MAGALLONA v. ERMITA, G.R.

187167, August 16, 2011

Facts:
In 1961, Congress passed R.A. 3046 demarcating the maritime baselines of the Philippines as an Archepelagic
State pursuant to UNCLOS I of 9158, codifying the sovereignty of State parties over their territorial sea. Then in
1968, it was amended by R.A. 5446, correcting some errors in R.A. 3046 reserving the drawing of baselines
around Sabah.
In 2009, it was again amended by R.A. 9522, to be compliant with the UNCLOS III of 1984. The requirements
complied with are: to shorten one baseline, to optimize the location of some basepoints and classify KIG and
Scarborough Shoal as ‘regime of islands’.
Petitioner now assails the constitutionality of the law for three main reasons:
1. it reduces the Philippine maritime territory under Article 1;
2. it opens the country’s waters to innocent and sea lanes passages hence undermining our sovereignty and
security; and
3. treating KIG and Scarborough as ‘regime of islands’ would weaken our claim over those territories.
Issue: Whether R.A. 9522 is constitutional?
Ruling:
1. UNCLOS III has nothing to do with acquisition or loss of territory. it is just a codified norm that regulates
conduct of States. On the other hand, RA 9522 is a baseline law to mark out basepoints along coasts, serving as
geographic starting points to measure. it merely notices the international community of the scope of our
maritime space.
2. If passages is the issue, domestically, the legislature can enact legislation designating routes within the
archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes passages. but in the absence of such, international law
norms operate.
the fact that for archipelagic states, their waters are subject to both passages does not place them in lesser
footing vis a vis continental coastal states. Moreover, RIOP is a customary international law, no modern state can
invoke its sovereignty to forbid such passage.
3. On the KIG issue, RA 9522 merely followed the basepoints mapped by RA 3046 and in fact, it increased the
Phils.’ total maritime space. Moreover, the itself commits the Phils.’ continues claim of sovereignty and
jurisdiction over KIG.
If not, it would be a breach to 2 provisions of the UNCLOS III:
Art. 47 (3): ‘drawing of basepoints shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general configuration of
the archipelago’.
Art 47 (2): the length of baselines shall not exceed 100 mm.
KIG and SS are far from our baselines, if we draw to include them, we’ll breach the rules: that it should follow the
natural configuration of the archipelago.
[ GR No. 204105, Oct 14, 2015 ]
GERONIMO S. ROSAS v. DILAUSAN MONTOR +
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari[1] assailing the March 9, 2012 Decision[2] and October 16,
2012 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 05497 which affirmed the Office of the
Ombudsman's (OMB's) March 2, 2007 Decision [4] and July 4, 2008 Order[5] in OMB-V-A-05-0036-A
finding petitioner Geronimo S. Rosas, Regional Director of the Bureau of Immigration Mactan
International Airport Station, guilty of grave misconduct.

The facts follow:

On December 7, 2004, Jafar Saketi Taromsari (Taromsari) and Jalal Shokr Pour Ziveh (Ziveh), both
Iranian nationals, arrived in the Philippines at the Mactan-Cebu International Airport (MCIA). After
staying in a hotel in Cebu City for a few days, they left for Narita, Japan on December 14, 2004.

On December 16, 2004, Japanese immigration authorities discovered that Taromsari and Ziveh had
counterfeit or tampered Mexican and Italian passports and used falsified names: "Jaime Humberto
Nenciares Garcia" for Ziveh and "Marco Rabitti" for Taromsari. For using these fraudulent passports and
lack of entry visa, the Japanese immigration authorities denied entry to Taromsari and Ziveh and sent
them back to the Philippines. Taromsari and Ziveh arrived at MCIA on the same day at 6:45 p.m. and
admitted at the detention cell of the Bureau of Immigration (BI) Cebu Detention Center.[6]

In a Memorandum[7] dated December 15, 2004 addressed to BI Commissioner Alipio F. Fernandez,

petitioner Geronimo S. Rosas, Senior Immigration Officer and Alien Control Officer of Cebu
Immigration District Office, who was then also designated as Regional Director, gave the following
report:

On flight PR 433 from Narita International Airport, Japan on Thursday, 16th of December 2004 at 18:45
Hours, passengers JAFAR SAKETI TAROMSARI @ Marco Rabitti (Italian) and JALAL SHOKR POUR
ZIVEH @ Jaime Humberto Nenciares Garcia (Mexican), both Iranian nationals, were boarded back to
Mactan-Cebu International Airport after caught by the Japanese Immigration authorities thereat for
using fake and fraudulent Italian and Mexican passports, respectively.

During the investigation conducted by Atty. Serafin A. Abellon, Special Prosecutor in the presence of
Regional Director Geronimo S. Rosas, subjects admitted that they bought the Italian and Mexican
passports from a certain "KURAM" in Tehran, Iran, whom they allegedly attached their respective
pictures substituting the pictures of the real owners and paid US$3,000 at US$1,500.00 each, for the
purpose of traveling in comfort without the requirement of entry visa to Japan and finally, to work
thereat, considering that JAFAR SAKETI TAROMSARI had worked there before for three (3) years from
1999 to 2002 and earned a lot of money until he was caught and deported by Japanese Immigration
authorities, that they both arrived in the Philippines for the first time at MCIA on December 07, 2004 on
board MI 566 from Singapore using Italian and Mexican passports under the names of MARCO
RABITTI and JAIME HUMBERTO NECIARES GARCIA, respectively. Subsequently, they left for Narita,
Japan on December 14, 2004 and were sent back to MCAI on December 16, 2004.

That the acts committed by the subjects are plain violations of our PIA of 1940 as amended under
Section 29 (a) (14) and therefore, they are excludable. Recommend inclusion of their names in the
Blacklist.

Thereupon, an Exclusion Order[8] was issued against Taromsari and Ziveh on grounds of "Not Properly
Documented" and "No Entry Visa."

