KNOWLEDGE AND INTENTION IN THE OFFENCE OF CRIME

INTENTIONALLY CAUSING DEATH – CLAUSE (I) OF SECTION 300

The first clause of s 300 states that when an act (including a legal omission) is performed
with the intent to cause death, it is called culpable homicide, which is the same as murder. It
is the most basic and, at the same time, the most serious form of murder. This clause's
meaning is simple and free of ambiguity. It's when someone does something with the specific
intent of killing someone. ‘Intention is just what it says it is.' As a consequence, a person's
motive can be deduced from their actions. If a person administers a lethal poison to a man, it
is evident that he intends to kill the man because the act's cause and effect are also obvious.
Poisoning is obviously the cause of death, and poisoning has the effect of causing immediate
death. The act indicates that the purpose was to kill someone. The case is neatly wrapped if
the identity of the person who administered the poison is identified. In real life, however,
situations are not as straightforward. “Since intention is only a state of mind, only its outward
manifestations can be used to prove it. When injuries are caused on vital parts of the body
with sharp edged instruments, the perpetrator is accused of intending to kill.” 1 “When a
person sets fire to a deceased person after another has poured kerosene on his body, there is
no question that the accused intended to kill the victim.”2
“When an accused stabbed the deceased in the chest with a two-foot-long sword blade with
such force that the liver and aorta were wounded, it was determined that the crime was
evidently one of murder.”3 When the accused saw the deceased and said he was looking for
him everywhere before stabbing him with a knife, particularly when the knife was drawn
downwards as if to cut the body in half, it was decided that the intention to kill him was very
obvious from the evidence.
“In the case of Vasanth v. State of Maharashtra, The accused and the deceased had a history
of resentment. The accused and the deceased were seen fighting. The two were separated by a
few people who were there. The accused then rushed to his jeep, drove it on the wrong side of
the road and straight into the deceased, knocking him down and running over him, killing
him. The road on which the accident occurred was wide and deserted. The accused had no
reason or necessity to push the jeep in the wrong direction. The Supreme Court ruled that the
accused intentionally jammed his jeep into the accused and drove him over with the intent to
kill him.”4
1
Chahat Khan v. State of Haryana AIR 1972 SC 2574, (1972) 3 SCC 408.
2
Bandampalli Venkateswarlu v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1975) 3 SCC 492
3
Rau Bhagwanta Hargude v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1979 SC 1224, (1979) Cr LJ 1022(SC).
4
AIR 1998 SC 699
“It's worth noting that the first clause of Section 300, "act performed with intent to cause
death," is similar to the first clause of Section 299, "doing an act with the intent to cause
death." As a result, an act that comes under cl (1) of s 300 will also come under cl (1) of s
299, and it will be culpable homicide amounting to murder in both cases.”5

