Rheem of the Philippines v Ferrer (In re: Proceedings Against Enrile...

)
Facts:
The proceeding for certiorari and contempt is an offshoot of the Court of Industrial Relations’ (CIR) denial of motion to
dismiss the respondent’s complaint.

The following was filed by the counsel (Atty. Jose S. Armonio) for the petitioner:
One pitfall into which this Honorable Court has repeatedly fallen whenever the question as to whether or not a particular
subject matter is within the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations is the tendency of this Honorable Court to rely
upon its own pronouncement without due regard to the statutes which delineate the jurisdiction of the industrial court.
Quite often, it is overlooked that no court, not even this Honorable Court, is empowered to expand or contract through its
decision the scope of its jurisdictional authority as conferred by law. This error is manifested by the decisions of this
Honorable Court citing earlier rulings but without making any reference to and analysis of the pertinent statute governing
the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations. This manifestation appears in this Honorable Court's decision in the
instant case. As a result, the errors committed in earlier cases dealing with the jurisdiction of the industrial court are
perpetuated in subsequent cases involving the same issue . . . .

The Court ordered counsel to show cause why he should not be held in contempt.

Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Armonio’s statements violated the duty of respect to courts.

Held:
YES. Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that, “it is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the
courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office but for the maintenance of its
supreme importance.” Worth remembering is the attorney’s duty to the courts “can only be maintained by rendering no
service involving disrespect to the judicial office which he is bound to uphold”.

In the case, the Court felt that Atty. Armonio’s language makes a sweeping charge that the decisions of the SC blindly
adhere to earlier rulings without making “any reference and analysis” of the pertinent statutes of the CIR. The statements
made by counsel detract much from the dignity and respect of the SC.

Atty. Armonio was admonished by the SC.

PALE Case Digest In Re: Dacanay, B.M NO. 1678, December 17, 2007 Facts: Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine
bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he migrated to Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for his
ailments. He subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship to avail of Canada’s free medical aid program. His application
was approved and he became a Canadian citizen in May 2004.On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225
(Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship. On that day, he
took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he
returned to the Philippines and now intends to resume his law practice.
Issue: WON petitioner may still resume practice?

YES Ruling: The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited to Filipino
citizens save in cases prescribed by law.15 Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar, loss
thereof terminates membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to engage in the practice of law. In
other words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The
practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners. 16 The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of
naturalization as a citizen of another country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because "all
Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine
citizenship under the conditions of [RA 9225]."17 Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country
is deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225. Although he is also
deemed never to have terminated his membership in the Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume law practice accrues.
Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines and he reacquires his Filipino
citizenship pursuant to its provisions "(he) shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such
practice."18 Stated otherwise, before a lawyer who reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can resume his
law practice, he must first secure from this Court the authority to do so, conditioned on: (a) the updating and payment in
full of the annual membership dues in the IBP; (b) the payment of professional tax; (c) the completion of at least 36 credit
hours of mandatory continuing legal education; this is specially significant to refresh the applicant/petitioner’s knowledge
of Philippine laws and update him of legal developments and (d) the retaking of the lawyer’s oath which will not only
remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to
maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as
a member of the Philippine bar.

Caronan vs Caronan A.C. 11316 July 12, 2016

Complainant: Patrick A. Caronan vs Respondent: Richard A. Caronan a.k.a. “Atty. Patrick A. Caronan” Facts:
Complainant and respondent are full siblings and both completed their secondary education at Makati High School where
they graduated in 1993 and in 1991, respectively. Complainant graduated at the University of Makati in 1997 with a
degree in Business Administration. He married Myrna G. Tapis in 2001 with whom he has two daughters. Concurrently,
respondent enrolled at Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila (PLM) for one year and then transferred to Philippine Military
Academy in 1992 where he was discharged after a year. Respondent was not able to obtain any college degree since then.
In 1999, respondent enrolled in St Mary’s Law School in Nueva Vizcaya and passed the Bar examinations in 2004.
Complainant had knowledge of such events but did not mind as he did not anticipate any adverse consequences to him. In
2009, complainant realized that respondent had been using his name to perpetrate crimes. Complainant filed the present
Complaint-Affidavit to stop respondent's alleged use of the former's name and identity, and illegal practice of law.
Respondent denied all the allegations against him and invoked res judicata as a defense. He maintained that his identity
can no longer be raised as an issue as it had already been resolved in CBD Case No. 09-2362 where the IBP Board of
Governors dismissed the administrative case filed against him, and which case had already been declared closed and
terminated by the Supreme Court in A.C. No. 10074. Moreover, according to him, complainant is being used by Reyes
and her spouse, Brigadier General Joselito M. Reyes, to humiliate, disgrace, malign, discredit, and harass him because he
filed several administrative and criminal complaints against them before the Ombudsman. On June 15, 2015, IBP
Investigating Commissioner Jose Villanueva Cabrera issued his Report and Recommendation, finding respondent
GUILTY of illegally and falsely assuming complainant's name, identity, and academic records. Since respondent falsely
assumed the name, identity, and academic records of complainant and the real "Patrick A. Caronan" neither obtained the
bachelor of laws degree nor took the Bar Exams, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that the name "Patrick A.
Caronan" with Roll of Attorneys No.49069 be dropped and stricken off the Roll of Attorneys. He also recommended that
respondent and the name "Richard A. Caronan" be barred from being admitted as a member of the Bar; and finally, for
making a mockery of the judicial institution, the IBP was directed to institute appropriate actions against respondent.

Issue: Whether or not the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)erred in their ordering that (a) the name “Patrick A.
Caronan” be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys; and (b) the name “Richard A. Caronan” be barred from being admitted to
the Bar.

Ruling: As correctly observed by the IBP, complainant has established by clear and overwhelming evidence that he is the
real "Patrick A. Caronan" and that respondent, whose real name is Richard A. Caronan, merely assumed the latter's name,
identity, and academic records to enroll at the St. Mary's University's College of Law, obtain a law degree, and take the
Bar Examinations. As pointed out by the IBP, respondent admitted that he and complainant are siblings when he disclosed
upon his arrest on August 31, 2012 that his parents are Porferio Ramos Caronan and Norma Atillo. 49 Respondent himself
also stated that he is married to Rosana Halili-Caronan. 50 This diverges from the official NSO records showing that
"Patrick A. Caronan" is married to Myrna G. Tagpis, not to Rosana Halili-Caronan. 51 Moreover, the photograph taken of
respondent when he was arrested as "Richard A. Caronan" on August 16, 2012 shows the same person as the one in the
photograph in the IBP records of "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan." 52 Meanwhile, complainant submitted numerous documents
showing that he is the real "Patrick A. Caronan," among which are: (a) his transcript of records from the University of
Makati bearing his photograph; 53 (b) a copy of his high school yearbook with his photograph and the name "Patrick A.
Caronan" under it; 54 and (c) NBI clearances obtained in 2010 and 2013.55chanrobleslaw

To the Court's mind, the foregoing indubitably confirm that respondent falsely used complainant's name, identity, and
school records to gain admission to the Bar. Since complainant - the real "Patrick A. Caronan" - never took the Bar
Examinations, the IBP correctly recommended that the name "Patrick A. Caronan" be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.
The IBP was also correct in ordering that respondent, whose real name is "Richard A. Caronan," be barred from admission
to the Bar. Under Section 6, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, no applicant for admission to the Bar Examination shall be
admitted unless he had pursued and satisfactorily completed a pre-law course, viz.:

Section 6. Pre-Law. - No applicant for admission to the bar examination shall be admitted unless he presents a certificate
that he has satisfied the Secretary of Education that, before he began the study of law, he had pursued and satisfactorily
completed in an authorized and recognized university or college, requiring for admission thereto the completion of a four-
year high school course, the course of study prescribed therein for a bachelor's degree in arts or sciences with any of the
following subject as major or field of concentration: political science, logic, english, Spanish, history, and economics.
(Emphases supplied)

In the case at hand, respondent never completed his college degree. While he enrolled at the PLM in 1991, he left a year
later and entered the PMA where he was discharged in 1993 without graduating. 56 Clearly, respondent has not completed
the requisite pre-law degree. The Court does not discount the possibility that respondent may later on complete his college
education and earn a law degree under his real name. However, his false assumption of his brother's name, identity, and
educational records renders him unfit for admission to the Bar. The practice of law, after all, is not a natural, absolute or
constitutional right to be granted to everyone who demands it. 57 Rather, it is a privilege limited to citizens of good moral
character.58 In In the Matter of the Disqualification of Bar Examinee Haron S. Meling in the 2002 Bar Examinations and
for Disciplinary Action as Member of the Philippine Shari'a Bar, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez,59 the Court explained the
essence of good moral character:

Good moral character is what a person really is, as distinguished from good reputation or from the opinion generally
entertained of him, the estimate in which . he is held by the public in the place where he is known. Moral character is not a
subjective term but one which corresponds to objective reality. The standard of personal and professional integrity is not
satisfied by such conduct as it merely enables a person to escape the penalty of criminal law. Good moral character
includes at least common honesty.

Here, respondent exhibited his dishonesty and utter lack of moral fitness to be a member of the Bar when he assumed the
name, identity, and school records of his own brother and dragged the latter into controversies which eventually caused
him to fear for his safety and to resign from PSC where he had been working for years. Good moral character is essential
in those who would be lawyers. 61 This is imperative in the nature of the office of a lawyer, the trust relation which exists
between him and his client, as well as between him and the court.62chanrobleslaw Finally, respondent made a mockery of
the legal profession by pretending to have the necessary qualifications to be a lawyer. He also tarnished the image of
lawyers with his alleged unscrupulous activities, which resulted in the filing of several criminal cases against him.
Certainly, respondent and his acts do not have a place in the legal profession where one of the primary duties of its
members is to uphold its integrity and dignity.

IN RE: REMOVAL FROM OFFICE OF ROSALIE L. PARAGUAS, Municipal Judge of Sablan, Benguet., G.R. No.
UNAV. July 6, 1976. Rosalie Llorente Paraguas, 43 years of age, who was appointed on June 16, 1973 Municipal Judge
os Sablan, Benguet was not among those who were admitted for the Bar Examination, took the Bar Examination, failed in
the Bar Examination or passed the Bar Examination, during the years 1946 through 1975 1 (Whether under her maiden
name of Rosalie Llorente or her married name of Rosalie Llorente Paraguas or any combination of the

said names). The Acting Judicial Consultant upon instructions of the Chief Justice required her in writing this month to
prove her qualifications as a member of the Philippine Bar and in a conference on June 10, 1976 she submitted an
affidavit of June 9, 1976 (which she later tried to retrieve) asserting that she took the Bar Examination in 1956 under the
name of ROSA C. BACULO (under which name she had been allegedly registered in school) which was also the name
she used "when I took my oath as a lawyer when I was admitted as a member of the Philippine Bar in 1957." 2 It is a fact,
however, that there exists a person by the name of ROSA C. BACULO of Borongan, Samar who passed the Bar
Examination in 1956 and was admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1957 (after having failed when she first took the Bar
Examination in 1955) and is presently employed in the Social Security System, and confronted with these facts, according
to the Acting Judicial Consultant’s Report, "Judge Paraguas broke into tears and told me that it was Rosa Baculo who
advised her to use that name and to lay claim to her Bar record." Whatever may be the truth or falsity of this last
allegation of Rosalie L. Paraguas, the fact remains that despite the opportunity give her, she has failed to submit any
positive proof or documentation of her ever been duly admitted as a member of the Philippine Bar, and without such
qualification, which is an essential requirement for appointment as a judge under the Constitution and the law, 3 she
cannot be permitted to stay one day longer in the Office of Municipal Judge of Sablan, Benguet, particularly in the light of
the certification dated June 28, 1976 of the Bar Division of this Court that she is not a member of the Philippine Bar.
ACCORDINGLY, Rosalie L. Paraguas is ordered removed from the Office of Municipal Judge of Sablan, Benguet,
effective immediately, with forfeiture of all benefits, and with prejudice to reinstatement in any branch of the government
service, whether pertaining to the national or local government, including government owned and or controlled
instrumentalities, agencies and corporations. Let certified copies of the pertinent records and papers be furnished the
Secretary of Justice for the filing of such action or actions as may be warranted by the evidence and the facts.

In re: Lanuevo A.M. No. 1162 August 29, 1975

FACTS: This is an administrative proceeding against Victorio Lanueva who was the Bar Confidant during the 1971 Bar
Examination emanating from the revelation of one Oscar Landicho, a bar examinee of the same bar exam, in his
confidential letter that the result of the bar exam of one of the bar examinee later identified as Ramon Galang was raised
before the result was released to make him pass the bar. Acting upon said letter, the court called the 5 bar examiners and
the Bar Confident Lanuevo to submit their sworn statements on the matter. It appears that each of the 5 bar examiners
were approached by Lanuevo with the examination booklet asking them to re-evaluate the grades of the bar examiner
explaining that it is a practice policy in bar exams that he will review the grades obtained in all subjects by an examinee
and when he finds a candidate to have extraordinary high grades in other subjects and low grade in one subject he can
bring it to the examiner for reconsideration to help the candidate pass. In good faith of trust and confidence to the
authority of Lanuevo, the examiners re-evaluated the exam of the candidate and reconsider the grade they give for each
subject matter. Further investigation also revealed that Ramon Galang was charged with crime of slight physical injuries
in the Mla. MTC but did not revealed the information in his application to take the bar examination.

ISSUE: WON Lanuevo has the authority to ask bar examiners to re-evaluate and re-correct the examination result of a bar
candidate.

RULING: The court ruled that it is evident that Lanuevo has deceptively staged a plot to convince each examiner
individually to re-evaluate the grades of Galang in order to help him pass the bar without prior authorization of the Court.
His duty as a Bar Confident is limited only as a custodian of the examination notebooks after they are corrected by the
examiners where he is tasked to tally the general average of the bar candidate. All requests for reevaluation of grades from
the bar exam shall be made by the candidate themselves. He does not possess any discretion with respect to the matter of
admission of examinees to the bar.  He does not a have any business evaluating the answers of the examinees. With the
facts fully established that Lanuevo initiated the re-evaluation of the exam answers of Galang without the authority of the
Court, he has breached the trust and confidence given to him by the court and was disbarred with his name stricken out
from the rolls of attorneys. Galang was likewise disbarred for fraudulently concealing the criminal charges against him in
his application for the bar exam while under oath constituting perjury. The court believed that the 5 bar examiners acted in
good faith and thereby absolved from the case but reminded to perform their duties with due care. It is patent likewise
from the records that respondent Lanuevo too undue advantage of the trust and confidence reposed in him by the Court
and the Examiners implicit in his position as Bar Confidant as well as the trust and confidence that prevailed in and
characterized his relationship with the five members of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee, who were thus deceived
and induced into re-evaluating the answers of only respondent Galang in five subjects that resulted in the increase of his
grades therein, ultimately enabling him to be admitted a member of the Philippine Bar. Section 2 of Rule 138 of the
Revised Rules of Court of 1964, in connection, among others, with the character requirement of candidates for admission
to the Bar, provides that "every applicant for admission as a member of the Bar must be ... of good moral character ... and
must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no charges against him
involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines." · Respondent Galang when he
took the Bar for the first time in 1962 did not expressly require the disclosure of the applicant's criminal records, if any. ·
Galang continued to intentionally withhold or conceal from the Court his criminal case of slight physical injuries which
was then and until now is pending in the City Court of Manila; and thereafter repeatedly omitted to make mention of the
same in his applications to take the Bar examinations in 1967, 1969 and 1971.

In re: Pet. to Sign in the Roll of Attorney, Medado, BM No. 2540, Sept. 24, 2013
FACTS:  Petitioner Michael A. Medado graduated from the University of the Philippines with the degree of Bachelor of
Laws in 1979 and passed the same year’s bar examinations with a general weighted average of 82.7 On 7 May 1980, he
took the Attorney’s Oath at the Philippine International Convention Center (PICC) together with the successful bar
examinees. He was scheduled to sign in the Roll of Attorneys on 13 May 1980, but he failed to do so on his scheduled
date, allegedly because he had misplaced the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys given by the Bar Office when he went
home to his province for a vacation. Several years later, while rummaging through his old college files, Medado found the
Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys. It was then that he realized that he had not signed in the roll, and that what he had
signed at the entrance of the PICC was probably just an attendance record. By the time Medado found the notice, he was
already working. He stated that he was mainly doing corporate and taxation work, and that he was not actively involved in
litigation practice. Thus, he operated “under the mistaken belief [that] since he ha[d] already taken the oath, the signing of
the Roll of Attorneys was not as urgent, nor as crucial to his status as a lawyer”; and “the matter of signing in the Roll of
Attorneys lost its urgency and compulsion, and was subsequently forgotten.” In 2005, when Medado attended Mandatory
Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) seminars, he was required to provide his roll number in order for his MCLE
compliances to be credited. Not having signed in the Roll of Attorneys, he was unable to provide his roll number.
About seven years later, or on 6 February 2012, Medado filed the instant Petition, praying that he be allowed to sign in the
Roll of Attorneys. The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) recommended that the instant petition be denied for petitioner’s
gross negligence, gross misconduct and utter lack of merit. 

ISSUE: WON Atty. Medado should be allowed to sign in the Roll of Attorneys

HELD: YES. RATIO: While an honest mistake of fact could be used to excuse a person from the legal consequences of
his acts  as it negates malice or evil motive, a mistake of law cannot be utilized as a lawful justification, because everyone
is presumed to know the law and its consequences.  Ignorantia facti excusat; ignorantia legis neminem excusat . Applying
these principles to the case at bar, Medado may have at first operated under an honest mistake of fact when he thought that
what he had signed at the PICC entrance before the oath-taking was already the Roll of Attorneys. However, the moment
he realized that what he had signed was merely an attendance record, he could no longer claim an honest mistake of fact
as a valid justification. At that point, Medado should have known that he was not a full-fledged member of the Philippine
Bar because of his failure to sign in the Roll of Attorneys, as it was the act of signing therein that would have made him
so.  When, in spite of this knowledge, he chose to continue practicing law without taking the necessary steps to complete
all the requirements for admission to the Bar, he willfully engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. Under the Rules of
Court, the unauthorized practice of law by one’s assuming to be an attorney or officer of the court, and acting as such
without authority, may constitute indirect contempt of court, which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both.  Such a
finding, however, is in the nature of criminal contempt and must be reached after the filing of charges and the conduct of
hearings.  In this case, while it appears quite clearly that petitioner committed indirect contempt of court by knowingly
engaging in unauthorized practice of law, we refrain from making any finding of liability for indirect contempt, as no
formal charge pertaining thereto has been filed against him. Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law likewise
transgresses Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides: CANON 9 – A lawyer shall not, directly
or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law. While a reading of Canon 9 appears to merely prohibit lawyers
from assisting in the unauthorized practice of law, the unauthorized practice of law by the lawyer himself is subsumed
under this provision, because at the heart of Canon 9 is the lawyer’s duty to prevent the unauthorized practice of law. This
duty likewise applies to law students and Bar candidates. As aspiring members of the Bar, they are bound to comport
themselves in accordance with the ethical standards of the legal profession. DISPOSITION: As Medado is not yet a full-
fledged lawyer, we cannot suspend him from the practice of law. However, we see it fit to impose upon him a penalty akin
to suspension by allowing him to sign in the Roll of Attorneys one (1) year after receipt of this Resolution. For his
transgression of the prohibition against the unauthorized practice of law, we likewise see it fit to fine him in the amount of
P32,000. During the one year period, petitioner is warned that he is not allowed to engage in the practice of law, and is
sternly warned that doing any act that constitutes practice of law before he has signed in the Roll of Attorneys will be
dealt with severely by this Court.

Vargas vs Kilcline et.al. GR No.L-45319 June 6, 1986

Facts: Petitioner is a member of the Philippine Bar and licensed to practice law in the Philippines. In her petition for
prohibition with preliminary injunction, she seeks to enjoin the US Naval Base Commander and the members of the Board
of Investigation at Subic Bay from investigating her for alleged court misconduct and incompetence to practice law before
the United States Navy Courts Martial. The records show that on several occasions, petitioner had been appearing as a
defense counsel for US Navy servicemen accused of violating the United States Uniform Code of Military Justice before
the United States Navy Courts Martial within the military base at Subic Bay. Prior to the filing of the petition, Lieutenant
David S. Durbin of the US Judge Advocate General Corps requested petitioner’s presence before a "Board of
Investigation" composed of respondents LCDR Frank Nivert, LCDR Thomas Lawrence and Lt. Timothy Rathbun that
was constituted by respondent Rear Admiral Thomas J. Kilcline to investigate her on the following matters: "a.
Demonstrated incompetence as counsel before Courts Martial; b. Deliberate use of frivolous and unwarranted dilatory
tactics; c. Unethical conduct in the representation of co-defendants in the face of obvious conflicts of interests." Petitioner
requested respondent Kilcline to withdraw his order and for the board to refrain from proceeding with their investigation.
Apparently, the request was not heeded. Petitioner then filed the instant petition raising the following arguments: (1) that
it is only this Court and not respondents who can discipline her or stop her from practicing her law profession in the
Philippines; and (2) that the U.S. Board of Investigation does not have the power to investigate and to recommend her
suspension to the U.S. Judge Advocate General from the practice of law inside the U.S. Military Base which is part of the
Philippine territory. Respondents, while reserving their rights to challenge this Court’s jurisdiction over their persons,
filed a comment arguing that: "each constituted court of law has an inherent right to police its own Bar: that the
government of the Philippines has given permission for United States Courts Martial to operate in its sovereign territory
by Article XIII of the Military Bases Agreement as amended, and that Attorney Vargas has submitted to the limited
jurisdiction of courts martial to police its own bar by appearing before such courts martial." Ruling: Sections 18 of Rule
138 of the Revised Rules of Court as amended provides the scope of the license to practice law within the Philippines, to
wit: "Section 18. Certificate. — The Supreme Court shall thereupon admit the applicant as a member of the bar for all the
courts of the Philippines, and shall direct an order to be entered to that effect upon its records, and that a certificate of such
record be given to him by the clerk of court, which certificate shall be his authority to practice." (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner, having been admitted to the Philippine bar, has authority to appear as counsel for all the courts of the
Philippines. Under Rule 139 of the Revised Rules of Court in relation to par. 5 Section 5 Article X of the 1973 Philippine
Constitution, this Court can admit and on lawful grounds suspend or totally prohibit by disbarment, members of the
Philippine bar from the practice of law. However, respondents do not seek to bar petitioner from practicing her law
profession in accordance with her license from this Court. They do not seek to bar her to practice law in accordance with
Philippine law. Petitioner is to be investigated in connection with her appearances as defense counsel before the U.S.
Navy Courts Martial which is beyond her license to practice law in the Philippines. The right to practice the law
profession proceeds not from the territorial boundaries of the licensing authority but within the jurisdiction of the
licensing authority.

Petitioner has confused her license to practice law in the Philippines to include the courts of other jurisdiction located
within the Philippine territory. The United States Navy Courts Martial are courts duly constituted and under the
jurisdiction of the United States Government. They are not extensions of the Philippine courts. They function
independently and are guided by their own rules on procedures. Under Article XIII of the Military Bases Agreement as
amended, the Philippine Government agreed that the United States will exercise exclusive jurisdiction over the following:
"ARTICLE XIII 1. Subject to the provisions of this Article, a) . . . b) The military authorities of the United States shall
have the right to exercise within the Republic of the Philippines all criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction conferred on
them by the law of the United States over all persons subject to the military law of the United States; 2) a) . . .

b) The military authorities of the United States shall have the right to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over persons subject
to the military law of the United States with respect to offenses, including offenses relating to its security, punishable by
the law of the United States, but not by the law of the Republic of the Philippines." In the above instances, the United
States Government possesses ample powers to determine a cause and adjudicate upon its merits to the exclusion of the
Philippine courts. Petitioner by appearing voluntarily before US military courts submits to their jurisdiction but her status
as a member of the Philippine bar and the exercise of her profession in Philippine Courts remain unaffected. In the light of
the foregoing, the instant petition is dismissed for lack of merit. In the Matter of the Disqualification of Bar Examinee
Haron Meling BM No. 1154 June 8, 2004 Facts: Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez (Melendrez) filed with the Office of the Bar
Confidant (OBC) a Petition1 to disqualify Haron S. Meling (Meling) from taking the 2002 Bar Examinations and to
impose on him the appropriate disciplinary penalty as a member of the Philippine Shari’a Bar. In the Petition, Melendrez
alleges that Meling did not disclose in his Petition to take the 2002 Bar Examinations that he has three (3) pending
criminal cases before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) Furthermore, Melendrez alleges that Meling has been
using the title "Attorney" in his communications, as Secretary to the Mayor of Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is not
a member of the Bar. Attached to the Petition is an indorsement letter which shows that Meling used the appellation and
appears on its face to have been received by the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cotabato City on November 27, 2001.

Issues: Ruling:

 the OBC recommended that Meling not be allowed to take the Lawyer’s Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys in the event
that he passes the Bar Examinations. Further, it recommended that Meling’s membership in the Shari’a Bar be suspended
until further orders from the Court. 7 We fully concur with the findings and recommendation of the OBC. Meling,
however, did not pass the 2003 Bar Examinations. This renders the Petition, insofar as it seeks to prevent Meling from
taking the Lawyer’s Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys, moot and academic. On the other hand, the prayer in the
same Petition for the Court to impose the appropriate sanctions upon him as a member of the Shari’a Bar is ripe for
resolution and has to be acted upon. Practice of law, whether under the regular or the Shari’a Court, is not a matter of right
but merely a privilege bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the law but who are also known to possess
good moral character.8 The requirement of good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the
practice of law, its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law. 9 The standard form issued
in connection with the application to take the 2002 Bar Examinations requires the applicant to aver that he or she "has not
been charged with any act or omission punishable by law, rule or regulation before a fiscal, judge, officer or
administrative body, or indicted for, or accused or convicted by any court or tribunal of, any offense or crime involving
moral turpitude; nor is there any pending case or charge against him/her." Despite the declaration required by the form,
Meling did not reveal that he has three pending criminal cases. His deliberate silence constitutes concealment, done under
oath at that. The disclosure requirement is imposed by the Court to determine whether there is satisfactory evidence of
good moral character of the applicant.10 The nature of whatever cases are pending against the applicant would aid the
Court in determining whether he is endowed with the moral fitness demanded of a lawyer. By concealing the existence of
such cases, the applicant then flunks the test of fitness even if the cases are ultimately proven to be unwarranted or
insufficient to impugn or affect the good moral character of the applicant. Meling’s concealment of the fact that there are
three (3) pending criminal cases against him speaks of his lack of the requisite good moral character and results in the
forfeiture of the privilege bestowed upon him as a member of the Shari’a Bar. Moreover, his use of the appellation
"Attorney", knowing fully well that he is not entitled to its use, cannot go unchecked. In Alawi v. Alauya,11 the Court had
the occasion to discuss the impropriety of the use of the title "Attorney" by members of the Shari’a Bar who are not
likewise members of the Philippine Bar. The respondent therein, an executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari’a
District in Marawi City, used the title "Attorney" in several correspondence in connection with the rescission of a contract
entered into by him in his private capacity. The Court declared that: …persons who pass the Shari’a Bar are not full-
fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence, may only practice law before Shari’a courts. While one who has been
admitted to the Shari’a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered "counselors,"
in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The title "attorney"
is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar
Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing;
and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction. 12 The judiciary has no place for dishonest
officers of the court, such as Meling in this case. The solemn task of administering justice demands that those who are
privileged to be part of service therein, from the highest official to the lowliest employee, must not only be competent and
dedicated, but likewise live and practice the virtues of honesty and integrity. Anything short of this standard would
diminish the public's faith in the Judiciary and constitutes infidelity to the constitutional tenet that a public office is a
public trust. In Leda v. Tabang, supra, the respondent concealed the fact of his marriage in his application to take the Bar
examinations and made conflicting submissions before the Court. As a result, we found the respondent grossly unfit and
unworthy to continue in the practice of law and suspended him therefrom until further orders from the Court.

B. M. No. 712 March 19, 1997, RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO TO TAKE THE LAWYERS OATH
Facts: Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino passed the bar examinations held in 1993. The Court however deferred his
oathtaking due to his previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting In Homicide. The criminal case which
resulted in petitioner's conviction, arose from the death of a neophyte during fraternity initiation rites sometime in
September 1991. Petitioner and seven (7) other accused initially entered pleas of not guilty to homicide charges. The
eight (8) accused later withdrew their initial pleas and upon re-arraignment all pleaded guilty to reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide. On the basis of such pleas, the trial court rendered judgment dated 11 February 1993 imposing on
each of the accused a sentence of imprisonment of from two (2) years four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years.
On 18 June 1993, the trial court granted herein petitioner's application for probation. On 11 April 1994, the trial court
issued an order approving a report dated 6 April 1994 submitted by the Probation Officer recommending petitioner's
discharge from probation. On 14 April 1994, petitioner filed before this Court a petition to be allowed to take the lawyer's
oath based on the order of his discharge from probation. On 13 July 1995, the Court through then Senior Associate
Justice Florentino P. Feliciano issued a resolution requiring petitioner Al C. Argosino to submit to the Court evidence
that he may now be regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral character imposed upon those seeking
admission to the bar. In compliance with the above resolution, petitioner submitted no less than fifteen (15)
certifications/letters executed by among others two (2) senators, five (5) trial court judges, and six (6) members of
religious orders. Petitioner likewise submitted evidence that a scholarship foundation had been established in honor of
Raul Camaligan, the hazing victim, through joint efforts of the latter's family and the eight (8) accused in the criminal
case. Ruling: The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who possess the strict intellectual and moral
qualifications required of lawyers who are instruments in the effective and efficient administration of justice. It is the
sworn duty of this Court not only to "weed out" lawyers who have become a disgrace to the noble profession of the law
but, also of equal importance, to prevent "misfits" from taking the lawyer's oath, thereby further tarnishing the public
image of lawyers which in recent years has undoubtedly become less than irreproachable. The resolution of the issue
before us required weighing and reweighing of the reasons for allowing or disallowing petitioner's admission to the
practice of law. The senseless beatings inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident absence of that moral fitness
required for admission to the bar since they were totally irresponsible, irrelevant and uncalled for. After a very careful
evaluation of this case, we resolve to allow petitioner Al Caparros Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, sign the Roll of
Attorneys and practice the legal profession with the following admonition:

In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, the Court recognizes that Mr. Argosino is not inherently of bad moral
fiber. On the contrary, the various certifications show that he is a devout Catholic with a genuine concern for civic duties
and public service. The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts to atone for the death of Raul
Camaligan. We are prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the general tendency of youth
to be rash, temerarious and uncalculating. We stress to Mr. Argosino that the lawyer's oath is NOT a mere ceremony or
formality for practicing law. Every lawyer should at ALL TIMES weigh his actions according to the sworn promises he
makes when taking the lawyer's oath. If all lawyers conducted themselves strictly according to the lawyer's oath and the
Code of Professional Responsibility, the administration of justice will undoubtedly be faster, fairer and easier for
everyone concerned. The Court sincerely hopes that Mr. Argosino will continue with the assistance he has been giving to
his community. As a lawyer he will now be in a better position to render legal and other services to the more unfortunate
members of society.

