inconsistent
therewith. Both circulars, however, contain a saving clause excepting from the circular
pending criminal actions involving violations of CB Circular No. 960 and CB Circular No.
1318. Petitioner led a motion to quash and then a motion for reconsideration which were
denied by the trial court. She then led a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
respondent Court of Appeals claiming that violations of CB Circular No. 960, specifically
Sections 4 and 10 thereof, ceased to be punishable upon the issuance in 1992 of CB
Circular Nos. 1318 and 1353, on the theory that the latter circulars completely repealed
the former, and that the reservations made in each of the repealing clauses of the latter
circulars are invalid. Respondent appellate court rejected her thesis on this score.
Issue:
Whether or not there was a violation of the provisions of the circular under Republic
Act 265, as amended (The Central Bank Act).
Held:
YES. The Supreme Court agrees with respondent appellate court that such
amendments and saving clauses are valid and were authorized enactments under a
delegated power of the Monetary Board under Section 14 of the Central Bank Act.
Administrative bodies have the authority to issue administrative regulations which are
penal in nature where the law itself makes the violation of the administrative regulation
punishable and provides for its penalty. This is still the rule on the matter and in the instant
case, the Central Bank Act defined the offense and its penalty while the questioned
circular merely spelled out the details of the offense.

Page 263 of 370

FORT BONIFACIO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION FORT BONIFACIO
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
G.R. No. 158885. October 2, 2009.
Facts:
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue disallowed Fort Bonifacio Development
Corporation's presumptive input tax credit arising from the land inventory on the basis of
Revenue Regulation 7-95 (RR 7-95) and Revenue Memorandum Circular 3-96 (RMC 3-
96).
Issue:
Whether or not Section 100 of the old national internal revenue code, as amended
by republic act no. 7716, could not have supplied the distinction between the treatment
of real properties or real estate dealers on the one hand, and the treatment of transactions
involving other commercial goods on the other hand.
Held:
The term “goods or properties” by the unambiguous terms of Section 100 includes
real properties held primarily for sale to customers or held for lease in the ordinary course
of business. Having been defined in Section 100 of the NIRC, the term "goods" as used
in Section 105 of the same code could not have a different meaning. As mandated by
Article 7 of the Civil Code, an administrative rule or regulation cannot contravene the law
on which it is based. RR 7-95 is inconsistent with Section 105 insofar as the definition of
the term "goods" is concerned. This is a legislative act beyond the authority of the CIR
and the Secretary of Finance. The rules and regulations that administrative agencies
promulgate, which are the product of a delegated legislative power to create new and
additional legal provisions that have the effect of law, should be within the scope of the
statutory authority granted by the legislature to the objects and purposes of the law, and
should not be in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by law.
To recapitulate, RR 7-95, insofar as it restricts the definition of "goods" as basis of
transitional input tax credit under Section 105 is a nullity. It is clear, therefore, that under
RR 6-97, the allowable transitional input tax credit is not limited to improvements on real
properties. The particular provision of RR 7-95 has effectively been repealed by RR 6-97
which is now in consonance with Section 100 of the NIRC, insofar as the definition of real
properties as goods is concerned. The failure to add a specific repealing clause would
not necessarily indicate that there was no intent to repeal RR 7-95. The fact that the
aforequoted paragraph was deleted created an irreconcilable inconsistency and
repugnancy between the provisions of RR 6-97 and RR 7-95.

Page 264 of 370

PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, INC. vs. CITY OF DAVAO
G.R. No. 143867. August 22, 2001.
Facts:
In January 1999, petitioner PLDT applied for a Mayor's Permit to operate its Davao
Metro Exchange. The application was withheld by the respondent City of Davao pending
payment of its local franchise tax in the amount of P3,681,985.72 for the first to the fourth
quarter of 1999. Petitioner protested the assessment and requested a refund paid by it
for the year 1997 and the first to the third quarter of 1998. Petitioner contended that it was
exempt from the payment of the franchise tax based on an opinion of the Bureau of Local
Government Finance that PLDT shall be exempted from the payment of franchise and
business taxes imposable by Local Government Units upon the effectivity of Republic Act
No. 7925 on March 16, 1995, but it shall be liable to pay the franchise and business taxes
on its gross receipts realized from January 1, 1992 to March 15, 1995 since at that time,
it was not enjoying yet the "most favored clause" proviso of RA 7925. The City Treasurer
of Davao denied the protest and claim for tax refund of petitioner. Petitioner then led a
petition in the Regional Trial Court of Davao seeking a reversal of respondent City
Treasurer's denial of petitioner's protest and the refund of the franchise tax paid by it for
the year 1998 in the amount of P2,580,829.23. The trial court denied petitioner's appeal
and armed the City Treasurer's decision. It ruled that the LGC withdrew all tax exemptions
previously enjoyed by all persons and authorized local government units to impose a tax
on business enjoying a franchise notwithstanding the grant of tax exemption to them. It
also denied petitioner's claim for exemption under RA 7925 for reasons, among others,
that it is clear from the wording of Section 193 of the LGC that Congress did not intend to
exempt any franchise holder from the payment of local franchise and business taxes.
Issue:
Whether or not PLDT is exempt from payment of taxes under the laws
Held:
NO. The Court ruled that it does not appear that, in approving Section 23 of R.A.
No. 7925, Congress intended it to operate as a blanket tax exemption to all
telecommunications entities. Applying the rule of strict construction of laws granting tax
exemptions and the rule that doubts should be resolved in favor of municipal corporations
in interpreting statutory provisions on municipal taxing powers, the Court held that Section
23 of R.A. No. 7925 cannot be considered as having amended petitioner's franchise so
as to entitle it to exemption from the imposition of local franchise taxes. Consequently,
the Court held that petitioner is liable to pay local franchise taxes in the amount of
P3,681,985.72 for the period covering the first to the fourth quarter of 1999 and that it is
not entitled to a refund of taxes paid by it for the period covering the first to the third
quarter of 1998.

Page 265 of 370

AT&T COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE
G.R. No. 185969. November 19, 2014.
Facts:
Petitioner led its Quarterly VAT Returns with the Bureau of Internal Revenue for
the taxable year period covering 1 January 2003 to 31 December 2003. On 5 February
2004, petitioner filed its first Amended Quarterly VAT Return for the Fourth Quarter of
taxable year 2003; while on 26 April 2004, petitioner filed its Amended Quarterly VAT
Returns for the First to Fourth Quarters of the taxable year 2003. Petitioner led on 13 April
2005 with the BIR an application for refund and/or tax credit of its unutilized VAT input
taxes for the aforesaid taxable period amounting to P3,003,265.14. However, there being
no action on said administrative claim, petitioner led a Petition for Review before the CTA
in Division on 20 April 2005 (or exactly seven days from the time it led its administrative
claim) in order to suspend the running of the prescriptive period provided under Section
229 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) of 1997, as amended.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to a refund or issuance of a TCC in its favor
amounting to P3,003,265.14 allegedly representing unutilized input VAT attributable to
petitioner's zero-rated sales for the period of 1 January 2003 to 31 December 2003, in
accordance with the provisions of the NIRC of 1997, as amended, other pertinent laws,
and applicable jurisprudential proclamations
Held:
YES. Clearly, the CTA had no jurisdiction to rule on petitioner's refund
claim covering the First Quarter of taxable year 2003 since its administrative claim was
led beyond the 2 year prescriptive period as mandated by law, or exactly fourteen (14)
days after the last day to file the same. On the other hand, as to petitioner's claims
covering the remaining quarters of taxable year 2003, the Court finds that petitioner has
indeed properly led its judicial claim before the CTA, even without waiting for the
expiration of the one hundred twenty (120) day period, since at the time petitioner filed its
petition, BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 issued on 10 December 2003 was already in effect.
Without doubt, it is evident from the foregoing jurisprudential pronouncements that as a
general rule, a taxpayer-claimant needs to wait for the expiration of the one hundred
twenty (120)-day period before it may be considered as "inaction" on the part of the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue. Thereafter, the taxpayer-claimant is given only a
limited period of thirty (30) days from said expiration to file its corresponding judicial claim
with the CTA. However, with the exception of claims made during the effectivity of BIR
Ruling No. DA-489-03 (from 10 December 2003 to 5 October 2010), petitioner has indeed
properly and timely filed its judicial claim covering the Second, Third, and Fourth Quarters
of taxable year 2003, within the bounds of the law and existing jurisprudence.

Page 266 of 370

JUDGE TOMAS C. LEYNES JUDGE TOMAS C. LEYNES, p e titio n e r , v s v s .
THE COMMISSION ON . THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA)
G.R. No. 143596. December 11, 2003.
Facts:
Petitioner Judge Tomas C. Leynes who, at present, is the presiding judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Calapan City, Oriental Mindoro, Branch 40 was formerly assigned
to the Municipality of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro as the sole presiding judge of the Municipal
Trial Court thereof. On March 15, 1993, the sanggunian Bayan of Naujan, through
Resolution No. 057, sought the opinion of the Provincial Auditor and the Provincial Budget
Officer regarding any budgetary limitation on the grant of a monthly allowance by the
municipality to petitioner judge. On May 7, 1993, the Sanggunian Bayan unanimously
approved Resolution No. 101 increasing petitioner judge's monthly allowance from P944
to P1,600 starting May 1993. In 1994, the Municipal Government of Naujan again
provided for petitioner judge's P1,600 monthly allowance in its annual budget which was
again approved by the Sanggunian Panlalawigan and the Office of Provincial Budget and
Management of Oriental Mindoro. On February 17, 1994, Provincial Auditor Salvacion M.
Dalisay sent a letter to the Municipal Mayor and the Sanggunian Bayan of Naujan
directing them to stop the payment of the P1,600 monthly allowance or RATA to petitioner
judge and to require the immediate refund of the amounts previously paid to the latter.
She opined that the Municipality of Naujan could not grant RATA to petitioner judge in
addition to the RATA the latter was already receiving from the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not resolution no. 101, series of 1993 of naujan is valid.
Held:
YES. From the foregoing history of the power of LGUs to grant allowances
to judges, the following principles should be noted: (1) the power of LGUs to grant
allowances to judges has long been recognized (since 1984 by virtue of LOI No. 1418)
and, at present, it is expressly and unequivocally provided in Sections 447, 458 and 468
of the Local Government Code of 1991; (2) the issuance of DBM Circular No. 91-7 dated
June 25, 1991 and LBC No. 55 dated March 15, 1994 indicates that the national
government recognizes the power of LGUs to grant such allowances to judges; (3) in
Circular No. 91-7, the national government merely provides the guidelines for the
continued receipt of allowances by judges from LGUs while in LBC No. 55, the national
government merely tries to limit the amount of allowances LGUs may grant to judges; and
(4) in the recent case of Dadole, et al. vs. COA, the Court upheld the constitutionally
enshrined autonomy of LGUs to grant allowances to judges in any amount deemed
appropriate, depending on availability of funds, in accordance with the Local Government
Code of 1991. We rule in favor of petitioner judge.

Page 267 of 370

ALPHA INVESTIGATION AND SECURITY AGENCY, INC. vs. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION
G.R. No. 111722. May 27, 1997.
Facts:
Petitioner Alpha Investigation and Agency, Inc. (AISA) is a private corporation
engaged in the business of providing security services to its clients, one of whom is the
Don Mariano Marcos State University. Private respondents were hired as security guards
by AISA on February 16, 1990. Five months later, 43 security guards filed before the
Regional Office of the Department of Labor and Employment a complaint against AISA
for non-compliance with the current minimum wage order. Private respondents have been
receiving a monthly salary of P900.00 although the security service agreement between
AISA and DMMSU provided a monthly pay of P1,200.00 for each security guard. AISA
made representations with DMMSU for an increase in the contract rates of the security
guards to enable them to pay the mandated minimum wage rates without compromising
its administrative and operational expenses. DMMSU, however, replied that, being a
government corporation, it cannot grant said request due to budgetary constraints.
Issue:
Whether or not the principal of a security service agreement be held jointly and
severally liable with the contractor for non-payment of the minimum wage.
Held:
YES. AISA's solidary liability for the amounts due the security guards finds
support in Articles 106, 107 and 109 of the Labor Code. The joint and several liability of
the contractor and the principal is mandated by the Labor Code to ensure compliance
with its provisions, including the statutory minimum wage. The contractor is made liable
by virtue of his status as direct employer, while the principal becomes the indirect
employer of the former's employees for the purpose of paying their wages in the event of
failure of the contractor to pay them. This gives the workers ample protection consonant
with the labor and social justice provisions of the 1987 Constitution. It is to be borne in
mind that wages orders, being statutory and mandatory, cannot be waived. AISA cannot
escape liability since the law provides for the joint and solidary liability of the principal and
the contractor to protect the laborers.

Page 268 of 370

JMM PROMOTIONS & MANAGEMENT, INC. vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION and ULPIANO L. DE LOS SANTOS
G.R. No. 109835. November 22, 1993.
Facts:
The petitioner contends that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in
applying these rules to decisions rendered by the POEA. It insists that the appeal bond
is not necessary in the case of licensed recruiters for overseas employment because they
are already required under Section 4, Rule II, Book II of the POEA Rules not only to pay
a license fee of P30,000.00 but also to post a cash bond of P100,000.00 and a surety
bond of P50,000.00. In addition, the petitioner claims it has placed in escrow the sum of
P200,000.00 with the Philippine National Bank in compliance with Section 17, Rule II,
Book II of the same Rule, "to primarily answer for valid and legal claims of recruited
workers as a result of recruitment violations or money claims."
Issue:
Whether or not the order of respondent National Labor Relations Commission
dated October 30, 1992, dismissing the petitioner's appeal from a decision of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration on the ground of failure to post the
required appeal bond, valid.
Held:
YES. The POEA Rules are clear. A reading thereof readily shows that in
addition to the cash and surety bonds and the escrow money, an appeal bond in an
amount equivalent to the monetary award is required to perfect an appeal from a decision
of the POEA. Obviously, the appeal bond is intended to further insure the payment of the
monetary award in favor of the employee if it is eventually affirmed on appeal to the NLRC.
It is true that the cash and surety bonds and the money placed in escrow are supposed
to guarantee the payment of all valid and legal claims against the employer, but these
claims are not limited to monetary awards to employees whose contracts of employment
have been violated. The POEA can go against these bonds also for violations by the
recruiter of the conditions of its license, the provisions of the Labor Code and its
implementing rules, E.O. 247 (reorganizing the POEA) and the POEA Rules, as well as
the settlement of other liabilities the recruiter may incur. As for the escrow agreement, it
was presumably intended to provide for a standing fund, as it were, to be used only as a
last resort and not to be reduced with the enforcement against it of every claim of recruited
workers that may be adjudged against the employer. This amount may not even be
enough to cover such claims and, even if it could initially, may eventually be exhausted
after satisfying other subsequent claims. Indeed, it is possible for the monetary award in
favor of the employee to exceed the amount of P350,000.00, which is the sum of the
bonds and escrow money required of the recruiter.

Page 269 of 370

ALFREDO SAJONAS and CONCHITA vs. THE . THE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 102377. July 5, 1996.
Facts:
On September 22, 1983, the spouses Ernesto Uychocde and Lucita Jarin agreed
to sell a parcel of residential land located in Antipolo, Rizal to the spouses Alfredo Sajonas
and Conchita R. Sajonas on installment basis as evidenced by a Contract to Sell dated
September 22, 1983. On August 27, 1984, the Sajonas couple caused the annotation of
an adverse claim based on the said Contract to Sell on the title of the subject property.
Upon full payment of the purchase price, the Uychocdes executed a Deed of Sale
involving the property in question in favor of the Sajonas couple on September 4, 1984.
The deed of absolute sale was registered almost a year after, or on August 28, 1985.
Meanwhile, it appears that Domingo Pilares filed for collection of sum of money against
Ernesto Uychocde. On June 25, 1980, a Compromise Agreement was entered into by the
parties in the said case under which Ernesto Uychocde acknowledged his monetary
obligation to Domingo Pilares amounting to P27,800 and agreed to pay the same in two
years from June 25, 1980. When Uychocde failed to comply with his undertaking in the
compromise agreement, a writ of execution was issued on August 12, 1982 by the CFI of
Quezon City where the civil case was pending. Pursuant to the order of execution dated
August 3, 1982, a notice of levy on execution was issued on February 12, 1985. On
February 12, 1985, defendant sheriff Roberto Garcia of Quezon City presented said
notice of levy on execution.
Issue:
Whether or not Pilares has a better right than the Sajonas couple to the property.
Held:
YES. Under the Torrens system, registration is the operative act which gives
validity to the transfer or creates a lien upon the land. A person dealing with registered
land is not required to go behind the register to determine the condition of the property.
He is only charged with notice of the burdens on the property which are noted on the face
of the register or certificate of title. While it is the act of registration which is the operative
act which conveys or affects the land insofar as third persons are concerned, it is likewise
true, that the subsequent sale of property covered by a Certificate of Title cannot prevail
over an adverse claim, duly sworn to and annotated on the certificate of title previous to
the sale. In sum the disputed inscription of adverse claim on the Transfer Certificate of
Title No. N-79073 was still in effect on February 12, 1985 when Quezon City Sheriff
Roberto Garcia annotated the notice of levy on execution thereto. Consequently, he is
charged with knowledge that the property sought to be levied upon on execution was
encumbered by an interest the same as or better than that of the registered owner thereof.
Such notice of levy cannot prevail over the existing adverse claim inscribed on the
certificate of title in favor of the petitioners.

Page 270 of 370

WEEK 11

Construction of Statute in Relation to Other Statutes

1. Akbayan-Youth v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 147066 &147179, March 26, 2001.
2. Philippine Economic Zone Authority v. Green Asia Construction & Development Corp., G.R.
No. 188866, October 19, 2011.
3. Trade and Investment Development Corporation of the Philippines, G.R. No. 182249, March
5, 2013.
4. Pabillo v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 216098 and 216562, April 21, 2015.
5. Civil Service Commission v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 176162, October 9, 2012.
6. Javier v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 215847, January 12, 2016.
7. Ruzol v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 186739-960, April 17, 2013.
8. Boracay Foundation, Inc. v. The Province of Aklan, G.R. No. 196870, June 26, 2012.
9. Banares II v. Balising, G.R. No. 132624, March 13, 2000.
10. Vda. De Urbano v. Government Service Insurance System, G.R. No. 137904, October 19,
2001.
11. Calingin v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 154616, July 12, 2004.
12. Lapid v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142261, June 29, 2000.
13. Remo v. Secretary of Foreign Affairs, G.R. No. 169202, March 5, 2010.
14. Lichauco & Company, Inc. v. Apostol, G.R. No. 19628, December 4, 1922.
15. Republic of the Philippines v. Herbieto, G.R. No. 156117, May 26, 2005.
16. Goldenway Merchandising Corporation, Equitable PCI Bank, G.R. No. 195540, March 13,
2013.

Strict and Liberal Construction

1. GSIS v De Leon
2. Castillo v Tolentino
3. Obra v. Social Security System
4. Employees’ Compensation Commission v. Court of Appeals
5. Torres v. Leon Ventura
6. Francisco Estolas v. Adolfo Mabalot
7. Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union
8. Calalang v. Williams
9. Vda. de Santos v. Garcia
10. De Ramas v. Court of Agrarian Relations
11. Hidalgo v. Hidalgo
12. Posadas v. Court of Appeals
13. Peña v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
14. David v. Court of Appeals
15. De Jesus v. Intermediate Appellate Court
16. Catorce v. Court of Appeals

Page 271 of 370

17. Santiago v. Court of Appeals
18. Cabatan v. Court of Appeals
19. Feliciano v. Court of Agrarian Relations
20. De Tanedo v. Dela Cruz
21. Torres v. Ventura
22. De Chavez v. Zobel
23. Liberal Party v. Commission on Elections
24. Maquiling v. Commission on Elections
25. Violago v. Commission on Elections
26. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. B.F. Goodrich Phils. Inc.
27. Amora Jr. v. Commission on Elections
28. Hebron v. Reyes
29. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Miguel Corporation
30. Philacor Credit Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
31. Philex Mining Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
32. Davao Gulf Lumber Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
33. Province of Tarlac v. Alcantara
34. Philippine Petroleum Corporation v. Municipality of Pililia Rizal
35. Planters Association of Southern Negros Inc. v. Ponferrada
36. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation v. Bureau of Internal Revenue
37. Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue
38. KEPCO Philippines Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
39. Elvira Yu v. Court of Appeals
40. Supreme Steel Corporation v. Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng Supreme Independent Union
41. Ong Lim Sing Jr. v. FEB Leasing and Finance Corporation
42. Preysler Jr. v. Manila South Coast Development Corporation
43. Mediserv, Inc. v. Court of Appeals
44. Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Court of Appeals
45. Republic of the Philippines v. Hernandez

Page 272 of 370

AKBAYAN vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 147066. March 26, 2001.
Facts:
Invoking this right, herein petitioners — representing the youth sector — seek to
direct the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to conduct a special registration before
the May 14, 2001 General Elections, of new voters ages 18 to 21. According to petitioners,
around four million youth failed to register on or before the December 27, 2000 deadline
set by the respondent COMELEC under Republic Act No. 8189. On January 29, 2001,
Commissioners Tancangco and Lantion submitted Memorandum No. 2001-027 on the
Report on the Request for a Two-day Additional Registration of New Voters Only.
Commissioner Borra called a consultation meeting among regional heads and
representatives and a number of senior staff headed by Executive Director
Mamasapunod Aguam. It was the consensus of the group, with the exception of Director
Jose Tolentino, Jr. of the ASD, to disapprove the request for additional registration of
voters on the ground that Section 8 of R.A. 8189 explicitly provides that no registration
shall be conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a
regular election and that the Commission has no more time left to accomplish all preelection
activities.
Issue:
Whether or not this Court can compel respondent COMELEC, through the
extraordinary writ of mandamus to conduct a special registration of new voters during the
period between the COMELEC's imposed December 27, 2000 deadline and the May 14,
2001 general elections.
Held:
NO. We hold that Section 8 of R.A. 8189 applies in the present case, for the
purpose of upholding the assailed COMELEC Resolution and denying the instant
petitions, considering that the aforesaid law explicitly provides that no registration shall
be conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular
election. As an extraordinary writ, the remedy of mandamus lies only to compel an officer
to perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one; mandamus will not issue to control
the exercise of discretion of a public officer where the law imposes upon him the duty to
exercise his judgment in reference to any manner in which he is required to act, because
it is his judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the court. Considering the
circumstances where the writ of m a n d a m u s lies and the peculiarities of the present
case, we are of the firm belief that petitioners failed to establish, to the satisfaction of this
Court, that they are entitled to the issuance of this extraordinary writ so as to effectively
compel respondent COMELEC to conduct a special registration of voters.

Page 273 of 370

PHILIPPINE ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY vs. GREEN ASIA CONSTRUCTION &
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 188866. October 19, 2011.
Facts:
Petitioner PEZA and respondent Green Asia Construction & Development
Corporation were parties to a contract for a road network/storm drainage project. The
project was awarded to Green Asia on 14 September 1992 with a contract price of
P130,595,337.40. Tagumpay R. Jardiniano, administrator of the then EPZA and Renato
P. Legaspi, the president of Green Asia, signed the contract on 23 September 1992. The
stipulations in the contract include the contract price, the mode of payment, advance
payment, and the progress payment. These stipulations found in Articles III to VI of the
contract comprised all the liabilities pertaining to EPZA. EPZA was later on effectively
succeeded by PEZA. On 26 March 1996, Green Asia sent a letter to the PEZA Director
General through Atty. Eugenio V. Vigo, Project Director for Construction of the PEZA
Development Project. The letter, invoking Presidential Decree No. 1594, notified PEZA
of Green Asia's claim for price escalation in the amount of P9,860,169.58. This claim was
denied by PEZA through a letter signed by the Acting Corporate Secretary Atty. Nestor
Hun Nadal. The denial of the claim was anchored on Section 8, PD 1594, requiring proof
of the increase or decrease in construction cost due to the direct acts of the government.
Issue:
Whether Presidential Decree 1594 requires the contractor to prove that the price
increase of construction materials was due to the direct acts of the government before a
price escalation is granted in this payment dispute in a construction contract.
Held:
NO. Price escalation, as explained in paragraph 6 of Cl 2.1 of the IRR, is meant
to compensate for changes in the prices of relevant construction necessities during the
effectivity of the contract, resulting in more than 5% increase or decrease in the unit price
of those items. It is thus the prices of the items that have actually increased that become
the basis of the computation. The contract between PEZA and Green Asia did not
incorporate provisions prohibiting price escalation or any clause that may be interpreted
as a waiver of the price escalation. Consequently, payment of price escalation is deemed
to have included the provision for the payment of price escalation. It was therefore wrong
for PEZA to disregard PD 454 by automatically denying the claim of Green Asia for price
escalation or to require the latter to prove that the increase in the construction cost was
due to the direct acts of the government. PD 454 actually bridges the gap between PD
1594 and its IRR. PD 1594 no longer explains the provision on price adjustment, because
it is already found in PD 454 and in older laws.

Page 274 of 370

TRADE AND INVESTMENT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
G.R. No. 182249. March 5, 2013.
Facts:
On August 30, 2001, De Guzman was appointed on a permanent status as
Financial Management Specialist IV of TIDCORP, a government-owned and controlled
corporation created pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1080. His appointment was
included in TIDCORP's Report on Personnel Actions for August 2001, which was
submitted to the CSC — Department of Budget and Management Field Office. In a letter
dated September 28, 2001, Director Leticia M. Bugtong disallowed De Guzman's
appointment because the position of Financial Management Specialist IV was not
included in the DBM's Index of Occupational Service. TIDCORP's Executive Vice
President Jane U. Tambanillo appealed the invalidation of De Guzman's appointment to
Director IV Agnes Padilla of the CSC-National Capital Region. According to Tambanillo,
Republic Act No. 8494, which amended TIDCORP's charter, empowers its Board of
Directors to create its own organizational structure and staffing pattern, and to approve
its own compensation and position classification system and qualification standards.
Issue:
Whether the Constitution empowers the CSC to prescribe and enforce civil service
rules and regulations contrary to laws passed by Congress
Held:
NO. TIDCORP is only required to furnish the CSC with its compensation and
position classification system and qualification standards so that the CSC can be properly
guided in processing TIDCORP's appointments, promotion and personnel action. The
1987 Constitution created the CSC as the central personnel agency of the government
mandated to establish a career service and promote morale, efficiency, integrity,
responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service. It is a constitutionally
created administrative agency that possesses executive, quasi-judicial and quasilegislative
or rule-making powers. While not explicitly stated, the CSC's rule-making
power is subsumed under its designation as the government's "central personnel agency"
in Section 3, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution. The original draft of Section 3
empowered the CSC to "promulgate and enforce policies on personnel actions, classify
positions, prescribe conditions of employment except as to compensation and other
monetary benefits which shall be provided by law." The CSC's rule-making power as a
constitutional grant is an aspect of its independence as a constitutional commission. It
places the grant of this power outside the reach of Congress, which cannot withdraw the
power at any time. As an administrative agency, the CSC's quasi-legislative power is
subject to the same limitations applicable to other administrative bodies.

Page 275 of 370

BISHOP BRODERICK S. PABILLO vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 216098. April 21, 2015.
Facts:
In 1997, Congress enacted Republic Act No. (RA) 8436, which authorized the
COMELEC "to use an automated election system for the process of voting, counting of
votes and canvassing/consolidation of results for the May 11, 1998]national and local
elections," as well as for subsequent national and local electoral exercises. To achieve
this purpose, the COMELEC was "to procure by purchase, lease or otherwise any
supplies, equipment, materials, and services needed for the holding of the elections by
an expedited process of public bidding of vendors, suppliers or lessors." RA 8436 further
provided that the AES "shall be under the exclusive supervision and control of the
COMELEC." The petitioners stated that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion in adopting Resolution No. 9922 as it violates the GPRA, which requires
competitive bidding for government procurement contracts as a general rule.
Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in issuing Resolution
No. 9922 and in subsequently entering into the Extended Warranty Contract Program 1
with Smartmatic-TM.
Held:
YES. The Court has not even gone to this extreme and prohibited the re-use of
the PCOS machines. Yet, the COMELEC's own spokesperson has conceded that when
push comes to shove, automated elections are still possible. There are no qualms about
the task of having the PCOS machines repaired and refurbished. However, there are
serious and unignorable legal flaws about how the COMELEC intends to pursue this
undertaking. Bluntly, the COMELEC has failed to justify its reasons for directly contracting
with Smartmatic-TIM: it had not shown that any of the conditions under Section 50, Article
XVI of the GPRA exists; its claims of impracticality were not supported by independently
verified and competent data; and lastly, its perceived "warranty extension" is, in reality,
just a circumvention of the procurement law. For all these counts, the conclusion thus
reached is that the COMELEC had committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. As a result, its Resolution No. 9922 and the Extended
Warranty Contract (Program 1) should be stricken down, and necessarily, all amounts
paid to Smartmatic-TIM pursuant to the said contract, if any, being public funds sourced
from taxpayers' money, should be returned to the government in accordance with the
procedures contained in existing rules and regulations. Note that the disposition of these
cases does not prohibit the COMELEC from resorting to direct contracting anew or other
alternative method of procurement with any service contractor, subject to compliance with
the conditions provided in the GPRA and all the pertinent rules and procedures.

