Journal of Cultural Economics 26: 29–52, 2002.

29
© 2001 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

Presidents’ Prize Paper

The Determinants of Artistic Innovation:

Bringing in the Role of Organizations

XAVIER CASTAÑER
Department of Strategic Management and Organization, Carlson School of Management,
University of Minnesota, MN 55455, U.S.A.

LORENZO CAMPOS
iSOCO, Barcelona, Spain

Abstract. This article deals with the determinants of artistic innovation by arts organizations. First,
we define artistic innovation. Second, we review the literature on its determinants, identifying some
gaps. In particular, we observe that existing research mostly focuses on macro-environmental factors
and tends to ignore the role of the organizations themselves. Thus, drawing from the organizational
literature on innovation we formulate testable propositions that relate organizational factors to artistic
innovation. We hope that our focus on organizational factors contributes to a more comprehensive
framework on the determinants of artistic innovation in particular and programming in general.

Key words: artistic innovation, cultural economics, organizational determinants, organizational

theory, performing arts organizations, sociology of arts

1. Introduction

Despite some early research conducted in the late 1970s and mid 1980s (Mar-
torella, 1977; DiMaggio and Stenberg, 1985), the determinants of arts program-
ming in general and artistic innovation in particular did not start to attract sig-
nificant scholarly attention until the mid and late 1990s (Heilbrun and Gray, 1993;
Heilbrun, 1998; Alexander, 1995; Cloake, 1997; Campos and Castañer, 1998; Frey,
1999). In part, these new studies have been spurred by the claim that the arts sector
suffers from an artistic deficit, i.e., that in their programming arts organizations
favor commercial, risk-free works over more innovative pieces (Heilbrun and Gray,
1993).1
In most of these studies, artistic innovation is associated with the programming
of contemporary works (Heilbrun and Gray, 1993; Heilbrun, 1998). However, re-
searchers typically do not define the concept of artistic innovation. Our first goal in
this paper is to try to address this gap.
30 XAVIER CASTAÑER AND LORENZO CAMPOS

Our second goal is to review and contribute to the literature on the determinants
of artistic innovation by arts organizations. Our literature survey fundamentally
reveals two theoretical approaches to the study of arts programming in general and
artistic innovation in particular. First, the economic literature has tended to focus
on the effect of the macro environment, that is, the socioeconomic and institutional
characteristics of the territory in which the arts organization is located (Heilbrun,
1998; Cowen, 2000; Pierce, 2000). More recently, studies in cultural economics
have started to borrow from the sociological approach (Martorella, 1977; Alexan-
der, 1995), which examines the effect of meso level variables such as funding
mix which are at the juncture between the environment and the organization (e.g.
Pierce, 2000).
While both the economic and sociological approaches have sometimes consid-
ered certain micro determinants of programming by arts organizations (such as
organizational size and age), they have tended to ignore the vast organizational
literature on innovation (see Damanpour, 1991; Drazin and Schoonhoven, 1996
for reviews). Following Drazin and Schoonhoven (1996), we argue for the joint
consideration of macro, meso and micro determinants of artistic innovation by arts
organizations. Given the state of the literature, in this article, our focus is in de-
veloping the micro side. However, before doing so, we develop some propositions
for a central meso level factor (funding mix) to try to surmount the limitations we
identify in the literature.
Taking the specificities of performing arts organizations into account, we assess
to what extent the organizational literature on innovation can be applied to the
study of artistic innovation. We posit that, in addition to extant macro and meso
factors, artistic innovation is also a function of the intensity of the motivation to
innovate and of resource availability. More specifically, we discuss the role of the
organizational aspiration gap and its internal determinants as well as the impact of
slack resources.
The remainder of the paper, organized in three sections, defines first the concept
of artistic innovation. Then, the following section reviews the economic and soci-
ological literature on repertoire determinants. Next, we introduce relevant factors
from the organizational literature on innovation. The paper concludes with a sum-
mary of our basic contributions and some thoughts on the research bias in favor of
a repertoire-based conception of artistic innovation.

2. Artistic Innovation: A Definition and Some Empirical Evidence

One of the problems of the artistic innovation literature is the lack of consensus on
the phenomenon under study. Some authors use the term innovation (Peterson and
Berger, 1975; Cloake, 1997), others refer to repertoire standardization (Martorella,
1977) and diversity (Lopes, 1992; Campos and Castañer, 1998), while a third group
addresses issues of conformity (DiMaggio and Stenberg, 1985; Heilbrun, 1998)2
and conventionality (Pierce, 2000). First of all, it is obvious that the diversity of
THE DETERMINANTS OF ARTISTIC INNOVATION 31

works programmed by an arts organization is not necessarily related to its degree

of innovativeness relative to other similar organizations or its own past. Second,
while programming standardization and conformity in a given arts field are related
terms, they only convey some sense of lack of innovation if all organizations tend
to program the same (types of) pieces for a long period. We believe that conformity
or conventionality cannot be equated with innovation, or its lack thereof, because
the force of conformity, which ultimately can lead to programming uniformity
or isomorphism in the field (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983),3 logically requires a
prior state of diversity in which innovative programming patterns have been intro-
duced. Furthermore, an innovative pattern that challenges the existing convention
can emerge, creating a state of variety at least for a while (Leblebici et al., 1991;
Oliver, 1992). The emergence of a new pattern, even if it replaces the old one,
would constitute evidence of innovation. This process is similar to the punctuated
equilibrium framework that has been used to describe both biological and techno-
logical evolution (Eldregde and Gould, 1972; Gersick, 1991) as repeated cycles of
initial homogeneity followed by the emergence of innovations that generate variety
and compete with the existing paradigm, leading to the selection of one of the
competing paradigms which becomes the dominant one.
After these initial clarifications and before we review what we know about its
determinants, we now define the concept of artistic innovation. We proceed in
steps, distinguishing two critical components of the generic concept of innovation
(the degree of newness and the referent) and two distinctive dimensions of artistic
innovation.

2.1. THE CONCEPT OF ARTISTIC INNOVATION

Artistic innovation is generally defined as the introduction in the field 4 (or market)
of something new (Cloake, 1997). However, the referent in evaluating the newness
of artistic outputs is oftentimes vague. While for technological innovation (Schum-
peter, 1942), the referent is clearly the rest of the competitors; in the arts, there are
at least three possible referents: (1) all other organizations in the field around the
world (cosmopolitan referent), (2) all other organizations in the local field (lo-
cal referent), and (3) the focal organization’s own past (self-referent). Art critics
and experts usually adopt a cosmopolitan or local perspective (Gouldner, 1950;
Bedzer, 1982). For instance, critics consider a symphony orchestra’s programming
innovative if it includes pieces that have not been or are rarely performed by other
orchestras either locally or worldwide. In contrast, both art managers and audiences
tend to take a more self-referential approach.
The choices of referent clearly determines the evaluation of an organization’s
innovativeness. For example, according to the cosmopolitan standard, if many
symphony orchestras around the world program the same new contemporary piece
during a given season, their individual programming cannot be considered inno-
vative. However, from a self-referential perspective, each of them is innovating
32 XAVIER CASTAÑER AND LORENZO CAMPOS

