Compiled Case Digests in

Administrative Law, Law on

Public Officers and Election Law
1. ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS G.R. No. 157013, July 10, 2003

FACTS:
Section 4 of R.A. No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act) provides that
all citizens of the Philippines abroad, who are not otherwise disqualified by
law, at least eighteen (18) years of age on the day of elections, may vote for
president, vicepresident, senators and party-list representatives.
Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 disqualifies from voting an immigrant or
permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host country, UNLESS
he/she executes, upon registration, an affidavit prepared for the purpose by
the Commission declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical permanent
residence in the Philippines not later than three (3) years from approval of
his/her registration under the said law. -Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 in
relation to Section 4 of the same Act empowers the COMELEC to order the
proclamation of the winning candidates (president, vicepresident, senators
and party-list representatives).
Sections 19 and 25 of R.A. No. 9189 created the “Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee” with the power to review, revise, amend and approve
the Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by the COMELEC.
Arguments of Macalintal: (1) Section 5(d) is unconstitutional because it
violates Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution which requires that the
voter must be a resident in the Philippines for at least one year and in the
place where he proposes to vote for at least six months immediately preceding
an election. He cites the ruling of the Supreme Court in Caasi vs. Court of
Appeals, wherein it was held that a “green card” holder immigrant to the
United States is deemed to have abandoned his domicile and residence in the
Philippines; (2) Section 18.5 is unconstitutional, as it affects the canvass of
votes and proclamation of winning candidates for president and vice-
president; (3) Sections 19 and 25 creating the Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee are unconstitutional intrudes into the independence of the
COMELEC. Should the rules promulgated by the COMELEC violate any law, it
is the Court that has the power to review the same via the petition of any
interested party, including the legislators.
ISSUES:
(1)Whether or not Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 violates Section 1, Article V
of the 1987 Constitution;
(2)Whether or not Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is unconstitutional insofar as
it involves the canvass of votes and proclamation of winning candidates for
president and vice-president;
(3)Whether or not the creation of the Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee violates Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution mandating the
independence of constitutional commissions.
RULING:
(1)No. Contrary to Macalintal’s claim that Section 5(d) circumvents the
Constitution, Congress enacted the law prescribing a system of overseas
absentee voting in compliance with the constitutional mandate. Such mandate
expressly requires that Congress provide a system of absentee voting that
necessarily presupposes that the “qualified citizen of the Philippines abroad”
is not physically present in the country.
The provisions of Sections 5(d) and 11 are components of the system of
overseas absentee voting established by R.A. No. 9189. The qualified Filipino
abroad who executed the affidavit is deemed to have retained his domicile in
the Philippines.
He is presumed not to have lost his domicile by his physical absence from this
country. His having become an immigrant or permanent resident of his host
country does not necessarily imply an abandonment of his intention to return
to his domicile of origin, the Philippines.
Therefore, under the law, he must be given the opportunity to express that
he has not actually abandoned his domicile in the Philippines by executing the
affidavit required by Sections 5(d) and 8(c) of the law.
x x x x Ordinarily, an absentee is not a resident and vice versa; a person
cannot be at the same time, both a resident and an absentee. However, under
our election laws and the countless pronouncements of the Court pertaining
to elections, an absentee remains attached to his residence in the Philippines
as residence is considered synonymous with domicile. x x x x For political
purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar
criteria of political laws. As these concepts have evolved in our election law,
what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for
election purposes is used synonymously with domicile. x x x x
To repeat, the affidavit is required of immigrants and permanent residents
abroad because by their status in their host countries, they are presumed to
have relinquished their intent to return to this country; thus, without the
affidavit, the presumption of abandonment of Philippine domicile shall remain.
(2)Yes. Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is repugnant to Section 4, Article VII of
the Constitution only insofar as said Section totally disregarded the authority
given to Congress by the Constitution to proclaim the winning candidates for
the positions of president and vice-president. Congress could not have allowed
the COMELEC to usurp a power that constitutionally belongs to it or, as aptly
stated by petitioner, to encroach “on the power of Congress to canvass the
votes for president and vice-president and the power to proclaim the winners
for the said positions.” x x x x The canvassing of the votes and the
proclamation of the winning candidates for president and vice-president for
the entire nation must remain in the hands of Congress.
NOTE: Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 was declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL with
respect only to the power given to the Comelec to canvass the votes and
proclaim the winning candidates for President and Vice-President, which is
lodged with Congress under Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution.
However, its consitutionality was UPHELD insofar as the authority given to the
COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates for the Senators and party-list
representatives.
(3)Yes. By vesting itself with the powers to approve, review, amend, and
revise the IRR for The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003, Congress went
beyond the scope of its constitutional authority. Congress trampled upon the
constitutional mandate of independence of the COMELEC. The second
sentence of the first paragraph of Section 19 stating that, “the Implementing
Rules and Regulations shall be submitted to the Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee created by virtue of this Act for prior approval,” and the second
sentence of the second paragraph of Section 25 stating that, “it shall review,
revise, amend and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations
promulgated by the Commission,” whereby Congress, in both provisions,
arrogates unto itself a function not specifically vested by the Constitution,
should be stricken out of the subject statute for constitutional infirmity. Both
provisions brazenly violate the mandate on the independence of the COMELEC.

2. G.R. No. 162759 AUGUST 4, 2006

LOIDA NICOLAS-LEWIS, et.al., petitioners vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondent
Topic: Citizen Participation and electoral rights – The Right to Vote

Facts:
1. Petitioner are successful applicants for recognition of Philippine
citizenship under RA 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition
Act) [basically dual citizens sila].
2. Long before the May 2004 elections, petitioners sought registration as
“overseas absentee voter” under RA 9189 (Overseas Absentee Voting
Act/Law) only to be advised by the Philippine Embassy in the US that,
as per a COMELEC letter, they have yet no right to vote because of their
lack of the one-year residence requirement prescribed by the
constitution. Such letter also stated that PH posts abroad should
continue voter’s registration.
3. Petitioner Nicolas-Lewis asked COMELEC for a clarification, in light of the
Macalintal ruling. The COMELEC replied that the petitioners still cannot
exercise the right to vote as the OAVL was not applicable to them. Only
Filipinos who have merely re-acquired their citizenship on Sept 18 2003,
at the earliest, are considered regular voters who have to meet the
residency requirement.
4. On April 1, 2004, petitioners filed this petition for certiorari and
mandamus. A week before the May 10 elections, COMELEC prayed for
the denial of the petition, arguing that the “duals” must first meet the
requirements in Sec. 1, Art. V; and that they have already renounced
their PH citizenship. As expected, petitioner failed to register; hence,
they failed to vote.
5. On May 20, 2004, OSG, in resolving COMELEC’s prayer, stated that all
qualified overseas Filipinos, including dual citizens, may exercise the
right to vote. However, such was already moot and academic as the
2004 elections has already concluded.
6. SC: Although moot and academic, such petition must be resolved
because of a broader and transcendental issue of the propriety of
allowing “duals” to participate and vote as absentee voter in future
elections.
Issue: W/N petitioners who might have meanwhile retained and/or reacquired
Philippine citizenship under RA 9225 may vote as absentee voter under RA
9189

Held: Yes! Duals may vote as an absentee voter.

1. Section 1, Art. V of the Constitution prescribes the residency
requirement for the right to vote; and Section 2 authorizes the Congress
to devise a system of absentee voting, implying that a non-resident
may, as an exception to the residency prescription, be allowed to
vote.
2. Meanwhile, Sec. 4 of the OAVL identifies who can vote under it; and
Sec. 5 lists those who cannot avail themselves of the absentee voting
mechanism.
3. However, in Sec. 5(d) of the enumeration, respecting Filipino
immigrants and permanent residents in another country, opens and
exception and qualifies the disqualification rule.
4. Such section faced a constitutional challenge in Macalintal, which the
Court has resolved, wherein it was stated that:
a. The section violated Sec.1 of Art. V which provides the residency
requirement. The Constitution does not allow provisional
registration by a voter to perform a condition to be qualified in a
political exercise.
b. However, Sec. 5(d) of the OAVL is constitutional as it allows an
immigrant or permanent resident to execute an affidavit to show
that he/she has not abandoned his domicile in pursuance to Sec.
1 and 2 of Art. V. Otherwise, if actual and physical residence in
the PH is required, there is no sense for the framers of the
Constitution to mandate the Congress to establish a system for
absentee voting.
c. Such execution of affidavit itself is not the enabling or
enfranchising act. It serves as an explicit expression that he had
not abandoned his domicile.
d. The ConCom even intended to extend to young Filipinos who reach
voting age abroad whose parents’ domicile of origin is in the
Philippines, and consider them qualified as voters.
e. Sec. 2, Art. V, was purposely put immediately after Sec. 1 in order
to indicate the ConCom’s intention to provide and exception to the
residency requirement with respect to Filipinos abroad. Such was
also deliberated upon in the Senate floor.
5. Likewise, after Sec. 5(d) of the OAVL passed the constitutionality test,
Congress enacted RA 9225, which includes provisions that those who
retain or re-acquire PH citizenship shall enjoy full civil and political
rights, including the right to suffrage, as well as to run for public office.
6. There is no provision in the OAVL that duels must actually establish
residence and physically stay in the PH before they can vote. On the
 contrary, RA 9225 implicitly acknowledges duals as non-residents. The
OAVL aims to enfranchise as much overseas Filpinos as possible.
7. Considering the unison of intent of the Constitution and the OAVL, with
the expansion of the scope of the latter law with the passge of RA 9225,
it can be concluded that “duals” may now exercise the right to sufferage
through absentee voting scheme.

8. The expanded thrust of the OAVL extends to the next generation of

“duals”, as deduced from the inclusion of Sec. 4 of RA 9225 on derivative
citizenship.
9. It is very likely that a considerable number of those children below 18
years of age had never set foot in the PH. Now, if these next gen duals
can enjoy full civil and political rights, then there is no reason why
petitioners and other present day duals, provided they meet
requirements under Sec. 1, Art. V, in relation with the OAVL, be denied
the right to vote as an absentee voter.

WHEREFORE, petition is GRANTED.

Important Provisions:
RA 9189 or OAVL

Section 4. Coverage. All citizens of the Philippines abroad, who are not
otherwise disqualified by law, at least eighteen (18) years of age on the day
of elections, may vote for president, vice-president, senators and party-list
representatives.

Section 5. Disqualifications. The following shall be disqualified from voting

under this Act:
xxx
(d) An immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as such
in the host country, unless he/she executes, upon registration, an affidavit
prepared for the purpose by the Commission declaring that he/she shall
resume actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later than
three (3) years from approval of his/her registration under this Act. Such
affidavit shall also state that he/she has not applied for citizenship in another
country. Failure to return shall be the cause for the removal of the name of
the immigrant or permanent resident from the National Registry of Absentee
Voters and his/her permanent disqualification to vote in absentia.
Xxx

RA 9225 Citizen Retention and Re-Acquisition Act

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared the policy of the

State that all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall
be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of
this Act.
 SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. Any provision of law to
the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have
lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of
a foreign country are hereby deemed to have re-acquired Philippine citizenship
upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic:
xxx xxx xxx
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this
Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine
citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.

SEC. 4. Derivative Citizenship. The unmarried child, whether

legitimate, illegitimate or adopted, below eighteen (18) years of age, of those
who re-acquire Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of this Act shall be
deemed citizens of the Philippines.

SEC. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. Those who retain
or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and
political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities
under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
(1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet the
requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act No.
9189, otherwise known as The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 and
other existing laws;
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet
the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution
and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy,
make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship ;
xxx;

3. Mercado vs. Manzano G.R. No. 135083 May 26, 1999

FACTS:

Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and respondent Eduardo Manzano were candidates

for vice-mayor in Makati City in the May 11, 1998. Manzano got the greatest number
of votes but his proclamation was suspended in view of the pending petition for
disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private respondent
was not a citizen of the PH but of the US.

On May 7 1998, COMELEC Second Division ordered the cancellation of the CoC
of the respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen and, under Section 40(d) of
the Local Government Code, persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from
running for any elective position. Manzano was born to his Filipino parents in San
Francisco California on September 14, 1955 and is considered an American citizen
under US laws.

