CO N T E N T S

PR EFA C E 5

IN TR O D U C TIO N 9

TEXTS AND TR A N SLA TIO N

Pseudo-Archytas 24 Iamblichus 26 Proclus 48
Damascius 64 Simplicius 94
Appendix: Plutarch 100 Tatian 102

NOTES 105

GLOSSARY 115

IN D EX 117
 I N T R O D U C T IO N

T of time, with all its implications, occupied the minds of

he n a t u r e
the Greek philosophers already in the pre-Socratic period. However,
only in Plato’s Timaeus (37-38) is time discussed at some length in
the passage describing the creation of the physical world by the
demiurge:
When the father who had begotten it saw it set in motion and
alive, a shrine brought into being for the everlasting gods, he
rejoiced and being well pleased he took thought to make it yet
more like its pattern. So as that pattern is the Living Being that
is for ever existent, he sought to make this universe also like it,
so far as might be, in that respect. Now the nature of that Living
Being was eternal, and this character it was impossible to confer
in full completeness on the generated thing. But he took thought
to make, as it were, a moving likeness of eternity; and, at the
same time that he ordered the Heaven, he made, of eternity that
abides in unity, an everlasting likeness moving according to num­
ber — that to which we have given the name Time.
For there were no days and nights, months and years, before
the Heaven came into being; but he planned that they should
now come to be at the same time that the Heaven was framed.
All these are parts of Time, and ‘was’ and ‘shall be’ are forms
of time that have come to be; we are wrong to transfer them
unthinkingly to eternal being. We say that it was and is and shall
be; but ‘is’ alone really belongs to it and describes it truly; ‘was’
and ‘shall be’ are properly used of becoming which proceeds in
time, for they are motions. But that which is for ever in the
same state immovably cannot be becoming older or younger by
lapse of time, nor can it ever become so; neither can it now have
been, nor will it be in the future; and in general nothing belongs
to it of all that Becoming attaches to the moving things of sense;
but these have come into being as forms of time, which images
eternity and revolves according to number (transi. F. M. Corn-
ford, Plato's Cosmology, Routledge & Kegan Paul, Ltd., London
1952).
This passage establishes that Time, which belongs to the sphere of
 the phenomenal cosmos, is a moving image (είκών) of Eternity which
is immobile and belongs to the Sphere of the Paradigm (i.c., to the
intelligible world). The motion of time is circular and according
to number.
In many ways, various doctrines concerning Time propounded by
various Platonic schools are for all intents and purposes commen­
taries on this text.
In the doctrines in question the dominant theme is the antithesis of
moving Time and immobile Eternity. The texts printed below show,
as we shall see, a notable departure from this tradition. The later
Neoplatonists propounded the concept of an intelligible static Time
(which is diflerent from Eternity).
It should be noted that Parmenides (140 E—141 D) has also had some
influence on the doctrine of the later Neoplatonists concerning
time.
Aristotle's exposition of Time (Physica, IV) is possibly the most sub­
stantial critique of this subject known to us. It gives what may be
called a phenomenological description of time and refers to some of
the topics that were to the fore in later debates, for instance, the
relation between Time and the Now (218a. 6—30: 219b, 9 flf; and
elsewhere), the relation between time and the soul (223a. 15 ff.) and
the tendency to consider lime as destructive rather than the opposite
(221a, 30-32).
However, Aristotle’s observations, though known to, and sometimes
criticized by, Neoplatonic philosophers, do not appear to have a
direct relevance to the texts printed below, for they are confined to
the mobile time of the cosmos known to our senses and ignore the
higher planes of temporality postulated by the Neoplatonists, with
whom wc are concerned. Aristotle’s definition of time reads as fol­
lows: Tim e is the number [or: measure] of movement in respect of
before and after.’ The movement referred to is, in the first place, that
of the heavenly Sphere. Time is thus a function of the motion of
bodies.
The Stoic doctrine of Time may have a bearing on the function of
Plotinus’s theory; on the whole, it does not seem to have a direct
connection with the discussions of the later Platonists. We may, how­
ever, note that the Stoic Apollodorus is quoted as saying that ‘the
whole of time is present, just as we say that the year has been pre­
sent...’* (H. Diels, Doxographi Graeci, Berlin 1879, p. 461,1. 10).
Two texts published below (pp. 100-103), which date from the second

* ένεστάναι δέ τόν πάντα χρόνον, ώς τόν ένιαυτόν.

century C.E., one an excerpt from a work of Plutarch of Chaeronaea
and the other taken from a polemical work of the Christian apologist
Tatian, seem to be relevant to a study of the origins of the concept
of static time.
Plotinus’s treatise On Eternity and Time (Ennead, III, 7) is in a sense
a meditation on the passage of the Timaeus quoted above. The opin­
ions of Aristotle and other philosophers, who considered time a
function of the motion of material bodies, are rejected. Time is
related to Soul and produced by it:

Wc must take ourselves back to the disposition which we said

existed in eternity, to that quiet life, all a single whole, still un­
bounded, altogether without declination, resting in and directed
towards eternity. Time did not yet exist, not at any rate for the
beings of that world... But since there was a restlessly active
nature which wanted to control itself and be on its own, and
chose to seek for more than its present state, this moved, and
time moved with it: and so, always moving on to the ‘next’ and
the ‘after’, and what is not the same, but one thing after another,
we made a long stretch of our journey and constructed time as
an image of eternity... For since the world of sense moves in
Soul — there is no other place of it (this universe) than Soul —
it moves also in the time of Soul. For as Soul presents one
activity after another, and then again another in ordered suc­
cession, it produces the succession along with activity, and goes
on with another thought coming after that which it had before,
to that which did not previously exist because discursive thought
was not in action, and Soul's present life is not like that which
came before it. So at the same time the life is different and this
‘different’ involves a different time. So the spreading out of life
involves time; life’s continual progress involves continuity of
time, and life which is past involves past time. So would it be
sense to say that time is the life of Soul in a movement of pas­
sage from one way of life to another? Yes, for if eternity is life
at rest, unchanging and identical and already unbounded, and
time must exist as an image of eternity (in the same relation as
that in which this All stands to the intelligible All), then we
must say that there is, instead of the life There, another life
having, in a way of speaking, the same name as this power of
the soul, and instead of intelligible motion that there is the
motion of a part of Soul... and instead of a complete unbound­
ed whole, a continuous unbounded succession, and instead of

[Π ]
 a whole all together a whole which is, and always will be, going
to come into being part by part... one must not conceive time
as outside Soul, any more than eternity There as outside real
being. It is not an accompaniment of Soul nor something that
comes after (any more than eternity There) but something
which is seen along with it and exists in it and with it, as
eternity does There [with real being] (transl. Λ.Η. Armstrong,
Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, London 1967,
Chap. II, pp. 337-343).
As regards Eternity, some of Plotinus’s observations seem to imply
that it is the being or the life of the eternal things:
The life, then,-which belongs to that which exists and is in
being, all together and full, completely without extension or in­
terval, is that which we are looking for, eternity (ibid., Chap. 3,
p. 305).
Other passages suggest that it exists by itself. But this difference need
not necessarily mean that Plotinus contradicts himself.
Later Neoplatonism, from lambiichus onwards, breaks in many ways
with the Plotinian tradition. This new departure is very much in
evidence in the theory of time.
In Simplicius's commentaries on Aristotle’s Categoriae and Physica,
there are several fragments of the writings of lambiichus (died c. 330
C.E.) and paraphrases of his expositions. These texts, as well as some
of Proclus’s writings, especially his commentary on the Timaeus, pro­
vide ample and convincing evidence for the assumption that, with
lambiichus, there began a radically new conception, substantializing
time as a hypostatic entity of its own in a way that differed from
anything said before of the nature of time. From Proclus's words it
seems that this revolutionary turn was connected with a critical anal­
ysis of Plotinus’s conception, a reproduction in a way of what Plo­
tinus himself did when he combined the exposition of his doctrine
of time with criticism of Aristotle's theory.
lambiichus, at the beginning of the fourth century, and, after him,
Proclus, in the middle of the fifth century, rejected the concept of
time as the life of the soul in contradistinction to eternity as the state
of life in the intelligible world. Instead, they gave to both the status
of substantialized entities within a system of hypostases, which was
much more complex and ramified than that of Plotinus. The need
for a further multiplication of hypostases probably arose from the
endeavours of lambiichus and his School to correlate their ontology
with the diversified syncretistic theology of their day, and to include
in their system the sacred entities and divinities of Oriental religions.
There was also an intrinsic logical necessity for this process of mul­
tiplication, since Plotinus’s three hypostatic levels above the physical
world no longer sufficed for an unambiguous arrangement of the
plethora of epistemological concepts and their variations within the
Neoplatonic ontology. This gradual conceptual differentiation led
forcibly to a proliferation of hypostatic levels and their splitting up
into sublevels. The same process was also a natural consequence of
another conspicuous tendency whose character was obviously dialec­
tical. On the one hand, the multiplicity of levels above the sensible
world will of necessity enlarge the gap between this world and the
perfect reality of the One, identified with the Good (a reality above
which lambiichus places the supreme hypostasis of the attributeless
One); and, on the other, that same multiplicity will narrow the gaps
between the adjacent levels and thus reduce to a minimum the dis­
continuity between the rungs in the ladder of hypostases.
We need not go into the details of lamblichus’s system of hypostases.
Its essential feature is that, in lieu of the two single levels pertaining
to the Soul and the Intellect, which, in the Plotinian system, separated
the One from the sensible world, there appear three levels — the
intelligible world (the world of ideas, that is, of the objects of thought),
the intellectual world (the world of the thinking subjects), and the
soul — of which each is divided into three sublevels. The main prin­
ciple governing the descent on the ladder of hypostases is the gradual
transition from complete unity and complete rest to complete diver­
sity and complete motion. The intelligible world has still something
of the statics characterizing the One, but it already contains the mul­
tiplicity of ideas. The intellectual world is characterized by an ambi­
valent state, which is partly static and partly dynamic, whereas the
level of the Soul is entirely dynamic, although it still is above the
level of the sensible world. Typical of lamblichus’s system of hypos­
tases, and also of Proclus’s (which is even more complex), is the
concept of participation, which expresses the dependence of a con­
cept, an idea, or a hypostasis, of a certain level on the analogous
essence of a higher level. The essence belonging to the higher level
can be participated by that of the lower, and in that case the inferior
essence participates in the superior, and there then appear in it the
properties of the superior, although somewhat lessened and con­
tracted. The dependence expressed by participation and by being
participated creates links, which join all the essences in a single con­
catenation comprising all hypostatic levels.
A most illuminating example of this conceptual structure of hypo­
 stases and their interdependence is the doctrine of time propounded
by Iamblichus and his School. As against Plotinus, Iamblichus ele­
vates Time from the level of the Soul to that of the Intellect, and
Eternity to that above the Intellect. One point of departure in his
theory is his criticism and interpretation of a passage from the writings
of an unknown Neopythagorean philosopher (who lived some time
between 200 B.C.E. and 200 C.E.), which were attributed to the Pytha­
gorean Archytas. Τη it, time is presented in the Aristotelian sense,
but an example is added that portrays the special position of the
Now in the eternal flux by which the future is transformed into the
past.
Pscudo-Archytas begins by indicating the specific characteristic of
time, namely, that each of its Nows is indivisible and transient. Time
is thus unreal, because the present is gone at the moment when we
perceive it, and, although the flux of time is continuous, its parts,
that is, past and future, are non-existent. And here the author com­
pares the Now to the vertex of an angle, the point of singularity
between the two sides of it, which is, as it were, at the same time the
end of one and the beginning of the other. This is an admirable
illustration, because although the Now, according to pseudo-Archytas,
changes continuously in a numerical sense, its form is still preserved.
And the preservation of the form, that is, the preservation of this
point of singularity in the passing of unreal time from the earlier to
the later, is shown clearly in the graph of the straight line broken
at an angle. We have to imagine the total of all the points of the
angle moving in a continuous flow from one side of the angle to the
other, and all successively passing through the vertex. At every mo­
ment, the vertex is represented by a different point that is rising
from the unreality of the future and moving into the unreality of
the past. But the present, too, is unreal because it is a point and
indivisible.
After quoting the passage from pseudo-Archytas, Iamblichus begins
his critical analysis, which also embodies the principles of his own
theory of lime. The two properties that pseudo-Archytas attributes
to time — that is, indivisibility and unreality — Iamblichus regards
as belonging to two different kinds of time on different hypostatic
levels, namely, a superior time that is participated, and an inferior
lime which participates. The indivisible Now is the property of a
kind of time discovered by Iamblichus, the time of the intellectual
world. Like all the essences of the intellectual level, it is indivisible,
permanent and stable. Here he transfers the term ‘indivisible’ applied
to a geometrical point to the realm of metaphysics, where it defines
the property of the intelligible essences that constitute indivisible
unities. On the other hand, he emphasizes that the unreal is the pro­
perty of time in the sensible world, being nothing but the permanent
motion common to all things belonging to the physical world. This
Now of the physical world cannot be separated from the things that
are perpetually becoming, and it is different from the transcendent
Now which is at rest. The intellectual Now has a cohesive quality,
which communicates something of its permanence to the numerically
changing time. The antithesis of the Now and the flux of time in
the phenomenological time of Aristotle is transformed by Iamblichus
into the antithesis of the time of the intellectual and of the sensible
world. He explains the reason why we erroneously attribute to the
intellectual essence of the Now and to intellectual time the changes
and affections to which all things are subject in the physical world.
It is that, because of their movement, the essences perpetually coming
into being in our world cannot fully receive the indivisible essence
in which they participate; therefore, at every moment, different parts
of them touch the intellectual essence. Iamblichus's words furnish an
interpretation of his concept that constitutes a complement to the
graphic representation of pseudo-Archytas. The time of the sensible

world flows along the sides of the angle like a conveyor belt, touching
the static time of the intellectual world only at the vertex, at the
point of its flowing Now. Only this changing Now, therefore, is in
immediate contact with reality. But the vertex also glides and passes
along this static time from the earlier to the later in such a way that,
consecutively, a different Now coincides with a different point of
static time. Thus we experience in succession the co-existing points
of intellectual time.
Iamblichus emphasizes that the function of time in the intellectual
 world is the ordering of the cosmos, and this time is thus elevated
to a position on a level higher than that of the Soul. The principal
essence of time is order, not an order that develops out of preceding
things, like the order in Aristotle’s time, but an order that leads all
things striving towards perfection. According to Iamblichus, time in
the intellectual world is not a measure of movement, and is not
measured by movement; it does not reveal the rotation of the heavens,
nor is time revealed by it. It is not. defined as the life of the soul, or
by cosmic phenomena in nature — all these are only secondary causes
connected with time. Time is the earlier and later in the intellectual
order, the first cause of all secondary causes in the different hypo­
static levels. It is, however, clear that the level of intellectual time is
inferior to that of the eternal essence. The eternal is absolutely static,
with no differentiation into a one-next-to-anothcr, which is extension,
and certainly with no differentiation of earlier and later, which means
order, and would result in a splitting up of unity. Therefore, the
eternal essence is superior to the intelligible essence and all the more
superior to the intellectual. Although the extant passages provide no
details, we can assume that Iamblichus regarded the level of Eternity
as situated between the levels of the One and of the Intelligible.
Thus we find intellectual time occupying an intermediate position
similar to that of the Soul in Plotinus’s system, where it ranks be­
tween the Intellect and the sensible world. Intellectual time ranks
between eternity and the sensible world, and its position is ambi­
valent because of the coexistence of time and the sensible world on
the one hand, and the ordering of time with regard to eternity on
the other. Intellectual time resembles eternity; it is a pattern of eter­
nity; it accordingly governs the sensible world, and physical time
participates in it. The ambivalent position of time in the other world,
as Iamblichus frequently calls intellectual time, is the result of an
ambivalent essence that is simultaneously at rest and in motion. It
is in motion with regard to Eternity, but at rest with regard to our
time that participates in it. The earlier and the later of intellectual
time are not in motion. Its points, arranged in an order of earlier
or later, do not possess the property of flux, which makes the future
pass into the present and the present into the past, but it is, as it
were, a static earlier or later, which, moreover, cannot be represented
by spatial extension. Every graphic representation, like that given
above, is only a poor makeshift of which we have to make use in
the absence of a more suitable one. Iamblichus says in this context
that the demiurge, so to speak, unravels intellectual time from the
tangle of threads of the divine order in the intellectual world and
passes it on into the sensible world, where time becomes a flux. This
mechanism of the threads unravelling themselves again explains time’s
place on the level of the intellectual essence, which possesses an ele­
ment of motion in spite of its intellectual, static, nature.
Proclus’s discourse on time in his commentary on the Timaeus (written
in 440 C.E.) is essentially a commentary on Tamblichus's theory of
time. In part, it is a systematization of that theory, and. in addition,
it provides a more general scientific foundation for Iamblichus’s views.
There is, besides, Proclus’s criticism of Plotinus’s psychological time,
and the emphasis on the theological aspect of time in support of
lamblichus’s new ontological concept. Broadly, it may be said that
his contribution to the theory of intellectual time is more in the
nature of a special nuance to Iamblichus’s statements than a supple­
ment of original ideas.
After this general appraisal, we can limit ourselves to a summary of
Proclus’s arguments, in which he often refers directly to Iamblichus.
He proves from the Theaetetus and other writings of Plato that
nothing can move wholly and absolutely. Every movement, be it a
change of place or of quality, can only occur against a background
of rest, otherwise the concept of movement does not make sense.
When this background is only potential and not actualized, it is
meaningless. When it is actualized but changes into movement, then
a second background becomes necessary against which the move­
ment can be measured. Thus we find that the background must be
actual but motionless. This is the specific property οΓ time, that is,
of intellectual time, or, as Proclus calls it, the monad of time, or
primary time, or the time above the cosmos. Proclus, however,
strongly emphasizes the dual character of this primary time, which
is at rest and also in motion, intelligible and also created, indivisible
and also divisible. There is an inherent contradiction in its character
that we can only grasp when we remember that the Soul, too, oc­
cupies an intermediate position, although it belongs to an hypostasis
inferior to that of time. The graphic representation that Proclus
employs is that of the centre of the circle and its periphery. As the
centre of the circle, primary time is at rest, and as its periphery it
is in motion, that is, in participation with the secondary time of the
sensible world. In the periphery we also find a hint of the numerical
aspect of time. The time that is above the cosmos and in participation
is thus at rest and also progressing, whereas cosmic time, in which
it participates, is wholly in motion, carried along by movement.
Proclus also criticizes Aristotelian time, which exists only in the
objects of the sensible world as a concomitant phenomenon, as the
 accidens, as it were, of an accidens. He also passes stricture on Plo-
tinian time, w'hich depends entirely on the soul, whereas it is evident
that inanimate objects, for instance, which have no soul, participate
in time. He clearly defines the following proportion: the ratio of
Eternity to the Intellect is the same as that of Time to the Soul,
namely, Time is prior to the Soul in the same way that Eternity is
prior to the Intellect, and the dual essence of Time is an intellectual
one inferior to that of the Intelligible. As to the sacred character of
Time — are not the hours and months, day and night, regarded as
gods to whom we pray? All the more is Time itself the god who
embraces all of them.
Damascius’s discourses on time, most probably written in the early
sixth century, are preserved in their greater part in Simplicius’s com­
mentary on the Physica of Aristotle, in quotations as well as in para­
phrases incorporated in Simplicius's critical remarks, and, to a less
extent, in Damascius's own book Dubitationes et Solutiones. Damas­
cu s introduces two extremely important innovations into the theory
of time. One is the quantization of physical time, which participates
in primary time. He starts from Zeno's arguments about movement
and the point-like Now. He sees the solution of the paradox in the
supposition that movement in time progresses along a temporal ex­
tension consisting of points of Now, which themselves have no ex­
tension. Tens of thousands of extensionless Nows will still only add
up to an equally extensionless quantity; one must, therefore, suppose
that the motion of time progresses by finite steps that happen sud­
denly, in jumps, as it were, that constitute finite, complete and indi­
visible units. Each of these jumps, each quantum of time, in mod­
ern parlance, is wholly sudden, simultaneous, and not divisible into
smaller parts of time. The flux of time in our world consists of the
progress of these intervals, whose size depends on the velocity of the
moving body. Thus, for instance, for a slower star, time progresses
by smaller steps, by smaller quanta, and, for a swifter star, by bigger
ones. The present, or the Now, which Damascius calls ‘the Being
that is becoming', is, therefore, a relative quantity, yet always finite
and not point-like, because rest, too, consists of a series of jumps.
It is obvious from Damascius’s explanations that what he has in
mind is what we now call the quantization of a certain quantity. The
jump of becoming is itself not becoming, but it is being. According
to one of Damascius’s definitions, it is the ‘aggregation of progress’.
This aggregation takes place section by section, and, as these sections
are complete in themselves, Damascius calls them ‘demiurgic sec­
tions’ in which time progresses at once. The problem that occupied
Aristotle, how one Now can emerge from another, thus finds its
solution in that one present of finite length borders on a second
finite one, and the two touch only at the point separating them,
which is the end of one jump and the beginning of the following.
We are reminded of Plato’s words in the Parmenides (156D ),
which introduce the term ‘sudden’ in his description of the paradox
of the blending of Being with the continuum of Becoming:
‘Sudden’ seems to imply a something out of which change takes
place into cither of two states; for the change is not from the
state of rest as such, nor from the state of motion as such; but
there is this curious nature which we call ‘sudden’ between rest
and motion, not being in any time.
The flux of our time is composed of movements that are a combi­
nation of motion and rest, or, to use a modern example, it resembles
a film consisting of many pictures, of which each presents a position
of rest and is separated from that of its neighbour by a small yet
finite jump. Damascius’s conception of time-quanta of finite duration
makes the present more concrete, more real. As each present is a
unit that exists at once, it follows that, while we live in our time,
we participate at every moment in a small section of that one Being
which is above time, in that essence about which Parmenides, one
thousand years earlier than Damascius, said that ‘it never was nor
will be, because it is now, a whole, altogether’.
According to Damascius, we receive, as it were, in each Now a
glimpse of the essence that is wholly present at once, yet the flux
of our time in its flow brings to us one section after another of the
real essence belonging to the intelligible world. What, however, is the
nature of this essence in its entirety? With regard to primary time
in its totality, Damascius repeatedly emphasizes that the whole of
it exists simultaneously in reality — a statement that his friend and
pupil Simplicius is unable to accept. Possibly Damascius’s colleagues
shrank from the comparison of the simultaneous extension of primary
time to a spatial extension, which constitutes his second important
conceptual innovation. Damascius compares intellectual time to the
extension of a river from source to mouth conceived as being at rest
at a certain moment, or to the appearance of the whole of a river if
we could halt its flow. Then we would be able to perceive the whole
river as a single unit in a state of rest, as a simultaneous one-next-
to-the-other of its extension from which the concrete river derives,
all of its parts flowing and discharged one after the other. In the
same way as the simultaneous extension of the whole river whose
 flow is halted is the ontological basis of the flowing waters of the
river, so the simultaneous extension of intelligible time is the basis
of our time, which makes the present flow from the past into the
future, or which flows from the future through the present into the
past. This is the basis of the ‘river of becoming’, as Damascius calls
the time of the physical world.
There is yet another parallel between space and time in Damascius's
theory. Space separates the bodies and prevents their merging one
into the other. Space, therefore, possesses something like a principle
of the ordering of coexistence. The same principle exists in intelli­
gible time, because the one-next-to-another of its simultaneous exten­
sion fixes the order of the succession of events in the sensible world
once and for all. The picture of the river also indicates the unilateral
direction of the flux of time: of two events, one is earlier (that is.
nearer the source) and the other later (that is, nearer the mouth),
and this arrangement of earlier and later will never change. It is
immaterial whether the two events took place in the near or in the
distant past, or whether one has happened and the other is going
to occur in the future, or whether both are still in the future. Damas­
cius uses as his example two wars: the Trojan war happened before
the Peloponnesian, and this relation of earlier and later will never
change, because it is based on the order of the one-next-to-another.
which was established from the beginning in the extension of intel­
ligible time.
Human beings are not able to perceive the simultaneity of intelligible
time as they can the simultaneity of space in its extension throughout
the world. But Damascius sees no essential difference between the
simultaneous perception of the entire spatial world and that of the
entire temporal world, if it is said with regard to intelligible time. But
as we feel only the eternal flux of physical time, which our conscious­
ness splits up into the three sections of past, present, and future, we
can only use analogies or substitutes. According to Damascius, one
such substitute is the faculty of the soul to bridge between the sub­
stance of the sensible world and that of the intelligible world. This
enables it to integrate certain lengths of time like a day, a month,
a year, or the duration of a game or a play, and to perceive them
in its imagination or memory as simultaneous units in a state of rest,
although the lengths are in motion. In the conceptual integration of
a long period of time and its fusion into one unit that is at rest, our
soul grasps something of the simultaneous essence of intelligible
time.
Iamblichus's concept of time was elevated to its highest perfection
in Damascius's theory of real time, as he describes it in the metaphor
of the river whose flow is halted and which thus exists at once in
its entirety, and further in his interpretation of sensible time as a
combination of quanta of indivisible Nows. Neither before Iamblichus
and his School nor afterwards, until our own times, has the ontology
of time been presented with such lucidity and persuasiveness, and we
may say that, even if he had contributed nothing else but his theory
of time, the place of Iamblichus in the history of philosophy would
be secure. The two great modern philosophers who, according to their
systems, could have followed in his steps — Spinoza and Hegel —
made no clear distinction between eternity and intelligible time. In
this respect, their ontology of time is not as clear as that of the later
Neoplatonists.*

* It should be added thal J. E. McTaggart in his analysis of lime, entitled ‘The

Unreality of Time* (Mind, 1908), introduces a series of the order of events
which strongly resembles Iamblichus’s intellectual time. Cf. S. Sambursky, ‘The
Concept of Time in Late Neoplatonism’, Proceedings o f the Israel Academy o f
Sciences and Humanities. II. Jerusalem 1968, p. 166 f.
 T HE C O N C E P T OF T IM E ΪΝ
LATE N E O P L A T O N IS M

ij
It'

k
“Τό δέ ποκά και ό χρόνος καθόλου μέν ίδιον έχει τό άμερές καί
τό άνυπόστατον. τό γάρ νϋν άμερές λεγόμενον άμα νοούμενοι'
καί λεγόμενον παρελήλυθεν καί ούκ έστιν παραμένον. γινόμενον
γάρ συνεχώς τό αύτό μέν ούδέποκα σφζεται κατ’ αριθμόν, κατά
μέντοι γε τό είδος.2 ό γάρ ένεστώς νΟν χρόνος καί ό μέλλων ούκ 5
έστιν ό αυτός τώ προγεγονότι- ό μέν γάρ άπογέγονεν καί ούκέτι
έστιν, ό δέ άμα νοούμενος καί ένεστακώς παρφχηκεν. καί ούτως
άεί συνάπτει τό νϋν συνεχώς άλλο καί άλλο γινόμενόν τε καί
φθειρόμενον, κατά μέντοι γε τό είδος τό αύτό. παν γάρ τό νΰν
άμερές καί άδιαίρετον καί πέρας μέν έστι τώ προγεγονότος, άρχά 10
δέ τώ μέλλοντος, ώσπερ καί γραμμάς ευθείας κλασθείσας τό
σαμεϊον περί 6 ή κλάσις άρχά μέν γίνεται τάς έτέρας γραμμάς,
πέρας δέ τάς έτέρας.3 συνεχής δέ ό χρόνος καί ού διορισμένος
ώσπερ άριθμός καί λόγος καί αρμονία, τώ μέν γάρ λόγω ταί
συλλαβαί τά μόρια, ταΰτα δέ διορισμένα, καί τάς αρμονίας τοί 15
φθόγγοι καί τώ άριθμώ ταί μονάδες· γραμμά δέ καί χωρίον καί
τόπος συνεχές· τά γάρ μόρια τούτων κοινά τμάματα ποιέει διαι-
ρεύμενα· τέμνεται γάρ γραμμά μέν κατά στιγμάν, έπίπεδον δέ
κατά γραμμάν, στερεόν δέ κατά έπίπεδον. έστιν ών καί ό χρόνος
συνεχής· ού γάρ ήν πόκα φύσις, όπόκα χρόνος, ούδέ κίνασις, 20
όπόκα τό νΟν ού παρής· άλλ' άεί ήν καί έσται καί ούδέποκα έπι-
λείψει τό νϋν άλλο καί άλλο γινόμενον καί άριθμώ μέν άτερον,
εΐδει δέ τωύτόν. διαφέρει γε μάν τών άλλων συνεχέων, ότι τάς
μέν γραμμάς καί τώ χωρίο καί τώ τόπο τά μέρεα ύφέστηκεν, τώ
δέ χρόνο τά μέν γενόμενα έφθαρται, τά δέ γενησόμενα φθαρή- 25
σεται. διόπερ ό χρόνος ήτοι τό παράπαν ούκ έστιν ή άμυδρός
καί μόλις έστιν ού γάρ τό μέν παρεληλυθός ούκέτι έστιν, τό δέ
μέλλον ούδέπω έστιν, τό δέ νΰν άμερές καί αδιαίρετον, πώς άν
ύπάρχοι τοΰτο κατ’ άλήθειαν;”
Time at any moment and time on the whole contain as a characteristic
property the indivisible and the unreal. For the Now, being indivisible,
is < already> in the past while being spoken of and apprehended,
and does not stay. For it is continuously becoming and is never
preserved according to number, yet it is indeed so according to its
form.2 The present time, which is Now, and the future are not the
same as the past; the one has gone and is not any more, the other,
having been apprehended and become present, has passed by. And
thus the Nows are always continuously linked together, becoming
and perishing at every changing moment, yet indeed the form is the
same. For every Now is a partless and indivisible limit of the former
time and a beginning of the future, like the point of a straight line
which is broken, Cnamely the point> at which the breaking occurs
and which becomes the beginning of one straight line and the end
of another.3 Time is continuous, and not discrete as number, speech
and harmony. The syllables are parts of speech, and they are discrete,
and the sounds are parts of harmony, and the monads are parts of
number, and a line and a figure and place are continuous. For the
parts of these, when separated, form sections with a common boun­
dary; a line is cut by a point, a plane by a line, a solid by a plane.
So time is continuous. For there was never nature when there was
no time, nor movement, when the Now was not present. For it
always was and will be, and the Now will never fail to change at
any changing moment, being different numerically and the same in
its form. < T im e> differs from the other continuous things insofar
as the parts of a line, of a figure, and of place do exist, whereas
those of time, which have become, perish, and those which will
become, will perish. Therefore the whole time either does not exist
or it hardly exists and only in a dim way. For how could that truly
exist whose past is no more and whose future is not yet, while the
Now is partless and indivisible?
Simpl., Συμφωνεί δέ προς τό αυτό καί ή τών έτι παλαιοτέρων δόξα.1 οί
Caleg., μέν γάρ, ώσπερ καί τοΰνομα δηλοϊ, χορεία τινΐ τής ψυχής περί
351,32- τόν νοϋν,2 οί δέ ταΐς τής ψυχής καί τοΰ νοϋ αυτής περιόδου;,3 οί
352, 20
δέ τή φυσική περί τόν νοϋν χορείςι, οί δέ ταΐς εγκυκλίους περι-
φοραϊς τόν χρόνον άφωρίζοντο, άπερ πάντα περιείληφεν ή Πυθα- 5
γόρειος αΐρεσις· τό γάρ καθόλου διάστημα τής τοϋ παντός
φύσεως πάσας τάς φύσεις τοΰ παντός καθόλου περιείληφεν καί
δι' όλων αυτών διήκει παντελώς, τόν τε χρόνον άνωθεν άρχό-
μενον άπό τών πρώτων λόγων4 μέχρι τινός διήκοντα άφωρίσατο,
ώς κατά τήν μετάβασιν καί κίνησιν τών όλων λόγων4 καθόλου ίο
τό διάστημα άφορίζοντα. ώς γάρ έπί τών έν γενέσει τουτί τό νϋν
παρά τό πρόσθεν νϋν καί αϋτη ή κίνησις παρά τήν πρώτην κίνη-
σιν μεταβολήν έπιδείκνυσιν, ούτως πολύ πρότερον καί άρχηγι-
κώτερον έπί τής ουσίας τών όλων φυσικών λόγων4 προϋπάρχον
θεωρείται καί κυρίως συμπληροί τό διάστημα τοΰ πρεσβυτάτου 15
πάντων χρόνου.5 άλλα νϋν μέν ώς δύο ορισμούς τοϋ χρόνου τού­
τους ό λόγος έξηγήσατο, δει δέ εις έν συναγαγείν αμφοτέρους.6
ούτως γάρ ή δλη φύσις τοϋ χρόνου Οεωρηθήσεται. τής γάρ
αυτοκινήτου κινήσεως ώς μονάδος χρονικής άριθμός ών ό γενε­
σιουργός χρόνος διάστημά έστι τών φυσικών λόγων,4 οό τό κατά 20
τόν όγκον7 ούτε τό κατά τήν κίνησιν άπλώς ιήν έκτος, άλλα τό
διάστημα τό κατά τήν προϋπάρχουσαν τής κινήσεως τάξιν, έν ή
τό πρότερον καί ύστερον προδιατεταγμένα καί ταΐς πράξεσι καί
ταΐς κινήσεσι τήν τάξιν παρέχεται, ουδέ γάρ οϊόν τε τό πρότερον
καί δεύτερον τών πραγμάτων συλλογίζεσθαι μή προϋφεστώτος 25
τοϋ χρόνου καθ’ εαυτόν, εις όν καί ή τών πράξεων τάξις άνα-
φέρεται.

Simpl., ‘Ο μέντοι Ιάμβλιχος ζητών, πώς τό άμερές καί άνυπόστατον

Categ., ύπάρχειν τώ χρόνω φησίν άσύνακτα8 όντα, ούκ επί τοϋ αύτοΰ
353,19- τιθέναι φησίν άμφότερα, άλλα κατά μέν τά είδη τών λόγων τά 30
356,7
έστώτα έν έαυτοϊς τό άμερές άφοριζόμενος, κατά δέ τάς προϊού-
σας απ’ αυτών κινήσεις, επειδή αΰται ού διασφζουσιν τήν άμέ-
ριστον καί άκίνητον ουσίαν, τό άνυπόστατον τιθέμενος, καί κατά
 The opinions of the older <philosophers> also agree with this:1
some of them define time as a kind of dance of the soul around the
intellect,2 as indicated by the world itself; others as the periods of
the soul and of the intellect itself; others again as a dance of nature
around the intellect;3 finally there are some who define it as circular
revolutions. All of which opinions are included in the Pythagorean
doctrine. For the general extension of the nature of the universe
includes all the natures of the universe and penetrates them totally
and entirely. And this doctrine defines time which begins above,
deriving from the first logoi4 and penetrating up to a certain point
so that, in conformity with the transition and motion of the whole
logoi,4 it delimits the general extension. In the same way as with
generated things this Now along with the previous Now and the
present movement along with the first movement indicate change, so,
though in an analogous but much anterior and primary way, the
extension of the most important time of all is seen as pre-existing
in the essence of the whole physical logoi4 and fittingly fills this
essence.5 But here the exposition has interpreted these definitions of
time as two separate ones, whereas one has to reduce them to one.6
For thus the whole nature of time will be seen. For the generative
time, being a number of self-moving movement <regarded> as a
■ time-like monad, is the extension of physical logoi,4 neither with
I regard to mass7 nor with regard to outward movement simply, but
it is the extension with regard to the pre-existing order of movement,
in which the earlier and later are arranged beforehand and provide
the actions and movements with order. For one cannot infer the
earlier and later of things without the pre-existence of time per se,
to which also the order of actions is referred.