at least in the sense of adopting a new (contemporary) piece. We believe that a

self-referential approach is not appropriate if innovation has to relate to existing
conventions in the field or profession. That leads us to discuss in more detail the
degree of newness, the second component of the innovation concept.
While in Schumpeter’s process of creative destruction, innovations make exist-
ing products, processes or organizational forms obsolete, in the arts world, there is
no perfect substitution, i.e. prior pieces and styles remain there to be performed and
even rediscovered. Thus, it is unclear how new an artwork must be to be considered
an artistic innovation. As argued, most authors identify innovation with the pro-
gramming of contemporary works (Heilbrun, 1998; Campos and Castañer, 1998).
However, contemporary works are not always innovative relative to the existing
state of the relevant art form. For example, a new minimalist piece by John Cage
does not constitute an innovation in the musical world, given that minimalism is
already a well-known musical form.
If cultural researchers are to adopt the term innovation as commonly under-
stood in other innovation domains, we suggest defining artistic innovation as the
programming of a work that is new to the field. In that regard, we concur with
Becker (1982) in viewing innovation as a complete departure from the existing
conventions.
Furthermore, we distinguish two dimensions in which arts organizations can
innovate: content and form. The extant research reviewed above concentrates on
content innovation and, more specifically, on repertoire innovation as the program-
ming of contemporary works. We consider the mere act of displaying a contem-
porary piece more akin to the organizational adoption of an external innovation
(Kimberly and Evanisko, 1981; Damanpour, 1991)5 rather than an innovative act
by the organization per se, such as developing radically different programming
patterns in terms of content, timing and sequence. In this way, we introduce a fun-
damental distinction between internal and external artistic innovation.6 However,
we recognize that when arts organizations adopt an innovative work they are still
taking a risk in terms of whether the general audience is going to appreciate it.
In terms of content, arts organizations often do more than adopt innova-
tive works; they also innovate. A well-known method for content innovation
is the combination of multiple art forms (multidisciplinarity).7 An example of
multidisciplinarity-based innovation is the Barcelona opera house’s 1999 pro-
duction of a baroque opera (Pergolesi’s La Serva Padrona) which combines the
traditional music setting with marionettes. In this production, singers not only give
voice to the marionettes but also interact with them.
As mentioned before, content innovation does not exhaust all the dimensions
of artistic innovation. As Cloake (1997, p. 272) argues, artistic innovation also
encompasses the form of presenting both old and new works. We claim that the
way an organization designs the interaction with its audience during performances
(interactivity) is a key formal dimension of artistic innovation. Artistic groups find
innovative ways to interact with the audience without necessarily introducing new
THE DETERMINANTS OF ARTISTIC INNOVATION 33

or innovative repertoire. For instance, a characteristic feature of the old Teatre

Lliure (Free Theater), an independent theater company established in Barcelona
in the 1970s, is its small rectangular stage situated at the center of the theater and
surrounded by rows of spectators on all four sides. The first row of spectators is
so close to the stage that actors can touch the audience, and often they do. Other
theatrical companies such as the Theatre de la Jeune Lune (Young Moon Theater)
in Minneapolis and the Catalan performing group La Fura dels Baus use similar
interactive strategies.
The examples above clearly suggest that the traditional way of conceptualiz-
ing and measuring innovation solely in terms of repertoire is at best incomplete.
In some instances, the exclusive focus on content innovation might even lead to
incorrect measures and conclusions. For instance, while La Serva Padrona could
be considered part of the conventional operatic repertoire, we would be mistaken
if we classified the Barcelona production as non-innovative.
We recognize that to observe multidisciplinarity and interactivity probably
requires more sophisticated and time-consuming empirical methods than does
repertoire innovation, but we believe that the innovative role of arts organizations
lies as much in these two dimensions as in the adoption of innovative works.
Before surveying the literature on the determinants of artistic innovation, we
review some of the empirical evidence on the extent to which there is a growing
artistic deficit.

2.2. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON ARTISTIC INNOVATION

Most of the studies, which focus on the repertoire dimension of artistic innovation
and, more precisely, on the adoption or programming of contemporary pieces, show
that there is substantial innovation. For instance, in the field of symphony orches-
tras, Allmendiger and Hackman (1996, p. 362) found that orchestras in different
countries performed pieces that were composed by musicians born in the twentieth
century with the following frequency: 8 percent for East Germany (under state so-
cialism), 20 percent for West Germany, 24 percent for the United Kingdom, and 32
percent for the United States. Using a more restrictive measure, Feist (1997, p. 263)
observed that in the 1991–1992 season the percentage of new, contemporary works
composed after 1982 over the total number of pieces performed ranged from 2 for
the London orchestras to 11 for the BBC orchestras.
For U.S. opera theaters, together, Martorella (1977) and Heilbrun (1998) ob-
served a trend towards repertoire standardization in the last thirty years. In
particular, during the period 1982–1998, Heilbrun (1998) detected an increase in
conformity or, more precisely, convergence around the same repertoire. However,
in his study of the degree of conventionality among 35 U.S. opera houses, Pierce
(2000) found that each of the 372 different operas staged during the 1989–1994
period was performed on average only five times (we do not know if by the same
or different opera houses) and over half of the operas were produced only once.
34 XAVIER CASTAÑER AND LORENZO CAMPOS

Therefore, contrary to Pierce’s conclusion, these data indicate that, despite the fact
that few operas are programmed by most opera houses, some opera houses also pro-
gram unconventional operas or, more accurately, operas that were not programmed
by the other houses during the same period.8
These data from symphony orchestras and opera houses’ programming suggest
a wide variation in the adoption of new works. First of all, data on symphony
orchestras show substantial variation across countries in terms of the percentage of
contemporary pieces played. Furthermore, the data on the repertoire of U.S. opera
houses indicates significant diversity within a given country.
Despite this evidence, researchers have tended to be concerned with an apparent
trend towards uniformity and attribute it to the seemingly increasing importance
of corporate funding (Heilbrun, 1998; Pierce, 2000). In the following section, we
review the literature that tries to explain the organizational differences in pro-
gramming in general and innovation in particular. Before doing so, it is important
to restate that most of the literature focuses on repertoire innovation or, more
precisely, on the adoption of contemporary works.

3. A Critical Review of the Literature on the Determinants of Artistic

Innovation

Whether arts organizations innovate a lot or a little, it is important to understand

the factors that enable innovation as well as the obstacles that hinder it. Perhaps
the reader will agree with us that the first thought that comes to mind is to ask
whether what we know about innovations by organizations in general is applicable
to arts organizations. However, until now researchers have not taken this approach.
Therefore, before addressing this fundamental question, we review the basic ap-
proaches researchers have adopted to study the determinants of the degree of
artistic innovation by arts organizations. Our purpose is to critically assess what
we already know from different disciplines and identify some interesting avenues
for future research. Hence, we take an interdisciplinary approach and explore the
contributions of both cultural economics as well as the sociology of the arts to the
study of artistic innovation. To organize the discussion of the existing literature,
we classify the studies along the following two dimensions: level of analysis and
discipline.
For the first dimension, we distinguish among macro, meso and micro levels of
explanatory factors. Studies that focus on the macro level deal with the effect on
artistic innovation of environmental features such as cultural policy, regulation and
economic conditions of the local territory (DiMaggio and Stenberg, 1985; Heil-
brun, 1998; Pierce, 2000), which represent what we call the macro-environmental
approach. Meso studies examine the interface between the environment and the
organization, such as the role of external sponsors (Martorella, 1977; Campos and
Castañer, 1998; Pierce, 2000). Finally, micro level research explores the impact
THE DETERMINANTS OF ARTISTIC INNOVATION 35

of organizational variables such as size and age (Heilbrun, 1998) as well as the
internal structure (DiMaggio and Stenberg, 1985).
In terms of the second dimension, we distinguish two disciplinary foci. On the
one hand, sociologists were probably the first to be concerned with an apparent
trend towards the commercialization of the performing arts’ repertoire. For in-
stance, to explain the seeming standardization of the operatic repertoire in the U.S.,
Martorella (1977) focused her research on the commercializing influence of the
increasingly important box office income. Drawing on the resource dependence
theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), more recent sociological research has con-
tinued to explore the effect of different types of donors on cultural programming
(Alexander, 1995). Interestingly, the emergent sociological view conceptualizes
programming as a negotiated outcome between external and internal powerful ac-
tors such as donors, managers and arts professionals (Alexander, 1995; Castañer,
1997b).
On the other hand, in the economic literature researchers view the choice of
repertoire as a result of market forces (Pierce, 2000), i.e. the interplay between
demand and supply. According to this perspective, arts organizations are embedded
in a (local) market in which there is demand for their services and a supply of
resources. Programming (the choice of repertoire) is the result of arts managers
supposedly maximizing an organizational utility function within the constraints
placed by the market (Heilbrun, 2000; Pierce, 2000).9
It is important to note that, while most authors who adopt an economic approach
emphasize the role of macro environmental factors, some have also considered
certain meso and micro features, such as the role of different funding sources, and
size and age, respectively (Heilbrun, 2000; Pierce, 2000). In the following section,
we review the theoretical arguments offered to explain programming choices as
well as their corresponding empirical evidence.