Page 276 of 370

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION vs. COURT OF
APPEALS
G.R. No. 176162. October 9, 2012.
Facts:
Respondents Dante G. Guevarra and Augustus F . Cezar were the Officer-in-
Charge/President and the Vice President for Administration, respectively, of the
Polytechnic University of the Philippines in 2005. On September 27, 2005, petitioner
Honesto L. Cueva, then PUP Chief Legal Counsel, filed an administrative case against
Guevarra and Cezar for gross dishonesty, grave misconduct, falsification of official
documents, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, being notoriously
undesirable, and for violating Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6713. Cueva charged
Guevarra with falsification of a public document, specifically the Application for Bond of
Accountable Officials and Employees of the Republic of the Philippines, in which the latter
denied the existence of his pending criminal and administrative cases. As the head of the
school, Guevarra was required to be bonded in order to be able to engage in financial
transactions on behalf of PUP.
Issue:
Whether the CSC has jurisdiction over administrative cases filed directly with it
against officials of a chartered state university.
Held:
YES. The CSC, as the central personnel agency of the government, has the
power to appoint and discipline its officials and employees and to hear and decide
administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on appeal. Section 2 (1),
Article IX (B) of the 1987 Constitution. By virtue of Presidential Decree No. 1341, PUP
became a chartered state university, thereby making it a government-owned or controlled
corporation with an original charter whose employees are part of the Civil Service and are
subject to the provisions of E.O. No. 292. The understanding by the CA of Section 47,
Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of E.O. No. 292 which states that "a complaint may
be filed directly with the Commission by a private citizen against a government official or
employee" is that the CSC can only take cognizance of a case filed directly before it if the
complaint was made by a private citizen. The Court is not unaware of the use of the words
"private citizen" in the subject provision and the plain meaning rule of statutory
construction which requires that when the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken
to mean exactly what it says. The Court, however, finds that a simplistic interpretation is
not in keeping with the intention of the statute and prevailing jurisprudence. It is a
wellestablished
rule that laws should be given a reasonable interpretation so as not to defeat
the very purpose for which they were passed. As such, "a literal interpretation is to be
rejected if it would be unjust or lead to absurd results."

Page 277 of 370

GOV. EXEQUIEL B. JAVIER vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 215847. January 12, 2016.
Facts:
On December 3, 1985, the Batasang Pambansa enacted the Omnibus Election
Code. Coercion, as an election offense, is punishable by imprisonment of not less than
one year but not more than six years. Notably, Section 68 of the Election Code provides
that the Commission may administratively disqualify a candidate who violates Section 261
(d) or (e). On February 20, 1995, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7890 amending the
definition of Grave Coercion under the Revised Penal Code. It increased the penalty for
coercion committed in violation of a person's right to suffrage to prision mayor. Further,
Section 3 of R.A. 7890 expressly repealed Section 26, paragraphs (d) (1) and (2) of the
Election Code. On September 3, 2012, Valderrama Municipal Vice-Mayor Christopher B.
Maguad filed an administrative complaint for Gross Misconduct/Dereliction of Duty and
Abuse of Authority against Mayor Mary Joyce U. Roquero.
Issue:
Whether the Commission gravely abused its discretion when it issued Resolution
No. 9581 fixing the 2013 election period from January 13, 2013 until June 12, 2013, for
the purpose of determining administrative and criminal liability for election offenses.
Held:
NO. No less than the Constitution authorizes the Commission to fix the dates of
the election period. Article IX-C, Section 9 provides: Unless otherwise fixed by the
Commission in special cases, the election period shall commence ninety days before the
day of election and shall end thirty days thereafter. Evidently, the 120-day period is merely
the default election period. The Commission is not precluded from fixing the length and
the starting date of the election period to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and
credible elections. This is not merely a statutory but a constitutionally granted power of
the Commission. Contrary to the petitioner's contention, the Commission's act of fixing
the election period does not amount to an encroachment on legislative prerogative. The
Commission did not prescribe or defined the elements of election offenses. Congress
already defined them through the Omnibus Election Code, the Fair Elections Act, and
other pertinent election laws. There is also no merit in the petitioner's argument that the
extended election period only applies to pre-election activities other than the
determination of administrative or criminal liability for violating election laws. Neither the
law nor the Constitution authorizes the use of two distinct election periods for the same
election. The law does not distinguish between election offenses and other pre-election
activities in terms of the applicable election period. Where the law does not distinguish,
neither should this Court.

Page 278 of 370

LEOVEGILDO R. RUZOL vs. THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. Nos. 186739-960. April 17, 2013.
Facts:
Ruzol was the mayor of General Nakar, Quezon from 2001 to 2004. Earlier in his
term, he organized a Multi-Sectoral Consultative Assembly composed of civil society
groups, public officials and concerned stakeholders with the end in view of regulating and
monitoring the transportation of salvaged forest products within the vicinity of General
Nakar. Consequently, from 2001 to 2004, two hundred twenty-one (221) permits to
transport salvaged forest products were issued to various recipients, of which forty-three
(43) bore the signature of Ruzol while the remaining one hundred seventy-eight (178)
were signed by his co-accused Guillermo T. Sabiduria, then municipal administrator of
General Nakar. On June 2006, on the basis of the issued Permits to Transport, 221
Information for violation of Art. 177 of the RPC or for Usurpation of Authority or Official
Functions were filed against Ruzol and Sabiduria
Issue:
Whether the authority to monitor and regulate the transportation of salvaged forest
product is solely with the DENR, and no one else.
Held:
NO. The LGU also has, under the LGC of 1991, ample authority to promulgate
rules, regulations and ordinances to monitor and regulate salvaged forest products,
provided that the parameters set forth by law for their enactment have been faithfully
complied with. While the DENR is, indeed, the primary government instrumentality
charged with the mandate of promulgating rules and regulations for the protection of the
environment and conservation of natural resources, it is not the only government
instrumentality clothed with such authority. While the law has designated DENR as the
primary agency tasked to protect the environment, it was not the intention of the law to
arrogate unto the DENR the exclusive prerogative of exercising this function. Whether in
ordinary or in legal parlance, the word "primary" can never be taken to be synonymous
with "sole" or "exclusive." In fact, neither the pertinent provisions of PD 705 nor EO 192
suggest that the DENR, or any of its bureaus, shall exercise such authority to the
exclusion of all other government instrumentalities. On the contrary, the claim of DENR's
supposedly exclusive mandate is easily negated by the principle of local autonomy
enshrined in the 1987 Constitution in relation to the general welfare clause under Sec. 16
of the LGC of 1991. Municipal governments are clothed with authority to enact such
ordinances and issue such regulations as may be necessary to carry out and discharge
the responsibilities conferred upon them by law, and such as shall be necessary and
proper to provide for the health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace and
order, improve public morals, promote the prosperity and general welfare of the
municipality and its inhabitants, and ensure the protection of property in the municipality.

Page 279 of 370

BORACAY FOUNDATION, INC. BORACAY FOUNDATION, INC. vs. THE PROVINCE
OF THE PROVINCE OF AKLAN
G.R. No. 196870. June 26, 2012.
Facts:
In 2005, Boracay 2010 Summit was held and participated in by representatives
from national government agencies, local government units, and the private sector. The
Summit aimed "to reestablish a common vision of all stakeholders to ensure the
conservation, restoration, and preservation of Boracay Island" and "to develop an action
plan that would allow all sectors to work in concert among and with each other for the
long term benefit and sustainability of the island and the community." The Summit yielded
a Terminal Report stating that the participants had shared their dream of having worldclass
land, water and air infrastructure, as well as given their observations that
government support was lacking, infrastructure was poor, and, more importantly, the
influx of tourists to Boracay was increasing. The Report showed that there was a need to
expand the port facilities at Caticlan due to congestion in the holding area of the existing
port, caused by inadequate facilities, thus tourists suffered long queues while waiting for
the boat ride going to the island.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent province, proponent of the reclamation project,
failed to comply with relevant rules and regulations in the acquisition of an ECC.
Held:
YES. The DENR is the government agency vested with delegated powers to
review and evaluate all EIA reports, and to grant or deny ECCs to project proponents. It
is the DENR that has the duty to implement the EIS system. It appears, however, that
respondent DENR-EMB RVI's evaluation of this reclamation project was problematic,
based on the valid questions raised by petitioner. An EIA is a 'process that involves
predicting and evaluating the likely impacts of a project (including cumulative impacts) on
the environment during construction, commissioning, operation and abandonment. It also
includes designing appropriate preventive, mitigating and enhancement measures
addressing these consequences to protect the environment and the community's welfare.
Thus, the EIA process must have been able to predict the likely impact of the reclamation
project to the environment and to prevent any harm that may otherwise be caused. The
project now before us involves reclamation of land that is more than five times the size of
the original reclaimed land. Furthermore, the area prior to construction merely contained
a jetty port, whereas the proposed expansion involves so much more. The Court chooses
to remand these matters to respondent DENR-EMB RVI for it to make a proper study,
and if it should find necessary, to require respondent Province to address these
environmental issues raised by petitioner and submit the correct EIA report as required
by the project's specifications.

Page 280 of 370

FIDEL M. BAÑARES vs. ELIZABETH BALISING
G.R. No. 132624. March 13, 2000.
Facts:
Petitioners herein were charged with sixteen criminal cases of estafa filed by
private respondents herein. After they were arraigned and pleaded not guilty, they led a
Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the cases were prematurely filed. The parties thereto
failed to undergo conciliation proceedings at the barangay lever that was required by law
considering that the parties lived in the same barangay. The Municipal Trial Court first
denied the motion on the ground that they failed to seasonably invoke said ground, which
amounted to waiver of the right to use it as a basis for dismissing the cases. After a motion
for reconsideration was filed, the Municipal Trial Court dismissed all sixteen cases against
petitioners without prejudice. More than two months later, private respondents filed a
motion to revive the above-mentioned criminal cases against petitioners stating that the
requirement of referral to the barangay for conciliation had already been complied with.
Petitioners filed an opposition to the cases claiming that the dismissal had long become
final and executory. The motion to revive was granted by the Municipal Trial Court and
the motion for reconsideration was denied. The Regional Trial Court of Antipolo denied
the petitioners' petition for certiorari, as well as the motion for reconsideration. Hence, this
petition for review.
Issue:
Whether or not an order dismissing a case or action without prejudice may attain
finality if not appealed within the reglementary period, as in the present case.
Held:
YES. A "final order" issued by a court has been defined as one which disposes of
the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving
nothing else to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined by the
court. As distinguished therefrom, an "interlocutory order" is one which does not dispose
of a case completely, but leaves something more to be adjudicated upon. The Supreme
Court ruled that the Regional Trial Court erred when it denied the petition for certiorari,
injunction and prohibition and when it ruled that the order of the Municipal Trial Court
dismissing without prejudice the criminal cases against petitioners had not attained finality
and hence, could be reinstated by the mere filing of a motion to revive. Sec. 18 of the
1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure merely states that when a case covered by
the rule is dismissed without prejudice for non-referral of the issue to the Lupon, the same
may be revived only after the dispute is submitted to barangay conciliation as required
under the Local Government Code. There is no declaration to the effect that said case
may be revived by mere motion even after the fifteen-day period within which to appeal
or to file a motion for reconsideration has lapsed. The petition was granted.

Page 281 of 370

PURIFICACION DE URBANO vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM
G.R. No. 137904. October 19, 2001.
Facts:
In 1971, petitioners mortgaged their 200-square meter property in Quezon City to
respondent GSIS to secure a housing loan of P47,000.00. As petitioners failed to pay
their loan when it fell due, the GSIS foreclosed the mortgage on October 28, 1983. GSIS
emerged as the highest bidder in the public auction of the property. Petitioners pleaded
several times to respondent GSIS to give them a chance to redeem the property. The
GSIS acceded to their plea but still they failed to redeem the subject property. After the
redemption period expired, the GSIS consolidated its title over the property, in favor of
the GSIS. On August 11, 1987, the GSIS approved under Resolution No. 342 the "sale
of the subject property to respondent Crispina dela Cruz for a consideration of
P267,000.00 CASH." Having learned about the sale of the subject property to dela Cruz,
petitioner Arrienda wrote a letter to the GSIS on September 27, 1987 protesting the said
sale and requesting its reconsideration and recall. Arrienda again wrote another letter to
the GSIS requesting for a formal investigation of the circumstances leading to the sale.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner has a right to repurchase the property.
Held:
NO. The Court ruled that petitioners are not entitled to repurchase the subject
property as a matter of right and the sale of the property to respondent dela Cruz cannot
be annulled on the basis of their alleged right to repurchase. The GSIS Board exercised
its discretion in accordance with law in denying petitioners' requests which was based not
on whim or caprice, but on a factual assessment of the financial capacity of the petitioners
to make good their repeated offers to purchase the subject property. The action taken by
the GSIS was well within the powers of the Board under the then GSIS charter or PD.
1146. The Court also upheld the GSIS in disposing the subject property through public
bidding. Being a financial institution extending loans to its members, the foreclosure of
the subject property as collateral to a loan was done in the regular course of business. Its
sale to private respondent dela Cruz falls within the exception provided by COA Circular
No. 86-264 allowing the disposal by government financial institutions of foreclosed assets
or collaterals acquired in the regular course of business. The Court also ruled that the
GSIS did not act in bad faith in their dealing with petitioners. The Court also considered
the fact that the GSIS sold the subject property to respondent dela Cruz only after giving
petitioners an almost one year opportunity to repurchase the property and only after
ascertaining that the purchase price proposed by private respondent dela Cruz in
payment of the subject property would benefit the GSIS.

Page 282 of 370

GOV. ANTONIO CALINGIN, GOV. ANTONIO CALINGIN vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 154616. July 12, 2004.
Facts:
The Office of the President issued a Resolution dated March 22, 2001 suspending
Gov. Calingin for 90 days. On April 30, 2001, Undersecretary Eduardo R. Soliman of the
Department of the Interior and Local Government, by authority of Secretary Jose D. Lina,
Jr., issued a Memorandum implementing the said Resolution of the Office of the
President. On May 3, 2001, Gov. Calingin filed before the Office of the President a Motion
for Reconsideration. The DILG Memorandum bore the authority of the COMELEC which
granted an exemption to the election ban in the movement of any public officer in its
Resolution No. 3992 promulgated on April 24, 2001. This was in pursuance to COMELEC
Resolution No. 340. On May 7, 2001, Gov. Calingin filed a petition for prohibition before
the Court of Appeals to prevent the DILG from executing the assailed suspension order.
However, on May 11, 2001, the Court of Appeals dismissed the said petition and by
resolution issued on July 1, 2002, denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Issue:
Whether or not the decision of the Office of the President already final and
executory.
Held:
YES. The decisions of the Office of the President are final and executory. No
motion for reconsideration is allowed by law but the parties may appeal the decision to
the Court of Appeals. The appeal, however, does not stay the execution of the decision.
Thus, the DILG Secretary may validly move for its immediate execution. A perusal of the
records, however, reveals that the Resolution was approved and signed on March 22,
2001 by Executive Secretary Renato de Villa by the authority of the President. Hence, the
approval was before the promulgation of COMELEC Resolution No. 3992 on April 24,
2001. The record also shows that the request to implement the said suspension order
was filed on March 22, 2001 by the Senior Deputy Executive Secretary of the Office of
the President pursuant to the requirements stated in the Resolution. Moreover,
COMELEC Resolution No. 3529, which may be applied by analogy and in relation to Sec.
2 of COMELEC Resolution No. 3401 merely requires the request to be in writing indicating
the office and place from which the officer is removed, and the reason for said movement,
and submitted together with the formal complaint executed under oath and containing the
specific charges and the answer to said complaint. The request for the exemption was
accompanied with the Affidavit of Complaint, Affidavit of Controversion, Reply and Draft
Resolution. The pertinent documents required by the COMELEC to substantiate the
request were submitted. There being a proper basis for its grant of exemption, COMELEC
Resolution No. 3992 is valid.

Page 283 of 370

GOVERNOR MANUEL M. LAPID vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 142261. June 29, 2000.
Facts:
Petitioner Lapid, Governor of the Province of Pampanga, and five other provincial
officers were charged with dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service for demanding and collecting fees for quarrying operations
beyond the P40.00 prescribed under the present provincial ordinance. The Ombudsman
rendered a decision finding petitioner liable for misconduct and meted on petitioner the
penalty of suspension for one year without pay. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but
the same was denied. The decision was brought to the Court of Appeals by way of a
petition for review with petitioner praying for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction. After the lapse of the period without the Court of Appeals resolving the
issuance of said writ, petitioner filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus seeking the issuance of a temporary restraining order and the
reversal of the assailed decision. Petitioner further alleged the apparent prejudgment of
the merits of the case by the Appellate Court in denying his prayer for preliminary
injunction and that the DILG acted prematurely in implementing the decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman finding herein
petitioner administratively liable for misconduct and imposing upon him a penalty of one
(1) year suspension without pay is immediately executory pending appeal.
Held:
NO. Section 27 of R.A. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) and Section 7, Rule III
of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman enumerate the final and
unappealable punishments imposed by the Ombudsman. Suspension for one year
without pay is not among those listed as final and unappealable. Thus, the same cannot
be implemented pending appeal. The legal maxim "inclusion unius est exclusio alterius"
applies. The provisions of the Local Government Code and the Administrative Code of
1987 mandating execution pending appeal do not apply to petitioner who was charged
with violations of the Ombudsman Act of 1989, and said laws were not even suppletory
to the Ombudsman Law in the absence of any provision in the latter providing for such
suppletory application. Where there are two statutes that apply to a particular case, that
which was specially designed for the said case must prevail over the other.

Page 284 of 370

MARIA VIRGINIA V. REMO vs. SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
G.R. No. 169202. March 5, 2010.
Facts:
Petitioner Maria Virginia V. Remo is a married Filipino citizen whose Philippine
passport was then expiring on 27 October 2000. Petitioner being married to Francisco R.
Rallonza, the following entries appear in her passport: "Rallonza" as her surname, "Maria
Virginia" as her given name, and "Remo" as her middle name. Prior to the expiry of the
validity of her passport, petitioner, whose marriage still subsists, applied for the renewal
of her passport with the Department of Foreign Affairs office in Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A.,
with a request to revert to her maiden name and surname in the replacement passport.
On 27 July 2004, the Office of the President dismissed the appeal and ruled that Section
5 (d) of Republic Act No. 8239 or the Philippine Passport Act of 1996 "offers no leeway
for any other interpretation than that only in case of divorce, annulment, or declaration of
nullity of marriage may a married woman revert to her maiden name for passport
purposes." The Office of the President further held that in case of conflict between a
general and special law, the latter will control the former regardless of the respective
dates of passage. Since the Civil Code is a general law, it should yield to RA 8239.
Issue:
Whether petitioner, who originally used her husband's surname in her expired
passport, can revert to the use of her maiden name in the replacement passport, despite
the subsistence of her marriage.
Held:
NO. In the case of renewal of passport, a married woman may either
adopt her husband's surname or continuously use her maiden name. If she chooses to
adopt her husband's surname in her new passport, the DFA additionally requires the
submission of an authenticated copy of the marriage certificate. Otherwise, if she prefers
to continue using her maiden name, she may still do so. The DFA will not prohibit her
from continuously using her maiden name. However, once a married woman opted to
adopt her husband's surname in her passport, she may not revert to the use of her maiden
name, except in the cases enumerated in Section 5 (d) of RA 8239. These instances are:
(1) death of husband, (2) divorce, (3) annulment, or (4) nullity of marriage. Since
petitioner's marriage to her husband subsists, she may not resume her maiden name in
the replacement passport. Otherwise stated, a married woman's reversion to the use of
her maiden name must be based only on the severance of the marriage. Even assuming
RA 8239 conflicts with the Civil Code, the provisions of RA 8239 which is a special law
specifically dealing with passport issuance must prevail over the provisions of Title XIII of
the Civil Code which is the general law on the use of surnames.

Page 285 of 370

COMPANY, INC. LICHAUCO & COMPANY, INC. vs. SILVERIO APOSTOL
G.R. No. 19628. December 4, 1922.
Facts:
The petitioner asserts that under the first proviso to section 1762 of the
Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3052 of the Philippine Legislature, it has
"an absolute and unrestricted right to import carabao and other draft animals and bovine
cattle for the manufacture of serum from Pnom-Pehn, Indo-China, into the Philippine
Islands" and that the respondents have no authority to impose upon the petitioner the
restriction requiring the immunization of the cattle before shipment. The respondents, on
the other hand, rely upon section 1770 of the Administrative Code and upon
Administrative Order No. 21 of the Bureau of Agriculture, promulgated on July 29, 1922,
by the Director of Agriculture, in relation with Department Order No. 6, promulgated on
July 28, 1922, by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, as supplying
authority for the action taken.
Issue:
Whether or not there is sufficient ground for granting the writs of mandamus and
injunction filed by petitioner.
Held:
No. We find that while section 1762 relates generally to the subject of the
bringing of animals into the Islands at any time and from any place, section 1770 confers
on the Department Head a special power to deal with the situation which arises when a
dangerous communicable disease prevails in some foreign country, and the provision is
intended to operate only so long as that situation continues. Section 1770 is the backbone
of the power to enforce animal quarantine in these Islands in the special emergency
therein contemplated; and if that section should be obliterated, the administrative
authorities here would be powerless to protect the agricultural industry of the Islands from
the spread of animal infection originating abroad. It is well settled that repeals by
implication are not to be favored. And where two statutes cover, in whole or in part, the
same matter, and are not absolutely irreconcilable, the duty of the court — no purpose to
repeal being clearly expressed or indicated — is, if possible, to give effect to both. In other
words, it must not be supposed that the Legislature intended by a later statute to repeal
a prior one on the same subject, unless the last statute is so broad in its terms and so
clear and explicit in its words as to show that it was intended to cover the whole subject,
and therefore to displace the prior statute.

Page 286 of 370

Republic vs Herbieto

Facts:
Respondents are Herbieto brothers, Jeremias and David, who filed with the MTC a single
application for registration of two parcels of land. They claimed to be owners by virtue of its
purchase from their parents
Republic filed an opposition arguing that: (1) Respondents failed to comply with the period of
adverse possession required by law; (2) Respondents’ muniments of title were not genuine and
did not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of bona fide acquisition of the Subject Lots;
and (3) The Subject Lots were part of the public domain
MTC granted the application for registration of the parcels of land of Jeremias and David.
CA affirmed the decision of MTC holding that the subject property, being alienable since 1963
as shown by CENRO Report dated June 23, 1963, may now be the object of prescription, thus
susceptible of private ownership.
Republic appealed to the SC contending that 1) MTC had no jurisdiction since there was a
procedural defect in filing of a single application for two parcels of land; 2) Respondents failed to
establish that they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, and
adverse possession of the Subject Lots in the concept of owners since 12 June 1945 or earlier.

ISSUE:
W/N there is a procedural defect which resulted to MTC’s lack of jurisdiction

HELD:
YES, but not with the ground stated by the petitioner, but because respondents, failed to
comply with the publication requirements mandated by the Property Registration Decree.
Misjoinder of causes of action and parties do not involve a question of jurisdiction of the court to
hear and proceed with the case.[26] They are not even accepted grounds for dismissal thereof
PUBLICATION: MTC did not acquire jurisdiction because publication on the Freeman and the
Banat News was only done 3 months after the hearing which renders inutile the intention of the
mandatory publication. In the instant Petition, the initial hearing was held on 03 September
1999. While the Notice thereof was printed in the issue of the Official Gazette, dated 02 August
1999, and officially released on 10 August 1999, it was published in The Freeman Banat News
only on 19 December 1999, more than three months after the initial hearing. Indubitably, such
publication of the Notice, way after the date of the initial hearing, would already be worthless
and ineffective. Whoever read the Notice as it was published in The Freeman Banat News and
had a claim to the Subject Lots was deprived of due process for it was already too late for him to
appear before the MTC on the day of the initial hearing to oppose respondents’ application for
registration, and to present his claim and evidence in support of such claim
With regard to period of possession, Respondents failed to comply with the required period of
possession of the Subject Lots for the judicial confirmation or legalization of imperfect or
incomplete title. The said lots are public lands classified as alienable and disposable only on
June 25, 1963 and the respondents were seeking for a confirmation of imperfect or incomplete
title through judicial legalization. Under Sec.48 of the Public Land Act, which is the ruling law in
this case, Respondents were not able to prove their continuous ownership of the land since
June 12, 1945 or earlier, because said lands were only classified as alienable and disposable
only on June 25, 1963

Page 287 of 370

Goldenway Merchandising Corporation vs. Equitable PCI Bank G.R. No. 195540, March 13,
2013

Facts:
On November 29, 1985, Goldenway Merchandising Corporation executed a Real Estate
Mortgage in favor of Equitable PCI Bank over three parcels of land. The mortgage secured the
Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) loan granted to petitioner. Petitioner failed to settle its loan
obligation, so respondent extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage on December 13, 2000.
Accordingly, a Certificate of Sale was issued to respondent on January 26, 2001. On February
16, 2001, the Certificate of Sale was registered.
In a letter dated March 8, 2001, petitioner’s counsel offered to redeem the foreclosed properties
by tendering a check. However, petitioner was told that such redemption is no longer possible
because the certificate of sale had already been registered and consolidated in favor of
respondent March 9, 2001.
Petitioner filed a complaint for specific performance and damages contending that the 1-year
period of redemption under Act 3135 should apply, and not the shorter redemption period under
RA 8791 as applying RA 8791 would result in the impairment of obligations of contracts and
would violate the equal protection clause under the constitution.
The RTC dismissed the action of the petitioner ruling that redemption was made belatedly and
that there was no redemption made at all. The CA affirmed the RTC, thus this petition for
review.

Issue:
Whether or not the redemption period should be the 1-year period provided under Act
3135, and not the shorter period under RA 8791 as the parties expressly agreed that
foreclosure would be in accordance with Act 3135.

Held:
No. The shorter period under RA 8791 should apply.
The one-year period of redemption is counted from the date of the registration of the certificate
of sale. In this case, the parties provided in their real estate mortgage contract that upon
petitioner’s default and the latter’s entire loan obligation becoming due, respondent may
immediately foreclose the mortgage judicially in accordance with the Rules of Court, or
extrajudicially in accordance with Act No. 3135, as amended.
Amending Act no. 3135 is Sec 47 of RA 8791, which stated an exception made in the case of
juridical persons which are allowed to exercise the right of redemption only “until, but not after,
the registration of the certificate of foreclosure sale” and in no case more than three (3) months
after foreclosure, whichever comes first.
The legislature clearly intended to shorten the period of redemption for juridical persons whose
properties were foreclosed and sold in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 3135
The right of redemption being statutory, it must be exercised in the manner prescribed by the
statute, and within the prescribed time limit, to make it effective.
Furthermore, the freedom to contract is not absolute; all contracts and all rights are subject to
the police power of the State and not only may regulations which affect them be established by
the State, but all such regulations must be subject to change from time to time, as the general
well-being of the community may require, or as the circumstances may change, or as
experience may demonstrate the necessity.

Page 288 of 370

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, Petitioner, v. FERNANDO P. DE LEON,
Respondent.

FACTS: Respondent Fernando P. de Leon retired as Chief State Prosecutor of the Department
of Justice (DOJ) in 1992, after 44 years of service to the government. He applied for retirement
under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 910, invoking R.A. No. 3783, as amended by R.A. No. 4140,
which provides that chief state prosecutors hold the same rank as judges. Thereafter, and for
more than nine years, respondent continuously received his retirement benefits, until 2001,
when he failed to receive his monthly pension. Respondent learned that GSIS cancelled the
payment of his pension because the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) informed
GSIS that respondent was not qualified to retire under R.A. No. 910; that the law was meant to
apply only to justices and judges; and that having the same rank and qualification as a judge did
not entitle respondent to the retirement benefits provided thereunder. Respondent then filed a
petition for mandamus before the CA, praying that petitioner be compelled to continue paying
his monthly pension and to pay his unpaid monthly benefits from 2001. The CA granted the
petition. Petitioner GSIS is now before this Court, assailing the Decision of the CA and the
Resolution denying its motion for reconsideration. GSIS argues that the writ of mandamus
issued by the CA is not proper because it compels petitioner to perform an act that is contrary to
law.
ISSUE:
Did the CA err in granting the petition for mandamus?
HELD:
This case involves a former government official who, after honorably serving office for 44 years,
was comfortably enjoying his retirement in the relative security of a regular monthly pension, but
found himself abruptly denied the benefit and left without means of sustenance. This is a
situation that obviously cries out for the proper application of retirement laws, which are in the
class of social legislation. Indeed, retirement laws are liberally construed and administered in
favor of the persons intended to be benefited, and all doubts are resolved in favor of the retiree
to achieve their humanitarian purpose. In this case, respondent was able to establish that he
has a clear legal right to the reinstatement of his retirement benefits. In stopping the payment of
respondents monthly pension, GSIS relied on the memorandum of the DBM, which, in turn, was
based on the Chief Presidential Legal Counsels opinion that respondent, not being a judge, was
not entitled to retire under R.A. No. 910. And because respondent had been mistakenly allowed
to receive retirement benefits under R.A. No. 910, GSIS erroneously concluded that respondent
was not entitled to any retirement benefits at all, not even under any other extant retirement law.
This is flawed logic. Respondents disqualification from receiving retirement benefits under R.A.
No. 910 does not mean that he is disqualified from receiving any retirement benefit under any
other existing retirement law. Prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 8291, retiring government
employees who were not entitled to the benefits under R.A. No. 910 had the option to retire
under either of two laws: Commonwealth Act No. 186, as amended by R.A. No. 660, or P.D. No.
1146. Respondent had complied with these requirements at the time of his retirement. GSIS
does not dispute this. Accordingly, respondent is entitled to receive the benefits provided under
Section 12 of the same law. To grant respondent these benefits does not equate to double
retirement, as GSIS mistakenly claims. Since respondent has been declared ineligible to retire
under R.A. No. 910, GSIS should simply apply the proper retirement law to respondents claim,
in substitution of R.A. No. 910. It must also be underscored that GSIS itself allowed respondent
to retire under R.A. No. 910, following jurisprudence laid down by this Court.
One could hardly fault respondent, though a seasoned lawyer, for relying on petitioners
interpretation of the pertinent retirement laws, considering that the latter is tasked to administer
the governments retirement system. He had the right to assume that GSIS personnel knew what
they were doing. Since the change in circumstances was through no fault of respondent, he
cannot be prejudiced by the same.

