US v. H. N. BULL, GR No.

5270, 1910-01-15
Facts:
H. N. Bull was the... master of a steam sailing vessel known as the steamship Standard, which
vessel was then and there... engaged in carrying and transporting cattle, carabaos, and other animals
from a foreign port... to the port and city of Manila... the said accused H. N. Bull... on or about the 2d
day of December, 1908... did... carry, transport, and bring into the port and city of Manila, aboard said
vessel, from the port of Ampieng, Formosa, six hundred and seventy-seven (677) head... of cattle and
carabaos, without providing suitable means for securing said animals while in transit, so as to avoid
cruelty and unnecessary suffering to the said animals... that by reason of the aforesaid neglect and
failure of the accused to provide suitable means for securing... said animals while so in transit, the noses
of some of said animals were cruelly torn, and many of said animals were tossed about upon the decks
and hold of said vessel, and cruelly wounded, bruised, and killed.
It is contended that the information is insufficient because it does not state that the court was sitting
at a port where the cattle were disembarked, or that the offense was committed on board a vessel
registered and licensed under the... laws of the Philippine Islands.
Issues:
whether the court had jurisdiction over an offense of this character, committed on board a foreign ship by
the master thereof, when the neglect... and omission which constitutes the offense continued during the
time the ship was within the territorial waters of the United States
Ruling:
No court of the Philippine Islands had jurisdiction over &n offense or crime committed on the high seas
or within the territorial... waters of any other country, but when she came within 3 miles of a line drawn
from the headlands which embrace the entrance to Manila Bay, she was within territorial waters, and a
new set of principles became applicable.
The ship and her crew were then subject to the jurisdiction of the territorial sovereign subject to
such limitations as have been conceded by that sovereignty through the proper... political agency. This
offense was committed within territorial waters.
The offense, assuming that it originated at the port of departure in Formosa, was a... continuing one, and
every element necessary to constitute it existed during the voyage across the territorial waters. The
completed forbidden act was done within American waters, and the court therefore had jurisdiction over
the subject-matter of the offense... and the person of the offender.
The defendant was found guilty, and sentenced to pay a fine of two hundred and fifty pesos, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
Principles:
Every state has complete control and jurisdiction over its territorial waters.
 Mabanag vs Lopez Vito (G.R. NO. L-1123)
FACTS: Petitioners include 3 senators and 8 representatives. The three senators were suspended by senate due to
election irregularities. The 8 representatives were not allowed to take their seat in the lower House except in the
election of the House Speaker. They argued that some senators and House Reps were not considered in determining
the required ¾ vote (of each house) in order to pass the Resolution (proposing amendments to the Constitution) –
which has been considered as an enrolled bill by then. At the same time, the votes were already entered into the
Journals of the respective House. As a result, the Resolution was passed but it could have been otherwise were they
allowed to vote. If these members of Congress had been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed
amendment would have been short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress. Petitioners filed
or the prohibition of the furtherance of the said resolution amending the constitution. Respondents argued that the
SC cannot take cognizance of the case because the Court is bound by the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill or
resolution.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court can take cognizance of the issue at bar. Whether or not the said resolution was
duly enacted by Congress.

HELD: As far as looking into the Journals is concerned, even if both the journals from each House and an
authenticated copy of the Act had been presented, the disposal of the issue by the Court on the basis of the journals
does not imply rejection of the enrollment theory, for, as already stated, the due enactment of a law may be proved
in either of the two ways specified in section 313 of Act No. 190 as amended. The SC found in the journals no signs
of irregularity in the passage of the law and did not bother itself with considering the effects of an authenticated copy
if one had been introduced. It did not do what the opponents of the rule of conclusiveness advocate, namely, look
into the journals behind the enrolled copy in order to determine the correctness of the latter, and rule such copy out
if the two, the journals and the copy, be found in conflict with each other. No discrepancy appears to have been noted
between the two documents and the court did not say or so much as give to understand that if discrepancy existed it
would give greater weight to the journals, disregarding the explicit provision that duly certified copies “shall be
conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof.”

**Enrolled Bill – that which has been duly introduced, finally passed by both houses, signed by the proper officers
of each, approved by the president and filed by the secretary of state.

Section 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190), as amended by Act No. 2210, provides: “Official
documents may be proved as follows: . . . (2) the proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of any legislatives
body that may be provided for in the Philippine Islands, or of Congress, by the journals of those bodies or of either
house thereof, or by published statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk of secretary, or printed by
their order; Provided, That in the case of Acts of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine Legislature, when
there is an existence of a copy signed by the presiding officers and secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive
proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof.”

The SC is bound by the contents of a duly authenticated resolution (enrolled bill) by the legislature. In case of conflict,
the contents of an enrolled bill shall prevail over those of the journals.
Planas v. COMELEC
49 SCRA 105; January 22, 1973
Ponente: Concepcion, C.J.

FACTS:
While the 1971 Constitution Convention was in session on September 21, 1972, the president issued Proclamation No.
1081 placing the Philippines under martial law. On November 29, 1972, the Convention approved its proposed
constitution. The next day the president issued PD No. 73 submitting to the people for ratification or rejection the
proposed constitution as well as setting the plebiscite for said ratification. On December 7, 1972, Charito Planas filed a
petition to enjoin respondents from implemented PD No. 73 because the calling of the plebiscite among others is lodged
exclusively in the Congress. On December 17, 1972, the president issued an order temporarily suspending the effects of
PD 1081 for the purpose of the free and open debate on the proposed constitution. On December 23, the president
announced the postponement of the plebiscite, as such, the Court refrained from deciding the cases. On January 12, the
petitioners filed for an “urgent motion” praying that the case be decided “as soon as possible”.

ISSUES:
1. Is the validity of PD 73 justiciable?
2. Is PD 73 valid?
3. Does the 1971 Constitutional Convention have the authority to pass the proposed constitution?

HELD:
The Court may pass upon the constitutionality of PD 73 not only because of a long list of cases decided by the Court but
also of subdivision (1) of Section 2, Article VIII of the 1935 Constitution which expressly provides for the authority of
the Court to review cases revolving such issue. The validity of the decree itself was declared moot and academic by the
Court. The convention is free to postulate any amendment as long as it is not inconsistent with what is known as Jus
Cogens.
 SANIDAD vs COMELEC
PABLO C. SANIDAD and PABLITO C. SANIDAD vs HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS & HONORABLE NATIONAL TREASURER

G.R. No. L-44640

October 12, 1976

FACTS: On September 2, 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 991 to call for a
national referendum on October 16, 1976 through the so-called Citizens Assemblies (“barangays”). Its primary
purpose is to resolve the issues of martial law (as to its existence and length of effectivity).

