G & S TRANSPORT CORPORATION V. TITO INFANTE, MELOR VELASCO, JR. JJ.

BORBO
AND DANILO CASTANEDA

FACTS: Respondents in this case were drivers of petitioner before they were dismissed for an
alleged work stoppage which constituted an illegal strike at the work premises. Petitioners
ordered the striking workers to return to work but some of the drivers, including respondents,
refused.

Respondents, on the other hand, denied involvement in the illegal strike as they were off-
duty on the day of the strike and was on sick leave.

Labor Arbiter declared that since respondent was found to have participated in the illegal
strike, were not meted out the penalty of dismissal; instead, petitioner was ordered to pay them
separation pay in lieu of reinstatement but without backwages.

On appeal, NLRC affirmed LA ruling.

However, the CA reversed the decision of the NLRC and the LA and declared the dismissal
of respondents as illegal as there was a failure to rule on the validity of respondents dismissal,
furthermore the CA ruled that since petitioner was still operational, the grant of separation pay
instead of reinstatement is proper.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: 1) WON THE ORDER OF DISMISSAL IS PROPER; AND

2)WON ORDER OF SEPARATION PAY, IN LIEU OF REINSTATEMENT OF

BACKWAGES IS PROPER;

RULING: 1) NO, Although respondents participation in the illegal strike has been established,
Article 264 of the Labor Code, in providing for the consequences of an illegal strike, makes a
distinction between union officers and members who participated therein. Thus, knowingly
participating in an illegal strike is a valid ground for termination of employment of a union
officer. The law, however, treats differently mere union members. Mere participation in an illegal
strike is not a sufficient ground for termination of the services of the union members.

The Labor Code protects an ordinary, rank-and-file union member who participated in
such a strike from losing his job, provided that he did not commit an illegal act during the strike.
An ordinary striking employee cannot be terminated for mere participation in an illegal strike.
There must be proof that he committed illegal acts during the strike and the striker who
participated in the commission of illegal act must be identified. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is
not required. Substantial evidence available under the attendant circumstances, which may
justify the imposition of the penalty of dismissal, may suffice.

2) Generally, it is not proper. The Court of Appeals, in ordering reinstatement, relied on the SEC
certification that petitioner was then still operational. However, seventeen (17) years have
elapsed since respondents were illegally dismissed, and jurisprudence dictates that considering
the years it take before a judgment was made, separation pay, in lieu of reinstatement, is
deemed more practical and appropriate to all the parties concerned.
 MALAYANG SAMAHAN NG MANGGAGAWA SA GREENFIELD V. HON.CRESENCIO RAMOS,
NLRC, GREENFIELD, INC., ET.AL

FACTS: Petitioners local union, is an affiliate of the private respondent federation, the local
union and respondent corporation, Greenfield Inc., entered into a CBA agreement wherein a
union security clause exist.

The local union held an election, and herein petitioner Beda Villanueva and others were
proclaimed as winners. On latter date, the local union held a general membership meeting, but
several union members failed to attend said meeting, prompting the board of the union to
investigate the non-attendance of several union members and imposed sanctions to those who
failed to attend.

The union then wrote Greenfield Company to deduct fines from wages/salaries of those
union members who failed to attend the general membership meeting. However, the national
federation disapproved the unions move.

The disagreement led the local union to declare general autonomy from the federation.
The company was thus constrained to file to the Med-Arbiter to resolve the issue of the union
and the federation, which in turn gives the federation the administration of the CBA of the
union.

Petitioner union officers, after the union was placed under trusteeship, were expelled from
the federation for allegedly committing acts of disloyalty and/or acts inimical to the interest and
violative to the constitution and by-laws of the federation.

On the same day, the federation advised respondent company of the expulsion of the 30
union officers and demanded their separation from employment pursuant to the Union Security
Clause in their collective bargaining agreement. This demand was reiterated twice, through
letters dated February 21 and March 4, 1989, respectively, to respondent company.

Thereafter, the Federation filed a Notice of Strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation
Board to compel the company to effect the immediate termination of the expelled union officers.