Iamblichus in his inquiry asks how both the indivisible and the
unreal can be properties of time, being incompatible,8 and says that
one must not apply them to the same thing. He defines the indivisible
with regard to the intrinsically stationary forms of logoi and the
unreal with regard to the movements proceeding from them which
i do not conserve the indivisible and immobile essence. He defines
the indivisible with respect to the actuality and perfection resting
 μέν τήν μένουσαν έν τή ούσίςι ενέργειαν1 καί τελειότητα τό άμέ-
ριστον άφοριζόμενος, κατά δέ τήν έξιοΰσαν εις τήν γένεσιν από
τοϋ δντος ροπήν τό άνυπόστατον τώ λόγω διαιρών. οϋτε ούν τό
άμερές, ώς φησιν ’Ιάμβλιχος, τό ίδιον τοΰ χρόνου, άνυπόστατον
έσται οΰτε τό ΰπόστατον άνυπόστατον (μάχεται γάρ τοΰτό γε 5
πρός εαυτό), αλλά διώρισται τό άμερές καί τό άνυπόστατον έπ’
άλλων καί άλλων φύσεων, των μέν τιμιωτέρων, των δε άπολειπο-
μένων τής πρεσβυτέρας φύσεως καί διά τοΰτο λεγομένων άνυπο-
στάτων, οόχ ότι μηδέ όλιος είσίν, άλλ’ ότι τό τής πρώτης ουσίας
καθαρόν καί άχραντον ού διασφζουσιν τοιαϋτα γάρ έστι πάντα 10
τά έν τφ γίνεσθαι τό είναι έχοντα, οϋτε είναι κυρίως λεγάμενα
οϋτε μή είναι, επειδή ούν τό μέν παρεληλυθός τοϋ χρόνου ούκέτι
έστιν, τό δέ μέλλον οϋπω έστιν, μόνον δέ τό ένεστηκός είναι
δοκεΐ άμερές όν, εϊπερ κατά τό νΰν λαμβάνοιτο, καί άμα τφ είναι
εις τό μή είναι χωροϋν, διά τοϋτο ούν ίδιον αύτοϋ τό άμερές άμα 15
καί άνυπόστατον είναι φησιν. ό μέντοι 'Ιάμβλιχος ούκ άποδέ-
χεται τούς τό άμερές επί τοϋ ρέοντος τούτου καί γενητοϋ χρόνου
θεωροΰντας καί άνυπόστατον αυτό λέγοντας διά τό μηδέποτε μέν
είναι, άεί δέ γίνεσθαι- “παν γάρ τό γινόμενον, φησιν, ή τό όπω-
σοϋν κινούμενον ού δύναται είναι άμερές- διαιρετή γάρ πάσα 20
κίνησίς έστιν άεί διά τήν συνέχειαν, άλλά μήν καί τό άμέριστον
ευθύς ϊσταται κατ’ αυτό τό είναι, καί εΐ μέν γίνοιτο άεί, ούκέτι
σφζει τό είδος- εί δέ σφζειν τό είδος διαρρήδην λέγοιτο, ούκ αν
άεί γίνοιτο. κάν λέγοι ούν, φησίν, ότι τό νΰν άμα νοούμενον καί
λεγόμενον παρελήλυθεν, έν τοΐς μετέχουσι τοΰ χρόνου2 δει τήν 25
τοιαύτην έκστασιν ύποτίθεσθαι- τά γάρ γινόμενα ού δύναται τήν
άμέριστον ούσίαν-1 άκινήτως δέξασθαι, άλλοτε δέ άλλοις μέρεσι
τοΐς έαυτών εκείνης έφαπτόμενα τό αυτών πάθημα έκείνης κατα-
ψεύδεται-4 διόπερ καί ή μέν κατ’ αριθμόν έτερότης άεί άλλοιου-
μένη τής των μετεχόντων έστιν διαφορότητος δείγμα, τό δέ είδος 30
ταύτό μένον τήν του άμεροΰς νΰν5 ένδείκνυται ταυτότητα.® καί
λέγεται γε ταΰτα καλώς, εί τό έστώς έν τή ροή τής γενέσεως
δυνηθείημεν τφ λογισμφ συλλαβεΐν- όταν δέ λέγη, φησίν, ό
Άρχύτας, ώς ό έν τφ νΰν χρόνος καί ό μέλλων ούκ έστιν ό αύτός
τφ προγεγονότι (ό μέν γάρ άπογέγονεν καί ούκέτι έστιν, ό δέ 35
άμα νοούμενος καί ένεστηκώς παρώχηκεν), δεϊται διορισμοΰ,
φησίν, τά τοιαΰτα πρός τήν τελείαν σαφήνειαν, καί ρητέον
<τόν> αυτόν τε είναι τόν άπαντα χρόνον καί ού τόν αύτόν.
ώσπερ καί τό νΰν- κατά μέν γάρ τήν ουσίαν καί τό είδος έν καί
ταύτόν,7 καθό δέ διαιρεί τό παρεληλυθός καί τό μέλλον, πολλά 40
in the essence,' and he determines the unreal with respect to the
downward tendency issuing from being into becoming. The indivi­
sible as a property of time, as Iamblichus says, will thus not be
unreal nor will the real be unreal (which is a contradiction in terms),
but the indivisible and the unreal are separate, cbeing attributes>
of different natures, some of which are more noble while others
defect from their higher nature and are therefore called unreal, not
because they are not existent altogether, but because they do not
preserve the first essence in purity and immaculateness. For this
is the character of everything that has its being in becoming and
cannot be properly called either being or non-being. As the time
passed is not any longer and the future time is not yet, only the
indivisible present seems to be, taken as Now, and in the moment
of its being it goes over into non-being; that is the reason why he
< A rchytas> says that time has simultaneously the property of the
indivisible and the unreal.
But Iamblichus does not agree with those who attribute the indivisible
to the flowing and generated time and who call it < th e indivisible>
unreal because it never is but always becomes. ‘Everything becoming',
he says, ‘or being in any way in motion can not be indivisible. For
every motion is always divisible because of its continuity. The indi­
visible. however, is naturally static with respect to its own being, and
if it were always becoming it could not preserve its form. But if
it is explicitly said to preserve its form, it can not always become.
And if he says that the Now, while being apprehended and spoken
of, is < already> in the past, one should rather postulate such an
onward movement with regard to tilings participating in time.2 For
the things becoming can not receive the indivisible essence3 without
being in motion, and as, at any different moment, a different part
of them touches this essence, their affection is falsely attributed to
it.4 Thus the always changing numerical otherness is evidence of the
mutability of the participating things, but the form remains the
same and indicates the identity of the indivisible Now.5-fi And this
could well be expressed, if we could grasp in one thought that which
is static within the flux of becoming. When Archytas says that the
present time and the future time are not the same as the time passed
(the one has passed and is no more whereas the other has already
receded while simultaneously being apprehended and being present),
one has for the sake of complete clearness to make a distinction
and to say that the whole of time is the same and not the same,
just like the Now; they are one and the same with respect to essence
and form,7 and they are many and ditferent with regard to what
καί έτερα, ώσπερ καί αΐ στιγμαί σχεδόν τι πΰσαι μία, τη θέσει
δέ καί τη διαιρέσει πλείους καί ούχ αί αΰταί· ή γάρ διαιρούσαν
έννοοΰμεν τήν στιγμήν, δύο γίνονται ή μία, ή μέν ώς έσχατον,
ή δέ ώς πρώτον, καί ούτως άεί συνάπτει καί συνέχει τόν όλον
χρόνον έν έαυτώ τό νυν έτερον καί έτερον τή διαιρέσει γινόμε- 5
νον, τώ δέ εϊδει τό αύτό μένον. καν γίνεσθαι οΰν καί φθείρεσθαι
λέγη τό νΰν, ούκ αύτοΰ τοϋ νϋν τήν γένεσιν καί φθοράν άκουσ-
τέον, αλλά των μετεχόντων αύτοϋ ή ού μετεχόντων- τό μέν γάρ
συνέχειν καί συνάπτειν ούκ άλλου τινός έστιν ή τοϋ άμεροΰς.
τό δέ άλλο καί άλλο γίνεσθαι καί φθείρεσθαι καί τό άεί ρεΐν 10
τής έν τή γενέσει μετουσίας τού νΰν έστιν οίκειότατον. πώς ούν
τό αύτό καί άλλο καί άλλο γίνεται καί μένει τό αυτό κατ’ είδος,
καί διαιρείται καί έστιν αδιαίρετον, καί αλλοιούται καί έν ένί
τό πέρας καί τήν αρχήν συνείληφεν; ή ότι άλλο μέν ήν τό έν
τή φύσει μετεχόμενον νΰν καί άχώριστον δν των γινομένων, άλλο 15
δέ τό χωριστόν καί καθ’ εαυτό, καί τό μέν έν εϊδει τώ αύτφ
έστηκεν ώσαύτως, τό δέ έν φορά συνεχεΐ θεωρείται.1 έπεί δέ τά
δύο ταΰτα όμοϋ συνείληπται έν τή τού νϋν άρχή τή συνεχούσή
τόν χρόνον, πάνυ σαφώς διά τοϋτο γραμμής ευθείας κλασθείσης
εις γωνίαν2 σημείφ περί δ ή κλάσις άπείκασεν τοϋ χρόνου τό 20
νΰν ώσπερ γάρ τό σημεΐον ής μέν άρχή γίνεται γραμμής, ής δέ
πέρας, οΰτω καί τό νΰν τήν άρχήν καί τό τέλος τοϋ χρόνου
παντός έν έαυτφ συνείληφεν, ούχ ώς συμβεβηκός τι, άλλ’ ώς
συνέχον αύτόν καί τήν <ούσίαν>3 αύτοϋ έν έαυτώ περιέχον καί
παρεχόμενον έξ έαυτοΰ. ού τοίνυν ώς μή δντος τοϋ νΰν έξηγεΐσ- 25
θαι χρή· τό γάρ κατ’ είδος έν αύτοϋ μένει τό αύτό, δπερ κυριώ-
τερόν έστι τής κατ’ αριθμόν έτερότητος. άλλα συνάπτειν φασί
τά πέρατα των μή δντων. άλλα ούκ έν τοΐς μή ουσιν, φαμέν,
διαπεφόρηται, έν έαυτώ δέ καί τά μή δντα συνέχει, καί καθ’
εαυτό έστιν έχον τινά ιδίαν ούσίαν. συνεχής δέ έστιν ό χρόνος, 30
ού μέντοι διά πέρατος άεί γινομένου καί άπολλυμένου συνέχεται*
έστηκεν γάρ τοϋτο έν τώ οίκείω εϊδει, ΐνα καί δντως ή συνεχής
καί άεί συνέχηται. περί άλλο δέ νΰν θεωρείται τό κατ’ άριθμόν
άλλο καί άλλο γινόμενον, δπερ ήδη θέσιν προσείληφεν καί σύν-
divides past and future, in the same way as generally speaking the
points < o f a line> are all one, but as regards position and division
they are many and not the same. Insofar as we apprehend the point
as dividing, the one becomes two, one being the last and the other
being the first, and thus the Now, which successively becomes different
through division but remains the same in its form, holds together
in itself the whole of time and makes it continuous. And if one says
that the Now becomes and disappears, one has to understand this
not with regard to the Now itself but with regard to the things which
participate in it or do not participate in it. For to hold together
and to make continuous is a property of the indivisible only, whereas
to become one thing after another and to perish and always to
flow is most characteristic of the participation of the Now in
becoming.
How can the same successively become different and remain the
same according to its form, be divided and be indivisible, change
and combine in one the end and the beginning? The answer is that
the Now which is participated in nature and is not separate from
the things which are in a state of becoming is different from the
Now which is separate and subsists in itself, the latter being at rest
with regard to its form while the former is seen to be in continuous
motion.1 But since these two are combined together in the principle
of the Now which makes time continuous, it is completely clear
that because of this he <A rchytas> likened the Now of time to
the point at which a breaking occurs, < the reference being> to a
straight line broken in such a way that it forms an angle.2 For just
as the point becomes the beginning of one line and the end of another,
the Now combines in itself the beginning and the end of all time,
not as an accidens of some kind but because it holds time together
and encompasses in itself < the essence of tim e> 2 and produces it
out of itself. One should thus not make an interpretation in which
the Now is supposed not to be. For its oneness remains the same
according to form, and this ranks higher than the numerical otherness.
But they say that the limits of those <parts of tim e> that are not.
are contiguous. We, however, say that it is not dispersed in those
< p arts of tim e> that are not, for it not only holds together in itself
those which are not, but has also per se some essence of its own.
Time is coherent, but it is not held together by a permanent becom­
ing and perishing of the limit. The limit is at rest in its own form
in order to be indeed coherent and always to remain so. In another
context the Now is seen as something which successively becomes
different numerically, something which moreover has acquired a
 ταξιν έχει πρός τά γινόμενα, οθεν δή, εΐ μέν τό νϋν λαμβάνοι
τις ώς μέρος χρόνου, λήψεται αυτό ώς συμφυές δν πρός τήν
κίνησιν· εΐ μέντοι μηδέ χρόνον αύτό είναι άποφαίνοιντο, ώσπερ
ήδη τινές1 περί αΰτοΰ διέγνωσαν, αρχή έσται τοϋ χρόνου χω­
ριστή καί τφ εΐδει ή αυτή διαμένει, καί όταν ούν λέγηται τό μέν 5
παρεληλυθός του χρόνου οϋκέτι είναι, τό δέ μέλλον ουπω είναι,
ίστέον ώς ταϋτα κατά τά νϋν λέγεται τά προϊόντα έξω καί συμ-
φερόμενα τή κινήσει καί μετά τής φοράς συναλλοιούμενα, τά
δέ έν τφ νϋν περιεχόμενα καί άιρωρισμένα έν αΰτφ καί μηδέποτε
έξιστάμενα τής οικείας αρχής, ταϋτα έν τφ νϋν άεί διαμένει, ίο
οθεν δή καί εικότως αϊώνος εϊκών κινητή ύ χρόνος άφώρισται,
ώς τής ψυχής πρός τόν νοϋν άπεικασΟείσης καί των λόγων αυτής
πρός τάς νοήσεις Καί τοϋ νϋν πρός τό έν ένΐ μένον- άπεικάσθη
δέ καί τό περιεκτικόν τοϋ χρόνου <πρόςτό έκείνου> άμα καί άεί
<τά όντα>2 έν έαυτφ περιέχον καί τό τούτου κινούμενον πρός 15
τό έκείνου έστηκός καί τό κατ’ αριθμόν τής γενέσεως μέτρον
πρός τό καθ' έν τών ουσιών.”3

Simpl., Ό μέντοι θείος Ιάμβλιχος έν τφ πρώτιρ τών εις τάς Κατηγορίας

Phys., υπομνημάτων τόν Άρχύταν όρίζεσθαί φησι τόν χρόνον ώς έστι
786,11 -
788,33 “κινάσιός τις αριθμός ή καί καθόλω διάσταμα τάς τώ παντός 20
φύσιος” . έξηγεΐται δέ τόν ορισμόν αυτός, ώς κινήσεως μέν εϊρηταί
τίνος ούχί μιας τών πολλών (αί γάρ άλλαι χρόνου λελεΐψονται)
ουδέ τής τών πολλών κοινότητος (αϋτη γάρ ού μία), άλλα τής
τφ όντι μιδς καί πασών τών άλλων προϋπαρχούσης οΐον μονάδος
τών κινήσεων, ή έστι πρώτη δικαίως καί αιτία πασών ή ψυχική 25
κατά τήν προβολήν τών λόγων εκφυόμενη πρώτη μεταβολή,
ταύτης δή αριθμός ούκ έπιγινόμενος ουδέ έξωθεν, ώς ό 'Αρισ­
τοτέλης οϊεται. αλλά προτεταγμένος αυτής έν αιτίας τάξει καί
προποδίζων αυτήν κατά μέτρα τά πρόσφορα ουσία ών ούσιώδη
οδσαν ένέργειαν οΐον έκμαιευομένη τών ψυχής ουσιωδών λόγων 30
τάς αύτοκινήτους προβολάς. “τό δέ καθόλου διάστημα τής τοϋ
παντός «ρύσεως υποληπτέον, φησί. τούς άρχαίους λέγειν τό έν
τοΐς λόγοις θε«ορούμενον συνεχές αυτών καί εις μερισμόν διισ-
τάμενον. ό γάρ έπί τών έν γενέσει μεταβολών έπιδείκνυσι τούτου
position and possesses an order with regard to becoming. Hence,
if one takes the Now as part of time, one understands it as some­
thing naturally united with motion. But if one docs not regard it
as lime, as some people1 have said about it, it is a separate principle
of time and remains the same in its form. And if it is slated that
the past time does not exist any more and the future is not yet exist­
ent. one has to know that this is stated with regard to the Nows
that proceed outwards and are carried on together with the motion
and change together in this motion. But that which is contained
in the Now and defined in it and never departs from its proper
nature — this persists always in the Now. That is why time reason­
ably was defined as the moving image of eternity, inasmuch as
the soul is modelled upon the intellect and the thoughts of the soul
upon the intellections and the Now upon that which rests in the
One. That which encompasses time is made to resemble the time
of the intellectual world, which encompasses simultaneously and
everlastingly < th e things that a re> ,2 and the moving time of this
world is modelled upon the static time of the intellectual world, and
the numerical measure of becoming is modelled upon the Oneness
of the essences C that really a re > .’3

The divine Iamblichus in his first commentary to the Categoriae

says that Archytas defines time as ‘a kind of number of movement
and the general interval of the nature of the universe’. He interprets
the definition < by pointing out> that the movement referred to
here is not one among many (for the others too require time) nor
is it the communion of many movements (for such a communion
would not be one), but he refers to the movement which in reality
is one, and which exists prior to all the others, as a kind of monad
of motions. This is the first change of the soul growing out of the
projection of thoughts; it is justly primary and the cause of all mo­
tions. The number of this motion does not originate as something
secondary or from outside, as Aristotle believes, but ranks higher
than it in the causal order and makes it progress according to
suitable measures; for it is an essence and thus makes this essence-
like activity progress and in a sense brings to birth the selfmoving
projections of the essential thoughts of the soul. He says that ‘one
should suppose that in saying “ the general extension of the nature
of the universe” the ancients have in mind something conceived in
thoughts which is both continuous and separated into parts. Evidence
of this is the change in becoming from the previous Now to the
present Now and from the previous movement to the present move-
τοϋ νϋν παρά τό πρόσθεν vOv καί ταύτης τής κινήσεως παρά τήν
πρόσθεν κίνησιν, τοϋτο δή πολύ πρότερον καί άρχηγικώτερον
έπί τής ουσίας των όλων φυσικών λόγων προϋπάρχον θεωρείται,
καί κυρίως συμπληροϊ τό διάστημα τοΰ πρεσβυτάτου πάντων
χρόνου τοϋ συνεχίζοντος τούς τής φύσεως λόγους, συμφωνεί δέ, 5
φησί, πρός τό αύτό καί ή τών ετι παλαιοτέρων δόξα, οί μέν γάρ,
ώσπερ καί τοϋνομα δηλοΐ. χορεία τινϊ τοϋ νϋν,1 οί δέ ταΐς τής
ψυχής περιόδους, οί δέ τή τούτων φυσική χώρα, οί δέ ταϊς
έγκυκλίοις περκροραΐς τον χρόνον άφωρίσαντο, & πάντα περι-
είληφεν ή Πυθαγόρειος αΐρεσις. καί νϋν μέν, φησίν, ώς δύο τούς 10
ορούς διωρθωσάμεθα ταΐς έξηγήσεσι, δει δέ εϊς έν συνελεΐν
άμφοτέρους τούτους τούς λόγους καί ώς συνεχή καί διωρισμένον
άμα τόν χρόνον ποιέίν, εί καί συνεχής έστι κυριώτερον.” 2 οΰτω
μέν ούν ό ’Ιάμβλιχος τόν ψυχικόν καί τόν φυσικόν χρόνον ύπό
τοϋ Άρχύτου παραδεδόσθαι φησί. διά δέ τής έμπροσθεν ύπ’ έμοϋ 15
παρατεθείσης τοϋ Άρχύτου ρήσεως τήν είς τό εκτός έκφαινο-
μένην τοϋ χρόνου ένέργειαν δηλοϋσθαί φησιν, ού τοίνυν μόνον
άξιοΰντος ύφεστηκέναι τοϋ Άρχύτου, αλλά καί χρόνον είναι
προηγούμενον έν τοϊς ουσι κατά τήν έαυτοϋ τάξιν εύ διακείμενον,
πρός ήν άναφέρεται τό πρότερον καί δεύτερον τών ήμετέρων 20
πράξεων, οπερ ούκ άν ήν μή προϋφεστώτος τοϋ χρόνου, τό δέ
άμερές καί άνυπόστατον ό ’Ιάμβλιχος έπ’ άλλου καί άλλου χρό­
νου άκούειν άξιοι κατά μέν τά είδη τών λόγων τά έστώτα έν
έαυτοΐς τό άμερές άφοριζόμενος, κατά δέ τάς προϊούσας άπ’
αύτών κινήσεις, επειδή αύται ού διασφζουσι τήν άμέριστον και 25
άκίνητον ουσίαν, τό άνυπόστατον. καί κατά μέν τήν μένουσαν
έν ούσίαις ένέργειαν καί τελειότητα τό άμερές. κατά δέ τήν
έξιοϋσαν είς γένεσιν ροπήν από τοϋ δντος τό άνυπόστατον, ότι
τό τής πρώτης ούσίας καθαρόν ού διέσωσε, “καί ποϋ, φησί, δει
νοεΐν τήν τοΰ χρόνου ροήν τε καί έκστασιν; έν τοΐς μετέχουσιν 30
αύτοΰ φήσομεν. γινόμενα γάρ ταΰτα αεί ού δύναται τήν έκείνου
σταθεράν ούσίαν άκινήτως δέξασθαι, άλλοτε δέ άλλοις μέρεσι
τοϊς εαυτών έκείνης έφαπτόμενα τό εαυτών πάθημα έκείνης κατα-
ψεύδεται. καί τό γίνεσθαι νϋν τούτοις υπάρξει τοΐς άεί μετέχουσι
<τοϋ νϋν, ή δέ έν τοΐς άλλοτε άλλως έχουσι καθ’ έν συνεχές 35
ταυτότης> τοΰ νϋν άμεροΰς έστιν ίδια, καί άπ’ αύτοϋ ένδίδοται
τοΐς άλλοτε άλλοις γινομένοις. διόπερ καί ή μέν κατ’ άριθμόν
έτερότης άεί άλλοιουμένη τής τών μετεχόντων έστί διαφορότητος
δείγμα, τό δέ είδος ταύτό μένον τήν τοΰ άμεροΰς νϋν ένδείκνυται
mcnt. But this is to be conceived as by far prior and more pre-eminent,
pre-existing in the essence of all the natural thoughts, and fills com­
pletely the extension of time which is senior to all the other things
and makes the thoughts of nature continuous. The doctrine of
those who are even more ancient is in accordance with this, he says.
Some of them defined time, as indicated by the word itself, by some
kind of circular dance of the Now,1 others by periods of the soul,
again others by the natural position of these periods, finally some
defined it by means of circular revolutions; all these are included
in the Pythagorean doctrine. At present, he says, we have through
our interpretation reduced the definitions to two, both of which
however should be contracted into one and time made simultaneously
continuous and divided, although the continuous aspect is more
fundamental.’2 And so Iamblichus says that Archytas in this way
accounted for the psychical and physical time. He says that in the
words of Archytas, quoted by me earlier, the activity of time revealed
outwardly is made evident, but that Archytas does not believe that
time simply exists but believes that it is also antecedent in the beings,
well arranged according to its own order to which the earlier and
later of our actions are referred; this could not have been the case
were time not pre-existent. Iamblichus wishes the indivisible and
unreal to be taken to apply to two different sorts of time, and he
defines the indivisible according to the forms of thoughts that are
static in themselves, and the unreal according to the motions pro­
ceeding from them, because these motions do not preserve the indi­
visible and immobile essence. The indivisible is related to the activity
and perfection which rest in the essences, whereas the unreal is
related to the downward tendency which goes forth from being to
generation because it has not preserved the purity of the first essence.
‘And where', he says, ‘has one to conceive the flux and onward
movement of time? The answer is: in the things participating in
time. For these are always becoming and can not receive the static
essence of time without being in motion, and, as at any different
moment a different part of them touches this essence, their affection
is falsely attributed to it. The becoming Now is an inherent attribute
of those which always participate in the Now, but the identity cor­
responding to the continuous Oneness of those which at any different
moment are in different states is a property of the indivisible Now
and is communicated from it to those which are generated at always
different moments. Thus the always changing numerical otherness
is evidence of the mutability of the participating things, but the
form remains the same and indicates the identity of the indivisible
ταυτότητα.” 1 οΰτω μύν ουν ό ’Ιάμβλιχος τόν Ά ρχύταν έξηγήσατο
καί άλλα πολλά τη εξηγήσει προσευπορήσας.
Ό δέ Δαμάσκιος οίμαι καν χθαμαλώτερον. άλλ' οΐκειότερόν γε
πρός τήν Άρχύτου λέξιν αριθμόν μέν τίνος κινήσεως ακούει θύ­
της ώς είδους καί ακινήτου, άλλα τής μεταβολικής. ώστε οΰ τής 5
ψυχικής μόνης, αλλά πάσης ομοίως μεταβολής (ίσως δέ καί ότι
άτόμων άεί καί άτομος ή μεταβολή, διά τούτο τινός· τό γάρ
καθόλου άμετάβλητον), καθόλου δέ διάστημα τής τού παντός
ψύσεως, ότι ού μόνης κινήσεως αλλά καί ηρεμίας, όπερ καί
’Αριστοτέλης καλώς νοήσας είπεν ότι “τούτο έστι” τη κινήσει 10
“τό έν χρόνφ είναι τό μετρεΐσθαι αυτής τό είναι' δήλον ότι καί
τοΐς αλλοις τούτό έστι τό έν χρόνφ είναι τό μετρεΐσθαι αυτών
τό είναι ύπό τού χρόνου.” ώστε καί τής ήρεμίας ή τού είναι
διάστασις όπό τού χρόνου μετρεΐται. ώσπερ και εί τής κινήσεως
ό χρόνος λέγεται, τής παρατάσεως2 λέγεται ταΰτης τής τού είναι 15
τής έν γενέσει. καί έοικεν ’Αριστοτέλης τό διάστημα τής φύσεως
εις τήν παράτασιν2 τού είναι τού έκαστου μεταλαβεΐν. εΐπών* ουν
αριθμόν κινήσεως έπί κοινότερόν τι μετήλθε τό διάστημα τής
φύσεως τό τοΐς γινομένοις οικείοι·, όπερ καί έπί ήρεμίας θεω­
ρείται καί όλως πάσης γενητής τε καί φυσικής ουσίας, διό καί 20
ούτως εϊπε^ “καί καθόλου τό διάστημα τής τού παντός φύσειος”
οις έν τοΐς φυσικοΐς μάλιστα θεωρεΐσθαι τόν χρόνον βουλόμενος.
καί γάρ καί ή ψυχή χρόνου μετέχει καθόσον φύσεως καί γενέ-
σεως κοινωνεΐ ώσπερ αΐώνος, όταν εις τό όντως δν άναδράμη.
καί οΐκειότερον δέ τώ χρόνφ τό διάστημά έστιν ήπερ αριθμός* 25
οό γάρ ώς αί μονάδες διεστήκασιν άλλήλων, οϋτω καί τά νΰν
οΰ γάρ παρεμπίπτει τι μεταξύ των νΰν, δ μή νυν έστι. διό καί
συνεχής ό χρόνος άλλ’ ού διορισμένος, ώς ό λόγος όνόμασι καί
ρήμασι καί συλλαβαΐς καί στοιχείοις καί ή αρμονία τοΐς φθόγ-
γοις. έπειδή δέ καί άλλο διάστημα τό μεγεθικόν ήν, προσέθηκε 30
“τής τού παντός φύσεως” φύσιν καλέσας τήν τού γινομένου άπό
τού δντος έκφυσιν άεί γινόμενη ν καί ρέουσαν. καί προελθών
έτι σαφέστερον έποίησεν, ότι ού κατά μέγεθος ώρισε τό διά­
στημα, άλλά κατά τήν τού άεί συνέχειαν, “άμερές” δέ καί “άνυ-
πόστατον” καλεϊ τόν χρόνον, διότι κατά τό νύν αύτόν όρδ τό 35
άδιάστατον, άνυπόστατον δέ, οτι ούχ υπομένει τό αύτό τφ αριθ­
μώ' τοιαύτη γάρ ή φύσις τών έν τφ γίνεσθαι τό είναι έχόντων.
Now.'1 Thus Iamblichus interpreted Archytas and added many ob­
servations of his own to this interpretation.
Damascius, on the other hand, seems to me to understand time in
a more pedestrian way which, however, better fits the text of Archy­
tas, namely as the number of a certain movement, not that of the
form and the immobile but that of change: not only change of
the soul but of every kind of change alike (perhaps because change
always concerns individuals and is individual, he says ‘a certain kind*
of movement, for the universal is unchanging). Time is the general
extension of the nature of the universe, that is to say not only of
movement but also of rest. This has been rightly understood by
Aristotle who said: ‘For movement being in time means the fact
that its existence is measured; but it is obvious that for other things
too being in time means the fact that their existence is measured by
time' <Phys., 221a. 6 > . Thus also the extension of the existence of
rest is measured by time: in the same way that one talks about time
as connected with movement one has in mind the continuance2 of
the existence of movement in becoming. Aristotle seems to have
understood the extension of nature in the sense of the continuance2
of the existence of each individual. Talking3 about the number of
movement he < Archytas ? > followed a more general concept, namely
the extension of nature proper to all things becoming, which is also
understood with regard to rest, and generally to the whole essence
of becoming and growth. Therefore he speaks3 of time as ‘being the
general extension of the nature of the universe', because he wanted
time to be considered mainly in relation to physical phenomena.
For the soul too participates in time, insofar as it takes part in nature
and generation just as it takes part in eternity, when it ascends again
into the real being. Extension is more adequate to time than number.
For the different Nows arc not separated from each other like the
monads, because nothing falls between two Nows which is not itself
a Now. Therefore time is continuous and not divisible into dis­
continuous parts like a sentence into nouns and words and syllables
and letters, and like harmony into sounds. However, as the quan­
titative extension is of a different kind, he added the words ‘the
nature of the universe', calling 'nature' the always becoming and
flowing outgrowth of existence from being. And later on he made
it still clearer that ‘extension’ is defined here not in the sense of a
quantity, but in the sense of a continuity of everlastingness. He calls
time ‘indivisible’ and ‘unreal’, because he sees it from the point of
view of the extensionless Now, and because it lacks reality, not
remaining numerically the same. For this is the nature of things
 . . . . k, j λ m . iw ·« · ( f c y p i u i v / i t · ) '^

διό καί κίνησις καί τό πρότερον καί ύστερον εν τούτοις. καί δρα
ότι όταν μέν άμερές καί άνυπόστατον λέγη τόν χρόνον καί δταν
τόν έν τφ νΟν χρόνον διαφέρειν λέγη του παρωχημένου, ταύτόν
λέγει τό νδν τφ χρόνφ· δταν δέ πέρας τοΰ παρφχημένου χρόνου
καί αρχήν τοΰ μέλλοντος λέγη τό νυν, τότε έτερον, καί δταν τό 5
μέν νΰν αδιαίρετον λέγη, τόν δέ χρόνον συνεχή, καί δταν τόν
χρόνον αριθμόν όρίζηται- τό γάρ νΰν ούκ civ εί'ποι αριθμόν
αδιαίρετον ό ν έοικεν ουν καί Ά ρχύτας, ώσπερ καί ’Αριστοτέλης
τήν των νΰν συνεχή καί άδιάκοπον ροήν τίθεσθαι τόν χρόνον
καί τούτον μάλιστα παραδιδόναι τόν τή γενέσει σύστοιχον καί 10
κυρίως λεγόμενον χρόνον εικόνα όντως τοΰ αΐώνος.

Μετά δέ τόν Πλωτΐνον καί ό ’Ιάμβλιχος ήμΐν ήκέτω φώς άνάψων

καί αυτός ταΐς ήμετέραις νοήσεσι. λέγει ούν καί αυτός περί τοΰ
πρώτου καί άμεθέκτου χρόνου1 έν τφ εις τάς Κατηγορίας2 ύπο-
μνήματι τήν Άρχύτου λέξιν έξηγούμενος· ουδέ γάρ ώς ή τοΰ 15
λύχνου <ρλόξ ούτως ή τοΰ άμεροϋς ένέργεια άεΐ γίνεται- ούτε γάρ
αισθητή αΰτη γε ούτε ρέουσα μένει τε έν τφ προϊέναι άεί τέ έστι
καί άεί ένεργεΐ καί ούδέποτε γίνεται, προέστηκε δέ έν τφ άκι-
νήτω ούσα άγένητος έν τφ αύτφ κατ’ άριθμόν εΐδει καί άφθαρτος,
αλλά γίνεσθαί φησιν άεί τό νΰν. οίμαι δέ αύτόθεν φαίνεσθαι, ιός 20
τό γινόμενον ποτέ ήρξατο γίνεσθαί καί ούκ άεί γίνεται, καί δτι
τό νΰν έστι καί ού γίνεται, εΐ δέ γίνεται έν παρατάσει έχον τό
κινεΐσθαι, ου γίνεται έν τφ νΰν. ήρεμία γάρ μάλλον θεωρείται
κατά τό νΰν καί οΰ κίνησις. άλλά συνεχές τί φησι καί κινήσεως
μέτρον συνεχούς, καί αίτιον γεννητικόν τοΰ χρόνου τό άμερές 25
ύποληπτέον. ποΰ τοίνυν ό ρέων καί γινόμενος χρόνος; ή έν τοΐς
μετέχουσι. “γινόμενα γάρ, φησί, ταΰτα άεί ού δύναται τήν εκείνου
σταθερόν ουσίαν άκινήτως δέξασθαι, άλλοτε δέ άλλοις μέρεσι
τοΐς εαυτών εκείνης έφαπτόμενα τό έαυτών πάθημα έκείνης κατα-
ψεύδεται. καί τό γίνεσθαί ούν τούτοις υπάρξει τοΐς άεί μετέχουσι 30
τοΰ νΰν, ή δέ έν τοΐς άλλοτε άλλως έχουσι καθ’ έν συνεχές
ταυτότης τοΰ νΰν άμεροΰς ιδία.” 3 έοικε δή έν τούτοις έν μέν τό
πρό των μετεχόντων νΰν άγένητον ύποτίθεσθαι, έκ δέ τούτου τά
having their being in becoming, and therefore they contain also
movement and earlier and later. And one must bear in mind that
he identifies time and Now when saying that time is without parts
and unreal, and when stating that the present lime differs from the
past, but that he means something else when stating that the Now
is the end of the past time and the beginning of the future and when
saying that the Now is indivisible but that time is continuous, and
when defining time as number. As the Now is indivisible he could
not apply to it the term ‘number’. It thus seems that Archytas, like
Aristotle, defined time as a continuous and uninterrupted flux, and
in particular and in the first instance interpreted the time corres­
ponding to generation as the real image of eternity.