On September 22, the president issued another proclamation (P.D. 1033) to specify the questions that are to be asked
during the referendum on October 16. The first question is whether or not the citizen wants martial law to continue,
and the second one asks for the approval on several proposed amendments to the existing Constitution.
The COMELEC was vested with the exclusive supervision and control of the national referendum in October 16.

Father and son, Pablo and Pablito Sanidad filed for prohibition with preliminary injunction to enjoin the COMELEC
from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16, and to declare without force and effect
Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the Constitution.

Another petitioner, Vicente Guzman filed for prohibition with preliminary injunction, asserting that the power to
propose amendments or revisions of the Constitution during the transition period is expressly conferred to the interim
National Assembly under Section 16, Article XVII of the Constitution.

Another set of petitioners, Raul Gonzales and Alfredo Salapantan sought to restrain the implementation of
Presidential Decrees relative to the forthcoming Referendum-Plebiscite of October 16. They assert that the incumbent
President cannot act as a constituent assembly to propose amendments to the Constitution and a referendum-
plebiscite is untenable under the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973.

The submission of the proposed amendments in such a short period of time for deliberation renders the plebiscite a
nullity. To lift Martial Law, the President need not consult the people via referendum; and allowing 15-.year olds to
vote would amount to an amendment of the Constitution, which confines the right of suffrage to those citizens of the
Philippines 18 years of age and above.

The Solicitor General contends that petitioners have no standing to sue, and that the issue raised is political in nature
– and thus it cannot be reviewed by the court. The Solicitor General also asserts that at this state of the transition
period, only the incumbent President has the authority to exercise constituent power; the referendum-plebiscite is a
step towards normalization.

ISSUE: WON the issue poses a justiciable question (specifically on the constitutionality of PDs 991 and 1033).

HELD: YES. 7 Justices of the Court held that the issue is a justiciable question, while only 3 maintained it was of
political nature and thus not justiciable.

The Court did not agree with the Solicitor General’s contention that the issue is a political one. This is because the
1973 Constitution expressly provided that the power to propose amendments to the constitution resides in the interim
National Assembly in the period of transition.

After that transition period, and when the regular National Assembly is in its active session, the power to propose
amendments becomes ipso facto the prerogative of the regular National Assembly. The normal course has not been
followed.

Rather than calling the National Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent assembly, the president undertook
the proposal of amendments through Presidential Decree 1033 and in effect, through a Referendum-Plebiscite on
October 16. Unavoidably, the irregularity of the amendment procedure raises a contestable issue.
 Javellana v. Executive Secretary
50 SCRA 30; March 31, 1973
Ponente: Concepcion, C.J

FACTS:
On January 20, 1973, Josue Javellana filed a prohibition case to restrain respondents from implementing any of the
provisions of the proposed constitution not found in the present constitution. Javellana maintained that the respondents
are acting without or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing proposed constitution and that the president is without
power to proclaim the ratification of the constitution. Similar actions were filed by Vidal Tan, Gerardo Roxas, among
others. Petitioners pray for the nullification of Proclamation 1102 (Citizens Assemblies) and any order, decree, and
proclamation which are similar in their objectives.

ISSUES:
1. Is the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 justiciable?
2. Was the constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention ratified validly in compliance with applicable
laws?

3. Was the proposed Constitution acquiesced by the people?

4. Are the petitioners entitled to relief?
5. Is the proposed Constitution in force?

HELD:
Whether a constitutional amendment has been properly adopted according to an existing constitution is a judicial
question as it is the absolute duty of the judiciary to determine whether the Constitution has been amended in the
manner required by the constitution. The Constitution proposed by the 1971 Convention was not validly ratified in
accordance with Article XV section 1 of the 1935 Constitution which provides only one way for ratification (election or
plebiscite held in accordance with law and only with qualified voters). Due to the environmental and social conditions
in the Philippines (i.e. martial law), the Court cannot honestly say that the people acquiesced to the proposed
Constitution. The majority ruled to dismiss the cases as the effectivity of the proposed Constitution is the basic issue
posed by the cases which considerations other than judicial are relevant and unavoidable. The new constitution is in
force as there are not enough votes to say otherwise.
 Occena v. COMELEC
G.R. No. L-56350 April 2, 1981
Fernando, C.J.
Facts:
Petitioners Samuel Occena and Ramon A. Gonzales, both members of the Philippine Bar and former delegates
to the 1971 Constitutional Convention that framed the present Constitution, are suing as taxpayers. The rather unorthodox
aspect of these petitions is the assertion that the 1973 Constitution is not the fundamental law, the Javellana ruling to the
contrary notwithstanding.

Issue:
What is the power of the Interim Batasang Pambansa to propose amendments and how may it be exercised?
More specifically as to the latter, what is the extent of the changes that may be introduced, the number of votes necessary
for the validity of a proposal, and the standard required for a proper submission?

Held:
The applicable provision in the 1976 Amendments is quite explicit. Insofar as pertinent it reads thus:
“The Interim Batasang Pambansa shall have the same powers and its Members shall have the same functions,
responsibilities, rights, privileges, and disqualifications as the interim National Assembly and the regular National
Assembly and the Members thereof.” One of such powers is precisely that of proposing amendments. The 1973
Constitution in its Transitory Provisions vested the Interim National Assembly with the power to propose amendments
upon special call by the Prime Minister by a vote of the majority of its members to be ratified in accordance with the Article
on Amendments. When, therefore, the Interim Batasang Pambansa, upon the call of the President and Prime Minister
Ferdinand E. Marcos, met as a constituent body its authority to do so is clearly beyond doubt. It could and did propose
the amendments embodied in the resolutions now being assailed. It may be observed parenthetically that as far as
petitioner Occena is concerned, the question of the authority of the Interim Batasang Pambansa to propose amendments
is not new. Considering that the proposed amendment of Section 7 of Article X of the Constitution extending the retirement
of members of the Supreme Court and judges of inferior courts from sixty-five (65) to seventy (70) years is but a
restoration of the age of retirement provided in the 1935 Constitution and has been intensively and extensively discussed
at the Interim Batasang Pambansa, as well as through the mass media, it cannot, therefore, be said that our people are
unaware of the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed amendment.

Issue:
Were the amendments proposed are so extensive in character that they go far beyond the limits of the authority
conferred on the Interim Batasang Pambansa as Successor of the Interim National Assembly? Was there revision rather
than amendment?

Held:
Whether the Constitutional Convention will only propose amendments to the Constitution or entirely overhaul
the present Constitution and propose an entirely new Constitution based on an Ideology foreign to the democratic system,
is of no moment; because the same will be submitted to the people for ratification. Once ratified by the sovereign people,
there can be no debate about the validity of the new Constitution. The fact that the present Constitution may be revised
and replaced with a new one is no argument against the validity of the law because ‘amendment’ includes the ‘revision’
or total overhaul of the entire Constitution. At any rate, whether the Constitution is merely amended in part or revised or
totally changed would become immaterial the moment the same is ratified by the sovereign people.