Page 289 of 370

Castillo v Tolentino

Facts:
The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as
well as on the sale or exchange of services. RA 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the
existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue
Code. There are various suits challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds.

One contention is that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as
required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution, because it is in fact the result of the
consolidation of 2 distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. There is also a contention that S.
No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings as required by the Constitution.

Issue:
Whether or not RA 7716 violates Art. VI, Secs. 24 and 26(2) ofthe Constitution

Held:
The argument that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as
required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the
law but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to originate exclusively in the
House of Representatives. To insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated
the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially be the same
as the House bill would be to deny the Senate’s power not only to concur with amendments but
also to propose amendments. Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative
for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills
and bills of local application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that,
elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more
sensitive to the local needs and problems. Nor does the Constitutionprohibit the filing in the
Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as
action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill.

The next argument of the petitioners was that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings on separate
days as required by the Constitution because the second and third readings were done on the
same day. But this was because the President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The
presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of
reading the bill on separate days. That upon the certification of a billby the President the
requirement of 3 readings on separate days and of printing and distribution can be dispensed
with is supported by the weightof legislative practice.

Page 290 of 370

MARIA BUENA OBRA,petitioner,
vs.
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM (Jollar Industrial Sales and Services Inc.),respondents.

FACTS:
Juanito Buena Obra, husband of petitioner, worked as a driver for twenty-four (24) years and
five (5) months. His first and second employers were logging companies. Thereafter, he was
employed at Jollar Industrial Sales and Services Inc. as a dump truck driver from January 1980
to June 1988. He was assigned to about 4 project within that time frame. On 27 June 1988,
Juanitosuffered a heart attack while driving a dump truck inside the work compound, and died
shortly thereafter. In the Report of Deathsubmitted by his employer to the Social Security
System (SSS), Juanito expired at the Worker’s Quarters at 10:30 a.m., of Myocardial Infarction.
Petitioner Maria M. Buenaobra immediatelyfiled her claim for death benefits under the SSS law.
She started receiving her pension in November 1988. Petitioner was, however, unaware of the
other compensation benefits due her under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, or the
Law on Employees’ Compensation. In September 1998,or more than ten (10) years after the
death of her husband, that she learned of the benefits under P.D. No. 626through the television
program of then broadcaster Ted Failon who informed that one may claim for Employees
Compensation Commission (ECC) benefits if the spouse died while working for the company.
Petitioner prepared the documents to support her claim for ECC benefits. On 23 April 1999, she
filed with the SSS her claim for funeral benefits under PD 626. SSS denied the claimof petitioner
for funeral benefits ruling that the cause of death of Juanito was not work-connected, absent a
causal relationship between the illness and the job. Re-evaluation was also denied. Records
were then elevated to the ECC. The appellate court then held that the petitioner’s cause of
action has prescribed. Petitioner’s husband died on 27 June 1988. She filed her claim for
funeral benefits under P.D. No. 626 or the Law on Employees’ Compensation only on 23 April
1999, or more than ten (10) years from his death. The CAapplied Art. 1142(2) of the Civil Code
(brought within ten (10) years from the time the right of action accrues: (2)Upon an obligation
created by law
ISSUE:
WON the claim has prescribed
WON the illness of the deceased is work-related
HELD:
We agree with the petitioner thather claim for death benefits under the SSS law should be
considered as the Employees’ Compensation claim itself.This is but logical and reasonable
because the claim for death benefits which petitioner filed with the SSS is of the same nature as
her claim before the ECC. Furthermore, the SSS is the same agency with which Employees’
Compensation claims are filed. As correctly contended by the petitioner,when she filed her claim
for death benefits with the SSS under the SSS law, she had already notified the SSS of her
employees’ compensation claim, because the SSS is the very same agency where claims for
payment of sickness/disability/death benefits under P.D. No. 626 are filed. It is true that under
the proviso, the employees’ compensation claim shall be filed with the GSIS/SSS within a
reasonable time as provided by law. It should be noted that neither statute nor jurisprudence
has defined the limits of “reasonable time.” Thus, what is reasonable time depends upon the
peculiar facts and circumstances of each case.In the case at bar,we also find petitioner’s claim
to have been filed within a reasonable time considering the situation and condition of the
petitioner.We have ruled that when the petitioner filed her claim for death benefits under the
SSS law, her claim for the same benefits under the Employees’ Compensation Law should be
considered as filed. The evidence shows that the System failed to process her compensation
claim. Under the circumstances, the petitioner cannot be made to suffer for the lapse committed
by the System. It is the avowed policy of the State to construe social legislations liberally in
favor of the beneficiaries.This court has time and again upheld the policy of liberality of the law
in favor of labor.

Page 291 of 370

EMPLOYEES’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION,Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS AND
AIDA ALVARAN,Respondents.

Facts:
The assailed Decision of the respondent Court of Appeals reversed a ruling by petitioner,
a government agency organized under P.D. 422, as amended, holding that private
respondent, a policeman’s widow, is not entitled to compensation. The facts are not
disputed and are quoted by the assailed Decision 4 from the reversed judgment of
petitioner as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The decreased was a member of the Mandaluyong Police Station, assigned at the Pasig
Provincial Jail as 2nd Shift Jailer with tour of duty from 7:00 P.M. to 7:00 A.M. He had
been serving the Mandaluyong Police Station for more than twenty years, since he first
entered the service on April 1, 1964, until his death on November 19, 1988.

Records disclosed that on November 19, 1988, at around 11:50 in the evening, the
decreased was infront (sic) of the Office of the Criminal Investigation of the Mandaluyong
Police Station and was talking with another policeman, PFC. Ruben Cruz, when another
policeman, Pat. Cesar Arcilla, who had just arrived, immediately got off the car holding
his service firearm and approached the deceased and without saying any word, he fired
three successive shots at the surprised police sergeant which sent him slumped to the
ground. The deceased, however, although critically wounded, drew his side firearm and
fired back, twice hitting fatally Pat. Cesar Arcilla, who was still advancing towards him
and uttering ‘ano, ano.’ Both fell, fatally wounded, and were rushed to the Mandaluyong
Medical Center, but Sgt. Alvaran was pronounced dead upon arrival. Pat. Cesar Arcilla,
died in the same hospital, the day after.

Records further disclosed that previous to that shooting incident, it was learned that the
same, stemmed from a family feud, wherein Sgt. Alvaran’s sons, stabbed the patrolman’s
nephew, a day before (November 18, 1988). Such quarrel was aggravated when the latter
fired shots on (sic) on the air and uttered defamatory words before the relatives of the
former. The presence of Sgt. Alvaran at the Mandaluyong Police Station, that night of
November 19, 1988, (when he was supposed to be in the Pasig Provincial Jail, as 2nd
Shift Jailer), was to accompany his son who was to be interviewed at the same and to
shed light with regards (sic) that stabbing incident which he got involved (in) a day
before.

Issue:
The respondent Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the private respondent is entitled to
the compensation benefit under P.D. 626, as amended, on account of the death of her
husband, P/Sgt. Wilfredo Alvaran.

Ruling:
in Vicente v. Employees’ Compensation Commission, 14 we held that in case of doubt,
"the sympathy of the law on social security is toward its beneficiaries, and the law, by its
own terms, requires a construction of utmost liberality in their favor." For this reason,
this Court lends a very sympathetic ear to the cries of the poor widows and orphans of
police officers. If we must demand — as we ought to — strict accountability from our
policemen in safeguarding peace and order day and night, we must also to the same
extent be ready to compensate their loved ones who, by their untimely death, are left
without any means of supporting themselves.

Page 292 of 370

Torres vs. Ventura 187 SCRA 96 , July 02, 1990

FACTS:
Petitioner was the leasehold tenant of a 4,000 square-meter parcel of land included in the
Florencio Firme Estate and located at Caloocan, Cabatuan, Isabela. In 1972, when
Presidential Decree No. 27 was signed into law, petitioner was the tiller of the
aforementioned piece of land and was automatically deemed owner of the property. Under
Presidential Decree No. 27, any form of transfer of those lands within the coverage of the
law is prohibited except as otherwise provided therein.

In 1978, urgently in need of money, petitioner was forced to enter into what is called a
"selda" agreement, with private respondent, wherein he transferred his rights of
possession and enjoyment over the landholding in question to the latter inconsideration
of a loan in the amount of P5,000.00 to be paid not earlier than 1980. As part of the
agreement, petitioner signed an "Affidavit of Waiver" whereby he waived all his rights
over the property in favor of private respondent. According to petitioner, it was also
agreed upon by them that upon the payment of the loaned amount, private respondent will
deliver possession and enjoyment of the property back to petitioner.Two years later or in
1980, petitioner offered to pay the loanedamount but private respondent asked for an
extension of one more year to continue cultivating the land and enjoying its fruits.
Because of this, the money being offered by petitioner to pay for the loan was utilized for
other purposes. In 1981, though petitioner really wanted to get the property back, he could
not do so because he lacked the necessary funds. It was only in 1985 when petitioner was
able to save enough money to make another offer but this time private respondent
categorically denied said offer and refused to vacate the land.Hence, petitioner filed a
complaint with the barangay captain of Magsaysay, Cabatuan, Isabela stating therein that
he mortgaged his land to private respondent and that he already wanted to redeem it. The
waiver was declared null and void. Upon appeal, the decision is reversed. Hence this
petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE: Who is the rightful owner of the land?

RULING:
The petitioner has the better right to the property.It is not disputed by private respondent
that petitioner was in fact the tiller of the subject land when Presidential Decree No. 27
was promulgated in 1972. As a consequence of the law, petitioner was granted the right to
possess and enjoy the property for himself. The Court of Appeals, believed that petitioner
completely waived his rights over the land as evidenced by the Affidavit of Waiver he
executed. According to the Court of Appeals, the said Affidavit of Waiver is valid because
at the time of its execution, petitioner was not yet the owner of the land there having been
no title issued to him yet. As such, continued the Court of Appeals, the Affidavit of Waiver
did not violate Presidential Decree No. 27. The Court of Appeals further added that
petitioner abandoned his landholding and received benefits under the agreement, hence,
should not be rewarded at the expense of private respondent.

After a careful scrutiny of the two conflicting decisions and an exhaustive study of the
laws and jurisprudence applicable to this case, We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
First, of all, We have given much weight to the finding of the trial court that what was
entered upon by the parties herein was a contract of mortgage. It need not be stressed
that in the matter of credibility of witnesses, We rely heavily on the findings of the trial
court because it had the opportunity to meet them face to face. As the trial court
observed, petitioner's version is more convincing because of the apparent evasive
attitude of private respondent as compared to the candid testimony of the
petitioner.3chanrobles virtual law librar

Page 293 of 370

FRANCISCO ESTOLAS, PETITIONER, VS. ADOLFO MABALOT, RESPONDENT.

Fatcs:
"On November 11, 1973, a Certificate of Land Transfer (hereinafter referred to as CLT) was
issued in favor of respondent over a 5,000 square meter lot (hereinafter referred to as subject
land) located in Barangay Samon, Sta. Maria, Pangasinan. Sometime in May, 1978, needing
money for medical treatment, respondent passed on the subject land to the petitioner for the
amount of P5,800.00 and P200.00 worth of rice. According to respondent, there was only a
verbal mortgage; while according to petitioner, a sale had taken place. Acting on the transfer,
the DAR officials in Sta. Maria, Pangasinan authorized the survey and issuance of an
Emancipation Patent, leading to the issuance of a Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3736 on
December 4, 1987, in favor of the petitioner. "Sometime in May, 1988, respondent filed a
Complaint against the petitioner before the Barangay Lupon in Pangasinan for the purpose of
redeeming the subject land. When no amicable settlement was reached, the case was referred
to the Department of Agrarian Reform's (hereinafter referred to as DAR) regional office at Pilar,
Sta. Maria, Pangasinan. "On July 8, 1988, Atty. Linda F. Peralta of the DAR's District Office
submitted her investigation report finding that respondent merely gave the subject land to
petitioner as guarantee for the payment of a loan he had incurred from the latter; and
recommending that the CLT remain in the name of respondent and that the money loan be
returned to petitioner. "Meanwhile, in a letter, dated September 20, 1988, petitioner insisted that
the subject land had been sold to him by respondent and requested the DAR to cancel the CLT
in respondent's name. Another investigation was conducted on the matter which led to the
Order dated March 9, 1989, issued by DAR Regional Director Antonio M. Nuesa. In the said
Order, the DAR found the act of respondent in surrendering the subject land in favor of
petitioner as constituting abandonment thereof, and denied respondent's prayer for redemption
of the subject land. Respondent's request for reinvestigation was denied in a Resolution, dated
April 11, 1989.
"Thus, on May 3, 1989, respondent appealed the case to the DAR Central Office which, on
August 28, 1990, issued an Order reversing the assailed Order of DAR Regional Director
Antonio M. Nuesa and ordering the petitioner to return the subject land to respondent.
Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied on June 8, 1992. He filed an Appeal with the
Office of the President which was dismissed in a Decision dated August 29, 1994. Petitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration of the said Decision was also denied in an Order dated November
28, 1994. Likewise, petitioner's second Motion for Reconsideration was denied in an Order
dated July 5, 1995."[4]
Issue:

"A. Whether or not in law there is a valid abandonment made by Respondent Mabalot.

Ruling:
The subject property was awarded to respondent by virtue of PD 27. On November 11, 1973, [9]a
CLT was issued in his favor. PD 27 specifically provides that when private agricultural land --
whether classified as landed estate or not is primarily devoted to rice and corn under a system
of sharecrop or lease tenancy, the tenant farmers thereof shall be deemed owners of a portion
constituting a family-size farm of five (5) hectares if not irrigated, and three (3) hectares if
irrigated. Petitioner avers that respondent neither protested when the former had the subject
land surveyed and planted with 40 mango trees, nor attempted to return the money he had
borrowed from petitioner in 1976. Because the lot has been abandoned by respondent, the
beneficiary, and because PD 27 does not prohibit the transfer of properties acquired under it,
petitioner theorizes that the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) may award the land to

Page 294 of 370

another qualified farmer-grantee.[10]

VICTORIANO VS. ELIZALDEUNION

FACTS:
1. Benjamin Victoriano (hereinafter referred to as Appellee), a member of the religious sect
known as the "Iglesia ni Cristo", had been in the employ of the Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc.
(hereinafter referred to as Company) since 1958.
2. As such employee, he was a member of the Elizalde Rope Workers' Union (hereinafter
referred to as Union) which had with the Company a collective bargaining agreement containing
a closed shop provision which reads as follows:
Membership in the Union shall be required as a condition of employment for all permanent
employees workers covered by this Agreement.
3. The collective bargaining agreement expired on March 3, 1964 but was renewed the following
day, March 4, 1964.
4. Under Section 4(a), paragraph 4, of Republic Act No. 875, prior to its amendment by Republic
Act No. 3350, the employer was not precluded "from making an agreement with a labor
organization to require as a condition of employment membership therein, if such labor
organization is the representative of the employees." On June 18, 1961, however, Republic Act
No. 3350 was enacted, introducing an amendment to — paragraph (4) subsection (a) of section
4 of Republic Act No. 875, as follows: ... "but such agreement shall not cover members of any
religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor organization".
5. Being a member of a religious sect that prohibits the affiliation of its members with any labor
organization, Appellee presented his resignation to appellant Union in 1962, and when no action
was taken thereon, he reiterated his resignation on September 3, 1974. Thereupon, the Union
wrote a formal letter to the Company asking the latter to separate Appellee from the service in
view of the fact that he was resigning from the Union as a member.
6. The management of the Company in turn notified Appellee and his counsel that unless the
Appellee could achieve a satisfactory arrangement with the Union, the Company would be
constrained to dismiss him from the service.This prompted Appellee to file an action for
injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. 58894 in the Court of First Instance of Manila to enjoin
the Company and the Union from dismissing Appellee. 1 In its answer, the Union invoked the
"union security clause" of the collective bargaining agreement; assailed the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 3350; and contended that the Court had no jurisdiction over the case, pursuant
to Republic Act No. 875, Sections 24 and 9 (d) and (e).
ISSUE/S:
WON RA 3350 introducing an amendment to paragraph (4) subsection (a) of section 4 of
Republic Act No. 875, as follows: ... "but such agreement shall not cover members of any
religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor organization" is
unconstitutional
WON RA 3350 infringes on the fundamental right to form lawful associations when it "prohibits
all the members of a given religious sect from joining any labor union if such sect prohibits
affiliations of their members thereto" 5 ; and, consequently, deprives said members of their
constitutional right to form or join lawful associations or organizations guaranteed by the Bill of
Rights, and thus becomes obnoxious to Article III, Section 1 (6) of the 1935 Constitution
RULING:

1. NO. R.A. No. 3350 is constitutional on all counts. It must be pointed out that the free exercise
of religious profession or belief is superior to contract rights. In case of conflict, the latter must,
therefore, yield to the former.
2. No. What the exception provides, therefore, is that members of said religious sects cannot be
compelled or coerced to join labor unions even when said unions have closed shop agreements
with the employers; that in spite of any closed shop agreement, members of said religious sects

Page 295 of 370

cannot be refused employment or dismissed from their jobs on the sole ground that they are not
members of the collective bargaining union.
Calalang vsWilliams

Facts:
The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July17, 1940, resolved to recommend to
the Director of the Public Works and to the Secretary ofPublicWorks andCommunications
thatanimal-drawnvehiclesbeprohibited frompassing along the following for a period of one year
from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic:
1) Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmariñas
Streetfrom 7:30Am to 12:30 pm and from 1:30 pm to 530 pm; and
2) along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to
Echague Street from 7 am to 11pm
The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission on July 18, 1940 recommended to the
Director of Public Works with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works the adoption of
thethemeasureproposedintheresolutionaforementionedinpursuanceoftheprovisionsoftheCommo
nwealthActNo.548whichauthorizessaidDirectorwiththeapprovalfromthe
SecretaryofthePublicWorksandCommunicationtopromulgaterulesandregulationsto regulate and
control the use of and traffic on national roads.
On August 2, 1940, the Director recommended to the Secretary the approval of the
recommendations made by the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission with modifications.
The Secretary of Public Works approved the recommendations on August 10,1940. The Mayor
of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced the
rules and regulation. As a consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and
pick up passengers in the places above mentioned to the detriment not onlyof their owners but
of the riding public as well.
Issues:
Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional
preceptregarding thepromotion of socialjusticeto insure the well-being and economic security of
all the people?

Held:
No. Social justice is “neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy,” but the
humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that
justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social
justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of
measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society,
through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the
members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable,
or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all
governments on the time-honored principles of salus populi estsuprema lex.
Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among
divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly
extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the
fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting health, comfort and quiet of all
persons, and of bringing about “the greatest good to the greatest number.”

Page 296 of 370

Vda. de Santos v. Garcia

Facts:
This case comes to us for review from the Court of Agrarian Relations. The only issue raised is
whether a tenant, who reaps crops without the previous knowledge and consent of the
landholder, may be ejected from the land.Respondent was found by the Court of Agrarian
Relations to have reaped a portion of the 1958-1959 crop without first notifying petitioner
landholder, contrary to his earlier assurance to petitioner’s son, Gregorio Santos, that all the
palay harvest had been taken to the threshing site and that nothing else remained on the land.
Discovery of the remaining palay here complained of to have been unlawfully reaped, estimated
to be two cavans, came only when petitioner’s son happened to go to respondent’s landholding
for the purpose of surveying the same.
Upon the above facts, respondent Judge Domingo M. Cabangon, before whom the case was
tried, ordered the ejectment of theRespondent. On a motion for reconsideration filed, the order
of ejectment was reversed, the said tribunal declaring:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph ". . . Humanly,
however, it would be revolting against the conscience of man if by reason of such a violation
involving an insignificant amount which does not even disturb one meal, or even the ‘segundo
almuerzo,’ so to speak, of petitioner, the tenant’s ejectment would be meted out, thus causing
him misery and hunger . . . Under these particular circumstances, the Court will be willing to be
lenient, considering that the amount involved in the violation of the law is so small but inflicting
bigger penalty such as his ejectment from his landholding which is the source of his
livelihood."cralaw virtua1aw library
From that resolution, petitioner appealed to this Court. Here, the Court of Agrarian Relations
found that respondent had reaped the remaining portion of the crop for 1958-1959 without
previous notice to the landholder. While under Section 36 of Republic Act No. 1199, as
amended by Republic Act No. 2263, respondent has the right to determine when to reap his
crop, yet this right is subject to the proviso that the reaping must be done "in accordance with
proven farm practices and after due notice to the landholder." Section 39 provides that —
"It shall be unlawful for either the tenant or the landholder, without mutual consent, to reap or
thresh a portion of the crop at any time previous to the date set for its threshing. Any violation by
either party shall be treated and penalized in accordance with this Act and/or under the general
provisions of law applicable to the act committed."cralaw virtua1aw library
Issue:
Whether ot not liberal construction shall be used in this case.
Ruling:
We concede that a literal interpretation of the above provision of law can warrant and even
justify the ejectment of the herein respondent tenant. However, in the consideration of social
welfare legislations, like the one at bar, this Court is guided by more than just an inquiry into the
literal meaning of the law. This Court will not ignore the truth that the broad consideration
bearing upon the proper interpretation of tenancy and labor legislations are the ultimate
resolution of doubts in favor of the tenant or worker (Section 56). Similar principle is embodied
in Article 1702 of our Civil Code. Furthermore, it should be noted that under this last mentioned
rule of law, in case of doubt, the law should be construed in favor of safety and decent living of
the laborer. There would be no better example or illustration of the applicability of this principle
than the one involved in this case. In this connection, We would like to make certain
observations regarding this case. The Court of Agrarian Relations found that the amount
involved in this litigation (2 cavans of palay) involves either P4.20 or P7.70 only (share of the
landowner), depending upon the tenancy contract of the parties concerned. It is evident,
therefore, as the Court of Agrarian Relation observed, that the amount was relatively
insignificant. Moreover, respondent tenant has already been called to account for his conduct
here complained of when the herein petitioner filed a complaint for theft against him with the
Justice of the Peace Court of Sta. Ana, Pampanga. Significantly, the said criminal action was

Page 297 of 370

dismissed.

De Ramas v. Court of Agrarian Relations

Facts:
Petitioners and private respondents were the official candidates of the NPC Lakas-NUCD
for elective municipal positions of Guipos, Zamboanga del Sur. After the canvass of
election returns, petitioners were proclaimed as the duly elected municipal officials
therein.

Private respondents seasonably filed an election protest with the RTC of Pagadian City
which ruled in their favor. Respondents thereafter filed a Motion for Immediate Execution
of Decision pending Appeal, however, petitioner filed an Opposition to this Motion.

The trial court issued an Order granting the motion for execution pending appeal.
COMELEC concurs with the trial court’s decision, hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it concurs with the
decision of the trial court.

Held:
The Supreme Court held the it has explicitly recognized and given approval to execution
of judgments pending appeal in election cases filed under existing election laws. All that
was required for a valid exercise of the discretion to allow execution pending appeal was
that the immediate execution should be based “upon good reasons to be stated in a
special order.”

The rationale why such executionis allowed in election cases is “to give as much
recognition to the worth of a trial judge’s decision as that which is initially ascribed by
the law to the proclamation by the board of canvassers.”

To deprive trial courts of their discretion to grant execution pending appeal would bring
back the ghost of the “grab-the-proclamation-prolong the protest techniques so often
resorted to by devious politicians in the past in their efforts to perpetuate their hold to an
elective office.” The following constitutes “good reasons,” and a combination of two or
more of them will suffice to grant the execution pending appeal: (1) public interest
involved or the will of the electorate; (2) the shortness of the remaining portion of the
term of the contested office; (3) the length of time that the election contest has been
pending. In this case, all elements was present, considering that this has been pending
for a year, the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion.

Page 298 of 370

Hidalgo v. Hidalgo

Facts:

Respondent-vendor Policarpio Hidalgo was until the time of the execution of the deeds of sale
on September 27, 1963 and March 2, 1964 in favor of his seven above-named private co-
respondents, the owner of the 22,876-square meter and 7,638-square meter agricultural parcels
of land situated in Lumil, San Jose, Batangas.

In Case L-25326, respondent-vendor sold the 22,876-square meter parcel of land, together with
two other parcels of land for P4,000.00. Petitioners-spouses Igmidio Hidalgo and Martina
Resales, as tenants thereof, alleging that the parcel worked by them as tenants is fairly worth
P1,500.00, "taking into account the respective areas, productivities, accessibilities, and
assessed values of three lots, seek by way of redemption the execution of a deed of sale for the
same amount of P1,500.00 by respondents-vendees in their favor.
In Case L-25327, respondent-vendor sold the 7,638-square meter parcel of land for P750.00,
and petitioners-spouses Hilario Aguila and Adela Hidalgo as tenants thereof, seek by way of
redemption the execution of a deed of sale for the same price of P750.00 by respondents-
vendees in their favor.
The petitioner-tenants have for several years been working on the lands as share tenants.No
90-day notice of intention to sell the lands for the exercise of the right of pre-emption prescribed
by section 11 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code (Republic Act No. 3844, enacted on August
8, 1963) was given by respondent-vendor to petitioners-tenants. Subsequently, the deeds of
sale executed by respondent-vendor were registered by respondents register of deeds and
provincial assessor of Batangas in the records of their respective offices notwithstanding the
non-execution by respondent-vendor of the affidavit required by section 13 of the Land Reform
Code.

Issue:
Whether or not the plaintiffs as share tenants are entitled to redeem the parcel of land they are
working form the purchases thereof, where no notice was previously given to them by the
vendor, who was their landholder of the latter's intention to sell the property and where the
vendor did not execute the affidavit required by Section 13 of RA 3844 before the registration of
the deed of sale.
OR
Is the right of redemption granted by Section 12 of RA 3844 applicable to share tenants?

Held:
The code intendedto afford the farmers' who transitionally continued to be share tenants after its
enactment but who inexorably would be agricultural lessees by virtue of the Code's proclaimed
abolition of tenancy, the same priority and preferential right as those other share tenants, who
upon the enactment of the Code or soon thereafter were earlier converted by fortuitous
circumstance into agricultural lessees, to acquire the lands under their cultivation in the event of
their voluntary sale by the owner or of their acquisition, by expropriation or otherwise, by the
Land Authority. It then becomes the court's duty to enforce the intent and will of the Code, for "...
(I)n fact, the spirit or intention of a statute prevails over the letter thereof.' (Tañada vs. Cuenco,
L-10520, Feb. 23, 1957, citing 82 C.J.S., p. 526.) A statute 'should be construed according to its
spirit or intention, disregarding as far as necessary, the letter of the law.' (Lopez & Sons, Inc. vs.
Court of Tax Appeals, 100 Phil. 855.) By this, we do not correct the act of the Legislature, but
rather ... carry out and give due course to 'its intent.
Therefore, the decision of Agrarian Court is reversed and the petitions to redeem the subject
landholdings are granted. In case L-25326however the case is remanded to the agrarian court

Page 299 of 370

to determine the reasonable price to be paid by petitioners therein to Procorpio Hidalgo
forredemptionof the landholding in accordance with the observations made

POSADAS V. CA

FACTS:
On October 16, 1986 at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning Pat. Ursicio Ungab and Pat. Umbra
Umpar, both members of the Integrated National Police (INP) of the Davao Metrodiscom
assigned with the Intelligence Task Force, were conducting a surveillance along Magallanes
Street, Davao City.

While they were within the premises of the Rizal Memorial Colleges they spotted petitioner
carrying a "buri" bag and they noticed him to be acting suspiciously.

