11.

G.R. No. L-46729 November 19, 1982

LAUSAN AYOG, et al, petitioners,
vs. JUDGE VICENTE N. CUSI, JR.,

On January 21, 1953, the Director of Lands, after a bidding, awarded to Biñan Development Co.,
Inc. on the basis of its 1951 Sales Application No. V-6834 Cadastral Lot No. 281 located at Barrio
Tamugan, Guianga (Baguio District), Davao City with an area of about two hundred fifty hectares.
Some occupants of the lot protested against the sale. The Director of Lands in his decision of August
30, 1957 dismissed the protests and ordered the occupants to vacate the lot.

The Director found that the protestants entered the land only after it was awarded to the corporation.
The Director characterized them as squatters.

Because the alleged occupants refused to vacate the land, the corporation filed an ejectment
suit

On July 18, 1961 the purchase price of ten thousand pesos was fully paid by Binan Development
Co., Inc.

It was only more than thirteen years later or on August 14, 1975 when Sales Patent No. 5681 was
issued to the corporation for that lot with a reduced area of 175.3 hectares. The patent was
registered. Original Certificate of Title No. P-5176 was issued to the patentee.

The Director of Lands in his memorandum dated June 29, 1974 for the Secretary of Natural
Resources, recommending approval of the sales patent, pointed out that the purchaser corporation
had complied with the said requirements long before the effectivity of the Constitution.

Secretary of Natural Resources Jose J. Leido, Jr., in approving the patent on August 14, 1975, noted
that the applicant had acquired a nested right to its issuance.

Before that patent was issued, there was a trial in the ejectment suit. Fifteen defendants testified that
they entered the disputed land long before 1951 and that they planted it to coconuts, coffee, jackfruit
and other fruit trees.

The trial court did not give credence to their testimonies. It believed the report of an official of the
Bureau of Lands.

Furthermore, the trial court during its ocular inspection of the land on November 8, 1964 found that
the plantings on the land could not be more than ten years old, meaning that they were not existing
in 1953 when the sales award was made. Hence, the trial court ordered the defendants to vacate the
land and to restore the possession thereof to tile company. The Court of Appeals affirmed that
judgment.

The corporation filed a motion for execution. The defendants, some of whom are now petitioners
herein, opposed the motion. They contended that the adoption of the Constitution, which took effect
on January 17, 1973, was a supervening fact which rendered it legally impossible to execute the
lower court's judgment.

Issue
Whether or not the sale of the subject land to Binan Devt Corp is barred by the 1973 Constitution
provision, that "no private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain
except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in area."

Decision

We hold that the said constitutional prohibition has no retroactive application to the sales application
of Biñan Development Co., Inc. because it had already acquired a vested right to the land applied for
at the time the 1973 Constitution took effect.

That vested right has to be respected. lt could not be abrogated by the new Constitution. Section 2,
Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution allows private corporations to purchase public agricultural lands
not exceeding one thousand and twenty-four hectares. Petitioners' prohibition action is barred by the
doctrine of vested rights in constitutional law.

Secretary of Justice Abad Santos in his 1973 opinion ruled that where the applicant, before the
Constitution took effect, had fully complied with all his obligations under the Public Land Act in order
to entitle him to a sales patent, there would seem to be no legal or equitable justification for refusing
to issue or release the sales patent (p. 254, Rollo).

In the instant case, it is incontestable that prior to the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution the right of
the corporation to purchase the land in question had become fixed and established and was no
longer open to doubt or controversy.

Its compliance with the requirements of the Public Land Law for the issuance of a patent had the
effect of segregating the said land from the public domain. The corporation's right to obtain a patent
for that land is protected by law.

In resume, we find that there is no merit in the instant prohibition action. The constitutional
prohibition relied upon by the petitioners as a ground to stop the execution of the judgment in the
ejectment suit has no retroactive application to that case and does not divest the trial court of
jurisdiction to enforce that judgment.

12
G.R. No. 135385               December 6, 2000
ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, petitioners,
vs. SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, et al respondents.

Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and mandamus as
citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371
(R.A. 8371), otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations

Respondents Chairperson and Commissioners of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples

(NCIP), filed on October 13, 1998 their Comment to the Petition, in which they defend the
constitutionality of the IPRA and pray that the petition be dismissed for lack of merit.

On October 19, 1998, respondents Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) and Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) filed
through the Solicitor General a consolidated Comment. The Solicitor General is of the view that the
IPRA is partly unconstitutional on the ground that it grants ownership over natural resources to
indigenous peoples and prays that the petition be granted in part.

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the IPRA and its Implementing
Rules on the ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands
of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the
regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution:

"(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of ancestral domains, and Section 3(b)
which, in turn, defines ancestral lands;

"(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that ancestral domains including inalienable
public lands, bodies of water, mineral and other resources found within ancestral domains are
private but community property of the indigenous peoples;

xxx

Petitioners pray for the following:

"(1) A declaration that Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52[I], 57, 58, 59, 63, 65 and 66 and other related
provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional and invalid;

xxx

After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court voted as follows:

Decision

Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an opinion, which the Chief Justice
and Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and Santiago join, sustaining the validity of the challenged
provisions of R.A. 8371. Justice Puno also filed a separate opinion sustaining all challenged
provisions of the law with the exception of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP Administrative Order
No. 1, series of 1998, the Rules and Regulations Implementing the IPRA, and Section 57 of the
IPRA which he contends should be interpreted as dealing with the large-scale exploitation of natural
resources and should be read in conjunction with Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. On
the other hand, Justice Mendoza voted to dismiss the petition solely on the ground that it does not
raise a justiciable controversy and petitioners do not have standing to question the constitutionality
of R.A. 8371.

Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition. Justice Panganiban filed a
separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related provisions
of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. He reserves judgment on the constitutionality of Sections 58, 59,
65, and 66 of the law, which he believes must await the filing of specific cases by those whose rights
may have been violated by the IPRA. Justice Vitug also filed a separate opinion expressing the view
that Sections 3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena,
Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon join in the separate opinions of Justices Panganiban and Vitug.

As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not obtained, the case
was redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the same. Accordingly,
pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.