Issue:
What is the vote necessary to propose amendments as well as the standard for proper submission?

Held:

The Interim Batasang Pambansa, sitting as a constituent body, can propose amendments. In that capacity,
only a majority vote is needed. It would be an indefensible proposition to assert that the three-fourth votes required
when it sits as a legislative body applies as well when it has been convened as the agency through which amendments
could be proposed. That is not a requirement as far as a constitutional convention is concerned. It is not a requirement
either when, as in this case, the Interim Batasang Pambansa exercises its constituent power to propose amendments.
Moreover, even on the assumption that the requirement of three- fourth votes applies, such extraordinary majority was
obtained. It is not disputed that Resolution No. 1 proposing an amendment allowing a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines naturalized in a foreign country to own a limited area of land for residential purposes was approved by the
vote of 122 to 5; Resolution No. 2 dealing with the Presidency, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, and the National
Assembly by a vote of 147 to 5 with 1 abstention; and Resolution No. 3 on the amendment to the Article on the
Commission on Elections by a vote of 148 to 2 with 1 abstention. Where then is the alleged infirmity? As to the requisite
standard for a proper submission, the question may be viewed not only from the standpoint of the period that must
elapse before the holding of the plebiscite but also from the standpoint of such amendments having been called to the
attention of the people so that it could not plausibly be maintained that they were properly informed as to the proposed
changes. As to the period, the Constitution indicates the way the matter should be resolved. There is no ambiguity to
the applicable provision: “Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a majority of
the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than three months after the approval of such amendment or
revision.” The three resolutions were approved by the Interim Batasang Pambansa sitting as a constituent assembly on
February 5 and 27, 1981. In the Batasang Pambansa Blg. 22, the date of the plebiscite is set for April 7, 1981. It is thus
within the 90-day period provided by the Constitution.
 Philippine Bar Association vs. COMELEC
140 SCRA 455
January 7, 1986

FACTS:

11 petitions were filed for prohibition against the enforcement of BP 883 which calls for special
national elections on February 7, 1986 (Snap elections) for the offices of President and Vice President
of the Philippines. BP 883 in conflict with the constitution in that it allows the President to continue
holding office after the calling of the special election.

Senator Pelaez submits that President Marcos’ letter of conditional “resignation” did not create the
actual vacancy required in Section 9, Article 7 of the Constitution which could be the basis of the
holding of a special election for President and Vice President earlier than the regular elections for
such positions in 1987. The letter states that the President is: “irrevocably vacat(ing) the position of
President effective only when the election is held and after the winner is proclaimed and qualified as
President by taking his oath office ten (10) days after his proclamation.”

The unified opposition, rather than insist on strict compliance with the cited constitutional provision
that the incumbent President actually resign, vacate his office and turn it over to the Speaker of the
Batasang Pambansa as acting President, their standard bearers have not filed any suit or petition in
intervention for the purpose nor repudiated the scheduled election. They have not insisted that
President Marcos vacate his office, so long as the election is clean, fair and honest.

ISSUE:

Is BP 883 unconstitutional, and should the Supreme Court therefore stop and prohibit the holding of
the elections

HELD:

The petitions in these cases are dismissed and the prayer for the issuance of an injunction restraining
respondents from holding the election on February 7, 1986, in as much as there are less than the
required 10 votes to declare BP 883 unconstitutional.

The events that have transpired since December 3,as the Court did not issue any restraining order,
have turned the issue into a political question (from the purely justiciable issue of the questioned
constitutionality of the act due to the lack of the actual vacancy of the President’s office) which can
be truly decided only by the people in their sovereign capacity at the scheduled election, since there
is no issue more political than the election. The Court cannot stand in the way of letting the people
decide through their ballot, either to give the incumbent president a new mandate or to elect a new
president.

Extract of the Decision of Philippine Supreme Court

On the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 883 on the holding of the Snap Presidential
Election[Released in Manila, December 19, 1985]

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the Court dated December 19, 1985

After considering all the pleadings and deliberating on the issues raised in the petitions as well as on the
oral arguments of the parties and the amici curiae in the hearings held in these cases, Chief Justice Ramon
C. Aquino and six (6) Justices, namely, Justices Claudio Teehankee, Hermogenes Concepcion Jr.,
Vicente Abad Santos, Efren I. Plana, Vinicio T. Escolin and Lorenzo Relova, voted to DISMISS the
petitions in these cases and to DENY the prayer for the issuance of an injunction restraining respondents
from holding the election on February 7, 1986. In the opinion of Chief Justice Aquino, B.P. 883 is
constitutional.
Justices Hugo Gutierrez, Jr., B.S. de la Fuente, Serafin R. Cuevas, Nestor B. Alampay and Lino M. Patajo
voted to DECLARE B.P. 883 unconstitutional and to grant the injunction prayed for.

Justices Teehankee, Plana, Escolin, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., Alampay and Patajo filed separate opinions.

This resolution is without prejudice to the filing of separate opinions by the other Members of this Court.”

Melencio-Herrera, J., is on leave.

G.R. NO. 72915 (PBA ET AL. VS. COMELEC ET AL.) and other consolidated petitions.

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

I vote for the dismissal of the petition for prohibition against enforcement of BP Blg. 883 on the ground
that no clear case has been made of an absolute void of power and authority that would warrant its
nullification and that prohibition is not a remedy for acts done that can no longer be undone.

The stated issue is quite simple: Is B.P. Blg. 883 calling for special national elections on February 7, 1986
for the offices of President and Vice-President of the Philippines (for the first time since the pre-martial era
1969 presidential elections) unconstitutional, and should this Court therefore stop and prohibit the holding
of the elections?

Upon the filing on December 3rd of the lead and other petitions at bar, four members of the Court (Justices
Abad Santos, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr. and myself) voted per the Court’s Resolution of December 5th to issue
a temporary restraining order against enforcement of the Act and to hear the petitions on last December
12th so as to maintain the status quo and thereafter speedily resolve the issue and prevent the people’s
expectations from reaching a point of no return. Our vote did not gain the required concurrence of a
majority of eight. Instead the Court granted the parties substantial periods for filing of respondents’
comment and petitioners’ replies and to hear the case only after two weeks on December 17th (continued
to December 18th) with a clear consensus to take a vote and resolve the petitions immediately after the
hearing.