Garrido vs Attys Garrido and Valencia AC No.6593 February 4, 2010

FACTS:   Maelotisea Sipin Garrido filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Angel E. Garrido (Atty. Garrido) and
Atty. Romana P.Valencia (Atty. Valencia) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on Discipline
charging them with gross immorality. Maelotisea  alleged that she is the legal wife of Atty. Garrido. They have 6 children.
Sometime in 1987, one of their children confided that an unknown caller talked with her claiming that the former is a
child of Atty Garrido. Also, one of her daughter, May Elizabeth, told her that she saw Atty. Garrido strolling at a mall
together with a woman and a child who was later identified as Atty. Valencia and Angeli Ramona Valencia Garrido,
respectively. Maelotisea was able to secure the Certificate of Live Birth of the child, stating among others that the said
child is the daughter of Atty. Garrido and Atty. Valencia. In 1993, Atty. Garrido left the conjugal home and joined Atty.
Valencia at their residence. Since he left the conjugal home Atty. Garrido failed and still failing to give Maelotisea the
needed financial support to the prejudice of their children who stopped schooling because of financial constraints. By way
of defense, Atty. Garrido alleged that Maelotisea was not his legal wife, as he was already married to Constancia David
(Constancia) when he married Maelotisea. He claimed he married Maelotisea after he and Constancia parted ways. As he
and Maelotisea grew apart over the years due to financial problems, Atty. Garrido met Atty. Valencia. He became close to
Atty. Valencia to whom he confided his difficulties. Together, they resolved his personal problems and his financial
difficulties with his second family. Atty. Garrido denied that he failed to give financial support to his children with
Maelotisea, emphasizing that all his six (6) children were educated in private schools; all graduated from college except
for Arnel Victorino, who finished a special secondary course. Atty. Garrido emphasized that all his marriages were
contracted before he became a member of the bar on May 11, 1979, with the third marriage contracted after the death of
Constancia on December 26, 1977. Likewise, his children with Maelotisea were born before he became a lawyer. On her
part, Atty. Valencia denied that she was the mistress of Atty. Garrido. She explained that Maelotisea was not the legal
wife of Atty. Garrido since the marriage between them was void from the beginning due to the then existing marriage of
Atty. Garrido with Constancia.

In the course of the hearings before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, Maelotisea filed a motion for the dismissal of
her complaint, arguing that she wanted to maintain friendly relations with Atty. Garrido, who is the father of her six (6)
children.

ISSUES: 1. Should the disbarment case against Atty. Garrido be dismissed because the alleged immoral acts were
committed before he was admitted to the Philippine Bar? 2. Whether the desistance of Maelotisea merits the dismissal of
the case. 3. Whether Atty. Garrido should be disbarred for gross immoral conduct. 4. Whether Atty. Valencia’s defense
that the marriage between Atty. Garrido and Maelotisea is void tenable.

RULING: 1.       Prescription of offenses by the complainant do not apply in the determination of a lawyer’s qualifications
and fitness for membership in the Bar. Admission to the practice of law is a component of the administration of justice
and is a matter of public interest because it involves service to the public.  The time that elapsed between the immoral acts
charged and the filing of the complaint is not material in considering the qualification of Atty. Garrido when he applied
for admission to the practice of law, and his continuing qualification to be a member of the legal profession. From this
perspective, it is not important that the acts complained of were committed before Atty. Garrido was admitted to the
practice of law. The possession of good moral character is both a condition precedent and a continuing requirement to
warrant admission to the bar and to retain membership in the legal profession. Admission to the bar does not preclude a
subsequent judicial inquiry, upon proper complaint, into any question concerning the mental or moral fitness of the
respondent before he became a lawyer (Zaguirre v. Castillo). Admission to the practice only creates the rebuttable
presumption that the applicant has all the qualifications to become a lawyer; this may be refuted by clear and convincing
evidence to the contrary even after admission to the Bar. 2..       In light of the public service character of the practice of
law and the nature of disbarment proceedings as a public interest concern, Maelotisea’s affidavit of desistance cannot
have the effect of discontinuing or abating the disbarment proceedings. Maelotisea is more of a witness than a
complainant in these proceedings. We note further that she filed her affidavits of withdrawal only after she had presented
her evidence; her evidence is now available for the Court’s examination and consideration, and their merits are not
affected by her desistance. We cannot fail to note, too, that Mealotisea filed her affidavit of desistance, not to disown or
refute the evidence she had submitted, but solely because of compassion (and, impliedly, out of concern for her personal
financial interest in continuing friendly relations with Atty. Garrido). 3.       The undisputed facts gathered from the
evidence and the admissions of Atty. Garrido established a pattern of gross immoral conduct that warrants his disbarment.
His conduct was not only corrupt or unprincipled; it was reprehensible to the highest degree. First, Atty. Garrido admitted
that he left Constancia to pursue his law studies; thereafter and during the marriage, he had romantic relationships with
other women. He had the gall to represent to this Court that the study of law was his reason for leaving his wife; marriage
and the study of law are not mutually exclusive. Second, he misrepresented himself to Maelotisea as a bachelor, when in
truth he was already married to Constancia. This was a misrepresentation given as an excuse to lure a woman into a
prohibited relationship. Third, Atty. Garrido contracted his second marriage with Maelotisea notwithstanding the
subsistence of his first marriage. This was an open admission, not only of an illegal liaison, but of the commission of a
crime.

Fourth, Atty. Garrido engaged in an extra-marital affair with Atty. Valencia while his two marriages were in place and
without taking into consideration the moral and emotional implications of his actions on the two women he took as wives
and on his six (6) children by his second marriage. Fifth, instead of making legal amends to validate his marriage with
Maelotisea upon the death of Constancia, Atty. Garrido married Atty. Valencia who bore him a daughter. Sixth, Atty.
Garrido misused his legal knowledge and convinced Atty. Valencia (who was not then a lawyer) that he was free to
marry, considering that his marriage with Maelotisea was not “valid.” Seventh, as the evidence on record implies, Atty.
Garrido married Atty. Valencia in Hongkong in an apparent attempt to accord legitimacy to a union entered into while
another marriage was in place. Eighth, after admission to the practice of law, Atty. Garrido simultaneously cohabited and
had sexual relations with two (2) women who at one point were both his wedded wives. He also led a double life with two
(2) families for a period of more than ten (10) years. By his actions, Garrido committed multiple violations relating to the
legal profession, specifically, violations of the bar admission rules, of his lawyer’s oath, and of the ethical rules of the
profession. Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral indifference to
the opinion of the upright and respectable members of the community. Immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as
to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such
scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the community’s sense of decency. We make these distinctions as the
supreme penalty of disbarment arising from conduct requires grossly immoral, not simply immoral, conduct. He did not
possess the good moral character required of a lawyer at the time of his admission to the Bar. As a lawyer, he violated his
lawyer’s oath, Section 20(a) of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, and Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
all of which commonly require him to obey the laws of the land. He violated ethical rules of the profession, specifically,
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which commands that he “shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct”; Canon 7 of the same Code, which demands that “a lawyer shall at all times uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession”; Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that,
“a lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in
public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.” 4.      While Atty. Valencia
contends that Atty. Garrido’s marriage with Maelotisea was null and void, the fact remains that he took a man away from
a woman who bore him six (6) children. Ordinary decency would have required her to ward off Atty. Garrido’s advances,
as he was a married man, in fact a twice-married man with both marriages subsisting at that time; she should have said no
to Atty. Garrido from the very start. Instead, she continued her liaison with Atty. Garrido, driving him, upon the death of
Constancia, away from legitimizing his relationship with Maelotisea and their children. Worse than this, because of Atty.
Valencia’s presence and willingness, Atty. Garrido even left his second family and six children for a third marriage with
her. This scenario smacks of immorality even if viewed outside of the prism of law. Atty. Valencia violated Canon 7 and
Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as her behavior demeaned the dignity of and discredited the legal
profession. She simply failed in her duty as a lawyer to adhere unwaveringly to the highest standards of
morality. Lawyers, as officers of the court, must not only be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good
moral character and must lead lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. Atty. Valencia
failed to live up to these standards before she was admitted to the bar and after she became a member of the legal
profession. Moral character is not a subjective term but one that corresponds to objective reality. To have good moral
character, a person must have the personal characteristics of being good. It is not enough that he or she has a good

reputation, i.e., the opinion generally entertained about a person or the estimate in which he or she is held by the public in
the place where she is known. The requirement of good moral character has four general purposes, namely: (1) to protect
the public; (2) to protect the public image of lawyers; (3) to protect prospective clients; and (4) to protect errant lawyers
from themselves. Each purpose is as important as the other. The Fallo: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court
resolves to: (1) DISBAR Atty. Angel E. Garrido from the practice of law for gross immorality, violation of the Lawyer’s
Oath; and violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and (2) DISBAR
Atty. Romana P. Valencia from the practice of law for gross immorality, violation of Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.

LEDESMA DE JESUS-PARAS, Petitioner, -versus - QUINCIANO VAILOCES, Respondent. A.C. No. 439, EN BANC,
April 12, 1961, BAUTISTA ANGELO, J. The intent of disbarment of an attorney is to protect the court and the public
from the misconduct of officers of the court, and its purpose is to protect the administration of justice by requiring that
those who exercise this important function shall be competent, honourable and reliable; men in whom courts and clients
may repose confidence. In this case, respondent was found guilty of falsification of public document, as a consequence,
the petitioner instituted a disbarment proceeding against respondent lawyer.

FACTS: On 14 December 1950, respondent as a member of the bar and in his Capacity as a notary public, acknowledge
the execution of a document purporting to be the last will and testament of one Tarcila Visitacion de Jesus. The will was
presented for probate before the CFI of Negros Oriental and was impugned by her surviving spouse and daughter. CFI
found that the will was a forgery, thus rendered a decision denying probate to the will. A criminal action for falsification
of public document was filed against respondent. They were found guilty. On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction of
respondent. Consequently, the offended part instituted the disbarment proceedings. Respondent argued that the charges
against him were based on insufficient and inconclusive evidence, and were merely motivated by sheer vindictiveness,
malice and spite. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is guilty of moral turpitude, and must be disbarred. (YES). RULING:
Section 25, Rule 127, of the Rules of Court states that a member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office
as attorney if it appears that he has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. Moral turpitude includes any act
deemed contrary to justice, honesty, and good morals. Indeed, falsification of public document is clearly contrary to
justice, honest, and good morals; it involves moral turpitude. Thus, he is amenable to disbarment. Therefore, Supreme
Court rendered a decision removing him from his office as attorney.

Cayetano v. Monsod, G.R. 100113, September 3, 1991. Paras, J. Practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or
litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings,
the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying.
Taking into consideration the modern definition of practice of law and the liberal construction intended by the framers of
the Constitution, verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in the practice of law
for at least ten years.

FACTS: Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of the
COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments. Commission on Appointments
confirmed Monsod’s nomination. Cayetano opposed and challenged the nomination and the subsequent confirmation of
the Commission because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years.
ISSUE: Whether or not Monsod possesses the required qualification for the position of Chairman of COMELEC. (YES)
HELD: The case of Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava stated that the practice of law is not limited to the conduct
of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in
addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law
incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the
foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the
preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of
the legal effect of facts and conditions." Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term "practice of law",
particularly the modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the
framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960
with the grade of 86.55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. After passing the
Bar, he worked in his father’s law office. Monsod also worked as an operations officer for World Bank Group
(19631970). Upon his return to the Philippines, he worked as Chief Executive officer of Meralco Group, and subsequently
rendered service to various company either as legal and economic consultant or as chief executive officer. He also served
as former Secretary General (1986), and National Chairman of NAMFREL (1987), as a member of the Constitutional
Commission (1986-1987) and Davide Commission (1990), and as Chairman of Committee on Accountability of Public
Officers. Atty. Monsod s past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of
industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyerlegislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy
the constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

LINGAN V. CALUBAQUIB A.C. NO. 5377, [JUNE 30, 2014]

FACTS:  In the resolution dated June 15, 2006, this court found Attys. Romeo I. Calubaquib and Jimmy P. Baliga guilty
of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and of the Lawyer’s Oath. Respondents
allowed their secretaries to notarize documents in their stead, in violation of Sections 245 and 246 of the Notarial Law.
This court suspended respondents from the practice of law for one year, revoked their notarial commissions, and
disqualified them from reappointment as notaries public for two years. Complainant Victor C. Lingan filed his motion for
reconsideration, praying that respondents be disbarred, not merely suspended from the practice of law. In the resolution
dated September 6, 2006, this court denied complainant Lingan’s motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.

On March 22, 2007, Atty. Baliga, also the Regional Director of the Commission on Human Rights Regional Office for
Region II, filed the undated ex parte clarificatory pleading with leave of court.C In his ex parte clarificatory pleading,
Atty. Baliga alleged that on July 14, 2006, complainant Lingan wrote the Commission on Human Rights. Lingan
requested the Commission to investigate Atty. Baliga following the latter’s suspension from the practice of law. After this
court had suspended Atty. Baliga from the practice of law, the Commission on Human Rights En Banc issued the
resolution dated January 16, 2007, suspending him from his position as Director/Attorney VI of the Commission on
Human Rights Regional Office for Region II. According to the Commission on Human Rights En Banc, Atty. Baliga’s
suspension from the practice of law “prevented] [him] from assuming his post [as Regional Director] for want of
eligibility in the meantime that his authority to practice law is suspended.” Atty. Baliga argued that he cannot be
suspended for acts not connected with his functions as Commission on Human Rights Regional Director. According to
Atty. Baliga, his suspension from the practice of law did not include his suspension from public office. He prayed for
clarification of this court’s resolution dated June 15, 2006 “to prevent further injury and prejudice to [his] rights.” As to
Atty. Baliga’s claim that he did not practice law while he held his position as Regional Director and only performed
generally managerial functions, complainant Lingan countered that Atty. Baliga admitted to defying the order of
suspension. Atty. Baliga admitted to performing the functions of a “lawyer-manager,” which under the landmark case
of Cayetano v. Monsod constituted practice of law. Complainant Lingan reiterated that the position of Regional
Director/Attorney VI requires the officer “to be a lawyer [in] good standing.” Moreover, as admitted by Atty. Baliga, he
had supervision and control over Attorneys III, IV, and V Being a “lawyermanager,” Atty. Baliga practiced law while he
held his position as Regional Director. The Commission on Human Rights filed its comment dated November 27, 2009. It
argued that “the penalty imposed upon Atty. Baliga as a member of the bar is separate and distinct from any penalty that
may be imposed upon him as a public official for the same acts.” According to the Commission, Atty. Baliga’s suspension
from the practice of law is a “bar matter” while the imposition of penalty upon a Commission on Human Rights official
“is an entirely different thing, falling as it does within the exclusive authority of the [Commission as] disciplining body.”
Nevertheless, the Commission manifested that it would defer to this court’s resolution of the issue and would “abide by
whatever ruling or decision [this court] arrives at on [the] matter.”

Issue: WON Atty. Baliga violated this court's order of suspension. Ruling: Practice of law is "any activity, in or out of
court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience."57 It includes
"[performing] acts which are characteristics of the [legal] profession"58 or "[rendering any kind of] service [which]
requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill."59 Work in government that requires the use of legal
knowledge is considered practice. of law. In Cayetano v. Monsod,60 this court cited the deliberations of the 1986
Constitutional Commission and agreed that work rendered by lawyers in the Commission on Audit requiring "[the use of]
legal knowledge or legal talent" 61 is practice of law. The Commission on Human Rights is an independent office created
under the Constitution with power to investigate "all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political
rights[.]" 62 It is divided into regional offices with each office having primary responsibility to investigate human rights
violations in its territorial jurisdiction.63 Each regional office is headed by the Regional Director who is given the position
of Attorney VI. Under the Guidelines and Procedures in the Investigation and Monitoring of Human Rights Violations
and Abuses, and the Provision of CHR Assistance,64 the Regional Director has the following powers and functions:

a. To administer oaths or affirmations with respect to "[Commission on Human Rights] matters;" 65 b. To issue mission
orders in their respective regional offices; 66 c. To conduct preliminary evaluation or initial investigation of human rights
complaints in the absence of the legal officer or investigator;67 d. To conduct dialogues or preliminary conferences
among parties and discuss "immediate courses of action and protection remedies and/or possible submission of the matter
to an alternative dispute resolution"; 68 e. To issue Commission on Human Rights processes, including notices, letter-
invitations, orders, or subpoenas within the territorial jurisdiction of the regional office; 69 and f. To review and approve
draft resolutions of human rights cases prepared by the legal officer. 70 These powers and functions are characteristics of
the legal profession. Oaths and affirmations are usually performed by members of the judiciary and notaries public 71 -
officers who are necessarily members of the bar.72 Investigating human rights complaints are performed primarily by the
Commission's legal officer.73 Discussing immediate courses of action and protection remedies and reviewing and
approving draft resolutions of human rights cases prepared by the legal officer require the use of extensive legal
knowledge. The exercise of the powers and functions of a Commission on Human Rights Regional Director constitutes
practice of law. Thus, the Regional Director must be an attorney - a member of the bar in good standing and authorized to
practice law.74 When the Regional Director loses this authority, such as when he or she is disbarred or suspended from
the practice of law, the Regional Director loses a necessary qualification to the position he or she is holding. The disbarred
or suspended lawyer must desist from holding the position of Regional Director. This court suspended Atty. Baliga from
the practice of law for one year on June 15, 2006, "effective immediately."75 From the time Atty. Baliga received the
court's order of suspension on July 5, 2006, 76 he has been without authority to practice law. He lacked a necessary
qualification to his position as Commission on Human Rights Regional Director/ Attorney VI. As the Commission on
Human Rights correctly resolved in its resolution dated January 16, 2007. In ordering Atty. Baliga suspended from office
as Regional Director, the Commission on Human Rights did not violate Atty. Baliga's right to due process. First, he was
only suspended after: investigation by the Commission on Human Rights Legal and Investigation Office.78 Second, the
Commission gave Atty. Baliga an opportunity to be heard when he filed his motion for reconsideration. Atty. Baliga's
performance of generally managerial functions was not supported by the record. It was also immaterial.1âwphi1 He held
the position of Commission on Human Rights Regional Director because of his authority to practice law. Without this
authority, Atty. Baliga was disqualified to hold that position. All told, performing the functions of a Commission on
Human Rights Regional Director constituted practice of law. Atty. Baliga should have desisted from holding his position
as Regional Director. Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, willful disobedience to any lawful order of a
superior court is a ground for disbarment or suspension from the practice of law: SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of
attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. - A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for
corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The

practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice. In Molina v. Atty. Magat,79 this court suspended further Atty. Ceferino R. Magat from the practice of law
for six months for practicing his profession despite this court's previous order of suspension. We impose the same penalty
on Atty. Baliga for holding his position as Regional Director despite lack.of authority to practice law. We note that the
Commission on Human Rights En Banc issued the resolution dated April 13, 2007, reconsidering its first resolution
suspending Atty. Baliga as Regional Director/ Attorney VI. Instead, the Commission admonished Atty. Baliga and sternly
warned him that repeating the same offense will cause his dismissal from the service. The resolution with CHR (III) No.
A2007-045 dated April 13, 2007 reads: In his Motion for Reconsideration dated March 15, 2007, respondent Atty. Jimmy
P. Baliga prays before the Honorable Commission to recall and annul his suspension as Regional Director/ Attorney VI of
the Commission on Human Rights - Regional Office No. II, per 16 January 2007 Commission en Banc Resolution CHR
(III) No. A2007-013.

The grounds relied upon the motion are not sufficient to convince the Commission that Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga is totally
blameless and should not suffer the appropriate penalty for breach of the Code of Professional Responsibility and his
Lawyer's oath. The Commission, in the exercise of its authority to discipline, is concerned with the transgression by Atty.
Baliga of his oath of office as government employee. As records have it, the Commission granted Atty. Baliga authority to
secure a commission as a notary public. With this, he is mandated to act as a notary public in accordance with the rules
and regulations, to include the conditions expressly set forth by the Commission. With the findings clearly enunciated in
the Supreme Court resolution in SC Administrative Case No. 5277 dated 15 June 2006, the Commission cannot close its
eyes to the act of Atty. Baliga that is clearly repugnant to the conduct of an officer reposed with public trust. This is
enough just cause to have this piece of word, short of being enraged, and censure Atty. Baliga for having contravened the
conditions of his commission as a notary public. What was granted to Atty. Baliga is merely a privilege, the exercise of
which requires such high esteem to be in equal footing with the constitutional mandate of the Commission. Clearly, Atty.
Baliga should keep in mind that the Commission exacts commensurate solicitude from whatever privilege the
Commission grants of every official and employee. The Commission notes that by now Atty. Baliga is serving the one
year suspension imposed on him pursuant to the Supreme Court resolution. The Commission believes that the further
suspension of Atty. Baliga from the office may be too harsh in the meantime that the Supreme Court penalty is being
served. This Commission is prevailed upon that the admonition of Atty. Baliga as above expressed is sufficient to
complete the cycle of penalizing an erring public officer. WHEREFORE, the Commission hereby modifies its ruling in
Resolution CHR (III) No. A2007-013 and imposes the penalty of admonition with a stem warning that a repetition of the
same will merit a penalty of dismissal from the service. The Commission on Human Rights erred in issuing the resolution
dated April 13, 2007. This resolution caused Atty. Baliga to reassume his position as Regional Director/ Attorney VI
despite lack of authority to practice law.

We remind the Commission on Human Rights that we have the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the practice of
law.81 The Commission cannot, by mere resolutions and .other issuances, modify or defy this court's orders of suspension
from the practice of law. Although the Commission on Human Rights has the power to appoint its officers and
employees,82 it can only retain those with the necessary qualifications in the positions they are holding. As for Atty.
Baliga, we remind him that the practice of law is a "privilege burdened with conditions." 83 To enjoy the privileges of
practicing law, lawyers must "[adhere] to the rigid standards of mental fitness, [maintain] the highest degree of morality[,]
and [faithfully comply] with the rules of [the] legal profession." 84 WHEREFORE, we further SUSPEND Atty. Jimmy P.
Baliga from the practice of law for six ( 6) months. Atty. Baliga shall serve a total of one (1) year and six (6) months of
suspension from the practice of law, effective upon service on Atty. Baliga of a copy of this resolution. Burbe vs Atty
Magulta AC No.99-634 June 10, 2002 Facts:  Petitioner engaged the services of the respondent to help him recover a
claim of money against a creditor. Respondent prepared demand letters for the petitioner, which were not successful and
so the former intimated that a case should already be filed. As a result, petitioner paid the lawyer his fees and included
also amounts for the filing of the case. A couple of months passed but the petitioner has not yet received any feedback as
to the status of his case. Petitioner made several follow-ups in the lawyer’s office but to no avail. The lawyer, to prove that
the case has already been filed even invited petitioner to come with him to the Justice Hall to verify the status of the case.
Petitioner was made to wait for hours in the prosecutor’s office while the lawyer allegedly went to the Clerk of Court to
inquire about the case. The lawyer went back to the petitioner with the news that the Clerk of Court was absent that day.
Suspicious of the acts of the lawyer, petitioner personally went to the office of the clerk of court to see for himself the
status of his case. Petitioner found out that no such case has been filed. Petitioner confronted Atty. Magulta where he
continued to lie to with the excuse that the delay was being caused by the court personnel, and only when shown the
certification did he admit that he has not at all filed the complaint because he had spent the money for the filing fee for his
own purpose; and to appease petitioner’s feelings, he offered to reimburse him by issuing two (2) checks, postdated June 1
and June 5, 1999, in the amounts of P12,000.00 and P8,000.00, respectively. Issue: Whether or not the lawyer should be
disbarred. Ruling: NO (SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of 1 year) Misappropriation of Client’s Funds
A lawyer-client relationship was established from the very first moment complainant asked respondent for legal advice
regarding the former’s business. To constitute professional employment, it is not essential that the client employed the
attorney professionally on any previous occasion. It is not necessary that any retainer be paid, promised, or charged;
neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward handle the case for which his service had been sought. If
a person, in respect to business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults a lawyer with a view to obtaining professional
advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces with the consultation, then the professional
employment is established. 7 Likewise, a lawyer-client relationship exists notwithstanding the close personal relationship
between the lawyer and the complainant or the nonpayment of the former’s fees. 8 Hence, despite the fact that
complainant was

kumpadre of a law partner of respondent, and that respondent dispensed legal advice to complainant as a personal favor to
the kumpadre, the lawyer was duty-bound to file the complaint he had agreed to prepare — and had actually prepared —
at the soonest possible time, in order to protect the client’s interest. Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides that lawyers should not neglect legal matters entrusted to them. This Court has likewise constantly held that once
lawyers agree to take up the cause of a client, they owe fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in them. 9 They owe entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and the
defense of the client’s rights, and the exertion of their utmost learning and abilities to the end that nothing be taken or
withheld from the client, save by the rules of law legally applied. 10 Similarly unconvincing is the explanation of
respondent that the receipt issued by his office to complainant on January 4, 1999 was erroneous. The IBP Report
correctly noted that it was quite incredible for the office personnel of a law firm to be prevailed upon by a client to issue a
receipt erroneously indicating payment for something else. Moreover, upon discovering the "mistake" — if indeed it was
one — respondent should have immediately taken steps to correct the error. He should have lost no time in calling
complainant’s attention to the matter and should have issued another receipt indicating the correct purpose of the
payment. Profession, Not a Business In this day and age, members of the bar often forget that the practice of law is a
profession and not a business. 11 Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is
not a capital that necessarily yields profits. 12 The gaining of a livelihood is not a professional but a secondary
consideration. 13 Duty to public service and to the administration of justice should be the primary consideration of
lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to themselves. The practice of law is a noble
calling in which emolument is a byproduct, and the highest eminence may be attained without making much money. 14 In
failing to apply to the filing fee the amount given by complainant — as evidenced by the receipt issued by the law office
of respondent — the latter also violated the rule that lawyers must be scrupulously careful in handling money entrusted to
them in their professional capacity. 15 Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that lawyers shall hold
in trust all moneys of their clients and properties that may come into their possession. Lawyers who convert the funds
entrusted to them are in gross violation of professional ethics and are guilty of betrayal of public confidence in the legal
profession. 16 It may be true that they have a lien upon the client’s funds, documents and other papers that have lawfully
come into their possession; that they may retain them until their lawful fees and disbursements have been paid; and that
they may apply such funds to the satisfaction of such fees and disbursements. However, these considerations do not
relieve them of their duty to promptly account for the moneys they received. Their failure to do so constitutes professional
misconduct. 17 In any event, they must still exert all effort to protect their client’s interest within the bounds of law. If
much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it correlative duties
not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public. 18 Respondent fell short of this standard when he
converted into his legal fees the filing fee entrusted to him by his client and thus failed to file the complaint promptly. The
fact that the former returned the amount does not exculpate him from his breach of duty.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
On the other hand, we do not agree with complainant’s plea to disbar respondent from the practice of law. The power to
disbar must be exercised with great caution. Only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and the
character of the bar will disbarment be imposed as a penalty.

Re: Atty. Edillon A.M. No. 1928, August 3, 1978. Castro, C.J. Requiring members of a privileged class, such as lawyers
are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong is indeed
imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration. Such
compulsion is justified as a valid exercise of the police power of the State over an important profession. FACTS:

Atty. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines. In 1975, the IBP Board of Governors unanimously
adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues Delinquency of
Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of
Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues" notwithstanding due notice pursuant to Par. 2, Sec. 24, Art.
III of the By-Laws of the IBP. In his pleadings, conceded to the propriety and necessity of the integration of the Bar of the
Philippines, but questions the all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership therein and the obligation to pay
membership dues arguing that the provisions therein (Section 1 and 9 of the Court Rule 139-A) constitute an invasion of
his constitutional right in the sense that he is being compelled, as a precondition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in
good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled
financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the
rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Respondent likewise questions the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court to strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys, contending that this matter is not among the justiciable
cases triable by the Court but is of an administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body.

ISSUES: Whether or not a member of the Philippine Bar may be compelled to pay the required membership fee in IBP.

RULING: YES To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of Edillon’s constitutional
freedom to associate. Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not
attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only
compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State’s
legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the
profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program — the lawyers. But,
assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar, such
compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. Nothing in the Constitution prohibits the Court, to
promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X,
Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) — from requiring members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a
reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that
the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of
integration. Whether the practice of law is a property right, the respondent’s right to practice law before the courts of this
country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory
measure is recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by
payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary. But it must be emphasized that the practice of law is not a property right
but a mere privilege, and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the
lawyer’s public responsibilities. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike the
name of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that the matters of admission, suspension, disbarment
and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and supervision have been and are indisputably recognized as inherent
judicial functions and responsibilities, and the authorities holding such are legion. DECISION WHEREFORE, premises
considered, it is the unanimous sense of the Court that the respondent Marcial A. Edillon should be as he is hereby
disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court.

IN RE: SUSPENSION FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW IN THE TERRITORY OF GUAM OF ATTY. LEON G.
MAQUERA [B.M. NO. 793. July 30, 2004] Facts: Maquera was admitted to the Philippine Bar on February 28, 1958. On
October 18, 1974, he was admitted to the practice of law in the territory of Guam. He was suspended from the practice of
law in Guam for misconduct, as he acquired his clients property as payment for his legal services, then sold it and as a
consequence obtained an unreasonably high fee for handling his clients case. Issue: WON a member of the Philippine Bar
who was disbarred or suspended from the practice of law in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an
attorney be meted the same sanction as a member of the Philippine Bar for the same infraction committed in the foreign
jurisdiction?

RULING: YES The power of the Court to disbar or suspend a lawyer for acts or omissions committed in a foreign
jurisdiction is found in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended by Supreme
Court Resolution dated February 13, 1992, which states: Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme
Court, grounds therefore. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before
admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party to a case without authority to do
so.The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice. The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent court or other
disciplinatory agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney is a ground for his
disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action includes any of the acts hereinabove enumerated. The judgment,
resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall be prima facie evidence of the ground for disbarment
or suspension (Emphasis supplied). The Court must therefore determine whether Maqueras acts, namely: acquiring by
assignment Castros right of redemption over the property subject of the civil case where Maquera appeared as counsel for
him; exercising the right of redemption; and, subsequently selling the property for a huge profit, violate Philippine law or
the standards of ethical behavior for members of the Philippine Bar and thus constitute grounds for his suspension or
disbarment in this jurisdiction. The Superior Court of Guam found that Maquera acquired his clients property by
exercising the right of redemption previously assigned to him by the client in payment of his legal services. Such
transaction falls squarely under Article 1492 in relation to Article 1491, paragraph 5 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Paragraph 5 of Article 149128 prohibits the lawyers acquisition by assignment of the clients property which is the subject
of the litigation handled by the lawyer. Under Article 1492, 29 the prohibition extends to sales in legal redemption. The
prohibition ordained in paragraph 5 of Article 1491 and Article 1492 is founded on public policy because, by virtue of his
office, an attorney may easily take advantage of the credulity and ignorance of his client 30 and unduly enrich himself at
the expense of his client.