On August 31, 1998, the COMELEC en banc reversed decision of the Second
Division and declared Manzano qualified to run for vice-mayor stating that Manzano
is also a Filipino citizen by operation of the 1935 constitution and he has effectively
renounced his US citizenship when he registered himself as a voter and voted in the
elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998. In view of this, Manzano was proclaimed as vice-
mayor of Makati. Hence, Ernesto Mercado who ranked next to Manzano in the
elections filed this petition

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent Manzano possesses dual citizenship and, if so,

whether he is disqualified from being a candidate for vice mayor of Makati City

RULING:
No. The petition was dismissed. Dual citizenship is different from dual
allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application
of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously
considered a national by the said states. For instance, such a situation may
arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to
the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of
jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part,
is concurrently considered a citizen of both states.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a
person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more
states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an
individual’s volition.
By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen;
that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he
will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith
and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private
respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively
repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said
before as a dual citizen. On the other hand, private respondent’s oath of
allegiance to the Philippine, when considered with the fact that he has spent
his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as
an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of
his election of Philippine citizenship.

4. CO. VS. HRET, G.R. No. 92191-92, 30 July 1991

FACTS:
This pertains to a petition to set aside and reverse the Decision rendered
by the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) declaring the Jose
Ong Chuan, Jr., herein respondent, a natural-born Filipino citizen.
Respondent was proclaimed as the duly elected Representative of the 2nd
Legislative District of Northern Samar during the May 1987 elections. Ong
Chuan bested several adversaries including herein petitioners, Sixto Balinquit
and Antonio Co. The petitioner alleges that the private respondent is not a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines and he is not a resident of Laoang,
Northern Samar, thereby not meeting the qualification provided under the Sec
6, Art. 6 of the 1987 Constitution.
Per records, Ong Te, respondent’s grandfather, arrived in the Philippines
from China and subsequently established his residence in Laoang, N. Samar.
Under the Philippine Bill of 1902, he was issued a Certificate of Residence. Ong
Te then brought Jose Ong Chuan, respondent’s father, to the said Municipality
in 1915 where the latter spent his childhood. There, he easily assimilated with
the community by adapting various Filipino values and practices. Jose Ong
Chuan then married Agripina Lao, a Filipino, and had eight (8) children including
herein respondent. Respondent’s father founded a hardware store which then
prospered and resulted in branching out in Binondo Manila. When the private
was respondent was nine (9) years old, his father’s application for naturalization
was approved.
Jose Ong, Jr. was born and raised in Laoang Northern Samar. His family
rebuilt their house as it was likewise burned. After completing his elementary
education, he stayed in Manila for his studies and thereafter practiced his
profession as an employee of the Central Bank of the Philippines. The
respondent eventually decided to manage their family business and then
married Desiree Lim, a Filipina. It was notable that during such years, the
respondent made periodical journeys back to the province.
The HRET ruled for the private respondent declaring him as a natural born
Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, N. Samar for voting purposes.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent, Jose Ong Chuan, Jr is a natural-born Filipino citizen.

HELD:
Yes. Article IV of 1987 Constitution provides that under Section 1, the
following are citizens of the Philippines:
1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption
of the Constitution;
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

Section 2, Natural-born Citizens are those who are citizens of the

Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect
their citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with
paragraph 3 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.
 The Supreme Court interprets that Section 1, Paragraph 3 does not only
apply to individuals who elected Philippine citizenship after February 2, 1987,
but likewise to those who having been born of Filipino mothers, elected
citizenship before that date.

Such provision pursuant to the Constitutional Commission was intended

to correct an unfair position which discriminates against Filipino women
wherein one born of a Filipino father and an alien mother was automatically
granted the status of a natural-born citizen while one born of a Filipino mother
and an alien father would still have to elect Philippine citizenship. If one so
elected, he was not, under earlier laws, conferred the status of a natural-
born.

Mr. Jose Ong Chuan, Jr traces his natural born citizenship from his mother
thereby expecting him to elect the same upon his age of maturity. However, it
was evident in this case, that the respondent’s father has been naturalized when
he was nine (9) years old, likewise making him a natural born Filipino citizen at
said age. Hence, there is no need for him to elect his citizenship upon his age
of majority as there is no other nationality he could choose pursuant to his
father’s naturalization.

Petitioned DISMISSED.

5. JUAN G. FRIVALDO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,

and RAUL R. LEE, respondents, G.R. No. 120295, June 28, 1996,
and
RAUL R. LEE, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JUAN G.
FRIVALDO, respondents, G.R. No. 123755, June 28, 1996

Facts:

On March 20, 1995, Juan G. Frivaldo filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the
office of Governor of Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 elections. On March 23,
1995, petitioner Raul R. Lee, another candidate, filed a petition with the
Comelec praying that Frivaldo "be disqualified from seeking or holding any
public office or position by reason of not yet being a citizen of the Philippines",
and that his Certificate of Candidacy be canceled. On May 1, 1995, the Second
Division of the Comelec promulgated a Resolution granting the petition.
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Frivaldo remained unacted upon until
after the May 8, 1995 elections. So, his candidacy continued and he was voted
for during the elections held on said date. On May 11, 1995, the Comelec en
banc affirmed the aforementioned Resolution of the Second Division.
The Provincial Board of Canvassers completed the canvass of the election
returns and a Certificate of Votes dated May 27, 1995, and Frivaldo got the
highest number of votes followed by Lee.
On June 9, 1995, Lee filed a (supplemental) petition praying for his
proclamation as the duly-elected Governor of Sorsogon. Accordingly, at 8:30
in the evening of June 30, 1995, Lee was proclaimed governor of Sorsogon.
On July 6, 1995, Frivaldo filed with the Comelec a new petition, praying for
the annulment of the June 30, 1995 proclamation of Lee and for his own
proclamation. He alleged that on June 30, 1995, at 2:00 in the afternoon, he
took his oath of allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines after "his petition for
repatriation under P.D. 725 which he filed with the Special Committee on
Naturalization in September 1994 had been granted.” As such, when "the said
order (dated June 21, 1995) (of the Comelec) . . . was released and received
by Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 at 5:30 o'clock in the evening, there was no
more legal impediment to the proclamation (of Frivaldo) as governor. On
December 19, 1995, the Comelec First Division promulgated the herein
assailed Resolution holding that Lee, "not having garnered the highest number
of votes," was not legally entitled to be proclaimed as duly-elected governor;
and that Frivaldo, having garnered the highest number of votes, and he having
reacquired his Filipino citizenship by repatriation on June 30, 1995 under the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 725 is qualified to hold the office of
Governor of Sorsogon.

Issue(s):
1. Was the repatriation of Frivaldo valid and legal? If so, did it seasonably cure
his lack of citizenship as to qualify him to be proclaimed and to hold the Office
of Governor? If not, may it be given retroactive effect? If so, from when?
2. Is Frivaldo's "judicially declared" disqualification for lack of Filipino
citizenship a continuing bar to his eligibility to run for, be elected to or hold
the governorship of Sorsogon?
3. Was the proclamation of Lee, a runner-up in the election, valid and legal in
light of existing jurisprudence?

Ruling:
1. Yes. Under Philippine law, citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of
Congress, by naturalization or by repatriation. The law does not specify any
particular date or time when the candidate must possess citizenship, unlike
that for residence (which must consist of at least one year's residency
immediately preceding the day of election) and age (at least twenty three
years of age on election day). Philippine citizenship is an indispensable
requirement for holding an elective public office, and the purpose of the
citizenship qualification is none other than to ensure that no alien, i.e., no
person owing allegiance to another nation, shall govern our people and our
country or a unit of territory thereof. An official begins to govern or to
discharge his functions only upon his proclamation and on the day the law
mandates his term of office to begin. Since Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship
on June 30, 1995, the very day the term of office of governor began, therefore
he was already qualified to be proclaimed, to hold such office and to discharge
the functions and responsibilities thereof as of said date.
If the law intended the citizenship qualification to be possessed prior to
election consistent with the requirement of being a registered voter, then it
would not have made citizenship a SEPARATE qualification. Therefore, the law
intended CITIZENSHIP to be a qualification distinct from being a VOTER, even
if being a voter presumes being a citizen first. The Local Government Code
requires an elective official to be a registered voter. It does not require him
to vote actually. Hence, registration, not the actual voting, is the core of this
"qualification." In other words, the law's purpose in this second requirement
is to ensure that the prospective official is actually registered in the area he
seeks to govern and not anywhere else. In fact, Frivaldo has voted in all the
previous elections including on May 8, 1995, thus, it is clear that he is a
registered voter in the province where he intended to be elected.
The prime issue of citizenship should be reckoned from the date of
proclamation, not necessarily the date of election or date of filing of the
certificate of candidacy. Juan G. Frivaldo was already and indubitably a citizen,
having taken his oath of allegiance earlier in the afternoon of the same day of
the proclamation and such oath had already cured his previous "judicially-
declared" alienage. Hence, at such time, he was no longer ineligible. To
remove all doubts, the repatriation of Frivaldo RETROACTED to the date of the
filing of his application on August 17, 1994.
2. No. The decision of the Supreme Court that Frivaldo was not a Filipino
citizen and thus disqualified was for the purpose of the 1988 and 1992
elections; and that there is no record of any "final judgment" of the
disqualification of Frivaldo as a candidate for the May 8, 1995 elections.
Indeed, decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot
govern a person's future status with finality. This is because a person may
subsequently reacquire, or for that matter lose, his citizenship under any of
the modes recognized by law for the purpose.
3. No. The fact remains that Lee was not the choice of the sovereign will, and
that he is "a second placer, . . . just that, a second placer.” The rule, therefore,
is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the
eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared
elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the
office. Hence, Lee's proclamation was patently erroneous.

6. BENGSON VS. CRUZ

G.R. NO. 142840 May 7, 2011

FACTS
Teodoro C. Cruz was born in San Clementte, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of
Filipino parents. On November 5, 1985, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United
States Marine Corps without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines,
took an oath of allegiance to the United States, became a naturalized US
citizen on June 5, 1990, and as a consequence, lost his Filipino citizenship
(Commonwealth Act No. 63, Section 1(4).
On March 17, 1994, the respondent reacquired his Philippine citizenship
through repatriation under RA No. 2630. He ran for was e ran for was elected
a lected as the Re s the Representativ presentative of the S e of the Second
District of Pangasinan in May11, 1998 elections.
Bengson filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) claiming that Cruz was not qualified
to become a member of the House of Representative since he is not a natural-
born citizen as required under Art. VI, Section 6 of themConstitution.
The HRET dismissed the petition for quo warranto on March 2, 2000. Cruz was
declared as the duly elected Representative of the Second District of
Pangasinan in the May 1998 elections. The HRET likewise denied petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration of the decision of the decision in the resolution
dated April the resolution dated April 27, 2000.
Petitioner then filed a petition asserting that the HRET had committed serious
error and grave abuse of direction, amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when
it ruled that private respondent is a natural born citizen of the Philippines
despite the fact that the respondent lost his Philippine citizenship when he
swore allegiance to the United States in 1995, and despite the fact that such
reacquisition could not legally and constitutionally restore his natural-born
status.
Respondents contends that he acquired his status as natural born citizen when
he was repatriated since the phrase “from birth” in Art. IV, Section 2 refers
to the innate, inherent and inborn characteristics of being a natural born
citizen.

ISSUE
Whether respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American
citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino considered a natural-
born Filipino upon his upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.

RULING
The petition is without merit.
In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered
service in the Armed Forces of the United States. However, he subsequently
reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 2630.
Respondent Cruz took the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and has
registered the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in
accordance with the aforecited provision to recover his original status as a
natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino
father. The act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original
status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.
7. LIMKAICHONG VS COMELEC G.R. No. 178831-32, 30 July 2009

FACTS:
Two petitions were consolidated on the issue about the qualifications of Jocelyn
Limkaichong to run for, be elected to, and assume and discharge the position
as Representative of the 1st District of Negros Oriental. The contention of the
parties who sought her disqualification is that she is not a natural-born citizen,
hence, she lacks the citizenship requirement in Section 6, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution. In the election that ensued, she was voted for by the
constituents of Negros Oriental and garnered the highest votes. She was
eventually proclaimed as the winner and has since performed her duties and
responsibilities as Member of the House of Representatives.