After Plotinus Iamblichus should come, as he too may bring light

to our reflexions. He speaks in his commentary' on the Categoriae,2
interpreting the passage in Archytas about the first and unparticipated
time.* The activity of the indivisible is not of the same kind as the
flame of a lamp, for it is not perceptible nor does it remain in a
state of flux and progress, but it is always in being and always actual
and never in the state of becoming; it stands out as being in the
immobile, ungenerated in a numerically identical form, and incor­
ruptible. On the other hand, he says, the Now is always in a state
of becoming. I believe however that it would appear from this that
what is in a state of becoming, began to become once upon a time
and is not always in a slate of becoming, and that the Now is and
does not become. For whatever becomes, having its motion in dura­
tion, does not become in the Now. For rest rather than motion
must be seen in the Now. But he says that the indivisible is to be
conceived as something continuous and as a measure of the conti­
nuous motion as well as the generating cause of time. Where then
is the flowing and becoming time? Certainly in the participating
things. ‘These < th e participating things>’, he says, ‘are always
becoming and can not receive the static essence of time without
being in motion, but they touch the essence of time at any different
moment with different parts and thus their affection is falsely attri­
buted to time. Becoming is therefore an inherent attribute of things
always participating in the Now, but the identity corresponding to
a continuous Oneness of those being in different states at any different
moment is a property of the indivisible Now.’3 In these words there
seems to be the assumption of one ungenerated Now of a higher
order than the participating things, and on this are dependent the
Nows which are accorded to the participating things. And just as
 τοΐς μετέχουσιν ένδιδόμενα. ώς δέ τό νϋν, οϋτω καί ό χρόνος
είς μέν ό πρό των χρονιζομένων, πολλοί δέ οί έν τοΐς μετέχουσι
γινόμενοι, έν οις δή καί ό μέν παρεληλυθώς. ό δέ ένεστώς, ό δέ
μέλλων. “ού κατά εύτρεπισμόν, φησίν, ώς τινες οΐονται, των
ήμετέρων πράξεων, αλλά καθ’ ύπόστασιν χρόνου τάς ήμετέρας 5
πράξεις εύ διατάττοντος. ουδέ γάρ τό πρώτον καί δεύτερον,
φησίν, τών πράξεων οΐόν τε συλλογίζεσθαι μή ύφεστώτος τοΰ
χρόνου καθ’ εαυτόν, προς όν άναφέρεται τό τεταγμένον τών
πράξεων, ότι δέ περιεκτικός ό χρόνος κατ’ αυτόν τής ψυχής,
εκείνη δηλώσει ή λέξις “εικότως άρα αίώνος είκοόν κινητή άφώ- 10
ρισται ό χρόνος, ώς τής ψυχής πρός τόν νοϋν άπεικασΟείσης
καί τών λόγων αυτής πρός τάς νοήσεις άφομοιωθέντων, καί τοΰ
νϋν άμεροϋς έν αυτή πρός τό έν ένί μένον καί τό περιεκτικόν
πάντων τούτου πρός τό εκείνου άμα καί άεί τά όντα έν έαυτφ
περιέχον καί πρός τό έκείνου έστηκός καί τό τοΰδε κινούμενον 15
άπεικασθέν καί πρός τό μέτρον τών ουσιών τό τής γενέσεως
μέτρον άποτυπωθέν.” δήλος ούν έστι τόν μέν αιώνα τών όντως
όντων περιεκτικόν μέτρον τιθέμενος, τόν δέ χρόνον1 ουσίαν μέν
αυτόν,2 μετρούσαν δέ τήν γένεσιν, πρώτην μέν τήν ψυχικήν, από
δέ ταύτης τήν άπ’ αύτής προΐοΰσαν, ένθα λοιπόν κινήσει σύστοι- 20
χος καί ανυπόστατος έστιν ό χρόνος ώς έν τώ γίνεσθαι τό είναι
έχων. βούλεται δέ ού τό νϋν ένεστηκέναι μόνον, αλλά καί χρόνον
μεταξύ δύο περάτων. προσκείσθω δέ καί τά άπό τών είς Τίμαιον
υπομνημάτων, έν τοίνυν τώ όγδόφ βιβλίω τώ Πλάτωνι μάλιστα
παρακολουθών τήν πρός τόν αιώνα τοϋ χρόνου συνάρτησιν 25
παραδίδωσι. διό καί περί έκείνου μάλιστα ποιείται τόν λόγον
τοϋ έξηρημένου μέν άπό τοϋ κόσμου, πάσης δέ τής έν αύτώ
κινήσεως τά μέτρα περιέχοντός τε καί χορηγοϋντος, ός άλλος
αν είη οδτος παρά τόν ύπό τών φυσικών ζητούμενον χρόνον,
λέγει δέ καί έν τώ ς’ κεφαλαίφ ταΰτα- “τήν δέ ούσίαν αύτοϋ τήν 30
κατ’ ένέργειαν τή προΐούση διακοσμήσει καί συνταττομένη πρός
τά δη μιουργούμενα καί αχώριστα) τών άποτελουμένων ύφ’ έαυτής
ύπαρχούση ταύτη συντάττομεν. τόν γάρ διάκοσμον άμα ούρανόν
ποιεΐν δηλοΐ τούτο, ότι συντέτακται τή διακοσμήσει τή άπό τοΰ
δημιουργού προελθούση καί ή τοϋ χρόνου ύπόστασις· καί δήτα 35
καί αΰτη προηγείται τής τοΰ ούρανοϋ περιόδου, ώσπερ δή καί ή
Γ in the case of the Now there is one time of a higher order than the
tilings made temporal, and many times which arc in a state of be­
coming in the participating things, with respect to which there is a
past, a present, and a future time. ‘N ot’, so he says, ‘as some
believe, in accordance with the performance of our actions, but
in accordance with the reality of time which brings about a well-
orderedness of our actions.’ ‘For’, he says, ‘it would be impossible
to reckon actions as earlier and later, had time not existed by itself,
to which one has to refer the order of actions.’ And the following
^ words make it clear that time encompasses the soul: ‘Reasonably
time is defined as the moving image of eternity inasmuch as the soul
• is modelled upon the intellect and its thoughts are made to resemble
, the intellections, as the indivisible Now which is in the soul is made
to resemble the Now which rests in the One; as the time which
encompasses all things in this world is made to resemble the time
of the intellectual world which encompasses, simultaneously and ever­
lastingly, the things which really are < an d do not become>; as the
moving time of this world is modelled upon the static time of the
intellectual world, and as the measure of becoming is made to repre­
sent the measure of the essences < th a t really a re > .’ It is therefore
evident that he regards eternity as an encompassing measure of the
things which really are, whereas he regards time1 on the other hand
as an essence which really is,2 but which measures becoming, in the
first place the becoming of the soul, and in the second place the
becoming proceeding from it, and there finally time corresponds to
motion and is unreal, having its being in becoming. He wants not
only the Now to be in the present, but also the time in the interval
between two limits. Something should be added to this from his
commentary on the Timaeus. In the eighth book he follows Plato
above all in propounding the connection between time and eternity.
Accordingly he discusses above all the intellectual time which trans­
cends the cosmos and encompasses and provides the measures of
. all the movements that arc in it. This time is different from the time
which the physicists inquire into. In the sixth chapter he makes
the following statement: ‘We coordinate the essence of time existing
in actu with the ordering of the cosmos which is in a state of proces­
sion and which is coordinated with reference to the created things
and which is not separated from the tilings that are completed by
it. That simultaneously this ordering produces the heaven is made
clear by the fact that the reality of time is likewise coordinated to
the ordering which proceeds from the demiurge. For clearly this
reality precedes the revolution of the heaven, just as. according to
 διακοσμούσα αύτήν διακόσμησις προσεχώς τε αυτής προτέτακται
κατά τά αυτά ταίς έκείνης έπιστασίαις- δλην τε καί αυτήν άθ-
ρόος1 συνείληφε διωρισμένοις τισί πέρασιν ΰτε διασώζουσα τόν
λόγον τής αιτίας άφ' ής παράγεται. τάξιν μέν ούν είναι τοΰ χρό­
νου καί ημείς συγχωροΰμεν οϋ μέντοι τήν ταττομένην, αλλά τήν
τάττουσαν, ουδέ τήν έπομένην τοΐς προηγουμένοις, άλλα τήν
άρχηγόν των άποτελουμένων και πρεσβυτέραν-2 ουδέ τήν μερισ-
τώς κατά λόγους ή κινήσεις ή άλλας διωρισμένας δυνάμεις
άφωρισμένην, άλλά τήν παντελή καθ’ όλας τάς δημιουργικός
άπογεννήσεις συμπεπληρωμένην. τό δέ πρότερον καϊ ύστερον έν 10
τή τάξει ού κατά κινήσεων μεταβάσεις ουδέ κατά ζωής ανελίξεις
ούδέ κατά κοσμικών γενέσεων διεξόδους ουδέ κατ’ άλλο ούδέν
τοιοΟτον τιθέμεθα, άλλά κατ’ αιτίων προήγησιν καί συμπλοκήν
συνεχή τών άπογεννήσεων καί πρωτουργόν ενέργειαν καί δύνα-
μιν έπιτελεστικήν τών κινήσεων καί κατά τοιαΰτα πάντα άφορι- 15
ζόμεθα.3 έτι τοίνυν οϋ μετά τής προϊούσης άπό τής ψυχής κινή-
σεως4 ή ζωής τόν χρόνον καί όμοΰ τόν ουρανόν λέγομεν άπογεν-
νασθαι, άλλ’ άπό τής προϊούσης άπό τοϋ δημιουργού νοερός
διακοσμήσεως- μετά γάρ ταύτης ό χρόνος τε έν αύτφ συνυπέστη
καί ό κόσμος, καί αυτός δέ ό παλαιός5 διαρρήδην τόν θεόν 20
διακοσμούντο καί παράγοντα τόν χρόνον όμοϋ καί τόν ούρανόν
ποιεΐν άποφαίνεται. καί θείη άν τις αύτόν είναι μέτρον ού τοι
κατά τό μετρούν τήν φοράν ή τή κινήσει μετρούμενον ή δηλοϋν
τήν περιφοράν ή δηλούμενον, άλλά κατά τό αίτιον καί έν όμοΰ
δή πάντων τούτων.” ταύτα μέν ούν περί τοϋ έξηρημένου τής 25
γενέσεως καί καθ’ εαυτόν ύφεστηκότος γέγραφεν. άμα δέ περί
τούτου καί περί τοΰ άπ' αύτοΰ ένδιδομένου τφ κόσμω έν τφ Γ
κεφαλαίω τάδε γέγραφε- “διά δή ταύτα καί κατά τό παράδειγμα
τής διαιωνίας φύσεως6 ομοιότατος αυτός αύτφ κατά δύναμίν έστι
καί ό χρόνος, καί προσέοικε τφ αΐώνι καί προς εαυτόν ομοιό­ 30
τατος έστι κατά τό δυνατόν7 διά τήν άμερή φύσιν, διά μιας τε
ένεργείας ένίσταται καί πρόεισι κατ’ αύτήν καί ορίζει πάντα τά
γινόμενα ώσαύτως, κάν ή διαφέροντα.” λέγει τοίνυν περί τούτων
καί άλλην άπόδειξιν τοιαύτην “τό μέν γάρ δή παράδειγμα πάντα
αίώνά έστιν, ό δέ αϋ διά τέλους τόν άπαντα χρόνον γέγονεν, ώστε 35
καί ών καί έσόμενος. δ τοίνυν έστιν ώς παράδειγμα έν τφ νοητφ,
τούτο ώς εϊκών έστιν έν τφ γενητφ. καί δπερ έστιν εκεί8 κατ’
the same rule, the < process of> ordering which acts upon it should
be regarded as immediately of a higher order than it, because of its
authority over it. For this ordering in its entirety1 draws together
the whole of it < the revolution of the heaven> with its distinct
limits, and this saves the reason of the cause from which it is pro­
duced. Wc too agree that there is an order in time, however not an
ordered order but an ordering one,2 not one that follows upon things
preceding it, but a leader of, and more important than, things being
accomplished. This order is not divided into parts according to pro­
portions or movements or other defined powers, but is completed
in every way according to the progeny of the demiurge in its entirety.
The earlier and later in the order < o f tim e> we posit not according
to the changes < o f position> of motions or according to the unfold­
ings of life, or according to the processions of cosmic generations,
or according to any similar < criterion>, but we define it according
to the sequence of causes and the continuous concatenation of
creations and the primary activity and the power of motions effecting
its purpose, and similar criteria.2 Furthermore we say that time and
likewise heaven were not generated together with the motion or life
proceeding from the soul,4 but <werc generated> from the intellec­
tual ordering proceeding from the demiurge. For time and the cosmos
came into existence simultaneously and together with this ordering.
And the Ancient3 himself states explicity that the ordering and crea­
ting God made time and the heaven simultaneously. One might
thus posit that time is a measure not with respect to measuring
locomotion or being measured by movement, nor with respect to
making manifest the revolution < o f the heaven> or being made
manifest by it, but with respect to its being simultaneously the cause
and the One of all these.’ This he wrote about that which transcends
generation and which exists in itself. He likewise writes about this
and about that which is given by it to the cosmos, in the tenth chap­
ter as follows: ‘Because of this and in accordance with the para­
digm of the sempiternal nature,6 time is potentially always uniform
with itself. It is because of the indivisible nature that it resembles
eternity and that it is uniform with itself as far as possible,7 and it
becomes present and proceeds only because of actualization, and in
accordance with it, and thus determines all things becoming with
all their differences.’ Concerning this he adduces another proof:
'Whereas the paradigm exists for all eternity, time has come to be
throughout all time, so that also it is and will be. That which is
paradigm in the intelligible world, is image in the generated world;
and that which is there8 < in the intelligible world> in accordance
 αιώνα, τοΟτο ένταϋθα κατά χρόνον, καί τό έν τφ νοητφ κατά τό
είναι νΰν ήδη παρόν, τοΰτο έν τοΐς τήδε κατά συνέχειαν διά
τέλους παραγίνεται, καί τό όν ωσαύτως τό έν αΰτφ γεγονός τε
καί όν καί έσόμενον κατά τούς τήδε τόπους έκφαίνεται. καί τό
άδιάστατον εκεί1 διεστηκός ένταϋθα καθοραται. καί νΰν δή τοϋ 5
χρόνου γέγονε κατάδηλος ή μέση διπλή φύσις, μέση μέν αίώνός
τε καί οϋρανοΰ, διπλή δέ καθόσον συνυφίσταται μέν πρός τόν
κόσμον, συντάττεται δέ πρός τόν αιώνα, καί τοϋ μέν ηγείται,
τφ δέ άφομοιοΰται.” τοιαύτη μέν τίς έστιν ή των προκειμένων
λέξεων τοϋ Τιμαίου σαφήνεια κατά τόν θειον 'Ιάμβλιχον. Η>

Procl., Οΰτω γάρ δή καί ή τοϋ χρόνου κίνησις κατά τά έν τή χρονική

Tim., Ill, μονάδι μέτρα προελθοΰσα πέρας αρχή συνάπτει, καί τοϋτο άπει-
30,30- ράκις, τάξιν μέν έχουσα καί αύτή Οείαν, ού μέντοι τήν ταττο-
32,6
μένην, ώς φησι καί ό φιλόσοφος ’Ιάμβλιχος, αλλά τήν τάττου-
σαν, ούδέ τήν επομένην τοΐς προηγουμένοις, αλλά τήν άρχηγόν 15
των άποτελουμένων. μετρεΐται δέ όμως καί αυτή έξ οΰδενός μέν
διαστατού2 (καί γάρ γελοΐον έκ των υστέρων μετρεΐσθαι λέγειν
τά πρεσβυτέραν έχοντα τήν φύσιν καί τήν αξίαν), έκ μόνης δέ
τής χρονικής μονάδος, ήν άνελίττειν ή πρόοδος εΐρηται, καί
πολύ πρότερον έκ τε τοϋ δημιουργού καί έξ αύτοΰ τοϋ αΐώνος, 20
ού δή λέγεται καί είκών, πρός όν καί κινητός άπετελέσθη. πρός
γοϋν αύτόν τόν αιώνα λέγεται κινητός τόν πάντη ακίνητον,
ώσπερ άν εϊ τις καί τήν ψυχήν μεριστήν περί τοΐς σώμασιν
έλεγεν ώς πρός τόν νοϋν, ούχ ότι τοϋτο μόνον έστίν, άλλ’ ότι
πρός νοϋν μέν παραβαλλομένη τοιοΰτο δόςειεν άν είναι, πρός 25
δέ τήν μεριστήν ουσίαν άμέριστος. οΰτω καί ό χρόνος καίπερ
αιώνιος ών κατά φύσιν όμως εΐρηται κινητός ώς πρός αύτόν
τόν αιώνα, διά δέ τήν τάξιν αύτοϋ καί τήν έν τή προόδφ συνέ­
χειαν τό τε πρότερον και ύστερον παρ’ αύτφ πολλοϋ δει τοιοϋτον
είναι, οιον αύτό τινες ύπειλήφασιν ούτε γάρ κατά κινήσεων 30
μεταβάσεις μόνον, ώσπερ επί τών κατ’ ούρανόν, ούτε κατά ζφων
ανελίξεις, ώσπερ έπί τής ψυχής, ούτε κατά σωματικών γενέσεων
διεξόδους, ώσπερ έπί τής «ρύσεως, ούτε κατ' άλλο τοιοϋτον ούδέν
αύτό θεωρητέον άφωρισμένως (τών γάρ μετ’ αύτόν τάξεων ίδια
ταϋτα καθέστηκεν), αλλά κατ’ αιτίων προήγησιν καί συμπλοκήν 35
τφ συνεχεΐ τών άπογεννήσεων καί πρωτουργόν ένέργειαν καί
with eternity, is in this world in accordance with time; and that
which in the intelligible world is present already now according to
being, is constantly becoming in this world according to its continuity.
And in this manner that which is, is revealed as becoming in itself
and as being and about to be in the regions of this world. And that
which is there1 extensionlcss is seen here extended. And now the
intermediate and dual nature of time has become manifest: it is
intermediate between eternity and the universe, and it is dual inas­
much as on the one hand it coexists with the cosmos and on the
other it is ordered in relation to eternity, leading the one and becom­
ing similar to the other.' This, according to the divine Iamblichus,
is approximately the evident meaning of the passages of the Timaeus
under discussion.

In the same way the motion of time, progressing according to the

measures in the temporal monad, joins together the end and the
beginning and does it again and again ad infinitum. It has a divine
order, not an ordered one but an ordering, as the philosopher Iam­
blichus also says, not one that follows upon things that precede,
but a leader of things being accomplished. It is likewise measured
by no extension2 (for it would be ridiculous if something having a
senior nature and higher value were measured by secondary things),
but by the temporal monad alone, which is said to be unfolded by
the procession and much before that by the demiurge and his eter­
nity, of which it is said to be the image and with regard to which
it is produced as moving. With regard to eternity itself, which is
completely immobile, it is said to move; this can be compared to
the soul in the bodies which can be called divisible with regard to
the intellect, not because it is only this but because, compared to
the intellect, it can appear as such, whereas with regard to the divi­
sible essence it appears indivisible. In the same way time, although
being eternity-like according to its nature, is likewise said to move
with regard to eternity itself, but by its order and the continuity of
its procession the earlier and later connected with it is far from
being like that <i.e., moving>. as some people have assumed about
it. For one has to define them < the earlier and later> neither ac­
cording to the changes < o f position> of motions — as in the celestial
movements — nor according to the unfoldings of life — as in the
soul — nor according to the processions of corporeal generations —
as in nature — nor according to any similar criterion (for these are
peculiar to the orders belonging to time), but according to the se­
quence of causes and the continuous concatenation of creations and
δύναμιν ένεργητικήν των ποικίλων καί παντοδαπών κινήσεων,
έστιν ούν κινητός ού καθ’ αυτόν, άλλα κατά τήν α π ' αύτοϋ
μέθεξιν τήν έν ταΐς κινήσεσι φανταζομένην καί μετροΰσαν καί
όρίζουσαν τάς κινήσεις, ώσπερ εϊ τις λέγοι καί τήν ψυχήν μερι-
στήν περί τοΐς σώμασι καθ’ όσον έστίν αυτής μέθεξίς τις περί 5
τά σώματα μεριστή, ής αύτή περιέχει τήν αιτίαν οΰτω γάρ καί
ό χρόνος κινητός, ώς έχων τήν αιτίαν τής ένεργείας τής έξω
προϊούσης α π ' αύτοϋ καί έν ταΐς κινήσεσι μεριστώς όρώμένης
καί συνδιισταμένης αύταΐς. ώς ούν αί κινήσεις έγχρονοι γίνονται
διά τήν μέθεξιν, ούτως ό χρόνος κινητός διά τό μετέχεσθαι ύπό 10
τών κινήσεων πρός ό καί μόνον όρώντες οί φ υσικοί τής κινή-
σεως αύτόν φήθησαν είναι τό άριθμητόν, τό αίτιον τούτου κατι-
δεΐν ού δυνηθέντες.

“ Ό τι, φησίν ό θείος Ιάμβλιχος, τό έν καί άπειρον τοϋ αΐώνος καί

ήδη ον καί όμοϋ π α ν καί έν τφ νΰν μένον καί άμέτρητον ον 15
μέτρον τών νοητών έν άνελίξει κυκλική καί έν συνεχεία καί τφ
έφεξής έπιδείκνυσι καί τφ άρχάς καί μέσα καί τέλη διακρίνοντι
καί μηδ’ ότιοϋν άπολείποντι τών ύπ' αύτοϋ περιεχομένων, καί
ώσπερ ού κινητός απλώς, άλλ’ ώς πρός τόν αιώνα κινητός, ούτως
ούδ’ απλώς είκών, αλλά τό σύνολον τοϋτο αΐώνος είκών άν 20
ρηθείη δικαίως·1 άληθινή γάρ ών ουσία καί άποκαταστατική καί
μετρητική καί περιεκτική τών κινήσεων δλως δμως είκών αΐώνος
είναι λέγεται, καί έοικεν ή πρώτη τών εικόνων2 αύτός είναι- νοΰς
μέν γάρ ό παντελής ού κυρίως είκών λέγεται τοϋ πρώτου3 (τί γάρ
άν άφωμοίωτο τφ πάντη άνειδέφ), τών δέ έπίταδε νοϋ4 καί τής 25
άμερίστου «ρύσεως χρόνος άν είη τό πρώτιστον, καί δλως, εί
δει τών μετεχόντων είναι τήν εικόνα (τύπον γάρ άλλου πρεσβυ-
τέρου διασφζειν βούλεται, παρ' ού καί τό ιδίωμα τής ιδέας κατα­
δέχεται), χρή μήτε έν ταΐς πρωτίσταις ούσίαις είναι τήν εικόνα
(ού γάρ μετέχουσιν έκεΐναι πρώτιστοί γε οϋσαι, μάλλον δέ αύ- 30
ταί ύφ’ ετέρων μετέχονται, ούκ έγγινόμεναι τοΐς μετέχουσιν,
άλλ’ έτερον τρόπον αύτά πρός εαυτός έπιστρέφουσαι), μήτ’ έν
ταΐς αίσθηταΐς μόναις (μετέχει γάρ καί τά μέσα τών πρώτων καί
ού μόνα τά αισθητά, έπεί καί τά αισθητά διά τάς έκ τών μέσων
έμφάσεις άφομοιοΰται τοΐς πρώτοις)· όρθώς άρα καί ό χρόνος 35
αΐώνος είκών εϊρηται καί πας ό κόσμος κατά τε ψυχήν καί κατά
σώμα τοϋ αύτοζφου.”
the primary activity and active power of the various and manifold
motions. Time is thus moving nol per se, but by the participation
in it appearing in the movements and measuring and defining them,
as though one were to call the soul divisible in the bodies insofar
as there exists some divisible participation in it in the bodies, whose
cause it encompasses. In this way time moves as possessing the
cause of the activity proceeding outside from it and perceived as
divisible in the movements and being extended together with them.
Thus in the same way as the movements become temporal through
participation, time moves through being participated in by the mo­
vements. With reference to it the physicists believed time to be that
which can be counted in movement, since they could not perceive
its cause.

‘Because', as the divine Iamblichus says, ‘in the cyclic unfolding

and continuity and succession, and in distinguishing between begin­
nings and middles and ends, and in leaving out nothing that is en­
compassed by it, it < tim e> indicates the One and infinite οΓ eternity,
that which is being as well as total, and rests in the Now and is the
immeasurable measure of the intelligibles. And just as it is moving
not in the absolute sense, but moving with respect to eternity, it
should not be called simply an image, but its totality should rightly
be called the image of eternity.1 For though it < tim e> is a veritable
essence that is recurrent and measuring and totally encompassing
the movements, it is yet said to be the image of eternity, and it seems
to be the first of images.2 The wholly perfect intellect can properly be
called not the image of the first3 (for what can resemble that which
is wholly formless?), but of the things which are lower than the
intellect4 and indivisible nature, time appears to be the first. And,
generally speaking, whereas an image must belong to the partici­
pating things (for it <such an im a g o wishes to preserve the im­
pression of something nobler from which the property of the idea
is received), there ought not to be an image either in the first essences
(for these, being the first, do not participate but are rather partici­
pated in by other things, they do not enter into the things that parti­
cipate but in another way they cause them to revert to themselves)
or in the perceptible things alone (for the intermediate things too,
and not only the perceptible ones, participate in the first, since the
perceptible things are made to resemble the first through the reflex­
ions deriving from the intermediate). Therefore time is rightly said
to be the image of eternity, while the whole cosmos is < the image>
of the self-living, according to soul and body.'
Simp!.. 'Αλλά καί Πρόκλος ό έκ τής Λυκίας φιλόσοφος ό τών ήμετέρων
Phys., διδασκάλων καθηγεμών περί μέν του χωριστού χρόνου τα αυτά
795,4-26
πως τφ Ίαμβλίχω φιλοσοφεί καί ού μόνον νουν, άλλά καί θεόν
αυτόν άποδεικνύναι πειρδται, ώς καί εις αύτοψίαν ύπό τών Οεουρ-
γΦν κληθήναι. τοΰτον δέ τάς μέν εΐσω μενούσας ένεργείας 5
άμεταβλήτους έχειν φησϊ, τάς δέ εις τό έκτος άποτεινομένας
μεταβαλλομένας. περί μέντοι τοϋ μεθεκτοΰ καί αχώριστου τής
γενέσεως χρόνου τά αυτά τφ Άριστοτέλει διατάττεται νομίζων
τόν Άριστοτέλην κατά τό νΟν μόνον ύφεστάναι λέγειν τόν χρό­
νον. οί δέ μετά Πρόκλον έως ημών σχεδόν τι πάντες οϋκ έν τούτω ίο
μόνον, άλλά καί έν τοϊς αλλοις άπασι τφ Πρόκλω κατηκολού-
θησαν. Άσκληπιόδοτον έξαιρώ λόγου τόν άριστον των Πρόκλου
μαθητών καί Δαμάσκιον τόν ήμέτερον ών ό μέν δι’ άκραν
ευφυΐαν καινοτέροις έχαιρε δόγμασιν, ό δέ Δαμάσκιος διά φιλο-
πονίαν καί τήν πρός τά ’Ιάμβλιχου συμπάθειαν πολλοΐς ούκ ώκνει 15
των Πρόκλου δογμάτων έφιστάνειν. έμοί δέ πρός τάς είρημένας
τών δύο φιλοσόφων δόξας τοσοϋτον λεγέσθω. ώς εΐ μέν τό αίτιον
τοϋ χρόνου τό έν νοΐς καί θεοΐς ζητοΰντες νοΰν καί τοϋτο έσ-
τώτα καί θεόν έλεγον, ανάγκη δέχεσθαυ καί γάρ τής κινήσεως
καί τής γενέσεως εΐ τις τάς πρώτας αιτίας ζητεί, νοΰν πάντως 20
καί θεόν εύρήσει. καί θαυμαστόν οΰδέν εί καί όνόμασιν αυτόν
καλοίη τοΐς αύτοΐς, επειδή πολλαχοΰ τοϋτο τοΐς θεολόγοις ήρε-
σεν, ίσως δέ καί αύτοΐς τοΐς θεοΐς. εί μέντοι τις τόν συνεγνωσ-
μένον τούτον ζητεί χρόνον τόν τή κινήσει συνυπάρχοντα, ούτε
ακίνητον ούτε άμα όλον ύφεστώτα οϋτε νοϋν οίμαι λέγειν δυνα- 25
τόν, ώσπερ ουδέ τήν κίνησιν ακίνητον ουδέ άμα δλην ύφεστώσαν
έστιν έπινοεΐν.

Procl.. Ά λλά πώς λέγεται “κινητή” είναι ή τοϋ αίώνος είκών; άρ’ δτι
Tim., Ill,
πάσα κινείται καί τό δλον αυτής έστιν έν κινήσει; ή τοϋτο μέν
IS, 19-
19. 14 άδύνατον- ούδέν γάρ καθ’ δλον εαυτό κινείται,1 ουδέ δσα μετά- 30
βάλλει κατ’ ουσίαν καί γάρ τούτων μένει τό ύποκείμενον. πολλφ
δέ μάλλον τά τάς άλλας κινούμενα κινήσεις μένει κατά τήν
ούσίαν καί εί αϋξοιτο καί εΐ άλλοιοΐτο καί εί τοπικώς κινοΐτο,
And Proclus too, the philosopher from Lycia, the leader of our
teachers, philosophizes about separate time in a similar way to
Iamblichus and attempts to show that time is not only Intellect
but also God, being even summoned to appear in magical mani­
festations by the thcurgists. Time, he says, keeps unchanged the
internal activities which are at rest, and keeps in a state of change
those which are directed externally. The participated time which is
not separated from becoming he classifies in the same way as Aris­
totle and assumes that Aristotle has said that time exists only with
respect to the Now. The philosophers after Proclus until our time
all generally agree with Proclus, not only on this poiDt but on all
the others, with the exception of Asclepiodotus, the best of Proclus’s
pupils, and my friend Damasci us. The first preferred new doctrines
because of his extreme ingenuity, and Damascius, because of his
industry and sympathy with Iamblichus, did not hesitate to attack
many of Proclus’s doctrines. With regard to these opinions of the two
philosophers I have to say that one has necessarily to accept that,
if those who investigate the cause of time, which is in the Intellects
and Gods, say that this cause is the Intellect, the Permanent and
God. If somebody inquires into the first causes of motion and be­
coming, he will indeed discover the Intellect and God. And there
is nothing to wonder about, if he applies to it the cause of time,
as this is the prevailing opinion of theologians and perhaps of the
Gods themselves. But if somebody inquires into time in the generally
understood sense, i.e., the time coexisting with motion, I think that he
cannot call it immobile or simultaneously real as a whole, or Intellect,
exactly as one can not conceive motion as immobile or as simul­
taneously real as a whole.

But how can the image of eternity be called ‘moving’? Could it

be because it moves altogether and is as a whole in motion? But
this is impossible. For there is nothing that is moved as a whole,1
not even those things which are subject to change according to their
essence, for their substratum remains. A fortiori things moving in
other kinds of motion rest with regard to their essence, whether
they grow or undergo alteration or be in locomotion, for if there
ή μή μένον κατά τι συνεξαφανίσει καί τήν κίνησιν· έν τινι γάρ
πάσα κίνησις. ούδέν ούν δλον κινείται, καθάπερ ε ϊπ ο μ ε ν , καί
μάλιστα δσα των άιδίων, α γε καί ένιδρΰσθαι χρή ταΐς οΐκείαις
άρχαϊς καί έν έαυτοΐς μένειν, εί μέλλοι σφζεσθαι διηνεκώς. δια-
φερόντως δέ ή τοΰ αίώνος είκών τό άεί κατά τά αύτά έχειν πη 5
οφείλει καί τό στάσιμον ώστε αδύνατον τόν χρόνον καθ’ δλον
εαυτόν είναι κινητόν, εΐπερ μηδέ άλλο τι τών πάντων, δει ούν
αύτοΰ τι μένειν έξ ανάγκης, εΐπερ παν κινούμενον κινείται κατά
τι μένον έαυτοϋ < τοΰ> το έχον. μένει τοίνυν καί ή τοΰ
χρόνου μονάς,1 έξηρτημένη τοΰ δημιουργού, πλήρης δέ ούσα με­ to
τρητικής δυνάμεως καί βουληθεΐσα μετρήσαι τής τε ψυχικής ου­
σίας τάς κινήσεις καί τής φυσικής τε καί σωματικής τό τ’ είναι
καί τάς ένεργείας καί τά παθήματα προήλθε κατ’ άριΟμόν. μένων
ούν ό χρόνος τή άμερεΐ έαυτοΰ καί ένδον ένεργεία τή έξω καί
ύπό τών μετρουμένων κατεχομένη πρόεισι κατ’ άριΟμόν, τουτέστι 15
κατά τινα είδη νοερά, μάλλον δέ κατ’ αύτόν τόν πρώτιστον
άριΟμόν. δς άνά λόγον τώ ένί δντι προέστηκε τών νοερών, φαίη
αν ό Παρμενίδης, ώς εκείνο τών νοητών, κατ’ άριθμόν ούν
εκείνον πρόεισι. διό καί έκάστοις τών εγκοσμίων ειδών τό πρόσ-
φορον άπονέμει μέτρον. 20

Ό δέ χρόνος τή μέν αιώνιος, τή δέ έξω δόσει κινητός, διό καί

οί Οεουργοί καλοΰσιν αύτόν αιώνιον καί ού Πλάτων μόνος- εικό­
τως- καί γάρ < ε ΐ> τό μέν έστι μόνως κινητόν καί καθ’ αύτό καί
κατά τά μετέχοντα αύτοΰ, κινήσεως μόνης αίτιον δν ώσπερ ψυχή
(μόνως γοΰν έαυτήν τε κινεί καί τά άλλα), τό δέ μόνως ακίνητον, 25
εαυτό τε άμετάβατον φυλάττον καί τοΐς άλλοις τοΰ άεί ώσαύτως
δν αίτιον, καί τοΐς κινουμένοις διά ψυχήν τό μέσον είναι δει
τούτων άκρων όντων (τοΰ μέν ακινήτου κατ’ άμφω, τοΰ δέ κινη­
τού τό καί κατά τήν αύτοΰ φύσιν καί κατά τήν εις άλλο δόσιν)
άκίνητον δν άμα καί κινούμενον, αλλά άκίνητον μέν καθ’ αύτό. 30
κινούμενον δέ έν τοΐς μετέχουσι.2 τοιοΰτος δέ ό χρόνος- καί γάρ
εΐ ό έν τοΐς μετέχουσίν έστιν ώς τό άριΟμούμενον αριθμός, τίς
έσται ό κατά τό άριθμεΐν εκείνον ών άριθμός; τό μέν ούν τήν
μερικήν ψυχήν λέγειν άτοπον- υστερογενής γάρ έστιν ό έν
ταύτη τόν χρόνον αριθμών άριθμός ούτως, ώς ό τούς δακτύλους 35
άριθμών έν ήμΐν. οϋκουν εκείνος ό ποιήσας πέντε τούς δακτύ­
λους, άλλ’ ό γενομένους άριθμών ύπό τής φύσεως τοσούτους.
ήμεϊς δέ ζητοϋμεν τό αίτιον τοΰ είναι τόν άριθμούμενον χρόνον.
rI were not rest relative to something, motion too together with it would
I be utterly destroyed, for all movement occurs in something. Thus
j nothing moves as a whole, as we said, and least of all those perpetual
' things which must also have a foundation in their own beginnings
and rest in themselves, if they are to be preserved in perpetuity.