The case of In re: Ruste 31 illustrates the significance of the aforementioned prohibition. In that case, the attorney
acquired his clients property subject of a case where he was acting as counsel pursuant to a deed of sale executed by his
clients in his favor. He contended that the sale was made at the instance of his clients because they had no money to pay
him for his services. The Court ruled that the lawyers acquisition of the property of his clients under the circumstances
obtaining therein rendered him liable for malpractice. The Superior Court of Guam also hinted that Maqueras acquisition
of Castros right of redemption, his subsequent exercise of said right, and his act of selling the redeemed property for huge
profits were tainted with deceit and bad faith when it concluded that Maquera charged Castro an exorbitant fee for his
legal services. The court held that since the assignment of the right of redemption to Maquera was in payment for his legal
services, and since the property redeemed by him had a market value of US$248,220.00 as of December 21, 1987 (the
date when the right of redemption was assigned to him), he is liable for misconduct for accepting payment for his legal
services way beyond his actual fees which amounted only to US$45,000.00. Maqueras acts in Guam which resulted in his
two (2) -year suspension from the practice of law in that jurisdiction are also valid grounds for his suspension from the
practice of law in the Philippines. Such acts are violative of a lawyers sworn duty to act with fidelity toward his clients.
They are also violative of the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically, Canon 17 which states that [a] lawyer
owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful the trust and confidence reposed in him; and Rule 1.01 which
prohibits lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The requirement of good moral
character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the Philippine Bar but is also a continuing requirement to
maintain ones goods standing in the legal profession.

Arnado vs Atty Adaza AC No. 9834 August 26, 2015

Facts: Atty. Samuel B. Arnado (complainant) called the attention of this Court to the practice of respondent of indicating
"MCLE application for exemption under process" in his pleadings filed in 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012, and "MCLE
Application for Exemption for Reconsideration" in a pleading filed in 2012. In a letter, dated 5 August 2013, Atty. Jesusa
Jean D. Reyes (Atty. Reyes), Assistant Executive Officer of the MCLE Office, forwarded to the Court the rollo of the case
together with the MCLE Governing Board's Evaluation, Report and Recommendation.2 In its Evaluation, Report and
Recommendation3 dated 14 August 2013,4 the MCLE Governing Board, through retired Supreme Court Associate Justice
Bernardo P. Pardo (Justice Pardo), MCLE Chairman, informed the Court that respondent applied for exemption for the
First and Second Compliance Periods covering 15 April 2001 to 14 April 2004 and 15 April 2004 to 14 April 2007,
respectively, on the ground of "expertise in law" under Section 3, Rule 7 of Bar Matter No. 850. The MCLE Governing
Board denied the request on 14 January 2009. In the same letter, the MCLE Governing Board noted that respondent
neither applied for exemption nor complied with the Third Compliance period from 15 April 2007 to 14 April 2010. In his
Compliance and Comment5 dated 3 February 2014, respondent alleged that he did not receive a copy of the 5 August
2013 letter of Atty. Reyes. He stated that he was wondering why his application for exemption could not be granted. He
further alleged that he did not receive a formal denial of his application for exemption by the MCLE Governing Board,
and that the notice sent by Prof. Feliciano was based on the letter of complainant who belonged to Romualdo and Arnado
Law Office, the law office of his political opponents, the Romualdo family. Respondent alleged that the Romualdo family
controlled Camiguin and had total control of the judges and prosecutors in the province. He further alleged that the law
firm had control of the lawyers in Camiguin except for himself. Respondent enumerated his achievements as a lawyer and
claimed that he had been practicing law for about 50 years. 

Issue: whether or not respondent is administratively liable for his failure to comply with the MCLE requirements.

Ruling: YES Bar Matter No. 850 requires members of the IBP to undergo continuing legal education "to ensure that
throughout their career, they keep abreast with law and jurisprudence, maintain the ethics of the profession and enhance
the standards of the practice of law."8 The First Compliance Period was from 15 April 2001 to 14 April 2004; the Second
Compliance Period was from 15 April 2004 to 14 April 2007; and the Third Compliance Period was from 15 April 2007
to 14 April 2010. Complainant's letter covered respondent's pleadings filed in 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012 which means
respondent also failed to comply with the MCLE requirements for the Fourth Compliance Period from 15 April 2010 to
14 April 2013. The records of the MCLE Office showed that respondent failed to comply with the four compliance
periods. The records also showed that respondent filed an application for exemption only on 5 January 2009. According to
the MCLE Governing Board, respondent's application for exemption covered the First and Second Compliance Periods.
Respondent did not apply for exemption for the Third Compliance Period. The MCLE Governing Board denied
respondent's application for exemption on 14 January 2009 on the ground that the application did not meet the
requirements of expertise in law under Section 3, Rule 7 of Bar Matter No. 850. However, the MCLE Office failed to
convey the denial of the application for exemption to respondent. The MCLE Office only informed respondent, through
its letter dated 1 October 2012 signed by Prof. Feliciano, when it received inquiries from complainant, Judge Sinfroso
Tabamo, and Camiguin Deputy Provincial Prosecutor Renato A. Abbu on the status of respondent's MCLE compliance.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration after one year, or on 23 October 2013, which the MCLE Governing Board
denied with finality on 28 November 2013. The denial of the motion for reconsideration was sent to respondent in a letter
9 dated 29 November 2013, signed by Justice Pardo. Clearly, respondent had been remiss in his responsibilities by failing
to comply with Bar Matter No. 850. His application for exemption for the First and Second Compliance Periods was filed
after the compliance periods had ended. He did not follow-up the status of his application for exemption. He furnished the
Court with his letter dated 7 February 201210 to the MCLE Office asking the office to act on his application for
exemption but alleged that his secretary failed to send it to the MCLE Office. 11 He did not comply with the Fourth
Compliance Period. In its 1 October 2012 letter to respondent, the MCLE Office enjoined him to comply with the
requirements for the First to Third Compliance periods. It was reiterated in the 29 November 2013 letter denying
respondent's motion for reconsideration of his application for exemption. The OBC also reported that a Notice of Non-
Compliance was sent to respondent on 13 August 2013. Under Section 12(5) of the MCLE Implementing Regulations,
respondent has 60 days from receipt of the notification to comply. However, in his Compliance and Comment before this
Court, respondent stated that because of his involvement in public interest issues in the country, the earliest that he could
comply with Bar Matter No. 850 would be on 10-14 February 2014 and that he already registered with the MCLE
Program of the University of the Philippines (UP) Diliman on those dates.

Section 12(5) of the MCLE Implementing Regulations provides:

Section 12. Compliance Procedures xxxx (5) Any other act or omission analogous to any of the foregoing or intended to
circumvent or evade compliance with the MCLE requirements. A member failing to comply with the continuing legal
education requirement will receive a NonCompliance Notice stating his specific deficiency and will be given sixty (60)
days from the receipt of the notification to explain the deficiency or otherwise show compliance with the requirements.
Such notice shall be written in capital letters as follows:

YOUR FAILURE TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE JUSTIFICATION FOR NON-COMPLIANCE OR PROOF OF

COMPLIANCE WITH THE MCLE REQUIREMENT WITHIN 60 DAYS FROM RECEIPT OF THIS NOTICE SHALL
BE A CAUSE FOR LISTING YOU AS A DELINQUENT MEMBER AND SHALL NOT BE PERMITTED TO
PRACTICE LAW UNTIL SUCH TIME AS ADEQUATE PROOF OF COMPLIANCE IS RECEIVED BY THE MCLE
COMMITTEE.

The Member may use the 60-day period to complete his compliance with the MCLE requirement. Credit units earned
during this period may only be counted toward compliance with the prior period requirement unless units in excess of the
requirement are earned in which case the excess may be counted toward meeting the current compliance period
requirement. A member who is in non-compliance at the end of the compliance period shall pay a non-compliance fee of
PI,000.00 and shall be listed as a delinquent member of the IBP by the IBP Board of Governors upon the recommendation
of the MCLE Committee, in which case Rule 13 9-A of the Rules of Court shall apply. Even if respondent attended the
10-14 February 2014 MCLE Program of UP Diliman, it would only cover his deficiencies for the First Compliance
Period. He is still delinquent for the Second, Third, and Fourth Compliance Periods. The Court has not been furnished
proof of compliance for the First Compliance Period. The Court notes the lackadaisical attitude of respondent towards
Complying with the requirements of Bar Matter No. 850. He assumed that his application for exemption, filed after the
compliance periods, would be granted. He purportedly wrote the MCLE Office to follow-up the status of his application
but claimed that his secretary forgot to send the letter. He now wants the Court to again reconsider the MCLE Office's
denial of his application for exemption when his motion for reconsideration was already denied with finality by the
MCLE Governing Board on 28 November 2013. He had the temerity to inform the Court that the earliest that he could
comply was on 1014 February 2014, which was beyond the 60-day period required under Section 12(5) of the MCLE
Implementing Regulations, and without even indicating when he intended to comply with his deficiencies br the Second,
Third, and Fourth Compliance Periods. Instead, he asked the Court to allow him to continue practicing law while
complying with the MCLE requirements. Even if respondent attended the 10-14 February 2014 MCLE Program of UP
Diliman, it would only cover his deficiencies for the First Compliance Period. He is still delinquent for the Second, Third,
and Fourth Compliance Periods. The Court has not been furnished proof of compliance for the First Compliance Period.
The Court notes the lackadaisical attitude of respondent towards Complying with the requirements of Bar Matter No. 850.
He assumed that his application for exemption, filed after the compliance periods, would be granted. He purportedly
wrote the MCLE Office to follow-up the status of his application but claimed that his secretary forgot to send the letter.
He now wants the Court to again reconsider the MCLE Office's denial of his application for exemption when his motion
for reconsideration was already denied with finality by the MCLE Governing Board on 28 November 2013. He had the
temerity to inform the Court that the earliest that he could comply was on 1014 February 2014, which was beyond the 60-
day period required under Section 12(5) of the MCLE Implementing Regulations, and without even indicating when he
intended to comply with his deficiencies br the Second, Third, and Fourth Compliance Periods. Instead, he asked the
Court to allow him to continue practicing law while complying with the MCLE requirements. The MCLE Office is not
without fault in this case. While it acted on respondent's application for exemption on 14 January 2009, it took the office
three years to inform respondent of the denial of his application. The MCLE Office only informed respondent on 1
October 2012 and after it received inquiries regarding the status of respondent's compliance. Hence, during the period
when respondent indicated "MCLE application for exemption under process" in his pleadings, he was not aware of the
action of the MCLE Governing Board on his application for exemption. However, after he had been informed of the
denial of his application for exemption, it still took respondent one year to file a motion for reconsideration. After the
denial of his motion for reconsideration, respondent still took, and is still aking, his time to satisfy the requirements of the
MCLE. In addition, when respondent indicated "MCLE Application for Exemption for Reconsideration" in a pleading, he
had not filed any motion for reconsideration before the MCLE Office. Respondent's failure to comply with the MCLE
requirements and disregard of the directives of the MCLE Office warrant his declaration as a delinquent member of the
IBP. While the MCLE Implementing Regulations state that the MCLE Committee should recommend to the IBP Board of
Governors the listing of a lawyer as a delinquent member, there is nothing that prevents the Court from using its
administrative power and supervision to discipline erring lawyers and from directing the IBP Board of Governors o
declare such lawyers as delinquent members of the IBP. The OBC recommended respondent's suspension from the
practice of aw for six months. We agree. In addition, his listing as a delinquent member pf the IBP is also akin to
suspension because he shall not be permitted to

practice law until such time as he submits proof of full compliance to the IBP Board of Governors, and the IBP Board of
Governors has notified the MCLE Committee of his reinstatement, under Section 14 of the MCLE Implementing
Regulations. Hence, we deem it proper to declare respondent as a delinquent member of the IBP and to suspend him from
the practice of law for six months or until he has fully complied with the requirements of the MCLE for the First, Second,
Third, and Fourth Compliance Periods, whichever is later, and he has fully paid the required non-compliance and
reinstatement fees.

Stemmerik vs Atty Mas AC No.8010 June 16, 2009

Facts: Keld Stemmerik is a citizen and resident of Denmark. In one of his trips to the Philippines, he was introduced to
respondent Atty. Leonuel N. Mas. In one visit to the Philippines, complainant marveled at the beauty of the country and
expressed his interest in acquiring real property in the Philippines. He consulted respondent who advised him that he
could legally acquire and own real property in the Philippines. Respondent even suggested an 86,998 sq.m. property in
Quarry, Agusuin, Cawag, Subic, Zambales with the assurance that the property was alienable. Trusting respondent,
complainant agreed to purchase the property through respondent as his representative or attorney-in-fact. Complainant
also engaged the services of respondent for the preparation of the necessary documents. For this purpose, respondent
demanded and received a ₱400,000 fee. Confident that respondent would faithfully carry out his task, complainant
returned to Denmark, entrusting the processing of the necessary paperwork to respondent. Thereafter, respondent prepared
a contract to sell the property between complainant, represented by respondent, and a certain Bonifacio de Mesa, the
purported owner of the property. 1 Subsequently, respondent prepared and notarized a deed of sale in which de Mesa sold
and conveyed the property to a certain Ailyn Gonzales for ₱3.8 million.2 Respondent also drafted and notarized an
agreement between complainant and Gonzales stating that it was complainant who provided the funds for the purchase of
the property. 3 Complainant then gave respondent the full amount of the purchase price (₱3.8 million) for which
respondent issued an acknowledgment receipt. 4 After the various contracts and agreements were executed, complainant
tried to get in touch with respondent to inquire about when the property could be registered in his name. However,
respondent suddenly became scarce and refused to answer complainant’s calls and e-mail messages. When complainant
visited the Philippines again in January 2005, he engaged the services of the Jimenez Gonzales Liwanag Bello Valdez
Caluya & Fernandez Law Office to ascertain the status of the property he supposedly bought. He was devastated to learn
that aliens could not own land under Philippine laws. Moreover, verification at the Community Environment & Natural
Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources in Olongapo City revealed that the
property was inalienable as it was situated within the former US Military Reservation.5 The CENRO also stated that the
property was not subject to disposition or acquisition under Republic Act No. 141.6 Thereafter, complainant, through his
attorneys-in-fact, 7 exerted diligent efforts to locate respondent for purposes of holding him accountable for his fraudulent
acts. Inquiry with the Olongapo Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) disclosed that respondent was in
arrears in his annual dues and that he had already abandoned his law office in Olongapo City.8 Search of court records of
cases handled by respondent only yielded his abandoned office address in Olongapo City. Complainant filed a complaint
for disbarment against respondent in the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the IBP.9 He deplored respondent’s
acts of serious misconduct. In particular, he sought the expulsion of respondent from the legal profession for gravely
misrepresenting that a foreigner could legally acquire land in the Philippines and for maliciously absconding with
complainant’s ₱3.8 million.

Issue: WON respondent should be disbarred

Ruling: YES Lawyers, as members of a noble profession, have the duty to promote respect for the law and uphold the
integrity of the bar. As men and women entrusted with the law, they must ensure that the law functions to protect liberty
and not as an instrument of oppression or deception. Respondent has been weighed by the exacting standards of the legal
profession and has been found wanting. Respondent committed a serious breach of his oath as a lawyer. He is also guilty
of culpable violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the code of ethics of the legal profession. All lawyers
take an oath to support the Constitution, to obey the laws and to do no falsehood. 21 That oath is neither mere formal
ceremony nor hollow words. It is a sacred trust that should be upheld and kept inviolable at all times.22 Lawyers are
servants of the law23 and the law is their master. They should not simply obey the laws, they should also inspire respect
for and obedience thereto by serving as exemplars worthy of emulation. Indeed, that is the first precept of the Code of
Professional Responsibility: CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS
OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES. Section 7, Article XII of the
Constitution provides: SEC. 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed
except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. This Court has
interpreted this provision, as early as the 1947 case Krivenko v. Register of Deeds,24 to mean that "under the
Constitution, aliens may not acquire private or agricultural lands, including residential lands." The provision is a
declaration of imperative constitutional policy. 25 Respondent, in giving advice that directly contradicted a fundamental
constitutional policy, showed disrespect for the Constitution and gross ignorance of basic law. Worse, he prepared
spurious documents that he knew were void and illegal. By making it appear that de Mesa undertook to sell the property
to complainant and that de Mesa thereafter sold the property to Gonzales who made the purchase for and in behalf of
complainant, he falsified public documents and knowingly violated the Anti-Dummy Law.26 Respondent’s misconduct
did not end there. By advising complainant that a foreigner could legally and validly acquire real estate in the Philippines
and by assuring complainant that the property was alienable, respondent deliberately foisted a falsehood on his client. He
did not give due regard to the trust and confidence reposed in him by complainant. Instead, he deceived complainant and
misled him into parting with ₱400,000 for services that were both illegal and unprofessional. Moreover, by pocketing and
misappropriating the ₱3.8 million given by complainant for the purchase of the property, respondent committed a
fraudulent act that was criminal in nature.1avvphi1 Respondent spun an intricate web of lies. In the process, he committed
unethical act after unethical act, wantonly violating laws and professional standards.

For all this, respondent violated not only the lawyer’s oath and Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He
also transgressed the following provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility: Rule 1.01. – A lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Rule 1.02. – A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities
aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system. CANON 7 – A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL
TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE
ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. CANON 15 – A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE
CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENT.
CANON 16 – A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT
MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION. CANON 17 – A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS
CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM. (emphasis
supplied) A lawyer who resorts to nefarious schemes to circumvent the law and uses his legal knowledge to further his
selfish ends to the great prejudice of others, poses a clear and present danger to the rule of law and to the legal system. He
does not only tarnish the image of the bar and degrade the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, he also betrays
everything that the legal profession stands for. Fermin vs Atty Bedol AC No. 6560 September 16, 2019 Facts:
Complainant averred that one of his opponents and defeated candidate for the mayoralty post of Kabuntalan,
Maguindanao, Bai Susan Samad, filed with the COMELEC en bane a petition to declare a failure of election in Precinct
No. 25A/26A of Barangay Guiawa, and the subsequent holding of a special election, which was docketed as Case No. 04-
403; and that the COMELEC issued its Resolution dated July 27, 2004 declaring a failure of election and the holding of
the special election on July 28, 2004. However, before the issuance of the COMELEC Resolution, the respondent, in his
capacity as the Provincial Election Supervisor III of Maguindanao, had already issued a Notice 1 dated July 23, 2004 to
all candidates, which included him, political parties and registered voters of Barangay Guiawa, Kabuntalan, Maguindanao,
informing them of the scheduled special election for Barangay Guiawa on July 28, 2004; that he issued another notice2
informing the candidates and political parties of a conference on July 25, 2004 to be held in his office; and that on July 26,
2004, he again issued a notice3 that the canvassing of votes shall be held in Shariff Aguak Maguindanao. Complainant
alleged that respondent, without basis in law and in fact, issued the above-mentioned premature notices of special election
which highlighted his shameless disregard of the truth and brazen disrespect for the rule of law which is his foremost duty
as a member of the Bar; and that those false and illegal notices showed his dishonest ways and predilection to
wrongdoings and his natural susceptibility to the culture of corruption and deception which renders him totally unfit to
remain as an honorable member of the Bar.4 Complainant prays for respondent's disbarment to protect future clients from
falling prey to his corrupt and evil deeds. In his Comment, respondent argued that the notice dated July 23, 2004 was to
apprise, alert and notify all candidates concerned that, in a short period of time, a special election would be conducted on
July 28, 2004; that election personnel in the province cannot afford to have only a day before election to notify the parties
and to prepare for the election the next day. As to the conference held, it was done to do away with violation of the Fair
Elections Act and the parties' duties respecting the special election. He claimed that all the cases filed by complainant
against him with the COMELEC were dismissed on the ground of complete absence of cause of actions. The Court
referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation/decision
within 90 days from receipt of the record. 7 After due proceedings, Commissioner Wilfredo E.J .E. Reyes of the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline ( CED-IBP) issued a Report and Recommendation8 dated February 2, 2009, finding
respondent guilty of violation of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit: CANON l - A LAWYER
SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR
LAW AND FOR LEGAL PROCESSES. and recommended that he be penalized with reprimand, with a stern warning that
a repetition of the same shall be dealt with more severely.9 In so ruling, the Commissioner found that respondent started
issuing notices of special election and invitation to prepare for the special election even before the COMELEC had issued
its Resolution on the need for a special election which was highly irregular if not totally wrong. In Resolution No. XIX-
2010-313 10 dated April 16, 2010, the IBP Board of Governors unanimously adopted and approved with modification the
Report and Recommendations of the Investigating Commissioner, thus: RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is
hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A" and finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering
Respondent's issuance of Notice of Special Election even before the Comelec had decided on the need for one, is highly
irregular and in violation of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Lintang H. Bedol is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one year.

Issue: WON atty. Bedol is liable for violating Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

Ruling: We concur with the findings and conclusions of the IBP that respondent should be held administratively liable in
this case. Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7166, 14 provides: Section 4. Postponement, Failure of Election and 8i1Jecial
Elections. - The postponement, declaration of failure of election and the calling of special elections as provided in
Sections 5, 6 and 7 of the Omnibus Election Code shall be decided by the Commission sitting en banc by a majority vote
of its members. The causes for the declaration of a failure of election may occur before or after the casting of votes or on
the day of the election. Based on the foregoing provision of law, the declaration of failure of election and the calling of
special elections shall be decided by the majority vote of the members of the COMELEC en bane. In this case, the
COMELEC en bane issued a Resolution dated July 27, 2004 declaring the failure of election and the holding of a special
election on July 28, 2004. However, prior to the issuance of the said Resolution, respondent, as the Provincial Election
Supervisor of Maguindanao, had already issued the following, to wit: Notice dated July 23, 2004 of the special election to
be done on July 28, 2004; Invitation dated July 25, 2004 for conference at his office in Cotabato City; and Notice dated
July 26, 2004 informing that the canvassing of votes shall be held in Shariff Aguak, Maguindanao. Respondent's act of
issuing those notices ahead of the issuance of the COMELEC en bane Resolution calling for a special election was not in
compliance with the procedures under the law and the COMELEC rules. In so doing, he breached his duty to obey the
laws and the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities, thus, violating Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Canon 1 clearly mandates the obedience of every lawyer to laws and legal processes. To the best of his
ability, a lawyer is expected to respect and abide by the law and, thus, avoid any act or omission that is contrary thereto.
15 A lawyer's personal deference to the law not only speaks of his character but it also inspires respect and obedience to
the law, on the part of the public. 16 As servants of the law and officers of the court, lawyers are required to be at the
forefront of observing and maintaining the rule of law. They are expected to make themselves exemplars worthy of
emulation. 17 This, in fact, is what a lawyer's obligation to promote respect for law and legal processes entails. Moreso, a
lawyer who is occupying a public office. 18 Lawyers in public office, such as respondent who was then a Provincial
Election Supervisor of Maguindanao, are expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which tend to lessen the
trust and confidence of the citizenry in government but also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and
observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. 19 A government lawyer is a keeper of public faith and is burdened
with a high degree of social responsibility, higher than his brethren in private practice.20 Respondent's claim that he
issued those notices as there was no more time to prepare for the special elections has no basis in law. To stress, the
notices were issued even prior to the COMELEC Resolution for the holding of a special election. Members of the Bar are
reminded that their first duty is to comply with the rules of procedure, rather than seek exceptions as loopholes.21
Respondent is expected to promote respect for the law and legal processes.

Ortigas Plaza Dev Corp vs Atty Tumulak AC No.11385 March 14, 2017
Facts: Complainant Ortigas Plaza Development Corporation owned the parcel of land located in Ortigas Avenue
Extension, Pasig City and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. PT-126797 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal
(property). The complainant alleges that at around 11:00 a.m. of November 29,  2012, Atty. Tumulak, accompanied by
uniformed guards of the Nationwide Security Agency, Inc., unlawfully entered and took control of the entrance and exit of
the property. It appears that prior to the incident, Atty. Tumulak had furnished several documents to the complainant,
including the deed of assignment executed by one Henry F. Rodriguez as the administrator of the Estate of the late Don
Hermogenes R. Rodriguez designating Atty. Tumulak as an assignee. 1 The documents furnished by Atty. Tumulak were
all related to the intestate proceedings of the Estate of the late Don Hermogenes Rodriguez docketed as S.P. No. IR-1110
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch  34, in Iriga City (RTC), which involved the claim of the heirs of the late Don
Hermogenes Rodriguez to several parcels of land situated all over the country, including the Provinces of Rizal, Quezon,
and Bulacan, and Quezon City, Caloocan City, Pasay City, Antipolo City, Muntinlupa City, Parañaque City, Marikina
City, Baguio City, Angeles City, San Fernando City and Tagaytay City.2 The complainant charges Atty. Tumulak with
deceit, dishonesty and fraud for claiming to have coordinated with the proper government agencies prior to the illegal and
forcible intrusion. 3 The complainant manifests that as a lawyer, Atty. Tumulak ought to know that the claim of his
principal in the property was barred by res judicata due to the valid issuance of a Torrens title under its name.
Accordingly, his conduct constituted conduct unbecoming of a lawyer deserving of sanction.4 In his answer to the
complaint,5 Atty. Tumulak denies having been present when the security guards of Nationwide Security Agency entered
the complainant's property. He insists that the allegations against him were pure hearsay because Ms. Montero, the
representative of the complainant, had no personal knowledge of the incident; that the documents he had furnished to the
complainant included records of the intestate proceedings in the RTC involving the Estate of the late Don Hermogenes
Rodriguez and Antonio Rodriguez; that he had no hand in procuring the documents; that he did not himself enter the
property; and that the entry into the property was effected by the sheriff pursuant to a writ of execution.

Issue:  Tumulak violate Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when he facilitated the
implementation of the writ of execution and the entry into the complainant's property.

Ruling: YES Pertinent portions of Commissioner Espina's Report and Recommendation, which adequately illustrated
Atty. Tumulak' s transgressions, are worth quoting verbatim, viz.: We enumerate respondent lawyer's violation of the
following rules/principles when he led the forcible intrusion into OPDC office in Pasig City: a)Atty. Tumulak knew, or
ought to know, that property claims based on Spanish title can no longer be cited as legitimate basis for ownership as of
16 February 1976 by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 892; b)Respondent lawyer, as a long-time practitioner (admitted to
the Bar in 1971), is presumed to know that the Supreme Court has promulgated a case specifically addressing the fake
titles arising from spurious "Deed of Assignment" of the supposed Estate of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez. This is the 2005
case of Evangelista, et al. vs. Santiago [G.R. No. 157447; April 29, 2005] where the same modus as the one adopted by
respondent lawyer, was used by an "assignee" in claiming properties located in Paranque, Las Pinas, Muntinlupa, Cavitc,
Batangas, Pasay, Taguig, Makati, Pasig, Mandaluyong, Quezon City, Caloocan, Bulacan, and Rizal, allegedly as part of
the Estate of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez; c) x x x; d) While respondent lawyer claims that the "deed of assignment" in
his favor has a consideration, unfortunately we did not see any agreed consideration in the document. If there is no
monetary consideration, it will be treated as a donation with the corresponding payable taxes. Respondent lawyer's
documents don't show that taxes have been paid for the document to be legally binding; e) Torrens title cannot be attacked
collaterally but can only be questioned in a principal action x x x. If respondent lawyer thinks that OPDC's title on the
Pasig property is questionable, he could have tiled an action to annul OPDC's title and not bring in the cavalry, so to
speak, in the form of uniformed security guards, to take over the property; and f) We find respondent's actions highly
questionable and contrary to legal protocol; (i) the court documents were issued by the RTC-Iriga City, Br. 94; (ii) it
"affects" a property located in Pasig City; (iii) respondent lawyer became the "assignee" of a Pasig City property; (iv) no
taxes were paid for the "assignment"; (v) assistance of the Sheriff of Pasig was not enlisted by respondent, instead, he
enlists the help of the Sheriff of Manila; (vi) all that the Sheriff of Manila did was to deliver the RTC-Iriga, Br. 34 court
documents to complainant but with a twist; the Sheriff and respondent lawyer were escorted by a phalanx of security
guards; (vii) the uniformed guards, obviously upon instruction, took over and/or controlled the gates of OPDC offices
with attendant force and intimidation. Respondent lawyer's claimed innocence cannot prevail over these illegalities of
which he, or his agents, had a hand. With the above highly questionable acts totally irreconcilable with a seasoned
practitioner like respondent lawyer, we find Atty. Eugenio S. Tumulak liable for violation of Canon 1, Code of
Professional Responsibility, specifically Rule 1.01 and 1.02 thereof. Commissioner Espina correctly observed that the
Court in the 2005 ruling in Evangelista v. Santiago8 had already enjoined the successors and heirs of the late Don
Hermogenes Rodriguez from presenting the Spanish title as proof of their ownership in land registration proceedings, as
follow:

In their Complaint, petitioners claimed title to the Subject Property by virtue of their actual and continuous possession of
the same since time immemorial, by themselves and through their predecessorsin-interest. Yet, the Deeds of Assignment
executed by lsmael Favila in their favor, attached to and an integral part of their Complaint, revealed that petitioners
predecessors-in-interest based their right to the Subject Property on the Spanish title awarded to Don Hermogenes
Rodriguez. There existed a contradiction when petitioners based their claim of title to the Subject Property on their
possession thereof since time immemorial, and at the same time, on the Spanish title granted to Don Hermogenes
Rodriguez. Possession since time immemorial carried the presumption that the land had never been part of the public
domain or that it had been private property even before the Spanish conquest. If the Subject Property was already private
property before the Spanish conquest, then it would have been beyond the power of the Queen of Spain to award or grant
to anyone. The title to and possession of the Subject Property by petitioners predecessors-in-interest could be traced only
as far back as the Spanish title of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez. Petitioners, having acquired portions of the Subject
Property by assignment, could acquire no better title to the said portions than their predecessors-in-interest, and hence,
their title can only be based on the same Spanish title. Respondent maintained that P.D. No. 892 prevents petitioners from
invoking the Spanish title as basis of their ownership of the Subject Property. P.D. No. 892 strengthens the Torrens system
by discontinuing the system of registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law, and by categorically declaring all lands
recorded under the latter system, not yet covered by Torrens title, unregistered lands. It further provides that within six
months from its effectivity, all holders of Spanish titles or grants should apply for registration of their land under what is
now P.D. No. 1529, otherwise known as the Land Registration Decree. Thereafter, Spanish titles can no longer be used as
evidence of land ownership in any registration proceedings under the Torrens system. Indubitably, P.D. No. 892 divests
the Spanish titles of any legal force and effect in establishing ownership over real property. P.D. No. 892 became effective
on 16 February 1976. The successors of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez had only until 14 August 1976 to apply for a Torrens
title in their name covering the Subject Property. In the absence of an allegation in petitioners' Complaint that petitioners
predecessors-in-interest complied with P.D. No. 892, then it could be assumed that they failed to do so. Since they failed
to comply with P.D. No. 892, then the successors of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez were already enjoined from presenting
the Spanish title as proof of their ownership of the Subject Property in registration proceedings. Registration proceedings
under the Torrens system do not create or vest title, but only confirm and record title already created and vested. By virtue
of P.D. No. 892, the courts, in registration proceedings under the Torrens system, are precluded from accepting,
confirming and recording a Spanish title. Reason therefore dictates that courts, likewise, are prevented from accepting and
indirectly confirming such Spanish title in some other form of action brought before them (i.e., removal of cloud on or
quieting of title), only short of ordering its recording or registration. To rule otherwise would open the doors to the
circumvention of P.D. No. 892, and give rise to the existence of land titles, recognized and affirmed by the courts, but
would never be recorded under the Torrens system of registration. This would definitely undermine the Torrens system
and cause confusion and instability in property ownership that P.D. No. 892 intended to eliminate. Moreover, in Santiago
v. Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority,10 the Court denied the petition of the successors of the late Don Hermogenes
Rodriguez by applying the principle of stare decisis, ruling therein that the applicable laws, the issues, and the testimonial
and documentary evidence were identical to those in the situation in Evangelista v. Santiago, thusly:

The present petition is substantially infirm as this Court had already expressed in the case of Nemencio C. Evangelista, et
al. v. Carmelino M. Santiago, that the Spanish title of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez, the Titulo de Propriedad de
Torrenos of 1891, has been divested of any evidentiary value to establish ownership over real property. Victoria M.
Rodriguez, Armando G. Mateo and petitioner Pedro R. Santiago anchor their right to recover possession of the subject
real property on claim of ownership by Victoria M. Rodriguez being the sole heir of the named grantee, Hermogenes
Rodriguez, in the Spanish title Titulo de Propriedad de Torrenos.

xxx Prescinding from the foregoing, the instant petition must be denied by virtue of the principle of stare decisis. Not only
are the legal rights and relations of herein parties substantially the same as those passed upon in the aforementioned
2005 Evangelista Case, but the facts, the applicable laws, the issues, and the testimonial and documentary evidence are
identical such that a ruling in one case, under the principle of stare decisis, is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same
issue. Finally, the 2011 ruling in Pascual v. Robles  12 affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) setting aside
the amended decision rendered in S.P. No. IR-1110 by the RTC. This ruling should have alerted Atty. Tumulak from
taking the actions giving rise to the complaint against him inasmuch as he has admitted to have derived his rights from the
deed of assignment executed in his favor by Henry Rodriguez as the administrator of the Estate of the late Don
Hermogenes Rodriguez pursuant to said amended decision. Moreover, Atty. Tumulak is presumed as a lawyer to know
the developments in S.P. No. IR-1110 not only by virtue of his becoming an assignee of the estate but also because of his
being a lawyer with the constant responsibility of keeping abreast of legal developments.13 Atty. Tumulak cannot shield
himself from personal responsibility behind the deed of assignment. The deed was doubtful on its face, as borne out by the
text, to wit:

DEED OF ASSIGNMENT KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS This Deed of Assignment is made and executed
by and between The INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE HERMOGENES R. RODRIGUEZ AND ANTONIO R.
RODRIGUEZ, represented by HENRY F. RODRIGUEZ, of legal age, widower, Filipino, x xx Judicial Heir and Court-
Appointed Administrator by virtue of AMENDED DECISION dated August 13, 19999 of Fifth Judicial Region, RTC
Branch 34, lriga City in SPECS. PROCS. No. IR-1110 which settled the issue of Heirship, Administratorship and Settled
[sic] of the Estate of Hem1ogenes and Antonio Rodriguez y Reyes Estate, hereinafter referred to as the ASSIGNOR; -and-

EUGENIO S. TUMULAK, of legal age, widower x x x hereinafter referred to as the ASSIGNEE: WITNESSETH:

WHEREAS, the ASSIGNOR is the Court-Appointed Administrator and one of the Judicial heirs of the Intestate Estate of
the late HERMOGENES and ANTONIO RODRIGUEZ y REYES Estate by virtue of AMENDED DECISION dated
Augsut 13, 1999 of Fifth Judicial Region, RTC Branch 34, Iriga City in SPECS. PROCS. No. IR-1110 which settled the
issue of Heirship, Administratorship and Settlement of the Estate of Hermogenes and Antonio Rodriguez y Reyes Estate,
thereafter, petitions for certiorari tiled with the SUPREME COURT assailing the aforesaid Amended Decision
were DENIED and declared FINAL & EXECUTORY in G.R. Nos. 140271, 140915, 168648, 142477 and 182645,
affirming the same Amended Decision; Whereas, the ASSIGNEE has secured the property and actual occupant/s over the
same property they arc presently occupying and initiating steps for recovery of the same parcel and has shown exemplary
loyalty and faithfulness to the ASSIGNOR and also consistently protected the rights and interest of the Estate against
intruder, impostor, usurpers and false claimant with spurious title/s over the same property; NOW THEREFORE, for and
in consideration of the foregoing, the ASSIGNOR has agreed to

execute this DEED OF ASSIGNMENT and the ASSIGNEE, has accepted and both parties have mutually agreed to the
following terms and conditions herein stipulated; A parcel of land situated in Ortigas Avenue corner Raymundo Avenue,
Barangay Rosario, Pasig City, Metro Manila, Island of Luzon, with containing an area of THIRTY-FIVE THOUSAND
EIGTH [sic] HUNDRED AND NINE[TY] ONE SQUARE METERS (35,891) more or less technical description
described below, to xxx 1. That the ASSIGNEE shall shoulder all the expenses in the performance of the task as indicated
x x x above such as payment for the real taxes, titling, researching, liaising with government agencies, paying lawyers
involved in the litigation, and other incidental expenses relevant in the consummation of the said transaction; 2. That the
ASSIGNEE shall secure and facilities (sic] all documents from Land Registration Authority, DENR-LMB, DENR-LMS,
Register of Deeds and such other government agencies concerned for the completion of titling process subject to the
existing laws, rules and regulation in accordance to Land Registration Act; 3. That the ASSIGNEE shall perform the task
of relocation and verification[,] land survey, possessing, fencing, guarding, surveying and or reviving plans, paying taxes,
titling, selling, leasing, developing, segregating and mortgaging; 4. That the ASSIGNEE shall be the AD-LITEM
representative of the ASSIGNOR, before of [sic] any Court[,] Administrative and Quasi-Judicial body and to bring suit,
defend, in connection with the actions brought for or against the ASSIGNOR of whatever nature and kind; and 5. That the
ASSIGNEE shall report regularly to the ASSIGNOR per the above tasks and accomplishment. IN WITNESS WHEREOF,
the parties have hereunto set their respective signatures on the date 22 March 2010 and place QUEZON CITY above
written. Atty. Tumulak cannot deny his personal participation in the unlawful and forcible intrusion into the property just
because the complainant did not establish his physical presence thereat at the time. In fact, such physical participation was
not even necessary in order to properly implicate him in personal responsibility for the intrusion after he admitted having
furnished to the complainant the deed of assignment and other documents as the source of his authority. Specifically, his
duties under the deed of assignment included "shoulder[ing] all the expenses in the performance of [securing the property
x x x and initiating steps for recovery of the same parcel] x x x such as x x x or payment for the real taxes, titling,
researching, liaising with government agencies, paying lawyers involved in the litigation, and other incidental expenses
relevant in the consummation of the said transaction;" and "possessing, fencing, [and] guarding" the property. It is notable
in this connection that Atty. Tumulak had been discharging his role as the assignee since the time of the execution of the
deed of assignment on March 22, 2010. Considering that he had been in charge of doing all the actions necessary to
enforce the interest of his principal since March 22, 2010, and that the forcible intrusion complained about occurred on
November 29, 2012, or more than two years from the execution of the deed of assignment, he is reasonably and
ineluctably presumed to have coordinated all the actions leading to the intrusion. Finally, even assuming that the amended
decision was valid and enforceable, Atty. Tumulak could not legitimately resort to forcible intrusion to advance the
interest of the assignor. The more appropriate action for him would be to cause the annulment of the complainant's title
instead of forcibly entering the property with the aid of armed security personnel. All told, Atty. Tumulak was guilty of
misconduct for circumventing existing laws and disregarding settled rulings in order to commit injustice against the
complainant. His conduct betrayed his Lawyer's Oath "to support [the] Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal
orders of the duly constituted authorities therein." He breached Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, to wit:

CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND FOR LEGAL PROCESSES. Rule 1.01 -A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Rule 1.02 -A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the
law or at lessening confidence in the legal system. To the best of his ability, every lawyer is expected to respect and abide
by the law, and to avoid any act or omission that is contrary thereto. The lawyer's personal deference to the law not only
speaks of his or her commendable character but also inspires in the public a becoming respect and obedience to the law.
15 The sworn obligation of every lawyer under the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility to respect
the law and the legal processes is a continuing condition for retaining membership in the Legal Profession. The lawyer
must act and comport himself or herself in such a manner that would promote public confidence in the integrity of the
Legal Profession.16 Members of the Bar are reminded, therefore, that their first duty is to comply with the rules of
procedure, rather than to seek exceptions as loopholes. 17 A lawyer who assists a client in a dishonest scheme or who
connives in violating the law commits an act that warrants disciplinary action against him or her.18 The suspension from
the practice of law or disbarment of a lawyer is justified if he or she proves unworthy of the trust and confidence imposed
by the Lawyer's Oath, or is otherwise found to be wanting in that honesty and integrity that must characterize the
members of the Bar in the performance of their professional duties. 19 Although the Court imposed a six-month
suspension from the practice of law on erring lawyers found violating Canon l, Rules 1.01 and 1.02,20 we adopt the
recommendation of the IBP to suspend Atty. Tumulak from the practice of law for a period of two years. Such penalty
was appropriate and condign in relation to the misconduct he committed as well as to the prejudice he caused the
complainant.

Ong vs Atty delos Santos AC No. 10179 March 4, 2014

Facts: In January 2008, complainant Benjamin Ong was introduced to respondent Atty. William F. Delos Santos by
Sheriff Fernando Mercado of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila. After several calls and personal interactions
between them, Ong and Atty. Delos Santos became friends. 1 In time, according to Ong, Atty. Delos Santos asked him to
encash his postdated check inasmuch as he was in dire need of cash. To reassure Ong that the check would be funded
upon maturity, Atty. Delos Santos bragged about his lucrative practice and his good paying clients. Convinced of Atty.
Delos Santos’ financial stability, Ong handed to Atty. Delos Santos on January 29, 2008 the amount of P100,000.00 in
exchange for the latter’s Metrobank Check No. 0110268 postdated February 29, 2008.2 However, the check was
dishonored upon presentment for the reason that the account was closed.3 Ong relayed the matter of the dishonor to Atty.
Delos Santos, and demanded immediate payment, but the latter just ignored him. 4 When efforts to collect remained
futile, Ong brought a criminal complaint for estafa and for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 against Atty. Delos
Santos. 5 Ong also brought this disbarment complaint against Atty. Delos Santos in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP), which docketed the complaint as CBD Case No. 11-2985.

Issue: WON By issuing the worthless check, did Atty. Delos Santos violate Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Ruling: YES Every lawyer is an officer of the Court. He has the duty and responsibility to maintain his good moral
character. In this regard, good moral character is not only a condition precedent relating to his admission into the practice
of law, but is a continuing imposition in order for him to maintain his membership in the Philippine Bar. 10 The Court
unwaveringly demands of him to remain a competent, honorable, and reliable individual in whom the public may repose
confidence.11 Any gross misconduct that puts his moral character in serious doubt renders him unfit to continue in the
practice of law.12 Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 has been enacted in order to safeguard the interest of the banking system and
the legitimate public checking account users.13 The gravamen of the offense defined and punished by Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22, according to Lozano v. Martinez,14 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check, or any check that is
dishonored upon its presentment for payment and putting it in circulation; the law is designed to prohibit and altogether
eliminate the deleterious and pernicious practice of issuing checks with insufficient funds, or with no credit, because the
practice is deemed a public nuisance, a crime against public order to be abated. The Court has observed in Lozano v.
Martinez: The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved
in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the
payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in
circulation, multiplied a thousandfold, can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking
system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. 15 xxx Being a lawyer, Atty. Delos Santos was
well aware of the objectives and coverage of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. If he did not, he was nonetheless presumed to know
them, for the law was penal in character and application. His issuance of the unfunded check involved herein knowingly
violated Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, and exhibited his indifference towards the pernicious effect of his illegal act to public
interest and public order. 16 He thereby swept aside his Lawyer’s Oath that enjoined him to support the Constitution and
obey the laws. He also took for granted the express commands of the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically
Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03, viz: CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION,
OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR THE LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES. Rule
1.01 - A Lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL
AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE
ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on
his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of
the legal profession. These canons, the Court has said in Agno v. Cagatan,17 required of him as a lawyer an enduring high
sense of responsibility and good fidelity in all his dealings, thus: The afore-cited canons emphasize the high standard of
honesty and fairness expected of a lawyer not only in the practice of the legal profession but in his personal dealings as
well. A lawyer must conduct himself with great propriety, and his behavior should be beyond reproach anywhere and at
all times. For, as officers of the courts and keepers of the public's faith, they are burdened with the highest degree of social
responsibility and are thus mandated to behave at all times in a manner consistent with truth and honor. Likewise, the oath
that lawyers swear to impresses upon them the duty of exhibiting the highest degree of good faith, fairness and candor in
their relationships with others. Thus, lawyers may be disciplined for any conduct, whether in their professional or in their
private capacity, if such conduct renders them unfit to continue to be officers of the court.18 That his act involved a
private dealing with Ong did not matter. His being a lawyer invested him – whether he was acting as such or in a non-
professional capacity – with the obligation to exhibit good faith, fairness and candor in his relationship with others. There
is no question that a lawyer could be disciplined not only for a malpractice in his profession, but also for any misconduct
committed outside of his professional capacity. 19 His being a lawyer demanded that he conduct himself as a person of
the highest moral and professional integrity and probity in his dealings with others.20

Moreover, in issuing the dishonored check, Atty. Delos Santos put into serious question not only his personal integrity but
also the integrity of the entire Integrated Bar. It cannot be denied that Ong acceded to Atty. Delos Santos’ request for
encashment of the check because of his complete reliance on the nobility of the Legal Profession. They uphold the law,
they know the law. He should not have issued the check if you know it cannot be funded because actually I have many
lawyer friend[s] and I have always high regard for lawyers. 22 Atty. Delos Santos should always be mindful of his duty to
uphold the law and to be circumspect in all his dealings with the public. Any transgression of this duty on his part would
not only diminish his reputation as a lawyer but would also erode the public’s faith in the Legal Profession as a whole. His
assuring Ong that he was in good financial standing because of his lucrative law practice when the contrary was true
manifested his intent to mislead the latter into giving a substantial amount in exchange for his worthless post-dated check.
Such actuation did not speak well of him as a member of the Bar. Accordingly, Atty. Delos Santos was guilty of serious
misconduct, warranting appropriate administrative sanction. Noting that the criminal complaint charging him with the
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 was already dismissed, and that he already repaid to Ong the full amount of
P100,000.00, 23 both of which are treated as mitigating circumstances in his favor, we find the recommendation of the
IBP Board of Governors to suspend him from the practice of law for a period of three years harsh. Thus, we reduce the
penalty to suspension from the practice of law to six months in order to accord with the ruling in Philippine Amusement
and Gaming Corporation v. Carandang.

Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., complainant versus Atty. Leo J. Palma, respondent. Adm. Case No. 2474    September 15,
2004
Facts:    Complainant and respondent met sometime in the 70’s. Complainant was a client of Angara Concepcion Regala
& Cruz Law Offices (ACCRA) and respondent was the lawyer assigned to handle his cases. Owing to his growing
business concerns, complainant decided to hire respondent as his personal counsel. Consequently, respondent’s
relationship with complainant’s family became intimate. He traveled and dined with them abroad.2 He frequented their
house and even tutored complainant’s 22-year old daughter Maria Luisa Cojuangco (Lisa), then a student of Assumption
Convent. On June 22, 1982, without the knowledge of complainant’s family, respondent married Lisa in Hongkong. It
was only the next day that respondent informed complainant and assured him that "everything is legal." Complainant was
shocked, knowing fully well that respondent is a married man and has three children. Upon investigation, complainant
found that respondent courted Lisa during their tutoring sessions. Immediately, complainant sent his two sons to
Hongkong to convince Lisa to go home to Manila and discuss the matter with the family. Lisa was persuaded.
Complainant also came to know that: (a) on the date of the supposed marriage, respondent requested from his
(complainant’s) office an airplane ticket to and from Australia, with stop-over in Hong Kong; (b) respondent
misrepresented himself as "bachelor" before the Hong Kong authorities to facilitate his marriage with Lisa; and (c)
respondent was married to Elizabeth Hermosisima and has three children, namely: Eugene Philippe, Elias Anton and
Eduardo Lorenzo. Complainant filed with this Court the instant complaint 5 for disbarment, imputing to respondent the
following acts: "a. In grave abuse and betrayal of the trust and confidence reposed in him by complainant and his family
and taking undue advantage of his tutoring sessions with Maria Luisa, respondent secretly courted her. The great disparity
in intelligence, education, age, experience and maturity between Maria Luisa and respondent gave the latter an
overwhelming moral ascendancy over Maria Luisa as to overcome her scruples and apprehensions about respondent’s
courtship and advances, considering that he is a married man with three (3) children; b. Respondent courted Maria Luisa
with persistence and determination and even pursued her in her travels abroad under false pretenses that he was traveling
on official business for complainant. To break down the final resistance of Maria Luisa and assuage her pangs of guilt, he
made representations that there was no legal impediment whatsoever to his marrying; c. With his moral ascendancy over
Maria Luisa and his misrepresentation that there was no legal impediment or prohibition to his contracting a second
marriage, respondent succeeded in inducing and beguiling her into marrying him. Without complying with the
requirements of Philippine law that he should first obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage to Elizabeth H.
Palma and that the "advice" of Maria Luisa’s parents should first be obtained she being only twenty-two (22) years of age,
respondent succeeded in contracting marriage with her in Hongkong on June 22, 1982 by falsely representing himself
before the Hongkong authorities that he is a ‘bachelor.’ x x x." Respondent filed a motion to dismiss6 on the ground of
lack of cause of action. He contended that the complaint fails to allege acts constituting deceit, malpractice, gross
misconduct or violation of his lawyer’s oath. There is no allegation that he acted with "wanton recklessness, lack of skill
or ignorance of the law" in serving complainant’s interest. Anent the charge of grossly immoral conduct, he stressed that
he married complainant’s daughter with "utmost sincerity and good faith" and that "it is contrary to the natural course of
things for an immoral man to marry the woman he sincerely loves."

Issue: Whether or not respondent's acts constitutes gross immoral conduct so as to warrant his disbarment from the legal
profession.

Ruling: YES
At the outset, it must be stressed that the law profession does not prescribe a dichotomy of standards among its members.
There is no distinction as to whether the transgression is committed in the lawyer’s professional capacity or in his private
life. This is because a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at
another.17 Thus, not only his professional activities but even his private life, insofar as the latter may reflect unfavorably
upon the good name and prestige of the profession and the courts, may at any time be the subject of inquiry on the part of
the proper authorities. 18 Respondent claims that he had served complainant to the best of his ability. In fact, the
complaint does not allege that he acted with "wanton recklessness, lack of skill and ignorance of the law." While,
complainant himself admitted that respondent was a good lawyer, 19 however, professional competency alone does not
make a lawyer a worthy member of the Bar. Good moral character is always an indispensable requirement. The ringing
truth in this case is that respondent married Lisa while he has a subsisting marriage with Elizabeth Hermosisima. The
Certification20 from the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City shows that he married Elizabeth on December 19, 1971 at
Cardial’s Private Chapel, Cebu City. On the other hand, the Certificate of Marriage 21 from the Deputy Registrar of
Marriages, Hong Kong, proves respondent’s subsequent marriage with Lisa on July 9, 1982. That Elizabeth was alive at
the time of respondent’s second marriage was confirmed on the witness stand by Atty. Victor P. Lazatin, Elizabeth’s
classmate and family friend. 22 Undoubtedly, respondent’s act constitutes grossly immoral conduct, a ground for
disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. He exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of
morality required of him as a member of the Bar. In particular, he made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred
institution demanding respect and dignity. His act of contracting a second marriage is contrary to honesty, justice, decency
and morality.23

This is not the first occasion that we censure immorality. Thus, we have somehow come up with a common definition of
what constitutes immoral conduct, i.e., "that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral
indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community."24 Measured against this definition,
respondent’s act is manifestly immoral. First, he abandoned his lawful wife and three children. Second, he lured an
innocent young woman into marrying him. And third, he misrepresented himself as a "bachelor" so he could contract
marriage in a foreign land. Our rulings in the following cases are relevant: 1) In Macarrubo vs. Macarrubo,25 respondent
entered into multiple marriages and then resorted to legal remedies to sever them. There, we ruled that "[S]uch pattern of
misconduct by respondent undermines the institutions of marriage and family, institutions that this society looks to for the
rearing of our children, for the development of values essential to the survival and well-being of our communities, and for
the strengthening of our nation as a whole." As such, "there can be no other fate that awaits respondent than to be
disbarred." (2) In Tucay vs. Tucay,26 respondent contracted marriage with another married woman and left complainant
with whom he has been married for thirty years. We ruled that such acts constitute "a grossly immoral conduct and only
indicative of an extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of his profession," warranting respondent’s disbarment.
(3) In Villasanta vs. Peralta,27 respondent married complainant while his first wife was still alive, their marriage still valid
and subsisting. We held that "the act of respondent of contracting the second marriage is contrary to honesty, justice,
decency and morality." Thus, lacking the good moral character required by the Rules of Court, respondent was
disqualified from being admitted to the bar. (4) In Cabrera vs. Agustin,28 respondent lured an innocent woman into a
simulated marriage and thereafter satisfied his lust. We held that respondent failed to maintain that degree of morality and
integrity, which at all times is expected of members of the bar. He is, therefore, disbarred from the practice of law. (5) In
Toledo vs. Toledo,29 respondent abandoned his wife, who supported him and spent for his law education, and thereafter
cohabited with another woman. We ruled that he "failed to maintain the highest degree of morality expected and required
of a member of the bar." For this, respondent was disbarred. (6) In Obusan vs. Obusan, Jr.,30 respondent abandoned his
lawful wife and child and resumed cohabitation with his former paramour. Here, we ruled that "abandoning one’s wife
and resuming carnal relations with a former paramour, a married woman," constitute grossly immoral conduct warranting
disbarment. The circumstances here speak of a clear case of betrayal of trust and abuse of confidence. It was respondent’s
closeness to the complainant’s family as well as the latter’s complete trust in him that made possible his intimate
relationship with Lisa. When his concern was supposed to be complainant’s legal affairs only, he sneaked at the latter’s
back and courted his daughter. Like the proverbial thief in the night, he attacked when nobody was looking. Moreover, he
availed of complainant’s resources by securing a plane ticket from complainant’s office in order to marry the latter’s
daughter in Hongkong. He did this without complainant’s knowledge. Afterwards, he even had the temerity to assure
complainant that "everything is legal." Clearly, respondent had crossed the limits of propriety and decency. Respondent
justified his conduct by professing he really loved Lisa and since he married her, he cannot be charged with immorality.
His reasoning shows a distorted mind and a brazen regard on the sanctity of marriage. In such relationship, the man and
the woman are obliged to live together, observe mutual respect and fidelity.31 How could respondent perform these
obligations to Lisa when he was previously married to Elizabeth? If he really loved her, then the noblest thing he could
have done was to walk away.

Respondent’s culpability is aggravated by the fact that Lisa was just a 22-year old college student of Assumption Convent
and was under psychological treatment for emotional immaturity. 32 Naturally, she was an easy prey. Anent respondent’s
argument that since the validity of his marriage to Lisa has not yet been determined by the court with finality, the same
poses a prejudicial question to the present disbarment proceeding. Suffice it to say that a subsequent judgment of
annulment of marriage has no bearing to the instant disbarment proceeding. As we held in In re Almacen,33 a disbarment
case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal but is rather an investigation by the court into the
conduct of its officers. Thus, if the acquittal of a lawyer in a criminal action is not determinative of an administrative case
against him, 34 or if an affidavit of withdrawal of a disbarment case does not affect its course,35 then the judgment of
annulment of respondent’s marriage does not also exonerate him from a wrongdoing actually committed. So long as the
quantum of proof --- clear preponderance of evidence --- in disciplinary proceedings against members of the bar is met,
then liability attaches. 36 The interdict upon lawyers, as inscribed in Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
is that they "shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." This is founded on the lawyers’
primordial duty to society as spelled out in Canon 1 which states: "CANON 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution,
obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes." It is not by coincidence that the drafters of our
Code of Professional Responsibility ranked the above responsibility first in the enumeration. They knew then that more
than anybody else, it is the lawyers -- the disciples of law -- who are most obliged to venerate the law. As stated in Ex
Parte Wall:37 "Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws. He is their sworn
servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to repudiate and override the laws, to trample them underfoot and to ignore
the very bonds of society, argues recreancy to his position and office and sets a pernicious example to the insubordinate
and dangerous elements of the body politic." Corollarily, the above responsibility is enshrined in the Attorney’s Oath
which every lawyer in the country has to take before he is allowed to practice. In sum, respondent committed grossly
immoral conduct and violation of his oath as a lawyer. The penalty of one (1) year suspension recommended by the IBP is
not commensurate to the gravity of his offense. The bulk of jurisprudence supports the imposition of the extreme penalty
of disbarment.

Maelotisea S. Garrido vs. Attys. Angel E. Garrido and Romana P. Valencia [A.C. No. 6593 February 4, 2010
FACTS:  Maelotisea Sipin Garrido filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Angel E. Garrido (Atty. Garrido) and
Atty. Romana P.Valencia (Atty. Valencia) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on Discipline
charging them with gross immorality. Maelotisea  alleged that she is the legal wife of Atty. Garrido. They have 6 children.
Sometime in 1987, one of their children confided that an unknown caller talked with her claiming that the former is a
child of Atty Garrido. Also, one of her daughter, May Elizabeth, told her that she saw Atty. Garrido strolling at a mall
together with a woman and a child who was later identified as Atty. Valencia and Angeli Ramona Valencia Garrido,
respectively. Maelotisea was able to secure the Certificate of Live Birth of the child, stating among others that the said
child is the daughter of Atty. Garrido and Atty. Valencia. In 1993, Atty. Garrido left the conjugal home and joined Atty.
Valencia at their residence. Since he left the conjugal home Atty. Garrido failed and still failing to give Maelotisea the
needed financial support to the prejudice of their children who stopped schooling because of financial constraints.

By way of defense, Atty. Garrido alleged that Maelotisea was not his legal wife, as he was already married to Constancia
David (Constancia) when he married Maelotisea. He claimed he married Maelotisea after he and Constancia parted ways.
As he and Maelotisea grew apart over the years due to financial problems, Atty. Garrido met Atty. Valencia. He became
close to Atty. Valencia to whom he confided his difficulties. Together, they resolved his personal problems and his
financial difficulties with his second family. Atty. Garrido denied that he failed to give financial support to his children
with Maelotisea, emphasizing that all his six (6) children were educated in private schools; all graduated from college
except for Arnel Victorino, who finished a special secondary course. Atty. Garrido emphasized that all his marriages were
contracted before he became a member of the bar on May 11, 1979, with the third marriage contracted after the death of
Constancia on December 26, 1977. Likewise, his children with Maelotisea were born before he became a lawyer. On her
part, Atty. Valencia denied that she was the mistress of Atty. Garrido. She explained that Maelotisea was not the legal
wife of Atty. Garrido since the marriage between them was void from the beginning due to the then existing marriage of
Atty. Garrido with Constancia. In the course of the hearings before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, Maelotisea
filed a motion for the dismissal of her complaint, arguing that she wanted to maintain friendly relations with Atty.
Garrido, who is the father of her six (6) children.

ISSUES: 1. Should the disbarment case against Atty. Garrido be dismissed because the alleged immoral acts were
committed before he was admitted to the Philippine Bar? 2. Whether the desistance of Maelotisea merits the dismissal of
the case. 3. Whether Atty. Garrido should be disbarred for gross immoral conduct. 4. Whether Atty. Valencia’s defense
that the marriage between Atty. Garrido and Maelotisea is void tenable.

RULING: A.       Prescription of offenses by the complainant do not apply in the determination of a lawyer’s
qualifications and fitness for membership in the Bar. Admission to the practice of law is a component of the
administration of justice and is a matter of public interest because it involves service to the public.  The time that elapsed
between the immoral acts charged and the filing of the complaint is not material in considering the qualification of Atty.
Garrido when he applied for admission to the practice of law, and his continuing qualification to be a member of the legal
profession. From this perspective, it is not important that the acts complained of were committed before Atty. Garrido was
admitted to the practice of law. The possession of good moral character is both a condition precedent and a continuing
requirement to warrant admission to the bar and to retain membership in the legal profession. Admission to the bar does
not preclude a subsequent judicial inquiry, upon proper complaint, into any question concerning the mental or moral
fitness of the respondent before he became a lawyer (Zaguirre v. Castillo). Admission to the practice only creates the
rebuttable presumption that the applicant has all the qualifications to become a lawyer; this may be refuted by clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary even after admission to the Bar. B.       In light of the public service character of the
practice of law and the nature of disbarment proceedings as a public interest concern, Maelotisea’s affidavit of desistance
cannot have the effect of discontinuing or abating the disbarment proceedings. Maelotisea is more of a witness than a
complainant in these proceedings. We note further that she filed her affidavits of withdrawal only after she had presented
her evidence; her evidence are now available for the Court’s examination and consideration, and their merits are not
affected by her desistance. We cannot fail to note, too, that Mealotisea filed her affidavit of desistance, not to

disown or refute the evidence she had submitted, but solely because of compassion (and, impliedly, out of concern for her
personal financial interest in continuing friendly relations with Atty. Garrido). C.       The undisputed facts gathered from
the evidence and the admissions of Atty. Garrido established a pattern of gross immoral conduct that warrants his
disbarment. His conduct was not only corrupt or unprincipled; it was reprehensible to the highest degree. First, Atty.
Garrido admitted that he left Constancia to pursue his law studies; thereafter and during the marriage, he had romantic
relationships with other women. He had the gall to represent to this Court that the study of law was his reason for leaving
his wife; marriage and the study of law are not mutually exclusive. Second, he misrepresented himself to Maelotisea as a
bachelor, when in truth he was already married to Constancia. This was a misrepresentation given as an excuse to lure a
woman into a prohibited relationship. Third, Atty. Garrido contracted his second marriage with Maelotisea
notwithstanding the subsistence of his first marriage. This was an open admission, not only of an illegal liaison, but of the
commission of a crime. Fourth, Atty. Garrido engaged in an extra-marital affair with Atty. Valencia while his two
marriages were in place and without taking into consideration the moral and emotional implications of his actions on the
two women he took as wives and on his six (6) children by his second marriage. Fifth, instead of making legal amends to
validate his marriage with Maelotisea upon the death of Constancia, Atty. Garrido married Atty. Valencia who bore him a
daughter. Sixth, Atty. Garrido misused his legal knowledge and convinced Atty. Valencia (who was not then a lawyer)
that he was free to marry, considering that his marriage with Maelotisea was not “valid.” Seventh, as the evidence on
record implies, Atty. Garrido married Atty. Valencia in Hongkong in an apparent attempt to accord legitimacy to a union
entered into while another marriage was in place. Eighth, after admission to the practice of law, Atty. Garrido
simultaneously cohabited and had sexual relations with two (2) women who at one point were both his wedded wives. He
also led a double life with two (2) families for a period of more than ten (10) years. By his actions, Garrido committed
multiple violations relating to the legal profession, specifically, violations of the bar admission rules, of his lawyer’s oath,
and of the ethical rules of the profession. Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that
show a moral indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable members of the community. Immoral conduct is
gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or
when committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the community’s sense of decency. We
make these distinctions as the supreme penalty of disbarment arising from conduct requires grossly immoral, not simply
immoral, conduct. He did not possess the good moral character required of a lawyer at the time of his admission to the
Bar. As a lawyer, he violated his lawyer’s oath, Section 20(a) of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, and Canon 1 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, all of which commonly require him to obey the laws of the land. He violated ethical rules
of the profession, specifically, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which commands that he “shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct”; Canon 7 of the same Code, which demands that “a lawyer
shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession”; Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides that, “a lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.”