The proponents against Limkaichong's qualification stated that she is not a

natural-born citizen because her parents were Chinese citizens at the time of
her birth. They went on to claim that the proceedings for the naturalization of
Julio Ong Sy, her father, never attained finality due to procedural and
substantial defects.

ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the citizenship of Limkaichong's parents may be questioned
in an election case.
2) Whether or not the HRET should assume jurisdiction over the
disqualification case.
3) Whether or not the 10-day prescriptive period under 1998 HRET Rules apply
to disqualification based on citizenship.
RULINGS:
1) No. The proper proceeding in cancelling the naturalization certificate of one
person should be in accordance with Section 18 of CA No. 473. Clearly under
the law and jurisprudence, it is the State, through the Solicitor General or the
representative designated by statute, that may question in the appropriate
denaturalization proceeding.

2) Yes. Limkaichong was proclaimed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers,

she had taken her oath of office, and she was allowed to officially assume
office on July 23, 2007. Accordingly, the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal, and no longer the COMELEC, should now assume the jurisdiction over
the disqualification case. Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and
in Section 2509 of the OEC underscore the exclusivity of the Electoral
Tribunal's jurisdiction over election contests relating to its members.

3) No. The ten-day prescriptive period under the 1998 HRET Rules does not
apply to disqualification based on citizenship, because qualifications for public
office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time
of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer's
entire tenure.

8. G.R. No. 150477 February 28, 2005

LAZARO C. GAYO, petitioner,

vs.
VIOLETA G. VERCELES, respondent.

FACTS:

Sometime in 1977, the respondent migrated to the United States of America

(U.S.A.) with her family to look for greener pastures. Although her husband
was granted American citizenship, she retained her citizenship as a Filipino.
In 1993, she returned to the Philippines for good. The following year, she was
appointed as Treasurer of the B.P. Verceles Foundation and regularly attended
the meetings of its Board of Directors.

In 1995, the respondent registered herself as a voter of Precinct No. 16 in

Tubao, La Union. As certified by the Assistant Revenue District Officer,
Revenue District No. 3 of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) in San
Fernando City, the respondent also filed her income tax returns for the taxable
years 1996 and 1997. Between the years 1993 to 1997, the respondent would
travel to the U.S.A. to visit her children.

The respondent abandoned her status as lawful permanent resident of the

U.S.A. effective November 5, 1997 for the purpose of filing her candidacy for
Mayor of Tubao, La Union in the May 11, 1998 elections. On January 28, 1998,
she surrendered her alien registration receipt card before the Immigration and
Naturalization Service of the American Embassy in Manila.

The respondent ran in the May 11, 1998 elections and was elected Mayor of
Tubao, La Union.

Thereafter, during the May 14, 2001 elections, the petitioner ran for re-
election and won. She was proclaimed as the duly-elected Mayor on May 16,
2001.

On May 26, 2001, the petitioner, also a candidate for Mayor during the May
2001 elections, filed a petition for quo warranto with the RTC of Agoo, La
Union. He prayed that (a) the respondent be declared disqualified to hold the
position of Mayor of Tubao, La Union; (b) the respondent’s proclamation as
winner be declared null and void; and (c) the petitioner be proclaimed as the
duly-elected mayor.

In her Answer, the respondent argued that she had clearly and unequivocally
shown, through direct and positive acts, that she already renounced and
waived her right to permanently reside in the U.S.A. even before she
surrendered her "green card" in 1998. As a counterclaim, she prayed for the
payment of attorney’s fees and litigation expenses, moral damages, and
exemplary damages.

On October 12, 2001, the RTC rendered a Decision, dismissing the petition
for quo warranto. The RTC ruled that the respondent was qualified to occupy
the position as Municipal Mayor.
The RTC held that the respondent’s act of registration as a voter, or of filing
an income tax return, does not constitute an abandonment or waiver of her
status as a permanent resident of the U.S.A. 11 Nonetheless, it declared that
the respondent was no longer such permanent resident during the May 2001
elections because she had already waived her green card even prior to the
filing of her certificate of candidacy when she first ran for mayor in the 1998
elections. The RTC held that the waiver of the status as a permanent resident
under Sec. 68(e) of the Omnibus Election Code is still effective. It ruled that
Sec. 40(f) of the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991 did not repeal Sec.
68(e). For one, there is nothing in the repealing clause of the LGC that
indicates an intention to repeal or modify the Omnibus Election Code.
Moreover, the two provisions are not inconsistent with each other. In fact,
Section 68(e) of the Omnibus Election Code complements Section 40(f) of the
LGC, in the sense that the former may supply the condition when permanent
residents may be qualified to run for public office. Dissatisfied, the petitioner
filed this petition for review.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the respondent was able to meet the residency requirement
for the position of municipal mayor during the May 2001 elections.

RULING:

Yes, the respondent was able to meet the residency requirement for the
position of municipal mayor during the May 2001 elections.

The issue in this case involves one of the essential qualifications for running
for public office, that is, the one-year residency requirement prescribed under
Section 39 of the LGC, thus:

SECTION 39. Qualifications. –

(a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a

registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in
the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang
panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be
elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately
preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or
any local language or dialect.
In jurisprudential precedence this requirement was interpreted as follows:

The term "residence," as used in the election law, imports not only an intention
to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled
with conduct indicative of such intention. "Domicile" denotes a fixed
permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, or for
like reasons, one intends to return.

Moreover, it was further clarified and held as follows:

The term "residence" is to be understood not in its common acceptation as

referring to "dwelling" or "habitation," but rather to "domicile" or legal
residence, that is, "the place where a party actually or constructively has his
permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given
time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi). A domicile
of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the place where the
child’s parents reside and continues (sic) until the same is abandoned by
acquisition of new domicile (domicile of choice).

Lastly, in Caasi v. Court of Appeals, we held that a Filipino citizen’s

immigration to a foreign country constitutes an abandonment of his domicile
and residence in the Philippines. In other words, the acquisition of a
permanent residency status in a foreign country constitutes a renunciation of
the status as a resident of the Philippines. On the other hand, the Court
explained in another case that a new domicile is reacquired if the following
conditions concur:

(1) Residence or bodily presence in the new locality; (2) an intention to remain
there; and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. There must be animus
manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at
the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of
residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the
new domicile must be actual.

Applying case law to the present case, it can be said that the respondent
effectively abandoned her residency in the Philippines by her acquisition of the
status of a permanent U.S. resident. Nonetheless, we find that the respondent
reacquired her residency in the Philippines even before the holding of the May
2001 elections. The records show that she surrendered her green card to the
Immigration and Naturalization Service of the American Embassy way back in
1998. By such act, her intention to abandon her U.S. residency could not have
been made clearer. Moreover, when she decided to relocate to the Philippines
for good in 1993, she continued living here and only went to the U.S.A. on
periodic visits to her children who were residing there. Moreover, she was
elected Mayor in the 1998 elections and served as such for the duration of her
term. We find such acts sufficient to establish that the respondent intended to
stay in the Philippines indefinitely and, ultimately, that she has once again
made the Philippines her permanent residence.
As ruled in Perez v. Commission on Elections:

When the evidence on the alleged lack of residence qualification is weak or

inconclusive and it clearly appears, as in the instant case, that the purpose of
the law would not be thwarted by upholding the right to the office, the will of
the electorate should be respected. In this case, considering the purpose of
the residency requirement, i.e., to ensure that the person elected is familiar
with the needs and problems of his constituency, there can be no doubt that
private respondent is qualified, having been governor of the entire province
of Cagayan for ten years immediately before his election as Representative of
that province’s Third District.

9. COQUILLA vs COMELEC, G.R. No. 151914, September 17, 2002

Coquilla was born on 1938 of Filipino parents in Oras, Eastern Samar. He grew
up and resided there until 1965, when he was subsequently naturalized as a
U.S. citizen after joining the US Navy.

In1998, he came to the Philippines and took out a residence certificate,

although he continued making several trips to the United States.

Coquilla eventually applied for repatriation under R.A. No. 8171 which was
approved. On November 10, 2000, he took his oath as a citizen of the
Philippines.

On November 21, 2000, he applied for registration as a voter of Butunga,

Oras, Eastern Samar which was approved in 2001.

On February 27, 2001, he filed his certificate of candidacy stating that he had
been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for 2 years.

Incumbent mayor Alvarez, who was running for re-election sought to cancel
Coquilla’s certificate of candidacy on the ground that his statement as to the
two year residency in Oras was a material representation as he only resided
therein for 6 months after his oath as a citizen.

Before the COMELEC could render a decision, elections commenced and

Coquillo was proclaimed the winner.

On July 19, 2001, COMELEC granted Alvarez’ petition and ordered the
cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the COMELEC en banc on
January 30, 2002. Hence this petition.
Issues:

1. Whether or not the COMELEC retained jurisdiction to decide this case

notwithstanding the proclamation of petitioner.
2. Whether or not petitioner had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar at
least one (1) year before the elections held on May 14, 2001 as he represented
in his certificate of candidacy
3. Whether or not petitioner’s motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC
en banc did not suspend the running of the period for filing this petition for
certiorari because the motion was pro forma.

Held:

1. Yes. R.A. No. 6646 provides:

SECTION 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been

declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the
votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not
declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted
for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or
Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or
protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during
the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such
candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. (Emphasis added)

SECTION 7. Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel a Certificate of

Candidacy. — The procedure hereinabove provided shall apply to petitions to
deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy as provided in Section
78 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.

The rule then is that candidates who are disqualified by final judgment before
the election shall not be voted for and the votes cast for them shall not be
counted. But those against whom no final judgment of disqualification had
been rendered may be voted for and proclaimed, unless, on motion of the
complainant, the COMELEC suspends their proclamation because the grounds
for their disqualification or cancellation of their certificates of candidacy are
strong. Meanwhile, the proceedings for disqualification of candidates or for
the cancellation or denial of certificates of candidacy, which have been begun
before the elections, should continue even after such elections and
proclamation of the winners.

2. No. Section 39(a) of the Local Government Code (R.A No. 7160) provides:
Qualifications. - (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the
Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province
or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang
panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be
elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the
day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local
language or dialect.

The term “residence” is to be understood not in its common acceptation as

referring to “dwelling” or “habitation,” but rather to “domicile” or legal
residence, that is, “the place where a party actually or constructively has his
permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given
time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi).” A domicile
of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the place where the
child’s parents reside and continues until the same
is abandoned by acquisition of new domicile (domicile of choice).

In the case at bar, petitioner lost his domicile of origin in Oras by becoming a
U.S. citizen after enlisting in the U.S. Navy in 1965. From then on and until
November 10, 2000, when he reacquired Philippine citizenship, petitioner was
an alien without any right to reside in the Philippines save as our immigration
laws may have allowed him to stay as a visitor or as a resident alien.

In Caasi v. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled that immigration to the United
States by virtue of a “greencard,” which entitles one to reside permanently in
that country, constitutes abandonment of domicile in the Philippines. With
more reason then does naturalization in a foreign country result in an
abandonment of domicile in the Philippines.

3. It is contended that petitioner’s motion for reconsideration before the

COMELEC en banc did not suspend the running of the period for filing this
petition because the motion was pro forma.

The mere reiteration in a motion for reconsideration of the issues raised by

the parties and passed upon by the court does not make a motion pro forma;
otherwise, the movant’s remedy would not be a reconsideration of the decision
but a new trial or some other remedy.

In the cases where a motion for reconsideration was held to be pro forma, the
motion was so held because (1) it was a second motion for reconsideration,[or
(2) it did not comply with the rule that the motion must specify the findings
and conclusions alleged to be contrary to law or not supported by the
evidence, or (3) it failed to substantiate the alleged errors, or (4) it merely
alleged that the decision in question was contrary to law, or (5) the adverse
party was not given notice thereof.
The 16-page motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner in the COMELEC en
banc suffers from none of the foregoing defects, and it was error for the
COMELEC en banc to rule that petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was
pro forma because the allegations raised therein are a mere “rehash” of his
earlier pleadings or did not raise “new matters.” Hence, the filing of the motion
suspended the running of the 30-day period to file the petition in this case,
which, as earlier shown, was done within the reglementary period provided by
law.

