Rules Applicable: Rule 63 of the Rules of Court (Declaratory Relief and Similar Remedies)

Bayan Telcommunications v. Republic, 513 SCRA 560

Facts:

The petitioner filed for a petition for declaratory relief filed before the RTC of Pasig which sought the
suspension of the requirement, under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 7925. They claimed that it is
impossible to perform such because its financial condition of the economy and such impossibility of
performance was an implied exception of the law. The Solicitor General moved for the dismissal of the
petition for failure to state a cause of action and maintained the clarity of the law.

The court granted the motion to dismiss and held that the elements of justiciable controversy and
ripeness for judicial determination were absent as there was no showing that petitioner asked for an
exemption from or deferment of compliance with the requirement of Section 21, from the NTC, and was
refused.

The Petitioner maintains that there is a justiciable controversy ripe for judicial determination as it faces
a possible sanction for its inability to comply with the mandate of the law. They also argued that
impossibility or impracticability of compliance excuses it from complying with said provision.

The respondent maintained the stand on the clarity of the law and that there were yet no implementing
rules and guidelines by the NTC or any administrative agency to carry into effect the requirement
imposed by the law. Hence, according to respondents, petitioner’s apprehension of an administrative
sanction was merely conjectural and anticipatory. they argue that under the circumstances, there is no
justiciable controversy ripe for judicial determination.

Issue:

Whether there is an ambiguity in the cited provision of Section 21, Rep. Act No. 7925 which justifies an
action for declaratory relief?

Held:

No. The court ruled that the respondents’ contention about the clarity of the law is valid and petitioner’s
plea lacks merit.

For such an action for declaratory relief before a trial court to prosper, it must be shown that (a) there is
a justiciable controversy, (b) the controversy is between persons whose interests are adverse, (c) the
party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy, and (d) the issue invoked is ripe for
judicial determination.

A justiciable controversy is a definite and concrete dispute touching on the legal relations of parties
having adverse legal interests, which may be resolved by a court of law through the application of a law.
In the case at bar, petitioner fears the risk of possible sanctions. However, a mere apprehension of an
administrative sanction does not give rise to a justiciable controversy Rep. Act No. 7925 does not
provide for a penalty for noncompliance with Section 21, and as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor
General, there are yet no implementing rules or guidelines to carry into effect the requirement imposed
by the said provision. Whatever sanctions petitioner fears are merely hypothetical.
Rules Applicable: Section 2 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Petition for Prohibition)

Diaz, et al. v. Sec. of Finance, G.R. No. 193007, July 19, 2011

Facts:

The petition arises to seek a declaratory relief from the burden of the impending imposition of the Value
Added Tax for the service provided by the toll operators. The petitioners claimed that the Congress did
not intend to include toll fees within the meaning of sale of services that are subject to VAT and that
such imposition would violate the non-impairment clause of the constitution.

The Court issued a TRO, enjoining the implementation of the VAT and then Later, issued another
resolution treating the petition as one for prohibition.

On its comment on the resolution, the government argued that petitioners’ allegations clearly made out
a case for declaratory relief, an action over which the Court has no original jurisdiction. The same added
that the petition does not meet the requirements of Rule 65 for actions for prohibition since the BIR did
not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions when it sought to impose VAT on toll fees the
petitioner has a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law against the BIR action
in the form of an appeal to the Secretary of Finance.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court may treat the petition for declaratory relief as one for prohibition?

Held:

Yes. Although the petition does not strictly comply with the requirements of Rule 65, the Court has
ample power to waive such technical requirements when the legal questions to be resolved are of great
importance to the public.

There are precedents for treating a petition for declaratory relief as one for prohibition if the case has
far-reaching implications and raises questions that need to be resolved for the public good. The Court
has also held that a petition for prohibition is a proper remedy to prohibit or nullify acts of executive
officials that amount to usurpation of legislative authority.

The imposition of VAT on toll fees has far-reaching implications. Its imposition would impact, not only on
the more than half a million motorists who use the tollways every day, but more so on the government’s
effort to raise revenue for funding various projects and for reducing budgetary deficits.
Rules Applicable: Section 2 and 3 of Rule 68 of the Rules of Court (Foreclosure of Real Estate
Mortgage)

Spouses Rosales v. Spouses Alfonso, G.R. No. 137792, August 12, 2003

Facts:

The petitioners failed to settle the amount due to the judgment creditor (Macaspac) which prompted
the latter to file a motion for execution against the property which was stated in a previous ruling of the
lower court. A writ of execution was issued by the trial court which the sale of the property for the
satisfaction of the judgment. The amount acquired in the sale was applied to the loan and sometime
later, the buyer-respondent filed with the trial court a motion for a writ of possession, contending that
the confirmation of the sale effectively cut off petitioners’ equity of redemption.

The Trial court decided on favor of the respondent and ruled that that petitioners have no right to
redeem the property since the case is for judicial foreclosure of mortgage under Rule 68 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure. The petitioner filed an appeal but the Court of Appeals dismissed outright the
petition for lack of merit, holding that there is no right of redemption in case of judicial foreclosure of
mortgage.

Issue:

Whether the execution of judgment for money under Section 9 in relation to Section 25, Rule 39 and
not rules on judicial foreclosure of mortgage under rule 68 should apply?

Held:

No. The Court ruled that the Petitioners’ contention lacks merit.

The decision of the trial court, which is final and executory, declared the transaction between
petitioners and Macaspac an equitable mortgage. In Matanguihan vs. Court of Appeals, the Court
defined an equitable mortgage as "one which although lacking in some formality, or form or words, or
other requisites demanded by a statute, nevertheless reveals the intention of the parties to charge real
property as security for a debt and contains nothing impossible or contrary to law." An equitable
mortgage is not different from a real estate mortgage, and the lien created thereby ought not to be
defeated by requiring compliance with the formalities necessary to the validity of a voluntary real estate
mortgage.

Since the parties’ transaction is an equitable mortgage and that the trial court ordered its foreclosure,
execution of judgment is governed by Sections 2 and 3, Rule 68 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
which summarily states that when the defendant fails to pay the amount of the judgment within the
period specified therein, the court, upon motion, shall order the property to be sold, it shall operate to
divest the rights in the property of all the parties to the action and to vest their rights in the purchaser,
subject to such rights of redemption as may be allowed by law.

The right of redemption in relation to a mortgage–understood in the sense of a prerogative to re-

acquire mortgaged property after registration of the foreclosure sale–exists only in the case of the
extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage. No such right is recognized in a judicial foreclosure except only
where the mortgagee is the Philippine National bank or a bank or a banking institution.