On March 7, 1989, under the pressure of a threatened strike, respondent company terminated
the 30 union officers from employment

ISSUES:

1) WON THE LA ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE STRIKE IS VALID

2) WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COMPANY WAS JUSTIFIED IN DISMISSING PETITIONER

EMPLOYEES MERELY UPON THE LABOR FEDERATION'S DEMAND FOR THE ENFORCEMENT
OF THE UNION SECURITY CLAUSE EMBODIED IN THEIR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AGREEMENT;

3) WON PETITIONER EMPLOYES WERE DEEMED TO HAVE ABANDONED THEIR WORK AND
HENCE, VALIDLY DISMISSED;

RULING:

1) YES, even though there exist in the CBA a no strike no lockout provision, it can however be
invoked only when the strike is economic in nature, which is not the case at bar.
2) NO, although this Court has ruled that union security clauses embodied in the collective
bargaining agreement may be validly enforced and that dismissals pursuant thereto may
likewise be valid, this does not erode the fundamental requirement of due process. The reason
behind the enforcement of union security clauses which is the sanctity and inviolability of
contracts cannot override one's right to due process.

The power to dismiss is a normal prerogative of the employer. However, this is not without
limitation. The employer is bound to exercise caution in terminating the services of his
employees especially so when it is made upon the request of a labor union pursuant to the
Collective Bargaining Agreement. Dismissals must not be arbitrary and capricious. Due process
must be observed in dismissing an employee because it affects not only his position but also his
means of livelihood. Employers should respect and protect the rights of their employees, which
include the right to labor.

The enforcement of union security clauses is authorized by law provided such

enforcement is not characterized by arbitrariness, and always with due process. 16 Even on the
assumption that the federation had valid grounds to expel the union officers, due process
requires that these union officers be accorded a separate hearing by respondent company.

3) No, jurisprudence holds that for abandonment of work to exist, it is essential (1) that the
employee must have failed to report for work or must have been absent without valid or
justifiable reason; and (2) that there must have been a clear intention to sever the employer-
employee relationship manifested by some overt acts. Deliberate and unjustified refusal on the
part of the employee to go back to his work post amd resume his employment must be
established. Absence must be accompanied by overt acts unerringly pointing to the fact that the
employee simply does not want to work anymore. And the burden of proof to show that there
was unjustified refusal to go back to work rests on the employer.

In the present case, respondents failed to prove that there was a clear intention on the
part of the striking employees to sever their employer-employee relationship. Furthermore, this
Court has ruled that an employee who took steps to protest his lay-off cannot be said to have
abandoned his work. The filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal is inconsistent with the
allegation of abandonment. In the case under consideration, the petitioners did, in fact, file a
complaint when they were refused reinstatement by respondent company.
 PAL VS. DRILON, PALEA

FACTS: Philippine Airlines is a corporation where the government has substantial equity
holding. It is engaged in an industry with national interest. Being the sole airline that services
domestic routes, a prolonged work stoppage will push back the national economic recovery
program of the government and consequently result to enormous damage to the economy of the
country. Due to this reasons, the Secretary of Labor of Employment assumes jurisdiction over
the issue of bargaining deadlock between PAL and the private respondent PALEA.

Sec. Drilon ordered the strikers, from PALEA, to lift their pickets and return to work,
directing management to accept all returning employees, and resolving the issues subject of the
strike, by awarding monetary benefits to the strikers and prohibiting the company from taking
retaliatory action against the strikers. Thereafter, Secretary Drilon declared the strike valid
stating that the Union complied with all the requirements for a valid strike.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: DO THE SEC. OF LABOR HAS THE AUTHORITY TO DECIDE THE LAGALITY OF
STRIKES AND TO REINSTATE OFFICERS AND MEMBERS OF UNION WHO PARTICIPATED
IN AN ILLEGAL STRIKE AND TO DESIS FROM TAKING ANY DISCIPLINARY OR
RETALIATORY ACTION AGAINST THEM?

RULING:

The jurisdiction to decide the legality of strikes and lock-outs is vested in Labor Arbiters,
not in the Secretary of Labor. In ruling on the legality of the PALEA strike, the Secretary of Labor
acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction.