10. Domino vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 134015 July 19, 1999

Facts:
DOMINO filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of
the Lone Legislative District of the Province of Sarangani indicating in item
nine (9) of his certificate that he had resided in the constituency where he
seeks to be elected for one (1) year and two (2) months immediately
preceding the election.
Private respondents Narciso Ra. Grafilo filed with the COMELEC a Petition to
Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy
Private respondents alleged that DOMINO is not a resident, much less a
registered voter, of the province of Sarangani where he seeks election.
For his defense, DOMINO maintains that he had complied with the one-year
residence requirement and that he has been residing in Sarangani since
January 1997.
The COMELEC 2nd Division promulgated a resolution declaring DOMINO
disqualified as candidate for lack of the one-year residence requirement and
likewise ordered the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy, his address
indicated as 24 Bonifacio St., Ayala
Heights, Old Balara, Quezon City. This negates all his protestations that he
established residence at Barangay Poblacion, Alabel, Sarangani
Counting, therefore, from the day after June 22, 1997 when respondent
registered at Precinct No. 4400-A, up to and until the day of the elections on
May 11, 1998, respondent clearly lacks the one (1) year residency
requirement provided for candidates for Member of the House of
Representatives
On the day of the election, the COMELEC issued Supplemental Omnibus
Resolution No. 3046, ordering that the votes cast for DOMINO be counted but
to suspend the proclamation if winning, considering that the Resolution
disqualifying him as candidate had not yet become final and executory.
The result of the election shows that DOMINO garnered the highest number
of votes over his opponents
DOMINO filed a motion for reconsideration of the Resolution which was denied
by the COMELEC en banc
Issues:
Whether or not the judgment of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City
declaring petitioner as resident of Sarangani and not of Quezon City is final,
conclusive and binding upon the whole world, including the Commission on
Elections
Whether or not petitioner herein has resided in the subject congressional
district for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the May 11, 1998
elections
Whether or not respondent COMELEC has jurisdiction over the petition a quo
for the disqualification of petitioner.

Ruling:
The first issue.
The COMELEC has jurisdiction as provided in Sec. 78, Art. IX of the Omnibus
Election Code, over a petition to deny due course to or cancel certificate of
candidacy. In the exercise of the said jurisdiction, it is within the competence
of the COMELEC to determine whether false representation as to material facts
was made in the certificate of candidacy, That will include, among others, the
residence of the candidate.
The determination of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City in the
exclusion proceedings does not preclude the COMELEC, in the determination
of DOMINO's qualification as a candidate, to pass upon the issue of compliance
with the residency requirement.
The proceedings for the exclusion or inclusion of voters in the list of voters are
summary in character. Thus, the factual findings of the trial court and its
resultant conclusions in the exclusion proceedings not conclusive upon the
COMELEC.
However, a decision in an exclusion or inclusion proceeding, even if final and
unappealable, does not acquire the nature of res judicata.
it does not operate as a bar to any future action that a party may take
concerning the subject passed upon in the proceeding.
Thus, a decision in an exclusion proceeding would neither be conclusive on the
voter's political status, nor bar subsequent proceedings on his right to be
registered as a voter in any other election.
Moreover, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City in its 18 January decision
exceeded its jurisdiction when it declared DOMINO a resident of the Province
of Sarangani.
It is not within the competence of the trial court, in an exclusion proceedings,
to declare the challenged voter a resident of another municipality. The
jurisdiction of the lower court over exclusion cases is limited only to
determining the right of voter to remain in the list of voters or to declare that
the challenged voter is not qualified to vote in the precinct in which he is
registered, specifying the ground of the voter's disqualification.
The trial court has no power to order the change or transfer of registration
from one place of residence to another for it is the function of the election
Registration Board
The Second Issue.
the term "residence," as used in the law prescribing the qualifications for
suffrage and for elective office, means the same thing as "domicile," which
imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal
presence in that... place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
three rules must be borne in mind, namely: (1) that a man must have a
residence or domicile somewhere; (2) when once established it remains until
a new one is acquired; and (3) a man can have but one residence or domicile
at a time.
Records show that petitioner's domicile of origin was Candon, Ilocos Sur and
that sometime in 1991, he acquired a new domicile of choice at 24 Bonifacio
St. Ayala Heights, Old Balara, Quezon City, as shown by his certificate of
candidacy
Petitioner is now claiming that he had effectively abandoned his "residence"
in Quezon City and has established a new "domicile" of choice at the Province
of Sarangani.
To successfully effect a change of domicile one must demonstrate an actual
removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona... fide intention of abandoning
the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts
which correspond with the purpose.
There must basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi.
As a general rule, the principal elements of domicile, physical presence in the
locality involved and intention to adopt it as a domicile, must concur in order
to establish a new domicile.
No change of domicile will result if either of these elements is absent. Intention
to acquire a domicile without actual residence in the locality does not result in
acquisition of domicile, nor does the fact of physical presence without
intention.
The lease contract entered into sometime in January 1997, does not
adequately support a change of domicile. The lease contract may be indicative
of DOMINO's intention to reside in Sarangani but it does not engender the
kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of one's original domicile.
The mere absence of individual from his permanent residence, no matter how
long, without the intention to abandon it does not result in loss or change of
domicile.
Further, Domino's lack of intention to abandon his residence in Quezon City is
further strengthened by his act of registering as voter in one of the precincts
in Quezon City.
It give rise to a strong presumption of residence especially in this case where
DOMINO registered in his former barangay.
The Third Issue.
The COMELEC, under Sec. 78, Art. IX of the Omnibus Election Code, has
jurisdiction over a petition to deny due course to or cancel certificate of
candidacy. Such jurisdiction continues even after election, if for any reason no
final judgment of disqualification is rendered before the election, and the
candidate facing disqualification is voted for and receives the highest number
of votes[38] and provided further that the winning candidate has not been
proclaimed or has taken his oath of office.
The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal's sole and exclusive
jurisdiction over all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications
of members of Congress as provided under Section 17 of Article VI of the
Constitution begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House
of Representatives.
The fact of obtaining the highest number of votes in an election does not
automatically vest the position in the winning candidate.[41] A candidate must
be proclaimed and must have taken his oath of office before he can be
considered a member of the House of Representatives.
Considering that DOMINO has not been proclaimed as Congressman-elect in
the Lone Congressional District of the Province of Sarangani he cannot be
deemed a member of the House of Representative. Hence, it is the COMELEC
and not the Electoral Tribunal which has jurisdiction over the issue of his
ineligibility as a candidate.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED.

11. MAUYAG B. PAPANDAYAN, JR., Petitioner, v. THE COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS and FAHIDA P. BALT, Respondents. G.R. No. 147909. 16 April
2002

FACTS:
In the May 14, 2001 elections, petitioner and respondent, who was
the incumbent mayor seeking reelection, ran for the position of
Mayor of Tuburan, Lanao del Sur.

Respondent sought the disqualification of petitioner, alleging that

he was not a resident of Tubaran, Lanao del Sur but a permanent
resident of Bayang, Lanao del Sur.

In support of her allegation, respondent submitted a joint affidavit

of the Barangay Chairman and two members of the Sangguniang
Barangay of Tangcal, Tubaran stating that petitioner never resided
in the barangay as they personally knew all the registered voters
of the said barangay nor did the petitioner own or lease any house
in Barangay Tangcal; and that petitioner’s family were permanent
residents of Bayang, Lanao del Sur. Respondent also submitted a
similar affidavit averring that petitioner did not state in his Voter
Registration Record the number of years and months he had been
a resident of the Municipality of Tubaran.

Petitioner claimed that he was a resident of Barangay Tangcal in

Tubaran; that his family were natives of Tangcal, Tubaran; that in
1990, he transferred his domicile from Bayang to Tangcal and
stayed there with his wife; that he managed an agricultural land in
Tubaran which he co-owned with his family; and that he filed in
1998 his certificate of candidacy for the position of municipal mayor
of Tubaran, which he later withdrew. To support his allegations,
petitioner presented several affidavits.
 COMELEC declared petitioner to be disqualified.

On May 14, 2001, elections were held in Tubaran. Petitioner was

among those voted by the electorate for the position of municipal
mayor. Petitioner then received a telegram from the COMELEC
notifying him of the resolution of the COMELEC en banc which
denied his motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction and also filed a petition with the COMELEC seeking the
issuance of an order directing the Board of Election Inspectors
(BEI) of Tubaran to count and tally the ballots cast in his favor.

After canvass of the election returns, the Municipal Board of

Canvassers issued a Municipal Certificate of Canvass showing that
petitioner had garnered the highest number of votes.

On May 29, 2001, the First Division of the COMELEC issued an order
suspending the proclamation of petitioner as the duly elected
mayor of Tubaran pending the resolution of this present petition.
The Office of the Solicitor General filed a motion in lieu of a comment,
recommending that this Court grant the present petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner has complied with the residency requirement for
elective positions

RULING:
YES.

After reviewing the records, we find the foregoing allegations of petitioner to

be correct. Hence, his petition should be granted.

We agree with the Solicitor General that petitioner has duly proven that,
although he was formerly a resident of the Municipality of Bayang, he later
transferred residence to Tangcal in the Municipality of Tubaran as shown by
his actual and physical presence therein for 10 years prior to the May 14,
2001 elections.

Section 39 of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160) provides:

Qualifications. — (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the
Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province
or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang
panglungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be elected;
a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of
the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other language or
dialect.

The principle of animus revertendi has been used to determine whether a

candidate has an "intention to return" to the place where he seeks to be
elected. Corollary to this is a determination whether there has been an
"abandonment" of his former residence which signifies an intention to depart
therefrom.

In Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, the Court held that "domicile" and
"residence" are synonymous. The term "residence," as used in the election
law, imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal
presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
"Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for
business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. The Court
explained that in order to acquire a new domicile by choice, there must
concur (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an intention
to remain there, and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. There
must be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to
remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time;
the change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place
chosen for the new domicile must be actual.

The record shows that when petitioner and his wife got married in 1990, they
resided in Tangcal, Tubaran. From then on, there was manifest intention on
the part of petitioner to reside in Tubaran, which he deemed to be the place
of his conjugal abode with his wife. The fact that he and his wife transferred
residence from Bayang to Tubaran shows that petitioner was relinquishing
his former place of residence in Bayang and that he intended Tubaran to be
his place of domicile. Although petitioner worked as a private secretary of
the mayor of Bayang, he went home to Tubaran everyday after work. This is
proof of animus manendi.

Further, the evidence shows that in the May 11, 1998 election, petitioner
was registered as a voter in Tubaran and that in fact he filed his certificate
of candidacy although he later withdrew the same. In the May 8, 1999
registration of voters, he was again registered as a voter in Barangay
Tangcal, Tubaran.

Indeed, it is the fact of residence that is the decisive factor in determining

whether or not an individual has satisfied the Constitution’s residency
qualification requirement.
When the evidence of the alleged lack of residence qualification of
a candidate for an elective position is weak or inconclusive and it
clearly appears that the purpose of the law would not be thwarted
by upholding the victor’s right to the office, the will of the electorate
should be respected. For the purpose of election laws is to give
effect to, rather than frustrate, the will of the voters. To successfully
challenge petitioner’s disqualification, respondent must clearly
demonstrate that petitioner’s ineligibility is so patently antagonistic
to constitutional and legal principles that overriding such ineligibility
and thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the people would
ultimately create greater prejudice to the very democratic
institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution and laws so
zealously protect and promote. Respondent failed to substantiate
her claim that petitioner is ineligible to be mayor of Tubaran.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

12. G.R. Nos. 154796-97 October 23, 2003

RAYMUNDO A. BAUTISTA @ "OCA", petitioner, HON. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS, JOSEFINA P. JAREÑO, HON. MAYOR RAYMUND M.
APACIBLE, FRANCISCA C. RODRIGUEZ, AGRIPINA B. ANTIG, MARIA G.
CANOVAS, and DIVINA ALCOREZA, respondents.