3.1. THE MACRO - ENVIRONMENTAL PERSPECTIVE : THE ROLE OF LOCAL

RESOURCES AND THE MARKET

As discussed above, students of artistic innovation have considered two different

aspects of the environment: the availability of local resources, and the market and
its institutional features such as the regulatory framework. We review each one in
turn.

3.1.1. Local Resource Availability

Starting with Baumol’s (1971) discussion of the provision of theater in ancient
Greece, several authors, both economists and sociologists, have argued that the
existence of arts organizations in a local community is a function of its size and
wealth (Blau, 1989).10 These authors claim that both population size and average
income capture the availability of resources for arts entrepreneurship in a com-
munity, such as educational organizations that train artists.11 Some authors have
36 XAVIER CASTAÑER AND LORENZO CAMPOS

extended this argument to explain programming choices and, in particular, the

degree of repertoire diversity of and innovation by performing arts organizations
(DiMaggio and Stenberg, 1985; Heilbrun, 2000; Pierce, 2000).12 For instance,
Pierce (2000) argues that the repertoire choices U.S. opera houses make (and their
degree of conventionality) are a function of the resources of the city where each
opera house is located.
We believe that, while local resources have a direct effect on the emergence
and viability of arts organizations, it is unclear why they should have a direct
influence on the degree of innovation by arts organizations. In fact, the empirical
evidence on the local resource availability hypothesis is mixed. On one hand, in
his study of the U.S. opera repertoire in the 1982–1998 period, Heilbrun (2000)
finds that the greater the size of the population in which an opera house is lo-
cated, the lower its conformity index and the higher the percentage of 20th century
works programmed. On the other hand, in a similar study also of the U.S. opera
repertoire in the period 1989–1994, Pierce (2000) reports that average income is
not a (statistically) significant factor. The lack of explanatory power of Pierce’s
(2000) model is not surprising. As Pierce (2000, p. 54) himself notes, in both the
U.S. and Europe (Netzer, 1992), opera audiences in particular, and performing arts
audiences in general, tend to have a higher income than the general population.
Hence, regardless of the population average income, oftentimes we can find a local
economic elite that can sustain the arts in general.
Perhaps the reason why population size has a significant positive effect on inno-
vation is because abundant local resources might not only sustain a large number of
arts organizations, but also allow them to specialize. And it is plausible to argue that
specialization facilitates innovation (DiMaggio and Stenberg, 1985). We encourage
researchers to consider measures of the size as well as the degree of specialization
of the local arts field in future research to test this argument more directly.

3.1.2. Market Forces: Demand and Supply

As discussed, economic research of artistic innovation tends to model repertoire
choices as a result of the interplay of demand and supply forces.

a) Demand
Whereas average population income does not appear to differentiate programming
characteristics across communities, one could argue that differences in human
capital (i.e, education) should have a stronger effect on artistic innovation. In that
regard researchers assume that educated audiences not only enable the existence
of arts organizations, but also stimulate them to be innovative in order to remain at
the forefront of the field (Heilbrun, 2000; Pierce, 2000).
Again, we believe that, although educational level can partly explain the overall
size of a local arts field (supply), the theoretical link between average educational
level and demand for artistic innovation is tenuous. Furthermore, extant empirical
evidence does not support the human capital hypothesis. In studies that control for
THE DETERMINANTS OF ARTISTIC INNOVATION 37

population size, measures of human capital (such as the percentage of white-collar

employees, degree of sophistication and average education level) do not have a
significant effect on conformity or conventionality, which measure the degree of
programming similarity among arts organizations in a given field (Heilbrun, 2000;
Pierce, 2000).
Surprisingly, proponents of the market model do not address the fact that most
of the organizations in the performing arts fields they study (such as opera) are
typically local monopolists.13 In this context, one would not expect overall demand
conditions to affect the choice of repertoire. For local monopolistic organizations,
patrons might have a much stronger influence on programming than the general
population does. This could be the reason why recent research has concentrated
on the influence of external funding. Before moving to this factor, we devote some
more attention to the supply side.

b) Supply
As argued above, despite the framing of programming in a supply-demand model,
Pierce (2000) and others have tended to ignore the effect of competition within
and across arts fields. While it is true that, in small and medium-sized cities, and
in certain performing arts fields such as symphony orchestra, opera and repertoire
theater organizations are monopolistic suppliers, general models of programming
cannot dispense with competitive supply, given (a) the multiplicity of suppliers in
large, metropolitan cities (DiMaggio and Stenberg, 1985), (b) the substantial sub-
stitutability among art forms (Throsby, 1994) and (c) the competition for local and
national monetary, physical and human resources across arts fields (which affect
monopolistic suppliers) (Castañer, 1997b).
In fact, the effect of market structure on innovation has been a central concern
in economics. In one of the seminal contributions, Schumpeter (1942) argued that
innovative organizations need to enjoy a temporary protection from competitive,
imitative forces in order to have an incentive to innovate. This protection has been
embedded in certain instances in patents or, more generally, property rights, which
in the performing arts arena are more likely to protect individual creators than or-
ganizations (except for recordings and videos).14 In contexts where property rights
are not viable or enforceable, Schumpeter suggested the need for a certain market
or monopolistic power. While Schumpeter’s argument has received some support
(Nelson and Winter, 1982; Kamien and Schwartz, 1982), his position has been
contested among others by Porter (1990), who has shown that the international
competitive advantage of industrial districts or clusters is partially due to a strong
level of local rivalry which stimulates innovation. Yet another line of research
that has studied the success of localized industries such as the Emilia-Romagna
textile district (Piore and Sabel, 1984), the Silicon Valley (Saxenian, 1994) or
Hollywood’s film district (Storper, 1989) argues that it is collaboration among
professionals and organizations rather than competition that facilitates innovation
and success through the rapid and free sharing of ideas and information.
38 XAVIER CASTAÑER AND LORENZO CAMPOS

The arguments and findings described above suggest that, while the supply-
demand or market perspective might be appropriate to model the production of art
in general (Throsby, 1994), it may not be the most adequate way to model different
aspects of organizational behavior, such as repertoire choice or innovation. The
extant empirical evidence provides little support for the macro-environmental ap-
proach to repertoire differences (Heilbrun, 2000; Pierce, 2000). Only one of the two
indicators of resource availability (population size) significantly affects program-
ming, whereas demand factors (such as average income and educational level) do
not. Moreover, these studies do not take into account supply factors such as local
market structure. Furthermore, while the research reviewed uses conventionality
or conformity variables to capture artistic innovation, in our opinion what these
measures really capture is the degree of repertoire similarity among the sample
organizations.