D.      While Atty. Valencia contends that Atty. Garrido’s marriage with Maelotisea was null and void, the fact remains
that he took a man away from a woman who bore him six (6) children. Ordinary decency would have required her to ward
off Atty. Garrido’s advances, as he was a married man, in fact a twice-married man with both marriages subsisting at that
time; she should have said no to Atty. Garrido from the very start. Instead, she continued her liaison with Atty. Garrido,
driving him, upon the death of Constancia, away from legitimizing his relationship with Maelotisea and their children.
Worse than this, because of Atty. Valencia’s presence and willingness, Atty. Garrido even left his second family and six
children for a third marriage with her. This scenario smacks of immorality even if viewed outside of the prism of law.
Atty. Valencia violated Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as her behavior demeaned the
dignity of and discredited the legal profession. She simply failed in her duty as a lawyer to adhere unwaveringly to the
highest standards of morality. Lawyers, as officers of the court, must not only be of good moral character but must also be
seen to be of good moral character and must lead lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the
community. Atty. Valencia failed to live up to these standards before she was admitted to the bar and after she became a
member of the legal profession. Moral character is not a subjective term but one that corresponds to objective reality. To
have good moral character, a person must have the personal characteristics of being good. It is not enough that he or she
has a good reputation, i.e., the opinion generally entertained about a person or the estimate in which he or she is held by
the public in the place where she is known. The requirement of good moral character has four general purposes, namely:
(1) to protect the public; (2) to protect the public image of lawyers; (3) to protect prospective clients; and (4) to protect
errant lawyers from themselves. Each purpose is as important as the other. The Fallo: WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the Court resolves to: (1) DISBAR Atty. Angel E. Garrido from the practice of law for gross immorality,
violation of the Lawyer’s Oath; and violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility; and (2) DISBAR Atty. Romana P. Valencia from the practice of law for gross immorality, violation of
Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Chu v. Ginco, A.C. No. 10573, January 13, 2015. FACTS: Complainant Chu retained Respondent Guico as counsel to
handle the labor disputes involving his company, CVC San Lorenzo Ruiz Corporation (CVC). Guico’s legal services
included handling a complaint for illegal dismissal. According to Chu, during a Christmas party held at Atty. Guico’s
residence, Atty. Guico asked him to prepare a substantial amount of money to be given to the NLRC Commissioner
handling the appeal to insure a favorable decision. Months later, Chu called Atty. Guico to inform him that he had raised
PhP 300,000.00 for the purpose and which he later delivered to the latter’s law office. In their subsequent meeting, Atty.
Guico then handed Chua a copy of an alleged draft decision of the NLRC in favor of CVC. Atty. Guico told Chu to raise
another PhP 300,000.00 to encourage the NLRC Commissioner to issue the decision but Chu could only produce PhP
280,000.00, which he again brought to Atty. Guico’s office. Finally, the NLRC issued an adverse decision against Chu’s
company and there was no other recourse but to file an appeal to the CA. In response to the administrative complaint,
Atty. Guico described the administrative complaint as replete with lies and inconsistencies, and insisted that the charge
was only meant for harassment. He denied demanding and receiving money from Chu, a denial that Atty. Guico’s
assistant Nardo corroborated with his own affidavit. He

further denied handing to Chu a draft decision printed on used paper emanating from his office, surmising that the used
paper must have been among those freely lying around in his office that had been pilfered by Chu’s witnesses in the
criminal complaint he had handled for Chu. IBP Commissioner Cecilio A.C. Villanueva found that Atty. Guico had
violated Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon I of the CPRL and recommended his disbarment from the practice of law. The IBP
Board of Governors, however, adopted leniency and reduced the penalty to three (3) years suspension. ISSUE: Whether or
not Respondent Guico violate the Lawyer’s Oath and Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon I of the CPRL for demanding and
receiving a huge sum of money from his client to guarantee a favorable decision from the NLRC. RULING: (YES) By the
acts committed by Atty. Guico, he has transgressed the parameters of conduct and ethics as embodied in the CPRL. In
disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests on the complainant to establish respondent attorney’s liability by clear,
convincing and satisfactory evidence. Indeed, this Court has consistently required clearly preponderant evidence to justify
the imposition of either disbarment or suspension as penalty. Chu submitted the affidavits of his witnesses, and presented
the draft decision that Atty. Guico had represented to him as having come from the NLRC. Chu credibly insisted that the
draft decision was printed on the dorsal portion of used paper emanating from Atty. Guico’s office, inferring that Atty.
Guico commonly printed documents on used paper in his law office. Despite denying being the source of the draft
decision presented by Chu, Atty. Guico’s participation in the generation of the draft decision was undeniable. For one,
Atty. Guico impliedly admitted Chu’s insistence by conceding that the used paper had originated from his office, claiming
only that used paper was just “scattered around his office.” The testimony of Chu, and the circumstances narrated by Chu
and his witnesses, espe-cially the act of Atty. Guico of presenting to Chu the supposed draft decision… sufficed to
confirm that he had committed the imputed gross misconduct by demanding and receiving PhP 580,000.00 from Chu to
obtain a favorable decision. Atty. Guico offered only his general denial of the allegations in his defense, but such denial
did not overcome the affirmative testimony of Chu. [The Court] cannot but conclude that the production of the draft
decision by Atty. Guico was intended to motivate Chu to raise money to ensure the chances of obtaining the favorable
result in the labor case. As such, Chu discharged his burden of proof as the complainant to establish his complaint against
Atty. Guico. The sworn obligation to respect the law and the legal processes under the Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility is a continuing condition for every lawyer to retain membership in the Legal Profession. To
discharge the obligation, every lawyer should not render any service or give advice to any client that would involve
defiance of the very laws that he was bound to uphold and obey, for he or she was always bound as an attorney to be law
abiding, and thus to uphold the integrity and dignity of the Legal Profession. Verily, he or she must act and comport
himself or herself in such a manner that would promote public confidence in the integrity of the Legal Profession. Any
lawyer found to violate this obligation forfeits his or her privilege to continue such membership in the legal profession.
Atty. Guico willingly and wittingly violated the law in appearing to counsel Chu to raise the large sums of money in order
to obtain a favorable decision in the labor case. He thus violated the law against bribery and corruption. He compounded
his violation by actually using said illegality as his means of obtaining a huge sum from the client that he soon
appropriated for his own personal interest. His acts constituted gross dishonesty and deceit, and were a flagrant breach of
his ethical commitments under the Lawyer’s Oath not to delay any man for money or malice; and under Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility that forbade him from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
His deviant conduct eroded the faith of the people in him as an
individual lawyer as well as in the Legal Profession as a whole. In doing so, he ceased to be a servant of the law. Atty.
Guico committed grave misconduct and disgraced the Legal Profession. Grave misconduct is “improper or wrong
conduct, the transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in
character, and implies a wrongful intent and not mere error of judgment.” There is no question that any gross misconduct
by an attorney in his professional or private capacity renders him unfit to manage the affairs of others, and is a ground for
the imposition of the penalty of suspension or disbarment, because good moral character is an essential qualification for
the admission of an attorney and for the continuance of such privilege. Accordingly, the recommendation of the IBP
Board of Governors to suspend him from the practice of law for three (3) years would be too soft a penalty. Instead, he
should be disbarred, for he exhibited his unworthiness of retaining his membership in the legal profession. LEAH B.
TADAY V. ATTY. DIONISIO B. APOYA, JR., - A.C. NO. 11981, JULY 03, 2018 FACTS: Leah B. Taday, an overseas
Filipino worker (OFW) staying in Norway, asked her parents in the Philippines, Virgilio and Natividad Taday, to seek
legal services for the nullification of her marriage. Taday's parents found Atty. Apoya and contracted his legal services.
On April 17, 2011, a Retainer Agreement was executed between Atty. Apoya and Taday's parents indicating that Atty.
Apoya's acceptance fee was P140,000.00, to be paid on a staggered basis. According to Taday, Atty. Apoya was informed
that she was staying in Norway and Atty. Apoya assured her that this would not be an issue as he can find ways to push
for the resolution of the case despite her absence. Atty. Apoya drafted a Petition for Annulment of Marriage3 (petition)
dated April 20, 2011, which he allegedly sent to Taday for her signature. After notarizing the petition, Atty. Apoya filed it
before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City (RTC). The case was then raffled to Branch 131, docketed as Civil Case
No. C-22813. On November 17, 2011, while Taday was on vacation in the Philippines, Atty. Apoya delivered a Decision
dated November 16, 2011 which granted the annulment of Taday's marriage. The said decision was promulgated by a
certain Judge Ma. Eliza Becamon-Angeles of RTC Branch 162. Taday became suspicious as the said decision came from
a different branch presided by a different judge where the case was originally filed. Taday's family became skeptical as
the said decision seemed to come too soon and was poorly crafted. Confused with the turn of events, verifications were
made to ascertain the validity of the decision. Taday discovered that both Branch 162 and Judge Ma. Eliza Becamon
Angeles do not exist in the RTC. Frustrated with the incident, Taday, through her parents, sought the withdrawal of Atty.
Apoya as her counsel from the case. However, instead of withdrawing as counsel, Atty. Apoya filed an urgent motion to
withdraw the petition. In its Order dated June 25, 2012, the RTC Branch 131 granted the said motion and the case was
dropped from the civil docket of the court. IBP REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION In its Report and
Recommendation, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (Commission) found that Atty. Apoya committed several
violations of the Code, particularly, Rules 1.01, 1.02 and Canon 1. The Commission held that Atty. Apoya notarized the
Verification and Certification of Non Forum Shopping of the petition, even though Taday was not personally present as
she was then in Norway. The Commission also found that Atty. Apoya authored a fake decision. It opined that the said
decision was fake because it bore the same format and grammatical errors as that of the petition prepared by Atty. Apoya.
The

Commission disregarded the defense of Atty. Apoya that it was Taday's parents who made the fake decision. It stressed
that any reasonable mind would know that a fake decision would not benefit Taday. Moreover, Taday's parents
continuously paid the legal fees of Atty. Apoya, which would show their lack of intent to create the fabricated decision.
The Commission further underscored that when Atty. Apoya was confronted with the fake decision, he filed an urgent
motion to withdraw the petition before RTC Branch 131. It highlighted that when the new counsel of Taday questioned
Atty. Apoya regarding these irregularities, he did not respond. Based on these circumstances, the Commission concluded
that the fake decision originated from Atty. Apoya and that he violated Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon I of the Code. It
recommended the penalty of suspension of two (2) years from the practice of law. In its Resolution No. XXI-2015-10012
dated January 31, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors (Board) modified the recommended penalty of two (2) years
suspension to a penalty of disbarment. ISSUE: Is Atty. Apoya guilty of violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Rule 1.02 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility? RULING: Yes, Atty. Apoya guilty of violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Rule
1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. In addition, he also violated Section 2, Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice. The Court adopts the findings of the Commission and agrees with the recommendation of the IBP Board
to disbar Atty. Apoya. It bears stressing that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A lawyer has
the privilege and right to practice law during good behavior and can only be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and
declared by judgment of the court after opportunity to be heard has afforded him. Without invading any constitutional
privilege or right, and attorney's right to practice law may be resolved by a proceeding to suspend or disbar him, based on
conduct rendering him unfit to hold a license or to exercise the duties and responsibilities of an attomey. In disbarment
proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the Taday, and for the court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case
against the Atty. Apoya must be established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof. In this case, the Court finds that
Atty. Apoya violated Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of the Code and the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Atty. Apoya
notarized the petition even though the affiant was not present. Notarization is not an empty, meaningless and routinary act.
It is imbued with public interest and only those who are qualified and authorized may act as notaries public.18
Notarization converts a private document to a public document, making it admissible in evidence without further proof of
its authenticity. A notarial document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. For this reason, notaries
public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties. The 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice provides that a notary public should not notarize a document unless the signatory to the document
personally appeared before the notary public at the time of the notarization, and personally known to the notary public or
otherwise identified through competent evidence of identity. At the time of notarization, the signatory shall sign or affix
with a thumb or other mark in the notary public's notarial register. The purpose of these requirements is to enable the
notary public to verify the genuineness of the signature and to ascertain that the document is the signatory's free act and
deed. If the signatory is not acting on his or her own free will, a notary public is mandated to refuse to perform a notarial
act. A notary public is also prohibited from affixing an official signature or seal on a notarial certificate that is incomplete.

In this case, on April 20, 2011, Atty. Apoya notarized the verification and certification of non forum shopping in the
petition filed before RTC Branch 131 supposedly executed by Taday as the affiant. At that time, however, complaint was
not in the Philippines because she was still in Norway working as an OFW. Undoubtedly, Atty. Apoya violated the
notarial rules when he notarized a document without the personal presence of the affiant. Atty. Apoya gave a flimsy
excuse that he was not informed that Taday was not in the Philippines when he notarized the verification and certification
on non forum shopping. Assuming arguendo that this is true, he should have refrained from notarizing such document
until Taday personally appear before him. In addition, Atty. Apoya should have explained to Taday and her parents that
he can only notarize and file the petition before the court once Taday returns to the Philippines. Lamentably, instead of
informing his client about the rules of notarization, Atty. Apoya proceeded with the notarization of the document and gave
a false assurance that the case of Taday would still continue even in her absence. In Gaddi v. Atty. Velasco, the Court held
that for notarizing a document without ascertaining the identity and voluntariness of the signatory to the document, for
affixing his signature in an incomplete notarial certificate, and for dishonesty in his pleadings, the lawyer failed to
discharge his duties as notary public and breached Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the Code. Here, Atty. Apoya notarized the
verification and certification of non forum shopping even though Taday did not personally appear before him. Not only
did he violate the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, he also violated Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the Code. Atty. Apoya
authored a fake decision and delivered it to his client. In this case, Atty. Apoya delivered a decision dated November 16,
2011, to Taday, which purportedly granted the petition for annulment of marriage in her favor. This decision is marred by
numerous and serious irregularities that point to Atty. Apoya as the author thereof. First, the decision came from a certain
Judge Ma. Eliza Becamon- Angeles of RTC Branch 162. Yet, a verification from the RTC revealed that the said judge and
the branch were non-existent. Second, the fake decision is starkly the same as the petition prepared and filed by Atty.
Apoya. A reading of the fake decision shows that the statement of facts, issues and the rationale therein are strikingly
similar, if not exactly alike, with the petition. Even the grammatical errors in both documents are similar. The fake
decision was so poorly crafted because it merely copied the petition filed by Atty. Apoya. Moreover, the font and spacing
in the caption of the petition and the fake decision are one and the same. Glaringly, Atty. Apoya did not give any credible
explanation regarding the similarity of the fake decision and the petition he drafted. Third, when Atty. Apoya was
confronted by Taday and her parents about the fake decision, Atty. Apoya immediately filed an urgent motion to
withdraw the petition before RTC Branch 131. Atty. Apoya provided a poor excuse that he merely prepared the said
motion but did not file it. However, it is clear from the order dated June 25, 2012 of RTC Branch 131 that the motion was
filed by Atty. Apoya and the case was indeed withdrawn. Lastly, when Taday's case was dropped from the civil docket of
RTC Branch 131 at the instance of Atty. Apoya, Taday and her parents sought the assistance of another lawyer. Atty.
Verzosa, through a letter dated February 26, 2013, confronted Atty. Apoya regarding the payment of attorney's fees and
the fake decision which Atty. Apoya gave to Taday. However, Atty. Apoya neither answered nor denied the allegation of
Taday's new counsel. In his last ditch attempt to escape liability, Atty. Apoya argued that the fake decision was drafted by
Taday's parents. The Court finds this completely absurd. On November 17, 2011, Taday's parents had just paid Atty.
Apoya's staggering acceptance fee as evidenced by a Receipt.24 On the other hand, the fake decision was dated November
16, 2011. Thus, it is illogical for Taday's parents to draft a fake decision when they regularly paid for the services of Atty.
Apoya to legally and rightfully represent their daughter's case. As opined by the Commission, any reasonable mind would
know that a fake decision would not benefit Taday, thus, Taday's parents have nothing to gain from it. Based on the
foregoing circumstances, the Court concludes that Atty. Apoya indeed authored the fake decision in order to deceive
Taday that he won the legal battle in her favor. Fortunately, Taday was prudent in protecting her

rights and discovered that the decision given to her by Atty. Apoya was fake. Surely, Atty. Apoya's acts resulted to
Taday's injuries and has tarnished the noble image of legal profession. PROPER PENALTY The Court finds that Taday
has established by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence that: (1) Atty. Apoya notarized the verification and
certification of non forum shopping of the petition without the personal presence of Taday; (2) Atty. Apoya is the author
of the fake decision to deceive Taday that her petition for annulment of marriage was granted; and (3) Atty. Apoya
retaliated against Taday for confronting him with the fake decision by withdrawing the petition in the court, resulting into
the dropping of the case from the civil docket of the court. These acts constitute violations of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Rule
1.02 of the Code, to wit: CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and for legal processes. RULE 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct. RULE 1.02 A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence
in the legal system. Atty. Apoya also violated Section 2, Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, which states that:
SECTION 2. Prohibitions. - x x x (b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the
instrument or document – (1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the notarization; and (2) is not
personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary public through competent evidence of identity
as defined by these Rules. A member of the Bar may be penalized, even disbarred or suspended from his office as an
attorney, for violation of the lawyer's oath and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code.
For the practice of law is a profession, a form of public trust, the performance of which is entrusted to those who are
qualified and who possess good moral character. The appropriate penalty for an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of
sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts. Laurel vs Atty Delute AC No. 12298 September 1, 2020 The
essential functions of lawyers are the representation of others and the protection of their rights. Attorneys-at-law act as
agents who prosecute or defend their clients' interests. Equipped with their knowledge of the legal system, lawyers ore the
highest fidelity to their clients' cause. This is because the attorney-client relationship is "imbued with utmost trust and
confidence." To effectively discharge this responsibility, any form of conflict of interest should be avoided at all times,
with the client's interest placed above the lawyer's. As the primary goal of lawyering is to ensure that the client receives
what is dµe to them by law, remuneration for work done should only be secondary. i Here, respondent failed to discharge
his responsibility as a lawyer. The complainant, Felipe D. Laurel (Laurel), and his wife engaged the services of
respondent Atty. Delute to assist them in their claim to recover a parcel of land. To supposedly achieve this, they were
told by Atty. Delute to sign a document in English-a language they did not understand. 2 As this would put them at 1a
disadvantage,

complainant requested that his daughter, who understood English, be allowed to accompany them during the signing.
However, Atty. Delute insisted that only complainant and his wife should come. Complainant and his wife did not have a
hand in the preparation of the document. They did not negotiate its terms and were not aware of its contents. They initially
refused to sign and asked for Atty. Delute to explain, its contents, but they were coerced by the latter to just sign the
document.4 Caught between their doubts and the insistence of their counsel, they ultimately relied on Atty. Delute who
promised that they would be able to' collect rent on the lot. They were later given P300,000.00, which they believed to be
the payment owed to them. From this, Atty. Delute took Pl 00,000.00 As it turns out, the document that complainant and
his wife signed, was a Compromise' Agreement containing a waiver of their claims over the lot. Further, the agreement
also contained a stipulation granting Atty. Delute a perpetual right of way over the lot. Complainant and his wife only
found out after their daughter came home from Manila and explained the content of what they had signed. Atty. Delute
abused the confidence his clients placed in him. He left them in the dark and purposefully kept them unaware of the nature
of the transactions he brokered. While lawyers, as agents, are entrusted to manage the interests of their clients, 7 this does
not grant them the license to transact with others at the expense of their clients' interests. Definitely, lawyer 1 s should not
use this authority for their personal benefit. Atty. Delute sold his client's cause by making them sign a waiver of their
claims, contrary to what his clients wanted, which was to prosecute their claim over the lot. This could not have escaped
Atty. Delute's mind, as he was aware that complainant had previously engaged the services of another counsel for' the
recovery of the land and the issuance of a Certificate of Land Ownership Award before he took over.9 Worse, Atty.
Delute took advantage of the fact that his clients did not understand the document he made them sign, which allowed him
to derive personal benefit from the transaction at his client's expense. As noted by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
Atty. Delute willfully manipulated complainant into executing the Compromise. Agreement. 10 He also profited
Pl00,000.00 from the P300,000.00 paid to, his clients. 11 This deceitful conduct by a lawyer to his clients is deserving 0f
disbarment. Respondent violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01;12 Canon 15, Rule 15.03; 13 ' and Canon 1714 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility by exhibiting dishonest and deceitful conduct when he manipulated his clients into signing a
document which they believed was in furtherance of their cause. When his clients expressed doubts as they could not
understand the language in which the document was written, respondent not only failed to explain its contents, he also
coerced them to sign the document. Citing Medina v. Lizardo, the ponencia refuses to rule on the validity of the
Compromise Agreement given the allegations of deceit in securing complainant's consent. Medina imposed the lighter
penalty of suspension due to insufficiency of evidence to hold the lawyer liable for deceitful conduct: As previously
mentioned, the Investigating Commissioner found that Atty. Lizardo allowed himself to be used by Martinez to
supposedly defraud Silves1ifa and the heirs of Alicia and therefore, held that Atty. Lizardo also violated Canon 1, Rule
1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. However, we refrain from passing upon the
finding of the Investigating Commissioner that Atty. Lizardo was guilty of deceit in allegedly inducing Silvestra and the
heirs of Alicia into selling their interest in all three lots covered by the subject TCTs in the Extrajudicial Settlement with
Sale when their purported intention was to sell only the parcels covered by TCT No. 13866. The matter of fraud in the
execution, of said agreement which will have implications on its validity and legal effects must be first threshed out by the
parties in the appropriate proceedings. While I agree that the Compromise Agreement's validity cannot be settled in an
administrative case, Medina should not be used to stop this Court from exercising its disciplinary authority over lawyers
until deceit can be proven in a separate civil case. After all, disbarment proceedings are sui generis and are not! akin to
civil or criminal cases. A disbarment proceeding "is intended to cleanse the ranks of the legal profession of its undesirable
members in order to protect the public and the courts." It is not a trial or a suit, but an investigation by this Court into its
officers' conduct.

The primary objective of administrative cases against lawyers is to protect public interest, as these proceedings determine
their fitness to enjoy the privileges of being an attorney. They are not meant to settle rights and controversies between
parties as in ordinary cases. Disciplinary cases are distinct, and proceed independently of civil or criminal cases, since of
lawyer's administrative liability "stands on grounds different from those in the other cases." Facts established during the
course of disbarment proceedings whichµ prove violations or the canons or the oath may be admitted and are sufficient
for this Court to rule on a lawyer's liability. In Luna v. Galarrita22 where the attorney entered into a compromise
agreement without, his client's. consent, this Court found his conduct deceitful and abusive of his client's trust and
confidence Luna held the lawyer administratively liable based on the facts established before the Investigating
Commissioner, even after the 1 client himself subsequently abandoned the issue. In this 'case, regular proceedings were
conducted before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, where the affidavitcomplaint was filed. Atty. Delute was given
several opportunities to dispute the allegations in the complaint he was twice given the chance to file his answer, and
finally, to file have verified position paper. However, he failed to do all of these. Subsequently, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines found that he deceives and manipulated his clients.25 All findings have basis on record, and both parties have
been given the opportunity to be heard. Hence, a separate proceeding to establish the deceit by Atty. Delute, such as a
civil case, is unnecessary. In any case, the issue here is his deceitful conduct, and not the validity of the Compromise
Agreement. This is not a simple case of a lawyer deceiving his client. It is aggravated by the fact that Atty. Delute
deliberately took advantage of his clients' circumstances and their inability to properly defend themselves. This scheme is
re'1ealed when he rejected his clients' pleas to allow their daughter to accompany them as a translator so they could
understand the document they would sign. When his clients hesitated and asked him to explain the contents, he refused
and threatened them into signing, saying he does not "defend a dead person."26 He sold his client's cause by making them
waive their claims-the complete opposite of what they had wanted: To add insult to injury, he even profited from this.
Clients come to lawyers with faith that their legal problems would\ be solved and that their interests would be protected.
Clients may not even be aware of their right~ or lack the skills to defend themselves. Lawyers step in to fill in this gap. As
such, they must be careful in handling the confidence reposed in them. This role is, even more pronounced when lawyers
represent the disadvantaged-those who have difficulty accessing their legal rights because of personal circumstances like
socioeconomic status and level of education, among others. Lawyering, in a much broader sense, is designed to bring
those at the margins closer to their rights under the law. Atty. Delute did the opposite of this. Clearly, he betrayed the very
purpose of being an attorney for his ' clients. His deceitful and opportunistic actions render him unfit to continue, being a
lawyer. Delos Santos II vs Atty Barbosa AC No.6681 June 17, 2015 Facts: A complaint for Falsification of Public
Document was filed by Melba D. De Los Santos Rodis (Rodis) against her, father, Ricardo D. De Los Santos, Sr. (De Los
Santos, Sr.) and Rosie P. Canaco (Canaco). Rodis alleged that Canaco made untruthful statements. in the certificate of live
birth of her son, Victor Canaco De Los Santos. Canaco indicated in her son's certificate of live birth that she was married
to De Los Santos, Sr. on September 1, 1974 in San Fernando, Camarines Sur when no such marriage took place. On April
24, 2002, an Information2 was filed against Canaco for violation of Sections 1 and 2 in relation with Section 9 of
Presidential Decree No. 651.3 Particularly, Canaco was charged of "willfully, unlawfully and knowingly making false
statements in the Certificate of Live Birth form for her son Victor P. Delos Santos who was born on June 30, 1982 by
falsely stating that she was married to the father of her son, RICARDO P. DELOS

SANTOS on September 1, 1974."4 The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 111152 and assigned to the Metropolitan
Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 43 of Quezon City. At the preliminary conference held on May 24, 2004, the respondent, as
counsel de parte of Canaco, objected to the Prosecution’s offer in evidence of the photocopy of the birth record of Victor
Canaco Delos Santos. As a result, the MeTC issued an order resetting the preliminary conference to October 19, 2004 in
order to give the prosecution time to file a certified true copy of the birth certificate. On May 25, 2004, the respondent
sent letters5 dated May 24, 2004 to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Quezon City, the National Census and Statistics
Office, and St. Luke’s Hospital. The pertinent portions of these letters state: RE: ALLEGED CERTIFIED TRUE COPY
OF CERTIFICATE OF LIVE BIRTH CODED AS 6826111, COVERED BY REGISTERED NUMBER 2499 LOCAL
CIVIL REGISTRAR, QUEZON CITY. There is being distributed by unauthorized person/s a purported copy of
Certificate of Live Birth above indicated which refers to one certain VICTOR CANACO DE LOS SANTOS. In this
connection, please be guided by provisions of our existing laws regarding possible violation of the secrecy and
confidentiality of records. Assuming without admitting that such facts of birth records exists, please be guided that my
client, VICTOR CANACO DE LOS SANTOS, has never authorized anybody to secure a copy, Xerox or otherwise, and
only upon his written authority and with undersigned counsel’s signature and verification may a copy be officially
reproduced, if any exist. On October 19, 2004, the MeTC noted the manifestation of the complainant that they failed to
secure a certified true copy of the birth certificate of the accused’s son because of the respondent’s letter. Thus, the MeTC
issued an order for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum/ad testificandum ordering the Civil Registrar of Quezon City
to produce a certified true copy of the live birth of Victor Canaco delos Santos who alleged to have been born on June 30,
1982 under Registry No. LCR 2499. Canaco, through the respondent, filed a motion for reconsideration of the order dated
October 19,2004 directing the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum/ad testificandum. In its order dated July 8, 2005, the
MeTC denied the motion for reconsideration. In the meantime, Victor D. De Los Santos II [herein complainant (brother of
Rodis and son of Delos Santos, Sr.)] filed a complaint with the prosecutor charging the respondent for obstruction of
justice. 6 In defense, the respondent argued, among others, that the name of his client Canaco’s son is VICTOR C. DE
LOS SANTOS and not VICTOR P. DE LOS SANTOS as stated in the Information charging Canaco with violation of
Presidential Decree No. 651.Thus, the respondent vehemently denied that he intentionally intended to delay and obstruct
the proceedings in the MeTC.7 The prosecutor dismissed the obstruction of justice complaint for insufficiency of
evidence. IBP Commission and IBP Board of Governor findings: The Findings of the Investigating Commissioner In our
Resolution15 dated August 24, 2005, we referred the case to the IBP for investigation, report, and recommendation. In her
Report and Recommendation, 16 IBP Commissioner Lolita A. Quisumbing found the respondent administratively liable
for violating his oath as a lawyer and the Code of Professional Responsibility. The IBP Commissioner opined that:

Respondent’s acts of objecting to the offer in evidence of a photocopy of the birth certificate of Victor C. De Los Santos
which necessitated the postponement of the preliminary conference in order to afford the prosecution the opportunity to
secure a certified true copy thereof was a calculated ploy to delay the successful prosecution of the case. To guarantee its
further delay, on the same day of the preliminary conference; i.e., on 24 May 2004, he prepared the letter addressed to the
Office of the Civil Registrar, National Census and Statistics Office and St. Luke’s Hospital to prevent or delay the
issuance of the certified true copy of the birth certificate. Such conduct is unethical, improper and inexcusable. 17 xxxx In
view of the foregoing, we find respondent acts of (1) writing and sending out the letter dated 24 May 2004 and of (2)
deliberately misleading the MeTC, the Supreme Court and this Commission into believing that Victor Canaco DeLos
Santos (accused’s son whose birth certificate is at issue in the criminal case) and Victor P. De Los Santos (named in the
Information)are two (2) different persons as constituting gross violation of his oath as a lawyer and of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Respondent’s acts were unethical, improper and committed with no other prompt and
efficient disposition of the case. Lawyers are reminded that as officers of the court, they have a responsibility to assist in
the proper administration of justice.18 [Emphasis supplied.] The IBP Commissioner recommended that Atty. Barbosa be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year. The Findings of the IBP Board of Governors In a
Resolution19 dated May 26, 2006, the IBP Board of Governors (BOG) resolved to adopt and approve the Report and
Recommendation of the IBP Commissioner after finding it to be fully supported by the evidence on record, the applicable
laws and rules. However, the IBP Board of Governors modified the IBP Commissioner’s recommended penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year to six (6) months. Atty. Barbosa moved to reconsider the
BOG resolution. In a Resolution 20 dated December 11, 2008, the BOG denied the motion but modified the respondent’s
suspension from the practice of law to a period of only three months. Ruling: Under Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, lawyers should uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote respect for the law and
legal processes. Specifically, Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 states that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct." Rule 1.03 also provides that "[a] lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest,
encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any man’s cause." Rule 12.04 of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility likewise states that "[a] lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse
Court processes." As an officer of the court, a lawyer is part of the machinery in the administration of justice. 21 A lawyer
should not only help attain the speedy, efficient, impartial, correct, and inexpensive adjudication of cases and prompt
satisfaction of final judgments, but should likewise avoid any unethical or improper practices that may impede, obstruct,
or prevent the realization of a speedy and efficient administration of justice. 22 In the present case, in disregard of the
METC’s intent to expedite the proceedings through its Order of October 19, 2004, the respondent sent letters to the Office
of the Civil Registrar of Quezon City, the National Census and Statistics Office, and St. Luke’s Hospital to prevent the
prosecution from obtaining a certified true copy of the birth certificate of Victor Canaco Delos Santos. The preliminary
conference of May 24, 2004 was precisely postponed to allow the prosecution to secure this certified true copy. Thus, the
respondent committed willful disobedience to a lawful order of the court intended to avoid any further delay of the
proceedings in the criminal case.