FACTS:
On 10 June 2002, Bautista filed his certificate of candidacy for Punong
Barangay in Lumbangan for the 15 July 2002 barangay elections. Election
Officer Josefina P. Jareño ("Election Officer Jareño") refused to accept
Bautista's certificate of candidacy because he was not a registered voter in
Lumbangan. On 11 June 2002, Bautista filed an action for mandamus against
Election Officer Jareño with the Regional Trial Court of Batangas, Branch 14
("trial court").3 On 1 July 2002, the trial court ordered Election Officer Jareño
to accept Bautista's certificate of candidacy and to include his name in the
certified list of candidates for Punong Barangay. The trial court ruled that
Section 7 (g) of COMELEC Resolution No. 4801 mandates Election Officer
Jareño to include the name of Bautista in the certified list of candidates until
the COMELEC directs otherwise. In compliance with the trial court's order,
Election Officer Jareño included Bautista in the certified list of candidates for
Punong Barangay. At the same time, Election Officer Jareño referred the
matter of Bautista's inclusion in the certified list of candidates with the
COMELEC Law Department on 5 July 2002. On 11 July 2002, the COMELEC
Law Department recommended the cancellation of Bautista's certificate of
candidacy since he was not registered as a voter in Lumbangan. The COMELEC
en banc failed to act on the COMELEC Law Department's recommendation
before the barangay elections on 15 July 2002.
During the 15 July 2002 barangay elections, Bautista and private
respondent Divina Alcoreza ("Alcoreza") were candidates for the position of
Punong Barangay in Lumbangan. Bautista obtained the highest number of
votes (719) while Alcoreza came in second with 522 votes, or a margin of 197
votes. Thus, the Lumbangan Board of Canvassers ("Board of Canvassers")7
proclaimed Bautista as the elected Punong Barangay.

ISSUE:
Whether it was proper to proclaim Alcoreza as Punong Barangay in view of the
alleged disqualification of the winning candidate Bautista.

HELD:
Under the Revised Administrative Code,33 one of the qualifications of an
elective municipal officer is that he must be a "qualified voter" in his
municipality. Section 2174 of the Revised Administrative Code reads:

Section 2174. Qualifications of elective municipal officer. - An elective

municipal officer must, at the time of the election, be a qualified voter in his
municipality and must have been resident therein for at least one year, and
must not be less than twenty-three years of age. He must also be able to read
and write intelligently either English, Spanish, or the local dialect. (Emphasis
supplied)

On the other hand, under the Republic Act No. 2370,34 otherwise known as
the Barrio Charter, a candidate for the barrio council 35 must be a "qualified
elector." Section 8 of the Barrio Charter reads:

Section 8. Qualifications for election to the barrio council. - Candidates for

election to the barrio council:
(a) Must be a qualified elector and must have been a resident of the barrio for
at least six months prior to the election; and

(b) Must not have been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude or of a
crime which carries a penalty of at least one year imprisonment. (Emphasis
supplied)

Thus, in the 1958 case of Rocha v. Cordis, the Court held that a candidate for
an elective municipal office did not have to be a registered voter in the
municipality to qualify to run for an elective municipal office. Citing the earlier
case of Yra v. Abaño, the Court ruled that the words "qualified elector" meant
a person who had all the qualifications provided by law to be a voter and not
a person registered in the electoral list. In the same vein, the term "qualified"
when applied to a voter does not necessarily mean that a person must be a
registered voter.

However, under the Local Government Code of 1991, which took effect on 1
January 1992, an elective local official, including a Punong Barangay, must not
only be a "qualified elector" or a "qualified voter," he must also be a registered
voter. It is thus clear that Bautista was remiss in his duty to ensure his right
to vote and to be voted for public office. As early as 2001, he was already
aware that his name was no longer included in the roster of registered voters.
Yet, Bautista chose not to register anew that year despite his knowledge that
he needed to register as a voter in the barangay to run for the office of Punong
Barangay.

Bautista alleges that his non-registration as a voter of Barangay Lumbangan

was due to the refusal of Election Officer Jareño to register him sometime in
January 2002.41 Aside from his bare allegation that he tried to register in
January 2002, Bautista did not proffer any other proof like a duly accomplished
application form for registration to substantiate his claim that he indeed
attempted to register anew. SC affirm the COMELEC's conclusion declaring
herein petitioner ineligible for the elective position as Representative of Makati
City's Second District on the basis of respondent commission's finding that
petitioner lacks the one year residence in the district mandated by the 1987
Constitution. A democratic government is necessarily a government of laws.

13. JAPZON VS. TY G.R. No. 180088, 19 January 2009

FACTS:
Petitioner Manuel B. Japzon (Japzon) and private respondent Jaime S. Ty (Ty)
were candidates for the Office of Mayor of the Municipality of General
MacArthur, Eastern Samar, in the local elections held on 14 May 2007.
Japzon instituted SPA No. 07-568, a Petition to disqualify and/or cancel Ty’s
Certificate of Candidacy on the ground of material misrepresentation.
Japzon averred in his Petition that Ty was a former natural-born Filipino, who
eventually migrated to the United States of America (USA) and became a
citizen thereof and has been residing in the USA for the last 25 years. Japzon
also alleged that though Ty may have applied for the reacquisition of his
Philippine citizenship, he never actually resided in Barangay 6, Poblacion,
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for a period of one year immediately
preceding the date of election as required under Section 39 of Republic Act
No. 7160.
Ty contended that he reacquired his Philippine citizenship and renounced his
American citizenship, and he has been a resident of the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for more than one year prior to the 14 May 2007
elections. Therefore, Ty sought the dismissal of Japzon’s Petition in SPA No.
07-568.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Ty’s Certificate of Candidacy should be disqualified and/or be
cancelled on the ground of material misrepresentation.

HELD:
NO. Ty’s Certificate of Candidacy should not be disqualified and/or be cancelled
on the ground of material misrepresentation.
It bears to point out that Republic Act No. 9225 governs the manner in which
a natural-born Filipino may reacquire or retain his Philippine citizenship
despite acquiring a foreign citizenship, and provides for his rights and liabilities
under such circumstances.
A close scrutiny of said statute would reveal that it does not at all touch on
the matter of residence of the natural-born Filipino taking advantage of its
provisions. Republic Act No. 9225 imposes no residency requirement for the
reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship; nor does it mention any
effect of such reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship on the current
residence of the concerned natural-born Filipino. Clearly, Republic Act No.
9225 treats citizenship independently of residence. This is only logical and
consistent with the general intent of the law to allow for dual citizenship.
There is no basis for this Court to require Ty to stay in and never leave at all
the Municipality of General MacArthur, Eastern Samar, for the full one-year
period prior to the 14 May 2007 local elections so that he could be considered
a resident thereof. To the contrary, the Court has previously ruled that absence
from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a
voter other than in the place where one is elected, does not constitute loss of
residence.
In Aquino v. COMELEC, the Court did not find anything wrong in an individual
changing residences so he could run for an elective post, for as long as he is
able to prove with reasonable certainty that he has effected a change of
residence for election law purposes for the period required by law. As this
Court already found in the present case, Ty has proven by substantial evidence
that he had established residence/domicile in the Municipality of General
MacArthur, Eastern Samar, by 4 May 2006, a little over a year prior to the 14
May 2007 local elections, in which he ran as a candidate for the Office of the
Mayor and in which he garnered the most number of votes.
To successfully challenge Ty’s disqualification, Japzon must clearly
demonstrate that Ty’s ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to constitutional
and legal principles that overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect
to the apparent will of the people would ultimately create greater prejudice to
the very democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution
and laws so zealously protect and promote. In this case, Japzon failed to
substantiate his claim that Ty is ineligible to be Mayor of the Municipality, the
instant Petition for Certiorari is dismissed.

14. MARCOS vs. COMELEC

September 18, 1995, 248 SCRA 300

Facts:

Imelda Romualdez-Marcos, filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of

Representative of Leyte First District. On March 23, 1995, private respondent
Cirilio Montejo, also a candidate for the same position, filed a petition for
disqualification of the petitioner with COMELEC on the ground that petitioner
did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. On March 29, 1995,
petitioner filed an amended certificate of candidacy, changing the entry of
seven months to “since childhood” in item no. 8 in said certificate. However,
the amended certificate was not received since it was already past deadline.
She claimed that she always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile and
residence. The Second Division of the COMELEC with a vote of 2 to 1 came up
with a resolution finding private respondent’s petition for disqualification
meritorious.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a

result of her marriage to the late President Marcos.

RULING:

No, for election purposes, residence is used synonymously with domicile. The
Court upheld the qualification of petitioner, despite her own declaration in her
certificate of candidacy that she had resided in the district for only 7 months,
because of the following: (a) a minor follows the domicile of her parents;
Tacloban became petitioner’s domicile of origin by operation of law when her
father brought the family to Leyte; (b) domicile of origin is lost only when
there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of
abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which
correspond with the purpose; in the absence of clear and positive proof of the
concurrence of all these, the domicile of origin should be deemed to continue;
(c) the wife does not automatically gain the husband’s domicile because the
term “residence” in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law;
when petitioner married President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of
origin and merely gained a new home, not a domicilium necessarium; (d) even
assuming that she gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired the
right to choose a new one only after her husband died, her acts following her
return to the country clearly indicate that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of
origin, as her domicile of choice.

15. AGAPITO AQUINO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTION

G.R. No. 120265 September 18, 1995
FACTS:
Petitioner Agapito A. Aquino filed his Certificate of Candidacy(CoC)
for the position of Representative for the new 2nd Legislative District of
Makati City providing the following information; Residence in
Constituency: ___ years & 10 months.
Move Makati, a duly registered political party, and Mateo Bedon,
Chairman of the LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Barangay Cembo, Makati City,
filed a petition to disqualify Agapito A. Aquino on the ground that the
latter lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman
which should be for a period not less than one (1) year immediately
preceding the elections
Petitioner filed another CoC amending the certificate. Peti tioner
stated in Item 8 of his certificate that he had resided in the constituency
for l year and 13 days.
Petitioner filed his Answer praying for the dismissal of the
disqualification case. On the same day, a hearing was conducted by the
COMELEC wherein petitioner presented in evidence, his Affidavit, lease
contract between petitioner and Leonor Feliciano.
2nd Division of COMELEC promulgated a Resolution which DISMISS
the: petition for Disqualification against respondent Agapito Aquino and
declares him ELIGIBLE to run for the Office of Representative in the 2nd
District of Makati City.
Elections were held in Makati City where 3 candidates vied for the
congressional seat in the 2nd District, petitioner 38,547 votes as against
another candidate, Agusto Syjuco, who obtained 35,910 votes.
Private respondents Move Makati and Bedon filed an Urgent Motion
to Suspend Proclamation of petitioner. Thereafter, they filed an Omnibus
Motion for Reconsideration of the COMELEC's 2nd Division resolution
dated May 6, 1995 and a 2nd Urgent Motion to Suspend Proclamation of
petitioner.
COMELEC issued an Order suspending petitioner's proclamation.
Petitioner filed a "Motion to File Supplemental Memorandum and
Motion to Resolve Urgent Motion to Resolve Motion to Lift Suspension o f
Proclamation" wherein he manifested his intention to raise, among
others, the issue of whether or not the determination of the qualifications
of petitioner after the elections is lodged exclusively in the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal pursuant to Sec 17, Art VI of the 1987
Constitution.
 COMELEC issued a Resolution reversing the resolution of the 2nd
Division dated May 6, 1995. Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration of the
Resolution of the 2nd Division, promulgated on May 6, 1995, is GRANTE D.
Respondent Agapito A. Aquino is declared ineligible and thus disqualified
as a candidate for the Office of Representative of the 2nd District of
Makati City in the elections, for lack of the constitutional qualification of
residence.

ISSUE:
Whether or not COMELEC's finding of non-compliance with the
residency requirement of 1 year against the petitioner is valid.

HELD:
Yes, COMELEC's finding of non-compliance with the residency
requirement of 1 year against the petitioner is valid.
Petitioner in his Certificate of Candidacy, indicated not only that he
was a resident of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992 but that he was a
resident of the same for 52 years immediately preceding that election.
His certificate indicated that he was also a registered voter of the same
district. His birth certificate places Concepcion, Tarlac as the birthplace
of both of his parents Benigno and Aurora. Thus, what stands consistently
clear and unassailable is that this domicile of origin was Concepcion,
Tarlac.
The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is
evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one. While a
lease contract maybe indicative of respondent's intention to reside in
Makati City it does not engender the kind of permanency req uired to
prove abandonment of one's original domicile especially since, by its
terms, it is only for a period of two (2) years, and respondent Aquino
himself testified that his intention was really for only one (l) year because
he has other "residences" in Manila or Quezon City.
While property ownership is not and should never be an indicia of
the right to vote or to be voted upon, the fact that petitioner himself
claims that he has other residences in Metro Manila coupled with the short
length of time he claims to be a resident of the condominium unit in
Makati indicate that the sole purpose of transferring his physical
residence is not to acquires new residence or domicile but only to qualify
as a candidate for Representative of the 2nd District of Makati City.
Finally, petitioner's submission that it would be legally impossible
to impose the one-year residency requirement in a newly created political
district is specious and lacks basis in logic. A new political district is not
created out of thin air. It is carved out from part of a real and existing
geographic area, in this case the old Municipality of Makati.