3.2. THE MESO PERSPECTIVE : THE FUNDING HYPOTHESIS

Some observers view the apparent repertoire commercialization or decreasing
diversity (Martorella, 1977; Heilbrun, 1998) as the result of the increasing impor-
tance of corporate sponsorship and parallel decline of public funding.
As argued, Martorella (1977) attributed the trend towards standardization
around a few popular titles in the U.S. operatic repertoire to the increasing depen-
dence of opera houses on the box office. However, it is unclear why all ticketholders
should necessarily have a preference for popular or commercial works. Further-
more, Martorella (1977) speculated that, in contrast to U.S. opera houses which
heavily depend on private sponsorship and the box office, European opera houses
are able to program more contemporary operas thanks to being publicly subsidized.
Similarly, Heilbrun (1998) suggested that the lower levels of operatic repertoire
conformity (measured as the degree of similarity of programming among opera
houses) in Canada as compared to the U.S. could be due to the higher level of
funding the Canadian government provides to opera when compared with the U.S.
However, recent research offers conflicting support for Martorella and Heil-
brun’s public funding hypothesis. For instance, Pierce (2000) argues that public
funding encourages opera houses to take more risks in programming and hence
should result in lower conventionality indices (i.e., theaters would program operas
that very few others program during the same period).15 His results indicate that
while, as expected, funding from the National Endowment of the Arts (NEA) mar-
ginally reduces the degree of repertoire conventionality, contrary to the hypothesis,
non-federal funds increase the level of conventionality (Pierce, 2000, p. 57).
Taken all together, these studies provide at best mixed empirical evidence about
the effect of public funding in determining repertoire differences and explaining an
apparent trend toward “commercialization”. We believe that these inconclusive re-
sults might be the consequence of three critical limitations in the way this research
stream models the influence of external actors on programming.
THE DETERMINANTS OF ARTISTIC INNOVATION 39

The first limitation lies in the assumptions researchers make about the
preferences of different types of sponsors. Both economists and sociologists at-
tribute generic preferences to different societal actors. More specifically, the
existing literature measures the influence of each funding source by its percentage
of the total income, as if all patrons of the same type had identical objectives. As
mentioned above, most authors consider that governments are generally supportive
of creativity, experimentation and innovation (Baumol and Bowen, 1966; Mar-
torella, 1977; Heilbrun and Gray, 1993; Alexander, 1995; Campos and Castañer,
1998; Pierce, 2000). However, there is evidence that governments with different
political ideologies have different attitudes towards the arts. For instance, Schulze
and Rose (1998) have shown that the ideological make-up of local governments in
Germany has a significant effect on the amount of funding that they contribute
to symphony orchestras. One can also expect wide variation among governing
political parties in terms of their position regarding innovation, as the controversial
exhibits of Mapplethorpe in publicly funded galleries and the subsequent debates
over the NEA appropriations clearly illustrate. Therefore, we offer the following
as our first theoretical proposition.
Proposition 1: The preferences of public patrons and thus their support for
artistic innovation will vary with their political outlook.
Similarly, researchers tend to attribute “commercial” goals such as maximizing
occupancy ratios and supporting popular works to corporations. The reasoning is
that to nurture their image, corporations want to maximize their exposure by only
supporting conventional or commercial works that attract large audiences. How-
ever, it is not clear why (and whether) corporations would always favor popular
over innovative works. Corporations might sometimes seek to associate themselves
with distinctive, sometimes elitist, symbols such as contemporary and unconven-
tional works. In an exploratory analysis of the repertoire evolution of a Spanish
chamber orchestra over the course of 10 years, Campos and Castañer (1998) found
some empirical evidence that challenges the innovation-depressing corporate spon-
sorship hypothesis. An increase in private funding in the last years of the decade
apparently led to an increase rather than a decrease in the percentage of contem-
porary pieces performed. In fact, one can observe a wide variety of corporate
philanthropy strategies that could be explained in part by firms’ industry mem-
bership, specific corporate strategy, and identity. For instance, we would expect
high technology corporations to associate themselves more with innovative arts
organizations than with mainstream ones. Hence, we propose that:
Proposition 2: The motivations of corporate patrons and thus their support
for artistic innovation will vary with industry membership, corporate strategy,
and identity.
In discussing the effect of public funding on artistic innovation, Frey (1999)
suggests that organizational creativity does not depend so much on the amount
40 XAVIER CASTAÑER AND LORENZO CAMPOS

of funding from a given governmental agency, but on the multiplicity of public

funding sources. Broadening Frey’s (1999) argument to encompass all funding
sources, one could argue that arts organizations are more likely to engage in artistic
innovation if they are not dependent on any single patron, whether public or pri-
vate. This argument is consistent with the resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and
Salancik, 1978), which argues that organizations try to reduce their dependence on
external actors. Thus, we contend that:
Proposition 3: Diversity of funding sources is positively related to artistic
innovation.16

The second limitation of the repertoire literature comes from the fact that most
of the extant research focuses on U.S. populations, raising questions about its
generalizability to other countries. While funding mix and, in particular, the rel-
ative importance of corporate versus public funding might be a relevant factor in
explaining repertoire differences in the U.S., we argue that its effect is probably
less pronounced in other countries with different institutional systems. In conti-
nental Europe, for instance, most arts organizations are still basically funded by
public agencies. For example, 80 percent of the German symphony orchestras’
budgets comes from public sources (Schulze and Rose, 1998). In the instances in
which corporate sponsorship is almost negligible, it cannot be the cause of the
lack of artistic innovation. This suggests the need for researchers to develop new
theoretical explanations of repertoire differences in countries in which corporate
sponsorship is non-existent.
The third limitation stems from the fact that economic models of artistic innova-
tion tend to view the influence of patrons as completely determining organizational
behavior (see Pommerehne and Frey, 1989 for an exception). However, studies in
both the tradition of agency theory (Pommerehne and Frey, 1989) and the soci-
ology of culture (Zolberg, 1986; Peterson, 1986; Alexander, 1995) provide ample
evidence that organizational decision-makers in arts organizations have their own
objectives and that they are capable of reducing the potential tension between these
and patrons’ goals. These two literature streams point out the need for program-
ming and innovation models to incorporate the role of internal, organizational
features in general and arts managers and key artistic employees in particular.
In the following section, we attempt to do so by bringing in factors such as the
interplay between external and internal actors in determining the power structure
of an organization.

4. Toward a More Comprehensive Framework to Explain Artistic

Innovation: The Role of Micro, Organizational Variables
Without downplaying the importance of macro and meso variables, we believe that
researchers interested in the determinants of artistic innovation should explore the
role of organizational variables.
THE DETERMINANTS OF ARTISTIC INNOVATION 41

Although economists have generally incorporated some organizational vari-

ables such as size and age in the study of programming, they have done so mostly
for control purposes rather than for substantive interest (Heilbrun, 1998; 2000). In
contrast, sociologists have long been interested in exploring the effect on artistic
innovation of organizational factors such as size, age and the administrative and
power structure (DiMaggio and Stenberg, 1985). As we have argued before, we
believe research on artistic innovation can benefit from drawing upon the organi-
zational literature on innovation (Rogers, 1995; Drazin and Schoonhoven, 1996).
However, before doing so, we need to answer the key question we have already
formulated above: can the theories and evidence from this literature be used to
explain innovation by arts organizations? Are arts organizations different from the
kinds of organizations studied by this literature in any way that makes that import
inappropriate?

4.1. CAN THE LESSONS FROM THE ORGANIZATIONAL LITERATURE ON

INNOVATION BE APPLIED TO ARTS ORGANIZATIONS ?

Contrary to what some readers might think, the organizational literature on inno-
vation has not studied only for-profit, manufacturing organizations. While Burns
and Stalker’s (1961) classical study began a research stream focused on product
innovation by for-profit firms (Van de Ven, 1986; Von Hippel, 1988; Brown and
Eisenhardt, 1995), other streams deal with innovation in both nonprofit and public
organizations as well as in service and professional ones (Hage and Aiken, 1967;
Kimberly and Evanisko, 1981).
We believe that performing arts organizations are comparable to some of the
organizational types studied by this innovation literature. We base this belief on our
understanding of performing arts organizations, which we think share with other
organizational types like service and professional organizations (such as hospitals
and educational institutions) the following seven distinctive characteristics:
(1) they produce an intangible service whose quality is difficult to evaluate
(Colbert, 1995; Castañer, 1997b; Kotler and Scheff, 1999);
(2) there is little structural differentiation in terms of the grouping of employees
in functional departments, except in large organizations;
(3) the operational core is usually larger than the rest of the organization
(Castañer, 1997a, Auvinen, 2000);
(4) the operational core is composed of semi-professionals who claim a cer-
tain degree of autonomy and defend professional/artistic values rather than
organizational ones alone (Etzioni, 1964, 1969; Chiapello, 1994; Castañer,
1997a, b);
(5) given the semi-professional nature of artistic employees, the artistic director
usually enjoys a high degree of decision-making power in the areas of pro-
gramming and artists’ recruitment, compensation and promotion (Castañer,
1997a, b);
42 XAVIER CASTAÑER AND LORENZO CAMPOS

(6) the activity of the organization is project-based (Goodman and Goodman,

1976) and
(7) given their high labor intensity, performing arts organizations suffer from
Baumol’s cost disease, that is, increasing deficits due to limited productivity
improvements relative to the rest of the economy (Baumol and Bowen, 1966).
We believe these specificities do not invalidate borrowing the lessons from
the organizational literature on innovation. While, contrary to Cloake (1997), we
think some specificities like limited structural differentiation make less relevant the
typical concern of the innovation literature on mechanisms for interdepartmental
coordination (Burns and Stalker, 1961; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967), other factors
such as the role of professional employees are central in arts organizations. For
the reasons mentioned above, from the vast list of factors the organizational liter-
ature on innovation has discussed (see Brown and Eisenhardt, 1995; Drazin and
Schoonhoven, 1996 for recent reviews), here we concentrate on motivations and
resource availability. We consider each of them in turn.