The Labor Secretary exceeded his jurisdiction when he restrained PAL from taking
disciplinary action against its guilty employees, for, under Art. 263 of the Labor Code, all that
the Secretary may enjoin is the holding of the strike, but not the company's right to take action
against union officers who participated in the illegal strike and committed illegal acts. The
prohibition which the Secretary issued to PAL constitutes an unlawful deprivation of property
and denial of due process for it prevents PAL from seeking redress for the huge property losses
that it suffered as a result of the union's illegal mass action.
UNIVERSITY OF SAN AGUSTIN EMPLOYES’ UNION-FFW VERSUS COURT OF APPEALS AND
UNIVERSITY OF SAN AGUSTIN

FACTS: Petitioner union is the duly recognized collective bargaining unit for teaching and non-
teaching rank and file personnel of the respondent University. The parties in this case entered
into a 5-year CBA which, among other things, contained a “no strike, no lockout” clause and a
grievance machinery procedure to resolve management-labor disputes.

Pursuant to the CBA, the parties commenced negotiations for the economic provisions for
the remaining two years. During the negotiations, the parties could not agree on the manner of
computing the TIP, thus the need to undergo preventive mediation proceedings before the
National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB), Iloilo City.

The impasse was not resolved, thus prompting the Union to declare a bargaining
deadlock. Thereafter, the Union filed a Notice of Strike before the NCMB which was expectedly
opposed by the University in a Motion to Strike Out Notice of Strike and to Refer the Dispute to
Voluntary Arbitration,3 invoking the "No strike, no lockout" clause4 of the parties’ CBA. The
NCMB, however, failed to resolve the University’s motion.

The parties then made a joint request for the SOLE to assume jurisdiction over the
dispute, SOLE then assumes jurisdiction over the labor dispute and accordingly strictly enjoined
the parties to cease and desist from committing any act that might exacerbate the situation.
Notwithstanding the SOLE’s assumption of jurisdiction, the Union still staged a strike.

The University then filed a Petition to Declare Illegal Strike and Loss of Employment
Status at the NLRC. The petition to declare the strike illegal was DISMISSED for want of legal
and factual basis.

The University then filed for an appeal for the decision and was later on MODIFIED to
effect that the strike held by petitioners is illegal. Hence, the union officers are deemed to have
lost their employment status.

ISSUE: WON THE STRIKE IS ILLEGAL;

RULING: YES. When the SOLE assumes jurisdiction over a labor dispute in an industry
indispensable to national interest or certifies the same to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration,
such assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or
impending strike or lockout. Moreover, if one had already taken place, all striking workers shall
immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately resume operations and readmit
all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout.

In this case, the AJO was served at 8:45 a.m. of September 19, 2003. The strikers then should
have returned to work immediately. However, they persisted with their refusal to receive the AJO
and waited for their union president to receive the same at 5:25 p.m. The Union’s defiance of the
AJO was evident in the sheriff’s report.

Thus, we see no reversible error in the CA’s finding that the strike of September 19, 2003 was
illegal. Consequently, the Union officers were deemed to have lost their employment status for
having knowingly participated in said illegal act.
 FILOMENA BARCENAS VERSUS NLRC, REV. SIM DEE

FACTS: Petitioner Filomena was hired by the then Head Monk and President of the Buddhist
Temple of Manila, Chua Se Su, as secretary and interpreter, she was to receive and assist
Chinese visitors to the temple, act as tourist guide for Foreign Chinese visitors, and attend to
different errands in the temple.

In 1981, Su and petitioner had amorous relations. In May, 1982, of five months before
giving birth to the alleged son of Su on October 12, 1982, petitioner was sent home to Bicol.
Upon the death of Su in July, 1983, complainant remained and continued in her job. However,
the new President of the Temple discontinued the payment of petitioner’s monthly allowance and
forcibly evicted her and her son from their quarters in the temple by 6 police officers.

Private Respondents claimed that petitioner was never an employee of the temple but a
servant who confined herself to the temple and to the personal needs of the late Chua Se Su and
thus, her position is coterminous with that of her master.

The LA awarded petitioner backwages, separation pay, unpaid wages and moral damages
on account of her alleged illegal dismissal.

However, on appeal the NLRC reversed the LA’s decision on the ground that since
petitioner was hired without the approval of the BOD of the temple, she was not an employee of
respondents. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WON THE NLRC ERRED IN ITS DECISION;

RULING: The NLRC’s decision is specious. Petitioner was a regular employee of the Manila
Buddhist Temple as secretary and interpreter. The work that petitioner performed in the temple
could not be categorized as mere domestic, they were essential and important to the operation
and religious functions of the temple.