They approached the petitioner and identified themselves as members of the INP. Petitioner
attempted to flee but his attempt to get away was thwarted by the two notwithstanding his
resistance.They then checked the "buri" bag of the petitioner where they found one (1) caliber .
38 Smith & Wesson revolver with Serial No. 770196 two (2) rounds of live ammunition for a .38
caliber gun a smoke (tear gas) grenade, and two (2) live ammunition for a .22 caliber gun. They
brought the petitioner to the police station for further investigation. Petitioner failed to show
license or authority to possess the weapons. Thus, he was charged and eventually convicted for
Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions by the RTC of Davao. CA affirmed in toto the
RTC’s decision. Petitioner questioned the validity of the seizure conducted. However, even the
OSG justified the warrantless search that it is in accordance of Section 12, Rule 136 of the
Rules of Court that a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or
anything used as proof of a commission of an offense without a search warrant. It is further
alleged that the arrest without a warrant of the petitioner was lawful under the circumstances.

ISSUE:
WON the warrantless arrest is valid

HELD:
YES. An arrest without a warrant may be effected by a peace officer or private person, among
others, when in his presence the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense; or when an offense has in fact just been committed, and he
has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person arrested has committed it. At the
time the peace officers, in this case, identified themselves and apprehended the petitioner as he
attempted to flee they did not know that he had committed, or was actually committing the
offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. They just suspected that he was
hiding something in the buri bag. They did now know what its contents were. The said
circumstances did not justify an arrest without a warrant. However, there are many instances
where a warrant and seizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest,
foremost of which is the "stop and search" without a search warrant at military or police
checkpoints, the constitutionality or validity of which has been upheld by this Court inValmonte
vs. de Villa. Thus, as between a warrantless search and seizure conducted at military or police
checkpointsand the search thereat in the case at bar, there is no question that, indeed, the latter
is more reasonable considering that unlike in the former, it was effected on the basis of a
probable cause.The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and
attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a probable cause that he was concealing
something illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty of the police officers to inspect the
same.

Page 300 of 370

Peña v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal

FACTS:
The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside and reversal of a decision of the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). The HRET declared that respondent Jose
Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting
purposes. On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern
Samar was held. Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the
second legislative district of Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co
and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr. Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected
representative of the second district of Northern Samar. The petitioners filed election protests
against the private respondent premised on the following grounds:1) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a
natural born citizen of the Philippines; and 2) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second
district of Northern Samar. The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found for the
private respondent.

ISSUE:
whether or not, the HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion. (EWAN KO KUNG TAMA TOH)
HELD:
On Jurisdiction
The Constitution explicitly provides that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET)
and the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be thesole judgesof all contests relating to the
election, returns, andqualificationsof their respective members. (SeeArticle VI, Section 17,
Constitution) The authority conferred upon the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete. The
use of the wordsoleemphasizes the exclusivity of the jurisdiction of these Tribunals. The
Supreme Court under the 1987 Constitution, has been given an expanded jurisdiction, so to
speak, to review the decisions of the other branches and agencies of the government to
determine whether or not they have acted within the bounds of the Constitution. (SeeArticle VIII,
Section 1, Constitution) Yet, in the exercise thereof, the Court is to merely check whether or not
the governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the Constitutional limits of its jurisdiction,
not that it erred or has a different view. In the absence of a showing that the HRET has
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for
the Court to exercise its corrective power; it will not decide a matter which by its nature is for the
HRET alone to decide. (SeeMarcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668 [1989]) It has no power to
look into what it thinks is apparent error.

In the case at bar, the Court finds no improvident use of power, no denial of due process on the
part of the HRET which will necessitate the exercise of the power of judicial review by the
Supreme Court.
On Citizenship
His grandfather was naturalized as a Filipino, Ong married a Filipina…. Blah blah…. He is only
renting a house
Even assuming that the private respondent does not own any property in Samar, the Supreme
Court in the case ofDe los Reyes v.Solidum(61 Phil. 893 [1935]) held that it is not required that
a person should have a house in order to establish his residence and domicile.It is enough that
he should live in the municipality or in a rented house or in that of a friend or relative. (Emphasis
supplied) To require the private respondent to own property in order to be eligible to run for
Congress would be tantamount to a property qualification. The Constitution only requires that
the candidate meet the age, citizenship, voting and residence requirements. Nowhere is it
required by the Constitution that the candidate should also own property in order to be qualified

Page 301 of 370

to run. (seeMaquera v. Borra, 122 Phil. 412 [1965])

David v. Court of Appeals

FACTS:
Jose Juego, a construction worker of D. M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the
Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death. He was crushed to death when the [p]latform
he was then on board and performing work, fell. And the falling of the [p]latform was due
to the removal or getting loose of the pin which was merely inserted to the connecting
points of the chain block and [p]latform but without a safety lock.Jose Juego’s widow,
Maria, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig a complaint for damages against
the deceased’s employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc.

The employer raised, among other defenses, the widow’s prior availment of the benefits
from the State Insurance Fund. The employer argued that in Floresca, the claimants may
invoke either the Workmen’s Compensation Act or the provisions of the Civil Code,
subject to the consequence that the choice of one remedy will exclude the other and that
the acceptance of compensation under the remedy chosen will preclude a claim for
additional benefits under the other remedy. The exception is where a claimant who has
already been paid under the Workmen’s Compensation Act may still sue for damages
under the Civil Code on the basis of supervening facts or developments occurring after
he opted for the first remedy.

Petitioner, argues that under Article 3 of the Civil Code, ignorance of the law excuses no
one from compliance therewith. As judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or
the Constitution form part of the Philippine legal system (Article 8, Civil Code), private
respondent cannot claim ignorance of this Court’s ruling in Floresca allowing a choice of
remedies.

ISSUE:
Whether the private respondent is already barred from claiming damages under the Civil
Code pursuant to Article 3 of the Civil Code.

HELD:
No.The application of Article 3 is limited to mandatory and prohibitory laws. This may be
deduced from the language of the provision, which, notwithstanding a person’s
ignorance, does not excuse his or her compliance with the laws. The rule in Floresca
allowing private respondent a choice of remedies is neither mandatory nor prohibitory.
Accordingly, her ignorance thereof cannot be held against her.

In any event, there is no proof that private respondent knew that her husband died in the
elevator crash when on November 15, 1990 she accomplished her application for benefits
from the ECC. The police investigation report is dated November 25, 1990, 10 days after
the accomplishment of the form. Petitioner filed the application in her behalf on
November 27, 1990.

There is also no showing that private respondent knew of the remedies available to her
when the claim before the ECC was filed.

Page 302 of 370

De Jesus v. Intermediate Appellate Court

Facts:
Petitioners are co-owners of a parcel of land in Barrio Wawa, Binangonan, Rizal (area:
19,061 sq m)
Petitioners allege that in October 1981, without their knowledge or consent, Lorenzo
Cadiente, a private contractor and the Provincial Engineer of Rizal constructed a road 9
meters wide and 128.70 meters long occupying 1,165 sq m of their parcel of land. Aside
from the road, an artificial creek 23.20 meters wide and 128.69 meters long was also
constructed, occupying an area of 2,906 sq m of their property constructed in a zigzag
manner, the creak meandered through their property. Petitioners files two cases which
were later consolidated. Solicitor General filed a motion to dismiss both cases several
grounds, including that both cases were in reality suits against the state which could not
be maintained without the State's consent. The lower court dismissed the petition;
petitioners elevated the case to the SC on certiorari, which referred the cases back to the
IAC

IAC ruled: the two actions cannot be maintained because they are suits against the State
without consent
Case was again elevated to the SC on certiorari

Issue:
Whether or not the consolidated actions, as suits against the State, can be maintained

Held:
Yes.
Ratio:
The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for
perpetrating an injustice on a citizen; it cannot serve as defense by the State against an
action for payment by the owner
The respondent government officials executed a shortcut in appropriating petitioners'
property for public use; no expropriation proceedings had been undertaken prior to the
construction of the projects
Damages may be awarded the petitioners in the form of legal interest on the price of the
land to be reckoned from the time of the unlawful taking
Petition granted. Civil Cases remanded to the lower court for trial on the merits after the
Republic of the Philippines shall have been impleaded as defendant in both cases.

Page 303 of 370

Catorce v. Court of Appeals

Facts:
n 1954, petitioner was instituted tenant over a parcel of irrigated rice land situated at Sta.
Cruz, Buhi, Camarines Sur, with an area of .7065 hectare, by the owner thereof, Simeona
Merilles. Their agreement was subject to the condition that petitioner would shoulder all
the expenses of production under a sharing system of 1/4 — 3/4 in favor of petitioner.
The landholding in question was planted to rice two times a year, the "cataunan"
cropping season covering the period from June to November, and the "doble", covering
the period from December to May, with the highest production at 25 cavans per cropping
season.

In 1960, the property was mortgaged by the landowner to Andrea Bagayawa, mother of
respondent, who from that time on, received the landowner’s share of the harvest from
petitioner.

In October, 1977, Andrea took possession of the land without petitioner’s knowledge and
consent, and caused the cultivation thereof without giving any share of the harvest to
petitioner. The latter tried to retrieve possession but Andrea told him that she would
work the land for the "cataunan" season only to recover the expenses she had incurred
in the cultivation of the land. Petitioner acceded to buy peace.

After the "cataunan" cropping season, petitioner tried again to get possession but
Andrea and her son, respondent Pedro Bagayawa, refused and, instead, continued tilling
the land. Petitioner reported the incident to the Office of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform
at Nabua, which sent mediation notices to Andrea 1 , but the latter never appeared.
Petitioner, assisted by the Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance of the Ministry of
Agrarian Reform, then filed a Complaint with the Agrarian Court (CAR Case No. 6040) on
January 9, 1980 which was, however, dismissed without prejudice for not having passed
first the Lupon Pambarangay as mandatorily required by Presidential Decree No. 1508.
Andrea died on January 30. 1980, and respondent, her son, took over possession of the
land.

Issue:
Whether or not liberal contruction should be used.
Ruling:
The Agricultural Land Reform Code has been designed to promote economic and social
stability (Gonzales v. GSIS, 107 SCRA 492 (1981). Being a social legislation, it must be
interpreted liberally to give full force and effect to its clear intent (Ibid., Pasadas v. CA, 82
SCRA 250 (1978), which is "to achieve a dignified existence for the small farmers" and to
make them "more independent, self-reliant and responsible citizens, and a source of
genuine strength in our democratic society." (Section 2[2] and [6], R.A. No. 3844, as
amended)

Page 304 of 370

Santiago v. Court of Appeals

Facts:
Petitioner Ildefonso Santiago donated a parcel of land to the Bureau of Plant Industry on
the terms that the Bureau should construct a building and install lighting facilities on the
said lot.
When time passed and there were still no improvements on the lot, Santiago filed a case
pleading for the revocation of such contract of donation but the trial court dismissed the
petition claiming that it is a suit against the government and should not prosper without
the consent of the government.

Issue:
Whether or not the respondent government has waived its immunity from suit.

Held:
Yes.
Ratio:

The government's waiver of immunity was implied by virtue of the terms provided in the
deed of donation.The government is a beneficiary of the terms of the donation but it did
not comply with such terms. Thus, the donor Santiago has the right to be heard in the
court. Also, to not allow the donor to be heard would be unethical and contrary to equity
which the government so advances. The Court of First Instance is hereby directed to
proceed with the case.

Page 305 of 370

Cabatan v. Court of Appeals

Facts:
Private respondent General Assembly of the Blind (GABI) were allegedly awarded a
verbal contract of lease in Rizal Park by the National Parks Development Committee
(NPDC). However, this verbal contract accommodation was unclear because there was
no document or instrument involved.

With the change of government, the new Chairman of NPDC, petitioner Amado J.
Lansang, sought to clean up Rizal Park and terminated the said verbal agreement with
GABI and demanded that they vacate the area.

The notice was signed by the president of GABI, private respondent Jose Iglesias,
allegedly to indicate his conformity to its contents but later on claimed that he was
deceived into signing the notice.

On the day of the supposed eviction, GABI filed an action for damages and injunction in
the RTC against the petitioner but it was dismissed, ruling that the complaint was
actually directed against the state which could not be sued without its consent.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and ruled that a
government official being sued in his official capacity is not enough to protest such
official from liability for acts done without or in excess of his authority.

Issues:
Whether or not private respondents' complaint against petitioner Lansang, as Chairman
of NPDC, is in effect a suit against the state which cannot be sued without its consent.

Whether or not petitioner Lansang abused his authority in ordering the ejectment of
private respondents from Rizal Park.

Held:
No, the complaint is not a suit against the state.
No, Lansang did not abuse his authority.

Ratio:
The doctrine of state immunity from suit applies to complaints filed against public
officials for acts done in the performance of their duties. The rule is that the suit must be
regarded as one against the state where satisfaction of the judgment against the public
official concerned will require the state itself to perform a positive act.
Lansang was sued not in his capacity as NPDC Chairman but in his personal capacity. It
is evident from the complaint that Lansang was sued allegedly for having personal
motives in ordering the ejectment of GABI from Rizal Park.
There was no evidence of abuse of authority.

Page 306 of 370

Feliciano v. Court of Agrarian Relations

Facts:
Conception Feliciano filed a petition before the Court of Agrarian Relations asking for
authority to dispossess her tenant Amado Afable of his holding situated in barrio
Libtong, Meycauayan, Bulacan, on the ground that (1) she desires to cultivate it
personally under Section 50 (a) Republic Act No. 1199, and (2) said tenant failed to pay in
full the agreed annual rental for the agricultural years 1951 to 1955.

The tenant, thru counsel, after admitting his tenancy relationship with petitioner,
disclaimed knowledge of the truth of the allegations contained in the petition.

After both parties had presented their evidence, the court, on September 8, 1958,
rendered judgment denying the petition. Petitioner was required to maintain her tenancy
relationship with respondent and to respect his peaceful possession of his landholding
in accordance with law. Petitioner interposed the present petition for review.

Issue:
Whether the finding that petitioner ‘did not show that the "agreed" rental is legal and
proper’, is supported by the evidence.

Ruling:
The same community of life and of interest exist between the members of the family. We
can even sat that the spiritual tie is greater when it comes to the relation of a mother and
a son. If a wife is given the privilege of working a farmland thru her husband, no valid
reason is seen why a mother cannot be given the same privilege.

Moreover, the law allows a tenant to cultivate a piece of agricultural land held under a
contract of tenancy either personally or with the aid of labor available from members of
his immediate farm household (Republic Act No.1199, Section 4, paragraph 3, as
amended by Republic Act No 2263). Note that he is not even required to have said
cultivation undertaken by immediate members of his family, but only by his immediate
members of his family, but only by his immediate farm household, who may or may not
belong to the family. Surely, no reason exists why the same right should be denied to the
landowner himself. If the purpose of the law is to establish the tenancy relation between
landlord and tenant upon the principle of social justice, and to afford adequate protection
to the rights of both tenant and landholder (Section 2, Republic Act No. 1199), the
protective arm of the law must be extended equally to the tenant as well as to the
landlord.

Having reached the above conclusion, we deem it unnecessary to discuss the other
issues raised by petitioner.

Page 307 of 370

De Tanedo v. Dela Cruz

FACTS:
Estrella, the plaintiff, and Severino, the defendant were married in Bacolod and begotten
6 children. During their coverture, they acquired several parcels of land and were engage
in various businesses. The plaintiff filed an action against her husband for the separation
of their properties. She further alleged that her husband aside from abandoning her, also
mismanaged their conjugal properties. On the other hand, Severino contended that he
had always visited the conjugal home and had provided support for the family despite
his frequent absences when he was in Manila to supervise the expansion of their
business. Since 1955, he had not slept in the conjugal dwelling instead stayed in his
office at Texboard Factory although he paid short visits in the conjugal home, which was
affirmed by Estrella. The latter suspected that her husband had a mistress named Nenita
Hernandez, hence, the urgency of the separation of property for the fear that her
husband might squander and dispose the conjugal assets in favor of the concubine.

ISSUE:
WON there has been abandonment on the part of the husband and WON there has been
an abused of his authority as administrator of the conjugal partnership.

HELD:
The husband has never desisted in the fulfillment of his marital obligations and support
of the family. To be legally declared as to have abandoned the conjugal home, one must
have willfully and with intention of not coming back and perpetual separation. There
must be real abandonment and not mere separation. In fact, the husband never failed to
give monthly financial support as admitted by the wife. This negates the intention of
coming home to the conjugal abode. The plaintiff even testified that the husband “paid
short visits” implying more than one visit. Likewise, as testified by the manager of one of
their businesses, the wife has been drawing a monthly allowance of P1,000-1,500 that
was given personally by the defendant or the witness himself.

SC held that lower court erred in holding that mere refusal or failure of the husband as
administrator of the conjugal partnership to inform the wife of the progress of the
business constitutes abuse of administration. In order for abuse to exist, there must be a
willful and utter disregard of the interest of the partnership evidenced by a repetition of
deliberate acts or omissions prejudicial to the latter.

Page 308 of 370

De Chavez v. Zobel

Facts:
Private respondent Zobel, as the registered owner of a parcel of land located at
Calatagan, Batangas, known as Hacienda Bigaa, with an aggregate area of more than five
hundred hectares, sought to eject petitioners, his tenants tilling lands in a portion
thereof, relying on the provision of Republic Act No. 1199, which would justify such a
move where the land is suited for mechanization. 5 Petitioners, as tenants, vigorously
objected to such petition not only on the ground that the small areas they are occupying
were not suited for mechanization, but likewise on the allegation that the true intention of
respondent as landholder was to utilize the same for pasture and for the raising of
sorghum. The Court of Agrarian Relations dismissed the petition for ejectment, doubting
such an intent to mechanize and at the same time holding that mechanization during the
rainy season of the year was not practicable. The matter was elevated to respondent
Court of Appeals, which reversed the Court of Agrarian Relations and granted such
petition for ejectment. Hence this petition for review.

Issue:
Whether or not CA erred in its decision.

Ruling:
On this vital policy question, one of the utmost concern, the need for what for some is a
radical solution in its pristine sense, one that goes at the root, was apparent. Presidential
Decree No. 27 was thus conceived. It was issued in October of 1972. The very next
month, the 1971 Constitutional Convention voiced its overwhelming approval. There is
no doubt then, as set forth expressly therein, that the goal is emancipation. 13 What is
more, the decree is now part and parcel of the law of the land according to the revised
Constitution itself. 14 Ejectment therefore of petitioners is simply out of the question.
That would be to set at naught an express mandate of the Constitution. Once it has
spoken, our duty is clear; obedience is unavoidable. This is not only so because of the
cardinal postulate of constitutionalism, the supremacy of the fundamental law. It is also
because any other approach would run the risk of setting at naught this basic aspiration
to do away with all remnants of a feudalistic order at war with the promise and the hope
associated with an open society. To deprive petitioners of the small landholdings in the
face of a presidential decree considered ratified by the new Constitution and precisely in
accordance with its avowed objective could indeed be contributory to perpetuating the
misery that tenancy had spawned in the past as well as the grave social problems
thereby created. There can be no justification for any other decision then whether
predicated on a juridical norm or on the traditional role assigned to the judiciary of
implementing and not thwarting fundamental policy goals.

Page 309 of 370

Liberal Party v. Commission on Elections

FACTS:
OnJuly 14, 2009, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 8646 settingAugust 17,
2009as the last day for the filing of petitions for registration of political parties.On
January 21, 2010, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 8752, providing, among
others, for the rules for the filing of petitions for accreditation for the determination of the
dominant majority party, the dominant minority party, ten major national parties, and two
major local parties for the May 10, 2010 elections.Resolution No. 8752 also set
thedeadline for filing of petitions for accreditation onFebruary 12, 2010and required that
accreditation applicants be registered political parties, organizations or coalitions.

OnFebruary 12, 2010, the LP filed with the COMELEC its petition for accreditation as
dominant minority party.On the same date, the Nacionalista Party (NP) and the
Nationalist Peoples Coalition (NPC) filed a petition for registration as a coalition (NP-
NPC) and asked that it be recognized and accredited as the dominant minority party for
purposes of theMay 10, 2010elections. It was docketed as an SPP (DM) case, indicating
pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 8752 that it was an accreditation case.

In support of its petition, the petitioner attached the Sworn Affidavits of two prominent
members of the NPC, namely: Atty. Sixto S. Brillantes (the current NPC Legal Counsel)
and Daniel Laogan (a member of the NPCs National Central Committee) to show that the
NP-NPC was entered into without consultations; much less, the approval of the NPCs
National Convention which was not even convened.

ISSUES:
Is the NP-NPC an operative fact that the COMELEC simply has to note and recognize
without need of registration?
Ruling:
The respondents next argue that the petitions cited grounds are mere errors of law and
do not constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.This objection can be read as afacial objectionto the petition or
asasubstantiveone that goes into the merits of the petition.We will discuss under the
present topic the facial objection, as it is a threshold issue that determines whether we
shall proceed to consider the case or simply dismiss the petition outright.
A facial objection is meritorious if,expressly and on the face of the petition, what is
evident as cited grounds are erroneous applications of the law rather than grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.After due consideration, we
conclude that the petition passes the facial objection test.

Page 310 of 370

Maquiling v. Commission on Elections

Facts:
On 31 December 2003, Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ), filed
his certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines under
the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the 2004 national elections. In his
certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines,
stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August
1939 and his place of birth to be Manila. Victorino X. Fornier, (GR 161824) initiated, on 9
January 2004, a petition (SPA 04-003) before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to
disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis
that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a
natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his
mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national,
being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, Fornier asseverated, that Allan F.
Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter
being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Fornier based the allegation of the illegitimate birth
of FPJ on two assertions: (1) Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita
Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, (2) even if no such prior marriage had existed,
Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of FPJ. On 23 January 2004, the
COMELEC dismissed SPA 04-003 for lack of merit. 3 days later, or on 26 January 2004, Fornier
filed his motion for reconsideration. The motion was denied on 6 February 2004 by the
COMELEC en banc. On 10 February 2004, Fornier assailed the decision of the COMELEC
before the Supreme Court conformably with Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition likewise prayed for a temporary restraining order, a writ of
preliminary injunction or any other resolution that would stay the finality and/or execution of the
COMELEC resolutions. The other petitions, later consolidated with GR 161824, would include
GR 161434 and GR 161634, both challenging the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and asserting
that, under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Court
had original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the case.
Issue:
Whether FPJ was a natural born citizen, so as to be allowed to run for the offcie of the President
of the Philippines.
Held:
Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses that "No person may be elected
President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read
and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines
for at least ten years immediately preceding such election." The term "natural-born citizens," is
defined to include "those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform
any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship." Herein, the date, month and year of
birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August 1939 during the regime of the 1935 Constitution.
Through its history, four modes of acquiring citizenship - naturalization, jus soli, res judicata and
jus sanguinis – had been in vogue. Only two, i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a
person to being a “natural-born” citizen of the Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs. Collector of
Customs (1912), did not last long. With the adoption of the 1935 Constitution and the reversal of
Roa in Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor (1947), jus sanguinis or blood relationship would now
become the primary basis of citizenship by birth. Considering the reservations made by the
parties on the veracity of some of the entries on the birth certificate of FPJ and the marriage
certificate of his parents, the only conclusions that could be drawn with some degree of certainty
from the documents would be that (1) The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley;
(2) FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939; (3) Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married

Page 311 of 370

to each other on 16 September, 1940; (4) The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and (5)
At the time of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old. The marriage
certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, the birth certificate of FPJ, and the death certificate
of Lorenzo Pou are documents of public record in the custody of a public officer. The documents
have been submitted in evidence by both contending parties during the proceedings before the
COMELEC. But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that FPJ is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor
enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his
certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus
Election Code. Fornier has utterly failed to substantiate his case before the Court,
notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties to present their position and
evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been material misrepresentation, which, as so
ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC, must not only be material, but also deliberate and
willful. The petitions were dismissed.

Page 312 of 370

Violago v. Commission on Elections

Facts:
Javier and Pacificador, a member of the KBL under Marcos,were rivals to be members of
the Batasan in May 1984 in Antique. During election, Javier complained of“massive
terrorism, intimidation, duress, vote-buying, fraud, tampering and falsification of election
returns under duress, threat and intimidation, snatching of ballot boxes perpetrated by
the armed men of Pacificador.” COMELEC just referred the complaints to the AFP. On the
same complaint, the 2nd Division of the Commission on Elections directed the provincial
board of canvassers of Antique to proceed with the canvass but to suspend the
proclamation of the winning candidate until further orders. On June 7, 1984, the same
2nd Division ordered the board to immediately convene and to proclaim the winner
without prejudice to the outcome of the case before the Commission. On certiorari before
the SC, the proclamation made by the board of canvassers was set aside as premature,
having been made before the lapse of the 5-day period of appeal, which the Javier had
seasonably made. Javier pointed out that the irregularities of the election must first be
resolved before proclaiming a winner. Further, Opinion, one of the Commissioners
should inhibit himself as he was a former law partner of Pacificador. Also, the
proclamation was made by only the 2ndDivision but the Constitute requires that it be
proclaimed by the COMELEC en banc. In Feb 1986, during pendency, Javier was gunned
down. The Solicitor General then moved to have the petition close it being moot and
academic by virtue of Javier’s death.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there had been due process in the proclamation of Pacificador.

HELD:
The SC ruled in favor of Javier and has overruled the Sol-Gen. The SC has repeatedly
and consistently demanded “the cold neutrality of an impartial judge” as the
indispensable imperative of due process. To bolster that requirement, we have held that
the judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added
assurance to the parties that his decision will be just.The litigants are entitled to no less
than that. They should be sure that when their rights are violated they can go to a judge
who shall give them justice. They must trust the judge, otherwise they will not go to him
at all. They must believe in his sense of fairness, otherwise they will not seek his
judgment. Without such confidence, there would be no point in invoking his action for
the justice they expect.

Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance with what
Justice Frankfurter calls the rudiments of fair play. Fair play calls for equal justice. There
cannot be equal justice where a suitor approaches a court already committed to the other
party and with a judgment already made and waiting only to be formalized after the
litigants shall have undergone the charade of a formal hearing. Judicial (and also
extrajudicial) proceedings are not orchestrated plays in which the parties are supposed
to make the motions and reach the denouement according to a prepared script. There is
no writer to foreordain the ending. The judge will reach his conclusions only after all the
evidence is in and all the arguments are filed, on the basis of the established facts and
the pertinent law.

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Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. B.F. Goodrich Phils. Inc.

Facts:
The facts are undisputed.4Private Respondent BF Goodrich Phils., Inc. (now Sime Darby
International Tire Co. Inc.), was an American-owned and controlled corporation previous to July
3, 1974. As a condition for approving the manufacture by private respondent of tires and other
rubber products, the Central Bank of the Philippines required that it should develop a rubber
plantation. In compliance with this requirement, private respondent purchased from the
Philippine government in 1961, under the Public Land Act and the Parity Amendment to the
1935 Constitution, certain parcels of land located in Tumajubong, Basilan, and there developed
a rubber plantation.

More than a decade later, on August 2, 1973, the justice secretary rendered an opinion stating
that, upon the expiration of the Parity Amendment on July 3, 1974, the ownership rights of
Americans over public agricultural lands, including the right to dispose or sell their real estate,
would be lost. On the basis of this Opinion, private respondent sold to Siltown Realty
Philippines, Inc. on January 21, 1974, its Basilan landholding forP500,000 payable in
installments. In accord with the terms of the sale, Siltown Realty Philippines, Inc. leased the said
parcels of land to private respondent for a period of 25 years, with an extension of another 25
years at the latters option.

Based on the BIRs Letter of Authority No. 10115 dated April 14, 1975, the books and accounts
of private respondent were examined for the purpose of determining its tax liability for taxable
year 1974. The examination resulted in the April 23, 1975 assessment of private respondent for
deficiency income tax in the amount ofP6,005.35, which it duly paid.

