Lee Bun Ting and Ang Chia vs. Hon.
Jose Aliagen, Rafael Dinglasan finally and definitely settled, there is Identity of parties, subject matter and cause
et. al.
Facts: In a previous cases [G. R. No. L-5996, "Rafael Dinglasan, et al. vs. Lee
Bun Ting, et al.] decided by the SC with the same set of private parties, it was
found that private respondents sold to herein petitioner a parcel of land located in
Roxas City, Capiz through a conditional sale. Lee, the buyer, on the other hand
avers that it was an absolute sale. Both trial court and CA ruled in favor of buyer
Lee. The SC found that Lee is normally not allowed to purchase the property on
the count of the constitutional prohibition (Section 5. Save in cases of hereditary
succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to
individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the
public domain in the Philippines.- Article 13, 1935 Consitution) But since it was
also found out that the buyers (private respondents) are in pari delicto for selling
the property in spite of the constitutional prohibition they are proscribed from
assailing the sale made between them and herein private respondents.
12 years after the above mentioned case was promulgated, the present case for
the recovery of the lot was instituted with the same contention of the respondents
Dinglasan that the sale should be null and void on account of the constitutional
prohibition.
A motion to dismiss was filed by petitioners in this case on the ground of res
judicata. An opposition thereto was filed by plaintiffs, with the averment that the
decision in the prior case "cannot be pleaded in bar of the instant action because
of new or additional facts or grounds of recovery and because of change of law or
jurisprudence.
The Court of Appeals denied the motion to dismiss.
Issue: Whether or not the motion to dismiss should be granted
Held: Affirmative. The decision of this Court in G. R. No. L-5996, "Rafael
Dinglasan, et al. vs. Lee Bun Ting, et al." constitutes a bar to Civil Case No. V-
3064 before the respondent court. Said Civil case, therefore, should have been
dismissed because it is a mere relitigation of the same issues previously adjudged
with finality, way back in 1956, between the same parties or their privies and
concerning the same subject matter. We have consistently held that the doctrine
of res judicata applies where, between a pending action and one which has been
of action.
We find that in the ultimate analysis, Civil Case No. V-3064 is but an attempt to
reopen the issues which were resolved in the previous case. Contrary to the
contentions of private respondents, there has been no change in the facts or in
the conditions of the parties. Posterior changes in the doctrine of this Court cannot
retroactively be applied to nullify a prior final ruling in the same proceeding where
the prior adjudication was had, whether the case should be civil or criminal in
nature. The determination of the questions of fact and of law by this Court on
June 27, 1956 in case No. L-5996 has become the law of the case, and may not
now be disputed or relitigated by a reopening of the same questions in a
subsequent litigation between the same parties and their privies the same subject
matter.
3. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK,  vs. HERMOGENES HIPOLITO and
LEONOR JUNSAY, 
FACTS: June 18, 1959 – a complaint was filed alleging that defendant
Hermogenes Hipolito and Leonor Junsay obtained various sugar crop loans from
plaintiff PNB through its Victorias Branch, evidenced by promissory notes.
The amount of the notes was a total of P9,692.00. Defendants only paid
P3,905.61, leaving a balance of P6,786.39, which, added to accrued interest of
P5,213.34, summed up to P11,999.73 as of January 17, 1957.
Despite repeated demands, defendants failed and refused to pay said amount.
May 7, 1957 - defendants went to Atty. Francis I. Medel of the legal department of
plaintiff's Victorias branch and offered a plan of payment of the account
For reasons unknown to plaintiff and probably due to the transfer of defendant
Hipolito as supervising teacher to some other province, his proposed plan of
payment did not materialize. Said offer of plan of payment was an
acknowledgment of defendants' just and valid obligation. The prayer is for the
court to order defendants to pay to plaintiff the said amount of P11,999.73, with
accrued annual interest thereon ( rate of 5% from January 17, 1957 up to the
date of payment, plus attorney's fees equivalent to 10%.)
Defendants moved for a bill of particulars – denied. Defendants moved to dismiss
on the ground that plaintiff's cause of action already prescribed. attached to the
motion: a joint affidavit and defendants averred that they never made any
acknowledgment of indebtedness nor offered a plan of payment, but on the
contrary had always maintained that plaintiff's action had prescribed.
Plaintiff’s opposition - contending that the prescriptive period had been
suspended by "EO No. 32, known as the Moratorium Law," and interrupted,
pursuant to Article 1973 of the old Civil Code, by plaintiff’s written extra-judicial
demands as well as by defendants’ acknowledgment of the indebtedness.
Defendants reply to plaintiff's opposition - citing Bachrach Motors Co., Inc.
v. Chua Tia Hian, stated that EO. No. 32, if at all, suspended the prescriptive
period "only for 2yrs, 4 months and 16 days, from March 10, 1945, or only up to
July 26, 1948," - that the alleged written extrajudicial demands constitute self-
serving evidence; and that defendant Hipolito’s letter of February 16, 1959 cannot
be considered as an acknowledgment of indebtedness.
Lower court – dismissed the complaint: ruled that the 7 promissory notes
constituted 1 single obligation, that the last promissory note dated June 23, 1941,
should be considered as the true date of the written contract, from which the 10-
year prescriptive period and such period has been suspended for 2 years, 4
months and sixteen 16 days (by reason of EO No. 32) until said Order was
declared unconstitutional.
contrary averment of fact, would be proper in the answer to the complaint but not
in a motion for dismissal, for the contradictory allegations would require
presentation of evidence. Denial of allegations in a complaint is not proper in a
motion to dismiss.
** A denial of an allegation of a complaint, as for example the denial of an offer of
payment which would prevent prescription from setting in, would be proper in the
answer to the complaint but not in a motion for dismissal, for the contradictory
allegations would require presentation of evidence
The same is true of the other allegations in the complaint concerning, the
demands for payment sent by plaintiff upon defendants and the partial payments
made by them, all or some of which may have a material bearing on the question
of prescription. In other words, the ground for dismissal not being indubitable, the
lower court should have deferred determination of the issue until after
trial of the case on the merits.
The order appealed from is set aside and the case is remanded to the lower court
for further proceedings.

ISSUE: Whether or not the defendant’s denial of the allegations constitute as

grounds for the dismissal of the complaint

RULING: NO. The dismissal is erroneous. In a motion to dismiss defendant

hypothetically admits the truth of the allegations of fact contained in the
complaint.

An examination of the complaint herein does not indicate clearly that prescription
has set in. On the contrary, it is belied by the allegation concerning defendant’s
offer of payment made on May 7, 1957. Such offer hypothetically admitted in the
motion, worked as a renewal of the obligation. An offer of payment works as a
renewal of the obligation and prevents prescription from setting in.

It is true that defendants attached to the motion a joint affidavit of merit wherein
they deny having made an offer of a plan of payment. The denial, being a