However, inspite of this finding, her status as a regular employee ended upon her return
to Bicol in May 1982 to await the birth of her child. The records do not show that petitioner filed
any leave from work or that a leave was granted her. Her return to work could not be deemed as
a resumption of her old position which she had already abandoned.
HOLIDAY INN MANILA AND/OR HUBERT LINER AND BABY DIQUITADO VERSUS NLRC AND
ELENA HONASAN

FACTS: Respondent Elena Honasan, was first accepted as an OJT as a telephone operator with
herein petitioner Holiday Inn. After completing her training, she was employed on a
probationary basis for a period of 6 months ending November 12. Her employment contract
stipulated that the Hotel could terminate her probationary employment at any time prior to the
expiration of the six month period in the event of her failure (a) to learn or progress in her job;
(b) to faithfully observe and comply with the hotel rules and the instructions and orders of her
superiors; or (c) to perform her duties according to hotel standards.
On November 8, 1991, four days before the expiration of the stipulated deadline, Holiday
Inn notified her of her dismissal, on the ground that her performance had not come up to the
standards of the Hotel.
Honasan then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, claiming that she was already a
regular employee at the time of her separation and so was entitled to full security of tenure. LA
dismissed the case who held that her separation was justified under the Code.
On appeal, NLRC reversed the LA’s decision, which held that Honasan had become a
regular employee and so could not be dismissed as a probationer.
ISSUE: WON NLRC ERRED IN DECLARING HONASAN AS REGULAR EMPLOYEE;

RULING: YES, her probation clearly exceeded the period of 6 months prescribed by this article.

Probation is the period during which the employer may determine if the employee is
qualified for possible inclusion in the regular force. In the case at bar, the period was for three
weeks, during Honasan's on-the-job training. When her services were continued after this
training, the petitioners in effect recognized that she had passed probation and was qualified to
be a regular employee.

Honasan was certainly under observation during her three-week on-the-job training. If
her services proved unsatisfactory then, she could have been dropped as early as during that
period. But she was not. On the contrary, her services were continued, presumably because they
were acceptable, although she was formally placed this time on probation.

Even if it be supposed that the probation did not end with the three-week period of on-
the-job training, there is still no reason why that period should not be included in the stipulated
six-month period of probation. Honasan was accepted for on-the-job training on April 15, 1991.
Assuming that her probation could be extended beyond that date, it nevertheless could continue
only up to October 15, 1991, after the end of six months from the earlier date. Under this more
lenient approach, she had become a regular employee of Holiday Inn and acquired full security
of tenure as of October 15, 1991.
 RJL MARTINEZ FISHING CORPORATION AND/OR PENINSULA FISHING CORPORATION
VERSUS NLRC

FACTS: Petitioner corporations are principally engaged in the deep-sea fishing business. Since
1978, private respondents were employed by them as stevedores at Navotas Fish Port for the
unloading of tuna fish catch from petitioners' vessels and then loading them on refrigerated vans
for shipment abroad.

On March 27, 1981, private respondents Antonio Boticario, and thirty (30) others, upon
the premise that they are petitioners' regular employees, filed a complaint against petitioners for
non-payment of overtime pay, premium pay, legal holiday pay, emergency allowance, service
incentive leave pay and night shift differential. 

Claiming that they were dismissed from employment on March 29, 1981 as a retaliatory
measure for their having filed the said complaint private respondents filed on the said complaint,
private respondents filed on April 21, 1981 another complaint against petitioners for Illegal
Dismissal and for Violation of Article 118 of the Labor Code, as amended . 

In disputing any employer-employee relationship between them, petitioners contend that

private respondents are contract laborers whose work terminated upon completion of each
unloading, and that in the absence of any boat arrivals, private respondents did not work for
petitioners but were free to work or seek employment with other fishing boat operators.

LA upheld petitioners’ position ruling that the latter are extra workers, who were hired to
perform specific tasks on contractual basis; that their work is intermittent depending on the
arrival of fishing vessels; that if there are no fish to unload and load, they work for some other
fishing boat operators, hence no dismissal was effected but that they were merely not hired.

NLRC reversed the findings of the LA, and resolved to uphold the existence of employer-
employee relationship between the parties.

