7

G.R. No. L-54276               August 16, 1991

DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,
vs. IGLESIA NI KRISTO

Facts:

Respondent Iglesia ni Kristo filed an application for the registration and confirmation of title
over a parcel of land, with an area of 280 sq. meters.

Petitioner (Republic) opposed the application on the ground that the Iglesia ni Kristo is a private
corporation, and that under Art. XIV, sec. 11, of the Constitution, private corporations cannot
acquire lands of the public domain but can only hold them by lease in an area not exceeding
1,000 hectares. ... It appears that the applicant acquired the property in question from Gregorio
Rolls and Romualdo Rolls (both of San Marcelino, Zambales) on May 23,1946, as shown by the
Deed of Sale (Exhibit 'I'). After acquiring the land, applicant had it declared for taxation
purposes.

the trial court rendered judgment on June 2,1980 decreeing the registration of the land in the
name of the respondent (Iglesia).

It is this decision of June 2, 1980 that is subject of the Government's petition for review on
certiorari at bar.

Issue:

Whether or not INC can acquire the subject land

Decision

The petition will have to be denied, in accordance with the judgment of this Court en banc in
Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court handed down on December 29, 1986, 3
involving substantially similar facts.

The weight of authority is that open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public
land for the period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon
completion of the requisite period ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other auction,
ceases to be public land and becomes private property.

Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 1942, which the respondent Court held to be
inapplicable to the petitioner's case, with the latter's proven occupation and cultivation for
more than 30 years since 1914, by himself and by his predecessors-in-interest, title over the
lands has vested on petitioner so as to segregate the land from the mass of public land.
Thereafter, it is no longer disposable under the Public Land Act as by free patent. ...
 As interpreted in several cases when the conditions as specified in the foregoing
provision are complied with, the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by
operation of law a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of
a certificate of title being issued. The land, therefore, ceased to be of the public
domain and beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of. The
application for confirmation is a mere formality, the lack of which does not affect
the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the
Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said patent.
Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering possession
of public land which is of the character and duration prescribed by statute as the
equivalent of an express grant from the State than the dictum of the statute itself
(Section 48 (b) of C.A. No. 141) that the possessor(s) "... shall be conclusively presumed
to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title ... ." No proof being admissible to overcome a conclusive
presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in truth, be little more than a formality,
at the most limited to ascertaining whether the possession claimed is of the required
character and length of time; and registration thereunder would not confer title, but
simply recognize a title already vested. The proceedings would not originally convert the
land from public to private land, but only confirm such a conversion already effected by
operation of law from the moment the required period of possession became complete.
As was so well put in Carino, '... (T)here are indications that registration was expected
from all, but none sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained
would be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but
simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law.
xxx     xxx     xxx
... The purely accidental circumstance that confirmation proceedings were brought
under the aegis of the 1973 Constitution which forbids corporations from owning lands
of the public domain cannot defeat a right already vested before that law came into
effect, or invalidate transactions then perfectly valid and proper. This Court has already
held, in analogous circumstances, that the Constitution cannot impair vested rights.

The substantial identity of the facts and issues between the case at bar and Director of Lands v.
I.A.C. being undeniable, and being cited to no persuasive reason to decline to apply the
doctrine in the latter to the former, the Court, as aforesaid, has no alternative except to rule
adversely to the petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the judgment of the respondent Court dated June 2,
1980 in LRC No. N-187-0 entitled, "Iglesia ni Kristo, etc. v. Director of Lands, et al.," is
AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

8
G.R. No. 85322             April 30, 1991
ALFREDO M. ALMEDA
vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:

The case involves a parcel of land with an area of 1,208 square meters located in Barrio
Pampangin Pateros, Rizal, and described in Survey Plan Psu-128539, originally owned by
Emiliano Almeda, father of the petitioners, by virtue of an "Escritura de Particion Extrajudicial

On September 12, 1984, the Almeda brothers applied for the registration of the land in the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig.

On the date of the hearing, no one appeared to oppose the application except the Director of
Lands, through the Solicitor General, who had earlier filed a formal opposition.

The Director of Lands, through the Office of the Solicitor General, presented Corazon Calamno
senior forester of the Bureau of Forest Development, who stated that she prepared the
inspection report on November 26, 1984; that the land fags within the alienable and disposable
land under Project No. 29 of Pateros, Metro Manila, as per BFD Map LC 2623, certified and
declared as such on January 23, 1968.

The Court found that the applicants' possession of the parcel of land sought to be registered,
together with that of their predecessors-in-interest, has been public, peaceful, continuous,
adverse to the whole world and in the concept of an owner for a period of more than thirty (30)
years, and, that the land is not located within any forest reservation nor mortgaged or
encumbered in favor of any person or lending institution.