It is of public knowledge and record, as pointed out by former Vice-President, Senator and Executive
Committee Member Emmanuel N. Pelaez, amicus curiae, who helped in drafting the 1984 constitutional
amendments abolishing the Executive Committee and restoring the Office of Vice-President as the
President’s successor, that such restoration was not made effective immediately, but only at the end of
the incumbent President’s term on June 30, 1987 in view of his oft-expressed “allergy to vice-presidents.”
Hence, Sen. Pelaez submits that the President’s letter of conditional “resignation” (for the word is nowhere
used therein) “did not create the actual vacancy required in Section 9, Article VII of the Constitution which
could be the basis of the holding of a special election for President and Vice-President earlier than the
regular election for such positions in 1987. The letter’s intent was obvious: to circumvent the constitutional
provision which would, in effect, require the President to actually vacate his office in favor of the Speaker
who would then be the Acting President until a new one shall have been elected and shall have qualified.
X X In prescribing the procedure to fill the office of President in case of vacancy therein occurred during
the term of President Marcos, it (the cited section) excluded any discretion on the part of the Batasang
Pambansa to legislate on the same subject. In fact, given the very detailed and precise steps to be taken
by the Batasang Pambansa under (the first four paragraphs) for the purpose of calling a special election
to fill the vacancy, there was no room for legislative action to supplement the same. BP Blg. 883 which is
a reproduction of Cabinet Bill No. 7, is in conflict with the constitution in that it allows the President to
continue holding office after the calling of the special election. To put it another way: the President’s offer
to cut his term short is valid. The trouble is he does not go far enough: he should actually vacate the office
forthwith.”
LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR A BETTER PHILIPPINES vs. AQUINO
(G.R. No. 73748 - May 22, 1986)
------------------------
(There is no "Full-Text" of this case. This is a Minute Resolution made by the SC.)

Minute Resolutions

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 73748, May 22, 1986]

LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR A BETTER PHILIPPINES AND/OR OLIVER A. LOZANO VS. PRESIDENT CORAZON C.
AQUINO, ET AL.

SIRS/MESDAMES:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court MAY 22, 1986.

In G.R. No. 73748, Lawyers League for a Better Philippines vs. President Corazon C. Aquino, et al.; G.R. No. 73972,
People's Crusade for Supremacy of the Constitution vs. Mrs. Cory Aquino, et al., and G.R. No. 73990, Councilor Clifton U.
Ganay vs. Corazon C. Aquino, et al., the legitimacy of the government of President Aquino is questioned. It is claimed that
her government is illegal because it was not established pursuant to the 1973 Constitution.

As early as April 10, 1986, this Court* had already voted to dismiss the petitions for the reasons to be stated below.
On April 17, 1986, Atty. Lozano as counsel for the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 73748 and 73972 withdrew the petitions
and manifested that they would pursue the question by extra-judicial methods. The withdrawal is functus oficio.

The three petitions obviously are not impressed with merit. Petitioners have no personality to sue and their petitions state no
cause of action. For the legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter. It belongs to the realm of politics
where only the people of the Philippines are the judge. And the people have made the judgment; they have accepted the
government of President Corazon C. Aquino which is in effective control of the entire country so that it is not merely a de
factogovernment but is in fact and law a de jure government. Moreover, the community of nations has recognized the
legitimacy of the present government. All the eleven members of this Court, as reorganized, have sworn to uphold the
fundamental law of the Republic under her government.

In view of the foregoing, the petitions are hereby dismissed.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) GLORIA C. PARAS

Clerk of Court

* The Court was then composed of Teehankee, C.J. and Abad Santos., Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Gutierrez, Jr.,
Cuevas, Alampay and Patajo, JJ.------------------------------------------
DIGEST

FACTS:
On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing that she and Vice President Laurel
were taking power.
On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino government assumption of power by
stating that the "new government was installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units
of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines."

ISSUE:
Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.

HELD:
Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to the realm of politics where only the
people are the judge.

 The Court further held that:

 The people have accepted the Aquino government which is in effective control of the entire country;
 It is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government; and
 The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new government.
 In re: Saturnino Bermudez (G.R. No. 76180)
October 24, 1986 | G.R. No. 76180

Saturnino Bermudez, petitioner

FACTS:

Bermudez filed a petition for declaratory relief before the SC, asking the same Court to clarify exactly who were being
referred to in Section 5, Art. XVIII of the proposed 1986 Constitution. Said provision reads in part: "The six-year term of the
incumbent President and Vice-President elected in the February 7, 1986 election is, for the purposes of synchronization of
elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992."

ISSUE:

Does Section 5, Art. XVIII of the proposed 1986 Constitution pertain to incumbent President Corazon Aquino and Vice-
President Salvador Laurel or to elected President Ferdinand Marcos and Vice-President Arturo Tolentino?

HELD:

Petition has no merit and should be dismissed outright for the following reasons:
 De Leon v. Esguerra
153 SCRA 602

FACTS:
Alfredo De Leon was elected Barangay Captain in the elections on May 17, 1982. On February 9, 1987, petitioner
received a Memorandum antedated December 1, 1986, but signed by OIC Governor Esguerra on February 8, 1987,
designating Florentino Magno as Barangay Captain of Barangay Dolores Taytay, Rizal. Petitioners pray that the
memorandum is null and void in accordance with Section 3 of Barangay Election Act of 1982. Petitioner further that
with the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, respondent OIC governor no longer has authority to designate successors
and replace them.

ISSUE:
Is the dismissal order of De Leon et. Al. by respondent OIC Governor valid?

HELD:
The constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February 2, 1987. By that date, the Provisional Constitution has been
superseded. As such, respondent OIC Governor could no longer rely on Section 2 Article III of said Constitution. The
Memoranda was declared to be of no legal force and the writ of prohibition enjoining respondents from proceeding with
the take-over was granted.
 MACARIOLA v. ASUNCION
114 SCRA 77FACTS:
On August 6, 1968, petitioner, Bernadita Macariola charged respondent Judge Elias Asuncion of CFI of Leyte, now
Associate Justice of CA, with “acts unbecoming of a judge” when the latter purchased a property which was previously
the subject of litigation on which he rendered the decision. Respondent and his wife were also members of Traders
Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc. to which their shares and interests in said property were conveyed. According
to the petitioner, respondent allegedly violated Article 1491 (5) of the New Civil Code and Article 14 (1) and (5) of
Code of Commerce, Sec. 3 of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Sec. 12 XVIII of the Civil Service Rules and Canon
25 of Canons of Judicial Ethics.
ISSUE:
Is Article 14 of the Code of Commerce still in force?

HELD:
Article 14 partakes of the nature of a political law as it regulates the relationship between the government and certain
public officers and employees like justices and judges. Said provision must be deemed to have been abrogated because
where there is a change of sovereignty, the political laws of the former sovereign are automatically abrogated. As such,
Article 14 is not in force. The respondent is not found to have violated the articles invoked by the petitioner but he was
advised by the Court to be more discreet in his private and business activities.