ISSUE: WON THERE IS AN EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE

PARTIES;

RULING: Although it may be that private respondents alternated their employment on different
vessels when they were not assigned to petitioners' boats, that did not affect their employee
status. The employer-employee relationship between the parties herein is not co-terminous with
each loading and unloading job. As earlier shown, respondents are engaged in the business of
fishing. For this purpose, they have a fleet of fishing vessels. Under this situation, respondents'
activity of catching fish is a continuous process and could hardly be considered as seasonal in
nature. So that the activities performed by herein complainants, i.e. unloading the catch of tuna
fish from respondents' vessel and then loading the same to refrigerated vans, are necessary or
desirable in the business of respondents. This circumstances makes the employment of
complainants a regular one, in the sense that it does not depend on any specific project or
seasonal activity.
 HILARIO RADA VERSUS NLRC AND PHILNOR CONSULTANTS AND PLANNERS, INC.

FACTS: Petitioner was hired as “Driver” for the construction supervision phase of the Manila
North Expressway Extension, Second Stage for a term of about 24 months. Sometime in the 2nd
week of December 1985, Petitioner applied for "Personnel Clearance" with Respondent dated
December 9, 1985 and acknowledged having received the amount of P3,796.20 representing
conversion to cash of unused leave credits and financial assistance. Petitioner also released
Respondent from all obligations and/or claims, etc. in a "Release, Waiver and Quitclaim".

On May 20, 1987, petitioner filed before the NLRC, a complaint for non-payment of
separation pay and overtime pay, on the other hand, respondent alleged that petitioner was not
illegally terminated since the project for which he was hired was completed; that he was hired
under 3 distinct contracts of employment, each of which was for a definite period.

Later on, petitioner filed an Amended complaint alleging that he was illegally dismissed
and that he was not paid overtime pay although he was made to render 3 hours overtime work
for a period of 3 years. Petitioner likewise avers that the contract of employment for a definite
period entered into between him and Philnor was a ploy to defeat the intent of Article 280 of the
Labor Code.

LA ordered respondent company to reinstate complainant to his former position without

loss of seniority rights and other privileges with full backwages from the time of his dismissal to
his actual reinstatement. However, NLRC reversed LA’s decision and dismissing petitioners’
complaint.

ISSUE: WON PETITIONER IS A REGULAR EMPLOYEE ENTITLED TO SECURITY OF

TENURE;

RULING: NO, It must be stressed herein that although petitioner worked with Philnor as a driver
for eight years, the fact that his services were rendered only for a particular project which took
that same period of time to complete categorizes him as a project employee. Petitioner was
employed for one specific project.

From the foregoing, it is clear that petitioner is a project employee considering that he
does not belong to a "work pool" from which the company would draw workers for assignment to
other projects at its discretion. It is likewise apparent from the facts obtaining herein that
petitioner was utilized only for one particular project, the MNEE Stage 2 Project of respondent
company. Hence, the termination of herein petitioner is valid by reason of the completion of the
project and the expiration of his employment contract.
 MERCURY DRUG CO., INC AND MARIANO QUE VERSUS CIR AND NARDO DAYAO

FACTS: Private Respondent Nardo Dayao was employed by petitioner originally as driver, later
assigned as delivery man, then as checker and was last promoted to the position of assistant
chief checker.

Dayao filed a complaint for unfair labor practice against herein petitioners for dismissing
him because of his having campaigned among his co-employees to become members of a new
labor union that he was then organizing.

In their answer to the ULP complaint, petitioners interposed as their only defense that
Dayao was separated from the service for cause because of creating trouble with another
employee who was also dismissed.

Herein respondent Court of Industrial Relations holds that petitioner have interfered with
Dayao’s union activity and that his dismissal from employment was discriminatory.

On appeal, herein petitioner insisted that the acceptance by Dayao of a separation pay
and his signing a renunciation of any other claim against herein petitioners, militates against the
charge of unfair labor practice .

ISSUE: WON ACCEPTANCE OF SEPARATION PAY AND SIGNING RENUNCIATION OF ANY

OTHER CLAIM AGAINST PETITIONER, AMOUNTS TO ESTOPPEL

RULING: NO. Acceptance of those benefits would not amount to estoppels. The reason is plain.
Employer and employee, obviously, do not stand on the same footing. The employer drove the
employee to the wall. The latter must have to get hold of money. Because, out of job, he had to
face the harsh necessities of life. He thus found himself in no position to resist money preferred
him. His, then, in a case of adherence, not of choice. One thing sure, however, is that petitioners
did not relent on their claim. They pressed it. They are deemed not to have waived any of their
rights. Renuntiatio non praesumitur ."
 ZENAIDA GACO VERSUS NLRC AND ORIENT LEAF TOBACCO

FACTS: Petitioner was hired by private respondent as Picker, after a year of service; she
was promoted to the position of Production Recorder. She held this position for a period of
fourteen (14) years until the end of private respondent’s working season in 1989. In April, 1990,
when petitioner reported for work at the start of the working season for that year, she found out
that her position was already occupied by another employee and that she was being demoted to
the position of Picker.