I
The image of eternity especially ought in some way always to remain
constant and stationary. Therefore it is impossible for time, as for
any other thing, to be itself as a whole in motion. Thus something
of it must necessarily be at rest, as everything moving will move so
that some of it will be at rest. Thus the monad of time1 will rest,
too, depending on the demiurge. However, being full of potency
for measurement and desirous to measure the movements of the
essence of the soul, and the being, activities and affections of the
physical and corporeal <cssence>, it proceeded according to number.
' Thus time, resting with regard to its indivisible and internal actuality,
advances according to number with regard to the external actuality,
kept under the measured things, i.e., it proceeds according to certain
intellectual forms, but foremost according to the first number itself,
which, as Parmenides would say, governs the intellectual things in
an analogous way to the One Being that governs the intelligible
things. It proceeds according to Lhis number in order that each of
, the mundane forms should preserve the appropriate measure.

Time is partly eternal, partly mobile by what it gives to external

things. Therefore not only Plato but also the theurgists call it eter­
nal, which is plausible. For what is only mobile, both with regard
to itself and with regard to those participating in it, is the cause
o f movement alone, like the soul (it is namely moving itself and
the others), and what is only immobile preserves itself without tran­
sition and is the cause for the others to remain always constant,
I and for those moving because of the soul it must be in the middle
between those two extremes (of the immobile in both respects and
of the mobile by its own nature and by what it gives to other things);
and what is simultaneously immobile and moving will be immobile
by itself and moving in the participating things.2 Such is < th e nature
o f> time. For if in the participants it exists qua counted number,
what will be the number which counts time? To say that it is the
particular soul would be absurd; for this number counting time in
the particular soul is of later origin, e.g., just like the one which
, counts our fingers. For the former is not that which creates the five
fingers, but it is the number counting the things generated by nature.
t But wre inquire into the cause for the existence of the counted time.
 T h e C o n c e p t o f T im e in L a te N e o p la to n ism

ούτος ούν έστιν ό αυτός μέν ακίνητος μένων, καθ’ εαυτόν δέ

άνελίττων τόν άριθμούμενον. δλως δέ εϊ κινητός έστιν ό εμφανής
χρόνος, πάν δέ τό κινητόν άλλο τι δν κινητόν έστιν (οΰ γάρ ή
κίνησις κινητόν, άλλα τό κινούμενον), είναι δει καθ’ εαυτόν
< > τόν χρόνον, ΐν’ ή κινητός, κατ' εκείνο <μέν> ούν έστιν 5
ώς αληθώς καί έν έαυτφ, καθό δέ έν τοΐς μετέχουσίν έστι, κινη­
τός έστι καί μετ' εκείνων, έξαπλών έαυτόν εις εκείνα.1έστιν ούν
αιώνιος μέν καί μονάς καί κέντρον κατ’ ουσίαν ό χρόνος καί
κατά τήν έν αύτώ μείνασαν ενέργειαν, συνεχής δέ αμα καί άριθ-
μός καί κύκλος κατά τό προϊόν καί τό μετεχόμενον.2 νους άρα 10
τις ούτός έστι προϊών, ιδρυμένος μέν έν αίώνι καί διά τούτο
αιώνιος καί αότός είναι λεγόμενος, έπεί μηδέ άλλως εις τελεοιτέ-
ραν άφομοίωσιν τών παραδειγμάτων τοΐς έγκοσμίοις συνετέ-
λεσεν, εί μή πρότερον αυτός έκείνων έξήρτητο, προϊών δέ καί
πολύς ρέων έπΐ τά ύπ’ αύτού φρουρούμενα πράγματα, όθεν, 15
οϊμαι, καί οί τών Οεουργών άκρότα τοι θεόν καί τούτον ύμνη­
σαν, ώς Ίουλιανός έν έβδόμω Τών Ζωνών, καί τοΐς όνόμασι
τούτοις έσέμνυναν, δι’ ών έκφαίνεται έν τοΐς μετέχουσι τά μέν
πρεσβύτερα ποιών, τά δέ νεώτερα, καί πάντα κύκλψ περιάγων
καί γάρ γελοΐον αίώνος όντα εικόνα τούτο δή είναι τό έν τοΐς 20
άριθμουμένοις μόνον ύφεστός χρονικόν εΐδωλον πώς γάρ είκών
θεού τοσούτου τού αίώνος τό τοιούτον έν ύποκειμένω όν, μάλλον
δέ έν τφ έν ύποκειμένω δντι φανταζόμενον καί συμβεβηκός δν
αύτό συμβεβηκότος; εί δέ καί νους μέν αίώνος δεύτερος, ψυχή
δέ νοΰ μίμημα, πώς ούχί ό χρόνος αίώνος ών είκών κρεΐττόν τι 25
καί αυτής <αν> εϊη τής ψυχής καί ούσιωδέστερον; ώς γάρ νούς
πρός ψυχήν, ούτως αιών έσται πρός χρόνον, καί έναλλάξ· ώστε
χρόνος πρό ψυχής, ώς πρό νοΰ αιών, καί μετέχοιτο μέν <άν>
ύπ' αυτής, ού μετέχοι δ’ άν αύτής, ώς ουδέ τού νοΰ ό uioiv, άλλ’
έμπαλιν.3 νοεράν άρα τινά φύστν έχων κατ' αριθμόν περιάγει τά 30
μετέχοντα αύτοΰ, τά τε άλλα καί τάς ψυχάς· καί γάρ ό μέν χρόνος
αιώνιός έστιν ού τή ούσία μόνον, άλλά καί τή ένεργεία τή
ένδον άεί ό αυτός ών, καθ' ήν δέ μετέχεται μόνην ύπό τών έξιο
κινητός έστι συνεκτείνων έκείνοις τήν έαυτοΰ δόσιν καί έφαρ-
μόζων. 35

Proci.,
Tim. Ill Διττής τής δημιουργίας ούσης,4 ώς πολλάκις ύπεμνήσαμεν, τής
53,6- μέν άφανοΰς καί μιας καί απλής καί ύπερκοσμίου καί όλικής,
55,7
This <cause> now is the time which rests immobile, unwinding by
itself the counied. In short — if the visible time is mobile, and every­
thing mobile is a different mobile being (for not movement is mobile
but the moving object), then time by itself must be <also in the
participants?», that it may be mobile. With respeci to the world of
the intellect it has its true being and rests in itself, but, as far as it is
in the participants, it is mobile together with them, unfolding itself
into them.1 Time by its essence and through the activity resting in
itself is thus eternal and a monad and a centre, and simultaneously
it is continuous and number and circle, in respect of that which is
proceeding and participating.2 It is thus a kind of proceeding intel­
lect. having its scat in eternity and therefore said to be itself eternal,
since it could not have helped the things of this world to achieve a
more complete likeness of the paradigms had it not itself first been
dependent upon the intelligible things, proceeding and flowing in
many ways towards the tilings guarded by it. For this reason, 1
believe, the most eminent theurgists have celebrated it also as god,
as lulianus did in the seventh hymn of the Zones, and have it exalted
with the names with which it appears in the participants, making
some older and the others younger, and leading all things round
in a circle. For it would be ridiculous if the image of eternity were
to exist only in the counted things as a temporal likeness. How could
the image of such a great god, namely eternity, be such a thing
existing in the substratum, or rather be imagined in a thing existing
in the substratum, being an accidens of an accidens'1. But if the intel­
lect is second to eternity, and the soul is a copy of the intellect,
how could time, the image of eternity, not be something worthier
and more essential than the soul itself? For the relation of the intel­
lect to the soul is as the relation of eternity to time, and permutando —
time ranks before the soul, as eternity before the intellect, and it
< tim e > could well be participated by the soul, but does not partici­
pate in it, as eternity does not participate in the intellect, but contra­
riwise.3 Time is thus of an intellectual nature and leads its partici­
pants in a circle according to number, the souls as well as the other
things. And time is eternal not only with regard to essence, but is
also everlastingly the same with regard to internal activity, according
to which alone it is participated by the external things, mobile in
extending them together and granting and adapting its gift with re­
spect to them.

Since the creation of the demiurge is twofold,4 as we have often

mentioned, the one being invisible and single and absolute and
της δέ έμφανούς καί πεπληθυσμένης καί πολυειδοΟς καί έν τφ
κόσμω μεριζομένης, καί διττάς έχούσης τάς ένεργείας, τάς μέν
πρωτουργούς καί ακινήτους καί νοεράς, τάς δέ δευτερουργούς
καί μετά κίνησε ως προϊούσας καί περί νοΰν χορευούσας, καί
τής μέν έξηρημένης των άποτελουμένων, τής δέ συντεταγμένης 5
αύτοΐς, διττός καί ό χρόνος προελήλυθεν εις τά όντα, δ μέν
υπερκόσμιος, δ δέ εγκόσμιος, καί δ μέν άμα μένων τε καί προϊών,
δ δέ έν κινήσει φερόμενος. καί ό μετεχόμενος διττός, δ μέν κατά
άπλήν μέθεξιν, δ δέ έν ταΐς περιόδοις τό>ν ουρανίων άστρων, δς
αποτελεί μήνας καί ήμέρας καί νύκτας καί ενιαυτούς, τοιαύτης 10
τοίνυν οϋσης τής τών χρόνων διαφοράς ό Πλάτων τά νοήματα
περί τής μιας καί απλής ουσίας τού χρόνου παραδεδωκώς μέλλει
τό λοιπόν εντεύθεν, καί περί τής ποικιλίας τού χρόνου ποιεΤσΟαι
τόν λόγον τού μετεχομένου μεριστώς, εις δν αύτω καί ή περί
τών πλανητών συντελέσει θεωρία (διά γάρ τής τούτων κινήσεως 15
περί τόν ήλιον χορευόντων ό συνεγνωσμένος άποτελεΐται χρόνος),
ένατον τούτο δημιουργικόν δώρον1 εις τόν κόσμον είσαγαγών.
ΐνα δέ σοι καί απ’ αυτών των προοιμίων ένδειξιν παράσχηται
τής τοΰδε τού χρόνου πρός εκείνον ύφέσεως, έκ λόγου τε καί
διανοία ς θεού τούτον ύποστήναί φησι, καί έτι διορισμόν παρα- 20
σχέσΟαι καί φυλακή ν άριθμώ ν χρόνου κατά την των άστρων
κίνησιν. καί προσεκτέον άμφοτέροις, τφ τε διορισμό) τών χρο­
νικών μέτρων τών πολλών μετά τόν ένα χρόνον καί τή φυλακή
τών αυτών άεΐ μέτρων, ών ένεκά φησι τά άστρα γενέσΟαι. τόν
μέν πρότερον χρόνον παρήγε τού δημιουργού πρός τόν αιώνα 25
βλέποντος2 καί κατά μίαν καί άπλήν νόησιν ένεργοΰντος, τόν
δέ δεύτερον,3 ώς καί αυτός φησιν, έκ λόγου καί δια νο ία ς, τό
διηρημένον τής αιτίας καί τό μεριζόμενον εις πλήθος από τής
μιδς νοήσεως ένδεικνύμενος· άλλος γάρ ό θείος νοΰς καί άλλος
ό θείος λόγος· δ μέν ηνωμένος, δ δέ πεπληθυσμένος. καί δ μέν 30
τά δλα περιέχων, δ δέ διαιρών τήν ένωσιν εις πλήθος, καί δ
μεν έν έαυτφ μένων, δ δέ έκφαίνων έαυτόν. ώστε καί ό δεύτερος
χρόνος, εΐ πδσιν έμφανής έστιν, εί έκφαίνει τόν ύπερκόσμιον
χρόνον, εί διηρημένος έστίν, εικότως έκ λόγου δημιουργικού
προελήλυθεν, έκείνου τήν ώς άπό νοΰ λαβόντος πάροδον, τού 35
μέν λόγου δηλοΰντος τήν αιτίαν, τής δέ διανοίας τήν έν τφ
δημιουργώ γνώσιν δυοειδή ούσαν καί άλλην μέν τού ώς αληθώς
supramundane and universal, the other being visible and multiple
and of many forms and divided into parts in the universe, and since
this creation has twofold activities, on the one hand primary and
immobile and intellectual, on the other hand secondary and pro­
ceeding along with movement and dancing round the Intellect, one
transcending the things completed, the other ordered together with
them — time too has come forth twofold into the things being, the
one supramundane, the other mundane, the one simultaneously being
at rest and proceeding, the other carried in movement. And the
participated time is also twofold: one with respect to absolute partic­
ipation. the other in the periods of the celestial bodies, completing
months and days and nights and years.
Since the difference of the times is like this. Plato, having handed
down the thoughts about the single and absolute essence of time,
will treat further on also of the diversity of the time which is partici­
pated parcel wise: in this he will also be assisted by the doctrine
of the planets (for time as generally understood is accomplished
through the movements of these planets as they dance around the
sun). He thus introduces a ninth gift1 of the demiurge into the uni­
verse. That the introductory words themselves may furnish a proof of
the subordination of the mundane time relative to the supramundane.
Plato says that this time exists “by the thought and reasoning of the
god’ <77/7?., 38 C > , and he says further that the determination and
preservation of the numbers oF time are provided according to the
movement of the stars. And one must pay heed to both, to the deter­
mination of the many temporal measures <following> upon the one
time, and to the everlasting preservation of these measures for the
sake of which he says that the stars have been created.
He introduced the prior time as that of the demiurge looking at
eternity2 and acting by a single and absolute intellection, whereas the
second.3 as he himself says, < h e m ade> ‘by thought and reasoning',
indicating the divisible nature of the cause and the splitting-up into
a multitude from a single intellection. For there is a difference be­
tween the divine intellect and the divine thought — the one being
unified, the other multiple, the one encompassing the whole tilings,
the other dividing unity into multitude, the one resting in itself, the
other revealing itself. Thus the second time, if it is visible to all, if
it reveals the supramundane time, if it is divided, has in all likelihood
come forth from the demiurgic thought, proceeding upon its way
from Intellect; for the thought makes manifest the cause, while rea­
soning <makes manifest> the knowledge which is of a twofold
form in the demiurge, the one of the time which is, as it were, true
 χρόνου, 6ς έστιν αριθμός των έν τφ παντΐ περιόδων πασών,
άλλην δέ του απ' εκείνου ρέοντος, δς έστι κατ’ άριθμόν προϊών.
έτι τοϊνυν εκείνου τα μέτρα πάντα περιέχοντος ένοειδώς, καθ'
α καί ταΐς ψυχαϊς αί περίοδοι καί τοϊς σώμασιν έπιτελοΰνται
καί τό εν μέτρον τής δλης άποκαταστάσειος (“έστι γάρ θείου 5
γενητοΰ περίοδος, ήν αριθμός περιλαμβάνει τέλειος," ώς πού
φησιν ό έν Πολιτείμ <546Β> Σωκράτης), ούτος ό χρόνος διο-
ριστικός έστι των μέτρων τών έν ταΐς ψυχ<ικ>αΐς η σωμαπ-
καΐς φοραΐς καί φρουρητικός· απονέμει γάρ άλλοις άλλα μέτρα
τά οικεία έκάστοις. καί τούτη) μέν διαιρεί τήν ένιαίαν έκείνου 10
δύναμιν, φρουρεί δέ τό προσήκον έκάστοις μέτρον καί κατά τοΟτο
ποιείται τάς αποκαταστάσεις- άλλο μέν γάρ τής ηλιακής περιόδου
μέτρον, άλλο δέ τής σεληνιακής, άλλο δέ τών μετεώρων (έπεί
καί έν τούτοις έστι τις κύκλος τον ουράνιον κύκλον άπεικονισά-
μενος) καί άλλο άλλων ζφων- καί γάρ τούτων εϊσί περίοδοι καί 15
μέτρα ζωής, ώς καί ό δαιμόνιος ’Αριστοτέλης ιρησί.1 ταΰτα
μέν ούν καί άπό τούτων λάβοις αν περί τών χρόνων τούτων τής
διαφοράς, καί έοικε καί τό ΐνα γεννηθή χρόνος είπεΐν ού
μάτην, άλλ' ΐνα δηλώση καί ότι προήν ό αφανής χρόνος αριθ­
μός ών όλος καί εις καί νοερός πρό τοΰ μετεχομένου καί κατ' 20
αριθμόν ιόντος, παν γοΰν τό γενόμενόν έστι πρό τής γενέσεως
άφανώς ίδρυμένον έν τή έαυτοΰ αιτία.

Proci., ΤοσοΟτον δέ άςιον έν τοϊς περί τής τοΰ χρόνου γενέσεως

Tim., Ill, έπιστάσεως- εί μέν μετά ψυχήν ό χρόνος, πώς έκείνη κινείται
58,23-
59.6 κατά χρόνον; εί δέ πρό ψυχής, πώς γενέσθαι λέγεται (τών γάρ 25
γεννηθέντων άρίστην είπεν είναι τήν ψυχήν); εί δέ ψυχή σύ­
στοιχος, πώς ούχί καί ό αιών τώ νω σύστοιχος, άλλα πρό νοϋ;
καί ήητέον, δτι πρό ψυχής μέν ό χρόνος, ώς πρό τοΰ νοΰ ό
αιών, άρίστη δέ ψυχή τών γεννηθέντων, u δή καί καθ’ αύτά
γενητά έστι καί ού μόνον κατά τήν εις τά δεύτερα παρουσίαν 30
εαυτών, αλλά καί τήν έντός ενέργειαν έχει γένεσιν καί τήν
ουσίαν μεριστήν εις πλήθος μερών, οίον αυτός ήμΐν παραδέ-
δωκεν. ό δέ χρόνος καθ’ αυτόν μέν αιώνιος, νοΰς ών, ώς
δέδεικται, μετέχεται δέ γενητώς, ούχ όλος άμα ουδέ άκινήτως,
ώσπερ οί πρό αύτοΰ νόες, αλλά κινητώς- δθεν καί τελειοΐ τήν 35
and which is the number of all the periods in the universe, and the
other, which is the knowledge of the time flowing from that <which
is num ber>; < this second tim e> proceeds according to number.
Further: while the supramundane time embraces in the form of unity
all measures by which the periods of the souls and the bodies are
made perfect, and the one measure of the whole periodic return (for,
as Socrates says somewhere in the Republic <546 B>, ‘the perfect
number embraces the period of what is of divine birth"), the mun­
dane time determines and preserves the measures in the psychic and
corporeal movements. For it assigns to everyone of them their own
particular measures. And in doing this it divides the unitary power
of the supramundane time, preserves the measure proper to each,
and in accordance with this brings about the cyclic returns. For the
measures of the solar period, the lunar period, and that of other
things above are different (as in these too is a certain cycle reflecting
the celestial cycle), and they arc different also for different living
beings. For these too have periods and measures of life, as the pro­
digious Aristotle says.1
This, therefore, which concerns the difference between these times,
can be grasped <from what has been said>. And it seems that the
words ‘in order that time might be brought into being’ <Tim., 38 C >
were not said without reason, but in order to make clear that the
invisible time was first, being a whole number, single and intellectual,
before the participated time which progresses according to number.
Thus all that is created has before its creation in an invisible manner
its basis in its own cause.

The various < points> concerning the inquiry into the generation of
time also merit attention: if time is posterior to the soul, how can
the latter move in time? And if time is prior to the soul — how can
it be said to be generated (the soul having been described as the
best of generated things)? And if it is coordinate to the soul — why
is not eternity coordinate to the intellect but is prior to it? The
answer is that while time is prior to the soul, just as eternity is prior
to the intellect, the soul is the best of generated things, namely those
which are generated per se, i.e., not only through their presence in
things which are posterior to them, but have generation and an
essence divisible into a multiplicity of parts qua internal activity, as
he himself has taught us. Time in itself is eternal, being, as has been
shown, an intellect, but is participated within the process of genera­
tion, not as a whole and immobile, as the intellects which are prior
to it, but in a process of movement. Hence qua intellect it perfects
ψυχήν ώς νοΰς, καί γενητός έστι κατά χάς μεθέξεις, ρεύσας πολύς
εις τά μετέχοντα, καί ώς αριθμητής έποίησε τάς γενέσεις.

Άλλη γάρ έννοια ψυχής καί άλλη χρόνου, καί έτέρων καί ού
τών αυτών έκάτερον αίτιον ψυχή μέν γάρ ζωής μεταδΐδωσι καί
κινεί τά πάντα (διό καί ό κόσμος, ώς έπλησίασε τή ψυχή, ζωής 5
έπληρώθη καί μετέσχε κινήσεως), χρόνος δέ διεγείρει· τά δη­
μιουργήματα πρός τήν αυτών τελείωσιν καί μέτρον έστί τών όλων
καί άιδιότητός τίνος χορηγός, καταδεέστερος δέ ψυχής οΰκ άν
εϊη, εϊπερ αύτοΰ καί ψυχή μετέχει, καί εί μή κατά τήν ουσίαν,
άλλα κατά γε τάς μεταβατικός έαυτής ένεργείας· καί γάρ ή τού 10
παντός άπαύστως ένεργεΐν εϊρηται καί ζήν έμφρόνοις πρός τόν
σύμπαντα χρόνον, λείπεται άρα καί ουσίαν είναι καί ψυχής μή
δεύτερον, επί πασι δέ ένθυμητέον, ώς εΐ μέν ό αιών ή γέννημα
ήν τού νοϋ ή δύναμίς τις νοερά, έδει καί τόν χρόνον τοιοϋτόν
τι λέγειν είναι τής ψυχής, εί δέ μέτρον έξηρημένον τοΰ πλήθους 15
τών νοητών ό αιών καί περιοχή τής πάντων άιδιότητός καί τε-
λειότητος, πώς ούχί καί ό χρόνος τούτον έξει τόν λόγον πρός
τήν ψυχήν καί τόν ψυχικόν διάκοσμον, ταύτη διαφέρων, ή καί
τά προελθόντα πάντα τών μεινάντων αιτίων;

Επειδή τοίνυν τούτων ούδέν δοκιμάζομεν, τί άν εΐη ό χρόνος; 20

ού γάρ ικανόν ίσως μέτρον είπεΐν τών εγκοσμίων, ούδ' ών έστιν
αγαθών αίτιος, άλλ’ εις δύναμιν άντιληπτέον αύτοΰ τής ίδιότητος.
άρ’ ούν κράτιστον ούσίαν αύτόν όντα καί ψυχής τελειωτικόν καί
πδσι παρόντα νοΰν είναι λέγειν ούχί μένοντα μόνον, άλλά καί
κινούμενον, μένοντα μέν κατά τήν ένδον ένέργειαν, καθ* ήν καί 25
έστιν αιώνιος όντως, κινούμενον δέ κατά τήν έξω προϊοΰσαν.
καθ’ ήν ορίζει πάσαν μετάβασιν; τοΰ γάρ αΐώνος καί καθ’ ήν
ένδον έχει καί καθ’ ήν εις τά αιώνια ενεργεί τό μένειν έχοντος
αυτός κατά τήν έτέραν εκείνον άπεικονισάμενος, κατά δέ τήν
λοιπήν διαστάς έγένετο μένων καί κινούμενος, τί δ’ άν εΐη νοητόν 30
άμα καί γενητόν; τί δ’ άν εΐη μεριστόν αμα καί άμέριστον; άλλ'
όμώς1 επί τής ψυχικής ουσίας πάντα ταΰτα προσηκάμεθα, καί
ούδ’ άλλως δυνάμεθα τής μεσότητος ταύτης κατακρατήσαι τε-
λέως, εί μή τρόπον τινά τοΐς άντικειμένοις επ’ αυτής χρησαίμεθα.
τί ούν θαυμαστόν, εί καί τήν τοΰ χρόνου φύσιν όρώντες πή μέν 35
ακίνητον ούσαν, πή δέ κινούμενην, μάλλον δέ ούχ ήμεϊς, άλλά
the soul and is generated according to its <m odes o f> participation;
flowing abundantly into the participating things it has made them
quasi-numeral.

The concept of time differs from that of the soul, and each is the cause
of different things. The soul communicates life and moves all things
(and therefore the cosmos too participates in motion and is full of
life, being near to the soul). Time, on the other hand, promotes the
objects of creation towards their completion, and is a measure of
the whole and a leader of a sort of perpetuity, it is not of lower rank
than the soul, for the soul participates in it, if not according to es­
sence, according to its activities involving change. And the incessant
activity of the universe is said to be also rational living through the
whole of time. It remains < to be said> that it too is an essence, and
not second to the soul. In all these one has to keep in mind that, if
eternity were either a generated product of the Intellect or some
intellectual potency, time too must be said to be something like that
with respect to the soul. If however eternity is a transcendent measure
of the multitude of the Intelligibles and the Encompassing of the per­
petuity and completion of all things, how could time also not have a
similar relation to the soul and the psychic order, differing insofar as
all the proceeding causes differ from those at rest?

As we approve none of these theories, what, after all, is time? It is

perhaps not enough to call it a measure of mundane things, or of
those good things of which it is a cause, but one has to grasp its
peculiarity as far as one is able to do. Should one not say that it
is the strongest essence, and perfecting the sou!, and an intellect pres­
ent in all things, and not only being at rest, but also moving, being
at rest with regard to the internal activity according to which it is
also truly eternal, and moving with regard to the externally proceeding
<activity>, according to which it defines every change? For, con­
taining the state of rest of eternity according to which the latter has
internal activity with regard to the eternal <entities>, it < tim e>
symbolizes eternity with regard to one < aspect> , and with regard
to the other it became extended, being at rest and in motion. What
then could be simultaneously intelligible and generated? What could
be simultaneously divisible and indivisible? But we admit all this
equally1 with regard to the psychic essence and can not otherwise
completely master this intermediate state if we do not avail ourselves
in a certain way of its contrarieties. Why then should it be strange
if we see die nature of time in some way as immobile, and in another
 πρό ημών ό φιλόσοφος διά μεν τοϋ είναι αιώνιον την έν ταότώ
μένουσαν αύτοΰ νοεράν μονάδα παρέστησε, διά δέ τοϋ κινητόν
τήν έξω φερομένην αΰτοϋ καί μετεχομένην ενέργειαν υπό τε
ψυχής καί κόσμου τοϋ σύμπαντος ένεδείξατο;

Prod., Πρώτον μέν ούν ρητέον, ότι ουδέ τό παν έν κινήσει μόνον 5
77«!,. ΜΙ, Οφέστηκεν, άλλα δει τι μένειν αύτοΰ πάντως, ϊνα μένον κινήται-
δέδεικται γοΰν έν Θεαιτήτφ <181 ίΤ.>, δτι κατά πάντα κινεΐσθαί
τι παντελώς αδύνατον, τοϋ τοίνυν έν μεΟέξει χρόνου έν κινήσει
δντος διά τό συμπαρατείνεσθαι τή κινήσει δεΤ τι μένειν πρό
τούτου, καί τοϋτο, εΐ μέν άνενέργητον, αδύνατον, εί δέ ένεργοϋν, 10
εΐ μέν κινούμενον, πάλιν άλλου δεήσεται τοϋ μεροϋντος αύτοΰ
τήν κίνησιν, εί δέ άκινήτως ένεργοϋν, τοϋτ' έστι τό ώς αληθώς
ιδίωμα τοϋ χρόνου, δεύτερον δέ κοινής οϋσης έννοιας είναι
τάς Ώρας θεάς καί τόν Μήνα θεόν, ών καί ιερά παρειλήφαμεν,
καί 'Ημέραν καί Νύκτα θεάς είναι φαμεν, ών καί κλήσεις έχομεν 15
έκδεδομένας παρ' αύτών τών θεών, πολλώ μάλλον ανάγκη τόν
χρόνον αύτόν είναι θεόν καί μηνός καί ώρών καί νυκτός καί
ήμέρας όντα περιληπτικόν, τρίτον τοίνυν, εί έστιν αριθμητόν
τι ό χρόνος, δει πρό τοϋ άριθμητοϋ τό αριθμούν προϋπάρχειν
(ταΰτα γάρ πρός άλληλα λέγεται καί τοϋ άριθμητοϋ προϋπάρχειν 20
τό άριθμοΰν), τοϋ μέν δυνάμει τό κατά δύναμιν, τοϋ δέ ένεργεία
τό κατ' ένέργειαν. εκείνο τοίνυν έστίν ό τώ όντι χρόνος, δς
έστιν αύτοαριθμός πασών τών περιόδων έκάστην αριθμών, τέταρ­
τον, εΐ τι μέν ψυχής μετέχει, καί χρόνου μετέχει, ούκ άνάπαλιν
δέ- καί γάρ τά άψυχα μετέχει χρόνου- τόν άρα χρόνον έπέκεινα 25
ψυχής θετέον. ψυχή δέ πρό τών μετεχόντων έστίν αυτή καθ'
αύτήν. πολλφ άρα μάλλον αυτός έστιν καθ’ έαυτόν έπέκεινα τών
χρόνου μετεχόντων. Πώς ούν ό τοιοϋτος είκών αν εΐη τοϋ
αίώνος; λεγέσθω γάρ πάλιν διά τήν τών πραγμάττον δυσεπί-
γνωστον ιδέαν. 30

Prod., Πώς ούν, είπερ ή τοϋ χρόνου φύσις, ώς φησι καί ό θείος Ίάμ-
Tim., ΜΙ. βλιχος κάγώ πείθομαι, μέση έστίν αίώνος καί ούρανοΰ καί
52 ^ του μεν ηγείται, τψ δε αφομοιουται, χρονος ουρανου χαριν1 υπ-
έστη; τό γάρ περιεκτικόν καί τελειωτικόν καί πλέον άφομοιοϋν
τήν εικόνα τφ παραδείγματι πώς τοϋ περιεχομένου καί άφομοιου- 35

L
way as moving? So, even more than we, did the philosopher who
came before us, for on the one hand he described its intellectual
monad as remaining at rest in the same state because of its being like
eternity, and on the other, because of its being mobile, showed its
outward moving and participated activity together with the soul and
the whole cosmos.

It must first be said that the universe does not subsist in motion
only, but that something of it must absolutely be at rest, in order
that it be moved while resting. Now in the Theaetetus <181 ff.> it
is shown to be absolutely impossible for something to move in all
respects. With regard to the participating time which is in motion
through being extended together with motion, something of it must
be at rest prior to it. and this, if it is not actualized, is impossible,
and, if actualized and moving, it will again be in need of something
else measuring its motion, if however actualized and immobile, this
will be the very specific property of lime. Secondly: since it is uni­
versally held that the Hours are goddesses, and that the Month is
a god, with regard to both of whom we have traditional rites, and
since we say that Day and Night are goddesses with regard to whom
we have invocations made known by the gods themselves, time itself
must a fortiori be a god, as it encompasses month, hours, night
and day. Thirdly: if time can be counted, that which is counted
presupposes that which counts (Lhese are correlative terms, and
the number presupposes that which numbers), that which is count­
ed potentially presupposes that which counts potentially, and the
same holds for the actual state. Therefore this < the immobile tim e>
is the veritable time which is the ideal number of all the numbers of
all the cycles. Fourthly: if something participates in the soul, it par­
ticipates also in time, but not the other way round. For the soulless
things too participate in time. Thus one has to put time beyond the
soul. The soul however exists by itself prior to the participating
things. All the more it < tim e> is by itself beyond the things partici­
pating in time. Now how can it be the image of eternity? Again
it must be said: on account of the hardly identifiable ‘idea* (ιδέα)
of things.

If, as the divine Iamblichus says and as 1 believe, the nature of time
is intermediate between eternity and heaven, being in command of
the latter and being made to resemble the former, how can time
exist for the sake of heaven?1 How can that which encompasses and
makes perfect and causes the image to resemble its model even more
 λ t ic κ^υπΐ- c j j i t/j i une in l^ u ic l v e o p u u o tu s m

μένου γέγονεν ενεκεν; οΰτω γάρ άν των τελών τά ένεκά του

σεμνότερα άν εΐη καί των ύφειμένων χάριν τώ κρείττω τήν έπί
τά όντα ποιοΐτο πρόοδον, έστι δέ οΰδέν τοιοΰτον έν τοΐς υπό
Πλάτωνος διατεταγμένοις εύρεΐν· ούτε γάρ ό χρόνος ούρανοΰ
μόνου γέγονε χάριν ούτε ό ουρανός του χρόνου μόνου χάριν 5
ΰπέστη. άλλ’ έκάτερος καί έαυτοΰ καί του ετέρου καί τοΰ συν-
αμφοτέρου· ΐνα γάρ ή πάσα δημιουργία τό τέλειον έχη, τοιοΰτος
μέν ό ουρανός, τοιοΰτος δέ ό χρόνος άπετελέσΟη. συμβαίνει
μέντοι καί έκάτερον τώ έτέρο) μεγάλα συναίρεσθαι πρός τήν τοΰ
οικείου παραδείγματος άφομοίωσιν- οϋτε γάρ ό χρόνος έμιμήσατο 10
άν τόν αιώνα μή όντος ούρανοΰ (ποΤ γάρ άν προήλθεν ή τί ποτ'
άν έμέτρησε τών όντων ή συνέσχεν ή έτελεώσατο;), οΰτ' αν ό
ουρανός μή όντος χρόνου τό παντελές καί τό άίδιον τοΰ αύτο-
ζώου κατά δύναμιν άπεμιμήσατο.

Prod., Έ τ ι καί κατ' άλλον τρόπον έπιχειρεΐν ήμϊν δυνατόν τών γάρ 15
77w., I, £ν τφ κήσμφ συνεστώτων τά μέν από τής πρώτης μόνης δημι-
8-2 ΐ ουργίας ύφέστηκε, τά δέ καί άπό τής πρώτης μέν, άλλά διά τής
δευτέρας. τά μέν ούν άπό τής πρώτης ΰφεστώτα ώσαύτως έχει
καί μοναδικά έστι, μιμούμενα τήν τοΰ παράγοντος μόνωσιν- ή
γάρ υπερκόσμιος δημιουργία καί άκίνητός έστι καί μία καί αΐώ- 20
νιος· τά δέ άπό τής δευτέρας μεταβαλλόμενά τέ έστι καί έν
πλήθει φερόμενα καί άλλοτε άλλοι ως συνιστάμενα- πολυειδής
γάρ έστιν ή δεύτερα δημιουργία καί κινουμένη ποιεί ά ποιεί, καί
χρόνος αυτή συμφυής έστιν,1 άλλ’ οΰκ αιών, διό καί τά άπ’
αυτής πολυμετάβολά έστι καί πεπληθυσμένα καί πάντη κινού- 25
μένα· τά γάρ έκ κινούμενων αιτίων τοιαΰτα τήν φύσιν έστιν.
have come into existence for the sake of that which is encompassed
and is made to resemble? If that were so, things which exist for
the sake of something else would be more noble than their final ends,
and the superior < cntities> would proceed towards the things that
are for the sake of the inferior < entities>. Nothing of this kind,
however, is to be found in the writings of Plato. For neither did time
come into being for the sake of heaven only, nor does heaven exist
for the sake of time only. Rather does each of them exist for its own
sake, and for the other’s sake, and for the sake of both of them
together. Heaven and time were made perfect in this way, in order
that the whole creation may be perfect. The result is, that each of
them cooperates to a large extent with the other with a view to
achieving resemblance to the respective model. For neither could
time imitate eternity if heaven did not exist (for whither could it
proceed and which of the beings could it measure or contain or make
perfect?), nor could heaven according to its capacity imitate the
totality and perpetuity of the Self-living, if time did not exist.