16. FERNANDEZ VS HRET

Facts:
•
On the May 14, 2007 elections, petitioner filed for candidacy as Representative
of the First Legislative District of the Province of Laguna. In his Certificate of
Candidacy, he indicated that he is a resident of Sta. Rosa City, Laguna.
•
Private respondent sought the cancellation of petitioner’s COC and the latter’s
disqualification as a candidate on the ground of an alleged material
misrepresentation in his COC regarding his place of residence, because during
past elections, he had declared Pagsanjan, Laguna as his address, and
Pagsanjan was located in the Fourth Legislative District of the Province of
Laguna. Private respondent likewise claimed that petitioner maintained
another house in Cabuyao, Laguna, which was also outside the First District.
The petition, however, was dismissed by COMELEC for lack of merit.

On June 27, 2007, petitioner was proclaimed as the duly elected

Representative of the First District of Laguna.

On July 5, 2007, private respondent filed a petition for quo warranto before
the HRET praying that petitioner be declared ineligible to hold office as a
Member of the House of Representatives representing the First Legislative
District of the Province of Laguna, and that petitioner’s election and
proclamation be annulled and declared null and void.

Private respondents claim that petitioner lacked the one-year residency

requirement provided under Article VI, Section 6of the 1987 Constitution. In
support of his petition, private respondent argued that petitioner falsely
declared under oath:
(1) his alleged Sta. Rosa residence; (2) the period of his residence in the
legislative district before May 14, 2007, which
he indicated as one year and two months; and (3) his eligibility for the office
where he was seeking to be elected. Private
respondent also presented testimonies of several witnesses attesting that
petitioner is not a resident of Sta. Rosa.
•
In order to buttress his claim that he and his family actually resided in Sta.
Rosa, Laguna beginning at least in February2006, petitioners evidence
included, among others: (a) original and extended lease contracts for a
townhouse in Villa de Toledo, Barangay Balibago, Sta. Rosa, Laguna; (b)
certification issued by the President of the Villa de Toledo Homeowners
Association, Inc, that petitioner has been a resident of said Subdivision since
February 2006; (c) affidavits of petitioners neighbors in Villa de Toledo
attesting that petitioner has been a resident of said subdivision since February
2006; (d) certification of the barangay chairman of Barangay Balibago, Sta.
Rosa, Laguna that petitioner is a resident of Villa de Toledo within the said
barangay; (e) certificates of attendance of petitioners children in schools
located in Sta. Rosa, Laguna since 2005; and (f) DTI certificates of business
issued in the name of petitioner and his wife to show that they own and
operate businesses in Sta. Rosa, Laguna since 2003.HRET ruled in favor of
private respondent.

Issue:
WON petitioner sufficiently complied with the one-year residency requirement
to be a Member of the House of Representatives, as provided in the 1987
Constitution.

Held/Ratio:
YES. The SC found the interpretation of the HRET of the residency requirement
under the Constitution to be overly restrictive and unwarranted under the
factual circumstances of this case. SC find nothing wrong if petitioner
sometimes transacted business or received visitors in his Cabuyao house,
instead of the alleged Sta. Rosa residence, as there is nothing in the residency
requirement for candidates that prohibits them from owning property and
exercising their rights of ownership thereto in other places aside from the
address they had indicated as their place of residence in their COC. It also
stated that there is nothing in the Constitution or our election laws which
require a congressional candidate to sell a previously acquired home in one
district and buy a new one in the place where he seeks to run in order to
qualify for a congressional seat in that other district. Neither does the SC see
the fact that petitioner was only leasing a residence in Sta. Rosa at the time
of his candidacy as a barrier for him to run in that district. It stated that the
Constitution does not require a congressional candidate to be a property
owner in the district where he seeks to run but only that he resides in that
district for at least a year prior to election day. To use ownership of property
in the district as the determinative indicium of permanence of domicile or
residence implies that only the landed can establish compliance with the
residency requirement. This Court would be, in effect, imposing a property
requirement to the right to hold public office, which property requirement
would be unconstitutional.

In the case at bar, there are real and substantial reasons for petitioner to
establish Sta. Rosa as his domicile of choice and abandon his domicile of origin
and/or any other previous domicile. To begin with, petitioner and his wife have
owned and operated businesses in Sta. Rosa since 2003. Their children have
attended schools in Sta. Rosa at least since 2005. Although ownership of
property should never be considered a requirement for any candidacy,
petitioner had sufficiently confirmed his intention to permanently reside in Sta.
Rosa by purchasing residential properties in that city even prior to the May
2007 election, as evidenced by certificates of title issued in the name of
petitioner and his wife. In all, SC found that petitioner had adequately shown
that his transfer of residence to Sta. Rosa was bona fide and was not merely
for complying with the residency requirement under election laws.

17.

CHAVEZ VS. COMELEC, G.R. No. 105323 July 3, 1992

Facts:

Petitioner Chavez, on various dates, entered into formal agreements with

certain establishments to endorse their products. Pursuant to
these agreements, three billboards were set up showing petitioner promoting
the products of said establishments.
On December 30, 2003, however, petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy
for the position of Senator.
On January 21, 2004, petitioner was directed to comply with the said provision
by the COMELEC's Law Department. He replied, by requesting the COMELEC
that he be informed as to how he may have violated the assailed provision.
He sent another letter, this time asking the COMELEC that he be exempted
from the application of Section 32, considering that the billboards adverted to
are mere product endorsements and cannot be construed as paraphernalia for
premature campaigning under the rules.
The COMELEC, however, ordered him to remove or cause the removal of
the billboards, or to cover them from public view pending the approval of his
request.
Feeling aggrieved, petitioner Chavez filed a petition for prohibition with the
SC, asking that the COMELEC be enjoined from enforcing the assailed
provision. He urges the Court to declare the assailed provision unconstitutional
as the same is allegedly (1) a gross violation of the non-impairment clause;
(2) an invalid exercise of police power; (3) in the nature of an ex-post facto
law; (4) contrary to the Fair Elections Act; and (5) invalid due to overbreadth.

Issue:
Is Section 2 of COMELEC Resolution No. 6520 unconstitutional?

Held:
Police power
Petitioner argues that the billboards, while they exhibit his name and image,
do not at all announce his candidacy for any public office nor solicit support
for such candidacy from the electorate. They are, he claims, mere product
endorsements and not election propaganda. Prohibiting, therefore, their
exhibition to the public is not within the scope of the powers of the COMELEC.

Police power, as an inherent attribute of sovereignty, is the power to prescribe

regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, or
safety, and the general welfare of the people. To determine the validity of a
police measure, two questions must be asked: (1) Does the interest of the
public in general, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the
exercise of police power? and (2) Are the means employed reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals?
A close examination of the assailed provision reveals that its primary
objectives are to prohibit premature campaigning and to level the playing field
for candidates of public office, to equalize the situation between popular or
rich candidates, on one hand, and lesser-known or poorer candidates, on the
other, by preventing the former from enjoying undue advantage in exposure
and publicity on account of their resources and popularity.
Moreover, petitioner cannot claim that the subject billboards are purely
product endorsements and do not announce nor solicit any support for his
candidacy. Under the Omnibus Election Code, election campaign or partisan
political activity is defined as an act designed to promote the election or defeat
of a particular candidate or candidates to a public office. It includes directly or
indirectly soliciting votes, pledges or support for or against a candidate.
It is true that when petitioner entered into the contracts or agreements to
endorse certain products, he acted as a private individual and had all the
right to lend his name and image to these products. However, when he filed
his certificate of candidacy for Senator, the billboards featuring his name and
image assumed partisan political character because the same indirectly
promoted his candidacy. Therefore, the COMELEC was acting well within its
scope of powers when it required petitioner to discontinue the display of the
subject billboards. If the subject billboards were to be allowed, candidates for
public office whose name and image are used to advertise commercial
products would have more opportunity to make themselves known to the
electorate, to the disadvantage of other candidates who do not have the same
chance of lending their faces and names to endorse popular commercial
products as image models. Similarly, an individual intending to run for public
office within the next few months, could pay private corporations to use him
as their image model with the intention of familiarizing the public with his
name and image even before the start of the campaign period. This, without
a doubt, would be a circumvention of the rule against premature campaigning.

Non-impairment of contract
Section 32 is not a gross violation of the non-impairment clause. The non-
impairment clause of the Constitution must yield to the loftier purposes
targeted by the Government. Equal opportunity to proffer oneself for public
office, without regard to the level of financial resources one may have at his
disposal, is indeed of vital interest to the public. The State has the duty to
enact and implement rules to safeguard this interest. Time and again, this
Court has said that contracts affecting public interest contain an implied
reservation of the police power as a postulate of the existing legal order. This
power can be activated at anytime to change the provisions of the contract,
or even abrogate it entirely, for the promotion or protection of the general
welfare. Such an act will not militate against the impairment clause, which is
subject to and limited by the paramount police power.

Ex post facto law

Petitioner argued that the assailed provision makes an individual criminally
liable for an election offense for not removing such advertisement, even if at
the time the said advertisement was exhibited, the same was clearly legal.
Hence, it makes a person, whose name or image is featured in any such
advertisement, liable for premature campaigning under the Omnibus
Election Code.
Section 32, although not penal in nature, defines an offense and prescribes a
penalty for said offense. Laws of this nature must operate prospectively,
except when they are favorable to the accused. It should be noted, however,
that the offense defined in the assailed provision is not the putting up of
propaganda materials such as posters, streamers, stickers or paintings on
walls and other materials showing the picture, image or name of a person,
and all advertisements on print, in radio or on television showing the image
or mentioning the name of a person, who subsequent to the placement or
display thereof becomes a candidate for public office. Nor does it prohibit or
consider an offense the entering of contracts for such propaganda materials
by an individual who subsequently becomes a candidate for public office. One
definitely does not commit an offense by entering into a contract with private
parties to use his name and image to endorse certain products prior to his
becoming a candidate for public office. The offense, as expressly prescribed in
the assailed provision, is the non-removal of the described propaganda
materials three (3) days after the effectivity of COMELEC Resolution No. 6520.
If the candidate for public office fails to remove such propaganda materials
after the given period, he shall be liable under Section 80 of the Omnibus
Election Code for premature campaigning. Indeed, nowhere is it indicated in
the assailed provision that it shall operate retroactively. There is, therefore,
no ex post facto law in this case.

Fair Elections Act

Next, petitioner urges that Section 32 is a violation of the Fair Elections Act.
According to him, under this law, billboards are already permitted as lawful
election propaganda. He claims, therefore, that the COMELEC, in effectively
prohibiting the use of billboards as a form of election propaganda through the
assailed provision, violated the Fair Elections Act. Petitioners argument is not
tenable. The Solicitor General rightly points out that the assailed provision
does not prohibit billboards as lawful election propaganda. It only regulates
their use to prevent premature campaigning and to equalize, as much as
practicable, the situation of all candidates by preventing popular and rich
candidates from gaining undue advantage in exposure and publicity on
account of their resources and popularity. Moreover, by regulating the use of
such election propaganda materials, the COMELEC is merely doing its duty
under the law.

Overbreadth

A statute or regulation is considered void for overbreadth when it offends the

constitutional principle that a governmental purpose to control or prevent
activities constitutionally subject to State regulations may not be achieved by
means that sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of
protected freedoms.
The provision in question is limited in its operation both as to time and scope.
It only disallows the continued display of a persons propaganda materials and
advertisements after he has filed a certificate of candidacy and before the start
of the campaign period. Said materials and advertisements must also show
his name and image.
There is no blanket prohibition of the use of propaganda materials and
advertisements. During the campaign period, these may be used subject only
to reasonable limitations necessary and incidental to achieving the purpose of
preventing premature campaigning and promoting equality of opportunities
among all candidates. The provision, therefore, is not invalid on the ground of
overbreadth.