4.2. MOTIVATION TO INNOVATE

The behavioral theory of the firm (March and Simon, 1958; Cyert and March,
1963) offers a coherent argument about the causal process that goes from mo-
tivation to actual innovative behavior, and also addresses the issue of resource
availability and power differences. This theory assumes bounded rather than
complete rationality and hence views organizations as satisficing rather than op-
timizing. The theory further argues that organizations only engage in risk-taking
(innovation) when their current performance is below their aspiration (but above
their survival level). Only then do organizations have an incentive to depart from
their routines and explore new solutions (see also Rogers, 1995). In contrast, given
their satisficing nature, when organizations are close to or above their aspiration
level they do not engage in search or experimentation. Both Lant (1992) and Bolton
(1993) have provided some empirical evidence in support of this proposition in the
context of for-profit firms. We believe this proposition is also applicable to arts
organizations. Thus, we propose that:

Proposition 4: Artistic organizations only engage in artistic innovation when

there is a negative gap between their performance and their aspiration.

We contend that the determination of both economic and artistic aspiration

levels is not exogenous. In fact, we believe ownership and funding mix have a
significant impact. Obviously, in contrast to public and non-profit organizations,
private ones will tend to be more profit-oriented, with a higher economic aspiration
level and maybe a lower artistic one, especially if they conflict. We have already
discussed the role of funding mix above as a meso variable. Here we only want
to suggest that patrons’ influence on programming is probably a function of their
THE DETERMINANTS OF ARTISTIC INNOVATION 43

presence in the organizational governing body. Patrons who are members of the
governing body are more likely to have greater influence than those who are not,
regardless of their level of contribution. Hence, we offer that:
Proposition 5: The influence of different funding sources (types of patrons)
on programming and, hence, on artistic innovation will be moderated by the
extent to which representatives of those sources belong to the organizational
governing body.

We believe economic and artistic aspiration levels are also determined by other
internal variables, in particular, the relative dominance of managerial versus artistic
values or, in other words, the identity of the dominant coalition (March and Simon,
1958) to which we turn in the next section.

4.3. THE LOCUS OF INTERNAL POWER : MANAGERS VS . ARTISTS

As discussed, most economic studies of artistic programming implicitly portray the
decision-makers of arts organizations as completely dependent on environmental
pressures and, in particular, the demands of their patrons. Students of artistic pro-
gramming have tended to ignore the fact that organizational members and, more
specifically, its leaders have their own programming preferences (see DiMaggio
and Stenberg, 1985, and Frey and Pommerehne, 1989 for exceptions). In contrast,
the sociology of culture has shown that managers and leading artistic employees
have paramount influence on programming (Peterson, 1986; Zolberg, 1986). For
example, Zolberg (1986, p. 186) argues that in museums “curators seek autonomy
from their boards to pursue research and acquire works that they themselves con-
sider important . . . ” (italics added). Moreover, Peterson (1986, p. 164) describes
performing arts managers as “. . . compromising the interests of chief donors with
those of artistic directors and personnel – conductors, choreographers, actors,
singers, players, or dancers” (italics added) (see also Alexander, 1995). This ev-
idence suggests the need to incorporate the preferences of organizational members
as a key determinant of both economic and artistic aspirations.
We concur with DiMaggio and Stenberg (1985) in identifying the managing
and artistic directors as the occupants of the two most powerful formal positions in
arts organizations. DiMaggio and Stenberg (1985) were probably among the first
to consider the relative influence of managers versus artists as a determinant of
artistic programming and, in particular, conformity. DiMaggio and Stenberg (1985)
argued that the greater the power of the managing director over the artistic director,
the greater the degree of conformity (lack of innovation). While DiMaggio and
Stenberg (1985) found support for this hypothesis, we believe that the implicit as-
sumption they make, that is, that managing directors will always go against artistic
innovation, is not fully warranted. DiMaggio and Stenberg (1985) also argued that
organizations with managing directors who only had a managerial education would
exhibit higher conformity levels.17 We think that in this second argument DiMag-
44 XAVIER CASTAÑER AND LORENZO CAMPOS

gio and Stenberg implicitly recognize that the preferences of managing directors
depend on their educational background as well as on their past experience.18 Fur-
thermore, we believe that management as a generic organizational discipline is too
often mischaracterized as oriented to the pursuit of profit. Management is mainly
oriented towards effectiveness, which is defined as the achievement of whatever
goals the organization (whether private, public or non-profit) has. We believe that
management should not be always identified with the search for profitability. It is
true that management is also associated with the pursuit of economy and efficiency,
and that management scholars tend to consider routinization and control as the
means to achieve higher efficiency (March and Simon, 1958; Nelson and Winter,
1982; see Chiapello, 1994 for a discussion in the context of arts organizations). It
is also true that as members of a broader professional community, arts managers
might feel the pressure to adopt certain practices and structures developed for the
for-profit sector that emphasize reduction of waste (such as total quality manage-
ment), efficiency, customer satisfaction and, ultimately, profitability (Abrahamson,
1996). Hence, it is reasonable to assume that arts managers who were only man-
agerially trained are less likely to encourage artistic innovation than managers with
only an artistic background or both types of background. Thus, we propose that:
Proposition 6: Organizations led by decision-makers with only a managerial
background will be less likely to engage in artistic innovation than organiza-
tions led by decision-makers with only an artistic background or with both an
artistic and a managerial background.

While the motivation to innovate is an important antecedent, organizations need

the resources to actually engage in innovative behavior. We turn to this issue in the
following section.

4.4. RESOURCE AVAILABILITY: SIZE OR SLACK ?

Resource availability has been a central issue in the artistic innovation literature;
researchers have typically operationalized it using budget size. Unfortunately, the
literature shows contradictory theoretical arguments and mixed empirical evidence.
While both Martorella (1977) and DiMaggio and Stenberg (1985) suggest that
large performing arts organizations will tend to program fewer innovative (con-
temporary) works than do smaller organizations, both Heilbrun (2000) and Pierce
(2000) argue that large organizations should be able to afford at least some exper-
imentation when compared with small ones. Empirically, DiMaggio and Stenberg
(1985) find support for their size hypothesis, whereas both Heilbrun (2000) and
Pierce (2000) find no statistically significant effect on a similar measure (confor-
mity). This mixed empirical evidence should not come as a surprise. As DiMaggio
and Stenberg (1985, p. 116) already recognized, size captures different theoretical
constructs (such as resource availability and stability among others), making the
interpretation of its effect ambiguous. The organizational literature on innovation
THE DETERMINANTS OF ARTISTIC INNOVATION 45