We can besides that also argue in another way. Some of the things
constituted in the universe subsist as derived from the primary single
creation, others, those subsisting as derived from a primary one, do
it through the secondary. Those subsisting as derived from the pri­
mary creation are constant and monadic, copying the uniqueness of
the creator. For the supramundane creation is immobile, single and
eternal, but the tilings deriving from the second creation are changed
and carried into multitude and constituted differently at different
times. For the second creation is of many forms and creates that
which it creates while moving, and time is naturally united with it,'
but not eternity. Therefore its derivatives are changing in many ways,
multiple and completely moving, for things deriving from moving
causes have this nature.
 DA M ASCI US

“'Έστιν ούν ό χρόνος μέτρον τής τοϋ είναι ροής, είναι δέ λέγω
ού τοΰ κατά τήν ουσίαν μόνον, αλλά καί τοΰ κατά τήν ενέργειαν.1
καί θαυμαστώς ό 'Αριστοτέλης είδε τε τοϋ χρόνου τήν φύσιν
καί έξέφηνεν είπών, ότι καί τη κινήσει καί τοΐς άλλοις τοϋτό
έστι τό έν χρόνιο είναι τό μετρεΐσθαι αυτών τό είναι Οπό τοΰ 5
χρόνου’, ώσπερ δέ ή κίνησις ού κατά τά άμερή γίνεται (ουδέ
γάρ σύγκειται έκ κιγημάτιον ουδέ ή γραμμή έκ στιγμών, άλλα
τά μέν πέρατα καί τής γραμμής καί τής κινήσεως άμερή έστι.
τά δέ μέρη αυτών έξ ιόν σύγκειται συνεχή όντα ούκ έστιν άμερή
αλλά μεριστά), οϋτω δέ καί τοΰ χρόνου τά μέν ώς πέρατα τά νΰν 10
άμερή έστι, τό δέ ώς μέρη ούκέτι. συνεχής γάρ ών ό χρόνος
διαιρούμενα έχει καί αύτός τά μέρη εις αεί διαιρετά, όίστε καν
έν συνεχεΐ ροή ή ή τε κίνησις καί ό χρόνος, ούκ έστιν άνυπό-
στατα, άλλ’ έν τώ γίνεσΟαι τό είναι έχει· τό δέ γίνεσθαι ού τό μή
είναι άπλώς έστιν, άλλά τό άλλοτε έν άλλφ μέρει τοΰ είναι ύφ- 15
ίστασθαι. ώσπερ γάρ ό αιών αίτιός έστι τοΰ κατά τό είναι μένειν
έν τώ έαυτοΰ ένί οντι τό τήν νοητήν διάκρισιν ύπομεΐναν από
τοϋ οικείου ένός όντος, ούτως ό χρόνος αίτιος τοΰ χορεύειν περί
τό νοητόν εν τοΰ είδους απαύγασμα τό εις αΐσθησιν έκεΐΟεν
ύπελθόν καί τεταγμένην έχον τήν τής χορείας συνέχειαν, ώς γάρ 20
διά τόν τόπον ού σύγκειται τά μέρη τών διεστώτων, οΰτω διά
τόν χρόνον ού συγχεΐται τό είναι τών Τρωικών τφ τών Πελοπον-
νησιακών είναι ούδέ έν έκάστω τό είναι τοΰ βρέφους τώ είναι
τοΰ νεανίσκου, καί δήλον ότι πανταχοΰ κινήσει σύνεστιν ό χρό­
νος καί μεταβολή συνέχων έν τφ γίνεσθαι τά έν τούτω τήν 25
ύπαρξιν έχοντα, όπερ ταύτόν έστι τώ χορεύειν ποιών περί τό όν
τό γινόμενον.” καί ότι μέν πάντων τών γενητών καί πόσης
γενέσεως κρατητικός έν τφ γίνεσθαι καί συνεκτικός ό χρόνος δ
τε άεί 6 τε ποτέ, καλώς εΐρηκεν ό Δαμάσκιος. τό δέ εξής δτι
“ καθ’ έαυτόν άμεταβλησίας αίτιος ίϊν εΐη τοΐς δσον έφ’ έαυτοΐς 30
έξισταμένοις τοΰ είναι δπερ εϊσίν, ώστε μάλλον ήρεμίας ήπερ
κινήσεως ό χρόνος”2 έοικε μέν είρήσθαι διά τήν τοΰ χρόνου πρός
 D A M A S C IU S

‘Time is the measure of the flux of being, whereby “ being” is con­

ceived not only with regard to substance but also with regard to
action.1 And Aristotle admirably knew the nature of time and stated
it clearly by saying that “ other things as well as motion exist in time
because their being too is measured by time” <Phys„ 221a, 8 > . For
in the same way as motion does not proceed by indivisibles (i.e., it
is not composed of instant movements, as a line is not composed of
points, for though the limits of a line and of motion are indivisible
their constituent parts are continuous and divisible), the Nows are
indivisible qua limits of time but never qua parts of it. Time is con­
tinuous and therefore contains divisible parts which can be divided
ad infinitum. Thus although motion and time are in a continuous
flux, they are not unreal but have their being in becoming; and
becoming does not absolutely mean “non-being” , but < m eans> to
exist in always different parts of being. Just as eternity is the cause
of the permanence in being of that which in its unified existence
undergoes intelligible differentiation, <proceeding> from its proper
unified oneness, so time is the cause of the circular motion of the
radiance of the pure form round the intelligible One, < a radiance>
which passes from the intelligible world into perception and keeps
the continuity of circular motion in order. Similarly to space prevent­
ing parts of separate bodies from being contiguous, time prevents
the event of the Trojan war from being confounded with the event
of the Peloponnesian war, and in an individual it prevents confound­
ing the state of a new-born with that of a youth. And obviously
everywhere time coexists with motion, and through change keeps
together in a state of becoming things which have their reality in
becoming, which is identical with saying that time makes becoming
circle round being.’
Damascius has rightly stated that time in its everlastingness and at
every moment controls all things becoming and the whole of gener­
ation in its state of becoming and keeps them together. What he
says next, that ‘time by its own nature is the cause of the lack of
change in things which insofar as they exist by themselves leave off
being as they are, so that time is more akin to rest than to motion’,2
is apparently based on the similarity of time to eternity and its con-
 i ne c o n c e p i oj t irne in L.uie iseoptaiom sni

τόν αιώνα ομοιότητα καί τήν έν τφ γίνεσθαι συνοχήν (ώς γάρ λ

εκείνος του μένειν έν τφ είναι αίτιος, ούτως ό χρόνος τοϋ μένειν
έν τφ γίνεσθαι), μήποτε δέ ού προσήκει τό μένειν όλως τφ
χρόνφ ώσπερ ουδέ τό είναι τή γενέσει, άλλ’ ώσπερ ή γένεσις
άνέλιξίς τις έκτετραμμένη τοϋ όντος γέγονεν, οΰτως ή περί τό 5
ον χορεία άνέλιξίς τής έν τφ όντι μονής, άλλά ταΰτα μέν ού
τοσοϋτον έμέ θράττει λεγάμενα παρ’ αύτοϋ, εκείνα δέ μάλλον,
απερ καί ζών έτι πολλάκις πρός έμέ λέγων ούκ έπειθε, τό είναι
άμα τόν όλον χρόνον έν όποστάσει. τοϋτο ούν καί έν τοΐς Περί
χρόνου γεγραμμένοις έκΟέμενος έπισκέψασθαι βούλομαι, τοϋ γάρ 10
Άριστοτέλους εϊπόντος,1 ότι έν χρόνφ έκεΐνό έστιν, οδ έστιν
έξω χρόνον λαβεΐν (οΰτω γάρ περιλαμβάνεσθαι ύπό τοϋ χρόνου),
ένιστάμενος πρός τοϋτο τάδε γέγραφε- “θαυμάσειε δ’ αν τις έτι
μειζόνως τοϋ έν χρόνφ όντος άκούσας τόν άφορισμόν, ότι ού
έστιν έξω χρόνον λαβεΐν (οΰτω γάρ περιλαμβάνεσθαι ύπό τοϋ 15
χρόνου ώς κατά τήν περιοχήν) μετροϋντα καί άριθμοϋντα τόν
χρόνον όρων έξωθεν όντα τοϋ περιεχομένου ώς τόν τόπον, καί
δή λέγει τοϋτο καί αυτός, άλλ’ εί τοϋτο, πώς πάθος τι τής κινή-
σεως ό χρόνος οΐον μέτρησις; ό γάρ τόπος ού τοιοϋτος. καί εί
μέτρησις, καν μηδέν εϊη λαβεΐν έξω, μεμέτρηται καί έν χρόνφ. 20
παράλογον δέ έπισυμβαίνει καί τοϋτο μή είναι χρόνον τόν σύμ-
παντα χρόνον, ού λέγω τό είδος οΐον τήν μορφήν, ώς αύτός
έφη2 πάντα αμα είναι τόν χρόνον, καθάπερ εΐ τις λέγοι πάντα άμα
τόν άνθρωπον είναι Σωκράτη, άλλά τόν κοινόν άεί ρέοντα χρό­
νον, όν περιειλήφθαι λέγει3 ύπό τοϋ αϊώνος. καίτοι άεί ρέοντα 25
χρόνον ταύτόν όμολογοΰμεν, έν φ καί τήν άεί τών ειδών μετα­
βολήν γίνεσθαι καί τών ούρανίων σωμάτων τήν άεικινησίαν. άλλ’
όμως ούκ έν χρόνφ αύται κατά τόν άφωρισμένον. τοϋ γάρ άεί
γινομένου χρόνου τί αν έξωθεν εϊη νοεΐν; παράδοξον δέ καί τό
μή τοϋ χρόνου όλου τά μόρια χρόνον ποιεϊν. έδει γάρ, εί τό 30
παρελθόν καί ένεστηκός καί μέλλον χρόνου μέρη, ή τό πέρυσι
καί τήτες καί εις νέωτα εί μέρη χρόνου, καί τόν όλον έξ αύτών
χρόνον ποιεϊν, ού όνομα τό αεί. ατοπον δέ καί έκεΐνο τό άεί
ταύτόν κατ’ άριθμόν μή είναι έν χρόνφ, διότι μή ρεΐ ή ούσία
μηδέ πέφυκε ρεΐν. άεί δέ είναι μόνον ώς τό άσύμμετρόν φησι4 τής 35
tinuity in the process of becoming (for as eternity is the cause of
permanence in being, so time is the cause of permanence in becom­
ing). But perhaps ‘permanence" does not correspond completely to
the conception of time, as being does not correspond to becoming,
but in a similar way as becoming is a kind of unfolding, unwinding
out of being, so the circling round being is an unfolding of permanence
in being. However these words of Damascius have not worried me
so much as those he used to tell me, without convincing me, when
he was still alive, namely that time as a whole does simultaneously
exist in reality. I want to inquire into this, which he has also expound­
ed in his treatise On Time. In opposition to Aristotle's words' that
something exists in time if one can apprehend time outside it (for
thus it is encompassed by time), Damascius writes: O n e could be
even more astonished hearing about the definition of “ that which
exists in time” as something which has to be encompassed by time
(for being encompassed by time means with regard to extent), < if
one realizes> that time as a measure and number is taken as being
outside the limits of what is encompassed by it, like place. This
namely is what Aristotle also says. But if this were the case, how
could time as measurement be a kind of property of motion? This
is not the case with place. And, if it < tim e > were measurement, it
too would have been measured in time even though it is impossible
to take anything outside it. And it is further absurd that time should
not be < re a l> taken as a whole. 1 do not mean the eidos of time, that
is to say its form (morphe) in the sense used by Aristotle,2 that the
whole of time <qua eidos> exists all at once, as if, e.g., somebody
could say that Socrates in his existence represents at one and the same
time the whole <eidos o f> man, but <1 m ean> the universal always
flowing time that he regards3 as encompassed by eternity. And yet
we agree that the always flowing time is the same in which there
occurs also the everlasting change of forms (eide) and the everlasting
motion of the celestial bodies. And yet these are not in time according
to the <i.e., his> definition. However, how could one conceive some-
tiring outside an always becoming time? It is also absurd that the
parts of the whole time should not produce time. This should be the
case, if past and present and future are parts of time, or last year
and this year and the coming year are parts of time and produce
out of themselves time as a whole, the expression for which is ever­
lastingness. And this too does not make sense, that what is always
the same numerically is not temporal, because the essence does not
flow and cannot flow. Aristotle namely says4 that always to be is only
comparable to the incommensurability of the diagonal and the side.
 J h e L on cep t o f T im e in L a te N e o p la to n ism

διαμέτρου πρός τήν πλευράν, καίτοι εί τό πολυχρονιώτατον έν

χρόνφ, διά τί μή καί τό παγχρόνιον, εϊ τις όνομάζοι καί τοΰτο;
διά τί δέ τό μέν πανταχοϋ οϊον τό παν η εί βούλει τό ύπουράνιον
πδν έν τόπφ λέγομεν κατειληφός γε πάντα τόν τόπον (ποΰ γάρ
δλον τό πανταχοϋ;), έπΐ δέ τοΰ χρόνου μή οϋτω νοοϋμεν έν χρόνφ 5
είναι τφ δλφ τό άεΐ δν ταύτόν έν ταύτφ κατ' αριθμόν; ο γάρ έστι
πρός τόπον τό πανταχοϋ, τοΰτο πρός χρόνον τό άεί. διά τί δέ
τόπος μέν έστιν άίδιος οιον ή κοίλη τοΰ ούρανοΰ περιφέρεια καί
τό μέσον τοϋ κόσμου, κατά ταύτόν δέ εϊπεΐν καί αριθμός αεί ό
αυτός οϊον ό των αστέρων, χρόνος δέ μόνος εϊς ό φθαρτός καί 10
γενητός, ού έξω πλείων άεί; καί γάρ εί καί κατά τόν άριθμόν,
άλλ' ούδέ τοΰ άιδίου άριθμοΰ έξω τις άίδιος. πας δέ καί αύτός
άριθμός.” 1
Έ ν δή τούτοις τήν ομοιότητα τοΰ χρόνου πρός τόν τόπον
τοΰ Άριστοτέλους λαβόντος. καθόσον καί ό χρόνος όρίζει καί 15
περιέχει τό έν χρόνφ, ώσπερ καί ό τόπος τό έν τόπφ καί ό
αριθμός τό έν άριΟμφ λεγόμενον, αύτός άξιοι, εί μή παντός τόπου
έστιν έξω τόπον λαβεΐν, μηδέ παντός χρόνου είναι χρόνον έξω
λαβεΐν. καίτοι δήλον δτι διαφέρειν καί ό ’Αριστοτέλης οϊεται
τόν τόπον τοΰ χρόνου, καθόσον ό μέν τόπος άμα ολος είναι ού 20
κωλύεται, ό δέ χρόνος έν τφ γίνεσΟαι έχει τό είναι ώσπερ καί ή
κϊνησις, ού μέντοι όλος άμα ύφέστηκεν. εί ούν έν τφ γίνεσΟαι τό
είναι έχει ό χρόνος ώσπερ καί ή κϊνησις. πώς παράλογον τό μή
είναι αμα τόν σύμπαντα χρόνον; τούναντίον γάρ αν ήν παρά­
λογον τό άμα είναι παν τό έν τφ γίνεσΟαι τό είναι έχον.2 εί ούν 25
μή έστι παράλογον τό μή είναι άμα πάσαν τήν κίνησιν διά τό
ροήν είναι, ούδέ τό μή είναι άμα τόν ρέοντα χρόνον παράλογον,
καν τό κοινόν είδος μένη τφ πάλιν καί πάλιν ώς έπί τής κινή-
σεως. εί δέ άεί ρέοντα χρόνον λέγομεν, τό άεί ούχ ώς άμα ύφεσ-
τώς άπειρον, άλλά κατά τό έπ’ άπειρον λέγομεν. οΰτω γάρ καί 30
χρόνον καί κίνησιν άεί είναι λέγομεν ώς μηδέποτε έκλείποντα,
ούχ ώς άμα δλον έχοντα τό άεί. διττόν γάρ καί τό άεί τό μέν
άμα δλον ώς τό αιώνιον, τό δέ έν τφ γίνεσΟαι τό είναι έχον κατά
τόν άνέκλειπτον χρόνον, έν τούτοι ούν καί ή άεί τών ειδών μετα­
βολή γίνεται καί αύτή ρέουσα τώ είναι, κατά δέ τό είδος τφ πάλιν 35
However, if the longest stretch of time is temporal, why not that
which persists throughout all time, if one could give a name to this
too? Why do we say that the “everywhere” or so to say the universe
or if you please everything under the sky is in place and that it occu­
pies all place (for where is the whole of “ everywhere” ?), and why do
we not have the same notion of time, that everlastingness occupies
the whole time, being numerically the same? For what “everywhere”
is with regard to place, “ everlastingness” is with regard to time. Why
then is place perpetual, e.g., the concave circumference of the heaven
and the centre of the universe, of which one says that it remains
the same and is numerically the same, e.g.. with regard to the number
of stars, whereas there is supposed to be only one perishing and
generated time outside which is everlastingness that is greater than
it? For if they ctin ie and everlastingness> are numerically the same,
the perpetual number cannot be encompassed by another perpetual
number, for all < pcrpetual> numbers are one and the same.’1
In this exposition he adopts Aristotle's comparison of time and place
insofar as time too defines and encompasses things in time, exactly
as place is said to define things that are in place and number those
that are numbered, and he himself is of the opinion that if there
cannot be conceived place outside the whole of place, there can
neither be conceived time outside the whole of time. Still, it is ob­
vious that Aristotle believes place to differ from time, insofar as
there is no hindrance for place to be as a whole at once, whereas
time has its being in becoming, like motion, and is not as a whole
real at once. If now time, like motion, has its being in becoming,
what is absurd in the notion that the totality of time does not exist
at once? Just the opposite would be absurd — that something having
its being in becoming should exist at once.2 If then it is not absurd
that the whole of motion does not exist at once because it is a flux,
it is also not absurd that the flowing time should not exist at once,
even if its common form remains in every changing moment, as is
the case for motion. If we speak of the everlastingly flowing time,
we mean ‘everlasting" not in the sense of an infinite reality existing
at once, but in the sense of something tending towards infinity. In
the same sense we say too that time and motion are everlasting, as
never ending and not as containing everlastingness as a whole at
once. For the ‘everlasting’ has two meanings, either being a whole
at once, as eternity, or having its being in becoming through the
never ending time. In the latter there occurs also the everlasting
change of forms which is a (lowing with regard to being, but remains
at rest at every successive moment with regard to form, and also
καί πάλιν μένουσα. καί ή των ουρανίων άεικινησία. καί ώσπερ
ή κίνησις τών ούρανίων ούχ άμα δλη έστίν, οϋτως ουδέ ό μετρη­
τικός αυτής σύμπας χρόνος, καί διά τοΰτο τοΟ μέν άμα όλου
χρόνου άτε μηδέ ύφεστηκότος ούκ έστι τι έξω λαβεϊν, τοΰ δέ
αεί έν ύποστάσει όντος έστιν έξω λαβεϊν διά τήν τοϋ άεί τούτου 5
άνέκλειπτον ροήν, άλλ’ ουδέ παράδοξον οΐμαι τό τοϋ μή όλου
άμα όντος χρόνου τά μόρια χρόνους ποιεΐν οίον τό παρελθόν
καί ένεστηκός καί μέλλον, εϊ μέν γάρ άμα είναι ταϋτα τά μόρια
έλέγομεν, άτοπον αν ήν τών μορίων άμα όντων μή καί τό όλον
άμα είναι, εΐ δέ ούτως έστΐ μέρη ως τοΰ μέν ούκέτι όντος τοΰ δέ 10
μήπω όντος, πώς οιόν τε τό όλον άμα είναι; τάχα γάρ άν τις
γράψας έναργέστερον έγώ δείξω τό παράδοξον τοϋ γάρ όλου
χρόνου άμα όντος παράδοξον πώς ούχ άμα τά μόρια- καί εϊ μή
άμα τά μύρια, παράδοξον εί ό όλος αμα. τό δέ άεί όνομα τοϋ
χρόνου ούχ ώς άμα όντος τοϋ άεί, όπερ καί πρότερον ειπον. άλλ’ 15
ώς κατά τό άνέκλειπτον έχοντος τό άεί.
Άτόπως δέ φησιν υπό τοΰ Άριστοτέλους τά άίδια λέγεσθαι μή
είναι έν χρόνο) ώς τό άσύμμετρον είναι τήν διάμετρον τή πλευρά,
καίτοι εί μέν τών ένεστώτων καί άμα όλων έστί τοΰτο, όήλον
ότι τών όντων καί ού γινομένων έστίν ώς τό άρτιον είναι τήν 20
δυάδα καί τάς ιδέας άσωμάτους, καί ούκ α ν εΐη ταϋτα έν χρόνιά
άλλ’ έν αίώνι μάλλον, εί δέ έν χρόνιο, δήλον ότι καί έν κινήσει,
καί ούκέτι όλον άμα ύφεστήξεται. ού γάρ έπειδή έν χρόνφ γινώ-
σκομεν ημείς τά ύπέρ χρόνον, διά τοΰτο καί έκεΐνα έν χρόνφ
ποιήσομεν.1 ’‘εί δέ τό πολυχρόνιον, φησίν, έν χρόνφ, διά τί μή 25
καί τό παγχρόνιον;” καί έστω γε καί τοΰτο έν χρόνφ, εΐπερ έν
κινήσει, καί μή άμα όλον ύφέστηκε. τοιγαροΰν άίδιον τήν κυκ­
λοφορίαν λέγομεν,2 ώς καί αύτήν άνέκλειπτον καί ύπό χρόνου
μετρουμένην άνεκλείπτου. άλλ’ ουδέ τοΰτο άναγκαΐον, εί έστι τι
έν όλφ τφ τόπφ άμα ό πανταχοΰ λέγομεν οίον τόν όλον σωμα- 30
τοειδή κόσμον, είναι καί έν τφ όλφ άμα χρόνφ τό άεί όν ταύτόν
έν ταύτώ κατ’ άριθμόν. τόν μέν γάρ όλον τόπον είναι άμα ούδέν
άτοπον- ούδέ γάρ έν τφ γίνεσθαι τό είναι έχει ό τόπος ώσπερ ή
κίνησις- τόν δέ χρόνον πώς δυνατόν κινήσεως όντα μέτρον; ώστε
the everlasting movement of the heavenly bodies. And just as this
does not exist at once as a whole, so does not the total time which
is capable of measuring it. And therefore one cannot conceive some­
thing outside the time which exists at a whole at once, seeing that
it is not real, but one can well conceive something outside the ever­
lastingly real time because of its everlastingly unending flux. In fact
1 do not regard it as absurd to conceive the parts of that time, which
does not exist as a whole at once, as times, namely past, present,
and future. For if we were to say that these parts exist at once, it
would not make sense that the parts should exist at once, and not
the whole. If the parts are such that one of them is not any more
and an othei not yet, how is it possible for the whole to be at once?
Perhaps one can express this absurdity clearer in the following way:
if the whole of time exists at once, it is absurd that its parts should
not exist at once; if however its parts do not exist at once, it is absurd
for the whole to exist at once. As I said before: the ‘everlasting’ is
an expression for time not in the sense that the everlasting exists
at once, but as containing the everlasting in the sense of never
ending.
He says that Aristotle is wrong in saying that perpetual things are
not in time, such as the proposition that the diagonal is incommen­
surable with the side < o f the square>. However if this holds for
things that are present and exist at once as a whole, it is obvious
that it also holds for things that are and do not come into being,
such as that the dyad is even and the ideas are incorporeal, for such
things are not in time but rather in eternity. If they were in time,
they obviously would also be moving and could not exist wholly at
once. For if we perceive things above time in a temporal way, we
still do not make them temporal by this.1 'If the longest stretch of
time is temporal’, he says, ‘why not that which persists throughout
all time?’ But let us then suppose that this is in time, <which could
only be tru e> if indeed it is moving; but then it would not exist at
once as a whole. For that very reason we call the circular motion
of the heavenly bodies perpetual,2 for it is never ending and is meas­
ured by a never ending time. On the other hand it is by no means
necessary that, if we say of something that it exists at once in the
totality of place, i.e., everywhere, such as the whole corporeal uni­
verse, what everlastingly remains numerically the same should also
exist at once in the whole of time. For it is not absurd for the whole
of place to exist at once, because unlike motion its being does not
consist in becoming. But how could time, which is the measure of
motion, exist at once? Thus even if there exists an analogy between
 καν άνά λόγον έχη τό πανταχοΰ πρός τό άεί, άλλα τό μέν υπο­
μένει, τό δέ ρεΐ. καί εΐ έτυχεν άπειρον είναι τό πανταχοΟ, τό μέν
ήν άπειρον μένον, τό δέ έπ’ άπειρον, “διά τϊ δέ, φησί, τόπος μέν
καί αριθμός έστιν άίδιος πρό τοϋ φθαρτού, χρόνος δέ ούκ έστιν;”
ή έστι μέν καί χρόνος άίδιος (άνέκλειπτον γοϋν άποδείκνυσι 5
τόν χρόνον Αριστοτέλης), άλλ’ έν τφ γίνεσθαι τό είναι έχων
ώσπερ καί ή κίνησις καί τό άεί αύτοίς υπάρχει, άλλ’ οΰχ άμα
δλον όν, άλλ’ επ' άπειρον προϊόν.
Ίνα δέ συνελών εϊπω τήν έμαυτοΰ γνώμην, εί έστι τις γένεσις
καί κίνησις ούκ έν τω γίνεσθαι τό είναι έχουσα ουδέ άλλο μετ’ ίο
άλλο έαυτης μόριον, άλλ’ άμα δλη ύφεστώσα (ώς τήν τής ψυχικής
ουσίαν ή, εί μή ταύτης, τήν γοΰν τοΰ ουρανίου σώματος είποι
τις άν γενητήν μέν ,είναι ώς άπό μόνης αιτίας ύφεστώσαν, καί
κινητήν οίίτω κατά τήν τής γενέσεως κίνησιν, καθ’ ήν του όντως
δντος εις τό γινόμενον έξέστη καί άπό παραδείγματος εις εικόνα), 1 5
εΐ τις ούν τοιαύτην γένεσιν καί κίνησιν όρμ, ώς ό έμός πολλάκις
διετείνετο Δαμάσκιος, εικότως καί χρόνον άμα δλον όράν φίλο-
νεικεΐ μετρητικόν τής τοιαύτης κινήσεως καί τοΰ είναι τοΰ άμα
δντος. εί δέ γενητόν ό Πλάτων1 ορίζεται τό γινόμενον καί άπολ-
λύμενον όντως δέ ουδέποτε δν, καί εί πάσα κίνησις μεταβολή 20
καί άλλο πάντως έχει μετ’ άλλο, οϋ χρή λέγειν γενητά ή κινητά
τά άμα δλα όντα. εί μή κατά τινα τρόπον ένιδεΐν έν αύτοίς τήν
μεταβολήν δυνατόν, καί οίδα μέν δτι τό γινόμενον καί άπολλύ-
μενον καί επί των άιδίων γενητών άμεταβλήτων δέ κατ' ουσίαν
εξηγούμενος ό Δαμάσκιοςμέσ ην έλεγε2 τοΰ δντος καί μή δντος 25
τήν τοιαύτην φύσιν, καί κατά μέν τήν εις τό δν άνάτασιν γινό­
μενον έλεγεν αύτό, κατά δέ τήν εις τό μή δν ύπόβασιν άπολλύ-
μενον άλλά μήποτε τό μέσον οίόν έστι τό τής ψυχικής ούσίας
ούδέ γενητόν έστι κυρίως, αλλά μέσον άμερίστου καί μεριστοΰ,
ταύτόν δέ εϊπεΐν δντος καί γενέσεως, καί διά τούτο μέσφ τινί 30
αίώνος καί χρόνου μέτρω μετρεΐται, δπερ διά τό μή έχειν ίδιον
όνομα ποτέ μέν αιώνα ποτέ δέ χρόνον2 οί φιλόσοφοι καλοΰσιν.
ή μέντοι των ουρανίων σωμάτων ούσία γενητή μέν δλη (ορατή
γάρ απτή τέ έστι καί σώμα έχει), γενητή δέ ούσα καί μή μείνασα
έν τώ ένί κίνησιν έσχε καί μεταβολήν, καν μή τήν κατ’ ούσίαν 35
 ‘everywhere' and ‘everlastingness’, still the first is at rest, while the
latter flows. And if ‘everywhere’ were infinite, it would be infinity
at rest, whereas everlastingness is lending towards infinity. ‘Why then’,
he asks, ‘is place and number perpetual rather than subject to de­
struction, but time not?’ The reply is that lime too is perpetual
(Aristotle shows that it is unending) but has its being in becoming
which also holds for motion, and everlastingness is predicated of
both, however it does not exist at once as a whole blit proceeds
towards infinity.
I shall now briefly state my own opinion: if there exist some gener­
ation and motion whose existence does not consist in becoming and
whose parts are not present one after another but which exist as
a whole at once (this may be the case with the essence of the soul
or, if not with this, then perhaps with the essence of the celestial
body of which one could say that though it was generated it exists
by a supreme cause and moves according to the creative motion by
which it descends from the real existence into becoming and from
the paradigm to the image), if now somebody would observe such
a generation and motion, as my friend Damascius has so often
stressed, then he would reasonably be eager to regard the time,
which measures both this motion and the being of that which exists
at once, as existing as a whole at once. If Plato1 defines that which
is becoming and perishing as generated but never really being, and
if every motion is change and a succession of different states, one
must not say that those things which exist at once as a whole arc
I generated and moving, unless it is somehow possible to discern change
in them. And I know that Damascius, expounding the essence of
things becoming and perishing in relation to the things which, though
perpetual and generated, are yet unchanging, stated2 that things of
such nature are intermediate between that which is and that which
is not, and called them originating through upward tension towards
being or perishing through declension towards non-being. But per­
haps the intermediate, such as the essence of the soul, is not, properly
speaking, generated, but is intermediate between the indivisible and
the divisible, or. in other words, between being and generation. There­
fore it is measured by a measure of some kind which is intermediate
between eternity and time, which, because it has no special name, the
philosophers sometimes call eternity and sometimes time.2 But the
essence of the celestial bodies is generated as a whole (for it is visible
and tangible and corporeal), and as it is generated and has not
remained in the One, it has acquired motion and change, not however
as far as its essence is concerned — a change in the sense of some·
ώς ποτέ μέν είναι ποτέ δέ μή είναι, άλλά τήν κατά οίον άλλοίωσίν
τινα, καθ’ ήν έν τοΐς διαφόροις σχηματισμοΐς1 διαφόρου ζωής τε
καί τελειότητας αυτοί τε μεταλαμβάνουσιν εις τάς εαυτών ουσίας
από των οικείων παραδειγμάτων καί άλλήλοις καί τοΐς υπό τήν
σελήνην μεταδιδόασιν. 5
Ά λλ’ επειδή καί διαίρεσιν τής τοΰ χρόνου ποιούμενος ύποστά-
σεως ό Δαμάσκιος πολλά περί τοΟ άμα όλου ύφεστώτος χρόνου
λέγει, φέρε καί εκείνων έπισκεψώμεθά τινα. έχει δέ ούτως· “τις
δέ ό σύμπας χρόνος; ή ού μή έστιν έξω τινά λαβεΐν. τοΰ δέ αεί
τί αν εκτός είποιμεν δήλωμα χρόνου; τφ γοΰν Άριστοτέλει καί 10
υπέρ χρόνον έδοξε τούτο καί τφ αίώνι προσήκειν. παντός γώρ
είναι χρόνου λαβεΐν τι έξω σαφώς άποφαίνεται έν τοΐς περί
χρόνου λόγοις. τό άεΐ άρα έστιν ό μέγιστος χρόνος, πότερον ούν
τό άειγενές άεΐ καί ό ρέων χρόνος ούτος ό μέγιστος; άλλ’ ούτος
ουδέποτε πάρεισιν εις τό είναι σύμπας ουδέ γίνεται όλος άθρους 15
ουδέ έστιν άεΐ τό αεί, μάλλον δέ ούδέποτε. έν μέν γάρ τφ ποτέ
πώς άν εΐη τό αεί, χαλεπόν καί πλάσαυ ταύτόν γάρ έσται καί
αμα τό ποτέ καί τό άεί. άλλά μήν ουδέ έν τφ άεί. αυτό γάρ τούτο
λέγομεν ούκ είναι άμα τό άεΐ, ρεΐν δέ κατά μέρος, άτοπον ούν
τόν μέν τινα καί έλάχιστον ύφίστασΟαι χρόνον,2 τόν δέ σύμπαντα 20
μηδέποτε, καίτοι εΐ σημαίνει τι τό άεί καί μή έστιν όνομα κενόν,
αδύνατον τό άεί πράγμα μή είναι άεί· δηλοΐ γάρ τό άίδιον-3
άίδιον δέ έστιν, ό άδύνατον ποτέ μή είναι ή μηδέποτε είναι,
καί όπερ ούκ ένδέχεται μή είναι, καί άναγκαΐον είναι, έπεί καί
εί τό άεί μή έστιν ή έστι μή άεί, ούδέν έσται τών γενητών άίδιον 25
ώστε οϋτε ουρανός άεΐ ούτε κόσμος κατ’ αριθμόν ό αυτός, άλλά
ρευσεΐται πάντα τού άεί έν ροή όντος οϋτε δή όντος οϋτε γινο­
μένου. τό γάρ ποτέ έκάστοτε γενήσεται καί ού τό άεί.” καί διά
μέν τούτων τό τού ουρανού άεί καί τοΰ σύμπαντος κόσμου άμα
όλον είναι βούλεται ού κατά τό έπ’ άπειρον καί άειγενές καί τόν 30
ρέοντα χρόνον, άλλά κατά τόν άμα όλον όφεστηκότα· έν δέ τοΐς
έξής άκριβέστερον οίμαι έπιβλέπων άλλαχοΰ που πρώτως τόν
τοιοΰτον χρόνον άποτίθεται. καί έξ έκείνου καί έν τή τού ούρα-
times existing and sometimes not — but a change in the sense of a
certain alteration by which they receive in their various configurations1
into their own essences from their own paradigms various degrees
of life and perfection and distribute them among themselves and
among the sublunar things.
But as Damascius, analysing the reality of time, talks a lot about
the time which exists as a whole at once, let us also inquire a bit
into that; his considerations are as follows: ‘What means total time?
Obviously that outside which nothing can be grasped. How then
could we talk of time being known to us except as everlastingness?
However, Aristotle believed that this pertains to eternity and is above
time. For he clearly maintains in Ills treatises about time that there
exists something outside every stretch of time. Everlastingness is
thus the longest time. But is this longest time really < the same as>
the always generated everlastingness and the flowing time? However
this never enters totally into existence nor does it become a whole
at once, nor is everlastingness always there, but rather never. For
it is difficult to imagine how everlastingness could be in any
particular part of time. This would mean that any particular time
and everlastingness would exist at once and be the same; but neither
would it < “cverlastingness"> exist in true everlastingness. About this
notion of everlastingness one could say that it does not exist at once
but that it flows part by part. Now it would be absurd if there were
to exist in reality some very short time,2 but not at all the total time.
However, if everlastingness signifies something and is not an empty
word, it is impossible that an everlasting thing should not be ever­
lasting. This is proved by the perpetual;3 for the perpetual is that for
which it is impossible sometimes not to be or never to be. And what
cannot not be, must necessarily be. For if cverlastingness were not
to exist or were not to be everlasting, none of the generated things
would be perpetual, thus neither the heaven would be everlasting nor
would the universe be numerically the same, but everything would
flow because everlastingness would be in a state of flux and would
neither be nor become. For then each particular time would be
generated on each occasion but not everlastingness.'
For these reasons he is of the opinion that the everlastingncss of the
heaven and of the totality of the universe exists at once as a whole,
not in the sense of a flowing and always generated time tending
towards infinity, but in the sense of a time which is real at once and
as a whole. In what follows he considers, in what I believe to be a
more careful analysis than elsewhere, primarily the nature of this
time. And he states that this time subsists in the essence of heaven
νοϋ ούσίμ τοιοϋτον ύφίστασΟαί φησιν. άνάγκη δέ πλείονα παρα-
γράφειν. ζητήσας γάρ, τί τό άεί ποιούν έσται τό ποτέ πάλιν καί
πάλιν γινόμενον ουδέποτε παυόμενον τοΰ πάλιν καί. πάλιν, έπά-
γει· “ ή φυσικόν γε όν ή φύσις ποιήσει καί ψυχή πρό τής φύσεως-
αϋτη γάρ πόσης έξάρχει μεταβολής, καί πώς ή φύσις άιδίων 5
σιομάτων ούσα δημιουργός καί τόν άεΐ ρέοντα χρόνον άφ’ έαυτής
έκχέουσα πώς οΰκ άίδιος καί λόγων πλήρης άιδίων; ούκοΟν καί
ό τοΰ χρόνου λόγος άίδιος ένουσιωμένος αυτή ούτος αν εΐη χρό­
νος ό άεΐ παρών όλος καί σάμπας, ομοίως δέ καί ό έν τή ψυχή
λόγος τού χρόνου προϋπάρχων άεΐ κατ' αριθμόν ό αυτός έσται 10
χρόνος, εί δέ έν τή άμεταβλήτω ψυχή καί φύσει τή τοιαύτη
χρόνος έσται συνηγμένος εις όλον τό τοΰ χρόνου είδος, καί
σύμπας χρόνος ουτός έστιν άεΐ μένων έν τώ άεΐ καί οΰδαμή
ρέων έχων έν ένί τό πρότερον καί ύστερον, καί τό νϋν αυτό ό
λέγομεν ενεστώτα χρόνον από γούν τοΰ έστώτος άδιαιρέτου ό 15
ρέων τριχή διαιρείται όπως άν διαιροΐτο. μήπιο γάρ περί τούτου.”
λέγει δέ προϊών ότι τό μέν έστιν έν ταΐς ένεργείαις τών άμετα-
βλήτων φύσεων ταΐς μεταβαλλομέναις είτε ψυχαίων εΐτε σωμα-
τοειδών σφζούσαις τό άεΐ κατά είδος μόνον, τό δέ έν ταΐς μετα-
βαλλομέναις έπ’ άπειρον ούσίαις όρΰται άεΐ σωζόμενον κατά 20
είδος έν ταΐς όλότησιν αυτών, τό δέ έν τοϊς γινομένους ή άπογι-
νομένοις πεπερασμένον τούτο ή κατά κύκλον ώς ή τοΰ όλου
γενητοΰ περίοδος ή τού ήλιου εί τύχοι άπό τοΰ αύτοΰ έπί τό
αυτό μία περιφορά ή κατ’ εΰθυπορίαν ώς έπί τών ατόμων καί
φθαρτών θεωρείται, οΰτω μέν τόν ρέοντα χρόνον διεΐλε-1 τοϊς δέ 25
προειρημένοις συνήψε ταϋτα- “εί δ’ ούν, τό ποιοΰν άίδιον καί έν
χρόνω τφ άεί, ποιεί δέ τφ είναι τα πρώτα τών γινομένων, εί γάρ
ταΐς ένεργείαις ποιεί, πολλφ μάλλον τφ είναι- δημιουργική γάρ
ή ουσία πρό τών ένεργειών καί τό άίδιον πρό τοΰ μή τοιούτου.
ώστε καί έν τοϊς άιδίοις τών γινομένων ένστηρίξει κατ' ουσίαν 30
τόν άεί όντα καί μηδέποτε ρέοντα χρόνον, μάλλον δέ ταΰτα έκεί-
νφ συνδήσει πρός τό άίδιον. τοΰ γάρ άεί μετασχοΰσα ή τοΰ
ουρανού ούσία γέγονεν άίδιος κατ’ αύτό τό άεί, ταύτόν δέ εϊπεΐν
τόν σύμπαντα χρόνον ούσιιυθεΐσα. ό άρα τφ όλω καί άιδίω χρόνος
όμοφυής καί όμόγονος εΐτε άπό ψυχής άρχόμενος είτε άπό τής 35
έαυτοΰ φύσεως < > .2 τοΰτο μέν γάρ εις ύστερον ού ρέων ουδέ
ρέοντι συνών ό σύμπας τώ όντι χρόνος3 έστιν, άφ' οΰ ό ρέων κατά
deriving from the intellectual time. Most of it I can only summarize.
Inquiring into the nature of the everlasting action, of that which is
generated at every moment again and again and never ceases cbeing
generated> again and again, he argues: ‘Truly, a physical being is
created by nature and by the soul before nature, for it initiates every
change. And how could nature, the creator of perpetual bodies,
pouring out from itself the everlastingly flowing time — how could
it not be perpetual and full of perpetual notions? Therefore the per­
petual notion of time, too, which through it acquires substance, will
be the time which is as a whole and in its totality everlastingly present.
And similarly too the notion of time which everlastingly and numer­
ically pre-exists in the soul will be of the same character. But if in
this unchanging soul and nature time is joined together into the com­
plete form of time, then our time too in its totality will always be at
rest in the everlastingness and will never flow, containing in One
past and future and the Now itself which we call the present time.
At any rate, from the undivided < tim e > at rest, the flowing one is
divided in three ways, whatever the division may be. But now enough
of this.' He then explains that these cth ree divisions of lim e> are
(1) that in the changing actions of the unchangeable natures, either
soul-like or corporeal, wliich preserve the cverlastingness only with
regard to their form; (2) that to be found in the infinitely changing
substances whose form is preserved as far as their wholeness is
concerned; (3) that which can be seen limited in things which come
to be and pass away either cyclically, as in the period of the generated
whole or for instance of the constantly recurring circular motion of
the sun or of the rectilinear motion of individual and perishing
bodies. In this way he divided the flowing tim e1 and added the fol­
lowing: ‘If the agent is perpetual, and in everlasting time, it is efficient
insofar as the first originated things exist. For if it is efficient with
respect to actions, all the more with respect to being. For creative
essence comes before actions, and the perpetual before the non-
perpetual, so that according to its essence it implants also in the
perpetual things among those generated the everlastingly being and
never flowing time, or rather binds them to the latter in perpetuity.
And the essence of heaven partaking in the everlastingness becomes
perpetual according to the idea of everlastingness, in other words it
becomes substantial for the totality of time. Time which is of the
same nature and the same kind as the whole and the perpetual either
originates in the soul or from its own nature.2 This namely is the real
total time3 which does not flow towards the future nor is associated
with flowing time, from which the flowing time winds olf part by
 μέρος έκμηρύεταν1 καί διά τούτον ού παύεται γινόμενος καίτοι
έκάστοτε παυόμενος ό έκάστοτε ένιστάμενος, ότι εκείνος άεί κατ’
αριθμόν ό αυτός έστηκεν ένεργών τον άεί κατ' είδος, ώς γάρ τοϋ
ουρανού ή ενέργεια κυκλοφορία πάλιν καί πάλιν άνέκλειπτος,
οϋτω καί χρόνου έκεϊ τοϋ εις έν συνηγμένου ό τής κυκλοφορίας 5
χρόνος ενέργεια, καί τί διοίσει, φαίη τις άν, τού αίώνος ό συν-
ηγμένος εις έν ώς λέγομεν χρόνος;2 ό γοϋν ’Αριστοτέλης αιώνα
τούτον αν λέγοι είναι έν τφ περιέχεσΟαι τόν έκάστοτε γινόμενον
έκαστον χρόνον, καί τάχα άν κατακολουθοίη μάλλον Άριστο-
τέλει τούτο λέγων Αλέξανδρος, ή πρός μέν ’Αλέξανδρον εϊποι 10
τις άν, ώς εϊη σκεπτέον, εί ταύτόν ’Αριστοτέλης θήσεται τό είναι
καί τό άεί τής τε τού πέμπτου σώματος ουσίας καί τής τού άκι-
νήτου όρεκτοΰ.3 εί.γάρ αΰτη μέν αιτία, εκείνη δέ άπ’ αιτίας, ώς
αύτός ομολογεί, καί εί μή γένεσιν άξιοί κατηγορεΐν τής σωμα­
τικής άιδιότητος (τούτο γάρ μόνον τό όνομα παραιτεΐσθαί φησιν), 15
εΐ δ’ ουν διαφέροι. συγχωρήσειεν άν καί τό άεί4 διττόν είναι, τό
μέν αιτίαν, τό δ’ άπ’ αιτίας, ημείς δέ οί τό ΰπό έτέρου υφιστά­
μενον γενητόν είναι καί γινόμενον όμολογοΰντες εικότως άν ούκ
αιώνα καλοΐμεν αυτόν άλλά χρόνον, αίώνος εικόνα πρώτην
τιθέμενοι ταύτην.” 20