On December 17, 2004, security guards Elmer Napilot (Napilot) and Jose Ramon Ugarte (Ugarte)
received a written order from petitioner directing them to escort Taromsari and Ziveh from Bi Detention,
Mandaue City to MCIA pursuant to the aforementioned exclusion order for violation of Sec. 29 (a) (17) of
Commonwealth No. 613 or the Philippine Immigration Act(PIA)of 1940.[9]

On December 19, 2004, Taromsari and Ziveh were released from detention and brought by Napilot and
Ugarte to the MCIA for deportation.[10] They were allowed to leave for Tehran, Iran via Kuala Lumpur,
Malaysia on board Malaysian Air Lines.[11]

On January 18, 2005, respondents Imra-Ali Sabdullah and Dilausan S. Montor, employees of the Bureau
of Immigration (BI), Cebu, filed a Complaint-Affidavit[12] before the OMB against petitioner, Napilot and
Ugarte for grave misconduct, violation of Section 3(e)[13] of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019 and conduct
prejudicial to the interest of public service. Respondents alleged that petitioner irregularly and
anomalously handled and disposed of the case involving two restricted Iranian nationals by allowing
them to leave the country without initiating any proceeding for violation of immigration laws
considering that said aliens were potential threats to the country's national interest and security. It was
further contended that the Iranian nationals should have been charged for deportation because they
violated Section 37(a)(9), in relation to Sections 45 and 46 of PI A.

In his Counter-Affidavit,[14] petitioner denied the allegations against him and asserted that he should not
be made liable for acts that do not fall within his area of responsibility. He pointed out that it is the
immigration officers who are incharge of primary inspection of incoming and outgoing passengers as
well as the determination of whether a passenger should be excluded, and the management, control and
supervision of such duties pertain to the Head Supervisor, Mr. Casimiro P. Madarang III. He also
averred that he did not have prior knowledge of the two Iranian nationals' previous entry to the country
as he was, in fact, not at the MCIA on that particular date and time of their first arrival in the Philippines.

Petitioner, nonetheless, contended that the two Iranian nationals were proper subjects for exclusion
under Section 29(a)(17)[15] since they used Iranian passports without the requisite Philippine entry visas
when they arrived on December 16, 2004. He explained that the counterfeit Italian and Mexican
passports were confiscated by the Japanese Immigration authorities when Japan excluded the Iranian
nationals. Such use of Iranian passports without entry visas served as the basis for their exclusion from
our country. He likewise denied giving preferential treatment to the detained Iranian nationals, citing his
Memorandum dated December 17, 2004 where he reported to the BI Commissioner that two Iranian
nationals violated Section 29(a)(17) of the PIA of 1940 and recommended placing them both in the
Blacklist.

On March 2, 2007, the OMB rendered its Decision finding substantial evidence of petitioner's grave
misconduct. It held that in unduly releasing the two Iranian nationals, petitioner showed manifest
partiality, evident bad faith and gross inexcusable negligence. It also stated that petitioner's claim that he
had no prior knowledge of the unlawful entry was belied by his December 17, 2004 Memorandum.
Napilot and Ugarte were acquitted from the charges as they merely acted on petitioner's orders and no
evidence was presented to suggest that they were in conspiracy with the petitioner.

The OMB thus ruled:

In view of the foregoing, this Office finds [petitioner] Rosas guilty of Grave Misconduct. Considering the
gravity of the offense and the fact that this is not the first time [petitioner] Rosas is administratively
sanctioned, the penalty of DISMISSAL is hereby imposed pursuant to Rule XIV, Section 23 of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292.

However, finding no conspiracy between [petitioner] Rosas and respondents Elmer Napilot and Ramon
Ugarte, the case against Napilot and Ugarte is hereby dismissed for want of substantial evidence.

SO DECIDED.[16]

On December 27, 2007, the OMB issued an Order[17] for the immediate implementation of the March 2,
2007 Decision. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. [18]

Via a petition for review,[19] petitioner assailed the OMB's ruling in the CA, arguing that he should not be
held administratively liable for the release of the two Iranian nationals pursuant to a validly issued
exclusion order.

In its March 9, 2012 decision, the CA affirmed the OMB's ruling. The CA held that there was sufficient
evidence on record for the OMB's conclusion that the release of the two Iranian nationals was irregular
and not in accord with existing immigration laws. It stressed that the matter was not one that merely
involved the lack of entry visas but that petitioner had knowledge that the two Iranian nationals were
excluded from Japan for using fraudulent passports. Plainly, the results of the investigation provide
sufficient basis for deportation proceedings. The CA concurred with the OMB that petitioner had the
duty to initiate deportation and criminal proceedings against the Iranian nationals for violation of
Section 37(a)(9) of the PIA in relation to Sections 45 and 46. Thus:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the Petition for Review dated November 2, 2010 is
hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.[20]

Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied.[21]

Hence, this petition.

Petitioner reiterates that he cannot be held administratively liable for a validly issued exclusion order
which is an examining immigration officer's function under the PIA of 1940. He asserts that there was
lack of substantial evidence to hold him liable for giving unwarranted benefit to the Iranian nationals.

On his part, the Solicitor General argues that Section 37 of the PIA of 1940 mandates the BI to arrest
aliens who enter the Philippines by false means and misleading statements. He explains that the two
Iranian nationals were held in detention not for the lack of entry visas but for using falsified documents
when they entered the Philippines on December 7, 2004 and when they left for Japan on December 14,
2004. Such was evident from the investigation conducted by the BI on the two Iranian nationals.

Petitioner submits the following assignment of errors:

WHETHER PETITIONER ROSAS CAN BE VALIDLY SANCTIONED WITH THE SEVEREST

ADMINISTRATIVE PENALTY OF DISMISSAL FOR THE PURELY DISCRETIONARY ACTS OF THE
ASSIGNED IMMIGRATION OFFICERS IN ORDERING THE EXCLUSION OF THE IRANIAN
NATIONALS NOTWITHSTANDING THE OVERWHELMING EVIDENCES THAT WOULD SHOW
THAT PETITIONER ROSAS HAS NO INVOLVEMENT AND PARTICIPATION IN RENDERING THE
SAID EXCLUSION ORDER AND NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THE SAID EXCLUSION ORDER WAS
VALIDLY AND PROPERLY ISSUED BY THE IMMIGRATION OFFICERS UNDER THE PREVAILING
CIRCUMSTANCES;
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER ROSAS CAN BE VALIDLY SANCTIONED WITH THE SEVEREST
ADMINISTRATIVE PENALTY OF DISMISSAL SANS ANY SPECK OF EVIDENCE THAT HE GAVE
UNWARRANTED BENEFIT TO THE IRANIAN NATIONALS AND THAT HE WAS MOTIVATED BY
CORRUPT MOTIVES WHEN HE SUBMITTED AN INCIDENT/RECOMMENDATORY REPORT TO
THE COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION AFFIRMING THE EXCLUSION ORDER OF THE
ASSIGNED IMMIGRATION OFFICERS AGAINST THE IRANIAN NATIONALS;
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER ROSAS CAN BE VALIDLY SANCTIONED WITH THE SEVEREST
ADMINISTRATIVE PENALTY OF DISMISSAL FOR NOT INITIATING THE DEPORTATION AND
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE IRANIAN NATIONALS WHICH UNDER THE LAW CAN
ONLY BE EXERCISED BY THE IMMIGRATION COMMISSIONER WHO WAS FULLY INFORMED OF
THE CIRCUMSTANCES PERTAINING TO THE INCIDENT INVOLVING THE IRANIAN NATIONALS;
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS SUBSTANTIAL BASIS TO CONCLUDE THAT THE DELAY
IN THE EXCLUSION OF THE IRANIAN NATIONALS APPEARED TO BE IRREGULAR AND
DEVIATED FROM THE NORM NOTWITHSTANDING THE OVERWHELMING EVIDENCES ON
RECORD THAT WOULD SHOW THAT THE SAME HAS FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS; AND
WHETHER OR NOT THE, COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE
SETTLED FACTS AND EVIDENCES THAT WOULD SHOW THAT PETITIONER ROSAS HAS NOT
DONE ANY MISCONDUCT IN RELATION TO THE INCIDENT INVOLVING THE IRANIAN
NATIONALS.[22]

Essentially, the issue before us is whether there is substantial evidence to sustain the finding of gross
misconduct warranting petitioner's removal from the service. Otherwise stated, does petitioner's act of
releasing the two Iranian nationals without initiating any case for violation of immigration laws despite
the results of the investigation undertaken constitute gross misconduct?

We rule in the affirmative.

It is well-settled that findings of fact and conclusions by the Office of the Ombudsman are conclusive
when supported by substantial evidence.[23] Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla; it means
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if
other minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise.[24] The factual findings of the Office
of the Ombudsman are generally accorded great weight and respect, if not finality by the courts, by
reason of their special knowledge and expertise over matters falling under their jurisdiction. [25]

We agree with the CA that there was sufficient basis to initiate deportation proceedings under Section
37(a)(9) in relation to Section 45 of the PIA of 1940. We find no cogent reason to overturn the CA's
findings the question of whether substantial evidence being a question of fact which is beyond this
Court's power of review for it is not a trier of facts.[26]

PETITIONER HAD TOE DUTY TO

INITIATE CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
AND DEPORTATION PROCEEDINGS
UNDER SECTION 45 OF THE PIA OF
1940

Every sovereign power has the inherent power to exclude aliens from its territory upon such grounds as
it may deem proper for its self-preservation or public interest. In the Philippines, aliens may be expelled
or deported from the Philippines on grounds and in the manner provided for by the Constitution, the
PIA of 1940, as amended, and administrative issuances pursuant thereto.[27]

Section 10[28] of the PIA of 1940 requires non-immigrants to present their unexpired passports and valid
passport visas to immigration officers. Pursuant to their powers as outlined in Section 6[29] of the PIA of
1940, the examining immigration officer determines whether the non-immigrant is qualified to enter the
Philippines based on Section 29(a).[30] If the alien holds none of the disqualifications as stated in Section
29, he may be admitted entry barring other circumstances that might affect his entry. If, however, the
immigration officer determines that an alien possesses any of the disqualifications under Section 29, the
immigration officer is authorized to issue an exclusion order.

Exclusion and deportation are formal removal procedures which ultimately results to an alien's removal
from the territory provided for separately under Section 29 and 37 of the PIA, respectively. The United
States in Ex Parte Domingo Corypus,[31] the Washington District Court in 1925 differentiated exclusion
from deportation in the following manner:

x x x Deporting a person who is already in the country, and therefore enlarged, is depriving him of a
privilege which he, at least at the time, is enjoying in the United States; whereas a person being denied
the privilege to enter is not deprived of any liberties which he had theretofore enjoyed. The gate is simply
closed and he may not enter.

Under Philippine immigration laws, exclusion is the authorized removal of an alien by immigration
officers, performing primary inspection, or by the immigration boards of special inquiry, by secondary
inspection, of any foreigner arriving in the Philippines who, upon inspection and prior to entry or
admission, is barred by immigration laws, rules and regulations from entering or being admitted to the
Philippines.[32] When an alien is excluded he is immediately sent back to the country where he came
from on the same vessel which transported him, unless in the opinion of the Commissioner of
Immigration such immediate return is not practicable or proper. [33] Under certain circumstances, when
an alien is excluded, Section 25[34] of the PIA of 1940 authorizes the alien's detention until such time it is
determined that he is qualified for entry and/or admission.

Deportation proceedings, on the other hand, are governed by Sections 37 [35] to 39 of the PIA. We have
stated that the power to deport aliens is an act of State, an act done by or under the authority of the
sovereign power.[36] It is a police measure against undesirable aliens whose continued presence in the
country is found to be injurious to the public good and the domestic tranquility of the people. [37]

Pertinently, Section 37(a)(9) provides:

Sec. 37. (a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of
Immigration or of any other officer designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the warrant
of the Commissioner of Immigration after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of
the existence of the "round for deportation as charged against the alien:

xxxx

9. Any alien who commits any of the acts described in sections forty-five and forty-six of
this Act, independent of criminal action which may be brought against him: Provided, That in the case of
an alien who, for any reason, is convicted and sentenced to suffer both imprisonment and deportation,
said alien shall first serve the entire period of his imprisonment before he is actually deported: Provided
however, That the imprisonment may be waived by the Commissioner of Immigration with the consent
of the Department Head, and upon payment by the alien concerned of such amount as the Commissioner
may fix and approved by the Department Head;

x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

The relevant provisions of Sections 45 and 46 state:

Sec. 45. Any individual who:

xxxx

(c) Obtains, accepts or uses any immigration document, knowing it to be false; or

xxxx

Sec. 46. Any individual who shall bring into or land in the Philippines or conceal, harbor,
employ, or give comfort to any alien not duly admitted by any immigration officer or not lawfully
entitled to enter or reside within the Philippines under the terms of the immigration laws,
or attempts, conspire with, or aids another to commit any such act, and any alien who enters the
Philippines without inspection and admission by the immigration officials, or obtains entry into the
Philippines by willful, false, or misleading representation or willful concealment of a
material fact, shall be guilty of an offense, and upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not
less than five thousand pesos but not more than ten thousand pesos, imprisoned for not
less than five years but not more than ten years, and deported if he is an alien. Dismissal by
the employer before or after apprehension does not relieve the employer of the offense.