The trial court affirmed the order of general default and confirmed the title of the applicants to
the parcel of land covered by the plan, Psu-128539, and ordered its registration in the names of
Alfredo, Leonardo and Ernesto Almeda pro-indiviso (pp. 42-45, Rollo).

From that decision, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor General,
appealed to the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 09309, alleging that the applicants-
appellees have not met the statutory requirements on possession under Section 48(b) of CA
141, mainly because the land applied for was inalienable forest land before its release as
alienable and disposable land on January 3, 1968. The applicants' possession thereof prior to
January 3, 1968 was invalid for purposes of a grant under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act.

The Court of Appeals, in a decision dated May 9, 1988, reversed the lower court and denied the
application for registration. It held that private respondents had not qualified for a grant under
Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act 141 which requires public, peaceful, continuous, adverse
possession by the applicants in the concept of an owner, for a period of at least 30 years. They
have to their credit only seventeen (17) years possession and occupation of the land, counted
from January 23, 1968, when it was declared alienable and disposable, up to September 12,
1984, when their application for registration was filed.

Issue
1. Whether the subject land could be registered under the name of the petitioner
almeda

No. There is no merit in the petition.

The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the private respondents had not qualified for a grant
under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act because their possession of the land while it was still
inalienable forest land, or before it was declared alienable and disposable land of the public
domain on January 13, 1968, could not ripen into private ownership, and should be excluded
from the computation of the 30-year open and continuous possession in concept of owner
required under Section 48(b) of Com. Act 141.

9.

G.R. No. 133250 July 9, 2002

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner,
vs. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY and AMARI COASTAL BAY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
respondents.

The Facts

On November 20, 1973, the government, through the Commissioner of Public Highways, signed
a contract with the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines ("CDCP" for
brevity) to reclaim certain foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay.

On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1084
creating PEA. PD No. 1084 tasked PEA "to reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged
areas," and "to develop, improve, acquire, x x x lease and sell any and all kinds of lands."1 On
the same date, then President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1085 transferring to PEA
the "lands reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay"2 under the Manila-Cavite
Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP).

On January 19, 1988, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517, granting
and transferring to PEA "the parcels of land so reclaimed under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road
and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP) containing a total area of one million nine hundred fifteen
thousand eight hundred ninety four (1,915,894) square meters." Subsequently, on April 9,
1988, the Register of Deeds of the Municipality of Parañaque issued Transfer Certificates of
Title Nos. 7309, 7311, and 7312, in the name of PEA, covering the three reclaimed islands
known as the "Freedom Islands" located at the southern portion of the Manila-Cavite Coastal
Road, Parañaque City.

On April 25, 1995, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement ("JVA" for brevity) with AMARI,
a private corporation, to develop the Freedom Islands. The JVA also required the reclamation of
an additional 250 hectares of submerged areas surrounding these islands to complete the
configuration in the Master Development Plan of the Southern Reclamation Project-MCCRRP.

On November 29, 1996, then Senate President Ernesto Maceda delivered a privilege speech in
the Senate and denounced the JVA as the "grandmother of all scams." As a result, the Senate
Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises, and the Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, conducted a joint investigation. The Senate
Committees reported the results of their investigation in Senate Committee Report No. 560
dated September 16, 1997.7 Among the conclusions of their report are: (1) the reclaimed lands
PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of the public domain which the
government has not classified as alienable lands and therefore PEA cannot alienate these lands;
(2) the certificates of title covering the Freedom Islands are thus void, and (3) the JVA itself is
illegal.

On April 27, 1998, petitioner Frank I. Chavez ("Petitioner" for brevity) as a taxpayer, filed the
instant Petition for Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
and Temporary Restraining Order.

Xxx

Petitioner assails the sale to AMARI of lands of the public domain as a blatant violation of
Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting the sale of alienable lands of the public
domain to private corporations.

Issue

Whether or not the reclaimed lands are alienable

Decision

No.
PEA readily concedes that lands reclaimed from foreshore or submerged areas of Manila Bay
are alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. In its Memorandum,67 PEA admits that
–
"Under the Public Land Act (CA 141, as amended), reclaimed lands are classified as alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain:
'Sec. 59. The lands disposable under this title shall be classified as follows:
(a) Lands reclaimed by the government by dredging, filling, or other means;
x x x.'"
Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares111 of
still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article
XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than
agricultural lands of the public domain. PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter,
the government can classify the reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable, and further declare
them no longer needed for public service. Still, the transfer of such reclaimed alienable lands of
the public domain to AMARI will be void in view of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public
domain.