Misleading the Court as to the Identity of his Client Under Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, lawyers
owe candor, fairness, and good faith to the court.1âwphi1 Particularly, Rule 10.01 provides that "[a] lawyer shall not do
any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any
artifice." A lawyer is, first and foremost, an officer of the court. A lawyer’s first duty is not to his client but to the
administration of justice.23 In this case, the respondent deliberately misled the MeTC, the Commission and this Court into
believing that Victor Canaco De Los Santos (Canaco’s son whose birth certificate is at issue in the criminal case) and
Victor P. De Los Santos (named in the Information) are different persons. The Court agrees with the findings of the IBP
Commissioner that the difference in the middle initial is a mere typographical error on the part of the City Prosecutor. The
criminal case involved one and the same Victor Canaco de los Santos whose birth certificate has been at issue. Members
of the Bar are expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any act or
omission, that might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the
legal profession. 24 In Molina v. Magat,25 the penalty of six months suspension from the practice of law was imposed
against the lawyer who made false and untruthful statements in one of his pleadings. Here, the respondent committed
breaches of ethical rules beyond what was committed in Molina; his defiance and willful disobedience to a lawful order of
the MeTC and the act of misleading the MeTC, the Commission, and this Court as to the identity of his client constitute
gross violation of his oath as a lawyer and of the Code of Professional Responsibility. For clearly falling short of the
standards set by the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court finds that the appropriate penalty should be a
suspension from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year as originally recommended by the Investigating
Commissioner. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds respondent Atty. Nestor C. Barbosa GUILTY of
violating Rules 1.01 and 1.03 of Canon 1, Rule 10.01 of Canon 10, and Rule 12.04 of Canon 12 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED for one (1) year from the practice of law, effective upon his
receipt of this Decision, and is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely. Judge Madrid vs Atty Dealca AC No. 7474 September 9, 2014 FACTS Respondent Atty. Juan Dealca was hired
as a counsel in a pending criminal case that was raffled to the sala of Judge Jose Madrid. Subsequently, Dealca moved that
the case be re-raffled to another Branch of the RTC considering the adverse incidents between the respondent Presiding
Judge and the complainant, which was denied by Judge Madrid. Thereafter, Judge Madrid filed a letter complaint in the
Office of the Bar Confidant citing Atty. Dealca’s unethical practice of entering his appearance and then moving for the
inhibition of the presiding judge on the pretext of previous adverse incidents between them. Atty. Dealca, on the other
hand, asserted that Judge Madrid’s issuance of the order unconstitutionally and unlawfully deprived the accused of the
right to counsel, to due process, and to a fair and impartial trial; that Judge Madrid exhibited bias in failing to act on the
motion to lift and set aside the warrant of arrest issued against the accused; and that it should be Judge Madrid himself
who should be disbarred and accordingly dismissed from the Judiciary for gross ignorance of the law. The IBP submitted
their findings and recommended that Atty. Dealca be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six months.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Dealca filed frivolous administrative and criminal complaints against judges and court
personnel in violation of the Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility. RULING: YES Atty. Dealca’s
complaint against Judge Madrid has failed the judicious scrutiny. The Court did not find any trace of idealism or
altruismin the motivations for initiating it. Instead, Atty. Dealca exhibited his proclivity for vindictiveness and penchant
for harassment, considering that, as IBP Commissioner Hababag pointed out, his bringing of charges against judges, court
personnel and even his colleagues in the Law Profession had all stemmed from decisions or rulings being adverse to his
clients or his side. He well knew, therefore, that he was thereby crossing the line of propriety, because neither
vindictiveness nor harassment could be a substitute for resorting to the appropriate legal remedies. He should now be
reminded that the aim of every lawsuit should be to render justice to the parties according to law, not to harass them. The
Lawyer’s Oath is a source of obligations and duties for every lawyer, and any violation thereof by an attorney constitutes
a ground for disbarment, suspension, or other disciplinary action. The oath exhorts upon the members of the Bar not to
"wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit." These are not mere facile words, drift and
hollow, but a sacred trust that must be upheld and keep inviolable. As a lawyer, therefore, Atty. Dealca was aware of his
duty under his Lawyer’s Oath not to initiate groundless, false or unlawful suits. The duty has also been expressly
embodied in Rule 1.03, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Ong vs Atty Unto AC No.2417 February 6, 2002 Facts: The complainant to file the present case for disbarment.
Essentially, the complainant alleged that the respondent "manufactured" the criminal and administrative cases against him
to blackmail him or extort money from him. He claimed that the respondent solicited for any information that could be
used against him in the aforementioned cases by offering any informer or would-be witness a certain percentage of
whatever amounts they could get from him. The complainant branded the respondent's tactics as "highly immoral,
unprofessional and unethical, constituting malpractice of law and conduct gravely unbecoming of a lawyer." In support of
his accusations, the complainant submitted the following documents: (1) the afore-quoted letters of the respondent
addressed to the complainant and Dr. Bueno; (2) Nemesia Garganian's affidavit where she denied any knowledge
regarding the demands listed in the letter addressed to Dr. Bueno; (3) an unsigned affidavit allegedly prepared by the
respondent for the complainant, wherein the latter was acknowledging that he sired Ms. Ganganian's son illegitimate
child; (4) the criminal complaints filed against the complainant for alleged violation of the Retail Trade Nationalization
Law and the Anti-Dummy Law; and (5) an affidavit of Manuel Orbeta, a neighbor of the complainant who claimed that a
representative of the respondent had asked him to sign an affidavit allegedly prepared by the respondent, with an offer "to
give any informer 20% and witness, 10%, of any amount he can get from Mr. Alex Ong." To further bolster the
disbarment case against the respondent, the complainant also included a Supplemental Affidavit,[7] citing several cases
previously filed against the respondent by other parties.[8] The records show that the respondent was directed to submit
his comment on the complaint lodged against him. [9] He did not file any. Subsequently, the case was endorsed to the
Office of the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. In turn, the OSG forwarded the records of
the case to the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Negros Oriental, authorizing said office to conduct the investigation.

It appears that the respondent did not appear before the investigating officer, then Provincial Fiscal Jacinto Bautista, to
answer the charges against him. Instead, he moved for postponement. After denying the respondent's third request for
postponement, Fiscal Bautista proceeded with the reception of the complainant's evidence. The respondent was duly
notified of the on-going investigation but he did not show up. When it was the respondent's turn to present evidence,
notices of the preliminary investigation were sent to his home address in Valenzuela, Negros Oriental, his law office in
Dumaguete City and his last known address in Quezon City. The return cards showed that he could not be located,
although his wife received some of the notices sent to his home in Dumaguete. Meanwhile, the case was transferred from
one investigating officer to another, with some of them inhibiting from the investigation. Finally, the case was assigned to
2nd Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Cristino Pinili. Atty. Pinili deemed the respondent's absence as waiver of his right to
present his evidence. Finding merit in the complainant's cause, the investigator recommended that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for one month, or, at the very least, be severely reprimanded. The records of the case
were endorsed to the Office of the Solicitor General.[10] Thereafter, the OSG transmitted the records to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines in Manila, "for proper disposition, conformably with adopted policies and procedures."[11] The IBP's
Commission on Bar Discipline adopted Atty. Pinili's report and recommendation in toto. Ruling: "In resolving this
disbarment case, (w)e must initially emphasize the degree of integrity and respectability attached to the law profession.
There is no denying that the profession of an attorney is required after a long and laborious study. By years of patience,
zeal and ability, the attorney acquires a fixed means of support for himself and his family. This is not to say, however, that
the emphasis is on the pecuniary value of this profession but rather on the social prestige and intellectual standing
necessarily arising from and attached to the same by reason of the fact that every attorney is deemed an officer of the
court. The importance of the dual aspects of the legal profession has been wisely put by Chief Justice Marshall of the
United States Court when he said:

‘On one hand, the profession of an Atty. is of great importance to an individual and the prosperity of his life may depend
on its exercise. The right to exercise it ought not to be lightly or capriciously taken from him. On the other hand, it is
extremely desirable that the respectability of the Bar should be maintained and that its harmony with the bench should be
preserved. For these objects, some controlling power, some discretion ought to be exercised with great moderation and
judgment, but it must be exercised.’ The purpose of disbarment, therefore, is not meant as a punishment depriving him of
a source of livelihood but is rather intended to protect the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise
this function should be competent, honorable and reliable in order that the courts and clients may rightly repose
confidence in them." The relevant rule to the case at bar is Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 14 It
mandates lawyers to represent their clients with zeal but within the bounds of the law. Rule 19.01 further commands that
"a lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not present,
participate or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding."
Considering the facts of this case, we find that respondent has not exercised the good faith required of a lawyer in
handling the legal affairs of his client. It is evident from the records that he tried to coerce the complainant to comply with
his letter-demand by threatening to file various charges against the latter. When the complainant did not heed his warning,
he made good his threat and filed a string of criminal and administrative cases against the complainant. We find the
respondent’s action to be malicious as the cases he instituted against the complainant did not have any bearing or
connection to the cause of his client, Ms. Garganian. Clearly, the respondent has

violated the proscription in Canon 19, Rule 19.01. His behavior is inexcusable. The records show that the respondent
offered monetary rewards to anyone who could provide him any information against the complainant just so he would
have a leverage in his actions against the latter. His tactic is unethical and runs counter to the rules that a lawyer shall not,
for corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding 15 and he shall not do any act designed primarily to solicit
legal business. 16 In the case of Choa v. Chiongson, 17 we held:

"While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client, full devotion to his genuine interest, and warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his right, as well as the exercise of his utmost learning and ability, he must do so only within
the bounds of the law. He must give a candid and honest opinion on the merits and probable results of his client’s case
with the end view of promoting respect for the law and legal processes, and counsel or maintain such actions or
proceedings only as appear to him to be just, and such defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable under the law.
He must always remind himself of the oath he took upon admission to the Bar that "he will not wittingly or willingly
promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit nor give aid nor consent to the same" ; . . . Needless to state, the
lawyer’s fidelity to his client must not be pursued at the expense of truth and the administration of justice, and it must be
done within the bounds of reason and common sense. A lawyer’s responsibility to protect and advance the interests of his
client does not warrant a course of action propelled by ill motives and malicious intentions against the other party." The
ethics of the legal profession rightly enjoin lawyers to act with the highest standards of truthfulness, fair play and nobility
in the course of his practice of law. A lawyer may be disciplined or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his
professional or private capacity. 18 Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and
improper conduct of a member of the Bar. Thus, every lawyer should act and comport himself in such a manner that
would promote public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession. 19 Finally, we note that during the investigation
of the case, despite being duly notified thereof as evidenced by the motions for postponement he filed on several
occasions, the respondent chose not to participate in the proceedings against him. His nonchalance does not speak well of
him as it reflects his utter lack of respect towards the public officers who were assigned to investigate the case. He should
be watchful of his conduct. 20 The respondent should keep in mind the solemn oath 21 he took before this Court when he
sought admission to the bar. The lawyer’s oath should not be reduced to mere recital of empty words for each word aims
to promote the high standard of professional integrity befitting a true officer of the court. The recommended penalty for
the unprofessional conduct of the respondent was one (1) month suspension or reprimand. We believe that the same is too
light vis-a-vis the misconduct of the Respondent. Palencia vs Atty Linsangan, et.al. AC No. 10557 July 10, 2018 FACTS
Complainant was an overseas Filipino worker seafarer who was seriously injured during work when he fell into the
elevator shaft of the vessel flying a Cyprus flag. After initial treatment in Singapore, complainant was discharged and
flown to the Philippines to continue his medical treatment and rehabilitation. While confined at the Manila Doctors
Hospital, one "Moises," and later Jesherel L. Millena (Jesherel), paralegals in respondents' law office, approached
complainant. They convinced him to engage the services of respondents' law office in order to file a suit against his
employers for indemnity. After several visits from the paralegals and respondent Atty. Pedro Linsangan, complainant
executed (1) an Attorney-Client Contract, and (2) a Special Power of Attorney,6 where he engaged the legal services of
respondents and Gurbani & Co., a law firm based in Singapore, and agreed to pay attorney's fees of 35% of any recovery
or settlement obtained for both. After execution of the contract, complainant, through the efforts of respondents, was paid
by his employer the following amounts: US$60,000.00 as indemnity and US$20,000.00 under their collective bargaining
agreement. From these amounts, respondents charged complainant attorney's fees of 35%.

Respondents and Gurbani & Co. also filed a tort case against the owners of "Panos G" before the High Court of Singapore
(Singapore case). For this case, respondents engaged the services of Papadopoulos, Lycourgos & Co., a law firm based in
Cyprus, to draft a written opinion on the issues involving Cyprus law, among others. Thereafter, negotiations led to a
settlement award in favor of complainant in the amount of US$95,000.00. Gurbani & Co. remitted to respondents the
amount of US$59,608.40. From this amount, respondents deducted their attorney's fees equivalent to 35% and other
expenses Respondents tendered the amount of US$20,756.05 to complainant, which the latter refused. complainant also
filed the subject letter-Complaint with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD).
He requested that an investigation be conducted and the corresponding disciplinary action be imposed upon respondents
for committing the following unethical acts: (1) refusing to remit the amount collected in the Singapore case worth
US$95,000.00, and in offering only US$20,756.05; (2) depositing complainant's money into their own account; and (3)
engaging in "ambulance chasing" by deploying their agents to convince complainant to hire respondents' services while
the former was still bedridden in the hospital.

ISSUE 1. WON they are guilty of ambulance chasing 2. WON there was failure to account the money of their client
RULING 1. YES Here, there is sufficient evidence to show that respondents violated these rules. No less than their former
paralegal Jesherel admitted that respondent Atty. Pedro Linsangan came with her and another paralegal named Moises, to
Manila Doctors Hospital several times to convince complainant to hire their services. This is a far cry from respondents'
claim that they were merely providing free legal advice to the public. Moreover, while respondents deny Jesherel 's
connection with their law firm, this was sufficiently rebutted by complainant when he presented Jesherel's resignation
letter as received by respondents' firm. In employing paralegals to encourage complainant to file a lawsuit against his
employers, respondents indirectly solicited legal business and encouraged the filing of suit. These constitute malpractice
which calls for the exercise of the court's disciplinary powers and warrants serious sanctions. The practice of law is a
profession and not a business. Lawyers are reminded to avoid at all times any act that would tend to lessen the confidence
of the public in the legal profession as a noble calling, including, among others, the manner by which he makes known his
legal services. 2. YES Money collected by a lawyer on a judgment rendered in favor of his client constitutes trust funds
and must be immediately paid over to the client.51 As he holds such funds as agent or trustee, his failure to pay or deliver
the same to the client after demand constitutes conversion.52 Thus, whenever a lawyer collects money as a result of a
favorable judgment, he must promptly report and account the money collected to his client. It is the lawyer's duty to give a
prompt and accurate account to his client. Upon the collection or receipt of property or funds for the benefit of the client,
his duty is to notify the client promptly and, absent a contrary understanding, pay or remit the same to the client, less only
proper fees and disbursements, as soon as reasonably possible.54 He is under absolute duty to give his client a full,
detailed, and accurate account of all money and

property which has been received and handled by him, and must justify all transactions and dealings concerning them.55
And while he is in possession of the client's funds, he should not commingle it with his private property or use it for his
personal purposes without his client's consent. Here, respondents claim that they promptly accounted for the total award
of US$95,000.00, and after deducting their fees, tendered the amount of US$20,756.05. Complainant, however, refused to
accept the amount because he contested both the expenses and the separate deduction of attorney's fees by respondents
and Gurbani & Co. We find that while respondents gave prompt notice to complainant of their receipt of money collected
in the latter's favor, they were amiss in their duties to give accurate accounting of the amounts due to complainant, and to
return the money due to client upon demand. The Attorney-Client Contract between the parties states: "We/I hereby
voluntarily agree and bind ourselves, our heirs and assigns to pay Atty. Pedro L. Linsangan and his collaborating
Singapore counsels, the sum equivalent to thirty-five [35%] percent of any recovery or settlement obtained."57 Clearly,
the stipulated rate referred to the combined professional fees of both respondents and their collaborating Singapore
counsel, Gurbani & Co.58 Nevertheless, respondents proceeded to deduct separate fees on top of the amount already
deducted by Gurbani & Co. Complainant contested this deduction and refused to accept the amount being tendered by
respondents. Since a claim for attorney's fees may be asserted either in the very action in which the services of a lawyer
had been rendered, or in a separate action,59respondents, instead of forcibly deducting their share, should have moved for
the judicial determination and collection of their attorney's fees. The fact alone that a lawyer has a lien for his attorney's
fees on money in his hands collected for his client does not entitle him to unilaterally appropriate his client's money for
himself. Worse, respondents allegedly kept the money inside the firm's vault for two years until they were made aware of
the disciplinary complaint against them before the IBP-CBD. However, as noted by the IBP-CBD in its Report and
Recommendation: [T]he defense of respondents that they kept in their office vault the share of complainant as computed
by them in the amount of US$18,132.43, hence, they forgot the same and remembered it only when they received the
Order of this Commission for them to file an Answer to complainant's Complaint [which is more than 2 years] is rather
highly incredible considering that it involves a substantial amount, the series of communications between the parties, and
the Civil cases subsequently filed. Even if we give credence to this explanation, it is improper for the lawyer to put his
client's funds in his personal safe deposit vault.62 Funds belonging to the client should be deposited in a separate trust
account in a bank or trust company of good repute for safekeeping It is apparent from the foregoing that respondents
failed to handle their client's money with great degree of fidelity. Respondents also showed their lack of good faith when
they appropriated for themselves more than what is allowed under their contract. They have demonstrated that the
payment of their attorney's fees is more important than their fiduciary and faithful duty of accounting and returning what
is rightfully due to their client. More, they also failed to observe proper safekeeping of their client's money. Respondents
violated the trust reposed in them, and demonstrated their lack of integrity and moral soundness.64 Respondents' flagrant
and malicious refusal to comply with the CPR amounts to gross misconduct. This warrants the imposition of disciplinary
sanctions. PENALTY: SUSPENSION OF 2 YEARS Atty Cabarroguis vs Atty Basa AC No. 8789 March 11, 2020 Facts:
Atty. Cabarroguis alleged in his complaint that he was the retained legal counsel of his friend, Godofredo V. Cirineo, Jr.
(Godofredo), who filed an estafa case against his sister-in-law, Erlinda Basa-Cirineo (Erlinda) before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Davao City, Branch 11. Erlinda was represented by her brother, Atty.

Basa.8 Atty. Cabarroguis accused Atty. Basa of dilatory tactics when, after eight years of court trial, Atty. Basa asked for
the inhibition of the presiding judge, Hon. Renato Fuentes (Judge Fuentes). After Judge Fuentes inhibited himself, all the
other presiding judges of the other regular RTCs to whom the case was raffled, also inhibited themselves one after the
other and for one reason or another.9 Atty. Cabarroguis further alleged that Atty. Basa exhibited his immaturity on two
occasions. First was through an omnibus motion filed by Atty. Basa in a civil case on behalf of his clients, Raul and
Evelyn Molabola (collectively, the Molabolas), where he repeatedly spelled Atty. Cabarroguis' first name, Honesto, as
"HONESTo." Second was through a demand letter involving the same case in which Atty. Basa purportedly misspelled
the first name of Atty. Cabarroguis as "Honest."10 Atty. Cabarroguis also alleged that in retaliation against him for being
the private prosecutor in the estafa case against Atty. Basa's sister, Erlinda, Atty. Basa filed numerous administrative,
civil, and criminal cases against him which were all malicious and unfounded.  Atty. Cabarroguis also pointed out that in a
complaint for malicious prosecution he filed against Atty. Basa, the latter offered in evidence different court records in
several cases where Atty. Cabarroguis was counsel or partylitigant to prove that he was engaging in patently dishonest and
deceitful conduct.12 Atty. Cabarroguis prayed that the Court orders Atty. Basa to suppress or destroy this extensive
database gathered about him in violation of the Writ of Habeas Data.13 In his Comment to the Complaint,14 Atty. Basa
attempted to set the record straight about the alleged numerous cases he filed against Atty. Cabarroguis. In CBD-ADM
Case No. 6629, contrary to Atty. Cabarroguis' assertion that it was dismissed, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Board
of Governors (IBP-BOG) found him guilty of ethical misconduct and admonished him for preparing the affidavit-
complaint for estafa against Erlinda, signing it and swearing it before an administering officer despite having no personal
knowledge of the facts recited therein. Atty. Cabarroguis was also being untrue when he said in his complaint that CBD-
ADM Case No. 07-2110 was awaiting the outcome of the eight criminal complaints filed with the City Prosecution Office
of Davao City against him. Atty. Basa countered that there was nothing in the record of CBD-ADM Case No. 07-2110
which showed this status. On the contrary, before the filing of the administrative complaint, the City Prosecution Office of
Davao City had already filed against Atty. Cabarroguis two Informations for Perjury and five Informations for
Falsification in the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities in Davao City. Atty. Basa also cleared up that CBD-ADM Case No.
08-2223 was already decided by the IBP-BOG, finding Atty. Cabarroguis guilty of violating Canon 10 of the CPR and
meting him with the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year. Atty. Basa clarified further that it was
not he who personally filed or instituted several of the criminal cases adverted to by Atty. Cabarroguis, but his clients.
Thus, according to Atty. Basa, Atty. Cabarroguis was then facing in court two counts of Perjury and five counts of
Falsification, together with administrative sanctions recommended by the IBP-BOG in three separate administrative
cases.15 He stressed that the instant complaint against him was only filed by Atty. Cabarroguis after all the other cases
against the latter were filed. The truth then was that Atty. Cabarroguis was the one motivated by vengeance in filing the
instant disbarment suit against Atty. Basa. Lastly, as to the voluminous evidence he offered in the complaint for malicious
prosecution that Atty. Cabarroguis filed against him, Atty. Basa maintained it was done in the exercise of his right to
defend himself and to disprove the several self-laudatory allegations contained in the complaint. After the Court referred
the Complaint and the Comment to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation, Atty. Cabarroguis filed three
more supplemental complaints. In his first Supplemental Complaint and Reply to the Comment to the Complaint,16 Atty.
Cabarroguis alleged that Atty. Basa filed another retaliatory complaint for falsification against him, which was dismissed
by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Davao City for lack of probable cause. He also insisted how obvious it was that all
the other complaints against him were commenced after he filed an estafa case against Erlinda.

In his Second Supplemental Complaint,17 Atty. Cabarroguis narrated the various motions and pleadings filed by the
parties in said falsification case adverted to in the first supplemental complaint to underscore the further retaliatory acts of
Atty. Basa against him. In his Third Supplemental Complaint,18 Atty. Cabarroguis alleged that Atty. Basa filed two new
retaliatory complaints for disbarment against him in the form of: (1) a manifestation and motion (in the malicious
prosecution case filed by Atty. Cabarroguis against Atty. Basa) to take judicial notice of a complaint Atty. Cabarroguis
filed against a certain Dario Tangcay for collection of unpaid attorney's fees; and (2) a supplement to the motion for
reconsideration Atty. Basa filed in CBD-ADM Case No. 08-2223. Issue:  

Ruling: The Court reverses the findings of the IBP-BOG in Resolution No. XXII-2017-1238 and reinstates the previous
Resolution No. XXI-2014-484 dated August 10, 2014. The Court finds that Atty. Basa violated the Lawyer's Oath, Canon
1, Rule 1.03,25 Canon 8, Rule 8.01,26 Canon 12, Rules 12.02 and 12.04,27 and Canon 19, Rule 19.0128 of the CPR when
he: (1) filed baseless criminal suits against Atty. Cabarroguis; (2) poked fun at Atty. Cabarroguis by deliberately
misspelling his name in an omnibus motion; and (3) caused delay in the estafa case after moving for the inhibition of the
presiding judge after eight years in trial. The Court agrees with the original findings of the IBP that Atty. Basa employed
harassing tactics against Atty. Cabarroguis after he, on behalf of his client, filed an estafa case against Atty. Basa's sister
in 2002. Firstly, the Court does not wholly agree with the more recent findings of the IBP in its Resolution No. XXII2017-
1238 that Atty. Basa did not act with malice or bad faith in filing all of the 17 complaints against Atty. Cabarroguis. True,
the administrative cases were proved to be substantiated as Atty. Cabarroguis was eventually disciplined in all three. Also,
the eight counts for falsification and perjury initiated by Atty. Basa's clients, the Molabolas, were later filed in court.
However, there are criminal complaints relative to, or were offshoots of, the estafa case filed against Erlinda which were
dismissed for lack of merit, and which the Court believes were frivolous and had no other apparent purpose to serve but to
vex Atty. Cabarroguis. In I.S. No. 03-E-3753 filed by Atty. Basa against Atty. Cabarroguis for falsification under Article
172, paragraph 1 or 2 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), the cause of action was founded on the complaint-affidavit
executed by Godofredo through his attorney-in-fact, Atty. Cabarroguis, in the estafa case filed against Erlinda. Atty.
Cabarroguis allegedly averred facts therein not of his own personal knowledge and had subscribed and sworn to the
truthfulness of these allegations before an authorized officer. I.S. No. 03-E-3753 was dismissed because the prosecutor
held that one of the elements of the crime, which is "that the offender knew that a document was falsified by another
person" was not present. The prosecutor went on to say that there can be no false narration of facts when the allegations
averred in the subject complaint-affidavit was attested to as being hearsay, i.e. there was an admission that the facts
narrated are not within the personal knowledge of Atty. Cabarroguis. At the most, complainant can only argue that said
allegations cannot be used as evidence for being hearsay.29 The dismissal of I.S. No. 03-E-3753 prompted Atty.
Cabarroguis to file a complaint for malicious prosecution with damages against Atty. Basa. In his complaint-affidavit,
Atty. Cabarroguis stated that he enjoys the honor and distinction of being President Emeritus of the Davao Jaycees, Inc.
(JCI). This allegation, in turn, impelled Atty. Basa to tile another complaint for falsification which was docketed as I.S.
No. 08-E-4146. In his complaint, Atty. Basa alleged that JCI certified that it has not, at any time, bestowed the title or
position of President Emeritus to any of its members. I.S. No. 08-E-4146 was, however, dismissed on the ground of the
existence of a prejudicial question in view of the pendency of the civil case for malicious prosecution with
damages.30 The essence of the resolution for dismissal was that the question as to whether the claim of Atty. Cabarroguis
is true can best be threshed out in the very civil case for malicious prosecution and damages. The resolution of the issue
would henceforth determine whether a criminal case for falsification could indeed proceed. The frivolity in filing I.S. No.
03-E-3753 and I.S. No. 08-E-4146 is readily apparent. Representation by the principal of an attorney-in-fact is sanctioned
by law. This representation to act on behalf of the principal includes

the filing of complaints. Thus, there is nothing irregular for an agent duly armed with a special power of attorney to aver
facts in an affidavit-complaint and to subscribe and swear to the truthfulness of the same before an authorized officer on
behalf of a principal. Insofar as I.S. No. 08-E-4146 was concerned, the dismissal of the complaint was likewise called for.
In the first place, the alleged falsity does not involve a fact that is material or relevant to the crime of malicious
prosecution, which only has as its elements the presence of malice and absence of probable cause. More significantly, in
the crime of falsification of making an untruthful statement in a narration of facts, one of the elements is that there is a
legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by the respondent. Legal obligation means that there is a law
requiring the disclosure of the truth of the facts narrated.31 While arguably, Atty. Cabarroguis was morally obliged not to
falsely claim that he was accorded the status of a President Emeritus by the JCI, there is, nevertheless, no law which
requires him to disclose the truth of the matter. Moreover, Atty. Basa initiated four more criminal complaints against Atty.
Cabarroguis for the same cause of action, in violation of Canon 12, Rule 12.02, and Canon 19, Rule 19.01 of the CPR, to
wit: Canon 12 - A LAWYER SHALL EXERT EVERY EFFORT AND CONSIDER IT HIS DUTY TO ASSIST IN THE
SPEEDY AND EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE. xxxx Rule 12.02 - A lawyer shall not file multiple
actions arising from the same cause. Canon 19 - A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL
WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF THE LAW. Rule 19.01 - A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the
lawful objectives of his client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal
charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding. The four criminal complaints were all in relation to
the same affidavit-complaint Atty. Cabarroguis filed as the attorney-in-fact of Godofredo in the estafa case against
Erlinda. In I.S. No. 2006-D-2748 for falsification, Atty. Basa accused Atty. Cabarroguis of making a false allegation in
paragraph 1 of said affidavit-complaint when he said that Godofredo inherited his parents' part in the parcel of land
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T14402, when in truth, Godofredo did not. The prosecutor dismissed I.S. No.
2006-D-2748 on the grounds that there can be no perjury because the allegation of inheritance in the subject complaint-
affidavit was not material to the charge of estafa, and that the element of willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood
was not sufficiently established. The prosecutor noted that Atty. Cabarroguis only acted as an attorney-in-fact when he
signed the subject complaint-affidavit and, hence, prepared and signed the same in accordance with the facts narrated to
him by Godofredo.32 In another complaint docketed as I.S. No. 2006-E-3378, Atty. Basa charged Atty. Cabarroguis and
Godofredo with falsification of public document under Article 172(1) of the RPC. The complaint shared the same cause of
action with I.S. No. 2006-D-2748, in that Atty. Cabarroguis purportedly made a false allegation by stating in the same
affidavit-complaint in the estafa case against Erlinda that Godofredo acquired the subject property by succession or
inheritance, when in truth, he purchased it from his parents. I.S. No. 2006-E-3378 was likewise dismissed for lack of
probable cause on the same grounds that I.S. No. 2006-D-2748 was dismissed. Two years after, the same cause of action
in I.S. No. 2006-D-2748 and I.S. No. 2006-E-3378 was again alleged in two more complaints for falsification under
Article 172 of the RPC, that is, the allegation in the affidavitcomplaint of Godofredo against Erlinda in the estafa case that
he and his brother inherited the subject property from their parents was false. The truth, rather, according to Erlinda, was
that Godofredo and his brother purchased the subject property from their parents. This time, the complaints, which were
docketed as I.S. No. 2008-G5045 and I.S. No. 2008-G-5045-A, were filed by Erlinda against Atty. Cabarroguis and Atty.
Dante C. Sandiego. There was also the additional allegation that Godofredo, although an American citizen, made it appear
in his affidavit-complaint that he was qualified to acquire and own the subject land because he and his brother inherited it
from their parents. I.S. No. 2008-G-5045 and I.S. No. 2008-G- 5045-A were also dismissed for lack of probable