INTENTIONAL CAUSING OF BODILY INJURY WITH KNOWLEDGE THAT IT WILL CAUSE

DEATH – CLAUSE (2) OF SECTION 300

The second clause of s 300 states that it is culpable homicide amounting to murder if a person
intentionally causes bodily injury with the knowledge that such bodily injury would result in
the death of the person injured. As a consequence, the mens rea, or mental mindset,
contemplated under s 300 clause 2 is twofold. First and foremost, there must be an intention
to do bodily harm. Second, there must be "knowledge" that death is "expected" to occur as a
result or effect of the intended bodily injury.
“If there is first the intention to inflict bodily harm and then the “subjective knowledge” that
death will be the probable outcome of the expected injury, the second clause of s 300 will
apply.”6
Since it is the accused’s own personal perception of the consequences of his actions, it is
referred to as “subjective knowledge.” In contrast to the objective criterion in cl 3 of s 300,
the information here is subjective. The bodily damage intended must be sufficient to cause
death in the ordinary course of nature, according to clause 3 of section 300. As a
consequence, the prerequisite of cl (3) of s 300 is that the injury must be clinically proven to
be sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of events. As a consequence, the
prerequisite of cl (3) of s 300 is that the injury must be clinically proven to be sufficient to
cause death in the ordinary course of events. The word "objective" applies to whether the
damage deliberately caused is sufficient to cause death objectively speaking, rather than the
accused's personal opinion.
Section 300’s second clause is less descriptive than the first. The act is performed with the
intent to cause death in the first clause, pure and simple. However, in clause (2), the
offender's intention is only to inflict physical harm that the offender subjectively knows will
result in death. The degree of purpose is the only difference between clause (1) and clause
(2). In certain cases, the nature of clause (2) is the accused's knowledge that the crime is
likely to result in death. The second clause of section 299, which reads, "with the intent of
5
Gudar Dusadh v State of Bihar (1972) 3 SCC 118
6
Rajwant Singh v. State of Kerala AIR 1966 SC 1874.
causing such bodily harm as is likely to cause death," is identical to clause 2 of section 300.
However, as in clause (2) of s 300, ‘knowledge' that the injury is likely to cause death is not
presupposed in s 299.
“In the case of Willie Slaney v. State of Madhya Pradesh, The accused was completely in
love with the deceased's sister, whom the deceased hated. They had a confrontation, and the
deceased told the accused to leave the house. The accused left with his brother and returned.
He called for the sister of the deceased. The deceased, on the other side, appeared. There was
a heated argument between the two of them. The accused grabbed a hockey stick from his
brother and smashed it into the deceased’s head. As a result, the deceased's skull was
fractured, and he died. The Supreme Court ruled that the accused's act was only one that was
likely to result in death, and that the accused lacked any special knowledge to bring in under s
300 clause (2). The accused was found guilty under Section 304, Part II, rather than Section
300.”7
In the case of BN Srikantiah v. State of Mysore, The deceased had as many as 24 fractures,
with 21 of them being incised. They were all over him, including his head, neck, shoulders,
and forearms. Since the majority of the injuries were to vital organs and the arms used were
sharp, it was decided that the intent to cause bodily injury had been identified, putting it
under the s 300 framework.
INTENTIONAL CAUSING OF INJURY SUFFICIENT TO CAUSE DEATH – CLAUSE (3) OF

SECTION 300

As previously mentioned, the third clause takes an objective approach to the situation. It is
divided into two parts. It must be shown in the first section that there was an intent to cause
the specific injury. The second condition is that the injury intended to be caused was
sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. “It refers to the intent to cause
bodily harm, which is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. The meaning
of the provision is that the injury must be sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of
nature.”8 When the term "sufficiency" is used, it refers to a condition in which there is a high
risk of death as a result of the injury.
In the case of Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab, The Supreme Court ruled that in order to bring
a lawsuit under s 300 clause (3), the prosecution must prove the following rules;
1. It must prove, objectively, that there is a bodily injury.

7
AIR 1956 SC 116, (1956) Cr LJ 291(SC).
8
Gudar Dusadh v. State of Bihar (1972) 3 SCC 118
 2. It is necessary to establish the nature of the injury.
3. It must be proven that there was a deliberate intent to cause that specific bodily injury,
that is, that it was not accidental or unintended, or that another form of injury was
intended.
If these three elements have been identified, the investigation will move forward.
4. It must be shown that the injury mentioned above, which consists of the three elements
stated above, is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature.