x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

The two Iranian nationals, Taromsari and Ziveh, confessed to have knowingly used falsified passports
and obtained entry into the Philippines by using the said fraudulent immigration documents, both of
which are grounds for deportation proceedings. Upon being questioned why they were sent back from
Japan, they admitted that they entered the Philippines previously using fraudulent passports, to wit:

Q Do you understand why you were sent back to [MCIA] from Narita, Japan?
Yes sir, we were caught using fake Italian and Mexican passports by Japanese Immigration
A.
officers at Narita International Airport, Japan.
Q. What fake passports are you referring to?
A. We were using fake Italian and Mexican passports in entering the Philippines at [MCIA].
xxxx
Q. Where are these Italian and Mexican passports, you mentioned?
A. The Japanese Immigration authorities confiscated them.
Q. What was your purpose in going to Japan with fake passports?
Our only purpose is to find jobs there, so that we can support financially our family in Tehran,
A. Iran but Iranians are required to secure entry visas and it is very difficult to get entry visas
from their embassy. Italians and Mexicans are not required entry visas to Japan.
Q. Can you narrate to us how did you and your friend able to reach our country?
First, we applied entry visas at the Thailand Embassy in Tehran, Iran using our Iranian
passports, which visa application was granted to us on October 26, 2004. W[e] went to
Bangkok, Thailand via Dubai and stayed there for one (1) month and came back to Iran. The
A.
last time we left Tehran, Iran again via Dubai on December 02, 2004 to Bangkok, Thailand.
Our destination this time [was] to reach Japan via Malaysia & Cebu, Philippines. We arrived
Malaysia in December 06, 2004.
Q. What travel documents were you using from Bangkok to Malaysia?
A. We were using our Iranian passports, sir.
Q. From Malaysia to Mactan-Cebu, what travel documents were you using?
From Malaysia, we left on December 06, 2004 and passed by Singapore where we spent about
A. ten (10) hours at the airport, we were using our Iranian passports, we finally boarded Silk Air
to [MCIA] and upon arrival in [MCIA], we were using Italian and Mexican passports.
xxxx
Q. Are you aware that you are violating our Immigration laws in the country?
 Yes, sir, but we have to use fake travel documents because of our desire to work and earn a
A.
living.
xxxx
Q. Have you been to Japan?
Yes, sir. I was there for three (3) years, 1999 to 2002 and I earned a lot of money but I was
A.
caught and departed back to Iran.[38]

Having admitted that they knowingly entered the country with the use of fraudulent passports and false
representations when they arrived on December 7 , 2004, Taromsari and Ziveh should have been
ordered arrested and formally charged with violation of Section 37(a)(9) in relation to Section 45(c) and
(d). Deportation proceedings should have been initiated forthwith against these aliens.

While the two Iranian nationals were initially held due to lack of entry visas, after their admission that
they used fraudulent passports in entering the country, the filing of a criminal action pursuant to Section
45 is proper, together with the initiation of deportation proceedings. While both exclusion and
deportation ultimately removes a person from our territory, Section 45 imposes an additional penalty -
deportation has an additional penalty in that it imposes a fine. Indeed, that these aliens were released
without undergoing deportation proceedings as required by law is highly irregular.

Misconduct is defined as "a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more
particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer." [39] It becomes grave misconduct
when it "involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law or to
disregard established rules, which must be established by substantial evidence." [40] A person charged
with grave misconduct may be held liable for simple misconduct if the misconduct does not involve any
of the additional elements to qualify the misconduct as grave.[41] The charge of gross misconduct is a
serious charge that warrants the removal or dismissal of a public officer or employee from service
together with the accessory penalties, such as cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits,
and perpetual disqualification from reemployment in government service.[42]

In this case, petitioner had the duty under the law to oversee the filing of criminal actions and
deportation proceedings against Taromsari and Ziveh and not merely excluding them. The facts on
record established that at the time petitioner recommended their exclusion on December 17, 2004, he
was already aware that said Iranian nationals used the falsified Mexican and Italian passports in
entering and leaving the Philippines on December 7 and 14, 2004. Such use of counterfeit passports by
aliens entering our country is a criminal offense under Sec. 45 of the PIA, as amended.

Instead of filing the appropriate criminal charge as mandated by law, petitioner allowed Taromsari and
Ziveh to depart and return to Tehran via Malaysia. While claiming that it was only on December 17, 2004
that he came to know of the Iranian nationals' detention for illegal entry into the Philippines, official log
book records[43] show that petitioner, along with security guards Napilot and Ugarte, brought the two
Iranian nationals to their detention cell on the same night of their arrival from Japan on December 16,
2004 and detained them there for three days. Custody over the two Iranian nationals caught violating
our immigration laws was simply handed over by petitioner to the two security guards whom he later
instructed to escort the said offenders to the airport to depart for Malaysia. In failing to initiate the
proper proceedings against the Iranian nationals and allowing them to escape criminal charges and
thorough investigation for possible terrorist activities or human trafficking, petitioner displayed a
blatant disregard of established immigration rules making him liable for grave misconduct that warrants
his removal from the service.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED for lack of merit and AFFIRM the March 9, 2012 Decision and
October 16, 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 05497.

With costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Peralta, (Acting Chairperson), Perez,* Mendoza,** and Leonen,*** JJ., concur.

October 22, 2015

N O T I C E OF J U D G M E N T

Sirs/Mesdames:

Please take notice that on ___October 14, 2015___ a Decision, copy attached herewith, was rendered
by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original of which was received by this Office on
October 22, 2015 at 10:17 a.m.

Very truly yours,

(SGD)
WILFREDO V. LAPITAN
Division Clerk of Court

*Designated additional Member in lieu of Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., per Raffle dated
September 30, 2015.

**Designated Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes, per Special Order No.
2084 dated June 29, 2015.

Designated additional Member in lieu of Associate Justice Francis H. Jardeleza, per Raffle dated
***

October 22, 2014.

[1] Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

[2]Rollo, pp. 36-46. Penned by Associate Justice Eduardo B. Peralta, Jr. with Associate Justices Edgardo
L. Delos Santos and Gabriel T. Ingles concurring.

Id. at 47-48. Penned by Associate Justice Gabriel T. Ingles with Associate Justices Edgardo L. Delos
[3]

Santos and Pamela Ann Abella Maxino concurring.