Article 14
The following can not engage in the commercial profession, either in person or by proxy, nor can they
hold any direct administrative or economic position in commercial or industrial associations within the
limits of the districts, provinces, or towns in which they discharge their duties:
1. Associate justices, judges, and officials of the department of public prosecution (ministerio fiscal)
in active service.
This provision shall not be applicable to mayors (alcaldes), municipal judges, and municipal
prosecuting attorneys, nor to those who by chance are discharging judicial or prosecuting
functions.
2. Administrative, economic, or military chiefs of districts, provinces, or garrisons.
3. Employees engaged in the collection and administration of public funds of the State appointed by
the Government.
Persons who administer and collect temporarily or their representatives are excepted.
4. Money and commercial brokers of any class whatsoever.
5. Those who by virtue of laws or special provisions can not trade in certain territory.
FRANCISCO ET AL V HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
FRANCISCO ET AL v HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FACTS

On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, sponsored by Representative Felix
William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice “to conduct an investigation, in aid of
legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF).” On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an
impeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and
seven Associate Justices of this Court for “culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public
trust and other high crimes.” The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first
impeachment complaint was “sufficient in form,”9 but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for
being insufficient in substance.10 To date, the Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the
House in plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. Four months
and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after
the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint11 was filed with
the Secretary General of the House12 by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. (First District, Tarlac)
and Felix William B. Fuentebella (Third District, Camarines Sur) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide,
Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House
Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a “Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment” signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of
Representatives.13 Since the first impeachment complaint never made it to the floor for resolution,
respondent House of Representatives concludes that the one year bar prohibiting the initiation of
impeachment proceedings against the same officials could not have been violated as the impeachment
complaint against Chief Justice Davide and seven Associate Justices had not been initiated as the House
of Representatives, acting as the collective body, has yet to act on it. Opposing petitioners on the other
hand interpreted the word “initiate” to mean the filing of the complaint. Since there was already a first
complaint that never got through the Committee, no impeachment complaint maybe filed until the lapse
of the 1 year period.

ISSUE/S

1. When is an impeachment proceeding initiated? 2. Is the second impeachment complaint valid?

HELD

1. Art. XI, Sec. 3, pars. (1), (5) & (6) of the Constitution states:
(1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period
of one year.
(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. When sitting for that
purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial,
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall
be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
“Initiate” of course is understood by ordinary men to mean, as dictionaries do, to begin, to commence, or
set going. As Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language concisely puts it, it
means “to perform or facilitate the first action,” The Court pried the Constitutional Convention Records
to ascertain the intent of the framers of the Constitution. The framers really intended “initiate” to mean
the filing of the verified complaint to the Committee on Justice of the Lower House. This is also based on
the procedure of the U.S. Congress where an impeachment is initiated upon filing of the impeachment
complaint.
2. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and
referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5)
of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner,
another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section
3(5) of the Constitution.
 MANILA PRINCE HOTEL, petitioner v GSIS, respondent (DIGEST)

G.R. No. 122156; February 3, 1997

TOPIC: Non-Self Executing v Self Executing Constitutional Provisions

FACTS:

The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51%
of the issued and outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel (MHC).

In a close bidding, two bidders participated: Manila Prince Hotel Corporation (MPHC), a Filipino
corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a
Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at
P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.

Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder and the execution of the contracts,
the MPHC matched the bid price in a letter to GSIS. MPHC sent a manager’s check to the GSIS in a
subsequent letter, which GSIS refused to accept. On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that GSIS
has disregarded the tender of the matching bid, MPHC came to the Court on prohibition and
mandamus.

Petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits that the Manila
Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical monument
which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture.

Respondents assert that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is merely a statement
of principle and policy since it is not a self-executing provision and requires implementing
legislation(s).

ISSUE:

Whether the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII Section 10, are self-executing.

RULING:

Yes. Sec 10, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.

A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Article II of the 1987
Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes
operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient
rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.

Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional
mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the
constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature
would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law.

In fine, Section 10, second paragraph, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive
command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or
rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it
in operation.
 Pamatong vs. Comelec

Prefatory Statement:

Last December 1 was the deadline for the filing of Certificate of Candidacies (COCs) for the 2010
Elections. In the end, a total of 99 filed their COCs for President. Among the lesser known
presidentiables include someone called "Manok" (because apparently he can mimic a cock's crow), a
six-star general, and a future "emperor of the world." Considering that we would be having automated
elections next year and the list of all candidates are to be written in the ballots while voters are
supposed to shade the circles corresponding to their choices, would all 99 candidates be included? No.
Aside from disqualification petitions filed against the aspirants, the Comelec can also motu propio
deny due course to the COCs. Aside from the qualifications set forth under the Constitution, a candidate
should also have the capacity and resources to launch a national campaign.

Under the Constitution (Article II, Section 26), "the State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities
for public service xxx." Would the Comelec's act of disqualifying the so-called "nuisance" candidates
violate this constitutional provision?

Rev. Ely Velez Pamatong Vs. Commission on Elections

G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004

FACTS:

Petitioner Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for President. Respondent COMELEC
declared petitioner and 35 others as nuisance candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign
and/or are not nominated by a political party or are not supported by a registered political party with a
national constituency.

Pamatong filed a Petition For Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme Court claiming that the COMELEC
violated his right to "equal access to opportunities for public service" under Section 26, Article II of the
1987 Constitution, by limiting the number of qualified candidates only to those who can afford to wage a
nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by political parties. The COMELEC supposedly erred in
disqualifying him since he is the most qualified among all the presidential candidates, i.e., he possesses
all the constitutional and legal qualifications for the office of the president, he is capable of waging a
national campaign since he has numerous national organizations under his leadership, he also has the
capacity to wage an international campaign since he has practiced law in other countries, and he has a
platform of government.

ISSUE:

Is there a constitutional right to run for or hold public office?

RULING:

No. What is recognized in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is merely a privilege subject to
limitations imposed by law. It neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an
enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language of the provision which suggests such a thrust or
justifies an interpretation of the sort.

The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled "Declaration of
Principles and State Policies." The provisions under the Article are generally considered not self-
executing, and there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment to the "equal access"
provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any
judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive
action. The disregard of the provision does not give rise to any cause of action before the courts.

Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive measures that would
accommodate as many people as possible into public office. Moreover, the provision as written leaves
much to be desired if it is to be regarded as the source of positive rights. It is difficult to interpret the
clause as operative in the absence of legislation since its effective means and reach are not properly
defined. Broadly written, the myriad of claims that can be subsumed under this rubric appear to be
entirely open-ended. Words and phrases such as "equal access," "opportunities," and "public service" are
susceptible to countless interpretations owing to their inherent impreciseness. Certainly, it was not the
intention of the framers to inflict on the people an operative but amorphous foundation from which
innately unenforceable rights may be sourced.