Subsequently the BIR also issued Letters of Authority Nos. 074420 RR and 074421 RR and
Memorandum Authority Reference No. 749157 for the purpose of examining Siltowns business,
income and tax liabilities. On the basis of this examination, the BIR commissioner issued
against private respondent on October 10, 1980, an assessment for deficiency in donors tax in
the amount ofP1,020,850, in relation to the previously mentioned sale of its Basilan
landholdings to Siltown. Apparently, the BIR deemed the consideration for the sale insufficient,
and the difference between the fair market value and the actual purchase price a taxable
donation.In a letter dated November 24, 1980, private respondent contested this assessment.
On April 9, 1981, it received another assessment dated March 16, 1981, which increased
toP1,092,949 the amount demanded for the alleged deficiency donors tax, surcharge, interest
and compromise penalty.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioners right to assess herein deficiency donors tax has indeed prescribed as
ruled by public respondent Court of Appeals

Ruling:
The petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the CTA on the issue of
prescription, because its ruling was based on factual findings that should have been left
undisturbed on appeal, in the absence of any showing that it had been tainted with gross error
or grave abuse of discretion.8The Court is not persuaded True, the factual findings of the CTA
are generally not disturbed on appeal when supported by substantial evidence and in the
absence of gross error or grave abuse of discretion. However, the CTAs application of the law
to the facts of this controversy is an altogether different matter, for it involves a legal question.
There is a question of law when the issue is the application of the law to a given set of facts. On

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the other hand, a question of fact involves the truth or falsehood of alleged facts.9In the present
case, the Court of Appeals ruled not on the truth or falsity of the facts found by the CTA, but on
the latters application of the law on prescription.
Amora Jr. v. Commission on Elections

FACTS:
In May 2007 Romeo M. Jalosjos, Jr., petitioner in G.R. 192474, ran for Mayor of Tampilisan,
Zamboanga del Norte, and won.While serving as Tampilisan Mayor, he bought a residential
house and lot inBarangayVeteransVillage, Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay and renovated and
furnished the same.In September 2008 he began occupying the house. After eight months or on
May 6, 2009 Jalosjos applied with the Election Registration Board (ERB) of Ipil, Zamboanga
Sibugay, for the transfer of his voters registration record to Precinct 0051F
ofBarangayVeteransVillage.Dan Erasmo, Sr., respondent in G.R. 192474, opposed the
application.After due proceedings, the ERB approved Jalosjos application and denied Erasmos
opposition. Undeterred, Erasmo filed a petition to exclude Jalosjos from the list of registered
voter. After hearing, the MCTC rendered judgment excluding Jalosjos from the list of registered
voters in question.The MCTC found that Jalosjos did not abandon his domicile in Tampilisan
since he continued even then to serve as its Mayor.Jalosjos appealed his case to the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Pagadian City which affirmed the MCTC Decision on September 11, 2009.
Jalosjos elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals (CA) through a petition for certiorari with an
application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction which was granted. On November
26, 2009 the CA granted his application and enjoined the courts below from enforcing their
decisions, with the result that his name was reinstated in the Barangay Veterans Village voters
list pending the resolution of the petition. On November 28, 2009 Jalosjos filed his Certificate of
Candidacy (COC) for the position of Representative of the Second District of Zamboanga
Sibugay for the May 10, 2010 National Elections.This prompted Erasmo to file a petition to deny
due course to or cancel his COC before the COMELEC,claiming that Jalosjos made material
misrepresentations in that COC when he indicated in it that he resided in Ipil, Zamboanga
Sibugay.But the Second Division of the COMELEC issued a joint resolution, dismissing
Erasmos petitions for insufficiency in form and substance. While Erasmos motion for
reconsideration was pending before the COMELEC En Banc, the May 10, 2010 elections took
place, resulting in Jalosjos winning the elections for Representative of the Second District of
Zamboanga Sibugay.He was proclaimed winner on May 13, 2010.

Meantime, the CA rendered judgment in the voters exclusion case before it,holding that the
lower courts erred in excluding Jalosjos from the voters list of Barangay Veterans Village in Ipil
since he was qualified under the Constitution and Republic Act 8189 to vote in that
place.Erasmo filed a petition for review of the CA decision before this Court in G.R. 193566.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction at this time to pass upon the
question of Jalosjos residency qualification for running for the position of Representative of the
Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay considering that he has been proclaimed winner in the
election and has assumed the discharge of that office.

HELD:
POLITICAL LAW: power and jurisdiction of the COMELEC

While the Constitution vests in the COMELEC the power todecide all questions affecting
elections, such power is not without limitation.It does not extend to contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives and the
Senate.The Constitution vests the resolution of these contests solely upon the appropriate
Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the House of Representatives.

The Court has already settled the question of when the jurisdiction of the COMELEC ends and

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when that of the HRET begins.The Proclamation of a congressional candidate following the
election divests COMELEC of jurisdiction over disputes relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the proclaimed Representative in favor of the HRET.
Hebron v. Reyes

FACTS : The Philippine Tourism Authority filed four (4) Complaints with the Court of First
Instance of Cebu City for the expropriation of some 282 hectares of rolling land situated in
barangays Malubog and Babag, Cebu City, under PTA's express authority "to acquire by
purchase, by negotiation or by condemnation proceedings any private land within and without
the tourist zones" for the purposes indicated in Section 5, paragraph B(2), of its Revised Charter
(PD 564), more specifically, for the development into integrated resort complexes of selected
and well-defined geographic areas with potential tourism value The defendants in Civil Cases
Nos. R-20701 and R-21608 filed their respective Opposition with Motion to Dismiss and/or
Reconsideration. The defendants in Civil Case No. R-19562 filed a manifestation adopting the
answer of defendants in Civil Case No. R-19864.
In their motions to dismiss, the petitioners alleged, in addition to the issue of public use, that
there is no specific constitutional provision authorizing the taking of private property for tourism
purposes; that assuming that PTA has such power, the intended use cannot be paramount to
the determination of the land as a land reform area; that limiting the amount of compensation by
Legislative fiat is constitutionally repugnant; and that since the land is under the land reform
program, it is the Court of Agrarian Relations and not the Court of First Instance that has
jurisdiction over the expropriation cases. The Philippine Tourism Authority having deposited with
The Philippine National Bank, Cebu City Branch, an amount equivalent to 10% of the value of
the properties pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1533. the lower court issued separate orders
authorizing PTA to take immediate possession of the premises and directing the issuance of
writs of possession.

On May 25, 1982, petitioners filed this petition questioning the orders of the respondent Judge

ISSUE :
WON The Expropriation for Tourism Purposes of Lands Covered by the Land Reform Program
Violates the Constitution

HELD :
There are three provisions of the Constitution which directly provide for the exercise of the
power of eminent domain. Section 2, Article IV states that private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation. Section 6, Article XIV allows the State, in the interest of
national welfare or defense and upon payment of just compensation to transfer to public
ownership, utilities and other private enterprises to be operated by the government. Section 13,
Article XIV states that the Batasang Pambansa may authorize upon payment of just
compensation the expropriation of private lands to be subdivided into small lots and conveyed at
cost to deserving citizens. While not directly mentioning the expropriation of private properties
upon payment of just compensation, the provisions on social justice and agrarian reforms which
allow the exercise of police power together with the power of eminent domain in the
implementation of constitutional objectives are even more far-reaching insofar as taking of
private property is concerned There can be no doubt that expropriation for such traditions'
purposes as the construction of roads, bridges, ports, waterworks, schools, electric and
telecommunications systems, hydroelectric power plants, markets and slaughterhouses, parks,
hospitals, government office buildings, and flood control or irrigation systems is valid. However,
the concept of public use is not limited to traditional purposes. Here as elsewhere the Idea that
"public use" is strictly limited to clear cases of "use by the public" has been discarded. As long
as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play. As
just noted, the constitution in at least two cases, to remove any doubt, determines what is public
use. One is the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots for resale at cost to

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individuals. The other is in the transfer, through the exercise of this power, of utilities and other
private enterprise to the government. It is accurate to state then that at present whatever may
be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Miguel Corporation

FACTS:
When SMC's October 19, 1999 letter requested the registration and authority to manufacture
"San Mig Light," to be taxed at ₱12.15 per liter, the BIR granted the request, thus confirming
SMC can register, manufacture, and sell "San Mig Light" as a new brand. The CIR argues that
"San Mig Light," launched in November 1999, is not a new brand but merely a low-calorie
variant of "San Miguel Pale Pilsen." Thus, the application of the higher excise tax rate for variant
products is appropriate (₱19.91 per liter instead of ₱9.15 per liter) and SMC should not be
entitled to a refund or issuance of a tax credit certificate. The CTA sided with SMC; hence, this
petition by the CIR with the SC.

ISSUES:
[1] Can the BIR validly reclassify brands?
[2]Is "San Mig Light" is a new brand and not a variant of "San Miguel Pale Pilsen"?
[3] Is it not that estoppel does not apply to the government in case of collection of taxes?
[4]Is SMC entitled to a refund of excess payment of excise taxes on "San Mig Light"?

HELD:
[1] No, any reclassification of fermented liquor products should be by act of Congress. (Section
143 of the Tax Code)
The CIR's letters and Notices of Discrepancy, which effectively changed San Mig Light's brand's
classification from "new brand to variant of existing brand," necessarily changes San Mig Light's
tax bracket. Based on the legislative intent behind the classification freeze provision, petitioner
has no power to do this. A reclassification of a fermented liquor brand introduced between
January 1, 1997 and December 31, 2003, such as "San Mig Light," must be by act of Congress.
There was none in this case.

[2] A new brand still because the BIR has no power to reclassify.

Also, a 'variant of a brand' shall refer to a brand on which a modifier is prefixed and/or suffixed
to the root name of the brand. The word "Light" cannot he considered as a mere suffix to the
word "San Miguel," hut it is part and parcel of an entirely new brand name, "San Mig Light."

Though the "escudo" logo appears on both "Pale Pilsen" bottle and "San Mig Light" bottle and
can, the same cannot be considered as an indication that "San Mig Light" is merely a variant of
the brand "Pale Pilsen", since the said "escudo" insignia is the corporate logo of petitioner. It
merely identifies the products, as having been manufactured by petitioner, but does not form
part of its brand. In fact, it appears not only in petitioner's beer products, but even in its non-beer
products.

[3]While estoppel generally does not apply against government, especially when the case
involves the collection of taxes, an exception can be made when the application of the rule will
cause injustice against an innocent party.136 Respondent had already acquired a vested right
on the tax classification of its San Mig Light as a new brand. To allow petitioner to change its
position will result in deficiency assessments in substantial amounts against respondent to the
latter's prejudice. The authority of the Bureau of Internal Revenue to overrule, correct, or
reverse the mistakes or errors of its agents is conceded. However, this authority must be
exercised reasonably.

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[4] Yes, SMC is entitled to tax refund or tax credit certification.The Tax Code includes remedies
for erroneous collection and overpayment of taxes. Under Sections 229 and 204(C) of the Tax
Code, a taxpayer may seek recovery of erroneously paid taxes within two (2) years from date of
payment.
Philacor Credit Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

Facts:
Philacor is a domestic corporation organized under Philippine laws and is engaged in the
business of retail financing. Through retail financing, a prospective buyer of a home
appliance with neither cash nor any credit card may purchase appliances on installment
basis from an appliance dealer. After Philacor conducts a credit investigation and
approves the buyers application, the buyer executes a unilateral promissory note in favor
of the appliance dealer. The same promissory note is subsequently assigned by the
appliance dealer to Philacor.4?r?l1

Pursuant to Letter of Authority No. 17107 dated July 6, 1974, Revenue Officer Celestino
Mejia examined Philacors books of accounts and other accounting records for the fiscal
year August 1, 1992 to July 31, 1993. Philacor received tentative computations of
deficiency taxes for this year. Philacors Finance Manager, Leticia Pangan, contested the
tentative computations of deficiency taxes (totaling P20,037,013.83) through a letter
dated April 17, 1995.

Issue:
The Cta En Banc Decision Extended The Words "Assignment" And "Transferring" In
Section 173 To The Promissory Notes; Such That, The "Assignment" Or "Transferring"
Of Promissory Notes Is Subject To Dst. However Sections 176, 178, And 198 Of Title Vii
Of The Tax Code Expressly Imposes [Sic] Dst On The Transfer/Assignment Of Certain
Documents Which Reveals The Legislative Intent That Only The Assignment/Transfer Of
Certain Documents In Sections 176, 178, And 198 Are Subject To Dst

Ruling:
Philacor, as an assignee or transferee of the promissory notes, is not liable for the
assignment or transfer of promissory notes as this transaction is not taxed under the
law.

The CIR argues that the DST is levied on the exercise of privileges through the execution
of specific instruments, or the privilege to enter into a transaction. Therefore, the DST
should be imposed on every exercise of the privilege to enter into a transaction.34There is
nothing in Section 180 of the 1986 Tax Code that supports this argument; the argument
is even contradicted by the way the provisions on DST were drafted.

As Philacor correctly points out, there are provisions in the 1997 NIRC that specifically
impose the DST on the transfer and/or assignment of documents evidencing particular
transactions.Section 176imposes a DST on thetransferof due bills, certificates of
obligation, or shares or certificates of stock in a corporation, apart fromSection 175which
imposes the DST on the issuance of shares of stock in a corporation.Section 178imposes
the DST on certificates of profits, or any certificate or memorandum showing interest in a
property or accumulations of any corporation, and on alltransfersof such certificate or
memoranda.Section 198imposes the DST on theassignment or transferof any mortgage,
lease or policy of insurance, apart fromSections 183, 184, 185, 194 and 195which impose
it on the issuances of mortgages, leases and policies of insurance. Indeed, the law has
set a pattern of expressly providing for the imposition of DST on the transfer and/or
assignment of documents evidencing certain transactions. Thus, we can safely conclude

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that where the law did not specify that such transfer and/or assignment is to be taxed,
there would be no basis to recognize an imposition.

Philex Mining Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

Facts:
The CTA EBs narration of the pertinent facts is as follows:
[CIR] is the duly appointed Commissioner of Internal Revenue, empowered, among others, to
act upon and approve claims for refund or tax credit, with office at the Bureau of Internal
Revenue ("BIR") National Office Building, Diliman, Quezon City. [San Roque] is a domestic
corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippines with
principal office at Barangay San Roque, San Manuel, Pangasinan. It was incorporated in
October 1997 to design, construct, erect, assemble, own, commission and operate power-
generating plants and related facilities pursuant to and under contract with the Government of
the Republic of the Philippines, or any subdivision, instrumentality or agency thereof, or any
governmentowned or controlled corporation, or other entity engaged in the development,
supply, or distribution of energy. As a seller of services, [San Roque] is duly registered with the
BIR with TIN/VAT No. 005-017-501. It is likewise registered with the Board of Investments
("BOI") on a preferred pioneer status, to engage in the design, construction, erection, assembly,
as well as to own, commission, and operate electric power-generating plants and related
activities, for which it was issued Certificate of Registration No. 97-356 on February 11, 1998.
On October 11, 1997, [San Roque] entered into a Power Purchase Agreement ("PPA") with the
National Power Corporation ("NPC") to develop hydro-potential of the Lower Agno River and
generate additional power and energy for the Luzon Power Grid, by building the San Roque
Multi-Purpose Project located in San Manuel, Pangasinan. During the cooperation period of
twenty-five (25) years commencing from the completion date of the Power Station, NPC will
take and pay for all electricity available from the Power Station. On the construction and
development of the San Roque Multi- Purpose Project which comprises of the dam, spillway
and power plant, [San Roque] allegedly incurred, excess input VAT in the amount of ?
559,709,337.54 for taxable year 2001 which it declared in its Quarterly VAT Returns filed for the
same year. [San Roque] duly filed with the BIR separate claims for refund, in the total amount of
?559,709,337.54, representing unutilized input taxes as declared in its VAT returns for taxable
year 2001. However, on March 28, 2003, [San Roque] filed amended Quarterly VAT Returns for
the year 2001 since it increased its unutilized input VAT to the amount of ?560,200,283.14.
Consequently, [San Roque] filed with the BIR on even date, separate amended claims for
refund in the aggregate amount of ?560,200,283.14.
Issue:
The Court of Appeals erred in construing that the advances made by Philex in the management
of the Sto. Nino Mine pursuant to the Power of Attorney partook of the nature of an investment
rather than a loan.
Ruling:
The lower courts correctly held that the "Power of Attorney" is the instrument that is material in
determining the true nature of the business relationship between petitioner and Baguio Gold.
Before resort may be had to the two compromise agreements, the parties’ contractual intent
must first be discovered from the expressed language of the primary contract under which the
parties’ business relations were founded. It should be noted that the compromise agreements
were mere collateral documents executed by the parties pursuant to the termination of their
business relationship created under the "Power of Attorney". On the other hand, it is the latter
which established the juridical relation of the parties and defined the parameters of their
dealings with one another. The execution of the two compromise agreements can hardly be
considered as a subsequent or contemporaneous act that is reflective of the parties’ true intent.
The compromise agreements were executed eleven years after the "Power of Attorney" and
merely laid out a plan or procedure by which petitioner could recover the advances and

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payments it made under the "Power of Attorney". The parties entered into the compromise
agreements as a consequence of the dissolution of their business relationship. It did not define
that relationship or indicate its real character.

Davao Gulf Lumber Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

FACTS:
Davao Gulf Lumber Corporation, a licensed forest concessionaire possessing a Timber
License Agreement granted by the Ministry of Natural Resources (Now DENR),
purchased from various oil companies refined and manufactured oils as well as motor
and diesel fuels for its exploitation and operation.

Selling companies paid and passed the specific taxes imposed under Sec. 153 and 156 of
the 1997 NIRC to petitioner as purchaser who in turn filed beforeCIRaClaim for Refundfor
P120, 825 representing 25% of the specific taxes actually paid based on Insular Lumber
Co. v. CTA and Sec. 5 of RA 1435 and complied with its procedure.

Then, petitioner filed beforeCAaPetition for Review: Favored petitioner to a partial refund
P2,923 (excluding those that have prescribed) and based on the rates deemed paid under
RA 1435 (NOT higher rates actually paid under the NIRC)

Insisting that the basis be the higher rate, petitioner elevated the case to theCTAwho
affirmed the CA's decision

ISSUE:
W/N the basis should be the higher rates prescribed by Sec. 153 and 156 of the 1997
NIRC

HELD:
NO. A tax cannot be imposed unless it is supported by the clear and express language of
a statute; On the other hand, once the tax is unquestionably imposed, a claim of
exemption from tax payments must be clearly shown and based on language in the law
too plain to be mistaken. Section 5, RA 1435 as a tax exemption, must be
construedstrictissimi jurisagainst the grantee.

Supported by CIR v. CA and Atlas Co., CIR v. Rio Tuba Nickel Mining Corp. and Insular
Lumber Co. - all cases where purchases was made BEFORE 1997 NIRC is in effect.
According to an eminent authority on taxation, there is no tax exemption solely on the
ground of equity

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Province of Tarlac v. Alcantara

Facts:
The present petition for review oncertiorariquestions the August 12, 1983 decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Tarlac, Branch LXIII dismissing the complaint filed by the
Province of Tarlac against Tarlac Enterprises, Inc. for collection of real property tax, and
the order of September 28, 1983 denying the motion for the reconsideration of said
decision. Hence, petitioner prayed that private respondent be ordered to pay the sum of
P532,435.55 representing the accrued real estate taxes, as well as damages and the costs
of the suit. On March 2, 1983, the private respondent filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint which was opposed by the petitioner. In its order of March 30, 1983, 2 the
lower court denied the motion. A motion for the reconsideration of the said order was
subsequently filed by the private respondent but it was likewise denied by the lower
court. hereafter, the petitioner set the auction sale of the private respondent’s properties
to satisfy the real estate taxes due. This prompted the private respondent to file a motion
praying that petitioner be directed to desist from proceeding with the public auction sale.
4 On April 15, 1983, the lower court issued an order granting said motion to prevent
mootness of the case considering that the properties to be sold were the, subjects of the
complaint. 5

Consequently, the private respondent filed its answer 6 admitting that demands for the
payment of, real property taxes had been made by the petitioner but it refused to pay the
same for the reason that under Sec. 40, paragraph (g) of Presidential Decree No. 464 in
relation to P.D. No. 551, as amended, it was exempt from paying said tax. It also raised as
affirmative defenses that the complaint stated no cause of action and that the claims had
been waived, abandoned or otherwise extinguished or barred by the statute of
limitations.chanrobles law library : red

On August 12, 1983, the lower court rendered the decision dismissing the complaint. It
ruled that P.D. No. 551 expressly exempts private respondent from paying the real
property taxes demanded, it being a grantee of a franchise to generate, distribute and
sell electric current for light. The court held that in lieu of said taxes, private respondent
had been required to pay two percent (2%) franchise tax in line with the intent of the law
to give assistance to operators such as the private respondent to enable the consumers
to enjoy cheaper rates. Citing the case of Butuan Sawmill, Inc. v. City of Butuan, 7 the
court ruled that local-governments are without power to tax the electric companies
already subject to franchise tax unless their franchise allows the imposition of additional
tax.

Issue:
Petitioner contends that respondent- judge erred in: (a) holding that private respondent
is exempt from the payment of realty tax under P.D. No. 551, as amended; (b) ruling,
under the authority of Butuan Sawmill, Inc. v. Butuan City, that it is without power to
impose said realty tax on private respondent, and (c) dismissing the complaint and
denying its motion for the reconsideration of its decision.

Ruling:
It has always been the rule that "exemptions from taxation are construed in strictissimi
juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority" primarily because

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"taxes are the lifeblood of government and their prompt and certain availability is an
imperious need." Thus, to be exempted from payment of taxes, it is the taxpayer’s duty to
justify the exemption "by words too plain to be mistaken and too categorical to be
misinterpreted." Private respondent has utterly failed to discharge this duty.

Philippine Petroleum Corporation v. Municipality of Pililia Rizal

Facts:
Petitioner, Philippine Petroleum Corporation (PPC for short) is a business enterprise engaged in
the manufacture of lubricated oil basestock which is a petroleum product, with its refinery plant
situated at Malaya, Pililla, Rizal, conducting its business activities within the territorial jurisdiction
of the Municipality of Pililla, Rizal and is in continuous operation up to the present PPC owns
and maintains an oil refinery including forty-nine storage tanks for its petroleum products in
Malaya, Pililla, Rizal Under Section 142 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1939,
manufactured oils and other fuels are subject to specific tax. On June 28, 1973, Presidential
Decree No. 231, otherwise known as the Local Tax Code was issued by former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos governing the exercise by provinces, cities, municipalities and barrios of
their taxing and other revenue-raising powers. Sections 19 and 19 (a) thereof, provide among
others, thatthe municipality may impose taxes on business, except on those for which fixed
taxes are provided onmanufacturers, importers or producers of any article of commerce of
whatever kind or nature, including brewers, distillers, rectifiers, repackers, and compounders of
liquors, distilled spirits and/or wines in accordance with the schedule listed therein. The
Secretary of Finance issued Provincial Circular No. 26-73 dated December 27, 1973, directed to
all provincial, city and municipal treasurers to refrain from collecting any local tax imposed in old
or new tax ordinances in the business of manufacturing, wholesaling, retailing, or dealing in
petroleum products subject to the specific tax under the National Internal Revenue Code
Likewise, Provincial Circular No. 26 A-73 dated January 9, 1973 was issued by the Secretary of
Finance instructing all City Treasurers to refrain from collecting any local tax imposed in tax
ordinances enacted before or after the effectivity of the Local Tax Code on July 1, 1973, on the
businesses of manufacturing,wholesaling, retailing, or dealing in, petroleum products subject to
the specific tax under the National Internal Revenue Code Respondent Municipality of Pililla,
Rizal, through Municipal Council Resolution No. 25, S-1974 enacted Municipal Tax Ordinance
No. 1, S-1974 otherwise known as "The Pililla Tax Code of 1974" on June 14, 1974, which took
effect on July 1, 1974.
Issue:
The Rtc Erred In Failing To Hold That Respondents Computation Of Tax Liability Has
Absolutely No Basis;
Ruling:
As to the authority of the mayor to waive payment of the mayor's permit and sanitary inspection
fees, the trial court did not err in holding that "since the power to tax includes the power to
exempt thereof which is essentially a legislative prerogative, it follows that a municipal mayor
who is an executive officer may not unilaterally withdraw such an expression of a policy thru the
enactment of a tax." The waiver partakes of the nature of an exemption. It is an ancient rule that
exemptions from taxation are construedin strictissimi jurisagainst the taxpayer and liberally in
favor of the taxing authority (Esso Standard Eastern, Inc. v. Acting Commissioner of Customs,
18 SCRA 488 [1966]). Tax exemptions are looked upon with disfavor (Western Minolco Corp. v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 124 SCRA 121 [1983]). Thus, in the absence of a clear and
express exemption from the payment of said fees, the waiver cannot be recognized. As already
stated, it is the law-making body, and not an executive like the mayor, who can make an
exemption. Under Section 36 of the Code, a permit fee like the mayor's permit, shall be required
before any individual or juridical entity shall engage in any business or occupation under the
provisions of the Code.

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However, since the Local Tax Code does not provide the prescriptive period for collection of
local taxes, Article 1143 of the Civil Code applies. Said law provides that an action upon an
obligation created by law prescribes within ten (10) years from the time the right of action
accrues. The Municipality of Pililla can therefore enforce the collection of the tax on business of
petitioner PPC due from 1976 to 1986, and NOT the tax that had accrued prior to 1976.

Planters Association of Southern Negros Inc. v. Ponferrada

Facts:
Prior to the passage of Republic Act No. 6982, entitled An Act Strengthening the Sugar
Amelioration Program in the Sugar Industry, Providing the Mechanics for its
Implementation, and for other Purposes, there were two principal laws providing
additional financial benefits to sugar farm workers, namely: Republic Act No. 809 and
Presidential Decree No. 621.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

Republic Act No. 809 5 (implementable in milling districts with an annual gross
production of 150,000 piculs or more), institutionalized production sharing scheme, in
the absence of any private agreement between the planters and farm workers, depending
on the mill’s total production for each immediately preceding crop year; and specifically
providing that any increase in the planters’ share shall be divided in the following
manner: 40% of the increase shall accrue to the planter and 60% to the farm workers. 6

On the other hand, Presidential Decree No. 621, 7 as amended, charged a lien of P2.00
per picul on all sugar produced, to be pooled into a fund for subsequent distribution as
bonuses to sugar workers. 8

On May 24, 1991, Republic Act No. 6982 took effect. It imposed a lien of P5.00 per picul
on the gross production of sugar beginning sugar crop year 1991-1992, with an
automatic additional lien of P1.00 for every two (2) years for the succeeding ten (10)
years from the effectivity of the Act subject to the discretion of the Secretary of Labor
and Employment and upon recommendation of the Sugar Tripartite Council.

Issue:
That the benefits under RA 6982 do not and cannot supersede or substitute the benefits
under RA 809 in milling districts where the latter law was already in implementation at
the time of the effectivity of RA 6982

Ruling:
It is a well-settled rule of legal hermeneutics that each provision of law should be
construed in connection with every other part so as to produce a harmonious whole and
every meaning to be given to each word or phrase is ascertained from the context of the
body of the statute. 19 Ut magis valeat quam pereat. 20 Consequently, laws are given a
reasonable construction such that apparently conflicting provisions are allowed to stand
and given effect by reconciling them, reference being had to the moving spirit behind the
enactment of the statute. 21

Applying the abovestated doctrine, Section 12 therefore, which apparently mandates a

total substitution by R. A. No. 6982 of all the benefits under R.A. No. 809 and P.D. No. 621
existing at the time of the effectivity of R.A. No. 6982, can not be construed apart from
Section 14 which prohibits such substitution if the effect thereof would be to reduce any
benefit, interest, right or participation enjoyed by the worker at the time R.A. No. 6982
took effect. The Court finds as untenable the interpretation of the petitioner based an
unqualified substitution of the benefits under R.A. No. 809 and P.D. No. 621 by the
monetary rewards conferred by R.A. No. 6982 in the amount of P5,583,145.61 as against

Page 323 of 370

the P36,173,232.53 previously enjoyed by the sugar farm workers under the former
laws.chanrobles law library

Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation v. Bureau of Internal Revenue

Facts:
[PAGCOR] claims that it is a duly organized government-owned and controlled corporation
existing under and by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 1869, as amended, with business
address at the 6thFloor, Hyatt Hotel and Casino, Pedro Gil corner M.H. Del Pilar Streets, Malate,
Manila. It was created to regulate, establish and operate clubs and casinos for amusement and
recreation, including sports gaming pools, and such other forms of amusement and recreation.
Respondent [CIR], on the other hand, is the Head of the [BIR] with authority, among others, to
resolve protests on assessments issued by her office or her authorized representatives. She
holds office at the BIR National Office Building, Agham Road, Diliman, Quezon City. [PAGCOR]
provides a car plan program to its qualified officers under which sixty percent (60%) of the car
plan availment is shouldered by PAGCOR and the remaining forty percent (40%) for the
account of the officer, payable in five (5) years. On October 10, 2007, [PAGCOR] received a
Post Reporting Notice dated September 28, 2007 from BIR Regional Director Alfredo Misajon
[RD Misajon] of Revenue Region 6, Revenue District No. 33, for an informal conference to
discuss the result of its investigation on [PAGCOR's] internal revenue taxes in 2004. The Post
Reporting Notice shows that [PAGCOR] has deficiencies on Value Added Tax (VAT),
Withholding Tax on VAT (WTV), Expanded Withholding Tax (EWT), and Fringe Benefits Tax
(FBT). Subsequently, the BIR abandoned the claim for deficiency assessments on VAT, WTV
and EWT in the Letter to [PAGCOR] dated November 23, 2007 in view of the principles laid
down inCommissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Acesite Hotel Corporation[G.R. No. 147295]
exempting [PAGCOR] and its contractors from VAT. However, the assessment on deficiency
FBT subsists and remains due to date. On January 17, 2008, [PAGCOR] received a Final
Assessment Notice [FAN] dated January 14, 2008, with demand for payment of deficiency FBT
for taxable year 2004 in the amount of P48,589,507.65. On January 24, 2008, [PAGCOR] filed a
protest to the FAN addressed to [RD Misajon] of Revenue Region No. 6 of the BIR. On August
14, 2008, [PAGCOR] elevated its protest to respondent CIR in a Letter dated August 13, 2008,
there being no action taken thereon as of that date.