[4] Id. at 87-100. Penned by Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer Nelia C. Lagura.

[5] Id. at 119-123. Penned by Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer II Nelia C. Lagura.

[6] OMB Records, p. 6.

[7] Rollo, p. 341.

[8] Id. at 203.

[9] OMB Records, p. 26.

[10] Id.at 7.

[11] TSN, April 3, 2008, p. 5 I (OMB Clarificatory Hearing), rollo, p. 319.

[12] Id. at 49-52.

[13] RA No. 3019, Section 3(e) provides:

SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already
penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are
hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxxx

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision
shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of
licenses or permits or other concessions.
[14] Rollo, pp. 53-65.

Petitioner initially stated Section 29(a)(14) as (he basis for exclusion but explained that there had
[15]

been a clerical error and said that it should have read as Section 29(a)(17). Rollo, p. 57.

[16] Rollo, pp. 99-100.

[17] Id. at 101-103.

[18] Supra note 5.

[19] Under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.

[20] Rollo, p. 45.

[21] Supra note 3.

[22] Id. at 14-15.

[23] Office of the Ombudsman v. Amalio A. Mallari, G.R. No. 183 161, December 3, 2014, p. 16.

Gupilan-Aguilar v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 197307, February 26, 2014, 7 17 SCRA 503,
[24]

532.

[25] Office of the Ombudsman v. Amalio A. Mallari, supra note 23.

[26] Secretary of Justice v. Koruga, 604 Phil. 405 (2009).

[27] Id. at 419.

[28] PHILIPPINE IMMIGRATION ACT of 1940, Section 10 provides:

Sec. 10. Presentation of unexpired passport. - Nonimmigrants must present for admission into the
Philippines unexpired passports or official documents in the nature of passports issued by the
governments of the countries to which they owe allegiance or other travel documents showing their
origin and identity as prescribed by regulations, and valid passport visas granted by diplomatic or
consular officers, except that such documents shall not be required of the following aliens:

(a) A child qualifying as a nonimmigrant, born subsequent to the issuance of the passport visa of an
accompanying parent, the visa not having expired; and

(b) A seaman qualifying as such under Section 9 (c) of this Act.

[29] PHILIPPINE IMMIGRATION ACT of 1940, Section 6 provides:

Sec. 6. Powers of Immigration Officer. - The examination of aliens concerning their right to enter or
remain in the Philippines shall be performed by Immigrant Inspectors with the advice of medical
authorities in appropriate cases. Immigrant Inspectors are authorized to exclude any alien not properly
documented as required by this Act, admit any alien complying with the applicable provisions of the
immigration laws and to enforce the immigration laws and regulations prescribed thereunder.
Immigrant Inspectors are also empowered to administer oaths, to take and consider evidence concerning
the right of any alien to enter or reside in the Philippines, and to go aboard and search for aliens on any
vessel or other conveyance in which they believe aliens are being brought into the Philippines.
Immigrant Inspectors shall have the power to arrest, without warrant, any alien who in their presence or
view is entering or is still in the course of entering the Philippines in violation of immigration laws or
regulations prescribed thereunder.

[30] PHILIPPINE IMMIGRATION ACT of 1940, Section 29 provides:

Sec. 29. (a) The following classes of aliens shall be excluded from entry into the Philippines:

Idiots or insane persons and persons who have been insane;

Persons afflicted with a loathsome or dangerous contagious disease, or epilepsy:
Persons who have been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude;
Prostitutes, or procurers, or persons coming for any immoral purposes;
Persons likely to become, public charge;
Paupers, vagrants, and beggars;
Persons who practice polygamy or who believe in or advocate the practice of polygamy;
Persons who believe in or advocate the overthrow by force and violence of the Government of the
Philippines, or of constituted lawful authority, or who disbelieve in or are opposed to organized
government, or who advocate the assault or assassination of public officials because of their office, or
who advocate or leach principles, theories, or ideas contrary to the Constitution of the Philippines or
advocate or teach the unlawful destruction of property, or who are members of or affiliated with any
organization entertaining or teaching such doctrines;
Persons over fifteen years of age, physically capable of reading, who cannot read printed matter in
ordinary use in any language selected by the alien, but this provision shall not apply to the grandfather,
grandmother, father, mother, wife, husband or child of a Philippine citizen or of an alien lawfully
resident in the Philippines;
Persons who are members of a family accompanying an excluded alien, unless in the opinion of the
Commissioner of Immigration no hardship would result from their admission;
Persons accompanying an excluded person who is helpless from mental or physical disability or infancy,
when the protection or guardianship of such accompanying person or persons is required by the
excluded person, as shall be determined by the Commissioner of Immigration;
Children under fifteen years of age, unaccompanied by or not coming to a parent, except that any such
children may be admitted in the discretion of the Commissioner of Immigration, if otherwise admissible;
Stowaways, except that any stowaway may lie admitted in the discretion of the Commissioner of
Immigration, if otherwise admissible;
Persons coming to perform unskilled manual labor in pursuance of a promise or offer of employment,
express or implied, but this provision shall not apply to persons bearing passport visas authorized by
Section Twenty of this Act;
Persons who have been excluded or deported from the Philippines, but this provision may be waived in
the discretion of the Commissioner of Immigration: Provided, however, That the Commissioner of
Immigration shall not exercise his discretion in favor of aliens excluded or deported on the ground of
conviction for any crime involving moral turpitude or for any crime penalized under Sections Forty-Five
and forty-Six of this Act or on the ground of having engaged in hoarding, black-marketing or profiteering
unless such aliens have previously resided in the Philippines immediately before his exclusion or
deportation for a period often years or more or are married to native Filipino women;
Persons who have been removed from the Philippines at the expense of the Government of the
Philippines, as indigent aliens, under the provisions of section forty-three of this Act, and who have not
obtained the consent of the Board of Commissioners to apply for readmission; and
Persons not properly documented for admission as may be required under the provisions of this Act.
xxxx

6 F.2d 336 (W.D. Wash. 1925). Based on the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, the United
[31]

States, in April 1997 eliminated the distinction between exclusion and deportation and consolidated both
under a process called Removal, (last accessed August 20, 2015).

Ledesma, Ronaldo. AN OUTLINE OF PHILIPPINE IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP LAWS, Rex

[32]

Printing Company; Quezon City, Manila, 1999. p. 169.