The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations. Some valid
limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions of the Omnibus
Election Code on "Nuisance Candidates.” As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without
discrimination, however, the equal access clause is not violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the
burdens engendered by the limitations are meant to be borne by any one who is minded to file a
certificate of candidacy. In the case at bar, there is no showing that any person is exempt from the
limitations or the burdens which they create.

The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the disqualification of candidates
who have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to divine. The State has a compelling
interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly. Towards this end, the
State takes into account the practical considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater the
number of candidates, the greater the opportunities for logistical confusion, not to mention the increased
allocation of time and resources in preparation for the election. The organization of an election with
bona fide candidates standing is onerous enough. To add into the mix candidates with no serious
intentions or capabilities to run a viable campaign would actually impair the electoral process. This is not
to mention the candidacies which are palpably ridiculous so as to constitute a one-note joke. The poll
body would be bogged by irrelevant minutiae covering every step of the electoral process, most probably
posed at the instance of these nuisance candidates. It would be a senseless sacrifice on the part of the
State.

The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both legal and factual. The basis of
the factual determination is not before this Court. Thus, the remand of this case for the reception of
further evidence is in order. The SC remanded to the COMELEC for the reception of further evidence, to
determine the question on whether petitioner Elly Velez Lao Pamatong is a nuisance candidate as
contemplated in Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Obiter Dictum: One of Pamatong's contentions was that he was an international lawyer and is thus
more qualified compared to the likes of Erap, who was only a high school dropout. Under the
Constitution (Article VII, Section 2), the only requirements are the following: (1) natural-born citizen of
the Philippines; (2) registered voter; (3) able to read and write; (4) at least forty years of age on the
day of the election; and (5) resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such
election.

At any rate, Pamatong was eventually declared a nuisance candidate and was disqualified.
 MUTUC VS. COMELEC
G.R. No. L-32717 November 26, 1970

AMELITO R. MUTUC vs. COMELEC

FACTS:

Petitioner Mutuc was a candidate for delegate to the Constitutional Convention. He filed a special civil action against the
respondent COMELEC when the latter informed him through a telegram that his certificate of candidacy was given due
course but he was prohibited from using jingles in his mobile units equipped with sound systems and loud speakers. The
petitioner accorded the order to be violative of his constitutional right to freedom of speech. COMELEC justified its
prohibition on the premise that the Constitutional Convention act provided that it is unlawful for the candidates “to
purchase, produce, request or distribute sample ballots, or electoral propaganda gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of
whatever nature), flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, cigarettes, and the
like, whether of domestic or foreign origin.” COMELEC contended that the jingle or the recorded or taped voice of the
singer used by petitioner was a tangible propaganda material and was, under the above statute, subject to confiscation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the usage of the jingle by the petitioner form part of the prohibition invoked by the COMELEC.

HELD:

The Court held that “the general words following any enumeration being applicable only to things of the same kind or
class as those specifically referred to”. The COMELEC’s contention that a candidate’s jingle form part of the prohibition,
categorized under the phrase “and the like”, could not merit the court’s approval by principle of Ejusdem Generis. It is
quite apparent that what was contemplated in the Act was the distribution of gadgets of the kind referred to as a means
of inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the candidate responsible for its distribution.

Furthermore, the COMELEC failed to observe construction of the statute which should be in consonance to the express
terms of the constitution. The intent of the COMELEC for the prohibition may be laudable but it should not be sought at
the cost of the candidate’s constitutional rights.
 ALIH VS. CASTRO
Alih vs. Castro
151 SCRA 279
June 23, 1987

Facts:
Respondents who were members of the Philippine marine and defense forces raided the compound occupied by
petitioner in search of loose firearms, ammunitions and explosives. A shoot-out ensued after petitioners resisted
the intrusion by the respondents, killing a number of men. The following morning, the petitioners were arrested and
subjected to finger –printing, paraffin testing and photographing despite their objection. Several kinds of rifle,
grenades and ammunitions were also confiscated.

The petitioners filed an injunction suit with a prayer to have the items illegally seized returned to them and invoked
the provisions on the Bill of Rights

The respondents admitted that the operation was done without a warrant but reasoned that they were acting under
superior orders and that operation was necessary because of the aggravation of the peace and order problem due
to the assassination of the city mayor.

Issue:
Whether or not the seizing of the items and the taking of the fingerprints and photographs of the petitioners and
subjecting them to paraffin testing are violative of the bill of Rights and are inadmissible as evidence against them.

Held:
The court held that superior orders nor the suspicion that the respondents had against petitioners did not excuse
the former from observing the guaranty provided for by the constitution against unreasonable searches and seizure.
The petitioners were entitled to due process and should be protected from the arbitrary actions of those tasked to
execute the law. Furthermore, there was no showing that the operation was urgent nor was there any showing of
the petitioners as criminals or fugitives of justice to merit approval by virtue of Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of
Court.

The items seized, having been the “fruits of the poisonous tree” were held inadmissible as evidence in any
proceedings against the petitioners. The operation by the respondents was done without a warrant and so the items
seized during said operation should not be acknowledged in court as evidence. But said evidence should remain in
the custody of the law (custodia egis).