has also long acknowledged the dual nature of size (Rogers, 1995). On one hand,
the fact that large organizations enjoy greater resources and income stability than
small ones would potentially allow them to engage in experimentation. However, at
the same time, large organizations are encumbered with inertia (Hannan and Free-
man, 1984; Kanter, 1983). As DiMaggio and Stenberg (1985) specifically argued
for performing arts organizations, the very same reliability they enjoy leads them
to avoid any changes that would negatively affect it.
Given the conceptual problems of size, we believe that slack is a much more
adequate concept to tap the role of resourcefulness in affecting risk-taking and in-
novation. According to the behavioral theory of the firm (Cyert and March, 1963),
organizations are more likely to engage in change and innovation when they have
slack resources.19 Singh (1986) has distinguished two kinds of slack: absorbed and
unabsorbed. Absorbed slack is defined as unnecessary resources that are currently
being used, such as redundant equipment or employees. In contrast, unabsorbed
slack corresponds to unused resources. Singh (1986) has empirically shown that
organizations with unabsorbed slack are more likely to take risks and engage in
product innovation (see also Rogers, 1995). We believe the slack argument is also
applicable to artistic innovation. When organizations engage in experimentation
they accept the possibility of failure. Hence, only organizations that enjoy a certain
amount of slack might engage in artistic innovation. In the context of the perform-
ing arts, a stable subscription base might be considered a source of slack that allows
greater experimentation. For instance, in the case of the Barcelona opera house, we
speculate that the introduction of the operas adapted for children, the programming
of unconventional or contemporary operas (such as Turina’s DQ-Don Quijote en
Barcelona, Wagner’s Rienzi or Britten’s Billy Bud) and the hiring of innovative the-
atrical companies (such as La Fura dels Baus or Els Comediants) in the 1999/2000
and 2000/2001 season might be due to the spectacular increase in the subscription
base which went from 7,000 in 1994 (before the house burnt down) to more than
14,000 after the reinauguration of the house (with approximately the same number
of seats) in 1999. Hence, we posit that:

Proposition 7: Organizational slack is positively related to artistic innovation.

However, slack is not without potential drawbacks. Drawing from agency theory
(Ross, 1973) and managerialism (Berle and Means, 1932), some researchers sug-
gest that slack allows managers to invest in unprofitable projects (Jensen, 1980).
To account for both the positive and negative consequences of slack, Nohria and
Gulati (1996) have suggested and found support for a curvilinear relationship
between slack and (product) innovation. We think the agency argument might be
also applicable to art organizations, especially in situations in which most of the
funding comes from external sources and, in particular, from public agencies. How-
ever, we believe the negative effect of slack in stimulating bad projects depends on
the nature of the governance structure (Brush et al., 1999). If the organization has
46 XAVIER CASTAÑER AND LORENZO CAMPOS

a good governance structure that makes managers accountable, it is unlikely that

slack will be used to fund bad projects.

5. Summary and Conclusion

In this article we have tried to accomplish three goals. First, we have attempted
to provide a working definition of artistic innovation. We have argued that artistic
innovation by arts organizations consists in the programming of an activity that
radically departs from existing art conventions, whether locally or globally. In
this way, we distinguish artistic innovation from mere newness. Furthermore, we
have identified two important dimensions in which arts organizations can innovate,
namely, content and form. While past research has concentrated on the repertoire
dimension of innovation, we encourage researchers to adopt a broader and more
adequate definition of artistic innovation that also takes into account other content
and process dimensions such as multidisciplinarity and interactivity.
Second, we have reviewed the existing research on the determinants of pro-
gramming in general and repertoire innovation in particular, identifying two main
theoretical perspectives (economical and sociological) and three levels of explana-
tion (macro, meso and micro). Our survey showed that both theoretical perspectives
tend to focus on the effect of macro-environmental (demand and supply) and meso
(funding mix) factors rather than on organizational ones (such as size, age, structure
and power distribution). Furthermore, we observed that the empirical evidence for
both the macro and meso factors is rather mixed and inconclusive. We identified
and discussed several limitations of both the demand-supply model and the con-
ceptualization of funding sources that might explain these findings. Moreover, we
provided new theoretical propositions about the role of funding mix that take these
limitations into account. In addition, we suggested that, given the lack of empirical
evidence for the macro determinants, new explanations of artistic innovation should
be developed, especially for arts organizations located in countries in which most
of the external funding comes from public agencies. In that regard, we argued that
micro organizational factors might be a potential source of explanatory power.
Third, we attempted to bridge the gap identified above by selectively and care-
fully drawing on the organizational literature on innovation, in a manner consistent
with the specific nature of arts organizations. In particular, we have drawn from
the behavioral theory of the firm to suggest that the gap between performance and
aspiration levels, together with the availability of slack resources, might drive artis-
tic innovation. In developing this overarching argument, we offered seven testable
propositions that also include the role of art managers’ background in determining
the organizational preferences. We hope that our addition of organizational deter-
minants provides a more comprehensive framework for future research on artistic
innovation in particular and the behavior of arts organizations in general. We truly
believe that the study of arts organizations can benefit from an interdisciplinary
THE DETERMINANTS OF ARTISTIC INNOVATION 47

dialogue between cultural economics, the sociology of the arts and organizational
theory.
In concluding, we should acknowledge that this article shares with the literature
reviewed a bias in favor of artistic innovation. The question whether innovation
is always good remains to be answered (see Downs and Mohr, 1976). From an
evolutionary perspective (Alchian, 1950; Eldredge and Gould, 1972; Hirschleifer,
1977), it has been argued that the generation of variety through innovation is a
necessary condition for selection to take place. However, the question is how much
emphasis and resources should be devoted to innovation.20
Furthermore, we should ask ourselves to what extent our preoccupation with
commercialization is justified. Clearly, the available data on programming, al-
though scattered, does not support such a pessimistic view. In addition, the
empirical evidence on the hypothetical negative role of corporate funding is not
supported either. This evidence prompts us to ask ourselves whether our concern
for an artistic deficit might be an elitist attitude. As Feist (1997, p. 262) suggests, in-
novative art can oftentimes alienate (contemporary) audiences if there is no attempt
by the artistic community to make innovative works understandable. Innovation per
se might not be as valuable for society as it could be.

Acknowledgements
The first author wants to thank Lluís Bonet for his comments on an earlier version
of this paper and, most importantly, for his unfailing encouragement to pursue
research in the field of cultural economics and management. The authors also grate-
fully acknowledge the valuable suggestions of co-editor Ruth Towse as well as the
helpful comments of John O’Hagan and Adriana Neligan. We thank Tuomas Au-
vinen, Timothy King and Pierre Korzilius for their feedback at the XI International
Conference on Cultural Economics, where an earlier version of this paper was
presented. Finally, we greatly appreciate the assistance of Elaine Lilly in editing
this paper. All errors remain ours.

Notes

This paper is a revised version of the paper that jointly won the Presidents’ Prize awarded at the
12th International Conference of the Association of Cultural Economics held in Minneapolis in
2000.
1. This repertoire-based argument differs from the commercialization claim that arts organizations
(such as art museums) increasingly depend on revenues coming from non-core activities (such
as museums’ publications and restaurants) (Anheier and Toepler, 1998).
2. DiMaggio and Stenberg (1985, p. 111) even argue that innovation in the theatrical sector cannot
be measured, because “. . . students of drama do not themselves agree about what constitutes
innovation”. See also Lopes (1992).
3. Conformity or the search for legitimacy rather than technical efficiency (rationality) constitutes
the fundamental driver of organizational behavior for the sociological branch of institutional
theory (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), which attempts to explain why organizations in a given
48 XAVIER CASTAÑER AND LORENZO CAMPOS

field resemble each other. According to sociological institutionalists, organizations conform to