In a Letter dated September 23, 2008 received on September 25, 2008, [PAGCOR] was
informed that the Legal Division of Revenue Region No. 6 sustained Revenue Officer Ma. Elena
Llantada on the imposition of FBT against it based on the provisions of Revenue Regulations
(RR) No. 3-98 and that its protest was forwarded to the Assessment Division for further action.

On November 19, 2008, [PAGCOR] received a letter from the OIC-Regional Director, Revenue
Region No. 6 (Manila), stating that its letter protest was referred to Revenue District Office No.
33 for appropriate action.
On March 11, 2009, [PAGCOR] filed the instant Petition for Review alleging respondents'
inaction in its protest on the disputed deficiency FBT.[6]
ISSUE:
Is Republic Act 9337 constitutional insofar as it excluded PAGCOR from the enumeration
of GOCCs exempt from the payment of corporate income tax?
HELD:
YES. The original exemption of PAGCOR from corporate income tax was not made pursuant to
a valid classification based on substantial distinctions so that the law may operate only on some

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and not on all. Instead, the same was merely granted due to the acquiescence of the House
Committee on Ways and Means to the request of PAGCOR.
The argument that the withdrawal of the exemption also violates the non-impairment clause will
not hold since any franchise is subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by Congress.
However, the Court made it clear that PAGCOR remains exempt from payment of indirect taxes
and as such its purchases remain not subject to VAT, reiterating the rule laid down in the
Acesite case.

Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

FACTS:
Atlas is a corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws engaged in the
production of copper concentrates for export. Atlas applied with the BIR for the issuance of a tax
credit certificate or refund under Section 106(b) of the Tax Code.
Atlas then filed a petition for review with the CTA on February 22, 1995 to prevent the running of
the prescriptive period under Sec. 230 of the Tax Code.

On October 13, 1997, the CTA rendered a Decision denying Atlas’ claim for tax credit or refund.
Respondent CIR filed his Answer asserting that Atlas has the burden of proving erroneous or
illegal payment of the tax being claimed for refund, as claims for refund are strictly construed
against the taxpayer In denying Atlas’ claim for tax credit or refund, the CTA held that Atlas
failed to present sufficient evidence to warrant the grant of tax credit or refund for the alleged
input taxes paid by Atlas. Relying on Revenue Regulation No. (RR) 3-88 which was issued to
implement the then VAT law and list the documents to be submitted in actions for refunds or tax
credits of input taxes in export sales, it found that the documents submitted by Atlas did not
comply with said regulation. It pointed out that Atlas failed to submit photocopies of export
documents, invoices, or receipts evidencing the sale of goods and others.

Atlas timely filed its Motion for Reconsideration of the above decision contending that it relied on
Sec. 106 of the Tax Code which merely required proof that the foreign exchange proceeds has
been accounted for in accordance with the regulations of the Central Bank of the Philippines.
Consequently, Atlas asserted that the documents it presented, coupled with the testimony of its
Accounting and Finance Manager sufficiently proved its case. It argued that RR 3-88 was
issued for claims for refund of input VAT to be processed by the BIR, that is, for administrative
claims, and not for judicial claims as in the present case. Anyhow, Atlas prayed for a re-trial,
even as it admitted that it has committed a mistake or excusable negligence when the CTA
ruled that RR 3-88 should be the one applied for Atlas to submit the basis required under the
regulation.

On Atlas’ appeal, the CA denied and dismissed Atlas’ petition on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence to support Atlas’ action for tax credit or refund.

ISSUE:
Whether Atlas has sufficiently proven entitlement to a tax credit or refund.

HELD:
No.
The Rules of Court, which is suppletory in quasi-judicial proceedings, particularly Sec. 349 of
Rule 132, Revised Rules on Evidence, is clear that no evidence which has not been formally
offered shall be considered. Thus, where the pertinent invoices or receipts purportedly
evidencing the VAT paid by Atlas were not submitted, the courts a quo evidently could not
determine the veracity of the input VAT Atlas has paid. Moreover, when Atlas likewise failed to
submit pertinent export documents to prove actual export sales with due certification from
accredited banks on the export proceeds in foreign currency with the corresponding conversion

Page 325 of 370

rate into Philippine currency, the courts a quo likewise could not determine the veracity of the
export sales as indicated in Atlas’ amended VAT return.

It must be noted that the most competent evidence must be adduced and presented to prove
the allegations in a complaint, petition, or protest before a judicial court. And where the best
evidence cannot be submitted, secondary evidence may be presented. In the instant case, the
pertinent documents which are the best pieces of evidence were not presented.
KEPCO Philippines Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
Facts:
This is a petition for review oncertiorari[1]under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking
reversal of the February 20, 2008 Decision[2]of the Court of Tax AppealsEn Banc(CTA) in
C.T.A. EB No. 299, which ruled that "in order for petitioner to be entitled to its claim for
refund/issuance of tax credit certificate representing unutilized input VAT attributable to
its zero-rated sales for taxable year 2002, it must comply with the substantiation
requirements under the appropriate Revenue Regulations."

Petitioner KEPCO Philippines Corporation(Kepco)is a VAT-registered independent power

producer engaged in the business of generating electricity. It exclusively sells electricity
to National Power Corporation(NPC),an entity exempt from taxes under Section 13 of
Republic Act No. 6395(RA No. 6395)
Issue:
The court of tax appealsen bancgravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it held that non-compliance with the invoicing requirement
shall result in the automatic denial of the claim.
Ruling:
The issue of whether the word "zero-rated" should be imprinted on invoices and/or
official receipts as part of the invoicing requirement has been settled in the case
ofPanasonic Communications Imaging Corporation of the Philippines vs. Commissioner
of Internal Revenue[30]and restated in the later case ofJ.R.A. Philippines, Inc. v.
Commissioner.[31] In the first case, Panasonic Communications Imaging
Corporation(Panasonic),a VAT-registered entity, was engaged in the production and
exportation of plain paper copiers and their parts and accessories. From April 1998 to
March 31, 1999, Panasonic generated export sales amounting to US$12,819,475.15 and
US$11,859,489.78 totaling US$24,678,964.93. Thus, it paid input VAT of P9,368,482.40 that
it attributed to its zero-rated sales. It filed applications for refund or tax credit on what it
had paid. The CTA denied its application. Panasonic's export sales were subject to 0%
VAT under Section 106(A)(2)(a)(1) of the 1997 NIRC but it did not qualify for zero-rating
because the word "zero-rated" was not printed on Panasonic's export
invoices. This omission, according to the CTA, violated the invoicing requirements of
Section 4.108-1 of RR No. 7-95. Panasonic argued, however, that "in requiring the
printing on its sales invoices of the word `zero-rated,' the Secretary of Finance unduly
expanded, amended, and modified by a mere regulation (Section 4.108-1 of RR No. 7-95)
the letter and spirit of Sections 113 and 237 of the 1997 NIRC, prior to their amendment
by R.A. 9337."[32] Panasonic stressed that Sections 113 and 237 did not necessitate the
imprinting of the word "zero-rated" for its zero-rated sales receipts or invoices. The BIR
integrated this requirement only after the enactment of R.A. No. 9337 on November 1,
2005, a law that was still inexistent at the time of the transactions.

Page 326 of 370

WEEK 12

Mandatory and Directory Statutes

1. Social Security Commission v. Court of Appeals,G.R. No. 152058, September 27, 2004.
2. Buklod nang Magbubukid sa Lupaing Ramos, Inc. v. E.M. Ramos & Sons, Inc., G.R. No.
131481, March 16, 2011.
3. Bayan Muna v. Beltran, G.R. No. 159618, February 1, 2011.
4. Lokin, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 179431-32, June 22,2010.
5. Lexber Inc. v. Spouses Dalman, G.R. No. 183587, April 20,2015.
6. In Re: Mira, G.R. No. L-18566, September 30,1966.
7. Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners (South) Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
117188, August 7, 1997.
8. In Re: Guarina,G.R. No. 1179, January 08,1913.
9. Cachola v. Cordero, G.R. No. L-5780, February 28, 1953.
10. Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc. v. National Telecommunications Commission, G.R.
No. L-63318, August 18, 1984.
11. Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102858, July 28, 1997.
12. Philippine Registered Electrical Practitioners, Inc. v. Francia, Jr., G.R. No. 87134, January
20, 2000.
13. Gonzales v. Pe, G.R. No. 167398, August 9, 2011.
14. University of Mindanao, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 181201, February 21, 2011.

Prospective and Retroactive Operation of Statutes

1. Assoc. of Southern Tagalog Electric Cooperatives Inc. v. Energy Regulatory Board, G.R. No.
192117, September 18, 2012.
2. GMA Network Inc. v. Movie and Television Review and Classification Board, G.R. No.
148579, February 5, 2007.
3. The Board of Trustees of the Government Service Insurance System v. Velasco, G.R. No.
170463, February 2, 2011.
4. G.R. No. L-63915, December 29, 1986.
5. Nagkakaisang Maralita v. Military Shrine Services, G.R. No. 187587, June 5, 2013.
6. In Re Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation of Intercity Savings and Loan Bank, G.R. No.
181556, December 14, 2009.
7. Commission on Elections v. CO et al., G.R. No. 186616, November 20, 2009.
8. Quirog v. Aumentado, G.R. No. 163443, November 11, 2008.
9. G.R. No.190147, March 5, 2013.

Page 327 of 370

10. Ortigas & Co. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126120, December 4, 2000.
11. Sps. Gauvain v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97973, January 27, 1992.
12. Heirs of Banaag v. AMS Farming Corp., G.R. No. 187801. September 13, 2012.
13. G.R. No. 100776, October 28, 1993.
14. G.R. No. 52306, October 12, 1981.
15. G.R. Nos. 94878-94881, May 15, 1991.
16. MLQU v. NLRC, G.R. No. 141673, October 17, 2001.
17. Narzoles v. NLRC, G.R. No. 141959, September 29, 2000.
18. People v. Delos Santos, G.R. No. 121906, April 5, 2000.
19. People v. Nepomuceno, Jr., G.R. No. 130800, June 29, 1999.
20. People v. Buado, Jr., G.R. No. 170634, January 8, 2013.
21. People v. Samonte, G.R. No. 126048, September 29, 2000.
22. G.R. No.156644, July 28, 2008.
23. Rufina Patis Factory v. Alusitain, G.R. No. 146202, July 14, 2004.
24. J.V. Angeles v. NLRC, G.R. No. 126888, April 14, 1999.
25. PH Scout Veterans Security v. NLRC, G.R. No. 115019, April 14, 1997.
26. G.R. No. 122641, January 20, 1997.
27. Julliano-Llave v. Republic, G.R. No. 169766, March 30, 2011.
28. Cheng v. Sps. Sy, G.R. No. 174238, July 7, 2009.
29. Republic v. National Centennial Commission, G.R. No. 141530, March 8, 2003.
30. Tan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 136368, January 16, 2002.
31. G.R. No.138137, March 8, 2001.
32. G.R. No.141530, March 18, 2003.

Page 328 of 370

People v. Samonte, G.R. No. 126048, September 29, 2000.

FACTS:
There was a shooting incident resulting to the death of Perez. Accused was detailed in
the Mayor’s Office. His revolver and a .38 palter was taken from him. Branch 9 acquitted him of
the crime of homicide but Branch 3 found him guilty of illegal possession of firearms aggravated
by homicide under PD 1866.

ISSUE:
Whether or not qualified illegal possession of firearms and homicide are distinct and
separate offenses punishable under separate laws.

Whether or not R.A. 8294 should be given retroactive application.

RULING:
In support of the first assignment of error, accused-appellant contends that inspite of the
fact that it was made known to the trial court that Branch 9 of the same court (Regional Trial
Court of Legazpi City) acquitted him in Criminal Case No. 6336 for homicide, said court still
entertained Criminal Case No. 6337 for illegal possession of firearms aggravated by homicide
under P.D. 1866. This contention is not tenable. There was no interference by the trial court
(Branch 3) with Branch 9 of the same Regional Trial Court which acquitted the accused-
appellant of the crime of homicide. As pointed out by the Solicitor General, citing People vs.
Quijada, qualified illegal possession of firearms and homicide are distinct and separate offenses
punishable under separate laws. Considering that accused-appellant allegedly used an
unlicensed firearm in killing Siegfred Perez, he was charged with aggravated illegal possession
of firearms. His acquittal of the homicide did not preclude his prosecution for aggravated illegal
possession of firearms for they were two distinct and separate crimes.

While the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearms in the present case had been
committed on June 13, 1993, we should give retroactive application to RA 8294 which considers
the use of an unlicensed firearm in the killing of the victim as a mere aggravating circumstance,
as it is advantageous to accused-appellant.

Page 329 of 370

Universal Robina Sugar Milling Corporation (URSUMCO) vs. Caballeda,
G.R. No.156644, July 28, 2008.

FACTS:
Petitioner Universal Robina Sugar Milling Corporation (URSUMCO) is a domestic
corporation engaged in the sugar milling business and petitioner Renato Cabati is URSUMCO’s
manager.

Respondent Agripino Caballeda (Agripino) worked as welder for URSUMCO from March
1989 until June 23, 1997 with a salary of P124.00 per day, while respondent Alejandro Cadalin
(Alejandro) worked for URSUMCO as crane operator from 1976 up to June 15, 1997 with a
salary of P209.30 per day.

On April 24, 1991, John Gokongwei, Jr., President of URSUMCO, issued a

Memorandum establishing the company policy on “Compulsory Retirement” (Memorandum) of
its employees. Subsequently, on December 9, 1992, Republic Act (RA) No. 76416 was enacted
into law, and it took effect on January 7, 1993,7 amending Article 287 of the Labor Code.

On April 29, 1993, URSUMCO and the National Federation of Labor (NFL), a legitimate
labor organization and the recognized sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all the
monthly and daily paid employees of URSUMCO, of which Alejandro was a member, entered
into a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). Article XV of the said CBA particularly provided
that the retirement benefits of the members of the collective bargaining unit shall be in
accordance with law.

Agripino and Alejandro (respondents), having reached the age of 60, were allegedly
forced to retire by URSUMCO. Both filed respective Complaints for illegal dismissal, damages
and attorney’s fees. They alleged that his compulsory retirement was in violation of the
provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) 7641 and, was in effect, a form of illegal dismissal.

ISSUE:
Whether R.A.7641 can be given retroactive effect.

RULING:
The issue of the retroactive effect of R.A. 7641 on prior existing employment contracts
has long been settled. In Enriquez Security Services, Inc. v. Cabotaje, 496 SCRA 169, 173-174
(2006), we held: RA 7641 is undoubtedly a social legislation. The law has been enacted as a
labor protection measure and as a curative statute that—absent a retirement plan devised by,
an agreement with, or a voluntary grant from, an employer—can respond, in part at least, to the
financial well-being of workers during their twilight years soon following their life of labor. There
should be little doubt about the fact that the law can apply to labor contracts still existing at the
time the statute has taken effect, and that its benefits can be reckoned not only from the date of
the law’s enactment but retroactively to the time said employment contracts have started.

This doctrine has been repeatedly upheld and clarified in several cases. Pursuant
thereto, this Court imposed two (2) essential requisites in order that R.A. 7641 may be given
retroactive effect: (1) the claimant for retirement benefits was still in the employ of the employer

Page 330 of 370

at the time the statute took effect; and (2) the claimant had complied with the requirements for
eligibility for such retirement benefits under the statute.

Rufina Patis Factory v. Alusitain, G.R. No. 146202, July 14, 2004.

FACTS:
In March 1948, Alusitain was hired as a laborer at the Rufina Patis Factory owned and
operated by petitioner Lucas. On February 19, 1991, respondent, then 63 years of age,
tendered his letter of resignation, and also executed a duly notarized affidavit of separation from
employment and submitted the same to the Pensions Department of the SSS. Meanwhile, R. A.
7641 took effect in January 1993.

In 1995, Alusitain, claiming that he retired from the company on January 31, 1995,
having reached the age of 65 and due to poor health, demanded the payment of his retirement
benefits in the amount of P86,710.00, which petitioner refused to pay. Respondent filed a
complaint before the NLRC against petitioners for non-payment of retirement benefits.

Petitioners maintained that respondent resigned from the company in 1991. On the other
hand, respondent maintained that he continued working for petitioners until January 1995, the
date of actual retirement, due to illness and old age, and that he merely accomplished the
documents incompliance with the requirements of the SSS in order to avail of his retirement
benefits. The Labor Arbiter upheld respondent’s position. The Court of Appeals upheld the
NLRC decision. Petitioners assert that the appellate court erred in applying retroactively R.A.
7641 as said law does not expressly provide for such retroactive application and to do so would
defeat the clear intent of Congress. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is entitled to his claim for retirement benefits.

RULING:
No. R.A. 7641 is a social legislation and may be given retroactive effect where: (1) the
claimant for retirement benefits was still the employee of the employer at the time the statute
took effect; and (2) the claimant had complied with the requirements for eligibility under the
statute for such retirement benefits.

It is thus clear that in order for respondent to claim retirement benefits from petitioner, he
has to prove that he was its employee at the time R.A. 7641 took effect. In the case at bar, it
was incumbent on respondent to prove that he retired on January 31, 1995 and not on February
20, 1991 as indicated on his letter of resignation. Respondent failed to prove that he was an
employee of petitioner at the time R.A. 7641 took effect. Thus, his claim for retirement benefits
must be disallowed.

Page 331 of 370

J.V. Angeles v. NLRC, G.R. No. 126888, April 14, 1999.
FACTS:
Petitioner assailed the decision of NLRC concerning a case between petitioner and
private respondent Pedro Santos. Petitioner was the employer of Pedro for 23 years and after
Pedro compulsorily retired, he filed a complaint for retirement benefits and service incentive
leave pay under RA 7641. Petitioner contended that it should not be made to pay the demands
of private respondent because the statute involved in this case cannot be given retroactive
effect.

ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 7641 can be applied retroactively in this case.

RULING:
No. Pedro was no longer an employee of petitioner at the time the said law took effect.
The Court provided in CJC Trading Inc. v. NLRC the circumstances which must occur before
the law could be given retroactive effect, to wit:

(1) the claimant for retirement benefits was still the employee of the employer at the time the
statute took effect; and

(2) the claimant has complied with the requirements for eligibility under the statute for such
retirement benefits."

In the case under scrutiny, private respondent Santos retired and ceased to be an
employee of petitioner on February 1992, eleven (11) months before the effectivity of R.A. 7641,
and he brought his complaint on October 23, 1993, nine (9) months after the law’s effectivity. It
is thus decisively clear that the provisions of R.A. 7641 could not be given retroactive effect in
his favor.

Page 332 of 370

PH Scout Veterans Security v. NLRC, G.R. No. 115019, April 14, 1997.

FACTS:
Mariano Federico, private respondent, had been working with petitioners Philippine
Scout Veterans Security and Investigation Agency and/or Severo Santiago as a security guard
for twenty-three (23) years. On 16 September 1991 Federico, then already sixty (60) years old,
tendered his so-called “letter of resignation” citing as his reasons physical disability to perform
his duties and desire to spend the rest of his life in the province. It seems that the letter did not
strictly refer to “resignation” but “withdrawal from occupation” because thereafter he sought
alternative reliefs from petitioners, namely, termination pay corresponding to his years of
service, or retirement benefits.

Petitioners rejected the claim for termination pay contending that respondent Federico
voluntarily resigned. The claim for retirement benefits met the same fate there being no
collective or individual agreement providing therefor.

On 4 December 1991 respondent Federico brought his grievance to the Labor Arbiter.
However, the latter sustained the stand of petitioners. Hence on 25 August 1992 he ruled
against Federico. Nevertheless, the termination of the proceedings did not leave respondent
empty-handed. The Labor Arbiter directed petitioners to pay respondent P10,000.00, the
amount they previously offered him, as financial assistance.

On 28 December 1993 public respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)

set aside on appeal the subject Decision, relying on Art. 287 of the Labor Code as amended by
R.A. 7641 which, in the absence of a retirement plan or agreement providing for retirement
benefits, grants retirement pay equivalent to fifteen (15) days for every year of service.2 The
amendment, which took effect on 7 January 1993, was thus retroactively applied in favor of
respondent Federico. On 21 March 1994, NLRC denied reconsideration of the Decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not R.A. 7641 can be applied retroactively.

RULING:
Under the amendment, respondent Federico appears to be entitled to retirement pay.
But can he avail himself of this provision considering that it took effect subsequent to his filing of
the complaint? This brings to mind the principle reiterated in Allied that police power legislation
intended to promote public welfare applies to existing contracts and can therefore be given
retroactive effect. Actually, the case at bench no longer presents a novel issue. We have ruled
in Oro Enterprises, Inc. v. NLRC that R.A. 7641 can indeed be applied retroactively.

Page 333 of 370

Subido, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 122641, January 20, 1997.

FACTS:
On June 25, 1992, Bayani Subido Jr., then a Commissioner of the Bureau of Immigration
and Deportation (BID) and Rene Parina, a BID special agent, while in the performance of their
official functions, issued and implemented a warrant of arrest against James J. Maksimuk,
knowing fully well that the BID decision requiring Maksimuk’s deportation was not yet final and
executory. This resulted to the detention of Maksimuk for a period of 43 days, causing him
undue injury.

Subido and Parina were charged with Arbitrary Detention defined and punished by
Article 124 of the Revised Penal Code. For their part, the petitioners filed a Motion to Quash,
contending that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the case since when it was filed,
Subido was no longer part of the service and Parina was not occupying a position
corresponding to salary grade “27”.

ISSUE:
Whether or not R.A. No. 7975 is a penal law.

RULING:
The petitioners’ invocation of the prohibition against the retroactivity of penal laws is
misplaced. Simply put, R.A. No. 7975 is not a penal law. Penal laws or statutes are those acts
of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violation; or those
that define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for their punishment. R.A. No. 7975, in
further amending P.D. No. 1606 as regards the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction, mode of appeal,
and other procedural matters, is clearly a procedural law, i.e., one which prescribes rules and
forms of procedure of enforcing rights or obtaining redress for their invasion, or those which
refer to rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer
justice. Moreover, the petitioners even suggest that it is likewise a curative or remedial statute:
one which cures defects and adds to the means of enforcing existing obligations.

Page 334 of 370

Julliano-Llave v. Republic, G.R. No. 169766, March 30, 2011.

FACTS:
Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamano married Estrellita twice – initially
under the Islamic laws and tradition on May 27, 1993 in Cotabato City and, subsequently, under
a civil ceremony officiated by an RTC Judge at Malabang, Lanao del Sur on June 2, 1993. In
their marriage contracts, Sen. Tamano’s civil status was indicated as “divorced”. Since then,
Estrellita has been representing herself to the whole world as Sen. Tamano’s wife, and upon his
death, his widow.

On November 23, 1994, private respondents Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda)
and her son Adib Ahmad A. Tamano (Adib), in their own behalf and in behalf of the rest of Sen.
Tamano’s legitimate children with Zorayda, filed a complaint with the RTC of Quezon City for
the declaration of nullity of marriage between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano for being bigamous.
The complaint alleged that Sen. Tamano married Zorayda on May 31, 1958 under civil rites, and
that this marriage remained subsisting when he married Estrellita in 1993.

ISSUE:
Whether the marriage between Estrellita and the late Sen. Tamano was bigamous.

RULING:
Yes. The civil code governs the marriage of Zorayda and late Sen. Tamano; their
marriage was never invalidated by PD 1083. Sen. Tamano’s subsequent marriage to Estrellita is
void ab initio.

The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was celebrated in 1958,
solemnized under civil and Muslim rites. The only law in force governing marriage relationships
between Muslims and non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950, under the provisions of
which only one marriage can exist at any given time. Under the marriage provisions of the Civil
Code, divorce is not recognized except during the effectivity of Republic Act No. 394 which was
not availed of during its effectivity.

As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. Tamano’s prior marriage to Zorayda has been
severed by way of divorce under PD 1083, the law that codified Muslim personal laws.
However, PD 1083 cannot benefit Estrellita. Firstly, Article 13(1) thereof provides that the law
applies to “marriage and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male
party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in
any part of the Philippines.” But Article 13 of PD 1083 does not provide for a situation where the
parties were married both in civil and Muslim rites.”

Page 335 of 370

Cheng v. Sps. Sy, G.R. No. 174238, July 7, 2009.

FACTS:
Petitioner Anita Cheng filed two (2) estafa cases before the RTC, Branch 7, Manila
against respondent spouses William and Tessie Sy for issuing to her Philippine Bank of
Commerce (PBC) in payment of their loan both of which were dishonored upon presentment for
having been drawn against a closed account. Meanwhile, based on the same facts, petitioner,
on January 20, 1999, filed against respondents two (2) cases for violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang (BP Blg.) 22 before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 25, Manila.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 1 of Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure and
Supreme Court Circular No. 57-97 on the Rules and Guidelines in the filing and prosecution of
criminal cases under BP Blg. 22 are applicable to the present case where the nature of the
order dismissing the cases for bouncing checks against the respondents was based on the
failure of the prosecution to identify both the accused.

RULING:
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet
commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court
trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in
accordance with Section 2 of this Rule governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions.

Petitioner is in error when she insists that the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure should
not apply because she filed her BP Blg. 22 complaints in 1999. It is now settled that rules of
procedure apply even to cases already pending at the time of their promulgation. The fact that
procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants’ rights does not preclude their retroactive
application to pending actions. It is axiomatic that the retroactive application of procedural laws
does not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, nor is it
constitutionally objectionable. The reason for this is that, as a general rule, no vested right may
attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws.

Page 336 of 370

Republic v. National Centennial Commission, G.R. No. 141530, March 8, 2003.

FACTS:
In line with the centennial celebration of Philippine Independence on June 12, 1998, the
government embarked on several commemorative Centennial Freedom Trail (CFT) projects.
One of these projects was the construction of the Tejeros Convention Center and the founding
site of the Philippine Army on the 3,497 sq. m. property of respondent Fe Manuel located in
Tejeros, Rosario, Cavite. The said property was declared by the National Historical Institute
(NHI) as a historical landmark in its Resolution No. 2 dated April 19, 1995.

To carry out the Tejeros Convention Project, the government, through the National
Centennial Commission (NCC), filed on December 4, 1997 a complaint for expropriation against
respondents Fe Manuel and Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank). The land was
mortgaged by Fe Manuel to Metrobank and was extrajudicially foreclosed by the latter on
November 20, 1997. Respondent Fe Manuel interposed no objection to the expropriation as
long as just compensation was paid.

ISSUE:
Whether or not procedural laws can be applied retroactively.

RULING:
The amendment under A.M. 00-2-03-SC quoted above is procedural or remedial in
character. It does not create new or remove vested rights but only operates in furtherance of the
remedy or confirmation of rights already existing. It is settled that procedural laws do not come
within the legal conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule against retroactive operation
of statutes. They may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at the
time of their passage and this will not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is
adversely affected, inasmuch as there is no vested rights in rules of procedure.

Page 337 of 370

Tan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 136368, January 16, 2002.

FACTS:
On January 22, 1981, Tan, for a consideration of P59,200 executed a deed of absolute
sale over the property in question in favor of spouses Jose Magdangal and Estrella Magdangal.
Simultaneous with the execution of this deed, the same contracting parties entered into another
agreement where under Tan was given one (1) year within which to redeem or repurchase the
property. Tan failed to redeem the property until his death on January 4, 1988.

On May 2, 1988, Tan's heirs filed before the RTC at Davao City a suit against the
Magdangals for reformation of instrument alleging that while Tan and the Magdangals
denominated their agreement as deed of absolute sale, their real intention was to conclude an
equitable mortgage.

On Sept. 28, 1995, CA affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto. Both parties received
the decision of the appellate court on Oct. 5, 1995. On March 13, 1996, the clerk of court of the
appellate court entered in the Book of Entries of Judgement the decision and issued the
corresponding Entry of Judgment which, on its face, stated that the said decision has on Oct.
21, 1995 become final and executory.

Magdangals filed in the RTC a Motion for Consolidation and Writ of Possession alleging
that the 120-day period of redemption of the petitioner has expired.

On June 10, 1996, the RTC allowed the petitioner to redeem the lot in question. It ruled
that the 120-day redemption period should be reckoned from the date of Entry of Judgment in
the CA or from March 13, 1996. The redemption price was deposited on April 17, 1996.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 1, Rule 39 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure should be
given retroactive effect.

RULING:
We hold that Section 1, Rule 39 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure should not be
given retroactive effect in this case as it would result in great injustice to the petitioner.
Undoubtedly, petitioner has the right to redeem the subject lot and this right is a substantive
right. Petitioner followed the procedural rule then existing as well as the decisions of this Court
governing the reckoning date of the period of redemption when he redeemed the subject lot.

Unfortunately for petitioner, the rule was changed by the 1997 Revised Rules of
Procedure which if applied retroactively would result in his losing the right to redeem the subject
lot. It is difficult to reconcile the retroactive application of this procedural rule with the rule of
fairness. Petitioner cannot be penalized with the loss of the subject lot when he faithfully
followed the laws and the rule on the period of redemption when he made the redemption.