However, as to the issue on finger-printing, photographing and paraffin-testing as violative of the provision against
self-incrimination, the court held that the prohibition against self-incrimination applies to testimonial compulsion only.
As Justice Holmes put it in Holt v. United States, 18 “The prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be a
witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from
him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material.”
 RAMON A. GONZALES v. COMELEC, GR No. L-28196 & L-28224, 1967-11-09
Facts:
House of
Representatives from a maximum of 120... two (2) elective delegates from each representative district,...
become delegates to the... aforementioned constitutional convention, without forfeiting their respective seats
in Congress.
Republic Act No. 4913, providing that the amendments to the Constitution proposed in the aforementioned
Resolutions Nos. 1 and 3 be submitted, for approval by the people, at... the general elections which shall be
held on November 14, 1967.
Ramon A. Gonzales, the petitioner in L-28196, is admittedly a Filipino citizen, a taxpayer, and a voter. He
claims to have instituted case L-28196 as a class suit, for and in behalf of all citizens, taxpayers, and voters
similarly... situated. Although respondents and the Solicitor General have filed an answer denying the truth
of this allegation,
Issues:
May Constitutional Amendments
Be Submitted for Ratification... in a General Election?
Would the submission now of the... contested amendments to the... people violate the spirit of... the
Constitution?
Ruling:
Indeed, the power to amend the Constitution or to propose amendments thereto is not included in the
general grant of legislative powers to Congress.[10] It is part of the inherent powers of the people as the
repository of... sovereignty in a republican state, such as ours[11] to make, and, hence, to amend their own
Fundamental Law. Congress may propose amendments to the Constitution merely because the same
explicitly grants such... power.[12] Hence, when exercising the same, it is said that Senators and Members of
the House of Representatives act, not as members of Congress, but as component elements of a
constituent... assembly. When acting as such, the members of Congress derive their authority from the
Constitution, unlike the people, when performing the same function,[13] for their authority does not...
emanate from the Constitution they are the very source of all powers of government, including the
Constitution itself.
Since, when proposing, as a constituent assembly, amendments to the Constitution, the members of
Congress derive their authority from the Fundamental Law, it follows, necessarily, that they do not have the
final say on whether or not their acts are within or beyond... constitutional limits. Otherwise, they could brush
aside and set the same at naught, contrary to the basic tenet that ours is a government of laws, not of men,
and to the rigid nature of our Constitution. Such rigidity is stressed by the... fact that, the Constitution
expressly confers upon the Supreme Court,[14] the power to declare a treaty unconstitutional,[15] despite the
eminently political character of the... treaty-making power.
In short, the issue whether or not a Resolution of Congress acting as a constituent assembly violates the
Constitution, is essentially justiciable, not political, and, hence, subject to judicial review, and, to the extent
that this view may be inconsistent with... the stand taken in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito,[16] the latter should be
deemed modified accordingly. The Members of the Court are unanimous on this point.
Petitioners maintain that the term "election," as used in Section 1 of Art. XV of the Constitution, should be
construed as meaning a special election. Some members of the Court even feel that said term ("election")
refers to a "plebiscite,"... without any "election," general or special, of public officers. They opine that
constitutional amendments are, in general, if not always, of such important, if not transcendental and vital
nature as to demand that the attention of the people be focused... exclusively on the subject-matter thereof,
so that their votes thereon may reflect no more than their intelligent, impartial and considered view on the
merits of the proposed amendments, unimpaired, or, at least, undiluted by extraneous, if not insidious
factors, let alone the... partisan political considerations that are likely to affect the selection of elective
officials.
Inasmuch as there are less than eight (8) votes in favor of declaring Republic Act 4913 and R.B.H. Nos. 1
and 3 unconstitutional and invalid, the petitions in these two (2) cases must be, as they are hereby,
dismissed, and the writs therein prayed for denied, without special... pronouncement as to costs.
 MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO v. COMELEC, GR No. 127325, 1997-03-19
Facts:
Delfin alleged in his petition that... he and the members of the Movement and other... volunteers intend to
exercise the power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution granted under Section 2, Article XVII
of the Constitution
Attached to the... petition is a copy of a "Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution"[10] embodying the
proposed amendments which consist in the deletion from the aforecited sections of the provisions concerning
term limits, and with the following proposition:
DO YOU APPROVE OF LIFTING THE TERM LIMITS OF ALL ELECTIVE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS,
AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTIONS 4 AND 7 OF ARTICLE VI, SECTION 4 OF ARTICLE VII, AND
SECTION 8 OF ARTICLE X OF THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION?
According to Delfin, the said Petition for Initiative will first be submitted to the people, and after it is signed by
at least twelve per cent of the total number of registered voters in the country it will be formally filed with the
COMELEC.
On 18 December 1996, the petitioners herein -- Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and
Maria Isabel Ongpin -- filed this special civil action for prohibition raising the following arguments:
(1) The constitutional provision on people's initiative to amend the Constitution can only be implemented by
law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed;
(2) It is true that R.A. No. 6735 provides for three systems of initiative, namely, initiative on the Constitution,
on statutes, and on local legislation. However, it failed to provide any subtitle on initiative on the Constitution,
unlike in the other modes of initiative, which... are specifically provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This
deliberate omission indicates that the matter of people's initiative to amend the Constitution was left to some
future law.
(5)The people's initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to revision thereof. Extending or
lifting of term limits constitutes a revision and is, therefore, outside the power of the people's initiative.
(6) Finally, Congress has not yet appropriated funds for people's initiative; neither the COMELEC nor any
other government department, agency, or office has realigned funds for the purpose.
Issues:
Issue No. 1

Whether R.A. No. 6735, entitled An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and
Appropriating Funds Therefor, was intended to include or cover initiative on amendments to the Constitution;
and if so, whether the Act, as worded, adequately covers... such initiative
Issue No. 2

Whether that portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 (In re: Rules and Regulations Governing the
Conduct of Initiative on the Constitution, and Initiative and Referendum on National and Local Laws)
regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution is valid,... considering the absence in
the law of specific provisions on the conduct of such initiative
Issue No. 3

Whether the lifting of term limits of elective national and local officials, as proposed in the draft "Petition for
Initiative on the 1987 Constitution," would constitute a revision of, or an amendment to, the Constitution.
Ruling:
Ruling on the first issue:

R.A. NO. 6735 INTENDED TO INCLUDE THE SYSTEM

OF INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION, BUT IS, UNFORTUNATELY,... INADEQUATE TO COVER THAT SYSTEM.
Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution provides:
SEC. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative
upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least... three per centum of the registered voters therein. No
amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this
Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
This provision is not self-executory. In his book,[29] Joaquin Bernas, a member of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, stated:
Without implementing legislation Section 2 cannot operate. Thus, although this mode of amending the
Constitution is a mode of amendment which bypasses congressional action, in the last analysis it still is
dependent on congressional action.
Bluntly stated, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system
of initiative would remain entombed in the cold niche of the Constitution until Congress provides for its
implementation. Stated otherwise, while the Constitution has... recognized or granted that right, the people
cannot exercise it if Congress, for whatever reason, does not provide for its implementation.
Ruling on the second issue

COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300, INSOFAR AS IT PRESCRIBES RULES AND REGULATIONS ON

THE CONDUCT OF INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, IS VOID.
It logically follows that the COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the
exercise of the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of
initiative. It does not have that power under R.A. No. 6735.
Reliance on the COMELEC's power under Section 2(1) of Article IX-C of the Constitution is misplaced, for
the laws and regulations referred to therein are those promulgated by the COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of
Article IX-C of the Constitution, or (b) a law where subordinate... legislation is authorized and which satisfies
the "completeness" and the "sufficient standard" tests.
Ruling on the 3rd issue

The foregoing considered, further discussion on the issue of whether the proposal to lift the term limits of the
elective national and local officials is an amendment to, and not a revision of, the Constitution is rendered
unnecessary, if not academic.
Principles:
Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution... is not self-executory.
Without implementing legislation Section 2 cannot operate. Thus, although this mode of amending the
Constitution is a mode of amendment which bypasses congressional action, in the last analysis it still is
dependent on congressional action.
 Lambino vs COMELEC G.R. No. 174153
G.R. No. 174153 October 25, 2006

FACTS:

On 25 August 2006, Lambino et al filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition
to change the 1987 Constitution under Section 5(b) and (c)2 and Section 73 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and
Referendum Act.
The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at least twelve per centum
(12%) of all registered voters, with each legislative district represented by at least three per centum (3%) of its registered
voters. The Lambino Group also claimed that COMELEC election registrars had verified the signatures of the 6.3 million
individuals.