certain (institutionalized) practices that they perceive to be legitimate. Hence, conforming leads
to uniformity (isomorphism) through either coercive, normative or mimetic mechanisms.
4. Here we define an organizational field or industry as the rest of organizations that perform the
same kind of activity (see DiMaggio and Powell, 1983 for a broader definition of organizational
field).
5. Following what we have called the self-referential approach, this literature usually considers
the adoption of practices that are new to the adopting unit (Downs and Mohr, 1976). In our
scheme, however, to qualify as the adoption of an innovation, organizations should be adopting
an innovative practice, that is, a practice that is at variance with the existing conventions (new to
the world).
6. In this context, the extemal innovation being adopted usually comes from an individual. It is
interesting to note that there has been some discussion about which factors determine individual
innovation or creativity in the artistic domain. For instance, Frey (1999) suggests that public
subsidies crowd out artists’ intrinsic motivation. We would differ from Frey given that in most
countries the bulk of public subsidies is awarded to arts organizations rather than artists, except
for academic fellowships. While public subsidies might have an influence on the extent to which
arts organizations commission new works, the effect on the overall output of individual artists
is probably not very substantial. Furthermore, we believe individual creativity heavily depends
upon innate characteristics that are difficult to stimulate or deflate with subsidies.
7. Both the economic and managerial literatures consider the (re)combination of existing mate-
rials as the essence of innovation (Schumpeter, 1942; Rogers, 1995; Galunic and Rodan, 1998;
Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998).
8. Obviously, in both Heilbrun and Pierce’s studies, the selection of a limited, specific time period
is problematic in that, by not considering the repertoire evolution since the establishment of
each opera house (that is, the data is left censored), it generates idiosyncratic results. Notice also
that conventionality or conformity are defined and measured endogeneously by the frequency
of performances across all houses over the entire period, rather than by reference to an external
convention or norm.
9. Some authors (Frey, 1999) also consider the role of public agencies, both in terms of the
regulations they enforce as well as their support through direct and indirect subsidies.
10. Pennings (1982) made a similar argument to explain the emergence of new organizations in other
industries.
11. Notice that populationsize and average income are also used to proxy demand for the arts (see
section 3.1.2.a).
12. From a more general perspective, Cowen (1999) has also argued that, contrary to conventional
wisdom, artistic innovation blossoms in developed, capitalistic countries.
13. Interestingly, DiMaggio and Stenberg (1985) discuss this factor in interpreting their results.
14. In addition to intellectual property rights, other regulations can indirectly affect the innovative
behavior of arts organizations. For instance, the tax treatment of corporate sponsorship, which
can stimulate or deter private giving (Breiswood, 1998), indirectly determines the funding mix
of arts organizations. However, given that taxation is usually regulated at the national level, we
should not expect it to have any explanatory power in country analyses. See Castañer and Bonet
(1997) for a full discussion of the range of institutional factors, both legal and cultural, that shape
the environment in which arts organizations operate.
15. Pierce (2000) also maintains that corporate and individual funding should be positively related
to conventionality. However, in the regression analysis he drops these variables.
16. Conceptually, it is important to distinguish between the effort and inputs devoted to artistic
innovation and experimentation and the actual outcome, that is, the achievement of an innovative
practice. Here and below we refer to the latter.
THE DETERMINANTS OF ARTISTIC INNOVATION 49

17. It is interesting to note that DiMaggio and Stenberg’s (1985) demographic approach to capture
the locus of internal power and internal preferences is consistent with the top management
team (TMT) literature (Hambrick and Mason, 1984) which claims that the demographics of
top managers constitute a valid approximation to their preferences which, in turn, are likely to
influence decision-making.
18. If a managing director has both a managerial and artistic educational background, it is less likely
that he/she will oppose artistic innovation as vehemently as the only managerially-trained one.
Similarly, a managing director with an artistic education but with managerial past experience is
likely to be sympathetic with both the managerial and artistic challenges. Hence, we believe it
is important that future research considers both the educational background and past experience
of both the managing and the artistic directors.
19. Obviously, this argument is partially related to performance-aspiration in a dynamic way,
given that the accumulation of slack probably comes from the achievement of a comfortable
performance level, although not necessarily greater than the desired one.
20. It is interesting to note that, despite the fact that the societal need for innovation is a modernist
characteristic (Becker, 1982; Cloake, 1997, p. 272), in societies like ours which are typically
characterized as postmodern, artistic innovation still seems to be a preoccupation (at least among
critics and academics).

References
Abrahamson, E. (1996) “Management Fashion”. Academy of Management Journal 21: 254–285.
Alchian, A.A. (1950) “Uncertainty, Evolution and Economic Theory”. Journal of Political Economy
58: 211–222.
Alexander, V. (1995) “Pictures at an Exhibition: Conflicting Pressures in Museums and the Display
of Art”. American Journal of Sociology 101: 797–839.
Allmendinger, J. and Hackman, J.R. (1996) “Organizations in Changing Environments: The Case of
East German Symphony Orchestras”. Administrative Science Quarterly 41: 337–369.
Anheier, H.K. and Toepler, S. (1998) “Commerce and the Muse: Are Art Museums Becoming Com-
mercial?”, in B.A. Weisbrod (ed.), To Profit or Not to Profit. The Commercial Transformation of
the Nonprofit Sector. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Auvinen, T. (2000) “The Comparative Organizational Structures of Five Opera Companies”. Paper
presented at the XIth International Conference on Cultural Economics, University of St. Thomas,
Minneapolis.
Baumol, W. (1971) “Economics of Athenian Drama: Its Relevance for the Arts in a Small City
Today”. Quarterly Journal of Economics LXXXV, 3: 365–376.
Baumol, W. and Bowen, W. (1966) Performing Arts – The Economic Dilemma. Twentieth Century
Fund, New York.
Becker, H. (1982) Art World. University of California Press, Berkeley, CA.
Berle, A. and Means, G.C. (1932) The Modern Corporation and Private Property. Macmillan, New
York.
Blau, J. (1989) The Shape of Culture. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Bolton, M.K. (1993) “Organizational Innovation and Substandard Performance: When Is Necessity
The Mother of Innovation?” Organization Science 4: 57–76.
Brown, S.L. and Eisenhardt, K.M. (1995) “Product Development: Past Research, Present Findings,
and Future Directions”. Academy of Management Review 20: 343–379.
Brush, T.H., Bromiley, P., and Hendrickx, M. (2000) “The Free Cash Flow Hypothesis for Sales
Growth and Firm Performance”. Strategic Management Journal 21: 455–472.
Burns, T. and Stalker, G.M. (1961) The Management of Innovation. Tavistock Publications, London.
50 XAVIER CASTAÑER AND LORENZO CAMPOS

Campos, L. and Castañer, X. (1998) “The Economic Effects of Public and Civic Involvement in the
Governance of Performing Arts Organizations: The Case of the Elche Chamber Orchestra”. Paper
presented at the Xth International Conference on Cultural Economics, University of Barcelona,
Barcelona.
Castañer, X. (1997a) “The Tension Between Artistic Leaders and Management in Arts Organisations:
The Case of the Barcelona Symphony Orchestra”, in M. Fitzgibbon and A. Kelly (eds.), From
Maestro to Manager. Critical Issues in Arts and Culture Management. Oak Tree Press, Dublin.
Castañer, X. (1997b) “Les Especificitats de la Gestió d’Organitzacions Artístiques i Culturals”.
Revista Econòmica de Catalunya 31: 84–101.
Castañer, X. and Bonet, L. (1997) “The Impact of the Institutional Setting in the Management of Cul-
tural Organizations”. Paper presented at the IVth International Conference on Arts Management
(AIMAC), Golden Gate University, San Francisco.
Chiapello, E. (1994) Les modes de contrôle des organisations artistiques. Unpublished PhD
dissertation, Université Paris IX Dauphine, Paris.
Cloake, M. (1997) “Management, the Arts and Innovation”, in M. Fitzgibbon and A. Kelly (eds.),
From Maestro to Manager. Critical Issues in Arts and Culture Management. Oak Tree Press,
Dublin.
Colbert, F. (1995) Marketing Culture and the Arts. Wiley, New York.
Cowen, T. (1998) In Praise of Commercial Culture. Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
Cyert, R. M. and March, J. (1963) A Behavioral Theory of the Firm. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs.
Damanpour, F. (1991) “Organizational Innovation: A Meta-Analysis of Effects of Determinants and
Moderators”. Academy of Management Journal 34: 555–591.
DiMaggio, P. and Powell, W. (1983) “Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in
Organizational Fields”. American Sociological Review 48: 147–160.
DiMaggio, P. and Stenberg, K. (1985) “Why Do Some Theaters Innovate more than Others? An
Empirical Analysis”. Poetics 14: 107–122.
Downs, G.W. and Mohr, L.B. (1976) “Conceptual Issues in the Study of Innovation”. Administrative
Science Quarterly 21: 700–714.
Drazin, R. and Schoonhoven, C.B. (1996) “Community, Population, and Organization Effects on
Innovation: A Multilevel Perspective”. Academy of Management Journal 39: 1065–1083.
Eldredge, N. and Gould, S.J. (1972) “Punctuated Equilibria: An Alternative to Phyletic Gradualism”,
in T.J.M. Schopf (ed.), Models in Paliobiology. Freeman Cooper, San Francisco.
Etzioni, A. (1964) Modern Organizations. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs.
Etzioni, A. (1969) (ed.) The Semi-professions and their Organization. Free Press, New York.
Fama, E. (1980) “Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm”. Journal of Political Economy 88:
288–307.
Feist, A. (1997) “Consumption in the Arts and Cultural Industries: Recent Trends in the U.K.”, in M.
Fitzgibbon and A. Kelly, (eds.), From Maestro to Manager. Critical Issues in Arts and Culture
Management. Oak Tree Press, Dublin.
Frey, B.S. (1999) “State Support and Creativity in the Arts: Some New Considerations”. Journal of
Cultural Economics 23: 71–85.
Frey, B.S. and Pommerehne, W. (1989) Muses and Markets: Explorations in the Economics of the
Arts. Basic Blackwell, Oxford.
Galunic, D.C. and Rodan, S. (1998) “Resource Recombinations in the Firm: Knowledge Structures
and the Potential for Schumpeterian Innovation”. Strategic Management Journal 19: 1193–1201.
Gersick, C. (1991) “Revolutionary Change Theories: A Multilevel Exploration of the Punctuated
Equilibrium Paradigm”. Academy of Management Review 16: 16–30.
Goodman, R.A. and Goodman, L.P. (1976) “Some Management Issues in Temporary Systems: A
Study of Professional Development and Manpower – The Theater Case”. Administrative Science
Quarterly 21: 494–501.
THE DETERMINANTS OF ARTISTIC INNOVATION 51