18. LAZATIN VS. HRET G.R. No. 84297, 8 December 1988

FACTS:

Petitioner Carmelo and private respondent Lorenzo Timbol were among the
candidates for Representative of the first district of Pampanga. Private
respondent objected to the inclusion of certain election returns during the
canvassing of the votes in which the Municipal Board of Canvasser did not rule
on his objections hence he brought the case to the COMELEC. The COMELEC
ordered the Provincial Board of Canvassers to suspend the proclamation of the
winning candidate. However, later on, the COMELEC ordered the Provincial
Board of Canvassers to proceed with the canvassing of votes and to proclaim
the winner. Petitioner Lazatin was proclaimed as winner. Private respondent
thus filed with the COMELEC petitions to declare petitioners proclamation as
void and to prohibit petitioner from assuming office. The COMELEC failed to
act on the second petition and later on declared petitioner's proclamation as
void. Petitioner challenged the COMELEC’s revocation of petitioner's
proclamation in which the SC ruled in favor of the petitioner. Private
respondent filed in the HRET an election protest. Petitioner moved to dismiss
private respondent's protest on the ground that it had been filed late, citing
Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881). However, the HRET
filed that the protest had been filed on time in accordance with Sec. 9 of the
HRET Rules. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was also denied. Hence,
petitioner challenged the jurisdiction of the HRET over the protest filed by
private respondent.
Issue: Whether or not the HRET has jurisdiction over the protest.
Held:
Yes, HRET has jurisdiction over the protest filed by the private respondent.
The SC ruled that Sec. 250 of the OEC must be applied only to petitions filed
before the COMELEC contesting the election of any Member of the Batasang
Pambansa, or any regional, provincial or city official. Furthermore, Art. VI,
Sec. 17 of the 1987 Consitution expressly stated that the Electoral Tribunals
of the Senate and the House of Representatives has the power to solely judge
all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of their
respective Members. Therefore, HRET has jurisdiction over the protest.
Additional facts:
After the issue on jusrisdiction was resolved, in the Private-Respondent's
Counter/Cross Petition, Private respondent in HRET Case prayed for the
issuance of a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin petitioner
herein from discharging his functions and duties as the Representative during.
However, the HRET resolved to defer action on said prayer as the grounds
therefor did not appear to be concrete. Private respondent moved for
reconsideration which was denied. Thus, private respondent asks the SC to
annul and set aside these two resolutions and to issue a temporary restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction.
Issue:
Whether or not the SC can annul and set aside the HRET resolutions and issue
a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction
Held:
No, the SC cannot annul and set aside the HRET resolutions and issue a
Restraining Order/WPI. The power to issue a restraining order and writ of
preliminary injunction and to determine whether there is sufficient ground to
issue such during the pendency of the protest, lies within the HRET. Moreover,
considering that the HRET had not yet taken any final action with regard to
his prayer therefore there is actually nothing to review or and set aside.
Furthermore, the SC cannot review any final action taken by HRET on a matter
within its jurisdiction unless it can be shown that there is grave abuse of
discretion in which in the instant case, there is none.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby DISMISSED. Private respondent's
Counter/Cross Petition is likewise DISMISSED.

19. BONDOC VS. PINEDA, 201 SCRA 792

FACTS:

On May 11, 1987, the petitioner (NP) and Pineda (LDP) were rival candidates
for Congressman of the Fourth District of Pampanga. Pineda was proclaimed
the winner having garnered a total of 31,700 votes compared to Bondoc’s
28,400 votes. The petitioner filed a protest with the HRET, composed of 9
members, 3 Justices of the Supreme Court, 6 members of the House chosen
on the basis of proportional representation from political parties. A decision
was reached declaring Bondoc as the winner by 23 votes, another recount was
insisted by the LDP members of the tribunal which increased Bondoc to 107
votes more than Pineda’s. Congressman Camasura (LDP) along with the
Justices, voted to proclaim Bondoc as the winner. Thereafter, Congressman
Camasura received a letter informing him that he was expelled from the LDP
for allegedly helping organize the Partido Pilipino of Eduardo Cojuangco and
inviting LDP members to join. The House voted for Cong. Cmasura’s removal
from the HRET and that his vote be withdrawn.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the House of Representatives is empowered to interfere with
election protests in the HRET by reorganizing the representation of the
majority party in the HRET.

RULING: Petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is granted

No, pursuant to Sec. 17 of Art. VI, the HRET is sole judge of all contests in
relation to the election, returns and qualification of their members. It is
created as non-partisan court to provide an independent and impartial tribunal
for determination of contests. The House cannot just shuffle and manipulate
the political component for their benefit and interests. The alleged “party
disloyalty” of Cong. Camasura, as a reason for his removal from the party,
when he voted in favor of Bondoc, undermines the independence of the HRET.
Such members of the HRET have security of tenure. They can only be replaced
in cases of term expiration, death, permanent disability, resignation from the
party. Disloyalty is not a valid cause of termination.

20. VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY v. COMELEC, GR No. 136781,

2000-10-06
Facts:
On 1998, the first election for party-list representation was held
simultaneously with the national elections. A total of one hundred twenty-
three (123) parties, organizations and coalitions participated.
the Comelec en banc proclaimed thirteen (13)... party-list representatives
from twelve (12) parties and organizations, which had obtained at least two
percent of the total number of votes cast for the party-list system.
Two of the proclaimed representatives belonged to Petitioner APEC.
PAG-ASA (People's Progressive Alliance for Peace and Good Government
Towards Alleviation of Poverty and Social Advancement) filed with the
Comelec a "Petition to Proclaim [the] Full Number of Party-List
Representatives provided by the Constitution." It alleged... that the filling up
of the twenty percent membership of party-list representatives in the House
of Representatives, as provided under the Constitution, was mandatory.
It further claimed that the literal application of the two percent vote
requirement and the three-seat limit... under RA 7941 would defeat this
constitutional provision, for only 25 nominees would be declared winners,
short of the 52 party-list representatives who should actually sit in the House.
Comelec Second Division granting PAG-ASA's Petition. It also ordered the
proclamation of herein 38 respondents who, in addition to the 14 already
sitting, would thus total 52 party-list representatives.
In allocating the 52 seats, it disregarded the two percent-vote requirement
prescribed under Section 11 (b) of RA 7941. Instead, it identified three
"elements of the party-list system," which should supposedly determine "how
the 52 seats should be filled up." First, "the system was conceived to enable
the marginalized sectors of the
Philippine society to be represented in the House of Representatives." Second,
"the system should represent the broadest sectors of the Philippine society."
Third, "it should encourage [the] multi-party system."
The twelve (12) parties and organizations, which had earlier been proclaimed
winners on the basis of having obtained at least two percent of the votes cast
for the party-list system, objected to the proclamation of the 38 parties and
filed separate Motions for Reconsideration.
They contended that (1) under Section 11 (b) of RA 7941, only parties,
organizations or coalitions garnering at least two percent of the votes for the
party-list system were entitled to seats in the House of Representatives; and
(2) additional seats, not exceeding two for each, should be allocated to those
which had garnered the two percent threshold in proportion to the number of
votes cast for the winning parties, as provided by said Section 11.

Issues:
Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in
Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a ceiling?
In other words, should the twenty percent allocation for party-list solons be
filled up completely and all the time?
Are the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat limit provided
in Section 11 (b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
(Whether the Twenty Percent Constitutional Allocation Is Mandatory.)
Ruling:
Court agrees with petitioners that the assailed Resolutions should be nullified,
but disagrees that they should all be granted additional seats.
We rule that a simple reading of Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, easily
conveys the equally simple message that Congress was vested with the broad
power to define and prescribe the mechanics of the party-list system of
representation. The Constitution explicitly sets down only the percentage of
the total membership in the House of Representatives reserved for party-list
representatives.
In the exercise of its constitutional prerogative, Congress enacted RA 7941.
As said earlier, Congress declared therein a policy to promote "proportional
representation" in the election of party-list representatives in order to enable
Filipinos belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors to
contribute legislation that would benefit them. It however deemed it necessary
to require parties, organizations and coalitions participating in the system to
obtain at least two percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system in
order to be entitled to a party-list seat. Those garnering more than this
percentage could have "additional seats in proportion to their total number of
votes." Furthermore, no winning party, organization or coalition can have
more than three seats in the House of Representatives. Thus the relevant
portion of Section 11(b) of the law provides:
"(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent
(2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one
seat each; Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the
votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number
of votes; Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be
entitled to not more than three (3) seats."
Considering the foregoing statutory requirements, it will be shown presently
that Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution is not mandatory. It merely
provides a ceiling for party-list seats in Congress.
The two percent threshold is consistent not only with the intent of the framers
of the Constitution and the law, but with the very essence of "representation."
Under a republican or representative state, all government authority
emanates from the people, but is exercised by representatives chosen by
them.
But to have meaningful representation, the elected persons must have the
mandate of a sufficient number of people. Otherwise, in a legislature that
features the party-list system, the result might be the proliferation of small
groups which are incapable of contributing significant legislation, and which
might even pose a threat to the stability of Congress. Thus, even legislative
districts are apportioned according to "the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio"[22] to ensure
meaningful local representation.
All in all, we hold that the statutory provision on this two percent requirement
is precise and crystalline. When the law is clear, the function of courts is simple
application, not interpretation or circumvention.
Consistent with the Constitutional Commission's pronouncements, Congress
set the seat-limit to three (3) for each qualified party, organization or
coalition. "Qualified" means having hurdled the two percent vote threshold.
Such three-seat limit ensures the entry of various interest-representations
into the legislature; thus, no single group, no matter how large its
membership, would dominate the party-list seats, if not the entire House.
After careful deliberation, we now explain such formula, step by step.
Step One. There is no dispute among the petitioners, the public and the private
respondents, as well as the members of this Court, that the initial step is to
rank all the participating parties, organizations and coalitions from the highest
to the lowest based on the number of votes they each received. Then the ratio
for each party is computed by dividing its votes by the total votes cast for all
the parties participating in the system. All parties with at least two percent of
the total votes are guaranteed one seat each. Only these parties shall be
considered in the computation of additional seats. The party receiving the
highest number of votes shall thenceforth be referred to as the "first" party.
Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of seats the first party is
entitled to, in order to be able to compute that for the other parties. Since the
distribution is based on proportional representation, the number of seats to
be allotted to the other parties cannot possibly exceed that to which the first
party is entitled by virtue of its obtaining the most number of votes.
For example, the first party received 1,000,000 votes and is determined to be
entitled to two additional seats. Another qualified party which received
500,000 votes cannot be entitled to the same number of seats, since it
garnered only fifty percent of the votes won by the first party. Depending on
the proportion of its votes relative to that of the first party whose number of
seats has already been predetermined, the second party should be given less
than that to which the first one is entitled.
The other qualified parties will always be allotted less additional seats than
the first party for two reasons: (1) the ratio between said parties and the first
party will always be less than 1:1, and (2) the formula does not admit of
mathematical rounding off, because there is no such thing as a fraction of a
seat. Verily, an arbitrary rounding off could result in a violation of the twenty
percent allocation. An academic mathematical demonstration of such incipient
violation is not necessary because the present set of facts, given the number
of qualified parties and the voting percentages obtained, will definitely not end
up in such constitutional contravention.

Principles:
The Legal and Logical Formula for the Philippines
In crafting a legally defensible and logical solution to determine the number
of additional seats that a qualified party is entitled to, we need to review the
parameters of the Filipino party-list system. They are as follows:
First, the twenty percent allocation - the combined number of all party-list
congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the
House of Representatives, including those elected under the party list.
Second, the two percent threshold - only those parties garnering a minimum
of two percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are
"qualified" to have a seat in the House of Representatives;
Third, the three-seat limit - each qualified party, regardless of the number of
votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is,
one "qualifying" and two additional seats.
Fourth, proportional representation - the additional seats which a qualified
party is entitled to shall be computed "in proportion to their total number of
votes."

21. BANAT V. COMELEC

FACTS: Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency

(BANAT) filed before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a petition to
proclaim the full number of party list representatives provided by the
Constitution. However, the recommendation of the head of the legal group of
COMELEC’s national board of canvassers to declare the petition moot and
academic was approved by the COMELEC en banc, and declared further in a
resolution that the winning party list will be resolved using the Veterans ruling.
BANAT then filed a petition before the SC assailing said resolution of the
COMELEC.