Ledesma, Ronaldo. AN OUTLINE OF PHILIPPINE IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP LAWS, Rex

[33]

Printing Company; Quezon City, Manila, 1999. p. 171.

[34] PHILIPPINE IMMIGRATION ACT of 1940, Section 25 provides:

Sec. 25. Period of detention of aliens. - For the purpose of determining whether aliens arriving in the
Philippines belong to any of the classes excluded by the immigration laws, the Period examining
immigration officers may order such aliens detained on board the vessel bringing them or in such other
place as the officers may designate, such detention to be for a sufficient length of time to enable the
officers to determine whether they belong to an excluded class and their removal to such other place to
be at the expense of the vessel bringing them.

[35] PHILIPPINE IMMIGRATION ACT of 1940, Sections 37 provides:

Sec. 37. (a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration
or of any other officer designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the warrant of the
Commissioner of Immigration after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of
the ground for deportation as charged against the alien:

Any alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date of this Act by means of false and misleading
statements or without inspection and admission by the immigration authorities at a designated port of
entry or at any place other than at a designated port of entry;

Any alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date of this Act, who was not lawfully admissible
at the time of entry;

Any alien who, alter the effective date ol this Act, is convicted in the Philippines and sentenced for a term
of one year or more for a crime involving moral turpitude committed within five years after his entry to
the Philippines, or who, at any time after such entry, is so convicted and sentenced more than once;

Any alien who is convicted and sentenced for a violation of the law governing prohibited drugs;

Any alien who practices prostitution or is an inmate of a house of prostitution or is connected with the
management of a house of prostitution, or is a procurer;

Any alien who becomes a public charge within five years after entry from causes not affirmatively shown
to have arisen subsequent to entry;

Any alien who remains in the Philippines in violation of any limitation or condition under which he was
admitted as a nonimmigrant;

Any alien who believes in, advises, advocates or teaches the overthrow by force and violence of the
Government of the Philippines, or of constituted law and authority, or who disbelieves in or is opposed
to organized government or who advises, advocates, or teaches the assault or assassination of public
officials because of their office, or who advises, advocates, or teaches the unlawful destruction of
property, or who is a member of or affiliated with any organization entertaining, advocating or leaching
such doctrines, or who in any manner whatsoever lends assistance, financial or otherwise, lo the
dissemination of such doctrines;

Any alien who commits any of the acts described in sections forty-five and forty-six of this Act,
independent of criminal action which may be brought against him: Provided, That in the case of an alien
who, for any reason, is convicted and sentenced to suffer both imprisonment and deportation, said alien
shall first serve the entire period of his imprisonment before he is actually deported: Provided however,
That the imprisonment may be waived by the Commissioner of Immigration with the consent of the
Department Head, and upon payment by the alien concerned of such amount as (he Commissioner may
fix and approved by the Department Head;

Any alien who, at any time within five years alter entry, shall have been convicted of violating the
provisions of the Philippine Commonwealth Act Numbered Six Hundred and Fifty-Three, otherwise
known as the Philippine Alien Registration Act of 1941, or who, at any time after entry, shall have been
convicted more than once of violating the provisions of the same Act;

Any alien who engages in profiteering, hoarding, or black-marketing, independent of any criminal action
which may be brought against him;

Any alien who is convicted of any offense penalized under Commonwealth Act Numbered Four hundred
and seventy-three, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Laws of the Philippines, or any law
relating to acquisition of Philippine citizenship;

Any alien who defrauds his creditor by absconding or alienating properties to prevent them from being
attached or executed;
(b) Deportation may be effected under clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 of paragraph (a) of this Section at any
time after entry, but shall not be effected under any other clause unless the arrest in the deportation
proceedings is made within five years after the cause for deportation arises. Deportation under clauses 3
and 4 shall not be effected if the court, or judge thereof, when sentencing the alien, shall recommend to
the Commissioner of Immigration that the alien be not deported.

(c) No alien shall be deported without being informed of the specific grounds for deportation nor without
being given a hearing under rules of procedure to be prescribed by the Commissioner of Immigration.

(d) In any deportation proceeding involving the entry of an alien the burden of proof shall be upon the
alien to show that he entered the Philippines lawfully, and the time, place, and manner of such entry,
and for this purpose he shall be entitled lo a statement of the facts in connection with his arrival as
shown by any record in the custody of the Bureau of Immigration.

(e) Any alien under arrest in a deportation proceeding may lie released under bond or under such other
conditions as may be imposed by the Commissioner of Immigration.
[ GR No. 202651, Aug 28, 2013 ]
LUCENA B. RALLOS v. CITY OF CEBU +
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
One of the Heirs of Reverend Father Vicente Rallos (Heirs of Fr. Rallos), Lucena B. Rallos [1] (Lucena), is
now before this Court with a petition[2] praying for the citation for indirect contempt of the City of Cebu,
Mayor Michael Rama (Mayor Rama), the presiding officer and members of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod, and lawyers from the Office of the City Attorney (respondents). The instant petition is
anchored on Lucena's allegation that the respondents impede the execution of final and executory
judgments rendered by this Court in G.R. Nos. 179662[3] and 194111[4]. G.R. Nos. 179662 and 194111 were
among a string of suits which originated from a Complaint for Forfeiture of Improvements or Payment of
Fair Market Value with Moral and Exemplary Damages [5] filed in 1997 by the Heirs of Fr. Rallos before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 9, against the City of Cebu relative to two parcels of
land[6] with a total area of 4,654 square meters located in Barangay Sambag I which were expropriated
in 1963 for road construction purposes.

Antecedent Facts

At the root of the controversy are Lots 485-D and 485-E of the Banilad Estate, Sambag I, Cebu City,
which were expropriated to be used as a public road in 1963. The Heirs of Fr. Rallos alleged that the City
of Cebu occupied the lots in bad faith sans the authority of the former's predecessors-in-interest, who
were the registered owners of the subject parcels of land.

On June 11, 1997, the Heirs of Fr. Rallos filed before the RTC a Complaint for Forfeiture of
Improvements or Payment of Fair Market Value with Moral and Exemplary Damages against the City of
Cebu.

In its Answer filed on October 6, 1997, the City of Cebu contended that the subject parcels of land are
road lots and are not residential in character. They have been withdrawn from the commerce of men and
were occupied by the City of Cebu without expropriation proceedings pursuant to Ordinance No. 416
which was enacted in 1963 or more than 35 years before the Heirs of Fr. Rallos instituted their
complaint.