Simpl., Ταύτας τοίνυν τάς απορίας ό φιλόσοφος Δαμάσκιος λύειν επι­

Phys., χειρεί τόν ενεστώτα χρόνον ου κατά τό άμερές νϋν λαμβάνει ν
796,27-
800,16 άξιών. πέρας γάρ χρόνου τό τοιοϋτο νύν καί ού χρόνος, τού δέ
περατουμένου μή όντος οόδ’ άν τό πέρας ύφεστήξεται· ού μέντοι
ούτε κίνησις ούτε μεταβολή τις έν τφ τοιούτφ νύν φανεΐται. 25
μεριστόν γάρ τι έν άμερεϊ πώς ύποστήσεται; άλλά ταΰτα μέν καί
αύτός άν ό άπορών είποι λόγος· “θαυμάζω δέ έγωγε, φησιν ούτως
καί τοΐς ρήμασι λέγων, πώς τόν μέν Ζήνωνος επιλύονται λόγον,
ώς ού κατά τι άδιαίρετον τής κινήσεως έπιτελουμένης, άλλά καθ’
όλον βήμα προκοπτούσης άθρούστερον, καί ούκ άεί τό ήμισυ 30
πρό τού όλου, άλλά ποτέ καί όλον καί μέρος οΐον ύπεραλλο-
μένης. ού συνενόησαν δέ οί τό άδιαίρετον μόνον νύν είναι λέγον-
τες τό αύτό καί επί τού χρόνου συμβαΐνον άτε συνόντος άεί τή
κινήσει καί οϊον συμπαραθέοντος, ώστε καί συμβηματίζοντος
όλφ πηδήματι συνεχεΐ καί ού κατά < τό > νύν διεξιόντος έπ’ 35
άπειρον, καί ταΰτα κινήσεως μέν οϋσης εναργούς έν τοΐς πράγ-
μασι. τού Άριστοτέλους οΰτω δεικνύντος5 λαμπρώς, ότι ούδέν έν
τφ νύν κινείται ούδέ μεταβάλλεται, άλλ' έν τούτφ μέν κεκίνηται
καί μεταβέβληται, μεταβάλλεται δέ καί κινείται πάντως ένχρόνω.
part.' And because of this it never ceases from becoming, although
each moment which begins comes to an end, for the reason that the
intellectual time always remains numerically the same and actualizes
everlastingness according to its form. In the same way as the circular
motion which unceasingly goes on again and again is the activity of
the heaven, so is the time of the circular motion the activity of the
intellectual time which is combined in one. And one might ask how
this time which we call the “ combined in one''2 is distinguished from
eternity? Aristotle would have called “ eternity” the time which orig­
inates from encompassing any time, and probably Alexander by
saying this rather follows Aristotle. And against Alexander one could
argue that one has to consider whether Aristotle regarded as identical
the being and everlastingness of the essence of the fifth body and
that of the unmoved object of desire.3 For if this is the cause, and the
former the effect, as he himself concedes, and if he believes that one
cannot assert a beginning of the corporeal perpetuity (for the term
itself does not admit it) — if there is a difference, he would concede
that everlastingness4 has two senses, as cause and as eiTcct. But we
who assume that reality, which depends on something else, is gener­
ated and is in the process of becoming would rather not call it
“ eternity” , but time, taking this as the primary image of eternity.'

The philosopher Damascius undertakes to solve these difficulties,

being of the opinion that the present time has not to be considered
in terms of the indivisible Now. For this kind of Now is not time,
but a limit of time. If what is limited does not exist, the limit could
not be real either. For in this kind of Now there appears no move­
ment or change. For how could something divisible be real in the
indivisible? But let him who raises the difficulty have his say: ‘1
wonder', so he says, and in these words, ‘whether Zeno’s argument
cannot be solved by saying that the movement is completed not in
indivisible units, but that it progresses by whole steps all at once,
and that the half does not always precede the whole, but that at any
time movement, as it were, leaps over both the whole and the part.
Those who say that only the Now is indivisible did not grasp that
the indivisible is also inherent in time which always coexists with
movement and, as it were, advances together with it in such a way
that it keeps pace <with movement> by means of whole continuous
leaps and does not proceed ad infinitum in Nows. This <m ust be
the case>, as motion is evidently in things, and as Aristotle has
lucidly shown5 that nothing moves or changes in the Now, but rather
has moved or changed in it, whereas it changes or moves wholly in
τό γοϋν άλμα τής κινήσεως1μέρος δν κινήσεως τό έν τφ κινεϊσθαι.
ούκ έν τφ νΰν έσται κινούμενον,2 ουδέ <έν> μή ένεστώτχ χρόνω
τό γε ένεστώς. ώστε έν φ κίνησις ή ένεστώσα. χρόνος ούτός έστιν
ό ένεστώς άπειρος ών τή διαιρέσει απείρου ούσης· έκάτερον γάρ
συνεχές, παν δέ συνεχές επ ' άπειρον διαιρετόν.” ταΰτα εΐπών καί 5
τήν’Αριστοτέλους παρατίθεται ρήσιν, έν ή τήν Ζήνωνος απορίαν3
επιλύεται έχουσαν ούτως· “αϊ γάρ αύταΐ διαιρέσεις έσονται τού
χρόνου καί του μεγέθους καί εΐ όποτερονοϋν άπειρον, καί θάτε-
ρον, καί ώς θάτερον, καί Οάτερον, οΐον εί μέν τοϊς έσχάτοις
άπειρος ό χρόνος, καί τό μήκος τοϊς έσχάτοις, εί δέ τή διαιρέσει, ίο
τή διαιρέσει καί τό μήκος <,εϊ δέ άμφοΐν ό χρόνος, άμφοΐν καί
τό μέγεθος>. διόπερ καί ό Ζήνωνος λόγος ψεύδος λαμβάνει τό
μή ένδέχεσθαι τά άπειρα διελθεΐν ή άψασΟυι, τών απείρων καθ'
έκαστον έν πεπερασμένω χρόνω- <διχώς γάρ λέγεται καί ό χρό­
νος καί τό μήκος άπειρον καί όλως παν τό συνεχές, ήτοι κατά 15
διαίρεσιν ή τοϊς έσχάτοις. τών μέν ούν κατά τό ποσόν απείρων
ούκ ενδέχεται άψασθαι έν πεπερασμένοι χρόνω,> τών δέ κατά
διαίρεσιν ενδέχεται, καί γάρ αυτός ό χρόνος ούτως άπειρος, ώστε
έν τφ όπείρφ <καΐ> ούκ έν τφ πεπερασμένο; συμβαίνει διιέναι
τό άπειρον καί απτεσθαι τών απείρων τοϊς άπείροις, ού τοϊς 20
πεπερασμένοις.” έκ δή τούτων φανερόν δ τι έν τοϊς συνεχέσιν
ού βούλεται ένεργεία είναι, ού μέντοι ουδέ τό δλον άθρούστερον
βήμα ούδέ τό τού όλου μέρους άλμα δοκεϊ μοι λόγον έχειν επί
τής κινήσεως ή έπί τοΰ χρόνου λεγόμενον, έπί μέν γάρ τού τόπου,
ου τά μόρια ύπομένει, δυνατόν οιμαι τήν τοιαύτην σύλληψιν 25
θεωρεϊν, έπί μέντοι τών έν τώ γίνεσθαι τό είναι έχόντων ούκ άν
εΐη τι άθρόον λαβεΐν, πλήν εί μή κατά τήν ήμετέραν έπίνοιαν,
τό γάρ άθρουν έκεΐνο ανάγκη μή ώς ρέον άλλ' ώς έστηκός λαβεΐν
καί μή ώς γινόμενον άλλ’ ώς όν. καίτοι τί έστι τοιοΰτον έν τοϊς
τό δν έν τφ γίνεσθαι έχουσιν; άλλά τούτοις μάλλον προσεκτέον 30
ύπό τοΰ φιλοσόφου Δαμασκίου καί τοϊς ρηθεΐσιν αύταΐς λέςεσν4
“τό δ’ αυ αεί μηδέποτε δν συνηγμένον εις έν, έν δέ τφ γίνεσθαι
τό είναι έχον, τοϋτον είναι τον χρόνον ώς ήμέραν καί νύκτα καί
μήνα καί ενιαυτόν, ούδέν γάρ τούτων άθρόον ούδέ ό άγών (καίτοι
πάρεστιν ό άγών, άλλά κατά μέρος έπιτελούμενος) ούδέ δρχησις 35
(καί αύτή γάρ κατά μέρος· άλλ' δμως όρχεϊσΟαι λέγεται τις
ένεστώσαν όρχησιν). ούτω δή καί τόν σύμπαντα χρόνον έφεσ-
 time. In any case the jump of movement,1 being a part of movement
inherent in moving, will not move in the Now,2 nor will the present
be in the time which is not present. In this way the time in which
the present motion is contained will be the present time, and is in­
finite because of the infinite divisibility. For both of them are con­
tinuous, and everything continuous is infinitely divisible.’ Having said
this he adds the passage from Aristotle in which the latter solves
Zeno's difficulty.3 It reads: ‘For the divisions of the distance can
always be made in the same ratio as the divisions of the time. Like­
wise, if either time or magnitude is infinite in any respect, so is the
other in the same respect. For instance, if the time extends infinitely
in both directions, so will the distance; and if time is infinitely divis­
ible, so will distance be; and if time is both infinitely extended and
infinitely divisible, so will distance be. Hence Zeno's argument makes
a false assumption in asserting that it is impossible for a thing to
traverse or severally come in contact with infinite things in a finite
time. For there are two senses in which a distance or a period of time
or indeed any continuum may be regarded as infinite, namely in
respect of its divisibility or in respect of its extension. Nowr it is not
possible to come in contact with quantitatively infinite things in a
finite time, but it is possible to traverse what is infinite in its divisi­
bility; for in this respect time itself is also infinite. Accordingly, a
distance which is infinite is traversed in a time which is not finite
but infinite; and the contacts with the infinite are made at Nows
which are not finite but infinite in number.’ From this it is clear that
in his opinion continua do not contain actual < p a rts > ; however, as
it seems to me, whole steps all at once or jumps of parts of the whole
do not make sense either with respect either to movement or to time.
I do believe that it is possible to have a perception of < th e truth o f>
this statement with regard to place whose parts are always there, but
with regard to things which have their being in becoming it is impos­
sible to grasp them < th e p arts> as something simultaneous, except
with the help of our thought. For this simultaneous something must
be grasped not as flowing but as static, not as becoming but as being.
But how to explain this <static notion> in things which have their
being in becoming? With regard to this one should rather give heed
to the philosopher Damascius and his statements:4 ‘Moreover that
which can never be combined in one but which has its being in be­
coming, is time qua day and night, month and year. None of these
is simultaneous, neither is a contest (foi though the contest is present,
it is being carried out piecemeal), nor a dance (this too is piecemeal,
and yet somebody can be said to dance in the present). In this way
τάναι γινόμενον, άλλ’ ούκ όντα, καί γάρ τά κοινά των ειδών
άίδια λέγειν ήμδς ώς άεί γένη, καί ρέοντα μέν κατ' άριθμόν.
έστώτα δέ τά αυτά κατ’ είδος, και τήν συνέχειαν κατά τοϋτο
σώζειν τριχή ταύτην διαιρουμένην ώς πρός ήμάς και τόν καθ’
ημάς ενεστώτα χρόνον, άλλοις γοΰν άλλος ό ένεστώς, έπεΐ καθ' 5
εαυτόν γε ό χρόνος1 εις συνεχής, τούτων ούν καλώς είρημένων
δυνάμει ρητέον είναι τήν τοϋ χρόνου διαϊρεσιν. καί τό άμερές
νϋν δυνάμει, τήν δέ ήμετέραν επίνοιαν διαιρεΐν, καί τά νϋν ύφισ-
τάνειν τοϋτο ώς πέρας καί τό άμερές, καί συλλαμβάνειν ώς
έστηκότα μέτρα τινά τοϋ χρόνου, ού καθ’ εν είδος άφορίζοντας,2 10
οϊον ήμέρας καί μήνας καί ενιαυτούς, καίτοι ή τών ειδών τούτων
άπόστασις κατέχει μέν τοϋ είναι μεγάλης τινός μοίρας, άλλ’ έν
τώ γίνεσθαι τό είναι έχει, καν άθρόον τις τό είδος στήσαι βου-
ληθή, ούκέτι ταύτόν τοϋτο έν γενέσει λαμβάνει, αλλά τό χωρισ­
τόν καί έςηρημένον οϋ κατά μέθεξιν ρέουσαν, όίσπερ ό ποταμός 15
ύφίσταται, τό τήδε. καί γάρ τών ποταμών έκαστον έστιν είδος
έστηκός, άφ’ ού ό ρέων ποταμός ύφίσταται έν βοή τό είδος
δεχόμενος, καί άν στήσης τόν ποταμόν, ούκέτι ό ποταμός έσται.
ούτως ούν καί τό ένεστώς καί τό παρεληλυθός καί τό μέλλον κατ'
είδος μέν έν τώ ένί εΐδει συνείληπται τοϋ χρόνου, άνελίττεται 20
δέ έν τή γενέσει, τό μέν άεί προϊόν εις τό είναι όφεστώς λεγό­
μενον, τό δέ έφθαρμένον παρεληλυθός, τό δέ μήπω δν μέλλον,
χρόνος δέ ό σύμπας έστιν ένδελεχώς ρέων ώσπερ καί ή κίνησις.
καν απολαβών τόν ενεστώτα ώς ένεργείμ τοΐς νϋν έκατέρωθεν
περατούμενον άθρόον στήση, άπολέσας τό τοϋ χρόνου είδος έν 25
τώ γίνεσθαι τό είναι έχον, ώσπερ ή κίνησις. οΐμαι ούν τήν
απορίαν γίνεσθαι τής ψυχής κατά τά έν αυτή έστώτα είδη πάντα
γινώσκειν έπιχειρούσης. ούτως γοΰν καί τήν κίνησιν ΐστησιν.
είδητικώς αυτήν καί ού κατά τήν σύμφυτον αύτή ροήν γινώσκειν
έπιχειροΰσα. καί ώσπερ τήν νοητήν ένωσιν διακρίνει μή δυνα- 30
μένη συνελεϊν τήν εκείνης παντότητα, άλλ’ ιδία μέν δικαιοσύνην,
ίδίμ δέ σωφροσύνην, ίδίμ δέ επιστήμην καθορώσα, καίτοι έκάσ-
του τών έκεΐ παντός δντος. καί συλλογίζεται ότι άθάνατος ή
ψυχή τρεις όρους τιθεΐσα, ψυχήν αΰτοκίνητον άθάνατον, καίτοι
τής ψυχής καθό ψυχή καί τό αΰτοκίνητον καί τό άθάνατον <έν> 35
έαυτή έχούσης· ώς ούν ταϋτα πάσχει πρός τά νοητά καί ήνω-
 the whole of time exists as becoming but not as being. For we desig­
nate that which is common to each form (eidos) as perpetual inas­
much as these are everlasting genera: they are flowing according to
number < as far as the individuals are concerned> but they are per­
manent as far as the form is concerned. And in this way continuity
is preserved, divided into three parts, as far as we and the time present
with regard to us are concerned. At different moments the present
is different, although time per sel is one and continuous. Assuming
that this is correct one must say that the division of time is potential.
And the indivisible Now exists in potentia while our conception di­
vides it, and wc look at this Now as existing as a limit and as that
which is indivisible, and we constitute, as it were, permanent measures
of time, delimiting them as being one form,2 such as days and months
and years. And though the extension of these forms possesses a large
portion of being, it has being in < the process o f> becoming. But if
somebody wants to put this form into a state of rest as a whole, he
should not take it in the state of becoming, but should take that < in
it> which is separate and transcendent and not according to its flow­
ing participation, which can be illustrated by the way a river subsists
here. For each river too is a form in a state of rest, from which the
flowing river derives its subsistence, receiving its form in its flow. If
however one puts the river < a s it is here> into a state of rest, there
will be no river any more. In the same way, that which according to
its form is the present, the past, and the future is put together in the
one form of time, but it is unrolled in becoming: that which always
proceeds towards being and is called the present, that which has
perished — the past, and that which as yet is not — the future. The
whole of time is continuously flowing like movement; taking away
the present as being actually limited by the Nows from both sides
would make it stop all at once, destroying the form of time which,
like movement, has its being in becoming. I believe accordingly that
the difficulty arises for the soul because of its attempts to know every­
thing according to the forms which are at rest in it. Thus it brings
also movement to a standstill by attempting to know it as a form,
and not according to the flow which is natural to it. This is like the
way it differentiates the intelligible unification, not being able to seize
together the totality of the latter, but perceiving separately justice,
moderation, and knowledge, in spite of the fact that everything in
the intelligible world exists as a whole. And the soul concludes that it
is immortal by positing three terms — soul, selfmoving, immortal —
although it has in itself qua soul also the selfmoving and the immortal.
In analogy to what the soul experiences with regard to the beings
μένα τών δντων διακρίνουσα έν έαυτή την εκείνων ένωσιν, καί
τοιαΰτα είναι νομίζουσα οϊα τίς έστιν ή έν αυτή περί εκείνων
γνώσις, οϋτως οίμαι τή στάσει των έν αυτή ειδών ίστάνειν
επιχειρεί τόν ποταμόν τής γενέσεως1 καί τρία μέρη χρόνου περι-
γράφουσα διορισμένα κατά τό ένεστώς ΐστησιν, άφωρισμένον τι 5
άθρόον συλλαμβάνουσα. μέση γάρ οΰσα τήν ουσίαν τόν τε γινο­
μένων καί τών δντων έκάτερα κατά τήν έαυτής φύσιν νοεΐν
επιχειρεί, τά μέν διακρίνουσα κατά τό χείρον μέν εκείνων έαυτή
δέ συμφυέστερον, τά δέ συνάγουσα κατά τό κρεϊττον μέν τής
γενέσεως, έαυτή δέ γνωριμώτερον. οϋτω γοΰν ήμέραν καί μήνα 10
καί ενιαυτόν γινώσκει συναιρούσα είς έν είδος έκαστον καί
άποτομάς τοΰ δλου χρόνου τοΟ ρέοντος περιγράφουσα. εΐ ούν
μή κενεμβατεϊ παντελώς ή έμή έννοια ταδτα λέγουσα, έκ ταύτης
άξιώ τάς προς τόν χρόνον άπορίας διαλύειν. τούτων γάρ ή μέν
πρώτη φησίν έπεί μήτε τό παρεληλυθός έστι μήτε τό μέλλον, 15
έκ δέ τούτων καί άπειρος ό άεί λαμβανόμενος χρόνος σύγκειται,
τό έκ μή δντων συγκείμενον αδύνατον αν είναι δόξειε μετέχειν
ούσίας. καί δήλον ότι < ό > ταΰτα απορών ού προσποιείται τήν
βοήν τής γενέσεως, ούδέ ορίζει τών άμα όλων ύφεστώτων τά έν
τώ γίνεσΟαι τό είναι έχοντα, έ<ρ’ ών τό άνάπαλιν άν τις εΐποι, 20
ότι εΐ μή τό μέν γέγονεν αύτών, τό δέ οϋπω έστιν, ήτοι ένια ή
πάντα τά μέρη εϊναι. όλως γάρ τό είναι τούτοις ού προσήκει.
άλλά τό γίνεσθαι. καί έστιν ούτος ό τής ύποστάσεως αύτών τρό­
πος όλου ρέοντος τοΰ είδους ένδελεχώς. έπειδή δέ ό κατά τό νΰν
έστώς ύφεστάναι καί είναι δοκεϊ καί ταύτη λύειν δυνατόν είναι 25
δοκεΐ τήν απορίαν, ότι μέρος τι τού μεριστοϋ έστι, δεικνύουσιν
ότι τό νΰν ούκ έστι μέρος τοΰ χρόνου έκ δυοΐν επιχειρημάτων
παν μέρος μετρεϊ τό όλον, ώστε καί τό τοΰ χρόνου μέρος, εί ούν
τό νΰν άμερές όν ού μετρεϊ τόν χρόνον συνεχή όντα, δήλον ότι
τό νΰν ούκ άεί μέρος τοΰ χρόνου, έτι δέ καί οϋτω δείκνυσι· τό 30
μέρος τοΰ χρόνου συντίθησι τόν όλον χρόνον μέρος γάρ έστιν
έξ ου σύγκειται τό όλον τό δέ νΰν ού συντίθησι τόν χρόνον (ού
γάρ σύγκειται έκ τών νΰν. ώς δείκνυσιν έν τοΐς περί κινήσεως)'
τό άρα νΰν ούκ έστι μέρος χρόνου, καί έστω ταΰτα καλώς λεγά­
μενα. ούδέ γάρ κατά τοΰτο τό <νϋν> έστηκεν ό χρόνος, ούδέ 35
which are intelligible and unified, differentiating in itself the unifi­
cation and believing that they are of the same kind as the knowledge
concerning them which is in it, it attempts, 1 believe, to bring to a
standstill, through the state of rest of the forms which are in it,
the river of becoming,1 and it also brings to rest the three parts of
time circumscribing those w'hich are separated with respect to the
present, bringing together all at once whatever is distinct. For having,
with regard to its substance, an intermediate position between things
which become and those which are, it attempts to know each of them
according to its own nature, distinguishing in the latter that which
is inferior but congenial to it, and combining in the former that which
is the best in becoming but more cognizable to it. In this way it
knows days, months, and years, bringing each together into one form
and circumscribing sections of the whole flowing time. If in saying
this my thought is not wholly lacking foundation, I claim to be able,
starting from this, to solve the difficulties concerning time. The first
may be stated as follows: as there exists neither past nor future, and
as the infinite time, as it is always conceived, is composed of these
two, it would seem impossible that something which is composed of
non-existent < p a rts> should participate in being. But obviously he
who raises the dilficulty does not take into account the flow of be­
coming and does not differentiate between entities w'hich exist as
wholes all at once and those which have their being in becoming.
With regard to these one could say contrariwise that, if one did not
suppose that one portion was in the past while another did not yet
exist, < one would have to suppose> that either some of the parts or
all of them are in being; however it is by no means being that pertains
to them, but rather becoming. This is the mode of their reality, in
that their whole form flows continuously.
Since the present seems to subsist and to be according to the Now,
and since it seems possible to solve the difficulty < by assuraing>
that it c th e N ow > is in some way a part of something consisting
of parts, it is shown < by Aristotle> that the Now is not a part of
time for two reasons. Every part measures the whole, ergo also the
part of time. If now the Now which has no parts does not measure
time which is a continuum, it is evident that the Now is never a part
of time. This is shown < b y him > also in the following way: the
whole of time is composed of its parts. For parts are that out of
which a whole is composed. However, time is not composed of Nows
(for it does not consist of Nows as he shows in his treatise on motion).
Consequently the Now is not a part of time. This may be held to
be correct. For time does not subsist according to this Now. N or is
 γάρ έστιν ένεργεία τό νΰν άφωρισμένον, ώς δ γε διδούς είναι τό
νΰν πέρας δν χρόνου πάντως δώσει καί τό περατούμενον. αί δέ
εφεξής άπορίαι πειρώνται δεικνύναι, δτι τό νΰν ού πέρας χρόνου
άνυπόστατόν έστιν, άλλ’ ούδ’ ώσπερ χρόνου έχειν τινά υπόστα-
σιν δύναται, εΐπερ ανάγκη μέν, εί πάρεστιν, ή τό αυτό διαμένειν 5
ή άλλο καί άλλο γίνεσθαι· έκάτερον δέ αδύνατον δείκνυται. ταϋτα
δέ ώσπερ ένεργεία τοΰ νυν υποτιθεμένου λέγεται καί ώς μέρος
χρόνου λαμβανομένου, ών ούδέτερον αληθές, έπειτα δέ. άξιοι, εί
φθείρεται τό νΰν, ή έν έαυτφ φθείρεσθαι ή έν άλλφ νΰν, επειδή
τό φθειρόμενον έν χρόνφ φθείρεται, ώσπερ τό γινόμενον έν 10
χρόνω γίνεται, και δήλον δτι οΰτος ό λόγος χρόνου χρόνον
απαιτεί, καίτοι κινήσεως είναι κίνησιν αυτός άπέφηνε. καί δλως
εί των μέτρων μέτρα πειραθώμεν λαβεϊν, έπ* άπειρον ήξομεν τοΰ
μετρητικού πήχεος άλλον πήχυν μετρητικόν ώς μετρητόν λαμ-
βάνοντες καί προ τών αριθμών αριθμούς τιθέντες. εί δέ ταϋτα 15
άτοπα, άρκοΰντος έκάστου τής έαυτοΰ ΐδιότητος τοΐς άλλοις δεο-
μένοις αυτής μεταδιδόναι, ού μέντοι καί αύτοϋ χρήζοντος μετα-
λαβείν τούτου δπερ έστίν, άτοπον καί έκεΐνο. εί δέ καί λέγοι
τις χρήζειν, βιαζόμενος ώς οιμαι λέγει, καί άρέσκει όμως έαυτώ
μεταδιδόναι. ώστε ούκ ανάγκη τον χρόνον έν χρόνφ φθείρεσθαι 20
ούδέ τό νΰν έν τφ νΰν. άλλ’ ούδέ άμα πλείονα είναι δυνατόν, έν
γάρ τή ρύσει τοΰ χρόνου κατά τήν όποιανοΰν καί ύπονοουμένην
στάσιν ή τοΰ νΰν θεωρείται ύπόστασις. αλλά πώς, εί έν τφ γίνεσ­
θαι τό είναι έχει ό χρόνος κινούμενος καί αυτός, ού δεήσεται
χρόνου τοΰ μετροΰντος καί τάττοντος τά τοΰ χρόνου μέρη, ώστε 25
μή έπισυγχυθήναι άλλήλοις; ή οϋτω κινείται ό χρόνος, ώς τή
κινήσει συμπαρομαρτών μέτρον δν τής κινήσεως. καί γάρ καί ό
πήχυς συνδιίσταται τφ μετρουμένω μένων έν τή τοΰ μέτρου ίδιό-
τητι καί άνενδεής ών τοΰ μετροΰντος.”