cause because the alleged false statement of fact was, on the contrary, a mere conclusion of law and that Godofredo was a
former Filipino citizen who later acquired an American citizenship and was not, therefore, absolutely disqualified from
acquiring lands in the Philippines. The foregoing shows how Atty. Basa recklessly applied the same cause of action in
four different complaints that were all dismissed for lack of probable cause. He cannot validly argue that it was not he
who initiated I.S. No. 2008-G-5045 and I.S. No. 2008-G-5045-A but his client, Erlinda. He cannot deny the fact that these
complaints were filed two years after similar complaints, which he personally filed himself, were already dismissed for
lack of probable cause. It is inexcusable for Atty. Basa to not be aware of his duty under his Lawyer's Oath not to
"wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same." This
duty has also been expressly provided for in Rule 1.03, Canon 1 of the CPR, to wit: Rule 1.03 - A lawyer shall not, for
any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any man's cause. Hence, inasmuch as lawyers
must guard themselves against their own impulses of initiating unfounded suits,33 they are equally bound to advise a
client, ordinarily a layman on the intricacies and vagaries of the law, on the merit or lack of merit of his or her case. If the
lawyer finds that his or her client's cause is defenseless, then it is his or her bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce
and submit, rather than traverse the incontrovertible.34 Lawyers must resist the whims and caprices of their clients and to
temper their propensities to litigate.35 Atty. Basa, by all means, is given the liberty to defend his client's cause with
utmost zeal.1âшphi1 This obligation, however, is not without reasonable limitations. The filing of frivolous suits against
his opposing counsel manifests, at the very least, his gross indiscretion as a colleague in the legal profession and his
malicious desire to vex Atty. Cabarroguis. Atty. Basa's act ultimately exhibits his intent to paralyze Atty. Cabarroguis
from exerting his utmost effort in protecting his client's interest.36 Verily, the rendition of improper service by lawyers
which does not meet the strictest principles of moral law invites stern and just condemnation from the Court because by
doing so, they fail to advance the honor of their profession and the best interests of their clients.37 In the same vein, the
Court cannot turn a blind eye to the crafty way with which Atty. Basa disrespected Atty. Cabarroguis via an Omnibus
Motion38 dated June 22, 2007. In this omnibus motion filed by Atty. Basa on behalf of his clients, the Molabolas, in a
special proceeding case where Atty. Cabarroguis was the petitioner, Atty. Basa misspelled the first name of Atty.
Cabarroguis, Honesto, as "HONESTo." The Court notes that this was not the first time that Atty. Basa misspelled the first
name of Atty. Cabarroguis. In a previous demand letter39 dated May 31, 2007 drafted by Atty. Basa and addressed to
Atty. Cabarroguis, the latter's name had also been misspelled as "Honest." While the mistake in the demand letter may be
dismissed as unintentional, the Court cannot arrive at the same conclusion with regard to the omnibus motion. By spelling
the first six letters of Atty. Cabarroguis's first name in capital letters and leaving the last letter in lowercase, the
impression given to the reader is that the author is attempting to illustrate an irony at the expense of Atty. Cabarroguis.
The misspelling was far from being a mere inadvertence as it had consistently appeared in all 14 pages of the omnibus
motion. Atty. Basa, as a lawyer, ought to know that his action becomes all the more malicious given that the omnibus
motion was not a mere private communication but formed part of public record when he filed it in court.40 In a long line
of cases, the Court has disciplined lawyers who resorted to clearly derogatory, offensive, and virulent language against
their opposing counsels, in violation of Canon 8, Rule 8.01 of the CPR: CANON 8 - A LAWYER SHALL CONDUCT
HIMSELF WITH COURTESY, FAIRNESS AND CANDOR TOWARD HIS PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUES, AND
SHALL AVOID HARASSING TACTICS AGAINST OPPOSING COUNSEL. Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his
professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper. While it may be argued that the
omnibus motion did not use language that can easily be characterized as such, the Court finds Atty. Basa's method
underhanded, a subtle way of name-calling, and was improperly offensive to Atty. Cabarroguis just the same. Inasmuch as
the Court has exhorted lawyers not to be too onion-skinned and should be tolerant of criticisms (especially those which
are fair or mild) against them as litigation is inherently a hostile endeavor between adverse or contending parties,41 this
has been weighed against an oft-repeated similar exhortation of the Court to

treat their opposing counsels with courtesy, dignity and civility.42 To the mind of the Court, the act of Atty. Basa in
poking fun at the name of Atty. Cabarroguis has traversed these bounds and exhibited a conduct unbecoming of an officer
of the court. Finally, the Court also finds merit in the claim of Atty. Cabarroguis that Atty. Basa has failed to measure up
to Canon 12, Rule 12.04 of the CPR when, apart from the baseless criminal complaints mentioned earlier, Atty. Basa also
caused the filing of a motion for inhibition against the presiding judge in the estafa case against Erlinda. While the Court
will not presume to evaluate the soundness of Judge Fuentes' discretion to inhibit from the case, the Court finds it
imperative to consider the unfortunate timing of the filing of the motion, which was after the trial of the case had taken
eight years to conclude, as well as its bearing in light of the totality of the other infractions of Atty. Basa which meant to
vex and harass Atty. Cabarroguis. The Court cannot likewise fail to observe how the inhibition of Judge Fuentes led to
five more inhibitions of the other judges to whom the case was re-raffled, which thus ultimately presented the problem of
unavailability of a judge who would try and hear the case. Needless to say, this turn of events caused untold delay in the
resolution of the case to the prejudice of Atty. Cabarroguis' client. In sum, the Court agrees with the previous Resolution
No. XXI-2014-48443 of the IBP finding Atty. Basa guilty of violating his Lawyer's Oath and multiple Canons of the CPR.
In previous cases, the penalties handed down by the Court against lawyers who violated Canon 8 of the CPR ranged from
admonition to suspension for periods ranging from one (1) month to three (3) months.44 In Atty. Herminio Harry L.
Roque, Jr. v. Atty. Rizal P. Balbin,45 following precedents,46 the Court suspended respondent therein from the practice
of law for a period of two (2) years for violating various Canons of the CPR, including Canon 8, Canon 12, Rule 12.03,
Rule 12.04, Canon 19, and Rule 19.01 of the CPR. Similarly in In Re: G.R. No. 157659 "Eligio P. Mallari v. Government
Service Insurance System and the Provincial Sheriff of Pampanga,"47 the Court suspended respondent therein from the
practice of law for two (2) years for violating the Lawyer's Oath and Canons 10 and 12, Rules 10.03, 12.02, and 12.04 of
the CPR. As applied to the facts of this case, the Comt deems it best to modify and temper the recommended penalty of
suspension from the practice of law from one (1) year to six (6) months. The Court also takes into consideration that this
is the first administrative case against Atty. Basa in his more than three decades in the legal profession. Penalty: Atty.
Danilo A. Basa is hereby found GUILTY of violating the Lawyer's Oath, Canon 1, Rule 1.03, Canon 8, Rule 8.01, Canon
12, Rule 12.02 and Rule 12.04, and Canon 19, Rule 19.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of 6 months. De Ysasi III vs NLRC & De Ysasi, GR No.
104599, March 11, 1994 Facts: The records of this case reveal that petitioner was employed by his father, herein private
respondent, as farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao in Hinigaran, Negros Occidental sometime in April, 1980. Prior
thereto, he was successively employed as sales manager of Triumph International (Phil.), Inc. and later as operations
manager of Top Form Manufacturing (Phil.), Inc. His employment as farm administrator was on a fixed salary, with other
allowances covering housing, food, light, power, telephone, gasoline, medical and dental expenses. As farm administrator,
petitioner was responsible for the supervision of daily activities and operations of the sugarcane farm such as land
preparation, planting, weeding, fertilizing, harvesting, dealing with third persons in all matters relating to the hacienda and
attending to such other tasks as may be assigned to him by private respondent. For this purpose, he lived on the farm,
occupying the upper floor of the house there. Following his marriage on June 6, 1982, petitioner moved to Bacolod City
with his wife and commuted to work daily. He suffered various ailments and was hospitalized on two separate occasions
in June and August, 1982. In November, 1982, he underwent fistulectomy, or the surgical removal of the fistula, a deep
sinuous ulcer. During his recuperation which lasted over four months, he was under the care of Dr. Patricio Tan. In June,
1983, he was confined for acute gastroenteritis and, thereafter, for infectious hepatitis from December, 1983 to January,
1984. During the entire periods of petitioner's illnesses, private respondent took care of his medical expenses and
petitioner continued to receive compensation. However, in April, 1984, without due notice, private respondent ceased to
pay the latter's salary. Petitioner made oral and written demands for an explanation for the sudden

withholding of his salary from Atty. Apolonio Sumbingco, private respondent's auditor and legal adviser, as well as for
the remittance of his salary. Both demands, however, were not acted upon. Petitioner then filed an action with the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC, for brevity), Regional Arbitration Branch No. VI, Bacolod City, on
October 17, 1984, docketed therein as RAB Case No. 0452-84, against private respondent for illegal dismissal with prayer
for reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and payment of full back wages, thirteenth month pay for 1983,
consequential, moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees. On July 31, 1991, said complaint for illegal
dismissal was dismissed by the NLRC, 1 holding that petitioner abandoned his work and that the termination of his
employment was for a valid cause, but ordering private respondent to pay petitioner the amount of P5,000.00 as penalty
for his failure to serve notice of said termination of employment to the Department of Labor and Employment as required
by Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 and consonant with this Court's ruling in Wenphil Corporation vs. National Labor Relations
Commission, et al.2 On appeal to the Fourth Division of the NLRC, Cebu City, said decision was affirmed in toto Ruling:
The conduct of the respective counsel of the parties, as revealed by the records, sorely disappoints the Court and invites
reproof. Both counsel may well be reminded that their ethical duty as lawyers to represent their clients with zeal55 goes
beyond merely presenting their clients' respective causes in court. It is just as much their responsibility, if not more
importantly, to exert all reasonable efforts to smooth over legal conflicts, preferably out of court and especially in
consideration of the direct and immediate consanguineous ties between their clients. Once again, we reiterate that the
useful function of a lawyer is not only to conduct litigation but to avoid it whenever possible by advising settlement or
withholding suit. He is often called upon less for dramatic forensic exploits than for wise counsel in every phase of life.
He should be a mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise, rather than a virtuoso of technicality in the
conduct of litigation. 56 Rule 1.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides that "(a) lawyer shall
encourage his client to avoid, end or settle the controversy if it will admit of a fair settlement." On this point, we find that
both counsel herein fell short of what was expected of them, despite their avowed duties as officers of the court. The
records do not show that they took pains to initiate steps geared toward effecting a rapprochement between their clients.
On the contrary, their acerbic and protracted exchanges could not but have exacerbated the situation even as they may
have found favor in the equally hostile eyes of their respective clients. In the same manner, we find that the labor arbiter
who handled this regrettable case has been less than faithful to the letter and spirit of the Labor Code mandating that a
labor arbiter "shall exert all efforts towards the amicable settlement of a labor dispute within his jurisdiction." 57 If he
ever did so, or at least entertained the thought, the copious records of the proceedings in this controversy are barren of any
reflection of the same. One final word. This is one decision we do not particularly relish having been obliged to make.
The task of resolving cases involving disputes among members of a family leaves a bad taste in the mouth and an aversion
in the mind, for no truly meaningful and enduring resolution is really achieved in such situations. While we are convinced
that we have adjudicated the legal issues herein squarely on the bases of law and jurisprudence, sans sentimentality, we
are saddened by the thought that we may have failed to bring about the reconciliation of the father and son who figured as
parties to this dispute, and that our adherence here to law and duty may unwittingly contribute to the breaking, instead of
the strengthening, of familial bonds. In fine, neither of the parties herein actually emerges victorious. It is the Court's
earnest hope, therefore, that with the impartial exposition and extended explanation of their respective rights in this
decision, the parties may eventually see their way clear to an ultimate resolution of their differences on more convivial
terms. Sevilla vs Atty Millo AC No. 10697 March 25, 2019 The Facts

Complainant alleged that he is the publisher of Pampango Footprints (Pampango), a provincial newspaper circulated in
Tarlac Province.3 Sometime in April 2014, he issued a statement of account 4 in the amount of P33,120.00 to Spouses
Avelino and Melendrina Manalo (Sps. Manalo) as fee for the publication of the notice of auction sale relative to Sps.
Manalo's petition for foreclosure of mortgage, which was published in three (3) consecutive issues of
Pampango.5 Claiming that the publication fee was "exorbitant and shocking," respondent, as Sps. Manalo's counsel,
refused to settle the account, threatened complainant that he would petition for the disqualification of Pampango, and
thereafter, wrote an undated letter 6 to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City in furtherance of
such threat. 7 Consequently, complainant filed this administrative complaint against respondent. During the pendency of
this complaint, Sps. Manalo negotiated for a discount of fifty percent (50%), to which complainant agreed. Yet,
respondent intervened and forbade his clients to pay. For this reason, complainant called respondent, but instead of
explaining his side, respondent shouted, "I am busy I don't want to talk to you!" and banged his cellphone.8 For his
part,9 respondent denied administrative liability, averring that he merely acted on behalf of his clients, who found the fee
"exorbitant and shocking."10 He also claimed that after the Executive Judge advised them to just settle the matter with
complainant, he withdrew as Sps. Manalo's counsel to give way to the said settlement.11 Finally, he maintained that
complainant's non-issuance of an affidavit of publication and nonsubmission of copies of the issues where the notice of
auction sale was printed caused the non-completion of the foreclosure proceedings.12 In a Resolution13 dated July 4,
2016, the Court referred the administrative case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and
recommendation. The IBP's Report and Recommendation In a Resolution19 dated February 22, 2018, the IBP Board of
Governors adopted the Investigating Commissioner's Report, with modification lowering the recommended penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for a period of one (1) month to mere reprimand. Issue: Ruling: The Court concurs
and affirms the findings of the IBP Board of Governors with modification as to the penalty. It is well to stress that lawyers
owe fidelity to the cause of their clients and are expected to serve the latter with competence and diligence. Consequently,
lawyers are entitled to employ every honorable means to defend the cause of their clients and secure what is due them.
20 However, professional rules set limits on a lawyer's zeal and hedge it with necessary restrictions and qualifications.
21 In this regard, Canon 1 of the CPR provides that lawyers "shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and of legal processes." In furtherance thereto, Rule 1.04 of the CPR mandates lawyers to
"encourage [their] clients to avoid, end, or settle a controversy if it will admit of a fair settlement." Guided by the
foregoing, the Court agrees with the findings of the Investigating Commissioner, as affirmed by the IBP Board of
Governors, that respondent indeed fell short of what is expected of him, despite his avowed duties as officer of the court.
Records reveal that respondent did not endeavor to initiate the settlement of the publication fee being charged by
complainant. Disagreeing with the statement of account, respondent chose not to pay and immediately referred the matter
to the Executive Judge, instead of negotiating and discussing the matter with complainant. Remarkably, respondent's
obstinate refusal to settle culminated in forbidding his clients, Sps. Manalo, to pay the reduced publication fee, which the
latter secured for themselves. He even shouted at and ignored complainant when the latter called him up in an effort to
finally settle. Ultimately, respondent's acts, which are violative of Rule 1.04, Canon 1 of the CPR, prejudiced his clients as
they resulted in the noncompletion of the foreclosure proceedings, since complainant did not issue the affidavit of
publication nor provide copies of the issues where the notice of auction sale was actually printed.

Anent the proper penalty to be imposed on respondent, under the circumstances and considering that this is his first
offense, the Court finds it appropriate to impose on respondent the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a
period of one (1) month. This is in line with the Court's ruling in Caspe v. Mejica,22 where respondent therein was
suspended for violating Rule 1.04, Canon 1 of the CPR, among others. Similarly, the Court has held that suspension is
appropriate when a lawyer knows that he is violating a court order or rule, and there is injury or potential injury to a client
or a party, or interference or potential interference with a legal proceeding, 23 as in this case. As a final note, it must be
emphasized that membership in the legal profession is a privilege burdened with conditions. A lawyer is required to
observe the law and be mindful of his or her actions whether acting in a public or private capacity. Any transgression of
this duty on his part would not only diminish his reputation as a lawyer but would also erode the public's faith in the legal
profession as a whole. 24 As such, the Court will not hesitate to impose the necessary penalty to a lawyer whose conduct
falls short of the exacting standards expected of him as a member of the Bar. Penalty: respondent Atty. Marcelo C. Millo
(respondent) is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of 1 month. People vs Liwanag et.al. GR No.
120468 August 15, 2001 Issue: WON Accused-appellant contention that he was deprived of his right to bail and that had
his counsel de officio been effective, he would have filed the proper motion is proper Ruling: NO The assistance extended
by Attorney Uy of the Public Attorney’s Office was sufficiently effective. As noted by the Office of the Solicitor General,
to wit: The pertinent transcripts of stenographic notes would show that appellant’s counsel de oficio, Atty. William Uy,
cross-examined the private complainant extensively as well as two other prosecution witnesses (SPO1 Sevilla and Edith
Hernandez). That said counsel opted not to cross-examine the prosecution expert witness, Dr. Louella Nario, is of no
moment because said witness merely explained in court her findings and conclusions that she had arrived at after
conducting the medical examination on the private complainant [Exhibit C] (TSN, March 30, 1993, pp. 10-12). In fact, at
one point, Atty. Uy raised an objection to the private prosecutor’s question on how private complainant’s genital injuries
were sustained for being incompetent to answer, which objection was impliedly sustained by the trial judge In assessing
the effectiveness of counsel’s assistance, the Strickland standard invoked by accused-appellant is too stringent for
application in Philippine judicial setting. Strickland only seeks to ensure that the adversarial testing process is present in a
case by requiring that the assistance rendered by counsel be "effective." The presence of an adversarial testing process, in
other words, ensures that the trial is fair by according the accused due process through the "effective" assistance of
counsel. While fairness is likewise the object of Article III, Section 14 (2) of the Philippine Constitution, the assistance
afforded by counsel to an accused in light of the Philippine constitutional requirement need only be in accordance with the
pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court, the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Canons of Professional Ethics.
In Philippine judicial setting, a counsel assisting an accused is presumed to be providing all the necessary legal defense
which are reasonable under the circumstances in accordance with said norms. In this regard, a counsel assisting an
accused is guided by the following provisions of Section 20 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court: SECTION 20. Duties of
attorneys. — It is the duty of an attorney: (c) To counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as appear to him to
be just, and such defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable under the law;

(d) To employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him, such means only as are consistent with truth
and honor, and never seek to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law; (h)
Never to reject, for any consideration personal to himself, the cause of the defenseless or oppressed; (i) In the defense of a
person accused of crime, by all fair and honorable means, regardless of his personal opinion as to the guilt of the accused,
to present every defense that the law permits, to the end that no person may be deprived of life or liberty, but by due
process of law. The following canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility, likewise, provide: Canon 2 — A lawyer
shall make his legal services available in an efficient and convenient manner compatible with the independence, integrity
and effectiveness of the profession. Canon 12 — A lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the
speedy and efficient administration of justice. Canon 17 — A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall
be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. Canon 18 — A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and
diligence. Canon 19 — A lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law. Lastly, the Canons of
Professional Ethics provide: 4. A lawyer assigned as counsel for an indigent prisoner ought not to ask to be excused for
any trivial reason and should always exert his best efforts in his behalf. 5. It is the right of the lawyer to undertake the
defense of a person accused of crime, regardless of his personal opinion as to the guilt of the accused; otherwise, innocent
persons, victims only of suspicious circumstances, might be denied proper defense. Having undertaken such defense, the
lawyer is bound, by all fair and honorable means, to present every defense that the law of the land permits, to the end that
no person may be deprived of life or liberty but by due process of law. 15. . . . The lawyer owes "entire devotion to the
interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and
ability," to the end that nothing be taken or be withheld from him, save by the rules of law, legally applied. No fear of
judicial disfavor or public unpopularity should restrain him from the full discharge of his duty. In the judicial forum the
client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land, and he may
expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. But it is steadfastly to be borne in mind that the great trust of the
lawyer is to be performed within and not without the bounds of the law. The office of attorney does not permit, much less
does it demand of him for any client, violation of law or any manner of fraud or chicanery. He must obey his own
conscience and not that of his client. The above-cited norms are more than adequate to guide a counsel’s conduct in the
performance of his duty to assist a client in an effective manner as required by Article III, Section 14 (2). Said
constitutional provision is patterned after the Sixth Amendment of the American Constitution. As in Article III, Section 14
(2), the Sixth Amendment refers simply to "counsel," not specifying particular requirements of effective assistance. It
relies instead on the legal profession’s maintenance of standards sufficient to justify the law’s presumption that counsel

will fulfill the role in the adversary process that the Amendment envisions. The proper measure of attorney performance
remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms. Coupled with the presumption that counsel’s
performance was reasonable under the circumstances, as long as the trial was fair in that the accused was accorded due
process by means of an effective assistance of counsel, then the constitutional requirement that an accused shall have the
right to be heard by himself and counsel is satisfied. The only instance when the quality of counsel’s assistance can be
questioned is when an accused is deprived of his right to due process. Otherwise, there is the danger that questioning
counsel’s acts or omissions in the conduct of his duties as counsel for an accused may breed more unwanted consequences
than merely upholding an accused’s constitutional right or raising the standard of the legal profession. In the case at
bar, Accused-appellant’s right to due process has been observed and the trial was conducted in a fair manner. Corollarily,
this Court sees no reason to doubt or overcome the presumption that counsel de officio reasonably assisted accused-
appellant in accordance with the prevailing norms of professional conduct and his sworn duties as an officer of the court.
Based on the findings of the trial court, Accused-appellant was not at all prejudiced by the alleged ineffectiveness of his
counsel. The alleged failures by his counsel to safeguard his rights from the time he was arrested up to the time he was
sentenced and the alleged inadequacies in the direct and cross-examinations of prosecution witnesses were ultimately
inconsequential to the eventual outcome of the case. If at all, the outcome was the result of the strength of the prosecution
evidence rather than the failures and inadequacies in the conduct of the defense. Rodica vs Atty Lazaro et.al.AC No.9529
August 23, 2012 Facts: This is a disbarment complaint filed by Rodica against the respondent Atty. Lazaro on grounds of
gross and serious misconduct, deceit, malpractice, grossly immoral conduct and violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. On May 5, 2011, William Strong was arrested and detained by the Bureau of Immigration for allegedly
being involved in an international gang and conspiracy in Brazil on fraud involving the creation of hundreds of dollars in
illegal securities. Strong requested his friend Philip Apostol to look for a lawyer. Apostol recommended the Lazaro Law
Office represented by Atty. Manuel Lazaro and his associates who initially declined but later accepted to handle the
deportation case.  Strong initiated giving the information that his deportation case may be due to the complaint filed by his
live-in partner Jasper Rodica before the RTC against the Hillview Marketing Corporation for recovery and possession and
damages involving a property they have in Boracay which is represented by Atty. Tan. Rodica was represented by Atty.
Ibutnande in this case. Apparently, Rodica claimed that Atty. Manuel met with Atty. Tan to discuss the settlement
package on the deportation case they filed against Strong on the condition that Rodica withdraws her complaint from the
RTC of Cebu.  On May 25, 2011 the Bureau of Immigration rendered a judgment deporting Strong to leave the country.
On  June 6, 2011 Rodica filed before the RTC a motion to withdraw her complaint against Hillview. Rodica now alleges
that after Strong was deported and withdrawing the case before the RTC, she was deceived by Atty Manuel et al for over
settlement of 7 million which was allegedly extorted from her after misrepresenting that the withdrawal of the case before
the RTC is only a part of the settlement package. It appears on the record that Atty. Espejo, an associate of the Lazaro
Law office helped in drafting the Manifestation with Motion to Withdraw Motion for Reconsideration after Rodica
pleaded him to prepare the motion and was requested further to indicate the name of the Lazaro Law Office including the
name of Atty. Manuel and Atty. Michelle to give more weight on the pleading. Rodica promised Atty. Espejo to talk to
Atty. Manuel about it. The case before the RTC was actually dismissed on March 29, 2011 for failure to show cause of
action but a motion for reconsideration was filed by Rodica.  Issue: Whether or not the allegations of Rodica merit the
disbarment of the respondents. 

Ruling In Siao v. Atty. De Guzman, Jr.,18 this Court reiterated its oft repeated ruling that in suspension or disbarment
proceedings, lawyers enjoy the presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof rests upon the complainant to clearly
prove her allegations by preponderant evidence.  In the absence of preponderant evidence, the presumption of innocence
of the lawyer continues and the complaint against him must be dismissed.19ςrνll In the present case, the totality of
evidence presented by Rodica failed to overcome the said presumption of innocence. Rodica s claim of "settlement
package" is devoid of merit. Rodica s assertions that Atty. Tan orchestrated Strong s arrest and that Atty. Manuel
proposed the withdrawal of the RTC case to facilitate the deportation of Strong, are mere allegations without proof and
belied by the records of the case. "The basic rule is that mere allegation is not evidence, and is not equivalent to proof."
20 Aside from her bare assertions, Rodica failed to present even an iota of evidence to prove her allegations. In fact, the
records belie her claims. The documents issued by the Bureau of Immigration showed that Strong was the subject of the
Interpol Red Notice for being a fugitive from justice wanted for crimes allegedly committed in Brazil. 21 His warrant of
arrest was issued sometime in February 2008. Significantly, even before Strong was arrested and eventually deported,
Atty. Tan had already obtained a favorable judgment for his clients. We also agree that it is highly inconceivable for Atty.
Tan and the Lazaro Law Office to concoct the scheme of "pressuring" Rodica to withdraw the RTC case for the purpose
of expediting the deportation proceedings of Strong. The following facts are undisputed: (1) Rodica s counsel of record in
the RTC is Atty. Ibutnande; (2) the RTC case was already dismissed in the Order22 of March 29, 2011 for failure to state
a cause of action; (3) on April 18, 2011, Rodica through her counsel of record filed a Motion for Reconsideration; (4) on
May 5, 2011, Strong was arrested and detained pursuant to an Interpol Red Notice; (5) Strong hired the Lazaro Law
Office to handle his deportation case; (6) on May 19, 2011 Strong filed a Manifestation with Omnibus Motion to
voluntarily leave the country; (7) the Bureau of Immigration rendered a Judgment 23 dated May 25, 2011 granting Strong
s motion to voluntarily leave the country; (8) Strong left the country on May 31, 2011; (9) Rodica s Manifestation with
Motion to Withdraw the Motion for Reconsideration was filed on June 6, 2011; and, (8) acting on the said Manifestation
with Motion, the RTC on June 14, 2011 issued an Order 24 granting the same. Given the chronology of events, there
appears no relation between the deportation case and the withdrawal of the RTC case. Thus, it would be specious if not
far-fetched to conclude that the withdrawal of the RTC case was a pre-condition to Strong s deportation. As regards the
alleged participation of Atty. Manuel in the "settlement package" theory of Rodica, suffice it to say that Atty. Manuel has
in his favor "the presumption that, as an officer of the court, he regularly performs the duties imposed upon him by his
oath as a lawyer and by the Code of Professional Responsibility." 25 Hence, absent any competent evidence to the
contrary, Atty. Manuel, as Strong s counsel, is presumed to have worked out the release and subsequent deportation of his
client in accordance with the proper procedures. Preponderance of evidence shows that Rodica caused the withdrawal of
the RTC case to facilitate the sale of the Boracay property to Apostol. We cannot lend credence to Rodica s allegation that
she was deceived by Atty. Manuel, Atty. Espejo, Atty. Almario and Atty. Michelle, another senior associate at the Lazaro
Law Office, into believing that the withdrawal of the RTC case was part of a settlement package to settle her differences
with her legal adversaries. We accord more credence to the explanation of the respondents, particularly Atty. Espejo, that
in the course of rendering

legal services to Strong, he had become close to Rodica so much so that he accommodated Rodica s request to cause the
withdrawal of the RTC case to facilitate the sale of the Boracay property to Apostol. In their Joint
Comment,26 respondents Attys. Almario, Espejo and Michelle debunked the opinion of Rodica s "well-meaning lawyer
friends" that the withdrawal of the RTC case "absolve[d] all defendants from any wrongdoing" and made "the contents of
her original complaint practically meaningless." Atty. Almario and Atty. Espejo opined that since the dismissal of Rodica
s complaint was based on her failure to state a cause of action and without prejudice, the same may simply be re-filed by
revising her complaint and ensuring that it states a cause of action. As argued by Atty. Manuel, he and his lawyers only
acted in the best interest of their client Strong and rendered services in accordance with the latter s objective of leaving the
country and not being deported to Brazil. The Lazaro Law Office cannot be faulted for the dismissal of the RTC case
because it had already been dismissed even before the Lazaro Law Office was engaged to handle Strong s immigration
case. Besides, Rodica admittedly agreed to withdraw her RTC case to meet Apostol s condition and to make the property
marketable. Apostol corroborated Atty. Manuel s statement in his Affidavit 27 of July 21, 2011. He affirmed that he told
Rodica that he would only consider purchasing the Boracay property if it is cleared of any pending case so that he can
protect himself, as a buyer, from any possible issues that may crop up involving the said property. According to him,
Rodica assured him that she would work for the termination of the RTC case and consult her lawyers in Boracay on the
matter so she could already sell the property. It is difficult to imagine that Rodica was deceived by some of the respondent
lawyers into believing that the withdrawal of the RTC case was only the initial step in the settlement of her differences
with her adversaries.28 We went over the said Manifestation with Motion to Withdraw the Motion for
Reconsideration29 and we note that paragraph 6 thereof specifically states: 6. However, the Plaintiff respectfully
manifests that after much serious thought and deliberation, and considering the anxieties caused by the pendency of the
instant case, Plaintiff is no longer interested in pursuing the case. Accordingly, Plaintiff respectfully moves for the
withdrawal of the Motion for Reconsideration dated April 14, 2011 of the Order dated March 29, 2011 dismissing the
instant Complaint filed on April 18, 2011. As already noted by the RTC, Branch 6, Kalibo, Aklan in its Order 31 dated
April 4, 2011, in the case for recovery of possession with damages: This Manifestation was signed by plaintiff, her Manila
lawyers and Atty. Joan Ibutnande, plaintiff s counsel on record. From the statements made by plaintiff in her
Manifestation to Withdraw Motion for Reconsideration that she had made serious thoughts and deliberation she cannot
now say that she was manipulated and forced in signing the same. The Court perceives plaintiff to be an intelligent
woman not to be swayed of her principles and beliefs and manipulated by others, she may have a fickle mind when it
comes to other things but definitely it can not be applied to the Court. The Court does not see the connection between the
instant case and that of William Strong as alleged by the plaintiff. Mr. Strong is not a party in this case, even plaintiff s
counsel thought so too. From the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Atty. Joan Ibutnande, it was stated in paragraph 5:
"That the undersigned counsel was baffled as she did not see any connection [between] the incident surrounding the arrest
of Mr. William Strong and the above-entitled case filed [by] the [plaintiff], and told the plaintiff about it x x x." As Mr.
Strong is not a party in the instance case, his affairs whatever they are cannot dictate the outcome of this case. Moreover,
it would appear from her own narration that Rodica is not someone who is naïve or ignorant. In her complaint, she
claimed to be an astute businesswoman who even has some business in Barcelona, Spain. 34 Thus, the more reason we
cannot lend credence to her claim that she was tricked into believing that the withdrawal of the RTC case was only
preliminary to the complete settlement of all her differences with her perceived adversaries. If such had been the
agreement, then a Compromise Agreement enumerating all the terms and conditions should have been filed instead of the
Manifestation with Motion to Withdraw the Motion for