ISSUE: (1) Is the 20% allocation for party-list representatives provided in Sec
5 (2), Art VI of the Constitution mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? (2)Is the
2% threshold and “qualifier” votes prescribed by the same Sec 11(b) of RA
7941 constitutional.
DECISION: Dismissed

RATIO DECIDENDI: 1) Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 mandates the

filling up of the entire 20% allocation of party-list representatives found in the
Constitution. The Constitution, in paragraph 1, Sec 5 of Art VI, left the
determination of the number of the members of the House of Representatives
to Congress. The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely a
ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be more then 20% of the members
of the House of Representatives. (2) No. We rule that, in computing the
allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two percent
threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second
clause of Sec 11(b) of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the
two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the
maximum number of available party-list seats when the available party-list
seat exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the
distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive
ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of Representatives shall consist
of party-list representatives.We therefore strike down the two percent
threshold only in relation to the distribution of the additional seats as found in
the second clause of Sec 11 (b) of RA 7941. The two percent threshold
presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Sec 5 (2), Art
VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of “the -broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives.” (3) No. Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 prohibits
major political parties from participating in the party-list system. On the
contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political
parties to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings.
However, by vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans
disallowing major political parties from participating in the party-list

22. ANG BAGONG BAYANI – OFW LABOR PARTY VS. COMELEC,

GR NO. 147589, June 26, 2001

FACTS:

On April 10, 2001, Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed before the COMELEC a
Petition praying that "the names of [some of herein respondents] be deleted
from the 'Certified List of Political Parties/Sectoral
Parties/Organizations/Coalitions Participating in the Party List System for the
May 14, 2001 Elections' and that said certified list be accordingly amended." It
also asked, as an alternative, that the votes cast for the said respondents not
be counted or canvassed, and that the latter's nominees not be proclaimed. On
April 11, 2001, Bayan Muna and Bayan Muna-Youth also filed a Petition for
Cancellation of Registration and Nomination against some of herein
respondents.

On April 18, 2001, the COMELEC required the respondents in the two
disqualification cases to file Comments within three days from notice. It also
set the date for hearing on April 26, 2001, but subsequently reset it to May 3,
2001. During the hearing, however, Commissioner Ralph C. Lantion merely
directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda.

Meanwhile, dissatisfied with the pace of the COMELEC, Ang Bagong Bayani-
OFW Labor Party filed a Petition before this Court on April 16, 2001. This
Petition, docketed as GR No. 147589, assailed COMELEC Omnibus Resolution
No. 3785. In its Resolution dated April 17, 2001, the Court directed
respondents to comment on the Petition within a non-extendible period of five
days from notice.

On April 17, 2001, Petitioner Bayan Muna also filed before this Court a Petition,
docketed as GR No. 147613, also challenging COMELEC Omnibus Resolution
No. 3785. In its Resolution dated May 9, 2001, the Court ordered the
consolidation of the two Petitions before it; directed respondents named in the
second Petition to file their respective Comments on or before noon of May 15,
2001; and called the parties to an Oral Argument on May 17, 2001. It added
that the COMELEC may proceed with the counting and canvassing of votes cast
for the party-list elections, but barred the proclamation of any winner therein,
until further orders of the Court.

Issues:

1. WON recourse under Rule 65 is proper under the premises. More

specifically, is there no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law
 2. WON political parties may participate in the party-list elections

3. WON the party-list system is exclusive to ‘marginalized and

underrepresented’ sectors and organizations.

4. WON Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating

Omnibus Resolution No. 3785
Ruling:

1. Petitioners attack the validity of Comelec Omnibus Resolution 3785.

Under both the Constitution 20 and the Rules of Court, such challenge
may be brought before this Court in a verified petition for certiorari
under Rule 65. Moreover, the assailed Omnibus Resolution was
promulgated by Respondent Commission en banc; hence, no motion for
reconsideration was possible consideration was possible.

2. Political parties, even the major ones, may participate in the party-list
elections. Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents
cannot be disqualified from the party-list elections, merely on the
ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution provides that members of the House of Representatives
may "be elected through a party-list system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations."

Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the

Constitution, political parties political parties may be registered under
the party-list system. For its part, Section 2 of RA 7941 also provides
for "a partylist system of registered national, regional and sectoral
parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, x x x." Section 3 expressly
states that a "party" is "either a political party or a sectoral party or a
coalition of parties."

3. That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not
mean, however, that any political party -- or any organization or group
for that matter -- may do so. The requisite character of these parties or
organizations must be consistent with the purpose of the party-list
system, as laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941. Section 5, Article
VI of the Constitution. The provision on the party-list system is not self-
 executory. It is, in fact, interspersed with phrases like "in accordance
with law" or "as may be provided by law"; it was thus up to Congress to
sculpt in granite to sculpt in granite the lofty objective of the lofty
objective of the Constitution. Hence, RA 7941 was enacted.

4. When a lower court, or a quasi-judicial agency like the Commission on

Elections, violates or ignores the Constitution or the law, its action can
be struck down by this Court on the ground of grave abuse of discretion.
Indeed, the function of all judicial and quasi-judicial instrumentalities is
to apply the law as they find it, is to apply the law as they find it, not to
reinvent not to reinvent or second-guess it. t or second-guess it.

“The party-list system is a social justice tool designed not only to give
more law to the great masses of our people who have less in life, but
also to enable them to become veritable lawmakers themselves,
empowered to participate directly in the enactment of laws designed to
benefit them. It intends to make the marginalized and the
underrepresented not merely passive recipients of the State's
benevolence, but active participants in the mainstream of representative
democracy. Thus, allowing all individuals and groups, including those
which now dominate district elections, to have the same opportunity to
participate in party-list elections would desecrate this lofty objective and
mongrelize the social justice mechanism into an atrocious veneer for
traditional politics. “

23. ANG BAGONG BAYANI – OFW LABOR PARTY VS. POWERS AND
FUNCTIONS OF THE COMELEC, GR NO. 147589 (6-26-2001)

Facts
Petitioners challenged the Comelec’s Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, which
approved the participation of 154 organizations and parties, including those
herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners sought the
disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list
system was intended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented; not
the mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or
overrepresented. Unsatisfied with the pace by which Comelec acted on their
petition, petitioners elevated the issue to the Supreme Court.
Issue:

1. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party list elections.
2. Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to 'marginalized and
underrepresented' sectors and organizations.
Ruling:
1. Yes. Political Parties -- even the major ones -- may participate in the party-
list elections subject to the requirements laid down in the Constitution and
RA 7941, which is the statutory law pertinent to the Party List System.

Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be

disqualified from the party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are
political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that
members of the House of Representative may “be elected through a party-
list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations”. It is however, incumbent upon the COMELEC to determine
proportional representation of the marginalized and underrepresented”, the
criteria for participation in relation to the cause of the party lsit applicants
so as to avoid desecration of the noble purpose of the party-list system.

2. Yes, political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not
mean, however, that any political party -- or any organization or group for
that matter -- may do so. The requisite character of these parties or
organizations must be consistent with the purpose of the party-list system,
as laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941.
The intent of the Constitution is clear: to give genuine power to the
people, not only by giving more law to those who have less in life, but more
so by enabling them to become veritable lawmakers themselves. Consistent
with this intent, the policy of the implementing law, we repeat, is likewise
clear: "to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, x x x, to become
members of the House of Representatives." Where the language of the law
is clear, it must be applied according to its express terms. 37
This Court, therefore, cannot allow the party-list system to be sullied
and prostituted by those who are neither marginalized nor
underrepresented. It cannot let that flicker of hope be snuffed out. The clear
state policy must permeate every discussion of the qualification of political
 parties and other organizations under the party-list system.

24.

G.R. No. 190582

April 8, 2010

ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY represented herein by its Chair, DANTON

REMOTO, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS Respondent.
FACTS:
The COMELEC (Second Division) dismissed the Petition for registration of the
petitioner on moral grounds that petitioner tolerates immorality which offends
religious beliefs, and advocates sexual immorality. Petitioner should likewise
be denied accreditation not only for advocating immoral doctrines but likewise
for not being truthful when it said that it ³ or any of its nominees/party-list
representatives have not violated or failed to comply with laws, rules, or
regulations relating to the elections. Furthermore, states COMELEC, Ang
Ladlad will be exposing our youth to an environment that does not conform to
the teachings of our faith.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the denial of accreditation by COMELEC, violated the
constitutional guarantees against the establishment of religion. insofar as it
justified the exclusion by using religious dogma.
2. Whether or not the Assailed Resolutions contravened

DECISION: Granted

RATIO DECIDENDI:
Comelec’s citation of the Bible and the Koran in denying petitioner’s application
was a violation of the non-establishment clause laid down in Article 3 section
5 of the Constitution. The proscription by law relative to acts against morality
must be for a secular purpose (that is, the conduct prohibited or sought to be
repressed is “detrimental or dangerous to those conditions upon which depend
the existence and progress of human society"), rather than out of religious
conformity. The Comelec failed to substantiate their allegation that allowing
registration to Ladlad would be detrimental to society. The LGBT community
is not exempted from the exercise of its constitutionally vested rights on the
basis of their sexual orientation. Laws of general application should apply with
equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in the party-list system
on the same basis as other marginalized and under-represented sectors.
Discrimination based on sexual orientation is not tolerated ---not by our own
laws nor by any international laws to which we adhere.

25. VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY vs. COMELEC Gr No. 136781, 6

October 2000
Facts:
COMELEC proclaimed 14 party-list representatives from 13 parties which
obtained at least 2% of the total number of votes cast for the party-list system
as members of the House of Representatives. Upon petition for respondents,
who were party-list organizations, it proclaimed 38 additional party-list
representatives although they obtained less than 2% of the total number of
votes cast for the party-list system on the ground that under the Constitution,
it is mandatory that at least 20% of the members of the House of
Representatives come from the party-list representatives.

Issue:
Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in
Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a ceiling?
In other words, should the twenty percent allocation for party-list solons be
filled up completely and all the time?

Held:
It is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for the party-list seats in the
House of Representatives. The Constitution vested Congress with the broad
power to define and prescribe the mechanics of the party-list system of
representatives. In the exercise of its constitutional prerogative, Congress
deemed it necessary to require parties participating in the system to obtain at
least 2% of the total votes cast for the party list system to be entitled to a
party-list seat. Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties having a
sufficient number of constituents deserving of representation are actually
represented in Congress.
FORMULA FOR

determination of total number of party-list representatives = #district

representatives/.80 x .20

additional representatives of first party = # of votes of first party/ # of

votes of party list system

additional seats for concerned party = # of votes of concerned party/ #

votes of first party x additional seats for concerned party

Issue:
Are the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat limit provided
in Section 11 (b) of RA 7941 constitutional?

Held:
Yes. In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that
only those parties, organizations and coalitions having a sufficient number of
constituents deserving of representation are actually represented in Congress.
This intent can be gleaned from the deliberations on the proposed bill. The
two percent threshold is consistent not only with the intent of the framers of
the Constitution and the law, but with the very essence of "representation."
Under a republican or representative state, all government authority
emanates from the people, but is exercised by representatives chosen by
them. But to have meaningful representation, the elected persons must have
the mandate of a sufficient number of people. Otherwise, in a legislature that
features the party-list system, the result might be the proliferation of small
groups which are incapable of contributing significant legislation, and which
might even pose a threat to the stability of Congress. Thus, even legislative
districts are apportioned according to "the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio" to ensure
meaningful local representation.
Issue:
How should the additional seats of a qualified party be determined?

Held:
Step One. There is no dispute among the petitioners, the public and the private
respondents, as well as the members of this Court that the initial step is to
rank all the participating parties, organizations and coalitions from the highest
to the lowest based on the number of votes they each received. Then the ratio
for each party is computed by dividing its votes by the total votes cast for all
the parties participating in the system. All parties with at least two percent of
the total votes are guaranteed one seat each. Only these parties shall be
considered in the computation of additional seats. The party receiving the
highest number of votes shall thenceforth be referred to as the “first” party.
Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of seats the first party is
entitled to, in order to be able to compute that for the other parties. Since the
distribution is based on proportional representation, the number of seats to
be allotted to the other parties cannot possibly exceed that to which the first
party is entitled by virtue of its obtaining the most number of votes.
Step Three The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that
the other qualified parties are entitled to, based on proportional
representation.
elections, directly or indirectly.