Petitioner fought to recover this lot from 1988. To lose it because of a change of
procedure on the date of reckoning of the period of redemption is inequitous. The manner of

Page 338 of 370

exercising the right cannot be changed and the change applied retroactively if to do so will
defeat the right of redemption of the petitioner which is already vested.

Zulueta vs. Asia Brewery, Inc., G.R. No.138137, March 8, 2001.

FACTS:
Respondent Asia Brewery, Inc., is engaged in the manufacture, distribution and sale of
beer; while Petitioner Perla Zulueta is a dealer and an operator of an outlet selling the former’s
beer products. A Dealership Agreement governed their contractual relations.

Respondent filed a complaint before the Iloilo Regional Trial Court against its former
dealer, Zulueta, for breach of contract. Petitioner filed a later complaint with the Makati Regional
Trial Court against respondent for collection of a sum of money.

The cases were ordered consolidated by the Makati Court but respondent filed a Petition
for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals against this consolidation. The appellate court found
for Asia Brewery, but Zulueta criticized it on the ground that the date of filing of the petition for
certiorari was made beyond the 60-day reglamentary period provided for in the new Rules of
Procedure.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the 60-day reglamentary period will be applied retroactively.

RULING:
Procedural laws may operate retroactively as to pending proceedings even without
express provision to that effect. Accordingly, rules of procedure can apply to cases pending at
the time of their enactment. In fact, statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be
applied on actions undetermined at the time of their effectivity. Procedural laws are
retrospective in that sense and to that extent.

Clearly, the designation of a specific period of sixty days for the filing of an original action
for certiorari under Rule 65 is purely remedial or procedural in nature. It does not alter or modify
any substantive right of respondent, particularly with respect to the filing of petitions for
certiorari.

Although the period for filing the same may have been effectively shortened, respondent
had not been unduly prejudiced thereby, considering that he was not at all deprived of that right.
It is a well-established doctrine that rules of procedure may be modified at any time to become
effective at once, so long as the change does not affect vested rights. Moreover, it is equally
axiomatic that there are no vested rights to rules of procedure.

Page 339 of 370

WEEK 13

Amendment, Revision, Codification, and Repeal

1. Palanca v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106685, December 2, 1994.
2. Javier v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 215847, January 12, 2016.
3. Advocates for Truth in Lending, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral Monetary Board, G.R. No. 192986,
January 15, 2013.
4. Manlangit v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 158014, August 28, 2007.
5. Zamora v. Heirs of Izquierdo, G.R. No. 146195, November 18, 2004.
6. Microsoft Philippines, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 180173, April 6,
2011.
7. Government Service Insurance System v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 162372, October
19, 2011.
8. Remman Enterprises, Inc. v. Professional Regulatory Board of Real Estate Service, G.R. No.
197676, February 4, 2014.
9. Martinez v. Villanueva, G.R. No. 169196, July 6, 2011.
10. Mecano v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 103982, December 11, 1992.
11. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Philippine Airlines Lines, Inc., G.R. Nos. 212536-37,
August 27, 2014.
12. Berces v. Guingona, G.R. No. 112099. February 21, 1995.
13. Erectors Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 104215, May 8, 1996.
14. City Government of San Pablo, Laguna v. Reyes, G.R. No. 127708, March 25, 1999.
15. Juan v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 132378, January 18, 2000.
16. Giron v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 188179, January 22, 2013.

Applying Legal Method

1. In re Estate of Johnson, G.R. No. L-12767, November 16, 1918.
2. Kare v. Platon, G.R. No. L-35902, October 28, 1931.
3. Centeno v. Villalon-Pornillos, G.R. No. 113092, September 1, 1994.
4. Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014.
5. Song Kiat Chocolate Factory v. Central Bank of the Phil., G.R. No. L-8888, November 29,
1957.
6. Southern Cross Cement Corp. v. Philippine Cement Manufacturers Corp., G.R. No. 158540,
July 8, 2004.
7. Nilo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. L-34586 & L-36625, April 2, 1984.

Page 340 of 370

8. Casco Phil. Chem. Co., Inc. v. Gimenez, G.R. No. L- 17931, February 28, 1963.
9. Resins, Inc. v. Auditor General, G.R. No. L-17888, October 29, 1968.

Palanca v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106685, December 2, 1994.

FACTS:
Petitioner Palanca, as vendor, and Jose Sanicas, as vendee, entered into a Contract to
Sell on Installment of a parcel of land.

Under the terms of the contract, Jose agreed to pay Palanca the amount of P9,851.00 as
down payment and the balance of P88,659.00 in 120 monthly installments with 14% interest per
annum on the outstanding balance.

Jose further agreed to pay the annual real property taxes, and that should he fail to pay
the said taxes, he would have to pay a yearly surcharge or penalty of 50% of the taxes due plus
12% compounded interest per annum.

Respondent Edgardo later assumed the account of his brother Jose and he designated
the latter as his authorized representative in dealing with petitioner.

Paragraph 11 of the contract contained escalator clause:

That it is further agreed and understood by the VENDEE that in the event of monetary
fluctuation, the unpaid balance account of the herein VENDEE on the aforecited subdivision lot
shall be increased proportionately on the basis of the present value of P6.72 to $1.00 US dollar.

Respondent tendered supposed balance payment (44k), but petitioner rejected it, which
prompted the former make a judicial consignment of the amount.

Petitioner justified his refusal by asserting the escalator clause in paragraph 11 of the
contract (155k).

ISSUE:
Whether or not the contract has been visited by an "extraordinary inflation" as to trigger
the operation of Article 1250.

RULING:
No, the Court holds that while the contract may contain an "escalator clause” still the
autonomy of the parties to provide such escalator clauses may be limited by law.

Article 1250 of the Civil Code of the Philippines is not the basis herein, but R.A. No. 529,
as amended, as a ground for violation of said clause.

In the case at bench, the clear understanding of the parties is that there should be an
upward adjustment of the purchase price the moment there is a deterioration of the Philippine
peso with the U.S. dollar. This is the "monetary fluctuation" contemplated by them as would
justify the adjustment, and not "extraordinary inflation" described in Art.1250.

Page 341 of 370

 Thus, the petition is DENIED.

Javier v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 215847, January 12, 2016.

FACTS:
Section 261 (d) and (e) of the Omnibus Election Code prohibits coercion of subordinates
by public officers. Section 68 empowers the Commission on Elections on administratively
disqualify any candidate who violates these provisions. Later, RA 7890 expressly repealed
Section 261 (d) and increased the penalty for grave coercion in the RPC if the said felony was
committed in violation of a person’s right to suffrage.

Aldon and Raymundo Roquero filed a petition for disqualification with the COMELEC
against Javier on the ground of Section 261 (d). After the elections wherein Javier won for
Governor, the COMELEC 2nd Division issued a resolution disqualifying Javier and annulling his
proclamation, on the basis of Section 261 (d). It held that although Section 261 (d) has been
repealed, the repeal did not remove coercion as a ground for disqualification under Section 68.
Also, there was no implied repeal under the general repealing clause.

ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 7890 removed coercion as a ground for disqualification under
Section 68 of the Election Code.

RULING:
A law that has been expressly repealed ceases to exist and becomes inoperative from
the moment the repealing law becomes effective. The discussion on implied repeals by the
Yusoph resolution, (and the concurring opinion of Chairman Brillantes, Jr.), including the
concomitant discussions on the absence of irreconcilable provisions between the two laws,
were thus misplaced. The harmonization of laws can only be had when the repeal is implied, not
when it is express, as in this case.

With the express repeal of Section 261(d), the basis for disqualifying Javier no longer
existed. As we held in Jalosjos, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, 683 SCRA 1 (2012), the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC to disqualify candidates is limited to those enumerated in Section
68 of the Omnibus Election Code. All other election offenses are beyond the ambit of
COMELEC jurisdiction. They are criminal and not administrative in nature. Pursuant to Sections
265 and 268 of the Omnibus Election Code, the power of the COMELEC is confined to the
conduct of preliminary investigation on the alleged election offenses for the purpose of
prosecuting the alleged offenders before the regular courts of justice.

Page 342 of 370

Advocates for Truth in Lending, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral Monetary Board,
G.R. No. 192986, January 15, 2013.

FACTS:
Advocates for Truth in Lending, Inc. and its President, Eduardo Olaguer claim that they
are raising issues of transcendental importance to the public and so they filed Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65 ROC seeking to declare that the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Monetary
Board (BSP-MB), replacing the Central Bank Monetary Board (CB-MB) by virtue of R.A. No.
7653, has no authority to continue enforcing Central Bank Circular No. 905, issued by the CB-
MB in 1982, which "suspended" the Usury Law of 1916 (Act No. 2655).

R.A. No. 265, which created the Central Bank (CB) of the Philippines, empowered the
CB-MB to, among others, set the maximum interest rates which banks may charge for all types
of loans and other credit operations, within limits prescribed by the Usury Law.

In its Resolution No. 2224, the CB-MB issued CB Circular No. 905, Series of 1982.
Section 1 of the Circular, under its General Provisions, removed the ceilings on interest rates on
loans or forbearance of any money, goods or credits.

On June 14, 1993, President Fidel V. Ramos signed into law R.A. No. 7653 establishing
the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) to replace the CB.

ISSUE:
Whether the CB-MB exceeded its authority when it issued CB Circular No. 905, which
removed all interest ceilings and thus suspended Act No. 2655 as regards usurious interest
rates.

RULING:
No. The CB-MB merely suspended the effectivity of the Usury Law when it issued CB
Circular No. 905.

The power of the CB to effectively suspend the Usury Law pursuant to P.D. No. 1684
has long been recognized and upheld in many cases. As the Court explained in the landmark
case of Medel v. CA, citing several cases, CB Circular No. 905 "did not repeal nor in anyway
amend the Usury Law but simply suspended the latter’s effectivity;" that "a CB Circular cannot
repeal a law, [for] only a law can repeal another law;" that "by virtue of CB Circular No. 905, the
Usury Law has been rendered ineffective;" and "Usury has been legally non-existent in our
jurisdiction. Interest can now be charged as lender and borrower may agree upon."

By lifting the interest ceiling, CB Circular No. 905 merely upheld the parties’ freedom of
contract to agree freely on the rate of interest. It cited Article 1306 of the New Civil Code, under
which the contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as
they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
order, or public policy.

Page 343 of 370

Manlangit v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 158014, August 28, 2007.

FACTS:
On October 16, 1998, petitioner, as Officer-in-Charge for Information, Education and
Communication of the Pinatubo Commission, received ₱176,300 to fund the 6th Founding
Anniversary Info-Media Activities of the Commission. A few months thereafter, he resigned
without accounting for the fund.

On April 12, 2000, Artaserxes L. Sampang, then Executive Director of the Commission,
filed with the Office of the Ombudsman an affidavit-complaint against petitioner for violation of
Articles 2174 and 218 of the Revised Penal Code. According to Sampang, Commission on Audit
(COA) Circular No. 90-3315 dated May 3, 1990, as amended by COA Circular No. 97-0026
dated February 10, 1997, required petitioner to render a true and correct account of all public
funds entrusted to him.

In his counter-affidavit dated July 11, 2000, petitioner averred that he had no intention to
appropriate the funds for himself. He failed to submit on time the liquidation report because of
the following reasons: a) a new management took over, and reorganized the Commission
causing some organizational confusion; b) he resigned and had to look for another employment;
and c) he had some personal and family problems. He said that he submitted his liquidation
report on July 12, 2000 and settled the account.

The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon filed an information against petitioner
for violation of Article 218 of the Revised Penal Code. It presented as evidence the affidavit-
complaint of Sampang, the counter-affidavit of petitioner, and the reply of Yap.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the prior demand by the commission on audit or provincial auditor for the
public officer to render an account, not an element of the crime penalized under Article 218 of
the Revised Penal Code?

RULING:
Article 218 consists of the following elements:

1. that the offender is a public officer, whether in the service or separated therefrom;
2. that he must be an accountable officer for public funds or property;
3. that he is required by law or regulation to render accounts to the Commission on Audit, or to a
provincial auditor; and
4. that he fails to do so for a period of two months after such accounts should be rendered.

Nowhere in the provision does it require that there first be a demand before an
accountable officer is held liable for a violation of the crime. The law is very clear. Where none
is provided, the court may not introduce exceptions or conditions, neither may it engraft into the
law qualifications not contemplated. Where the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken
to mean exactly what it says and the court has no choice but to see to it that its mandate is
obeyed. There is no room for interpretation, but only application.

Page 344 of 370

 Petitioner’s reliance on Saberon is misplaced. As correctly pointed out by the OSP,
Saberon involved a violation of Act No. 1740 whereas the present case involves a violation of
Article 218 of the Revised Penal Code. Article 218 merely provides that the public officer be
required by law and regulation to render account. Statutory construction tells us that in the
revision or codification of laws, all parts and provisions of the old laws that are omitted in the
revised statute or code are deemed repealed, unless the statute or code provides otherwise.

Zamora v. Heirs of Izquierdo, G.R. No. 146195, November 18, 2004.

FACTS:
This case is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision and Resolution of
the CA. There was a complaint on the ground that the controversy was not referred to the
barangay for conciliation.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, contending that a motion to dismiss the
complaint on the ground of failure to refer the complaint to the Lupon for conciliation is allowed
under Section 19 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. The case was referred to
the Lupon Chairman for conciliation. Petitioner’s motion to discuss even if allowed is bereft of
merit.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the parties must undergo a conciliation process before the Lupon
Chairman or the Pangkat, as a precondition to filing a complaint in court.

RULING:
While it is true that the Sertifikasyon dated September 14, 1997 is entitled ‘Ukol Sa Hindi
Pagbibigay Ng Pahintulot Sa Pagpapakabit Ng Tubig’, this title must not prevail over the actual
issues discussed in the proceedings. Minutes would show that other issues were also discussed
such as the violation of the terms of the lease.

Hence, to require another confrontation at the barangay level as a sine qua non for the
filing of the instant case would not serve any useful purpose anymore since no new issues
would be raised therein and the parties have proven so many times in the past that they cannot
get to settle their differences amicably.”

Here, while the Pangkat was not constituted, however, the parties met nine (9) times at
the Office of the Barangay Chairman for conciliation wherein not only the issue of water
installation was discussed but also petitioners’ violation of the lease contract. It is thus manifest
that there was substantial compliance with the law which does not require strict adherence
thereto.

Page 345 of 370

Microsoft Philippines, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
G.R. No. 180173, April 6, 2011.

FACTS:
Microsoft renders marketing services to two affiliated nonresident foreign corporations
with their services being paid for in foreign currency. Microsoft filed a claim for refund for
unutilized input VAT but the CTA denied the same on the basis that the official receipts issued
did not bear the imprinted word “zero-rated” on its face and are thus not valid evidence of
Microsoft’s sales.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Microsoft is entitled to a refund.

RULING:
No. The regulations in effect when the sales were made by Microsoft clearly indicate in
the portion outlining the “Invoicing Requirements” that the word “zero-rated” must be imprinted
in the invoice. Without such, the invoice is not considered as VAT invoices and thus could not
give rise to any input tax. The Court added that the reason for enforcing this rule even if only
based on regulation is that it prevents buyers from falsely claiming input VAT from their
purchases when no VAT is actually paid.

Page 346 of 370

Government Service Insurance System v. Commission on Audit,
G.R. No. 162372, October 19, 2011.

FACTS:
On May 30, 1997, Republic Act No. 8291, otherwise known as "The Government Service
Insurance System Act of 1997" (GSIS Act) was enacted and approved, amending Presidential
Decree No. 1146, as amended, expanding and increasing the coverage and benefits of the
GSIS, and instituting reforms therein.

On October 17, 2000, pursuant to the powers granted to it under Section 41(n) of the
said law, the GSIS Board of Trustees, upon the recommendation of the Management-Employee
Relations Committee (MERCOM), approved Board Resolution No. 326 wherein they adopted
the GSIS Employees Loyalty Incentive Plan (ELIP).

COA’s General Counsel Santos M. Alquizalas (Alquizalas) issued a Memorandum to

COA Commissioner Raul C. Flores regarding the GSIS RFP. Alquizalas opined that the GSIS
RFP is a supplementary retirement plan, which is prohibited under Republic Act No. 4968, or
the "Teves Retirement Law." He also said that since there is no provision in the new Republic
Act No. 8291 expressly repealing the Teves Retirement Law, the two laws must be harmonized
absent an irreconcilable inconsistency. Alquizalas pronounced that Board Resolution Nos. 360
and 6 are null and void for being violative of Section 28(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 186 as
amended by Republic Act No. 4968, which bars the creation of a supplemental retirement
scheme; and Section 41(n) of Republic Act No. 8291, which speaks of an early retirement plan
or financial assistance.

ISSUE:
Whether or not RA the provisions of the Teves Retirement Law that are inconsistent with
RA 8291 are deemed repealed or modified.

RULING:
This is because, unless the intention to revoke is clear and manifest, the abrogation or
repeal of a law cannot be assumed. The repealing clause contained in Republic Act No. 8291 is
not an express repealing clause because it fails to identify or designate the statutes that are
intended to be repealed. It is actually a clause, which predicated the intended repeal upon the
condition that a substantial conflict must be found in existing and prior laws.

Since Republic Act No. 8291 made no express repeal or abrogation of the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 186 as amended by the Teves Retirement Law, the reliance of the
petitioners on its general repealing clause is erroneous. The failure to add a specific repealing
clause in Republic Act No. 8291 indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing law,
unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exists in the terms of the new and old
laws.

We are likewise not convinced by petitioners’ claim of repeal by implication. It is a well-

settled rule that to bring about an implied repeal, the two laws must be absolutely incompatible
and clearly repugnant that the later law cannot exist without nullifying the prior law.

Page 347 of 370

Remman Enterprises, Inc. v. Professional Regulatory Board of Real Estate Service,
G.R. No. 197676, February 4, 2014.

FACTS:
RA 9646 or the Real Estate Service Act of the Philippines was passed, which purpose is
to professionalize the real estate service sector under regulatory scheme of licensing,
registration and supervision of real estate service practitioners.

The supervision was likewise lodged under the authority of the Professional Regulatory
Commission (PRC). The law required that companies providing real estate services must
transact with the employ of duly licensed real estate brokers.

Petitioner assails the constitutionality of the law, alleging that it violates the due process
clause and infringes the ownership rights of real estate developers enshrined in Article 428 of
the Civil Code. Furthermore, they claim that it violates the equal protection clause as owners of
private properties are allowed to sell their properties without the need of a licensed real estate
broker.

ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 9646 is in conflict with PD 957, as amended by EO 648, with respect
to the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB to regulate real estate developers.

RULING:
It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals by implication are not
favored. In order to effect a repeal by implication, the later statute must be so irreconcilably
inconsistent and repugnant with the existing law that they cannot be made to reconcile and
stand together. The clearest case possible must be made before the inference of implied repeal
may be drawn, for inconsistency is never presumed. There must be a showing of repugnance
clear and convincing in character. The language used in the later statute must be such as to
render it irreconcilable with what had been formerly enacted. An inconsistency that falls short of
that standard does not suffice. Moreover, the failure to add a specific repealing clause indicates
that the intent was not to repeal any existing law, unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and
repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and old laws.

There is nothing in R.A. No. 9646 that repeals any provision of P.D. No. 957, as
amended by E.O. No. 648. P.D. No. 957, otherwise known as “The Subdivision and
Condominium Buyers’ Protective Decree,” vested the NHA with exclusive jurisdiction to regulate
the real estate trade and business in accordance with its provisions. It empowered the NHA to
register, approve and monitor real estate development projects and issue licenses to sell to real
estate owners and developers. It further granted the NHA the authority to register and
issue/revoke licenses of brokers, dealers and salesmen engaged in the selling of subdivision
lots and condominium units.

Page 348 of 370

Martinez v. Villanueva, G.R. No. 169196, July 6, 2011.

FACTS:
Petitioner Martinez is the General Manager of Claveria Agri-Based Multi-Purpose
Cooperative, Inc. (CABMPCI) while respondent Villanueva is the Assistant Regional Director of
the Cooperative Development Authority (CDA), Regional Office No. 02, Tuguegarao City,
Cagayan. Respondent solicited several loans from CABMPCI. The Ombudsman later found that
Respondent abused her position when she solicited a loan from CABMPCI despite the fact that
she is disqualified by its by-laws. The relevant provision under which respondent was charged is
Section 7(d) of R.A. No. 6713.

On appeal, Respondent argued that the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon
erred in treating the loan she obtained from CABMPCI as a prohibited loan under Section 7(d)
of R.A. No. 6713 because she was an official of the CDA. Respondent argued that although
Section 7(d) of R.A. No. 6713 prohibits all public officials and employees from soliciting or
accepting loans in connection with any operation being regulated by her office, the subsequent
enactment of R.A. No. 6938 or the Cooperative Code of the Philippines allows qualified officials
and employees to become members of cooperatives and naturally, to avail of the attendant
privileges and benefits of membership. She contended that it would be absurd if CDA officials
and employees who are eligible to apply for membership in a cooperative would be prohibited
from availing loans. On appeal, the CA that respondent should not have been held liable for
grave misconduct because of the supposed failure of Martinez to show undue influence

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Cooperative Code impliedly repealed Section 7 (d) of RA 6713.

RULING:
No. True, the Cooperative Code allows CDA officials and employees to become
members of cooperatives and enjoy the privileges and benefits attendant to membership.
However, it should not be taken as creating in favor of CDA officials and employees an
exemption from the coverage of Section 7(d), R.A. No. 6713 considering that the benefits and
privileges attendant to membership in a cooperative are not confined solely to availing of loans
and not all cooperatives are established for the sole purpose of providing credit facilities to their
members. Thus, the limitation on the benefits which respondent may enjoy in connection with
her alleged membership in CABMPCI does not lead to absurd results and does not render
naught membership in the cooperative or render R.A. No. 6938 ineffectual, contrary to
respondent’s assertions.

We find that such limitation is but a necessary consequence of the privilege of holding a
public office and is akin to the other limitations that, although interfering with a public servant’s
private rights, are nonetheless deemed valid in light of the public trust nature of public
employment.

Page 349 of 370

Mecano v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 103982, December 11, 1992.

FACTS:
Petitioner requested reimbursement for his expenses on the ground that he is entitled to
the benefits under Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 (RAC). Commission
on Audit (COA) Chairman, in his 7th Indorsement, denied petitioner’s claim on the ground that
Section 699 of the RAC had been repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987 (Exec. Order
No. 292), solely for the reason that the same section was not restated nor re-enacted in the
latter.

Petitioner also anchored his claim on Department of Justice Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 by
Secretary Drilon stating that “the issuance of the Administrative Code did not operate to repeal
or abrogate in its entirety the Revised Administrative Code. The COA, on the other hand,
strongly maintains that the enactment of the Administrative Code of 1987 operated to revoke or
supplant in its entirety the RAC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Administrative Code of 1987 repealed or abrogated Section 699 of
the Revised Administrative Code of 1917.

RULING:
NO. Petition granted. Respondent ordered to give due course on petitioner’s claim for
benefits.

Repeal by implication proceeds on the premise that where a statute of later date clearly
reveals an intention on the part of the legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject, that
intention must be given effect. Hence, before there can be a repeal, there must be a clear
showing on the part of the lawmaker that the intent in enacting the new law was to abrogate the
old one. The intention to repeal must be clear and manifest; otherwise, at least, as a general
rule, the later act is to be construed as a continuation of, and not a substitute for, the first act
and will continue so far as the two acts are the same from the time of the first enactment.

It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals of statutes by implication are

not favored. The presumption is against inconsistency and repugnancy for the legislature is
presumed to know the existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted inconsistent or
conflicting statutes. The two Codes should be read in pari materia.

Page 350 of 370

Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Philippine Airlines Lines, Inc.,
G.R. Nos. 212536-37, August 27, 2014.

FACTS:
Philippine Airlines, Inc. had zero taxable income for 2000 but would have been liable for
Minimum Corporate Income Tax based on its gross income. However, Philippine Airlines, Inc.
did not pay the Minimum Corporate Income Tax using as basis its franchise which exempts it
from “all other taxes” upon payment of whichever is lower of either (a) the basic corporate
income tax based on the net taxable income or (b) a franchise tax of 2%.

ISSUE:
Whether or not PD 1590 has been revoked by the NIRC of 1997.

RULING:
It is a basic principle of statutory construction that a later law, general in terms and not
expressly repealing or amending a prior special law, will not ordinarily affect the special
provisions of such earlier statute. So, it must be here. Indeed, as things stand, PD 1590 has not
been revoked by the NIRC of 1997, as amended. Or to be more precise, the tax privilege of PAL
provided in Sec. 13 of PD 1590 has not been revoked by Sec. 131 of the NIRC of 1997, as
amended by Sec. 6 of RA 9334.

We said as much in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Philippine Air Lines, Inc, 592
SCRA 237 (2009): That the Legislature chose not to amend or repeal [PD] 1590 even after PAL
was privatized reveals the intent of the Legislature to let PAL continue to enjoy, as a private
corporation, the very same rights and privileges under the terms and conditions stated in said
charter.

Page 351 of 370

Berces v. Guingona, G.R. No. 112099. February 21, 1995.

FACTS:
Petitioner filed with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan two administrative cases against
respondent incumbent Mayor and obtained favorable decision suspending the latter.
Respondent Mayor appealed to the Office of the President questioning the decision and at the
same time prayed for the stay of execution in accordance with Sec. 67(b) of the Local
Government Code (LGC).

The Office of the President thru the Executive Secretary directed “stay of execution”.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was dismissed. Petitioner filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court with prayer for mandatory
preliminary injunction, assailing the Orders of the Office of the President as having been issued
with grave abuses of discretion. Petitioner argued that Sec. 68 of LGC (1991) impliedly repealed
Section 6 of Administrative Order No. 18 (1987).

ISSUE:
Whether or not Sec. 68 of R.A. No. 7160 repealed Sec. 6 of Administrative Order No. 18.

RULING:
No. Petition was dismissed. “Stay of execution” applied.

The first sentence of Section 68 merely provides that an “appeal shall not prevent a
decision from becoming final or executory.” As worded, there is room to construe said provision
as giving discretion to the reviewing officials to stay the execution of the appealed decision.
There is nothing to infer therefrom that the reviewing officials are deprived of the authority to
order a stay of the appealed order. If the intention of Congress was to repeal Section 6 of
Administrative Order No. 18, it could have used more direct language expressive of such
intention.

An implied repeal predicates the intended repeal upon the condition that a substantial
conflict must be found between the new and prior laws. In the absence of an express repeal, a
subsequent law cannot be construed as repealing a prior law unless an irreconcilable,
inconsistency and repugnancy exists in the terms of the new and old laws.

Page 352 of 370

Erectors Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 104215, May 8, 1996.

FACTS:
In September 1979, Erectors recruited Florencio Burgos to work as Service Contract
Driver in Saudi Arabia for 12 months with a salary of $165 and an allowance of $165 per month.
Burgos will also be entitled a bonus of $1000 if after the 12-month period, he renews/extends
his contract without availing his vacation or home leave. His contract was approved by the
Ministry of Labor and Employment.

However, the contract was not implemented. In December 1979, Erectors notified
Burgos that the position of Service Driver was no longer available. On December 14, 1979, they
executed another contract changing his position from driver to laborer with a salary of $105 and
an allowance of $105 per month. This contract was not submitted to the MLE.

On December 1979, Burgos left the country and worked at Erectors Buraidah Sports
Complex project in Saudi Arabia as a laborer. He received a monthly salary and allowance of
$210. Burgos renewed his contract after one year and his salary and allowance were increased
to $231.

Burgos returned to Philippines on August 1981. He then invoked his first employment
contract. He demanded the difference between his salary and allowance in the said contract
and the amount paid to him.

On March 1982, Burgos filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for underpayment of
wages and non-payment of overtime pay and bonus.

While his case was still in conciliation stage, EO 797 creating POEA was established
Sec. 4(a) of EO 797 vested the POEA with "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases
including money claims, involving employer-employee relationship arising out of or by virtue of
any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas employment."

Despite EO 797, Labor Arbiter proceeded to try the case and rendered judgement in
favor of Burgos. In view of EO 797, Erectors questioned the jurisdiction of the LA in NLRC.
NLRC dismissed the petitioner's appeal and upheld the LA's jurisdiction.

ISSUE:
Whether or not EO 797 applies retroactively to affect pending cases, including the
complaint filed by Burgos.

RULING:
No. The rule is that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the law in force
at the time of the commencement of the action. On March 31, 1982, at the time private
respondent filed his complaint against the petitioner, the prevailing laws were Presidential
Decree No. 1691 and Presidential Decree No. 1391 which vested the Regional Offices of the
Ministry of Labor and the Labor Arbiters with "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases
involving employer-employee relations including money claims arising out of any law or

Page 353 of 370

contracts involving Filipino workers for overseas employment." At the time of the filing of the
complaint, the Labor Arbiter had clear jurisdiction over the same.

City Government of San Pablo, Laguna v. Reyes, G.R. No. 127708, March 25, 1999.