Reconsideration. In addition, the withdrawal should not have been limited to the RTC case as it appears that there are
other cases pending with other tribunals and agencies 35 involving the same parties. If Rodica is to be believed, then these
cases should likewise have been dismissed in order to achieve the full and complete settlement of her concerns with her
adversaries. From the above and by preponderance of evidence, it is clear that Rodica s purpose in withdrawing the RTC
case is to pave the way for Apostol to purchase the Boracay property. In fact, Rodica eventually executed a Deed of
Absolute Sale in favor of Apostol over the Boracay property. Rodica s claim of paying more than P7 million to the Lazaro
Law Office is not substantiated. There is likewise no merit in Rodica s allegation that the Lazaro Law Office extorted
from her more than P7 million for alleged professional and legal fees and penalties relative to Strong s immigration case.
To support her claim, Rodica attached four statements of account issued by the Lazaro Law Office for US$2,650.00 under
Statement of Account No. 13837,37 US$2,400.00 under Statement of Account No. 13838,38 US$1,550.00 under
Statement of Account No. 1383939 and US$8,650.00 under Statement of Account No. 13835,40 or for a total amount of
US$15,250.00. She likewise presented photocopies of portions of her dollar savings account passbook to show where the
aforesaid funds came from. Considering the prevailing exchange rate at that time, the Court notes that the sum total of the
abovementioned figures in its peso equivalent is far less than P7 million. In fact, the statements of account even support
the contention of Atty. Manuel that Strong failed to fully pay the amount of US$100,000.00 as success fee. Anent the
alleged withdrawals from Rodica s dollar savings account, the same merely established that she made those withdrawals.
They do not constitute as competent proof that the amounts so withdrawn were indeed paid to Lazaro Law Office. Rodica
was not the client of the Lazaro Law Office. Rodica also faulted the Lazaro Law Office lawyers for disclaiming that she is
their client. However, Rodica admitted in paragraph 5 of her unnotarized Sworn Affidavit 41 that Atty. Manuel and his
lawyer-assistants were "engaged by William Strong to handle his case with the Philippine immigration authorities." Thus,
this Court is more inclined to believe that the Lazaro Law Office agreed to handle only the deportation case of Strong and
such acceptance cannot be construed as to include the RTC case. In fact, all the billings of Lazaro Law Office pertained to
the immigration case, and not to the RTC case. To reiterate, the RTC case has nothing to do with Strong s deportation
case. Records also show that the RTC case was filed long before Strong was arrested and detained. In fact, it had already
been dismissed by the trial court long before Strong engaged the legal services of the Lazaro Law Office. More
importantly, Strong is not a party to the RTC case. Also, the counsel of record of Rodica in the RTC case is Atty.
Ibutnande, and not the Lazaro Law Office. There is nothing on record that would show that respondent Attys. Manuel,
Michelle, and Almario had any participation therein. Atty. Espejo s participation in the RTC case. However, we cannot
say the same as regards Atty. Espejo. He admitted drafting Rodica s Manifestation and Motion to Withdraw Motion for
Reconsideration indicating therein the firm name of the Lazaro Law Office as well as his name and the names of Atty.
Manuel and Atty. Michelle without the knowledge and consent of his superiors, and in likewise affixing his signature
thereon. Atty. Espejo acknowledged committing the abovementioned acts as a way of assisting Rodica who had already
become his close friend. Atty. Espejo s admissions are as follows: 11. Atty. Espejo further recounts that after being
advised to simply withdraw her Motion for Reconsideration ("MR"), Rodica pleaded with Atty. Espejo to prepare the
documents required to be filed

with the RTC x x x to spare her Boracay lawyers from preparing the same. Atty. Espejo accommodated Jasper and drafted
the Manifestation with Motion to Withdraw Motion for Reconsideration ("Motion to Withdraw MR") to be given to
Rodica s Boracay counsel, Atty. Joan I. Tabanar-Ibutnande, who is in a better position to evaluate the merit of the
withdrawal of the MR. 11.1. Upon seeing Atty. Espejo s initial draft, Rodica requested Atty. Espejo to include x x x the
name of the Lazaro Law Office as signatory allegedly to give more credence and weight to the pleading and to show the
defendants in the RTC case her sincere intention to terminate the case. Due to Rodica s pleas and insistence, Atty. Espejo,
who among all lawyers of the Lazaro Law Office, became the most familiar and "chummy" with Rodica, agreed to
include the Lazaro Law Office and put his name as the signatory for the Office. Still not satisfied, Rodica pleaded with
Atty. Espejo to further revise the Motion to Withdraw MR to include the names of Atty. Manuel and Atty. Michelle as
signatories and represented that she herself will cause them to sign it. Relying on Rodica s representations that she would
speak to Atty. Manuel about the matter, Atty. Espejo obliged to include the name of Atty. Michelle and Atty. Manuel.
Rodica repeatedly reminded Atty. Espejo not to bother Atty. Manuel on the matter and that she herself will take it up with
Atty. Manuel at the proper time. 11.2 Atty. Espejo has a soft heart. He signed the pleading only with good intentions of
helping and assisting Rodica, the common law wife of a client, whom he had learned to fancy because of being constantly
together and attending to her. He never thought ill of Rodica and believed her when she said she would speak to Atty.
Lazaro about the matter as represented. Atty. Espejo only agreed to sign the pleading for purposes of withdrawing Rodica
s MR to attain Rodica s purpose or desired result and objective to convince or facilitate the sale to Apostol and/or to make
the property more marketable to interested buyers and to attain peace with the defendants in the RTC case. Evidently,
Rodica took advantage of Atty. Espejo s youth and naivete and manipulated him to do things on her behalf, and
deliberately excluded Atty. Almario the senior lawyer. Rodica preferred to discuss matters with Atty. Espejo than with
Atty. Almario as the latter often contradicts her views. Atty. Espejo apologized to Atty. Manuel for allowing himself to be
manipulated by Rodica. At the outset, Atty. Espejo was well aware that Rodica was represented by another counsel in the
RTC case. As a practicing lawyer, he should know that it is the said counsel, Atty. Ibutnande, who has the duty to prepare
the said motion. In fact, he himself stated that it is Atty. Ibutnande who is in a better position to evaluate the merit of the
withdrawal of the Motion for Reconsideration. Atty. Espejo s claim that he drafted and signed the pleading just to extend
assistance to Rodica deserves scant consideration. It is true that under Rules 2.01 and 2.02, Canon 2 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not reject, except for valid reasons, the cause of the defenseless or the
oppressed, and in such cases, even if he does not accept a case, shall not refuse to render legal advise to the person
concerned if only to the extent necessary to safeguard the latter s right. However, in this case, Rodica cannot be
considered as defenseless or oppressed considering that she is properly represented by counsel in the RTC case. Needless
to state, her rights are amply safeguarded. It would have been different had Rodica not been represented by any lawyer,
which, however, is not the case. Moreover, the Court wonders why Atty. Espejo, knowing fully well that Rodica is not
their law firm s client and without the knowledge and consent of his superiors, gave in to Rodica s request for him to
indicate in the said motion the names of his law firm, Atty. Manuel and Atty. Michelle for the purpose of "giving more
weight and credit to the pleading." As a member of the bar, Atty. Espejo ought to know that motions and pleadings filed
in courts are acted upon in accordance with their merit or lack of it, and not on the reputation of the law firm or the lawyer
filing the same. More importantly, he should have thought that in so doing, he was actually assisting Rodica in
misrepresenting before the RTC that she was being represented by the said law firm and lawyers, when in truth she was
not. It is well to remind Atty. Espejo that before being a friend to Rodica, he is first and foremost an officer of the
court.43 Hence, he is expected to maintain a high standard of honesty and fair dealings and must conduct himself beyond
reproach at all times.44 He must likewise ensure that he acts within the bounds of reason and common sense, always
aware that he is an instrument of truth and justice. 45 As shown by his actuations. Atty. Espejo fell short of what is
expected of him. Under the circumstances, Atty. Espejo should have exercised prudence by first diligently studying the
soundness of Rodica s pleas and the repercussions of his acts.

We note that on August 5, 2011, or even before the filing of the disbarment complaint, Atty. Espejo already caused the
filing of his Motion to Withdraw Appearance 46 before the RTC. Therein, Atty. Espejo already expressed remorse and
sincere apologies to the RTC for wrongly employing the name of the Lazaro Law Office. Considering that Atty. Espejo is
newly admitted to the Bar (2010), we deem it proper to warm him to be more circumspect and prudent in his actuations.
Algura v. The LGU of the City of Naga GR No.150135 October 30, 2006 The Facts Spouses Antonio F. Algura and
Lorencita S.J. Algura filed a Verified Complaint  for damages against the Naga City Government and its officers, arising
from the alleged illegal demolition of their residence and boarding house and for payment of lost income derived from
fees paid by their boarders amounting to PhP 7,000.00 monthly. Simultaneously, petitioners filed an Ex-Parte Motion to
Litigate as Indigent Litigants, to which petitioner Antonio Alguras pay showing a gross monthly income of PhP 10,474.00
and a net pay PhP 3,616.99.

Finding that petitioners’ motion to litigate as indigent litigants was meritorious RTC granted petitioners plea for
exemption from filing fees. Meanwhile, as a result of respondent Naga City Governments demolition of a portion of
petitioners’ house, the Alguras allegedly lost a monthly income of PhP 7,000.00 from their boarders’ rentals. With the loss
of the rentals, the meager income from Lorencita Alguras sari-sari store and Antonio Alguras small take home pay
became insufficient for the expenses of the Algura spouses and their six (6) children for their basic needs including food,
bills, clothes, and schooling, among others. Respondents filed an Answer with Counterclaim arguing that the defenses of
the petitioners in the complaint had no cause of action, the spouses’ boarding house blocked the road right of way, and
said structure was a nuisance per se. Respondents filed a Motion to Disqualify the Plaintiffs for Non-Payment of Filing
Fees. They asserted that in addition to the more than PhP 3,000.00 net income of petitioner Antonio Algura, who is a
member of the Philippine National Police, spouse Lorencita Algura also had a mini-store and a computer shop on the
ground floor of their residence. Also, respondents claimed that petitioners second floor was used as their residence and as
a boarding house, from which they earned more than PhP 3,000.00 a month. In addition, it was claimed that petitioners
derived additional income from their computer shop patronized by students and from several boarders who paid rentals to
them. Hence, respondents concluded that petitioners were not indigent litigants. The Naga City RTC issued an Order
disqualifying petitioners as indigent litigants on the ground that they failed to substantiate their claim for exemption from
payment of legal fees and to comply with the third paragraph of Rule 141, Section 18 of the Revised Rules of Court
directing them to pay the requisite filing fees. Petitioners submitted their Compliance attaching the affidavits of petitioner
Lorencita Algura and Erlinda Bangate, to comply with the requirements of then Rule 141, Section 18 of the Rules of
Court and in support of their claim to be declared as indigent litigants. Petitioner Lorencita Algura claimed that the
demolition of their small dwelling deprived her of a monthly income amounting to PhP 7,000.00.  Also, they did not own
any real property as certified by the assessor’s office of Naga City. More so, according to her, the meager net income from
her small sari-sari store and the rentals of some boarders, plus the salary of her husband, were not enough to pay the
family’s basic necessities. To buttress their position as qualified indigent litigants, petitioners also submitted the affidavit
of Erlinda Bangate, who attested under oath, that petitioners derived substantial income from their boarders; that they lost
said income from their boarders rentals when the Local Government Unit of the City of Naga, through its officers,
demolished part of their house because from that time, only a few boarders could be accommodated; that the income from
the small store, the boarders, and the meager salary of Antonio Algura were insufficient for their

basic necessities like food and clothing, considering that the Algura spouses had six (6) children; and that she knew that
petitioners did not own any real property. Issue: Whether petitioners should be considered as indigent litigants who
qualify for exemption from paying filing fees? Held: The position of petitioners on the need to use Rule 3, Section 21 on
their application to litigate as indigent litigants brings to the fore the issue on whether a trial court has to apply both Rule
141, Section 16 and Rule 3, Section 21 on such applications or should the court apply only Rule 141, Section 16 and
discard Rule 3, Section 21 as having been superseded by Rule 141, Section 16 on Legal Fees. The Court rules that Rule 3,
Section 21 and Rule 141, Section 16 (later amended as Rule 141, Section 18 on March 1, 2000 and subsequently amended
by Rule 141, Section 19 on August 16, 2003, which is now the present rule) are still valid and enforceable rules on
indigent litigants. Furthermore, Rule 141 on indigent litigants was amended twice and yet, despite these two amendments,
there was no attempt to delete Section 21 from said Rule 3. This clearly evinces the desire of the Court to maintain the
two (2) rules on indigent litigants to cover applications to litigate as an indigent litigant. The Court opts to reconcile Rule
3, Section 21 and Rule 141, Section 19 because it is a settled principle that when conflicts are seen between two
provisions, all efforts must be made to harmonize them.  Hence, every statute [or rule] must be so construed and
harmonized with other statutes [or rules] as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence.   In the light of the foregoing
considerations, therefore, the two (2) rules can stand together and are compatible with each other. When an application to
litigate as an indigent litigant is filed, the court shall scrutinize the affidavits and supporting documents submitted by the
applicant to determine if the applicant complies with the income and property standards prescribed in the present Section
19 of Rule 141 that is, the applicants gross income and that of the applicants immediate family do not exceed an amount
double the monthly minimum wage of an employee; and the applicant does not own real property with a fair market value
of more than PhP 300,000.00. If the trial court finds that the applicant meets the income and property requirements, the
authority to litigate as indigent litigant is automatically granted and the grant is a matter of right. However, if the trial
court finds that one or both requirements have not been met, then it would set a hearing to enable the applicant to prove
that the applicant has no money or property sufficient and available for food, shelter and basic necessities for himself and
his family. In that hearing, the adverse party may adduce countervailing evidence to disprove the evidence presented by
the applicant; after which the trial court will rule on the application depending on the evidence adduced. In addition,
Section 21 of Rule 3 also provides that the adverse party may later still contest the grant of such authority at any time
before judgment is rendered by the trial court, possibly based on newly discovered evidence not obtained at the time the
application was heard. If the court determines after hearing, that the party declared as an indigent is in fact a person with
sufficient income or property, the proper docket and other lawful fees shall be assessed and collected by the clerk of court.
If payment is not made within the time fixed by the court, execution shall issue or the payment of prescribed fees shall be
made, without prejudice to such other sanctions as the court may impose. The Court concedes that Rule 141, Section 19
provides specific standards while Rule 3, Section 21 does not clearly draw the limits of the entitlement to the
exemption. Knowing that the litigants may abuse the grant of authority, the trial court must use sound discretion and
scrutinize evidence strictly in granting exemptions, aware that the applicant has not hurdled the precise standards under
Rule 141. The trial court must also guard against abuse and misuse of the privilege to litigate as an indigent litigant to
prevent the filing of exorbitant claims which would otherwise be regulated by a legal fee requirement. Thus, the trial court
should have applied Rule 3, Section 21 to the application of the Alguras after their affidavits and supporting documents
showed that petitioners did not satisfy the twin requirements on gross monthly income

and ownership of real property under Rule 141. Instead of disqualifying the Alguras as indigent litigants, the trial court
should have called a hearing as required by Rule 3, Section 21 to enable the petitioners to adduce evidence to show that
they didn’t have property and money sufficient and available for food, shelter, and basic necessities for them and their
family. In that hearing, the respondents would have had the right to also present evidence to refute the allegations and
evidence in support of the application of the petitioners to litigate as indigent litigants. Since this Court is not a trier of
facts, it will have to remand the case to the trial court to determine whether petitioners can be considered as indigent
litigants using the standards set in Rule 3, Section 21. Recapitulating the rules on indigent litigants, therefore, if the
applicant for exemption meets the salary and property requirements under Section 19 of Rule 141, then the grant of the
application is mandatory. On the other hand, when the application does not satisfy one or both requirements, then the
application should not be denied outright; instead, the court should apply the indigency test under Section 21 of Rule 3
and use its sound discretion in determining the merits of the prayer for exemption. Gone vs Atty Ga AC No. 7771 April 6,
2011 Facts: This case stemmed from the complaint for disciplinary action dated 23 October 1989 filed by Patricio Gone
against Atty. Macario Ga before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). The
complaint was due to Atty. Ga's failure to reconstitute or turn over the records of the case in his possession. Complainant
Gone reported that Atty. Ga is his counsel in NLRC Case No. RB-IV-2Q281-78 entitled "Patricio Gone v. Solid Mills,
Inc." The case was dismissed by the Labor Arbiter and was elevated to the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC). Complainant alleged that on 13 December 1983, the NLRC building in Intramuros, Manila was burned and
among the records destroyed was his appealed case. Complainant Gone further reported that as early as 8 March 1984,
Atty. Ga had obtained a certification from the NLRC that the records of NLRC Case No. RB-IV-2Q281-78 were burned.
Despite knowledge of the destruction of the records, Atty. Ga allegedly did not do anything to reconstitute the records of
the appealed case. On 9 September 1989, complainant allegedly sent a letter to Atty. Ga requesting him to return the
records of the case in his possession. As of date of complaint, Atty. Ga has yet to turn over the records. Complainant
submits that his counsel's continued refusal has caused great injustice to him and his family. [1] On 16 February 1999,
Commissioner Gonzales-delos Reyes, IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, issued an Order directing respondent Ga to file
his answer on the complaint. [2] In a letter dated 22 November 1999, Atty. Ga explained that as far as he could recall,
during the pendency of their motion for reconsideration, the NLRC Office in Manila caught fire. Although worried of the
records of their case, he was relieved when he received summons from the NLRC setting the case for hearing. It was
unfortunate, however, that in the two scheduled hearings set by the NLRC herein complainant failed to appear. For such
absence, the NLRC allegedly shelved their case. [3] Atty. Ga averred that had it not been for the instant complaint, he
would not have, as he never, heard from complainant Gone since 1984. What he was aware of was the latter's
abandonment of his family way back in 1978. Complainant's wife is the relative of Atty. Ga, being the daughter of his first
cousin. [4] The instant case was set for presentation of evidence on 17 January 2000. On said date, complainant appeared
without counsel while respondent failed to appear.[5] Several hearings were set for the case but these were reset for
failure of one or both of the parties to appear. [6] In the hearing held on 19 June 2000, complainant appeared with counsel
but respondent failed to appear despite notice. During that hearing, the Commissioner asked complainant if there was a
possibility for the case to be settled amicably considering that respondent is a relative of his wife. The complainant
answered in the affirmative and the case was reset to 24 July 2000. The two succeeding hearings scheduled by the
Commissioner were again reset. On 10 November 2000, a hearing was conducted wherein respondent Ga appeared while
complainant was absent despite notice. In view of the latter's absence, respondent Ga prayed for time to file a Motion to
Dismiss. [7]

In his Motion to Dismiss dated 8 December 2000,[8] respondent Ga alleged that he had a heart to heart talk with
complainant about his labor case and the latter may have already understood that it was not respondent's fault that the case
was shelved by the NLRC. He averred that complainant may have already been dissuaded from pursuing the case, thus his
absence in the hearing held on 10 November 2000. Nevertheless, if there is still hope for the case, he commits to help
complainant by whatever means he can. On 14 February 2007, Commissioner Marilyn S. Guzman, IBP Commission on
Bar Discipline, submitted her report recommending that respondent Atty. Ga be censured for violation of Rule 18.03,
Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.[9] On 19 September 2007, the Board of Governors of the IBP
adopted and approved with modification, the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
[10] Respondent Atty. Ga was censured for violation of Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and was directed to reconstitute and turn over the records of the case to complainant, with stern warning that failure to do
so would merit a stiffer penalty. Issues: Ruling: We agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP. The Code of
Professional Responsibility mandates lawyers to serve their clients with competence and diligence. Rule 18.03 and Rule
18.04 state:

Rule 18.03. A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable. Rule 18.04. A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a
reasonable time to the client's request for information. Respondent Atty. Ga breached these duties when he failed to
reconstitute or turn over the records of the case to his client, herein complainant Gone. His negligence manifests lack of
competence and diligence required of every lawyer. His failure to comply with the request of his client was a gross
betrayal of his fiduciary duty and a breach of the trust reposed upon him by his client. Respondent's sentiments against
complainant Gone is not a valid reason for him to renege on his obligation as a lawyer. The moment he agreed to handle
the case, he was bound to give it his utmost attention, skill and competence. Public interest requires that he exerts his best
efforts and all his learning and ability in defense of his client's cause. Those who perform that duty with diligence and
candor not only safeguard the interests of the client, but also serve the ends of justice.[16] They do honor to the bar and
help maintain the community's respect for the legal profession.[17] If respondent believed that he will not be able to
represent complainant effectively because of what the latter has done to his family, then he should have withdrawn his
services as a lawyer. Had it not been for complainant's insistence, his labor case would have forever remained dormant.
The fact that respondent is retained as the lawyer of the complainant, he was duty bound to give his best service. His
failure to do so constitutes an infringement of his oath. In addition, We note respondent's disregard of the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline's directive for him to reconstitute and turn over the records of the case to complainant.
Likewise, respondent unjustifiably ignored the directive of the Court for him to explain his failure to comply with IBP
Resolution No. XVIII-2007-94. Respondent's unjustified disregard of the lawful orders of this Court and the IBP is not
only irresponsible, but also constitutes utter disrespect for the Judiciary and his fellow lawyers. [18] His conduct is
unbecoming of a lawyer, for lawyers are particularly called upon to obey Court orders and processes and are expected to
stand foremost in complying with Court directives being themselves officers of the Court. [19] As an officer of the Court,
respondent is expected to know that a resolution of this Court is not a mere request but

an order which should be complied with promptly and completely. [20] This is also true of the orders of the IBP as the
investigating arm of the Court in administrative cases against lawyers. [21] Respondent should strive harder to live up to
his duties of observing and maintaining the respect due to the Courts,[22] respect for law and for legal processes, [23] and
of upholding the integrity and dignity of the legal profession[24] in order to perform his responsibilities as a lawyer
effectively. All told, We could suspend respondent for his transgressions. Considering, however, that he is already in the
twilight of his career and considering further that he was not entirely to be blamed for the archiving of the labor case,
complainant's absence during the hearings being contributory therein, We deem the penalty of fine in the amount of
P5,000.00 sufficient sanction under the circumstances. Such consideration would be more in line with the very purpose of
administrative cases against lawyers, that is, not so much to punish but to instill discipline in them, as well as, protect the
integrity of the Court and shelter the public from the misconduct and inefficiency of lawyers. Frias Jr et.al. vs Sorongon
et.al. GR No.184827 February 11, 2015 Facts: On May 24, 2007, petitioner Felipe Jhonny Frias, Jr. and Rogelio
Veneracion (predecessor of petitioner heirs) filed before the Mandaluyong City RTC a complaint 3 for declaration of
nullity of certificates of title with damages against respondents First Asia Realty Development Corporation and/or SM
Prime Holdings, Inc. (First Asia Realty/SM) and Ortigas & Company Limited  Partnership (Ortigas).  They alleged to be
the co-owners of a parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 779 which embraces the property
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 126575 registered in the name of Ortigas.  They claimed that TCT No.
126575 is falsified and spurious and that consequently, all derivative titles of TCT No. 126575 including those now
registered in the name of First Asia Realty/SM are also void.  The case was docketed as Civil Case No. MC073276 and
was raffled off to Branch 211 of the RTC of Mandaluyong City. Civil Case No. MC07-3276 is one of five cases filed by
Frias, Jr. and Veneracion before the Mandaluyong City RTC which all seek the nullification of TCT No. 126575.  On
even date, Frias, Jr. and Veneracion filed a Motion for Leave and to Admit Complaint of Indigent Litigants. On May 25,
2007, it appears that said motion was granted by Mandaluyong City RTC Executive Judge Maria C. Erum who wrote the
following notation on the first page of the motion:

Granted provided the docket fees for this case shall be a lien in case plaintiffs get a favorable judgment. 12

On June 29, 2007, First Asia Realty/SM filed a Motion to Dismiss 13 arguing that: (1) the summonses were not properly
served on it; (2) the correct and proper docket fees were not paid; (3) the complaint fails to state a cause of action; (4)
there was a willful violation of the rule against forum-shopping; (5) the plaintiffs are guilty of laches; and (6) the cause of
action is barred by the statute of limitations or prescription. On July 6, 2007, Ortigas filed its Consolidated Motion to
Dismiss and Motion to Cite Plaintiffs and Counsel in Direct Contempt based on the following grounds: (1) failure to state
a cause of action; (2) lack of capacity to sue; (3) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim for non-payment
of docket fees; (4) failure to comply with a condition precedent for filing the claim; (5) splitting a single cause of action;
(6) forum-shopping; (7) litis pendentia; (8) prescription; and (9) laches. On July 10, 2007, petitioners filed a Manifestation
stating that they were adopting their Comment/Opposition to Defendant Ortigas’ Consolidated Motion to Dismiss and
Motion to Cite Plaintiffs and Counsel in Direct Contempt that was previously filed in Felipe Jhonny Frias, Jr., et al. v.
United Laboratories, Inc., et al. (Civil Case No. MC07-3226) pending in Branch 214 of the Mandaluyong City RTC. 15 
The following day, petitioners filed a Comment/Opposition to Motion to Dismiss16 of First Asia Realty/SM.

On August 13, 2007, Judge Paulita B. Acosta-Villarante, then Presiding Judge of Branch 211, denied the motion to
dismiss filed by First Asia Realty/SM. On December 12, 2007, First Asia Realty/SM filed its Motion for Reconsideration
Ad Cautelam 18 attaching four separate orders from different branches of the Mandaluyong City RTC involving
complaints filed by petitioners. Due to the retirement of Judge Acosta-Villarante, Civil Case No. MC07-3276, pending
before Branch 211, was assigned to respondent judge. On March 18, 2008, the respondent judge issued the first assailed
order the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, consistent with the Order of November 12, 2007 in Civil Case No. MC07-3226, issued by the
undersigned presiding judge, plaintiffs are hereby given a period of sixty (60) days from receipt hereof to pay the proper
docket fees, which shall be assessed by the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, and failure to
comply therewith shall cause the 1) DISMISSAL of the complaint on jurisdictional grounds; 2) to DENY plaintiff’s
motion for receivership for utter lack of merit; and, 3) to CONSIDER the issues raised by the defendant in its respective
motion for reconsideration ripe for resolution only after plaintiffs have paid the proper amount of docket fees. Issue:
WON respondent judge disregarded petitioner’s constitutional right to free access to courts by issuing the assailed orders.
Ruling: NO Petitioners cite Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court which provides: SEC. 21. Indigent party. – A party
may be authorized to litigate his action, claim or defense as an indigent if the court, upon an ex parte application and
hearing, is satisfied that the party is one who has no money or property sufficient and available for food, shelter and basic
necessities for himself and his family. Such authority shall include an exemption from payment of docket and other lawful
fees, and of transcripts of stenographic notes which the court may order to be furnished him. The amount of the docket
and other lawful fees which the indigent was exempted from paying shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the case
favorable to the indigent, unless the court otherwise provides. Any adverse party may contest the grant of such authority at
any time before judgment is rendered by the trial court. If the court should determine after hearing that the party declared
as an indigent is in fact a person with sufficient income or property, the proper docket and other lawful fees shall be
assessed and collected by the clerk of court. If payment is not made within the time fixed by the court, execution shall
issue or the payment thereof, without prejudice to such other sanctions as the court may impose. Respondents, on the
other hand, cite Section 19, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 00-201-SC and A.M. No. 04-2-04-
SC, which reads: SEC. 19. Indigent litigants exempt from payment of legal fees. – Indigent litigants (a) whose gross
income and that of their immediate family do not exceed an amount double the monthly minimum wage of an employee
and (b) who do not own real property with A FAIR MARKET VALUE AS STATED IN THE CURRENT TAX
DECLARATION of more than THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P300,000.00) PESOS shall be exempt from the
payment of legal fees. The legal fees shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the case favorable to the indigent litigant
unless the court otherwise provides. To be entitled to the exemption herein provided, the litigant shall execute an affidavit
that he and his immediate family do not earn a gross income abovementioned, and they do not own any real property with
the fair value aforementioned, supported by an affidavit of a disinterested person attesting to the truth of the litigant’s
affidavit. The current tax declaration, if any, shall be attached to the litigant’s

affidavit. Any falsity in the affidavit of litigant or disinterested person shall be sufficient cause to dismiss the complaint or
action or to strike out the pleading of that party, without prejudice to whatever criminal liability may have been incurred.
In the case of Spouses Algura v. Local Gov’t. Unit of the City of Naga,27 this Court had the opportunity to explain how
the two rules cited by the opposing parties can stand together and are compatible with each other, to wit: In the light of the
foregoing considerations, therefore, the two (2) rules can stand together and are compatible with each other. When an
application to litigate as an indigent litigant is filed, the court shall scrutinize the affidavits and supporting documents
submitted by the applicant to determine if the applicant complies with the income and property standards prescribed in the
present Section 19 of Rule 141—that is, the applicant’s gross income and that of the applicant’s immediate family do not
exceed an amount double the monthly minimum wage of an employee; and the applicant does not own real property with
a fair market value of more than Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php300,000.00).  If the trial court finds that the
applicant meets the income and property requirements, the authority to litigate as indigent litigant is automatically granted
and the grant is a matter of right. However, if the trial court finds that one or both requirements have not been met, then it
would set a hearing to enable the applicant to prove that the applicant has “no money or property sufficient and available
for food, shelter and basic necessities for himself and his family.” In that hearing, the adverse party may adduce
countervailing evidence to disprove the evidence presented by the applicant; after which the trial court will rule on the
application depending on the evidence adduced. In addition, Section 21 of Rule 3 also provides that the adverse party may
later still contest the grant of such authority at any time before judgment is rendered by the trial court, possibly based on
newly discovered evidence not obtained at the time the application was heard. If the court determines after hearing, that
the party declared as an indigent is in fact a person with sufficient income or property, the proper docket and other lawful
fees shall be assessed and collected by the clerk of court. If payment is not made within the time fixed by the court,
execution shall issue or the payment of prescribed fees shall be made, without prejudice to such other sanctions as the
court may impose. In the instant case, based on the list of documents submitted by petitioners in support of their Motion
for Leave and to Admit Complaint of Indigent Litigants, it cannot be disputed that petitioners failed to complete the
requirements set forth in Section 19, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court.  They did not execute their own affidavit as required
by said Section 19.  And as this Court ruled in Spouses Algura,29 if the trial court finds that one or both requirements
have not been met, then it would set a hearing to enable the applicant to prove that the applicant has “no money or
property sufficient and available for food, shelter and basic necessities for himself and his family.” As correctly argued by
Ortigas, the hearing requirement, contrary to petitioners’ claim, was complied with during the hearings on the motions to
dismiss filed by respondents. In said hearings, petitioners’ counsel was present and they were given the opportunity to
prove their indigency. Clearly, their non-payment of docket fees is one of the grounds raised by respondents in their
motions to dismiss and the hearings on the motions were indeed the perfect opportunity for petitioners to prove that they
are entitled to be treated as indigent litigants and thus exempted from the payment of docket fees as initially found by the
Executive Judge.  Moreover, not only were petitioners properly represented during the hearings on the motions to dismiss,
they even filed on July 10, 2007 a Manifestation wherein they adopted the Comment/Opposition to Defendant Ortigas’
Consolidated Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Cite Plaintiffs and Counsel in Contempt filed in Civil Case No. MC07-
3226 before Branch 214 and on July 11, 2007, a Comment/Opposition to Motion to Dismiss of First Asia Realty/SM. 
Thus, it is erroneous for them to claim that respondents neither submitted evidence nor were they required by respondent
judge to submit evidence on the issue of indigency and that respondent judge disregarded their constitutional right to free
access to courts.  In sum, no grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to respondent judge in issuing the assailed orders.