Considering it as constructive dismissal, petitioner thus refused to report for work and
filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter for payment of separation pay.

Private respondent raised the defense that the demotion of petitioner was effected on a
valid ground, that is, gross inefficiency, committing the same mistakes frequently in spite of her
attention being called repeatedly and advised to take the necessary corrective measures.

LA declared the demotion of complainant to be unjustified thereby ordering Orient Leaf to

pay complainant her backwages. On appeal with the NLRC, LA’s decision was modified with
regard to the computation of petitioners separation pay and deletes the payment of backwages.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WON NLRC HAD NO BASIS IN COMPUTING THE SEPARATION PAY AT ½ MONTH
PAY FOR EVERY YEAR OF SERVICE AND ERRED IN DELETING THE AWARD OF
BACKWAGES;

RULING: YES, NLRC gravely abused its discretion when it modified the decision of the LA.

In one case decided by the Supreme Court, defines constructive dismissal as a quitting
because continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely; as, an offer
involving a demotion in rank and a diminution in pay. As we have stated previously, both the
Labor Arbiter and respondent NLRC arrived at a factual finding that petitioner was demoted to
her former position without any justifiable cause. However, they differed in the conclusions they
derived therefrom: the Labor Arbiter considered petitioner's demotion as constructive dismissal
whereas respondent NLRC held that constructive dismissal could not deduced from the
circumstances. On the basis of the foregoing jurisprudence defining the term constructive
dismissal, we sustain the ruling of the Labor Arbiter and his rationalization thereon.
Consequently, petitioner is entitled to her full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and other
benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time her compensation was withheld
from her up to the time of her actual reinstatement.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission dated January 27, 1992 is SET ASIDE and the decision of the Labor Arbiter dated
July 31, 1991 is REINSTATED.
CARLOS SALOMON, STEPHEN BATHAN, NICOLAS CAMARA, ET.AL VERSUS ASSOCIATE OF
INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING LINES, INC.

FACTS: Respondent Association of International Shipping Lines, Inc. is a corporation engaged in

the principal business of shipping and container and/or cargo services. However, due to a
decline in the volume of cargo measuring activities and shipping transactions, respondent
suffered substantial financial losses. With this development, respondent adopted an
organizational streamlining program that resulted in the closure of its Measuring Department
and retrenchment or termination from the service of seventeen (17) workers. Among them were
herein petitioners.

Aggrieved, petitioners filed with NCMB a complaint for illegal dismissal and
payment of retirement benefits against respondent. During the conciliation proceedings,
respondent paid petitioners their retirement pay at the rate of 1 month salary per year of
service.3 Additionally, they received their leave credits, and pro-rated 13th month pay. And after
having been paid their retirement pay, they executed and signed separate Releases and
Quitclaims. Consequently, the above case was considered closed and terminated.

Surprisingly, petitioners filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for payment of retirement
benefits, damages and attorney’s fees against respondent. They alleged that what each received
was a separation pay, not retirement benefits.

LA dismissed the complaint. NLRC affirmed LA’s decision. On appeal, the CA affirmed the
decision of NLRC providing that petitioners were separated from service due to retrenchment and
such cause is one of the authorized causes for termination of employment.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WON PETITIONERS IS STILL ENTITLED TO RETIREMENT BENEFITS;

RULING: No, petitioners were separated from the service for cause. Consequently, pursuant
to the CBA, what each actually received is a separation pay. Accordingly and considering their
Releases and Quitclaims, they are no longer entitled to retirement benefits.

It bears stressing that as held by the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC and the Court of Appeals,
there is no provision in the parties’ CBA authorizing the grant to petitioners of retirement
benefits in addition to their retrenchment pay; and that there is no indication that they were
forced by respondent to sign the Releases and Quitclaims.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.