FACTS:
After the Escudero franchise under Act No. 3648 was transferred to MERALCO, PD. 551
was enacted and provides that the franchise tax shall be 2% of the gross receipts in lieu of all
taxes and assessments of whatever nature imposed by any national or local authority on
earnings, receipts, income and privilege of generation, distribution and sale of electric current.

Pursuant to the enactment of the Local Government Code, the Sangguniang

Panglunsod of San Pablo City enacted Ordinance No. 56, otherwise known as the Revenue
Code of the City of San Pablo imposing a tax on business enjoying a franchise, at a rate of
50% of 1% of the gross annual receipts, which shall include both cash sales and sales on
account realized during the preceding calendar year within the city.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was violation of non-impairment clause when the City of San Pablo
imposed a local franchise tax pursuant to the LGC upon MERALCO considering that under PD
551 the tax paid is in lieu of all taxes and assessments of whatever nature imposed by any
national or local authority on savings or income.

RULING:
No. The phrase in lieu of all taxes have to give way to the peremptory language of the
Local Government Code specifically providing for the withdrawal of such exemptions, privileges,
and that upon the effectivity of the Local Government Code all exemptions except only as
provided therein can no longer be invoked by MERALCO to disclaim liability for the local tax.

There is further basis for the conclusion that the non-impairment of contract clause
cannot be invoked to uphold Meralco’s exemption from the local tax. Legislative franchise under
Act No. 3648 provided that the franchise is granted upon the condition that it shall be subject to
amendment, or repeal by the Congress of the United States.

Also, under the 1935, the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions, no franchise or right shall be
granted except under the condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by
the National Assembly when the public interest so requires. With or without the reservation
clause, franchises are subject to alterations through a reasonable exercise of the police power;
they are also subject to alteration by the power to tax, which like police power cannot be
contracted away.

Page 354 of 370

Juan v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 132378, January 18, 2000.

FACTS:
Information were filed against Petitioner Juan, De Jesus, Carreon and Galguerra of
Barangay Talipapa Nova, Quezon City for violation of Section 261 (o) of the Omnibus Election
Code before the Regional Trial Court. Juan and De Jesus used the VHF radio transceiver
owned by the barangay for election campaign while the other two used a tricycle owned by the
barangay also for their political campaigns.

Petitioners questioned the standing of movants and assailed the information that it did
not conform to the notice requirements under the Rules of Court. The RTC issued an order
directing the immediate suspension from office of all the accused for a period of 60 days from
service of the order.

CA upheld the ruling of the RTC. And said that Section 13 of RA 3019 is mandatory in
character upon the filing of a valid information in court. It can be issued in whatever stage of
execution and mode of participation is pending in court and that it is justifiable for as long as its
continuance is for a reasonable length of time,

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners can be preventively suspended under RA 3019 since the
offense for which they were charged was under the Omnibus Election Code.

RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that before the amendment, only public officers charged with
violation of RA 3019 or those covered by the RPC provision on bribery may be preventively
suspended. Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, when it amended RA 3019, expanded the preventive
suspension provision. Under the amendment, public officers may likewise be suspended if they
are charged with offenses under Title 7, Book II of the RPC, or with any other form of fraud
involving government funds or property.

The Court categorized the charges against the accused as constituent of fraud involving
governments funds or property. While the accused had been charged under the Omnibus
Election Code, the Code must be read with complementing law. The Court posited that charges
are not uni-dimensional, hence, are covered by Section 13 of RA 3019. It upheld the validity of
the preventive suspension.

Page 355 of 370

Giron v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 188179, January 22, 2013.

FACTS:
This case is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition assailing the
constitutionality of Sec. 12 (Substitution of Candidates) and Sec. 14 (Repealing Clause) of R.A.
9006, otherwise known as the Fair Election Act. The Petition also seeks to prohibit the
COMELEC from further implementing the aforesaid sections of the Fair Election Act, on the
ground that these provisions would enable elective officials to gain campaign advantage and
allow them to disburse public funds from the time they file their certificates of candidacy until
after the elections.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the inclusion of Sections 12 and 14 in the Fair Election Act violates
Section 26(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, or the “one subject-one title” rule.

RULING:
No. It is a well-settled rule that courts are to adopt a liberal interpretation in favor of the
constitutionality of legislation, as Congress is deemed to have enacted a valid, sensible, and
just law. Because of this strong presumption, the one who asserts the invalidity of a law has to
prove that there is a clear, unmistakable, and unequivocal breach of the Constitution; otherwise
the petition must fail.

After a thorough review of the arguments raised, the Court found that petitioner and
petitioners-in-intervention were unable to present a compelling reason that would surpass the
strong presumption of validity and constitutionality in favor of the Fair Election Act. They have
not put forward any gripping justification to reverse the ruling in Fariñas, in which the SC have
already ruled that the title and the objectives of R.A. 9006 are comprehensive enough to include
subjects other than the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda.

Page 356 of 370

APPLYING LEGAL METHOD

In re Estate of Johnson, G.R. No. L-12767, November 16, 1918.

FACTS:
On February 4, 1916, Emil H. Johnson, a native of Sweden and a naturalized citizen of
the United States, died in the city of Manila. He left a will disposing an estate with an estimated
amount of P231,800. The will was written in the testator’s own handwriting, and is signed by
himself and two witnesses only, instead of three witnesses required by section 618 of the Code
of Civil Procedure.

This will, therefore, was not executed in conformity with the provisions of law generally
applicable to wills executed by inhabitants of these Islands, and hence could not have been
proved under section 618.

On February 9, 1916, however, a petition was presented in the Court of First Instance of
the city of Manila for the probate of this will, on the ground that 1) Johnson was, at the time of
his death, a citizen of the State of Illinois, United States of America; 2) that the will was duly
executed in accordance with the laws of that State; and hence could properly be probated here
pursuant to section 636 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Petitioner alleged that the law is
inapplicable to his father’s will.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was deprivation of due process on the part of the petitioner.

RULING:
Due publication was made pursuant to this order of the court through the three-week
publication of the notice in Manila Daily Bulletin. The Supreme Court also asserted that in view
of the statute concerned which reads as “A will made within the Philippine Islands by a citizen or
subject of another state or country, which is executed in accordance with the law of the state or
country of which he is a citizen or subject, and which might be proved and allowed by the law of
his own state or country, may be proved, allowed, and recorded in the Philippine Islands, and
shall have the same effect as if executed according to the laws of these Islands” the “state”,
being not capitalized, does not mean that United States is excluded from the phrase (because
during this time, Philippines was still a territory of the US).

Page 357 of 370

Kare v. Platon, G.R. No. L-35902, October 28, 1931.

FACTS:
The petitioner filed a motion of protest contesting the election of the respondent
Francisco Perfecto, upon the grounds that the respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance
of Albay entered an order requiring the petitioner to give a personal bond for P3,000 and a cash
bond of P2,000 to be deposited with the provincial treasurer of Albay in order that proper
proceedings might be taken on his motion of protest. These sums were later changed so that
the cash bond was for P1,500 and the personal bond for P3,500.

The petitioner invoked section 482 of the Election Law in support of his contention. The
respondent judge bases his action upon the same section and also upon section 479 as lately
amended by Act No. 3699. Section 482 provides:

Bond or cash deposit required of contestants. — Before the court shall entertain any such
contest or counter-contest or admit an appeal, the party filing the contest, counter-contest, or
appeal shall give bond in an amount fixed by the court with two sureties satisfactory to it,
conditioned that he will pay all expenses and costs incident to such motion or appeal, or shall
deposit cash in court in lieu of such bond.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the court may require the petitioner either a bond or a cash deposit.

RULING:
Yes. Said section is preceded by the heading, "Bond or cash deposit required of
contestants," which apparently indicates that the court taking cognizance of the election contest
may require the contestant either to give a bond or to make a cash deposit. But the petitioner
contends that the right to choose between giving a personal bond and depositing a sum of
money in lieu thereof is granted only to the contestant or appellant. If there be any conflict
between the heading of the section under question and the body, it must be settled according to
the canons of statutory construction.

Black on Interpretation of Laws, page 181, says: "Headings prefixed to the titled,
chapters, and sections of a statute or code may be consulted in aid of the interpretation, in case
of doubt or ambiguity; but inferences drawn from such headings are entitled to very little weight,
and they can never control the plain terms of the enacting clauses." The rule accepted by most
of the authorities is that if the chapter or section heading has been inserted merely for
convenience of reference, and not as an integral part of the statute, it should not be allowed to
control the interpretation.

Applying this rule to the case at bar, it will be seen that the present section provides that
before the court entertain any contest or counter-contest or admits an appeal, the party filing the
contest, counter-contest or appeal shall give bond with two sureties to the satisfaction of the
court, or deposit cash in court in lieu of such bond. The court holds that the court may only
require a personal bond, and that the contestant may make a cash deposit in lieu thereof.

Page 358 of 370

 The court ruled that although it does not adhere strictly to legal technical phraseology,
there is in it no excess of jurisdiction or abuse of judicial discretion to be rectified by means of
the writ applied for. Hence the petition was dismissed.

Centeno v. Villalon-Pornillos, G.R. No. 113092, September 1, 1994.

FACTS:
In the last quarter of 1985, the officers of a civic organization known as the Samahang
Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikay launched a fund drive for the purpose of renovating the chapel of
Barrio Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan.

Petitioner Martin Centeno, the chairman of the group, together with Vicente Yco,
approached Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, a resident of Tikay, and solicited from her a
contribution of P1,500.00. It is admitted that the solicitation was made without a permit from the
Department of Social Welfare and Development.

As a consequence, based on the complaint of Judge Angeles, an information was filed

against petitioner Martin Centeno, together with Religio Evaristo and Vicente Yco, for violation
of Presidential Decree No. 1564, or the Solicitation Permit Law, before the Municipal Trial Court
of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch and docketed as Criminal Case No. 2602.

On December 29, 1992, the said trial court rendered judgment finding accused Vicente
Yco and petitioner Centeno guilty beyond reasonable doubt and sentencing them to each pay a
fine of P200.00

ISSUE:
Whether or not charitable purposes can be construed in its broadest sense so as to
include a religious purpose.

RULING:
No and that legislative enactments specifically spelled out "charitable" and "religious" in
an enumeration, whereas Presidential Decree No. 1564 merely stated "charitable or public
welfare purposes," only goes to show that the framers of the law in question never intended to
include solicitations for religious purposes within its coverage. Otherwise, there is no reason
why it would not have so stated expressly.

Solicitation for religious purposes may be subject to proper regulation by the State in the
exercise of police power. However, in the case at bar, considering that solicitations intended for
a religious purpose are not within the coverage of Presidential Decree No. 1564, as earlier
demonstrated, petitioner cannot be held criminally liable therefor and therefore acquitted.

Page 359 of 370

Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014.

FACTS:
Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354,
otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH
Law), challengers from various sectors of society came knocking on the doors of the Court,
beckoning it to wield the sword that strikes down constitutional disobedience. Aware of the
profound and lasting impact that its decision may produce, the Court now faces the controversy,
as presented in fourteen (14) petitions and two (2) petitions-in-intervention.

The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared unconstitutional.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the RH law is unconstitutional?

RULING:
The Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as not unconstitutional except with respect to the
following provisions which are declared unconstitutional:
[1] Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require
private health facilities and non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and
operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in an emergency or life-threatening case,
as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility which is conveniently
accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or minors who have suffered a miscarriage access to
modem methods of family planning without written consent from their parents or guardian/s;
[2] Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24
thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and or refuses to
disseminate information regarding programs and services on reproductive health regardless
of his or her religious beliefs.
[3] Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a
married individual, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic
Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health procedures without the consent of the spouse;
[4] Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit
the requirement of parental consent only to elective surgical procedures.
[5] Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24
thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and/or refuses to
refer a patient not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act
No. 8344, to another health care service provider within the same facility or one which is
conveniently accessible regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
[6] Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24
thereof, insofar as they punish any public officer who refuses to support reproductive health
programs or shall do any act that hinders the full implementation of a reproductive health
program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
[7] Section 17 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro
bona reproductive health service in so far as they affect the conscientious objector in
securing PhilHealth accreditation; and

Page 360 of 370

[8] Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier "primarily"
in defining abortifacients and contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and
void for contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution.

Song Kiat Chocolate Factory v. Central Bank of the Phil.,

G.R. No. L-8888, November 29,1957.

FACTS:
During the period from January 8, 1953 to October 9, 1953, the plaintiff appellant
imported sun dried cocoa beans for which it paid the foreign exchange tax of 17 per cent
totaling P74,671.04. Claiming exemption from said tax under Section 2 of same Act, it sued the
Central Bank that had exacted psayment; and in its amended complaint it included the
Treasurer of the Philippines. CFI Manila dismissed the case on the ground that the term
"chocolate" does not include sun-dried cocoa beans.

ISSUE:
Whether or not cocoa beans may be considered as "chocolate" for the purposes of
exemption from the foreign exchange tax imposed by Republic Act No. 601 as amended.

RULING:
No, exemption from Section 2 of chocolate does not include cocoa beans. Having in
mind the principle of strict construction of statutes exempting from taxation, we are of the
opinion and so hold, that the exemption for "chocolate" in the above Section 2 does not include
"cocoa beans". The one is raw material, the other manufactured consumer product; the latter is
ready for human consumption; the former is not.

On the other hand, the congress approved Republic Act 1197 amending Section 2 by
substituting "cocoa beans" for "chocolate.". However, since statutes operate prospectively, the
amendments cannot be applied in the case at bar. The appellant's cocoa beans had been
imported during January - October 1953, i.e. before the exemption decree which is after
September 3, 1954 pursuant to Proclamation No. 62.

Page 361 of 370

 Southern Cross Cement Corp. v. Philippine Cement Manufacturers Corp.,
G.R. No. 158540, July 8, 2004.

FACTS:

Petitioner Southern Cross Cement Corporation (Southern Cross) is a domestic

corporation engaged in the business of cement manufacturing, production, importation and
exportation. Private respondent Philippine Cement Manufacturers Corporation (Philcemcor) is
an association of domestic cement manufacturers. DTI accepted an application from
Philcemcor, alleging that the importation of gray Portland cement in increased quantities has
caused declines in domestic production, capacity utilization, market share, sales and
employment; as well as caused depressed local prices. Accordingly, Philcemcor sought the
imposition a definitive safeguard measures on the import of cement pursuant to the Safeguard
Measures Act.

The Tariff Commission received a request from the DTI for a formal investigation to
determine whether or not to impose a definitive safeguard measure on imports of gray Portland
cement.

After reviewing the report, then DTI Secretary Manuel Roxas II (DTI Secretary)
disagreed with the conclusion of the Tariff Commission that there was no serious injury to the
local cement industry caused by the surge of imports. In view of this disagreement, the DTI
requested an opinion from the Department of Justice (DOJ) on the DTI Secretary’s scope of
options in acting on the Commission’s recommendations.

Subsequently, then DOJ Secretary Hernando Perez rendered an opinion stating that
Section 13 of the SMA precluded a review by the DTI Secretary of the Tariff Commissions
negative finding, or finding that a definitive safeguard measure should not be imposed. DTI then
denied application for safeguard measures against the importation of gray Portland cement.

Philcemcor received a copy of the DTI Decision on 12 April 2002. Ten days later, it filed
with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus seeking to set
aside the DTI Decision, as well as the Tariff Commissions Report. On the other hand, Southern
Cross filed its Comment arguing that the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction over Philcemcors
Petition, for it is on the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) that the SMA conferred jurisdiction to review
rulings of the Secretary in connection with the imposition of a safeguard measure.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the decision of DTI Secretary, to impose safeguard measures is valid.

RULING:
No, due to the nature of this case, the Court found that the DTI should follow the
regulations prescribed by SMA. The Court held that he assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals is declared null and void and set aside. The Decision of the DTI Secretary dated 25
June 2003 is also declared null and void and set aside.

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 Yet on 25 June 2003, the DTI Secretary issued a new Decision, ruling this time that that
in light of the appellate court’s Decision there was no longer any legal impediment to his
deciding Philcemcors application for definitive safeguard measures. He made a determination
that, contrary to the findings of the Tariff Commission, the local cement industry had suffered
serious injury as a result of the import surges. Accordingly, he imposed a definitive safeguard
measure on the importation of gray Portland cement, in the form of a definitive safeguard duty in
the amount of P20.60/40 kg. bag for three years on imported gray Portland Cement.

Nilo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. L-34586 & L-36625, April 2, 1984.

FACTS:
Respondent Almario Gatchalian is the owner of a parcel of rice land at Barrio San
Roque, San Rafael, Bulacan with an area of two (2) hectares covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-76791 of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan. Petitioner Hospicio Nilo has been the
agricultural share-tenant of Gatchalian since agricultural year 1964-65.

On February 22, 1967, petitioner filed a petition in C.A.R. Case No. 1676 with the Court
of Agrarian Relations electing the leasehold system. On March 7, 1968, Gatchalian flied an
ejectment suit against petitioner on the ground of personal cultivation under Sec. 36 (1) of
Republic Act No. 3844. Nilo alleged by way of affirmative defense that the ejectment suit was
but an act of reprisal and retaliation because he elected the leasehold system.

The Court of Agrarian Relations found that there was a bona fide intention to cultivate
the land personally. The petitioner appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed
the decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations. The Court found no justification to unduly
interfere with the desire of Gatchalian to personally cultivate his own land.

The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration contending that "personal cultivation as
a ground for ejectment of an agricultural lessee has been eliminated under Republic Act No.
6389". The latter law which took effect on September 10, 1971. The respondent Court of
Appeals denied the motion resolving that Republic Act No. 6389 has no retroactive application.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the amendment in R.A. 6389 should be given retroactive effect to cover
cases that were filed during the effectivity of the repealed provision.

RULING:
Laws shall not have a retroactive effect unless therein otherwise provided. (Article 3 of
the old Civil Code ,now Article 4 of the New Civil Code)That it was the intention of the legislature
in amending paragraph (1), sec. 36 of R.A. 3844 to deprive the landowner of the right to eject
his tenant on the ground that the former would personally cultivate the land and also to abate
cases brought by the landowner to eject the tenant on the same grounds which were still
pending at the time of the passage of the amendatory act, is clear and evident from the
deliberations and debate of Congress when Republic Act 6389 was being deliberated, as
published in the Senate Journal ....the massive overhaul of the system of land ownership by the
transfer to the tenants of the ownership of the land they till and the grant to them of the
instruments and mechanisms to increase their land's productivity will decisively improve the
people's livelihood and promote political and social stability.

Section 12 of Article XIV specifically mandates that "the State shall formulate and
implement an agrarian reform program aimed at emancipating the tenant from the bondage of
the soil and achieving the goals enunciated in this Constitution." At any rate, there is no need to

Page 363 of 370

pass upon the constitutional issue for the purpose of resolving the narrow question of
retroactivity of the questioned provision. The petition is denied for lack of merit.

Casco Phil. Chem. Co., Inc. v. Gimenez, G.R. No. L- 17931, February 28, 1963.

FACTS:
Casco Chemical Co., which is engaged in the manufacture of synthetic resin glues used
in bonding lumber and veneer by plywood and hardwood producers, bought foreign exchange
for the importation of urea and formaldehyde which are the main raw materials in the production
of the said glues. They paid P33,765.42 in November and December 1949 and P6345.72 in
May 1960.

Prior thereto, the petitioner sought the refund of the first and second sum relying upon
Resolution No. 1529 of the Monetary Board of said bank, dated November 3, 1959, declaring
that the separate importation of urea and formaldehyde is exempt from said fee.

The Auditor of the Bank, Pedro Gimenez, refused to pass in audit and approve the said
refund on the ground that the exemption granted by the board in not in accord with the provision
of section 2 of RA 2609.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Urea and formaldehyde are exempt by law from the payment of the
margin fee.

RULING:
No, it is not exempt from payment of the marginal fee. Urea formaldehyde is clearly a
finished product which is distinct from urea and formaldehyde. The petitioners contend that the
bill approved in Congress contained the conjunction “and” between the terms “urea” and
“formaldehyde” separately as essential elements in the manufacture of “urea formaldehyde” and
not the latter. But this is not reflective of the view of the Senate and the intent of the House of
Representatives in passing the bill. If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before
it was passed the only remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.

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 Resins, Inc. v. Auditor General, G.R. No. L-17888, October 29, 1968.

FACTS:
Petitioner Resins Inc, as in Casco v. Gimenez, seeks a refund from respondent Central
Bank on the claim that it was exempt from the margin fee under RA 2609 for the importation of
urea and formaldehyde, as separate units, used for the production of synthetic glue, of which it
was a manufacturer.

Since the specific language of the Act speak of “urea formaldehyde” and petitioner
admittedly did import urea and formaldehyde separately, it can be exempted if the law was
construed to read “urea and formaldehyde.”

ISSUE:
Whether or not Resin’s contention is with merit.

RULING:
No. “Urea formaldehyde” is clearly a finished product, which is patently distinct from
“urea” and “formaldehyde” as separate articles. Resins contend that the approved Congress bill
contained the conjunction “and” and that Congress intended to exempt urea and formaldehyde
separately, citing statements made on the floor of the Senate. Said individual statements do not
necessarily reflect the view of the Senate, much less of the House of Representatives. It is also
well settled that the enrolled bill is conclusive upon the courts. If there has been any mistake in
the printing of the bill, the remedy is by amendment or curative language not by judicial decree.

Additionally, refund partakes of a nature of an exemption, it cannot be allowed unless

granted in the most explicit and categorical language. The Court has held that exemption from
taxation is not favored and never presumed, so that if granted it must be strictly construed
against the taxpayer (strictissimi juris). Petition denied.

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THE MEMORANDUM OF LAW

Yambot v. Tuquero, G.R. No. 169895, March 23, 2011.

FACTS:
An article from the Philippine Daily inquirer headlined a report written by Contreras,
herein referred to as the petitioner regarding the mauling incident that happened between RTC
Judge Cruz and Mendoza, an administrative officer assigned at Makati RTC. Such article was
referred to by Judge Cruz as false and malicious so the latter filed a libel case against the writer,
particularly the line that states that the said judge still has a pending sexual harassment case
filed at the SC. It appeared that the sexual harassment being referred to by the Petitioner was
based from a Court Petition for cancellation of contempt order by one Paredes- Garcia. She
appended an affidavit executed by Talag-Pascual to purportedly show the proclivity of Judge
Cruz for seducing women who became objects of his fancy, stating that she also suffered the
same infirmities. The SC later on granted the petition for cancellation of contempt order but the
administrative case against the Judge was not passed upon.

Subsequently, the RTC of Makati approved a resolution finding probable cause against
the PDI employees hence an information was filed them. The petitioners appealed to the DOJ
and the CA who dismissed the same hence the said Petition for review on Certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a petition for certiorari assailing the resolution of the Secretary of Justice
may be allowed, notwithstanding the filing of an information with the trial court.

RULING:
Similar to the present case, in Advincula, respondents Amando and Isagani Ocampo
filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with the Court of Appeals questioning the
Resolution of the Secretary of Justice which had earlier led to the filing of Informations against
them in court.

The Court of Appeals granted the Petition and set aside the Resolution of the Secretary
of Justice. In reversing the Decision of the Court of Appeals, we applied the rule that certiorari,
being an extraordinary writ, cannot be resorted to when other remedies are available. The Court
observed that respondents had other remedies available to them, such as the filing of a Motion
to Quash the Information under Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, or allowing the trial to proceed
where they could either file a demurrer to evidence or present their evidence to disprove the
charges against them.

At the outset, it should be made clear that the Court is not abandoning the foregoing
ruling in Advincula. However, Advincula cannot be read to completely disallow the institution of
certiorari proceedings against the Secretary of Justice’s determination of probable cause when
the criminal information has already been filed in court. Under exceptional circumstances, a
petition for certiorari assailing the resolution of the Secretary of Justice (involving an appeal of

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the prosecutor’s ruling on probable cause) may be allowed, notwithstanding the filing of an
information with the trial court.

WEEK 14

The Memorandum of Law

1. Yambot v. Tuquero, G.R. No. 169895, March 23, 2011.

Legal Method and the Rule of Law

1. Maliksi v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 203302, March 12, 2013.
2. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 567 (2006).

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Maliksi v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 203302, March 12, 2013.

FACTS:
During the 2010 Elections, Saquilayan was proclaimed as winner for the position of
Mayor of Imus, Cavite. Maliksi, the candidate who garnered the second highest number of
votes, brought an election protest in the RTC in Imus, Cavite alleging that there were
irregularities in the counting of votes in 209 clustered precincts. Subsequently, the RTC held a
revision of the votes, and, based on the results of the revision, declared Maliksi as the duly
elected Mayor of Imus commanding Saquilayan to cease and desist from performing the
functions of said office. Saquilayan appealed to the COMELEC. In the meanwhile, the RTC
granted Maliksi's motion for execution pending appeal, and Maliksi was then installed as Mayor.

The COMELEC First Division, without giving notice to the parties, decided to recount the
ballots through the use of the printouts of the ballot images from the CF cards. Thus, it issued
an order dated requiring Saquilayan to deposit the amount necessary to defray the expenses for
the decryption and printing of the ballot images. Later, it issued another order for Saquilayan to
augment his cash deposit.

ISSUE:
Whether the Supreme Court erred in dismissing the instant petition despite a clear
violation of petitioner's constitutional right to due process of law considering that decryption,
printing and examination of the digital images of the ballots were done inconspicuously upon
motu propio directive of the COMELEC First Division sans any notice to the petitioner and for
the first time on appeal.

RULING:
Based on the pronouncement in Alliance of Barangay Concerns (ABC) v. Commission
on Elections, the power of the COMELEC to adopt procedures that will ensure the speedy
resolution of its cases should still be exercised only after giving to all the parties the opportunity
to be heard on their opposing claims. The parties right to be heard upon adversarial issues and
matters is never to be waived or sacrificed, or to be treated so lightly because of the possibility
of the substantial prejudice to be thereby caused to the parties, or to any of them. Thus, the
COMELEC En Banc should not have upheld the First Divisions deviation from the regular
procedure in the guise of speedily resolving the election protest, in view of its failure to provide
the parties with notice of its proceedings and an opportunity to be heard, the most basic
requirements of due process.

The picture images of the ballots are electronic documents that are regarded as the
equivalents of the original official ballots themselves. That the two documents the official ballot
and its picture image are considered "original documents" simply means that both of them are
given equal probative weight. In short, when either is presented as evidence, one is not
considered as weightier than the other.

Page 368 of 370

 But this juridical reality does not authorize the courts, the COMELEC, and the Electoral
Tribunals to quickly and unilaterally resort to the printouts of the picture images of the ballots in
the proceedings had before them without notice to the parties. Despite the equal probative
weight accorded to the official ballots and the printouts of their picture images, the rules for the
revision of ballots adopted for their respective proceedings still consider the official ballots to be
the primary or best evidence of the voters will. In that regard, the picture images of the ballots
are to be used only when it is first shown that the official ballots are lost or their integrity has
been compromised

Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 567 (2006).

FACTS:
It is alleged that between the years of 1996 and 2001, Hamdan was engaged in actions
in preparation of the September 11, 2001 attacks against the United States. Militia forces in
Afghanistan that were fighting the Taliban captured Hamdan and turned him over to the U.S.
Military in 2002. He was transferred to Guantanamo Bay. A United States occupied Military
base. After a year of being detained without any charges being brought against him, President
Bush declared that he had committed acts triable by a military commission. He was charged
with one count of conspiracy to commit offenses triable by the commission. This commission is
created by military necessity, not by statute or constitutional power. This commission has a
presiding officer and at least three other members. The accused is afforded military counsel,
and a copy of the charges against him. This hearing may be conducted outside the presence of
the accused for the accused does not have a right to see all evidence or hear all witness
statement against him for purposes of national security. After being tried and convicted of
conspiracy, Hamdan apply for a writ of Habeas Corpus stating he deserved all the constitutional
rights afforded to him at trial, the writ was granted.

ISSUE:
Whether Hamdan committed a crime triable by military commissions and whether that
commission is constitutional.

RULING:
No. The President at a time of war has the power to try and punish crimes against the
laws of nations. This is the constitutional provision used to show that military commission
tribunals are legal. However, this court feels that only certain circumstances allow for offense to
be triable in a military commission. Those offenses are; (1) in place of civilian courts when
marital law has been declared, (2) temporary military government in occupied territory or in
lands where there is no government to try cases, and (3) when the crime is an incident to the
conduct of war which violate the laws of war.

The court states that only the 3rd type applies, however the charge of conspiracy is not
an incident to the conduct of war. Incidents of war are accusations of actual conduct, not the
attempt or planning of such conduct. Inchoate criminal charges belong in a federal court or court
martial proceeding. Secondly this commission violates not only constitutional rights afforded an
individual, but also rules established by the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and the
Geneva Conventions.

A military commission tribunal must have rules and regulations that do not fall short of at
least a military court marshal proceeding. The lack of presence and ability to see the evidence
and witness before you is not constitutional. Therefore, Hamdan should not be tried in front of
this commission. This court reversed the commission’s charges of conspiracy.

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