Gouldner, A. (1957) “Cosmopolitans and Locals: Toward an Analysis of Latent Social Roles – I”.
Administrative Science Quarterly 2: 281–306.
Hage, J. and Aiken, M. (1967) “Program Change and Organizational Properties: A Comparative
Analysis”. American Journal of Sociology 72: 503–519.
Hambrick, D.C. and Mason, P.A. (1984) “Upper Echelons: The Organization as a Reflection of its
Top Managers”. Academy of Management Review 9: 193–206.
Hannan, M.T. and Freeman, J.H. (1984) “Structural Inertia and Organizational Change”. American
Sociological Review 49: 149–164.
Heilbrun, J. (1998) “A Study of Opera Repertory in the United States, 1982–1983 to 1997–1998”.
Paper presented at the Xth International Conference on Cultural Economics, University of
Barcelona, Barcelona.
Heilbrun, J. (2000) “Explaining the Repertory of Opera Companies in the United States”. Paper
presented at the XIth International Conference on Cultural Economics, University of St. Thomas,
Minneapolis.
Heilbrun, J. and Gray, C. (1993) The Economics of Art and Culture. An American Perspective.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Hirshleifer, J. (1977) “Economics from a Biological Viewpoint”. Journal of Law and Economics 20:
1–52.
Kamien, M.I. and Schwartz, N.L. (1982) Market Structure and Innovation. Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge.
Kanter, R.M. (1983) The Change Masters. Simon and Schuster, New York.
Kimberly, J.R. and Evanisko, M. (1981) “Organizational Innovation: The Influence of Individual, Or-
ganizational, and Contextual Factors on Hospital Adoption of Technological and Administrative
Innovations”. Academy of Management Journal 24: 689–713.
Kotler, P. and Scheff, J. (1997) Standing Room Only: Strategies for Marketing in the Performing Arts.
Harvard Business School Press, Boston.
Lant, T. (1992) “Aspiration-Level Adaptation: An Empirical Exploration”. Management Science 38:
623–644.
Lawrence, P.R. and Lorsch, J.W. (1967) Organization and Environment. Managing Differentiation
and Integration. Harvard University, Boston.
Leblebici, H., Salancik, G.R., Copay, A., and King, T. (1991) “Institutional Change and the Transfor-
mation of Interorganizational Fields: An Organizational History of the U.S. Radio Broadcasting
Industry”. Administrative Science Quarterly 36: 333–363.
Lopes, P. (1992) “Innovation and Diversity in the Popular Music Industry, 1969 to 1990”. American
Sociological Review 57: 56–71.
March, J.G. and Simon, H.A. (1958) Organizations. Wiley, New York.
Martorella, R. (1977) “The Relationship between Box Office and Repertoire: A Case Study of
Opera”. Sociological Quarterly 18: 354–366.
Nahapiet, J. and Ghoshal, S. (1998) “Social Capital, Intellectual Capital, and the Organizational
Advantage”. Academy of Management Review 23: 242–267.
Nelson, R.R. and Winter, S.G. (1982) An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change. Belknap Press
of Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
Netzer, D. (1992) “Arts and Culture”, in C. Clotfelter (ed.), Who Benefits from the Nonprofit Sector.
University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Nohria, N. and Gulati, R. (1996) “Is Slack Good or Bad for Organizational Innovation?” Academy of
Management Journal 39: 1245–1265.
Oliver, C. (1992) “The Antecedents of Deinstitutionalization”. Organization Studies 13: 563–588.
Pennings, J. (1982) “Organizational Birth Frequencies: An Empirical Investigation”. Administrative
Science Quarterly 27: 120–145.
Peterson, R. and Berger, D. (1975) “Cycles in Symbolic Production: The Case of Popular Music”.
American Sociological Review 40: 158–173.
52 XAVIER CASTAÑER AND LORENZO CAMPOS

Peterson, R. (1986) “From Impresario to Arts Administrator: Formal Accountability in Nonprofit

Cultural Organizations”, in P.J. DiMaggio (ed.), Nonprofit Enterprise in the Arts. Studies in
Mission and Constraint. Oxford University Press, New York.
Pfeffer, J. and Salancik, G.R. (1978) The External Control of Organizations: A Resource Dependence
Perspective. Harper and Row, New York.
Pierce, J. (2000) “Programmatic Risk-Taking by American Opera Companies”. Journal of Cultural
Economics 24: 45–63.
Pinto, M.B., Pinto, J.K., and Prescott, J.E. (1993) “Antecedents and Consequences of Project Team
Cross-Functional Success”. Management Science 39: 1281–1298.
Piore, M. and Sabel, C. (1984) The Second Industrial Divide. Basic Books, New York.
Porter, M.E. (1990) Competitive Advantage of Nations. Harvard Business School Publishing, Boston.
Rogers, R. (1995) Diffusion of Innovations. Free Press, New York.
Ross, S.A. (1973) “The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal’s Problem”. American Economic
Review 63: 134–139.
Saxenian, A.L. (1994) Regional Advantage: Culture and Competition in Silicon Valley and Route
128. Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
Schulze, G.G. and Rose, A. (1998) “Public Orchestra Funding in Germany – An Empirical
Investigation”. Journal of Cultural Economics 22: 227–247.
Schumpeter, J.A. (1942) Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. Harper and Row, New York.
Singh, J. (1986) “Performance, Slack, and Risk Taking in Organizational Decision Making”.
Academy of Management Journal 29: 562–585.
Storper, M. (1989) “The Transition to Flexible Specialization in the U.S. Film Industry: External
Economies, the Division of Labour, and the Crossing of Industrial Divides”. Cambridge Journal
of Economics 13: 273–305.
Throsby, D. (1994) “The Production and Consumption of the Arts: A View of Cultural Economics”.
Journal of Economic Literature XXXII: 1–29.
Van de Ven, A.H. (1986) “Central Problems in the Management of Innovation”. Management Science
32: 590–608.
Von Hippel, E. (1988) The Sources of Innovation. Oxford University Press, New York.
Zolberg, V. (1986) “Tensions of Mission in American Art Museum”, in P.J. DiMaggio (ed.), Nonprofit
Enterprise in the Arts. Studies in Mission and Constraint. Oxford University Press, New York.