The Lambino Group’s initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI (Legislative
Department)4 and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive Department) and by adding Article XVIII entitled “Transitory
Provisions.” These proposed changes will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary
form of government.

On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the COMELEC indicating modifications in the
proposed Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their initiative.

The COMELEC denied the petition citing Santiago v. COMELEC declaring RA 6735 inadequate to implement the initiative
clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.
ISSUES:

1. Whether the Lambino Group’s initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on amendments to
the Constitution through a people’s initiative;

2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 “incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential
terms and conditions” to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution; and
HELD:

1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct Proposal by the People
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional provision that allows a people’s initiative to propose
amendments to the Constitution. This section states:

Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of
at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters of which every legislative district must be represented by at
least three per centum of the registered voters therein. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The framers of the Constitution intended that the “draft of the proposed constitutional amendment” should be “ready and
shown” to the people “before” they sign such proposal. The framers plainly stated that “before they sign there is already a
draft shown to them.” The framers also “envisioned” that the people should sign on the proposal itself because the
proponents must “prepare that proposal and pass it around for signature.”

The essence of amendments “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition” is that the entire proposal on
its face is a petition by the people. This means two essential elements must be present. First, the people must author and
thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the
proposal must be embodied in a petition.

These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first shown to the people who
express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment is “directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition” only if the people sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments.

There is no presumption that the proponents observed the constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures. The
proponents bear the burden of proving that they complied with the constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures –
that the petition contained, or incorporated by attachment, the full text of the proposed amendments.

The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition with this Court a copy of the paper that the people signed as their
initiative petition. The Lambino Group submitted to this Court a copy of a signature sheet after the oral arguments of 26
September 2006 when they filed their Memorandum on 11 October 2006.

2. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary

The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to comply with the basic requirements of Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution on the conduct and scope of a people’s initiative to amend the Constitution. There is no need to revisit this
Court’s ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 “incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions” to cover
the system of initiative to amend the Constitution. An affirmation or reversal of Santiago will not change the outcome of the
present petition. Thus, this Court must decline to revisit Santiago which effectively ruled that RA 6735 does not comply with
the requirements of the Constitution to implement the initiative clause on amendments to the Constitution.
SC DENIES WITH FINALITY MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION ON PEOPLE’S
INITIATIVE CASE
21 November 2006

It’s final. The people’s initiative petition of petitioners Raul Lambino, et al. is dead.

Maintaining its 8-7 vote, the Supreme Court today denied with finality the motions for reconsideration of its October 25, 2006 decision
dismissing the said petition to amend the 1987 Constitution through a people’s initiative.

In a four-page resolution, the Court held that the basic issues raised had already been duly passed upon and that no substantial
arguments were presented to warrant the reversal of the October 25, 2006 decision. The assailed decision, penned by Justice Antonio
T. Carpio, upheld the Commission on Elections’ August 31, 2006 resolution denying due course to an initiative petition to amend the
Constitution by petitioners.

Ten justices however reiterated their earlier opinions that RA 6735 is sufficient and adequate as an enabling to amend the Constitution
through a people’s initiative. Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban and Justices Consuelo Ynares-Santiago and Adolfo S. Azcuna
joined their dissenting colleagues — Senior Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno, and Justices Leonardo A. Quisumbing, Renato C.
Corona, Dante O. Tinga, Minita V. Chico-Nazario, Cancio C. Garcia, and Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. — in ruling that RA 6735 suffices
as an enabling law to implement the constitutional provision on people’s initiative.

The Court also resolved by a unanimous vote to deny for utter lack of merit the motion to inhibit filed by the counsel for intervenor
Sulongbayan Movement Foundation, Inc. that sought the inhibition of Chief Justice Panganiban and Justice Carpio.

This Court cannot betray its primordial duty to defend and protect the Constitution. The Constitution, which embodies the people
sovereign will, is the bible of this Court. This Court exists to defend and protect the Constitution. To allow this constitutionally infirm
initiative, propelled by deceptively gathered signatures, to alter basic principles in the Constitution is to allow a desecration of the
Constitution. To allow such alteration and desecration is to lose this Court raison detre,• said the Court in the October 26 decision.

Justice Carpio was joined in the majority vote by Chief Justice Panganiban, Justices Santiago, Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez, Ma.
Alicia Austria-Martinez, Conchita Carpio Morales, Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna. Chief Justice Panganiban, Justices Santiago,
Gutierrez, Callejo, and Azcuna wrote separate concurring opinions.

The dissenters led by Senior Associate Justice Puno argued for a remand of the Lambino Petition to the Comelec for verification of
the over six million signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution. No one voted to grant the Lambino prayer
to reverse the Comelec and immediately submit the proposed constitutional changes to a plebiscite. Joining Puno were Justices
Quisumbing, Corona, Tinga, Nazario, Garcia, and Velasco. Justices Quisumbing, Tinga, Corona, Nazario, and Velasco also wrote
separate dissenting opinions. (Min. Res., GR No. 174153, Lambino and Aumentado v. Comelec; GR No. 174299, Binay, et al. v.
Comelec, et al.; November 21, 2006)
 Tolentino v. COMELEC
G.R. No. L-34150; October 16, 1971
Ponente: Barredo, J.

FACTS:
After the election of delegates to the Constitutional Convention held on November 10, 1970, the convention held its
inaugural session on June 1, 1971. On the early morning of September 28, 1971, the Convention approved Organic
Resolution No. 1 which seeks to amend Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution, lowering the voting age to 18. On
September 30, 1971, COMELEC resolved to inform the Constitutional Convention that it will hold the plebiscite
together with the senatorial elections on November 8, 1971. Arturo Tolentino filed a petition for prohibition against
COMELEC and prayed that Organic Resolution No. 1 and acts in obedience to the resolution be null and void.

ISSUE:
1. Does the court have jurisdiction over the case?
2. Is the Organic Resolution No. 1 constitutional?

HELD:
1. The case at bar is justiciable. As held in Gonzales vs. Comelec, the issue of whether or not a resolution of Congress,
acting as a constituent assembly, violates the constitution is a justiciable one and thus subject to judicial review. The
jurisdiction is not because the Court is superior to the Convention but they are both subject to the Constitution.

2. The act of the Convention calling for a plebiscite on a single amendment in Organic Resolution No. 1 violated Sec.
1 of Article XV of the Constitution which states that all amendments must be submitted to the people in a single
election or plebiscite. Moreover, the voter must be provided sufficient time and ample basis to assess the amendment in
relation to the other parts of the Constitution, not separately but together.