Damasc., Πρός δέ τό ενδέκατον άπορήσειεν άν τις, εί διάστημα ό χρόνος, 30

Dub. Sol.,
πώς συνθήσει αύτόν τό άδιάστατον μυρία γάρ έπί μυρίοις τά
11,236,3-
237,28 νΰν συνελθόντα εν ποιεί νΰν άδιάστατον, άλλ’ ούτε ήμιωρίαν ούτε
it possible to define the Now as actual, for he who posits the Now as
a limit of time, will certainly have to posit also that which is limited
< by it> .
The exposition of the difficulties following upon this attempts to show
that the Now is neither an unreal limit of time nor capable of having
some kind of reality which pertains to time, because, if it is present,
it must necessarily either remain the same or become constantly dif­
ferent. It is shown that both <suppositions> are impossible. This
applies both to the Now being regarded as actual and to its being
conceived as part of time, neither of which is true. Further on he
asserts < P h y s 218a, 17> that, if the Now perishes, it either perishes
in itself or in another Now, since everything which perishes, perishes
in time, just as everything which becomes, becomes in time. And it
is evident that this conception requires a time of time. And further
it would show that there is a motion of motion. And generally, if
we attempt to take measures of measures, we would have to go on
infinitely, taking one measuring yardstick to measure another yard­
stick and substituting numbers for other numbers. If this is absurd,
since each of them is capable of giving a share of its own particular
<character> to the others which require it, but on the other hand
does not itself need to share in something which is its own self, it
follows that the first assumption too Cconccrning the Now s> is
absurd. If however someone should say that there is such a need, I
believe that he would do so under the pressure of argument and it
would mean that he is of the opinion that < a measure> gives a share
< o f itself> to itself. There is thus no need < to assume> that either
time perishes in time or the Now in the Now, nor can several of them
exist simultaneously. For one has to see the reality of the Now in
the llow of time with reference to an assumed rest, whatever it may
be. The question could be put whether time whose being consists in
becoming, and which moves, does not need a time measuring it and
ordering the parts of time so that they do not get mixed up. <The
answer is > that time moves in such a way that it accompanies move­
ment, being a measure of the latter. For the yardstick too exists
separately from, and together with, the measured object, preserving
its specificity as a measure without requiring another measure.’

On the eleventh point <how time, being composed of Nows, i.e., of

indivisibles, can be divisible, and how it is continuous as well as
discrete> one could ask: if time is an extension, how could the
unextended constitute it? For myriads upon myriads of Nows com­
ing together make only one extensionless Now, but never half an
 Λ ,ι« , s^ K s tt^ c -y i yj i ir / fc itt J-,u tC iV t f U J J iU lU r U S f f t

όποστονοΰν μόριον ώρας, διότι παν έπ’ άπειρον εις τά vCv ού

παύσεται διαιρούμενον εί γάρ καί «σώματος ό χρόνος, άλλ’ ούκ
«διαστατός, έπεΐ καί τό μαθηματικόν μέγεθος άσώματον, άλλ’
όμως οΰκ άν ποτέ συντεθείη άπό σημείων, εύλαβητέον άρα τό
εξ άμερών είναι τον χρόνον, τι ούν; ουδέ συνεχής έστι καί 5
διορισμένος, ώς άποδείκνυσιν, πάνυ γε φήσω, άλλ’ οΰκ έκ μερών
άμερών, άλλ’ έκ διαστατών διορισμένων συγκείμενος, έστιν γάρ
σύνθετος, ώς φησι Στρατών,1 έκ μερών μή μενόντων ταύτη ούν
έκ διορισμένων έκαστον δέ μέρος συνεχές έστι, καί οΐον μέτρον
έστιν έκ πολλών μέτρων έδείκνυμεν γάρ καί έν τοϊς εις Τίμαιον 10
οτι ού κατά τά νΰν προκόπτει ό χρόνος· ούδέ γάρ αν προέκοψεν
άπειρων δντων άεΐ τών νΰν. άλλ' ώσπερ ή κίνησις προκόπτει
διαστηματικώς, άλλ’ οΰ κατά σημεΐον, άλλ’ οίον κατά άλματα,
ώς έλεγε καί Αριστοτέλης,2 ούτως άνάγκη καί τό χρόνον κατά
μέτρα όλα προβαίνειν δ μετρητικά τών αλμάτων γίγνεται τής 15
κινήσεως. οϋτως άρα έκ μέτρων ό χρόνος· άλλά μέτρον πέρασι
διειλημμένον καί διωρισμένον. διό καί ό Παρμενίδης τόν χρόνον
παρήγαγεν μετά τό συνεχές πηλίκον καί τό διωρισμένον πλήθος,-'
ότι καί αυτός ώς έκ μέτρων τε καί μερών, συνεχής τέ έστι καί
διορισμένος.4 άλλ’ οΰτω, φαίη τις άν, καί ή κίνησις έσται συνε­ 20
χής καί διορισμένη, ότι ούδέ ταύτης τά μέρη μένει; ή αληθές
τοΰτύ έστι- συνεχίζεται γάρ υπό τοϋ σώματος έφ’ ού τε καί ού
ή κίνησις, όιακοπτομένη δέ διορίζεται τοΐς έαυτής άλμασιν τό
δέ αληθώς συνεχές τό μέγεθος έστιν οΰ καί ή συνέχεια όλη
όμοΰ ούσα παραιτεΐται τόν διορισμόν, ότι δέ έκ μέτρων διο­ 25
ρισμένων σύγκειται ό χρόνος, άλλ’ οΰκ έκ τών άμερών νΰν, δηλοΐ
αύτοΰ τό επί ψυχής παράδειγμα.5 έστω μέν γάρ συνεχής ή ψυχική
νόησις, διοριζέσθω δέ ταΐς μεταβάσεσι καθορώσης μέν δικαιο­
σύνην, καθορώσης δέ σωφροσύνην, καθορώσης δέ έπιστήμην.
άρα ούν καθ’ έκαστον είδος έν νΰν διατρίβει μόνον, ή χρόνον 30
όλον έστηκεν έν έκάστω; εί μέν γάρ τούτο, άλμασιν έοικότα
έσται τά νοήματα- οΰτω δέ καί τά διαστήματα τών μεταβάσεων
έν χρόνφ φανεΐται, άλλ’ ούκ έν τφ νΰν τό μέν γάρ νενοηκέναι
έν τώ νΰν, τό δέ νοεΤν έν τώ χρόνο, ό δέ διορισμός έκ τών μερών
σύγκειται τών κατά τό νοεΐν τε καί καθοραν, ή ούκ αν ένέμεινέν 35
τινι νοητώ χρόνον ούδένα· τοότο δέ άτοπον κινεϊσΟαι μόνον, ού
στάσιν δέ μηδεμίαν ένεΐναι ταΐς νοήσεσιν. πώς ούν ό Παρμε-

[SS]
hour or any part of an hour. Therefore everything will be infinitely
divided into Nows, and this division will never come to an end.
For even although time is incorporeal, it is still not extensionless,
since the mathematical quantity, being incorporeal, is still never com­
posed of points. One must thus beware of ebelieving th at> time is
composed of indivisibles. How then ? It is not continuous and is dis­
crete, as he shows and as I certainly would agree; however it is not
composed of indivisible parts but of discrete and extended parts. For
it is composed, as Strato says,1 of parts which are not at rest, which
means of discrete parts. Each part, however, is continuous and, as it
were, a unit of measurement consisting of many such units. For we
have shown in our commentary on the Timaeus that time does not
advance according to Nows; for it could not advance, as the Nows
are always infinite. But in the same way as motion progresses by
intervals and not by points but so to say, using a term of Aristotle,2
by jumps, time also must necessarily progress according to whole
units of measurement, which become capable of measuring the jumps
of motion. Thus time is indeed composed of units of measurement,
these units being marked ofl' and determined by limits. For this
reason Parmenides has introduced time after the continuous quantity
and the discrete multitude,3 since being itself composed of measures
and parts it is both continuous and discrete.4 But then, one could
say, motion too would be continuous and discrete, since its parts
are not at rest either. Indeed, this is true; for motion is made con­
tinuous by the body in which it is and whose motion it is, and
progressing it is divided through its own jumps. The truly continuous
is the quantity whose continuity, existing simultaneously as a whole,
does not admit of division.
That time is composed of units of measurement and not of indivisible
Nows is shown by the example of the soul.5 For let us suppose that
the process of thought in the soul is continuous, but that it is divided
because of its transition into different states when it perceives justice,
moderation, or knowledge. Does it then spend only one single Now
for every form < o f thought> or does it not rather dwell on each of
them a full <stretch o f> time? If this latter is the case, the process­
es of thought will be similar to jumps. Thus the extensions marked
by the transition to the different states will appear in time, but not
in the Now. For having thought pertains to the Now, but thinking
pertains to time. The division <into units> is composed of parts both
of thinking and perceiving, otherwise it would not stay any stretch
of time with one object of thought. It would be absurd if the thoughts
would only move and there would not be any rest in them. How then
 1 lie C o n c e p t o j l i m e in L a te N e o p la to n ism

νίδης έν μέσω τοΰ γιγνομένου κατά τό νΰν θεωρεί τό μήτε νεώ-

τερον μήτε πρεσβύτερον; έπειδάν γάρ έντύχη τφ νϋν, πέπαυται
γιγνόμενον. ή καί τό διάστημα έκαστον τοΰ χρόνου ν Ον καλείται,
ώς ένεστώς χρόνος, άλλ’ οϋχ ώς τό τοΰ χρόνου πέρας· έστι γάρ
τι διάστημα χρόνου ό ένέστηκεν όλον όμοΰ, ού παρά τά δύο 5
νΰν- καί ότι τοϋτο τό διάστημα κέκληκεν νΰν ό Παρμενίδης
έδήλωσεν χρ ό νο ν αυτό όνομάσας· λέγει γάρ· “άραούχ όταν κατά
τόν νΰν χρόνον, ή γιγνόμενον τόν μεταξύ τοΰ ήν τε καί έσται;”
καί ότι πλάτος έχει τοΰτο τό νΰν, καί όλον τί έστι καί μέρη
έχει, σαφέστατα παρέστησεν έπαγαγών “τό γάρ προϊόν οίίτως ίο
έχει, ώς άμφοτέρων έφάπτεσθαι, τοΰ τε νΰν άφιέμενον, τοΰ δ '
έπειτα έπιλαμβανόμενον.” έστιν άρα άπτεσΟαι άμα καί άφίεσθαι
τοΰ νΰν μέρους μέν αρα αψεται, μέρους δέ άφεΟήσεται- μεριστόν
άρα τό νΰν χρόνος άρα, καί ού πέρας χρόνου, έτι δέ πορεύεται
μέν έν τφ γίγνεσθαι τό γιγνόμενον, έπίσχει δέ καί ΐσταται έν 15
τφ είναι, ώς δέ ή κίνησις, ουτω καί ή στάσις έν χρόνοι τοΐς τήδε
πράγμασιν. καί έστηκεν αρα έν χρόνοι τό όν, ώσπερ κινείται
τό γιγνόμενον. χρονικόν άρα καί τό νΰν διάστημα, καί έκ τοιού-
των σύγκειται ό χρόνος, τή μέν ούν διαδοχή καί οΐον κινήσει
τών τοιούτων διαστημάτων, άλλος άεί καί άλλος ό χρόνος, τή 20
δέ καί όπωσοΰν άθρόςι μονή τοΰ διαστήματος έκάστου έν χρόνψ
τό άεί ον έστιν,1 ώσπερ έν άλλω τό γιγνόμενον.

Damasc.. ΤΑρα ούν τό νΰν τήν στάσιν εισάγει τή γενέσει; καί μήν έν τφ
Dub. Sol., όλω χρόνω καί τό έστώς έστηκε τόν άπειρον χρόνον, ού ρέον
11,241,20- τφ νΰν μόνον, άλλά καί έν τφ ρέοντι χρόνω. καί πώς ή μή 25
242,26
ρέουσα τφ ρέοντι συνυφέστηκεν; ή ότι γένεσίς έστι καί ή στάσις
έν τή ΰλη, καί έν τψ γίγνεσθαι έχει τό είναι- άλλ’ ούχ όλη ήδη
έστιν ό έστιν ό δέ χρόνος μετρεΐ τήν γένεσιν, πορευόμενος
πορευομένην. ούκ άρα τήν έν τφ νΰν έπίσχεσιν τήν έν παρα-
στάσει άκουστέον στάσιν άντικειμένην τή κινήσει· άλλ’ ήτοι τό 30
μεταξύ τής πορείας τοΰ τε χρόνου καί τής γενέσεως, όν τε καί
νΰν άπολαμβανόμενον, άμερές μεριστής, τοΰ μέν χρόνου τό νΰν,
τής δέ νΰν γενέσεως τό όν, ώς καί αυτός ό έξ η γη τή ς άξιοι, ή
ώς άρτι έλέγομεν, άεί τοΰ χρόνου ρέοντος καί κατά άλματα προ-
κόπτοντος, έκαστον άλμα όλον όμοΰ έστι καί άμέριστον, καθ’ 35
ύπόστασιν τής διαστηματικής προκοπής· άλλου δέ άλλο μέτρον
τών αλμάτων, τοΰ μέν βράδιον κινουμένου άστέρος έλάττω, τοΰ
does Parmenides theorize < 152E > about that which is neither young­
er nor older as being in the middle of becoming in respect of the
Now? For as soon as it reaches the Now, it has ceased to become.
The answer is that each extension of time is called Now qua present
time, but not qua limit of time. For there exists an extension of time
which is present at once as a whole and not beside the two Nows.
And Parmenides made it clear that it is this extension that he called
‘Now’ by giving it the name ‘time’. He says: ‘When in becoming
it gets to the point of time between “ was” and “ will be” which is
“ Now” ...’ < 1 5 2 B > . And he stated very clearly that this ‘Now’ has
a range and is a certain whole and has parts, by adding: ‘For it is
the nature of that which goes on to touch both <prescnt and future>,
letting go the present and seizing the after’ < 1 5 2 C > . It is thus the
nature of the Now to be touched and be let go, being touched in
part and being let go in part; ergo the Now is divisible; ergo it is
time, and not a limit of time. Further that what becomes moves
along in becoming, while it pauses and rests in being, and just as
movement is in time, rest is in time for the things of this world. Thus
being rests in time, whereas becoming moves. Therefore the Now is
a temporal extension and time consists of such extensions. In the suc­
cession and, as it were, movement of such extensions time is different
at any different moment, wliile in the aggregated rest of every exten­
sion, whatever the mode may be, everlasting being exists in everlasting
time,1 just as becoming in the other kind of time.

Is it the Now that introduces rest into becoming? But surely in the
whole of time that which is at rest was at rest throughout infinite
time; it is not flowing with regard to the Now only, but also with
regard to flowing time. And how can the not flowing < re st> co­
exist with that which flows? Because rest in matter, too, consists in
becoming and has its being in becoming, not being actually wholly
what it is. But time, while advancing, measures becoming which also
advances. Thus the stoppage which occurs in the Now, and which
consists in a juxtaposition, has not to be understood as a state of
rest contrary to movement. But it is that which is between the course
of time and that of generation, that which is and now ceases to be,
the indivisible of the divisible <generation>, the Now of time, the
being of generation which takes place in the Now, as the commentator
himself understands it; or, as we have just said, since time is always
flowing and progressing by jumps, each jump is wholly simultaneous
and indivisible, according to the reality of the progression by inter­
vals. Every jump has a measure of its own, a smaller one for a slower
δέ τάχιον μείζω· διό Θδττον διανύει τόν αυτόν κύκλον, άνάγκη
δέ άλλων καί άλλων ούσών των κινήσεων, άλλους είναι καί άλ­
λους τούς χρόνους· όμοίως δέ καί των στάσεων, καί ταύτης γάρ
ή γένεσις δι’ άλμάτων άλλως γάρ ούκ ενδέχεται προκόπτειν, εϊ
κατά τά άδιάστατα γίγνοιτο ή πορεία, οϋ γάρ κίνησις μόνον 5
έστιν ή γένεσις, αλλά καί στάσις, όισπερ καί έν ουσία: κίνησις
άμα καί στάσις, ού γάρ τή ϊδιότητι κίνησις, αλλά τω μερισμφ
τοϋ χρόνου, ώς ουδέ ή ουσία τή ϊδιότητι στάσις, αλλά τή συνοχή
τού αίωνος. ταϋτα δ' ούν τά άλματα μέτρα όντα χρονικά δημιουρ-
γικαΐς τομαίς διωρισμένα καί ταύτη γε άμέριστα, καί όλον όμοϋ ίο
έκαστον την έπίσχεσιν τού πορευομένου χρόνου φατέον ένδεί-
κνυσθαι, καί νϋν καλεϊσθαι, ούχ ώς πέρας χρόνου, άλλ’ ώς
χρόνον άμέριστον δημιουργικής, εϊ καί τή ήμετέρα έπινοία διαι­
ρετόν, καί τούτο επ’ άπειρον, έπεί καί παν σώμα επ' άπειρον
διαιρετόν, άλλ’ είσίν άμέριστοι δημιουργικαί τομαΐ τών σωμά­ 15
των- άμέλει καί τά άλματα τής γενέσεως τοιαύτα αν εϊη γενητά.1
εί γάρ γενητά, επ’ άπειρον μεριστά. οΰτω δέ ούκ άν προέλθοι
ποτέ εις τέλος ή γένεσις- διό τό άλμα τής γενέσεως άγένητόν
έστι, κατ’ αυτήν γε τήν συναίρεσιν2 τής προκοπής, διό καί δν
λέγεται ώς πρός τήν σύνθετον έκ τών άλμάτων γένεσιν, ώσπερ 20
καί τό άλμα τού χρόνου νϋν ονομάζεται ώς πρός τόν χρόνον,
δς έστιν έκ τώνδε τών άλμάτων σύνθετος, έν τούτφ άρα τό νϋν
ούκέτι γίγνεται. άλλ’ έστιν νεώτερον καί πρεσβύτερον.3 πώς ούν
τοϋ μέν άφίεται, τοϋ δέ επιλαμβάνεται τών άλμάτων τό πορευό-
μενον, εΐπερ ού τέμνει τό άλμα έκαστον εις άλλα άλματα; ή 25
δυνατόν μέν, ώς καί επί τών άμερών νϋν άκούει αυτός, καί έπί
τούτων άκούειν. όμως δέ ταϋτα πεπέρασται Οπό δύο νϋν κατ'
ενέργειαν.4 καί τό πέρας τοϋ προτέρου άλματος άρχή έστι τοϋ
δευτέρου.
moving star, a larger one for a faster moving; therefore the latter
traverses the same circle faster. For necessarily, if the movements are
different, the times will differ too; and the same holds for the states
of rest. For the generation of rest too takes place by jumps. For it
would be impossible to progress if the advance would proceed by
interval-less parts. For generation consists not only in movement but
also in rest, just as in being there is simultaneously movement and
rest. For generation is movement not by a specific property, but
by the division of time, just as being is rest not by a specific property
but by the coherence of eternity. Thus the jumps are temporal units
of measurement, separated by demiurgic sections and thus indivisible,
and therefore one must say that each of them simultaneously as a
whole indicates the stoppage of time in its advance and is called
‘Now', not as a limit of time, but as time demiurgically indivisible,
though divisible for our thought, and this ad Infinitum, because every
body is infinitely divisible. There are however demiurgic sections of
the bodies which are indivisibles. And indeed the jumps of generation
should be such that they are ungenerated,1 for, if they were generated,
they would be infinitely divisible; thus the generation could never
come to an end. For this reason the jump of generation is ungenerat­
ed, namely by the aggregation2 of progress. For this reason it is called
‘being’, in respect of the generation composed of jumps, in the same
way as the jump of time is called ‘Now’ in respect of time which is
composed of such jumps. Thus in this jump the Now is no longer
becoming but it is younger and older.3 How now does the thing in
its course leave this jump and occupy the next one, if it does not cut
each jump into other jumps? This can be understood in the same
sense as he <A ristotle> understands the indivisible Nows. These
jumps are limited by Nows in actuf and the limit of the first jump
is the beginning of the second.
Simpl., Ά λλ’ έοικεν ή πανταχοϋ διά μεσότητος πρόοδος αιτία είναι τοϋ
Phys., καί αυτόν καλώς έρωτδν, πώς ουρανός και κόσμος κατ’ αριθμόν
783, 1-
785,10 ό αύτός έσται, εάν εν τώ γίνεσΟαι καί φΟείρεσθαι τό είναι έχη,
καί εμέ πάλιν άντερωτδν, εΐ γενητός ών ό ούρανός καί ό σωμα­
τικός 6δε κόσμος τό αεί έστηκός έχει καί άμα δλον ύφεστηκός, 5
πώς τοϋ αιωνίου καί όντως δντος διοίσει τό τοιοΰτον γενητόν.
δυοΐν γάρ όντων άκρων ώς οίμαι τοϋ αεί σημαινομένων τοϋ τε
κυρίως αιωνίου καί όντως δντος καί άμα όλου ύφεστηκότος καί
τοϋ κατ’ ουσίαν δέοντος καί άλλοτε άλλο τφ άριθμφ κατ’ ουσίαν
τό γινόμενον έχοντος, ώς ή τε κίνησις τών ουρανίων έναργώς 10
όρδται καί είδη πάντα τά ύπό σελήνην1(τό γάρ άνΟρώπειον είδος
έν άλλοις καί άλλοις άεί θεωρείται άτόμοις τοΐς γινομένους καί
φθειρομένοις), τούτων ούν τών άκρων δύο μεσότητές εϊσιν ή τε
ψυχική καί ή φυσική άμα καί σωματική, πρός μέν τοϋ όντως
δντος ή ψυχική, πρός δέ τοϋ μόνως γινομένου ή τών άιδίων 15
σωμάτων φυσική σύστασις· ών ή μέν ψυχική, καν έξέβη τής
αιωνίου συναιρέσεως2 καί τής άμερϊστου τελέως ύποστάσεως,
άλλ' ούχ ύπέβη3 πρός τό τελέως μεριστόν ούτε κατ’ ουσίαν ούτε
κατά τήν τοϋ είναι παράτασιν. διόπερ καί ό Πλάτων καί ό ’Αρισ­
τοτέλης εις δύο διελόντες τά μέτρα τής τοϋ είναι παρατάσεως 20
εις αιώνα καί χρόνον, ό μέν Πλάτων αμφω τάς μεσότητας έν
χρόνφ δοκεΐ τεθεικέναι περί μέν τής ψυχής εΐπών δτι “ήρξατο
άπαύστου καί έμφρονος βίου πρός τόν σύμπαντα χρόνον,” περί
δέ τοϋ όλου ούρανοϋ ήτοι κόσμου δτι χρόνος μετ’ ούρανοϋ
γέγονεν ό δέ ’Αριστοτέλης έν αίώνι μάλλον άμφω τέθεικε τόν 25
χρόνον τοΐς έναργώς άεί γινομένους καί φθειρομένοις άποδούς·
άκριβεϊ δέ λόγω μέσα άν εΐη τών μέσων τά μέτρα καί άλλοις
όνόμασι σύμμετρα.4 καί τό άεί τοίνυν τό τε τής ψυχικής ούσίας
καί τό τής ούρανίας καί τής κοσμικής όλότητος ούτε δλον άμα
νοητέον ώς τό κυρίως αιώνιον ούτε γινόμενον καί φθειρόμενου 30
ούτως ώς τό τών υπό σελήνην,5 άλλ’ ώσπερ αί ούσίαι μέσην
έχουσι φύσιν, ούτως καί ή τοϋ είναι παράτασις αυτών καί τά
But the procession which everywhere goes through intermediate
<Ievels> seems to be the reason for him <D am ascius> to raise the
correct question how heaven and universe can be the same according
to number, if their being consists in generation and corruption, and
1 raise again the question how this generated < world > differs from
the eternal and really existent, if the heaven is generated and this
corporeal universe contains the static everlastingness and is simulta­
neously real as a whole. I believe that there are two extreme meanings
of everlastingness, that of the properly eternal and really existent and
simultaneously real as a whole, and that of the flowing with regard to
essence and containing that which is generated in an always chang­
ing number as regards its essence, as it clearly appears in the move­
ment of celestial bodies and all sublunar forms1 (for the human form
appears everlasting in different individuals who are generated and
destroyed). There are two intermediates of these extremes, the soul­
like level and the physical or corporeal level, the soul-like being nearer
to the really existent, the physical structure of the eternal bodies
being nearer to that which is only generated. Of these the soul-like,
although departing from the eternal aggregation2 and the completely
indivisible reality, does not, however, descend3 towards that which is
completely divisible, either in its substance or in the extension of its
existence. Therefore Plato and Aristotle divide the measures of the
extension of being into two — eternity and time. Plato on the one
hand supposes that both intermediates are placed in time and says
about the soul: ‘the soul made a divine beginning of ceaseless and
intelligent life for all time’ <Tim., 36 E > , and about the whole heaven
or universe he says that time was created with the heaven. Aristotle
on the other hand rather places both in eternity and assigns time to
Ihings obviously always generated and destroyed. In the exact sense
of the notion the measures would be intermediates of the interme­
diates and corresponding to other names.4 And thus one must conceive
the everlastingness of the physical essence and that of the celestial
and cosmic wholeness neither as being wholly simultaneous, as the
properly eternal, nor as generated and destroyed as the sublunai
things,5 but in the same way as the essences have an intermediate
nature, so do their extension in being and the measures of the exten-
μέτρα τής του είναι παρατάσεως. καί εϊ βούλεται τις χρόνον
καλεϊν, οΰδείς φθόνος ονομάτων, μή μέντοι τοϋτο τό τοΰ χρόνου
σημαινόμενον τό σύνηΟες τό τφ ένεστώτι καί παρεληλυθότι καί
μέλλοντι διαιρούμενον, έψ ’ ού καί ό ’Αριστοτέλης καί Πλάτων
τάττουσι τό όνομα, έπ’ εκείνων φερέτω, μηδέ τό αεί μόνον εκείνο 5
γινωσκέτω τό άμα δλον ύφεστηκώς καί έν ένί μένον, άλλ’ ϊδέτω
καί τό έπ’ άπειρον αεί τό έν τφ γίνεσθαι τό είναι έχον καί τάς
έν μέσφ τούτων τεταγμένας τοΰ αεί διαφοράς, άς άκριβολογού-
μενός τις ούτε τω αίώνι κυρίως προσήκειν ούτε τφ χρόνφ
βουλήσεταυ μετά γάρ κινήσειος είναι πάντως καί κινήσεως ό 10
χρόνος είναι τι δοκεΐ. εΐ δέ τον ρέοντα τούτον χρόνον τόν τήν
σωματικήν μετροΰντα κίνησιν τήν τε κατ’ ούσίαν καί τήν κατά
τάς άλλας μεταβολάς ό έν τή φύσει λόγος άίδιος τοΰ χρόνου ό
ένουσιωμένος τή φύσει1 ούτός έστιν ό παράγων καί ούτός έστιν,
ως φησι, χρόνος ό αεί παρών όλος καί σύμπας. ομοίως δέ καί 15
ό έν τή ψι>λή λόγος τοΰ χρόνου προϋπάρχουν αεί κατ’ αριθμόν ό
αυτός ούτός έστιν ό όλος χρόνος, δν φησιν άμα δλον ΰφεστάναι,
ούκέτι μοι σκληρόν τό δόγμα δοκεί.2 λόγον μέν γάρ χρόνου
ώσπερ καί κινήσεως άμα δλον είναι καί έν ψυχή καί έν φύσει,
ώς έστιν έν έκείνοις τό άμα, οΰδέν θαυμαστόν, καί γάρ τοΰ 20
σώματος ό λόγος προϋπάρχει άσώματος καί άδιάστατος, καί άπ’
εκείνου τοΰτο τό έν διαστάσει, δπερ άδιάστατον είναι άδύνατον.
ούτως ούν καί χρόνος καί κίνησις έν μέν παραδείγμασι καί
λόγοις είδητικοΐς έστω δλα άμα, έν είκοσι δέ καί ΰποστάσεσι
γενηταΐς ώς οΐμαι άδύνατον. μήποτε δέ ουδέ οί φυσικοί καί 25
ψυχικοί λόγοι, εϊπερ τοΰ όντως όντος καί τοΰ έν ένί μένειν ύπέ-
βησαν, δύνανται τό δλον άμα έχειν ώς άκριβώς είπείν, άλλ’ ούτως
ώς έκείναις προσήκει ταΐς μεσότησιν. ώς δέ συνελόντα φάναι
έν μεθέξει μέν δλον άμα χρόνον θεωρεΐν άδύνατον είναι νομίζω,
άπό δέ τής τοΰ αίώνος αναλογίας εις έννοιαν ήλθον καί εγώ του 30
πρώτου χρόνου3 τοΰ υπέρ πάντα τά έγχρονα δντος καί ταΐς έαυτοΰ
μεθέξεσιν εκείνα χρονίζοντος, τουτέστι τήν τοΰ είναι παράτασιν
αύτών εΰθετίζοντος καί μετροΰντος, καί τάξιν έχειν ποιοΰντος
τά τής τοιαύτης παρατάσεως μόρια, ώς γάρ ό αιών πρό τών
αιωνίων ύφεστηκώς μέσος έστί τής τε ηνωμένης τοΰ δντος υπερ­ 35
οχής καί τής τοΰ νοΰ διακεκριμένης ύποβάσεως κατά τό δια-
κρινόμενον αυτός ύφεστώς (διό καί ζωή σύστοιχος ό αιών,
επειδή καί αυτή μεταξύ τοΰ δντος ούσα καί τοΰ νοΰ, ταύτόν δέ
είπείν τοΰ ηνωμένου καί τοΰ διακεκριμένου, κατά τό διακρινό-
μενον ύφέστηκεν), ούτως ούν μεταξύ τοΰ όντως όντος καί τοΰ 40
sion in being. And if somebody wishes to call < it > time, one should
not object to this terminology, not to the usual meaning of time,
which is divided into present, past, and future, in that sense in which
Aristotle and Plato refer to the world, nor should one take it only
as that which is simultaneously real as a whole and rests in the One,
but one should also behold the everlastingness going on ad infinitum,
having its being in becoming, and the different kinds of evcrlastingness
whose order is intermediate to these, which everyone who is precise
in his terminology will attribute neither to the really eternal nor to
time. For time seems to be altogether connected with movement and
something belonging to movement. If the perpetual notion of time
in nature, which acquires substance through nature,1 is the producer
of this flowing time which measures the corporeal movement, that of
substance as well as that of other changes, and if this notion is, as
he <D am ascius> says, the time which is as a whole and in its totality
everlastingly present, then in a like manner the notion of time which
always pre-exists in the soul is numerically the same total time of
which he says that it exists simultaneously as a whole. This doctrine
does not at all seem to me to be harsh.2 For it is not strange that the
notion of time as well as that of movement is simultaneously as a
whole in the soul and in nature, in the way in which simultaneity is
in these. For the notion of body pre-exists as something incorporeal
and without extension, and from it derives the extended body for
which it is impossible to be unextendcd. In the same way time and
movement will also be simultaneous as wholes in the paradigms and
the notions of forms which, as I believe, they cannot be in the images
and the generated realities. But possibly, to be precise, neither the
physical nor the psychical notions can contain the whole simulta­
neously, since they are inferior to the really existent and to that which
rests in the One, but only in the sense which is proper to those inter­
mediate levels. In short — I believe it impossible to conceive the whole
simultaneous time as being participated, but in analogy to eternity
I too have arrived at the notion of the primary time3 which exists
above all things temporal and makes these temporal by participation,
i.e., the time which sets in order and measures their extension in being
and causes the parts of such an extension to possess order. In the
same way as eternity subsists prior to eternal things and is interme­
diate between the unified superiority of the being and the divided
declension of the intellect, having itself a distinct subsistence (where­
fore eternity is coordinate to life, since life too is intermediate between
being and intellect, which is the same as to say that it subsists dis­
tinctly between the unified and the divided) — in a like manner there
 The Concepi o f Time in Late Neoplatonism
γινομένου, ταύτόν δέ είπεϊν τοΰ άκινήτου καί κινούμενου, ήτοι
τό άμα δλον εχοντος τό είναι τό τε τής ούσίας καί τής δυνάμεως
καί ένεργείας < >, είναι δεΐ πάντως τό τής μέν γενέσεως
έξηρημένον προσεχώς, ΰποβεβηκός δέ τοΟ όντος καί διά τοϋτο
μετρούν καί συνέχον καί τάττον την παράτασιν τής γενέσεως τή 5
έαυτοϋ μεθέςει. οΰ γάρ ή παράτασίς έστιν ό μεθεκτός χρόνος,
άλλα τό μέτρον καί ή τάςις τής παρατάσεως.1 καί εϊ ταϋτα άληΟή
λέγω, ώς έχει πρός τήν ζωήν ό αιών ό άμέθεκτος, ούτως έχει2
πρός ψυχήν ό πρώτος ούτος χρόνος, οϋτε δέ ή ζωή αιώνιός έστιν
(αιώνιον γάρ τό Οπό αΐώνος μετρούμενον), αλλά ή αυτή μέν τφ 10
αΐώνι ουσία, κατ’ άλλην δέ θεωρούμενη ιδιότητα, οϋτε ή ψυχή
έγχρονος άλλ’ αΰτόχρονος. πλήν ότι ψυχή μέν κατά τό ζφοποιόν
έστι, χρόνος δέ κατά τό μετρητικόν τής τοϋ είναι παρατάσεως,
εί μή άρα ή πρόοδος έν τούτοις τάς ούσίας διέστησεν, ώς άλλην
μέν είναι τήν ψυχήν, άλλον δέ τόν χρόνον, καί γάρ καί εκεί3 15
τριφυής ήν ή μεσότης εκείνη, άλλως μέν ώς ζωή, άλλως δέ ώς
αιών, άλλως δέ ώς όλότης θεωρούμενη, ού διηρημένων εκείνων,
άλλ’ ήμών περί τήν ήνωμένην εκείνων παντότητα διαιρούμενων,
καί δήλον δτι ουτος άν εΐη ό χρόνος ό ώς θεός υπό τε Χαλδαίων
καί τής άλλης ίεράς άγιστείας τιμηθείς, άλλ’ οΰ περί τούτου τοΐς 20
φυσικοΐς ό λόγος, αλλά τοϋ έν μεθέξει θεωρούμενου.
ought to exist absolutely between the really existing and the becoming,
i.e., between the immobile and the moving or that which simulta­
neously contains the whole being of essence and potency and actuality,
Cthere ought to exist> that which properly transcends becoming but
is inferior to being and therefore measures, holds together and orders
the extension of becoming through its own participation. For the par­
ticipated time is not extension, but rather the measure and order of
extension.1 And I think I am right in saying that the relation of this
primary time to the soul is as the relation of2 unparticipated eternity
to life. For neither is life eternal (for the eternal is measured by
eternity) but it is the very essence of eternity which is conceived with
respect to another property, nor is the soul temporal, but it is time
per se. This is so, except for the fact that the soul < is considered>
in relation to the creation of life, while time < is considered> in
relation to the measurement of the extension of being; there is how­
ever the possibility that the procession has separated their essences,
so that soul and time are different. And in the intelligible world3 too
exists this threefold intermediate level, in one way appearing as life,
in another as eternity, and in a third way as wholeness, not separated
in themselves but by us who separate their unified totality. And it
is obvious that this would be the time which is venerated as god by
the Chaldeans and in other holy rituals; however it is not with this
time that the physicists deal but with that seen in participation.
 Appendix