INTENTION TO CAUSE PARTICULAR INJURY REQUIRED

In the case of Virsa Singh, The apex court claimed, among other things, that "it must be
proven that there was an intention to inflict the particular bodily injury, that is to say, that it
was not accidental or unintended, or that some other kind of injury was planned" while
raising the ingredients of cl (3) of s 300. “In Harjinder Singh v. Delhi Administration, the
Supreme Court considered this aspect of the case. In this case, the accused was attempting to
assault one Dalip Singh when the deceased intervened. The accused finding himself one
against two, took out the knife and stabbed the deceased. At that stage, the deceased
happened to be in a crouching position presumably to intervene and separate the two. The
upper part of the left thigh was pierced by the knife. The stab wound was oblique, cutting the
femoral artery and vein, which are essential main arteries in the body, under the muscle.
Cutting these arteries will result in a substantial loss of blood, resulting in immediate death or
death after a short period of time. According to the Supreme Court, the facts did not
demonstrate that the appellant intended to cause that specific injury on that particular place.
As a result, it was decided that clause (3) of s 300 did not apply. The accused was found
guilty under Section 304, Part I.”9
KNOWLEDGE THAT ACT IS SO IMMINENTLY DANGEROUS SO AS TO CAUSE DEATH –
CLAUSE (4) OF SECTION 300
In general, s 300 (4) contemplates the commission of actions that are so imminently
dangerous that they are likely to result in death. Under this provision, the act does not have to
be aimed at a specific person, nor does it have to be done with the intent to kill that person. It
only has to be a reckless act that is highly dangerous. The scope of the clause is clearly
specified in Example (d). ‘A’ for no apparent cause, shoots loaded cannon into a crowd of
people, killing one of them. A is guilty of murder, even though he did not have a
premeditated intention to kill someone in particular.
9
AIR 1968 SC 867.
“The essential ingredients of this clause are:
(i) The act must be imminently dangerous;
(ii) The person committing the act must have knowledge that it is so imminently dangerous;
(iii) that in all probability it will cause (a) death or (b) bodily injury as is likely to cause
death, and
(iv) Such imminently dangerous act should be done without any reason or justification for
running the risk of causing death or such injury.”10

The mental aspect contemplated by this provision is "knowledge" that the act is so
imminently dangerous that it is likely to result in death or serious bodily injury. The word
‘imminently dangerous’ means that the risk is present and immediate. As a result, under this
provision, the intention to kill someone does not have to be present in order for the crime of
murder to be committed. The degree of recklessness and inexcusability of an act must be
determined by the facts and circumstances of each case, because such imminently dangerous
actions resulting in death would only be considered murder if they were carried out without
any fair justification for taking such a risk.
“In the case of State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ram Prasad, The Supreme Court applied this
provision in an entirely different way. The accused Ram Prasad and his wife Raji had a
dispute in this case. Villagers were summoned to mediate, but they were unsuccessful. At that
point, the accused doused the wife in kerosene oil and set her on fire. She died as a result of
her injuries, which included serious burns. The Supreme Court noted that, in relation to
clauses 1-3 of s 300, the issue would arise as to the accused’s intention, the extent of the
injuries he intended to inflict, and so on, all of which would be matters of speculation. The
Supreme Court reasoned that relying on clause (4) would be easier because it only
contemplates “knowledge” and not “intention”. Though the clause is generally invoked where
there is no intent to cause the death of any individual person, the court held that the clause
can be used in situations where there is such callousness toward the outcome, and the risk
taken is such that it can be argued that the person knows the act is likely to cause death. In
this scenario, the accused must have known that pouring kerosene on his wife and setting fire
to her would result in her death. Since he had no reason to take such a chance, the crime was
ruled to be culpable homicide amounting to murder under s 300 clause (4).”11

10
PSA Pillai, Criminal Law, pg no. 10, 12th edition.
11
AIR 1968 SC 881.
EXCEPTIONS TO SECTION 300 WHERE CULPABLE HOMICIDE IS NOT CONSIDERED AS A

MURDER

“Clauses 1-4 of s 300 provide the essential ingredients wherein culpable homicide amounts to
murder. The section also provides five exceptional situations, the existence of which will
remove a case from the purview of s 300.”12
“The exceptions provided for under s 300 are: (1) grave and sudden provocation; (2) private
defence; (3) acts of public servants; (4) sudden fight, and (5) consent.”13

12
PSA Pillai, Criminal Law, pg no. 12, 12th edition.
13
PSA Pillai, Criminal Law, pg no. 12, 12th edition.