PLUTARCH

Plut., “Τί ούν όντως όν έστι; τό άίδιον καί άγένητον καί αφθαρτον,
Delph., φ χρόνος μεταβολήν ουδέ εις έπάγει. κινητόν γάρ τι καί κινου-
392 E -F
μένη συμφανταζόμενον Ολη καί ρέον άεί καί μή στέγον, ώσπερ
άγγεΐον φθορδς καί γενέσεως, ό χρόνος, ου γε δή τό μέν
‘έπειτα' καί τό ‘πρότερον’ καί τό ‘έσται’ λεγόμενον καί τό 5
‘γέγονεν,’ αΰτόθεν έξομολόγησίς έστι τοΟ μή όντος· τό γάρ
έν τω είναι τό μηδέπω γεγονός ή πεπαυμένον ήδη τοΟ είναι
λέγειν ώς έστιν, ευηθες καί ατοπον, ω δέ μάλιστα τήν νόησιν
έπερείδοντες τοϋ χρόνου, τό ‘ένέστηκε’ καί τό ‘πάρεστι’ καί τό
‘νυν’ φθεγγόμεΟα, τοΟτ’ αύ πάλιν απαν είσδυόμενος ό λόγος 10
άπόλλυσιν. έκθλίβεται γάρ εις τό μέλλον καί τό παριρχημένον
ώσπερ ακμήν βουλομένοις ίδεΐν, έξ ανάγκης διιστάμενον.”
 PLUTARCH

What, then, really is Being? It is that which is perpetual, ungenerated

and indestructible, to which no time, however long, brings change.
For time is something mobile, something that is imagined together
with moving matter, ever flowing, keeping nothing, a receptacle, as
it were, of destruction and generation; its ‘afterwards’ and ‘before’,
its ‘shall be’ and 'has been', are, when they are being said, of them­
selves a confession of Not-being. For to designate as Being that which
has not yet come about, or that which has already ceased to be, is
stupid and absurd. And as for that on which we most rely in our
conception of time, as we utter ‘it is present’, ‘it is at hand’, and
‘now’ — all this again, reflection, when it goes into the matter, des­
troys utterly. For ‘now’ is squeezed out into the future and the past,
as a culmination for those who want to see it; for of necessity it
stands apart.
 Τ Α Τ ΙΑ Ν

Tat., Τί μοι μερίζετε τόν χρόνον, λέγοντες τό μέν τι είναι παριρχηκός

Or. Graec.,
αυτοϋ, τό δέ ένεστός, τό δέ μέλλον; Πως γάρ δύναται παρελΟεΐν
27,22-28
ό μέλλων, εί έστιν ό ένεστώς; "Ωσπερ δέ οί έμπλέοντες τής νεώς
φερομένης οϊονται διά την άμαθίαν ότι τά όρη τρέχουσιν, οϋτω
καί ύμεϊς ού γινώσκέτε παρατρέχοντας μέν ύμδς, έστώτα δέ τόν 5
αιώνα, μέχρις αν αυτόν ό ποιήσας είναι θελήσΐΐ-
 TATIA N

Why do you divide time, saying that a portion of it is the past, a

portion the present, and a portion the future? For how can the future
pass by, if the present is there? Just as passengers believe, out of
ignorance, as the ship is carried on, that the mountains are going
< p a s t> , so are you unaware that you are going past, whereas eter­
nity is < and will be> static for as long as its Maker wills it to
exist.
ψ NOTES

pages 24 and 25
1 Simplicius quotes the text of pseudo-Archytas twice, with some
variations: here, and in his In Phys., 785, 16, to 786, 10; cf., e.g.,

I
Simplicius, In Phys., 785, 17 f .: άμερές δν, λεγόμενον άμα καί νοού-
μενον, παρελήλυθε...; ρ. 24, II. 2 f.: άμερές λεγόμενον άμα νοού-
( μενον και λεγόμενον παρελήλυθεν...
2 ούδέποκα... τό είδος ‘and is never... to its form’. — Cf. Simpli­
cius, In Phys., 785, 19. The phrase contrasts αριθμός ‘number’ and
είδος ‘form’; cf. Aristoteles, De Anima, 411b, 21; Meteorologica,
357b, 28, 31; De Generatione et Corruptione. 338b, 13, 17. The
dual nature of the Now is emphasized by Aristotle by contrasting
the identity as well as the otherness of different Nows; cf. Aris­
toteles, Physica, 2.19b, 11 f. and 19 f.: τό γάρ νυν τό αυτό δ ποτ'
ήν, τό δ’είναι αύτω έτερον ‘for the Now as a subject is an iden­
tity, but it accepts different attributes’. Cf. also Phvsica. 190a,
15 f.; 277b, 3; 242b, 4.
3 κλασθείσας... έτέρας ‘which is broken... of another'. — Cf. Sim­
plicius, In Phys., 785, 25 f.; see also p. 30, II. 19 f.
pages 26 and 27
1 Cf. p. 34, 11. 5-10, where II. 1-6 on p. 26 are repeated with small
variations.
2 χορεία τινί τής ψυχής περί τόν νοΰν ‘a kind of dance of the soul
around the intellect’. — Cf. p. 34, I. 7: χορείςι τινί τοΰ νΰν ‘some
kind of circular dance of the Now'.
I 3 τής ψυχής καί τοΰ νοϋ αύτής περιόδοις 'the periods of the soul
and of the intellect itself’. — Cf. p. 34. 11. 7 f.: τής ψυχής περι­
όδου; 'periods of the soul’.
4 λόγοι 'logoP. — The word is used here in the sense cither of
‘principles’, ‘laws’, ‘relations’, or of ‘forces’.
5 Lines 6-16 on p. 26 are repeated, with variations in dire
, tation, on p. 32, 1. 30, to p. 34, 1. 5, adding after χρόνου ‘of
time’ (p. 34,1. 5): τοΰ συνεχίζοντος τούς τής φύσεως λόγους ‘as
indicated by the word itself’.
6 δει δέ εϊς εν συναγαγεΐν άμφοτέρους ‘whereas one has to reduce
them to one’. — According to the conception of Iamblichus and
his school, one has to see the generative time (γενεσιουργός χρό­
νος) as the only real time (namely, χρόνος καθ’ εαυτόν ‘time per
s e \ see 1. 26), and physical time as its derivative.
7 κατά τόν δγκον ‘with regard to mass’, i.e., to physical bodies.
* 8 άσύνακτα ‘incompatible’. — Iamblichus declares τό άμερές ‘the
indivisible’ and τό άνυπόστατον ‘the unreal’ as incompatible, be­
cause of a semantic transposition from geometrical to metaphys-
[105]
 ical terminology. Here, indivisibility denotes for him not the at­
tribute of a geometrical point, but the property of the intelligible
essences that constitute indivisible entities.

pages 28 and 29
1 μηνούσαν έν tfj ούσία ενέργειαν ‘actuality resting in the es­
sence’. — Cf. Aristoteles, Ethica Nicomachea, 1154b, 27: ενέργεια
ακινησίας ‘activity of immobility’.
2 μετέχουσι τοϋ χρόνου ‘participating in time’. — Scil. νοεροΟ ‘in­
tellectual’ or πρώτου ‘primary’ (time).
3 τήν άμέριστον ουσίαν ‘the indivisible essence'. — Cf. p. 34, II.
31 f.; p. 38, II. 27 f.: τήν εκείνου σταθερόν ουσίαν ‘the static es­
sence of time’.
4 άλλοτε δέ... καταψεύδεται ‘and as at any different moment... is
falsely attributed to it’. — Cf. also p. 34, II. 32 ff.; p. 38, II. 28 ff.
As to this interpretation of Iamblichus, see Introduction, p. 15.
5 Cf. p. 24, 1. 4. κατ’ αριθμόν έτερότης των μετεχόντων ‘the numer­
ical otherness of the participating things' is contrasted with τό
είδος ταΰτό μένον ‘the form which remains the same’ = ταύτότης
τοΟ αμεροΰς vOv ‘the identity of the indivisible Now', but. unlike
pscudo-Archytas, this contrast is ascribed to two different entities,
namely, sensible time and intelligible time.
6 Lines 26-31. — This excerpt from Tamblichus is quoted more fully
on p. 34, 1. 31, to p. 36,1.1, which version appears again on p. 38,
II. 27-32, in a more shortened form. The sentence after κατα-
ψεύδεται (p. 34, 1. 34) is contained in II. 6-11 on p. 30.
7 κατά μέν γάρ τήν ουσίαν καί τό είδος εν καί ταυτόν ‘they are one
and the same with respect to essence and form’. — This, again,
goes back to Aristoteles, Physica, 219b, 11 f. and 19 f.
pages 30 and 31
1 Lines 14-17 (ή ότι... θεωρείται ’The answer is... continuous mo­
tion’) contain expressly Iamblichus’s statement of the existence of
two different Nows: one participating and moving, the other sub­
sisting in itself and at rest. Simplicius alludes to this in in Categ.,
95, 28 f., when he speaks about time per se as the object of άλλης
φιλοσοφίας ‘another philosophy’.
2 γραμμής ευθείας κλασθείσης εις γωνίαν ‘a straight line broken
in such a way that it forms an angle’. — ‘εϊς γωνίαν’ ‘that it forms
an angle’ is added by Iamblichus in order to illustrate pseudo-
Archytas’s remarks.
κλασθείσης ‘broken’. — Cf. Liddell & Scott, s.v. κλάω (A)2:
‘usually of drawing a straight line “ broken back” at a line or
surface’ (Pappus, 904, 17; Aristoteles, Physica, 228b, 24; Meteoro-
logica, 377b, 22; et al.).
3 ούσίαν (in accordance with Kalblleisch) ‘the essence of time’,

pages 32 and 33
1 τινές ‘some people’. — Obviously the Peripatetics are meant.
2 τό όντα ‘the things that are’. — Supplemented by K.albfieisch
 from Simplicius, In Phys., 793, 16 (our p. 40, I. 14).
3 Lines 10-16 are repeated, with variations, on p. 40, 11. 10-17.
pages 34 and 35
1 Here Iamblichus alludes to an opinion according to which χρόνος
‘time’ is derived from χορεία ‘a circular dance’.
2 Time, according to lamblichus’s interpretation, is both continuous
and divided, i.e., separated into parts. This is in conformity with
his view of the common origin of continuous and discrete quan­
tities; cf. Iamblichus, apud: Simplicius, In Categ., 135, 10-28.
pages 36 and 37
1 καί ποΰ (p. 34, 1. 29)... ταυτότητα (p. 36, 1. 1) ‘And where...
Now’. — As to this passage, cf. p. 28, 11. 26 IT.; p. 38, 11. 27 ff.
2 παράτασις ‘continuance’, in contradistinction to διάστασις ‘space-
like extension’.
3 είπών ‘talking’; είπε ‘he speaks’. — Scii. Archytas; cf. Simplicius,
In Categ., 350, 12; In Phys., 700, 20; cf. also p. 32, 1. 19.

pages 38 and 39
1 πρώτου καί άμεθέκτου χρόνου ‘the first and unparticipated
time’. — This is one of lamblichus’s many characterizations of
intellectual time. Other expressions: ό καθ’ εαυτόν χρόνος ‘time
by itself’ (p. 40, I. 8); ό εικεΐνος χρόνος ‘intellectual time’ (p. 40,
1. 26); ό χωριστός χρόνος ‘separate time’ (p. 48, 1. 2); μονάς
χρόνου ‘the monad of time’ (p. 50,1. 10); ό αφανής χρόνος ‘the
invisible time’ (p. 56, 1. 19); ό σόμπας τφ οντι χρόνος ‘the real
total time’ (p. 76, 1. 37); ό συνηγμένος εις εν χρόνος ‘the com-
bined-in-one time’ (p. 78, 11. 6 f.).
2 λέγει... εις τάς Κατηγορίας ‘He speaks in his commentary on the
Categories'. — Cf. p. 32, I. 18.
3 Lines 27-32. — Also quoted on p. 28, II. 26-31: p. 34. 1. 31, to
p. 36, 1. I.
pages 40 and 41
1 αίώνα-χρόνον ‘eternity-time’. — Clearly distinguishing between
eternity and intellectual time; cf. Introduction, p. 11.
2 χρόνον ουσίαν μέν αυτόν ‘time... as an essence which really
is’. — In contradistinction to Plotinus’s interpretation of time as
a state of the soul.

pages 42 and 43
t όλην... άθρόος ‘in its entirety’. — This emphasizes the simul­
taneity of the order of intellectual time.
2 Lines 4-7. — Cf. Iabmlichus, apud: Proclus, p. 44, 11. 13-16:
τάξιν... ού... ταττομένην,... άλλα... τάττουσαν ‘not an ordered
order, but an ordering one’.
3 Lines 10-16 are quoted also on p. 44, 1. 27, to p. 46, 1. 1, with
additional explanations, where κινήσεων μεταβάσεις ‘the changes
< o f position> of motions’ is illustrated by ώσπερ έπΐ τών κατ'
 ουρανόν ‘as in the celestial movements’, ζωής ανελίξεις ‘the un-
Foldings oF liFe' by ώσπερ επί τής ψυχής ‘as in the soul’, κοσμι­
κών (σωμα,τικών) γενέσεων διεξόδους ‘processions of cosmic (cor­
poreal) generations’ by επί τής φύσεως ‘as in nature’. Iamblichus
here stresses that all these examples are secondary causes, deriving
From the primary intellectual cause by which time must be de­
fined. This is a criticism of Aristotle’s conception of time.
4 από τής ψυχής κινήσεως ‘proceeding from the soul’. — Here
Plotinus’s concept is criticized.
5 ό παλαιός ‘the Ancient’. — Plato.
6 τής διαιωνίας φύσεως ‘of the sempiternal nature’. — Cf. Plato,
Timaeus, 39 E.
7 κατά τό δυνατόν ‘as far as possible'. — Ibid., 38 B-C.
8 έκεΐ ‘there’. — The intellectual hypostasis; see also p. 44, 1. 5.
pages 44 and 45
1 έκεΐ ‘there’. — See preceding note.
2 μετρεΐται... έξ ούδενός μέν διαστατού ‘it is measured by no ex­
tension’. — According to Iamblichus’s view, extension can only
be measured by physical means. Intellectual time is extensionless
and becomes extended only in the act of participation. Cf. p. 46,
II. 6-11.

pages 46 and 47
1 αλλά τό σύνολον τοΰτο... δικαίως ‘but its totality should rightly
be called the image of eternity’. — Because eternity combines in
one the totality of time, only this totality is an image of eternity.
2 ή πρώτη τών εικόνων The first of images’. — According to
Iamblichus, there are several images of eternity, not only that
of the perceptible world, but also those at higher levels. About
the views of various Neoplatonists on this point cF. Proclus, In
Timaeum, III, 33, 31, to 34, 7.
3 τοΟ πρώτου ‘of the first’. — The first hypostasis, i.e., τό εν.
4 έπίταδε voO ‘lower than (lit. on this side of) the intellect'. —
Cf. ibid., 10, 20; 12. 14.

pages 48 and 49
l οΰδέν γάρ καθ’ όλον εαυτό κινείται etc. ‘nothing is moved as a
whole’ etc. — Cf. p. 60, 11. 5-13, where Theaetetus, 181, is men­
tioned as an authority, and where άκινήτως ενεργούν ‘actualized
and immobile’ is given as the final answer. This again goes
back to Aristoteles, Ethica Nicomachea, 1154b, 27: ενέργεια
ακινησίας ‘activity of immobility’. See also p. 28, 1. 1, about
what Iamblichus says as regards μένουσαν έν τή ουσία ενέργειαν
‘actuality resting in the essence’.
pages 50 and 5 1
I ή του χρόνου μονός ‘the monad of time’. — Intellectual time
(see also p. 52, 1. 8); cf. p. 26, 1. 19, where Simplicius expounds
χρονική μονός ‘a time-like monad’, which is also defined as
[108]
 N o le s
l· αυτοκίνητος κίνησις ‘a self-moving movement', the number of
which is ό γενεσιουργός χρόνος ‘the generative time’.
2 ακίνητον... μετέχουσι ‘and what is simultaneously... participat­
ing things’. — Such is the dual nature of time, which provides
the link between intellectual and perceptible time.
pages 52 and 53
1 έξαπλων εαυτόν εις έκεΐνα ‘unfolding itself into them’. — Cf.
Proclus, The Elements o f Theology (ed. Dodds), Prop. 55, p. 52, I.
30, to p. 54, 1. 3: άιδιότης... έξαπλιοθεϊσα.
II 2 Lines 8-10. — χρόνος ‘time’ is μονάς καί κέντρον ‘a monad and
a centre’ and also αριθμός καί κύκλος ‘number and circle’. This
is Proclus's graphic representation of time’s dual nature: κέντρον
‘a centre’ — κατά τήν μείνασαν ενέργειαν ‘through activity rest­
ing’; κύκλος ‘a circle’ — κατά τό προϊόν καί τό μετεχόμενον ‘in
respect of that which is proceeding and participating’; cf. Proclus’s
triadic symbolism of the circle, In Euclid, (ed. Friedlein), 153, IQ-
26: κέντρον ‘centre’ = μονή ‘permanence’; διαστάσεις ‘exten­
sions’ = πρόοδος ‘procession’; περιφέρεια ‘circumference’ =
έπιστροφή ‘return to the source’.
3 Lines 26-30. — Proclus’s proportion intellect : soul = eternity :
time, and its corollary that time ranks before the soul, as eternity
does before the intellect (cf. also p. 56. II. 23-25), contains an
implicit criticism of Plotinus.
4 Διττής τής δημιουργίας οϋσης etc. ‘since the creation of the dem­
iurge is twofold' etc. — Cf. p. 62, II. 15-26, and in particular
I. 24: χρόνος αύτή συμφυής έστιν ‘time is naturally united with it’.
pages 54 and 55
I 1 ένατον... δώρον ‘a ninth gift'. — Scil. time; the eight other gifts
are the sphere of the fixed stars and those of the sun, moon and
the five planets.
2 τοΰ δημιουργού πρός τόν αιώνα βλέποντος O f the demiurge
looking at eternity’. — Cf. Plato, Timaeus, 29A.
3 τόν πρότερον χρόνον... τόν δεύτερον ‘the prior time... the sec­
ond’. — Again the dual nature of time, the first directed towards
eternity, the second multiplied and divided.
pages 56 and 57
! ώς ό... ’Αριστοτέλης φησί ‘as Aristotle says’. — Cf. Aristoteles.
Physica, 253a, 13-15; 265b, 34.
pages 58 and 59
l όμως ‘equally’, is in this context preferable to όμως ‘nevertheless’,
which is found in Diehl’s text. Because of the contrarieties in­
volved in Lhe nature of the soul, we are able to grasp the contra­
rieties involved in the dual nature of time-
pages 60 and 61
1 ούρανοΟ χάριν ‘for the sake of heaven’. — Cf. Plato, Timaeus
37E, 38B.
 The Concept o f Time in Late Neoplatonism
pages 62 and 63
1 χρόνος άυτή συμφυής έστιν ‘time is naturally united with it'. —
Cr. p. 52, l.‘ 36, and n. 4.
pages 64 and 65
1 κατά τήν ουσίαν... κατά τήν ενέργειαν ‘with regard to sub­
stance... with regard to action’. — Cf. Simplicius, In Categ., 341,
21 IT. (Simplicius’s comments on a passage quoted from Iambli­
chus), where it appears that ουσία is to be taken here in the sense
of ‘substance’, in contradistinction to ενέργεια ‘action’. Accord­
ing to Simplicius, time usually measures changes in action, but
space measures those in substance, i.e., changes of positions in
space; it could, however, also be the other way round, and from
the line referred.to here it follows that Simplicius adopts Damas­
ci us’s view.
2 For Damascius’s assertion that time preserves the identity of
changing tilings, cf. Plotinus, 3, 7, 8, 63-67, on time and rest.
pages 66 and 67
t Άριστοτέλους εΐπόντος ‘Aristotle’s words'. — This probably
refers to Aristoteles, Physica, 221a, 28 ff.:... άνάνγη πάντα τά έν
χρόνοι οντα περιέχεσθαι Οπό χρόνου etc. ‘it is necessary' that all
the things existing in time should be contained by time’ etc.
2 ώς αύτός έφη ‘as he says’. — I.e., in the same sense as used by-
Aristotle; cf. Aristoteles, Physica, 223b, 3 if.
3 λέγει ‘he regards’. — Idem, De Caelo, 279a, 25.
4 φησί ‘says’. — Idem, Physica, 22Jb, 25.

pages 68 and 69
1 P. 68, 1. 14, to p. 74, I. 5 (‘In this exposition - sublunar things’)
contain Simplicius’s comments on Damascius.
2 τουναντίον... έχον ‘just the opposite... at once’. — Simplicius
rejects Damascius’s conception of simultaneously existing (intel­
lectual) time.
pages 70 and 71
1 ού γάρ επειδή... ποιήσομεν ‘For if we perceive... by this-. — Cf.
Philoponus in his controversy with Simplicius, In Phys., 1158, 30 ff.
2 άίδιον τήν κυκλοφορίαν λέγομεν etc. ‘we call the circular mo­
tion of the heavenly bodies perpetual’ etc. — About temporal
perpetuity', cf. Proclus, The Elements o f Theology (ed. Dodds), Prop.
55, p. 52, I. 30; and commentary, p. 229.
pages 72 and 73
1 Πλάτων ‘Plato’. — Cf. Timaeus, 52A.
2 ό Δαμάσκιος... έλεγε ‘Damascius... stated’. — in Damascius’s
Dubitationes et Solutiones we could not find such a statement.
3 αιώνα... χρόνον ‘eternity... time’. — Obviously Simplicius alludes
1o intellectual time. In connection with his remarks about the
ambiguity of the relevant terminology it should be noted that

u
 later on, in mediaeval terminology (Avicenna and the schoolmen),
a third term for time was introduced. The Latin terms arc tempus,
aevum and aeternitas.
pages 74 and 75
1 σχηματισμοΐς 'configurations’. — Scil. stellar configurations; the
passage included in 11. 2-5 has a definite astrological tinge.
2 έλάχιστον... χρόνον ‘a very short time’. — Damascius here al­
ludes to his ‘quanta of time' and. taking them for granted, wants
to conclude from their existence that total time, too, must be
real all at once.
3 δηλοΐ γάρ τό «ίδιον 'this is proved by the perpetual'. — Cf.
again Dodds, loc. cit.
pages 76 and 77
t Lines 17-25 (‘He then explains - the flowing time’). — Time
flows with regard to things preserving their form (the stars), or
with regard to changing things, whose form is only preserved
as a whole (the elements and species), or with regard to cyclic
changes dependent on the seasons or natural motions.
2 According to Diels there is a lacuna here.
3 ό σόμπας τω όντι χρόνος ‘the real total time’. — I.e.. intellectual
time.
pages 78 and 79
1 έκμηρύεται ‘winds off. - Cf. Damascius, Dubitationes et Solu­
tiones, I, 141, 25-26.
2 ό συνηγμένος... χρόνος ‘thecombined-in-one time’. — I.e., άθρόος
‘all at once', intellectual time.
3 τοΰ ακινήτου όρεκτοΰ ‘the unmoved object of desire’. — Cf.
Aristoteles, De Anima, 433a, 18; 433b, II; Dodds, Index, s.v.
όρεκτός.
4 άεί ‘everlastingness’. — As cause and effect, i.e., the unmoved
mover and the fifth body.
5 Άριστοτέλους οΰτω δεικνύντος ‘as Aristotle has shown’. — Cf.
Physica, IV, Chaps. 10-14.
pages 80 and 81
1 καθ’ όλον βήμα (p. 78, 1. 30) ‘by whole steps'; ύπεραλλομένης
(p. 78, 1. 31) ‘leaps over’; άλμα τής κινήσεως (p. 80, 1. 1) ‘jump
of movement’. — Cf. Damascius’s theory of time quanta, p. 88,
II. 13 ff.; p. 90, 11. 34 ff.
2 ούκ έν τφ vOv έσται κινούμενον ‘will not move in the Now’.
Damascius regards each quantum of time as being at rest, i.e., as
a discrete entity existing all at once.
3 Ζήνωνος άπορίαν ‘Zeno’s difficulty’. ■ — Cf. Aristoteles, Physica.
233a, 16-26.
4 P. 80, 1. 32, to p. 84, 1. 24 (‘Moreover - continuously). — This
first part of Damascius’s observations, quoted by Simplicius, re­
fers to intellectual time (e.g., the picture of the river etc.); in the
following passage (p. 84, 1. 24, to p. 86, I. 29: ‘Since the present -
 another measure') another subject is discussed, an interpretation
oF Aristotle’s Now and the difficulties concerning it; this probably
is also a quotation from Damascius.
pages 82 and 83
1 καθ' εαυτόν γε ό χρόνος ‘time per se'. ■- I.e., intellectual time.
2 ού καθ’ εν είδος άφορίζοντας. ■— In our translation we have de­
leted ού (perhaps a repetition of the ου of χρόνου).
pages 84 and 85
l τόν ποταμόν τής γενέσεως ‘the river of becoming’. — Damascius’s
metaphor of time as ποταμός γενέσεως ‘river of becoming' seems
to have been suggested by Porphyry’s expression ποταμός των
πραγμάτων ‘river of things' in his Ad MarceUam, 5; cf. Porphyrii
Opuscula Selecta., ed. A. Nauck, Leipzig 1886, p. 276, 11. 21 ff.
pages 88 and 89
1 ώς φησι Στρατών ‘as Strato says'. — Cf. Simplicius. In Phys.,
711, 9-12, where Strato’s statement is thus paraphrased: ούκ από
τοϋ μεγέθους μόνον συνεχή τήν κίνησιν είναι..., αλλά καί καθ'
έαυτήν, ώς εΐ διακοπείη, στάσει διαλαμβανομένην, καί τό μεταξύ
δύο στάσεων κίνησιν ούσαν άδιάκοπον ‘Motion is not only con­
tinuous with regard to extension < o f the trajectory>, but also
with regard to itself; if it is interrupted it is divided < in to tw o>
by a rest, uninterrupted motion being that which is between two
<m om cnts> of rest.’ This is equivalent to Damascius’s rendering
έκ μερών μή μενόντων ‘of parts which are not at rest’, but the
following words, ταύτη οΰν έκ διωρισμένων ‘which means of dis­
crete parts’, are an interpretation, preparing for his hypothesis
of άλματα χρόνου ‘the jumps of time'.
2 ώς έλεγε καί ’Αριστοτέλης ‘using a term of Aristotle’. — This
does not refer to the conceptual aspect of Damascius's theory, but
to its terminology. In coining his quanta of time ‘άλματα’, Damas­
cius borrows from an expression used in Aristoteles, Afeteorologica,
343b, 23, where the tail of a comet is described as οΐον άλμα. Cf.
also the commentaries of Alexander Aphrodis. (In Meteor., 31,
29), Olympiodorus (In Meteor., 58, 8: οιον τι πήδημα ποιήσας)
and Philoponus (In Meteor., 87, 33).
3 μετά... πλήθος ‘after... multitude’. — Cf. Plato, Parmenides, 151 f.,
where the discussion of Time follows that of quantities and their
parts.
4 συνεχής τέ έστι καί διωρισμένος ‘it is both continuous and
discrete’. — Cf. Iamblichus, apud Simplicius, In Categ., 135, 8
If., on the simultaneous continuity and discreteness of every en­
tity. Time, according to Damascius, conforms to this dualism, and
the same applies to movement. The continuity of movement
follows from the identity of the moving body: its discreteness —
from the assumed ‘jumps’.
5 δηλοΐ αύτοϋ τό έπί ψυχής παράδειγμα ‘is shown by the example
of the soul’. — The analogy of the soul and its divisions; cf. the
quotation from Damascius on p. 82, II. 30 ff. In the present con­
 text (p. 88, 11. 30-37) this is mentioned in order to explain the
quanta of time.
page 90
I Emendation: instead of έν χρόνφ τό ΰεϊ ον έστιν read έν χρόνω
τφ άεΐ τό άεί δν έστιν; cf. ρ. 64, U. 28 f.: ό χρόνος 6 τε άεί δ
τε ποτέ; Proclus, In Timaeum, I, 291, 16: εΐ δέ τό ΰεϊ δν τό κατά
τόν άεί χρόνον etc.
pages 92 and 93
1 τοιαΰτα άν εΐη γενητά . — Read, with Chaignet, άγενητά.
2 συναίρεσις ‘aggregation' ( = ‘quantum’). — Cf. Simplicius, In
Phys., 635, 33; 783, 14.
3 άλλά έστιν νεώτερον καί πρεσβύτερον ‘but is younger and
older’. — Cf. Plato, Timaeus, 38 A; Damascius, Dubitationes et
Solutiones, II, 243, 5: ...συναίρεσιςέστι τό ίσήλικον τοΰ νεωτέρου
καί πρεσβυτέρου ‘aggregation is that which is synchronous with
< b o th > that which is younger and that which is older’.
4 πεπέρασται ύπό δύο νΰν κατ’ ενέργειαν ‘limited by Nows in
actu'. — Cf. p. 82, 1. 25.
pages 94 and 95
1 ή τε κίνησις των ουρανίων ‘the movement of celestial bodies’...
πάντα τά ύπό σελήνην ‘all sublunar forms’. — Both arc examples
of τοΰ κατ’ ούσίαν ρέοντος καί άλλοτε άλλο τφ άριθμφ κατ’
ουσίαν τό γινόμενον έχοντος ‘the flowing with regard to es­
sence and containing that which is generated in an always chang­
ing number as regards its essence’.
2 τής αιωνίου συναιρέσεως ‘eternal aggregation’. — The adjective
αιώνιος clearly shows that συναίρεσις has a connotation akin
to indivisibility, similar to Damascius’s time-quanta; c f p. 92,
I. 19.
3 έξέβη... άλλ’ ούχ ύπέβη ‘departing... does not, however, de­
scend’. — About this intermediate state, cf. p. 72, 11. 25-29, where
Simplicius states that this is Damascius’s doctrine: άνάτασιν ‘up­
ward tension’ - ύπόβασιν ‘declension’.
4 άλλοις όνόμασι σύμμετρα ‘corresponding to other names’. — Cf.
p. 72, 11. 31 f.: διά τό μή έχειν ίδιον όνομα ‘because it has no
special name’.
5 In 11. 28-31 Simplicius draws a distinction between ουρανία
δλότης ‘celestial wholeness’ and τά ύπό σελήνην ‘the sublunear
things’, in contrast to 11. 9-11.
pages 96 and 97
1 ένουσιωμένος τή φύσει ‘which acquires substance through na­
ture’. — C f p. 76, 1. 8, where Damascius is quoted.
2 ούκέτι μοι σκληρόν τό δόγμα δοκέ! ‘this doctrine does not at all
seem to me to be harsh’. — Simplicius, attempting to moderate
the extreme notion of time in Damascius’s doctrine, here inter­
pretes simultaneous intellectual time as something pre-existing in
the soul. In the soul, however, it exists without extension.
3 τοϋ πρώτου χρόνου ‘primary time*. — Cf. p. 38, 11. 13 F.
pages 98 and 99
1 ού γάρ ή παράτασίς... παρατάσεως ‘For the participated... of ex­
tension’. — Again a moderation of Damascius’s notion of the
‘river time’.
2 ώς έχ ει... ούτως έχ ει... ‘the relation of... is as the relation
of...’. — Cf. p. 52, 11. 26-30. Simplicius assumed ζωή to be in­
telligible.
3 εκεί ‘in the intelligible world'. — In the intelligible hypostasis
there is also a threefold level, life-eternity-wholeness, split by
our consciousness into three separate levels. See Beutler’s article
‘Proklos’ in PW, XXIII, p. 225.
 G L OSSA RY
άδιάστατος extensionless, inter­
val-less
τό αεί everlastingness
άεικινησία everlasting motion
άθρόος at once, aggregated, as
a whole, simultaneous
άίδιος perpetual
άιδιότης perpetuity
αιών eternity
αιώνιος eternal
άλμα jump (quantum of time)
άμα simultaneously, at once
άμέθεκτος unparticipatcd
άμερής indivisible
άνάτασις upward motion
άνυπόστατος unreal
βήμα step (quantum of time)
διαιώνιος sempiternal
διάστασις extension
διάστημα extension, interval
διηρημένος divided, divisible
διορισμένος divided, discrete,
discontinuous
καθ' εαυτό per se, subsisting in
itself
εκεί the intellectual (intelligible)
world
τά εκείνα the intellectual (intel-
legible) tilings
τό εκείνο the world of the intel­
lect
ό εκείνος (scil. χρόνος) the in­
tellectual time
έκστασις onward movement
ενέργεια activity, actuality
κατ’ ενέργειαν in actu
έξη ρη μένος transcendent
έπίταδε on this side of, lower
than
έστώς static, permanent
κοινός (scil. χρόνος) universal
λόγοι thoughts, definitions
μέθεξις participation
μετάβασις transition, change of
position
μετέχειν participate
μετέχεσθαι being participated
μετουσία participation
νοερός intellectual
νόησις intellection
τά νοητά the intelligibies
τό νοητόν the intelligible world
νοητός intelligible
νους intellect
όγκος mass, body
όμοΰ simultaneously
ουσία essence, substance
(opp.: action)
παράστασις juxtaposition
παράτασις continuance, dura­
tion, (time-like) extension
πήδημα leap (quantum of time)
ποτέ every moment, any par­
ticular moment (opp.: αεί)
προβολή projection
ροπή downward tendency
σταθερός static, permanent
συναίρεσις aggregation (quan­
tization)
συνεχής continuous
συνυπάρχειν coexist
σύστοιχος corresponding
ύπόβασις declension
ύπόστασις reality
χωριστός separate