On January 14, 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision,[7] which found the City of Cebu liable to pay the
Heirs of Fr. Rallos just compensation in the amount still to be determined by a board of three
commissioners, one each to be designated by the contending parties and the court.

To assail the Decision rendered on January 14, 2000, the City of Cebu filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, which was however denied by the RTC on February 5, 2001.[8]

The members of the Board of Commissioners thereafter submitted their respective appraisal reports. On
July 24, 2001, the RTC rendered a Decision,[9] the dispositive portion of which, in part, reads:

WHEREFORE, the [RTC] hereby renders judgment, ordering [the City of Cebu] to pay [the Heirs of Fr.
Rallos] as just compensation for Lots 485-D and 485-E the amount of Php34,905,000.00 plus interest at
12% per annum to start 40 days from [the] date of this decision and to continue until the whole amount
shall have been fully paid. [The City of Cebu] is further ordered to pay [the Heirs of Fr. Rallos] the
following amounts:

1. Php50,000.00 as reimbursement for attorney's fees;

2. Php50,000.00 as reimbursement for litigation expenses.[10]

The contending parties both moved for the reconsideration of the Decision rendered on July 24,
2001. The City of Cebu argued that the reckoning period for the computation of just compensation
should be at least not later than 1963 when the said lots were initially occupied. On the other hand, the
Heirs of Fr. Rallos insisted that the amount of just compensation payable by the City of Cebu should be
increased from Php 7,500.00 to Php 12,500.00 per sq m, the latter being the fair market value of the
subject lots. They also prayed for the award of damages in the amount of Php 16,186,520.00, which was
allegedly the value of the loss of usage of the properties involved from 1963 to 1997 as computed by Atty.
Fidel Kwan, the commissioner appointed by the RTC.

On March 21, 2002, the RTC issued a Consolidated Order [11] denying the Motion for Reconsideration
filed by the City of Cebu, but modifying the Decision rendered on July 24, 2001. Through the said order,
the RTC increased the amount of just compensation payable to the Heirs of Fr. Rallos from Php 7,500.00
to Php 9,500.00 per sq m.

The City of Cebu filed with the RTC a Notice of Appeal, which was opposed by the Heirs of Fr. Rallos.

In the Decision[12] rendered on May 29, 2007, which resolved the appeal[13] filed by the City of Cebu, the
CA opined that the RTC erred in holding that the reckoning point for the determination of the amount of
just compensation should be from 1997, the time the complaint for just compensation was filed by the
Heirs of Fr. Rallos. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the CA still dismissed on procedural grounds the
appeal filed by the City of Cebu. The CA pointed out that pursuant to Sections 2 [14] and 9,[15] Rule 41 and
Section 1,[16] Rule 50 of the Rules of Court, a record on appeal and not a notice of appeal should have
been filed before it by the City of Cebu to assail the RTC's Decisions rendered on January 14, 2000 and
July 24, 2001 and the Orders issued on February 5, 2001 and March 21, 2002.

The City of Cebu filed before this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari[17] to assail the Decision
rendered by the CA on May 29, 2007. This Court denied the same through a Minute Resolution [18] issued
on December 5, 2007. The said Minute Resolution was recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgments on
April 21, 2008.[19]

The Heirs of Fr. Rallos thereafter filed before the RTC a Motion for Execution relative to the Decision
rendered on July 24, 2001. They claimed that in 2001, the City of Cebu paid them Php 34,905,000.00,
but there remained a balance of Php 46,546,920.00 left to be paid, computed as of September 2, 2008.
On its part, the City of Cebu admitted still owing the Heirs of Fr. Rallos but only in the amount of Php
16,893,162.08.[20]

On December 4, 2008, the RTC issued a writ of execution in favor of the Heirs of Fr. Rallos, which in
part, reads:

NOW, THEREFORE, you are hereby commanded to serve a copy hereof to judgment obligor City of Cebu
and demand for the immediate payment of Php 44,213,000.00, less the partial payment of Php
34,905,000.00 plus interest at 12% per annum to start 40 days from date of the July 24, 2001 Decision
and to continue until the whole amount has been fully paid; Php 50,000.00 as attorney's fees; and Php
50,000.00 as litigation expenses. x x x. [21]
Sheriff Antonio Bellones (Sheriff Bellones) then served upon the City of Cebu a demand letter, dated
December 4, 2008, and which was amended on January 26, 2009, indicating that:

DEMAND is hereby made for the judgment obligor City of Cebu x x x to facilitate the prompt payment of
the following: (a) just compensation of Lots 485-D and 485-E in the amount of Php 44,213,000.00 plus
interest of 12% per annum starting 40 days from the July 24, 2001 Decision and to continue until the
whole amount has been duly paid less partial payment of Php 34,905,000.00 x x x. [22]
The City of Cebu sought the reiteration of the directives stated in the Writ of Execution issued on
December 4, 2008 and the setting aside of the amended demand letter served upon it by Sheriff
Bellones.

On March 16, 2009, the RTC issued an Order[23] denying the City of Cebu's motion for the reiteration of
the writ of execution. The RTC, however, set aside the demand letter served upon the City of Cebu by
Sheriff Bellones and interpreted the directives of the writ of execution issued on December 4, 2008 as:

[T]he entire amount of Php 44,213,000.00 shall be subjected to a 12% interest per annum to start 40
days from the date the decision on July 24, 2001 [was rendered] until the amount of Php 34,905,000.00
was partially paid by the City of Cebu. After the payment by the City of Cebu of a partial amount, the
balance shall again be subjected to 12% interest until the same shall have been fully paid.[24]
The Heirs of Fr. Rallos assailed the abovementioned order on the ground that it effectively modified the
final and executory Decision rendered on July 24, 2001. They likewise sought the application of Article
2212[25] of the New Civil Code and jurisprudence so as to entitle them to legal interest on the interest due
to them pursuant to the Decision rendered on July 24, 2001. In the Order issued on May 20, 2009, the
RTC did not favorably consider the preceding claims.

A Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus[26] was then filed by the Heirs of Fr. Rallos before the CA to
challenge the Orders issued by the RTC on March 16, 2009 and May 20, 2009. The CA granted the
petition after finding that the two assailed orders effectively modified the final and executory disposition
made by the RTC on March 21, 2002. The CA likewise ruled that the case calls for the application of
Article 2212 of the New Civil Code, hence, it directed the City of Cebu to pay interest at the rate of
12% per annum upon the interest due, to be computed from the date of the filing of the complaint until
full satisfaction of the obligation. The CA stated:
Note that the final and executory consolidated decision of July 24, 2001 as modified by the final and
executory order of March 21, 2002, clearly directed herein respondent Cebu City to pay interest at the
rate of 12% per annum based on the amount of [Php]9,500.00 per square meter starting 40 days from
the date of the decision and to continue until the entire amount shall have been fully paid. Yet, the
assailed orders x x x, now directed that the 12% interest per annum be paid on the declining balance
contrary to the directive in the final and executory judgment x x x.

xxxx

x x x [The Heirs of Fr. Rallos] are without a doubt entitled to 12% interest per annum on the interest due
from finality until its satisfaction x x x. The same is proper even if not expressly stated in the final and
executory judgment x x x.[27]
The City of Cebu assailed the Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 04418 by way of a Petition for Review
on Certiorari[28] filed before this Court. The same was denied through a Minute Resolution [29] issued on
December 6, 2010. The said resolution was recorded in this Court's Book of Entries of Judgments on
June 16, 2011.[30]

The Heirs of Fr. Rallos then moved for execution relative to Civil Case No. CEB-20388. The RTC granted
the motion through the Order[31] issued on September 23, 2011.

The City of Cebu thereafter filed the following: (1) Urgent Omnibus Motions to Quash the Writ of
Execution, and to Set Aside the Notice of Garnishment; (2) Supplemental Urgent Omnibus Motions to
Quash the Writ of Execution, and to Set Aside the Notice of Garnishment; (3) Motion for Issuance
of Status Quo Order Pending Resolution of [the City of Cebu's] Urgent Omnibus Motions to Quash the
Writ of Execution and to Set Aside the Notice of Garnishment;[32] and (4) Motion to Strike out or
Expunge Urgent Omnibus Motion and Supplemental Urgent Omnibus Motion with Manifestation and
Reservation. The RTC denied the four motions in the Order[33] issued on October 26, 2011. The RTC's
Order[34] issued on January 26, 2012 likewise did not favorably consider the motion for reconsideration
filed by the City of Cebu. The RTC emphasized that the Convenio[35] already existed way back in 1940,
hence, it cannot be considered as a supervening event which transpired after the judgment in Civil Case
No. CEB-20388 had become final and executory. The City of Cebu no longer filed any motion or action to
assail the RTC Orders issued on October 26, 2011 and January 26, 2012.

Meanwhile, in response to Mayor Rama's query, the Commission on Audit's (COA) Regional Director
Delfin P. Aguilar wrote the former a letter[36] dated October 27, 2011 opining that:

Under Administrative Circular No. 10-2000[37] issued by the Supreme Court, it was clearly stated that
the prosecution, enforcement or satisfaction of state liability must be pursued in accordance with the
rules and procedures laid down in Presidential Decree No. 1445, otherwise known as the Government
Auditing Code of the Philippines, wherein it is provided that all money claims against the government
must first be filed with the [COA]. x x x.

Clearly, based on the aforementioned Supreme Court issuance and in the line with the rulings of the
Supreme Court in various cases against garnishment of public funds or property to satisfy money
judgment against the government, we are of the view that the issuance of the writ of execution for the
satisfaction of the money judgment against the City of Cebu may be considered beyond the powers of the
court.

On the other hand, Section 1, Rule VIII of the 2009 Revised Rules of Procedure of the COA provides that
a money judgment is considered as a money claim which is within the original jurisdiction of the
Commission Proper (CP) of the COA and which shall be filed directly with the Commission Secretary x x
x.[38]
On February 27, 2012, the RTC issued another Order [39] directing under pain of contempt the Cebu
branches of Philippine Veterans Bank and Postal Savings Bank to release to the concerned RTC sheriff
certifications indicating the correct account names and numbers maintained by the City of Cebu in the
said banks. The Order also directed the Sangguniang Panlungsod to enact an appropriation ordinance
relative to the money judgment. Upon presentment of the ordinance, the above-mentioned banks were
expected to release the amounts stated therein to satisfy the judgment rendered in favor of the Heirs of
Fr. Rallos. The City of Cebu filed a Motion for Reconsideration [40] against the Order dated February 27,
2012.

Even before the Motion for Reconsideration to the Order dated February 27, 2012 can be resolved by the
RTC, the City of Cebu filed before the CA a Petition for Annulment of Final Decision/s and Order/s with
prayer for the issuance of injunctive reliefs.[41] The City of Cebu claimed that the act of the Heirs of Fr.
Rallos of suppressing the existence of the Convenio amounted to extrinsic fraud which would justify the
annulment of the RTC's decisions and orders relative to Civil Case No. CEB-20388. In praying for the
issuance of injunctive reliefs, the City of Cebu stressed that it had already paid the Heirs of Fr. Rallos
Php 56,196,369.42 for a 4,654 sq m property or at a price of Php 12,074.85 per sq m. Further, the
procedures prescribed in Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1445, this Court's Administrative Circular
(Admin. Circular) No. 10-2000 and Rule VIII of the COA's Revised Rules of Procedure were not yet
complied with, hence, public funds cannot be released notwithstanding the rendition of the decisions
and issuance of the orders by the RTC relative to Civil Case No. CEB-20388.

On April 13, 2012, the CA, through a Resolution,[42] granted the City of Cebu's application for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) relative to CA-G.R. SP No. 06676. Subsequently, a writ
of preliminary injunction was likewise issued through the Resolution [43] dated June 26, 2012.

Lucena then filed the following petitions for indirect contempt, all of which in relation with Civil Case
No. CEB-20388:

Docket
Title Date Filed Forum
Number

Lucina B. Rallos v.
Mayor Michael Rama, SCA No. CEB- RTC of Cebu City,
October 3, 2011
Eileen Mangubat and 38121 Branch 10
Doris Bongcac[44]

Lucina B. Rallos v.
Nicanor Valles, Ricardo SCA No. CEB- October 25, RTC of Cebu City,
Balbido, Jr., and Mayor 38196 2011 Branch 14
Michael Rama[45]

Lucina B. Rallos v.
SCA No. CEB- November 4, RTC of Cebu City,
Philippine Veterans
38212 2011 Branch 7
Bank, et al.

Lucina B. Rallos v. City of

SCA No. CEB- December 6, RTC of Cebu City,
Cebu, Michael Rama, et
38292 2011 Branch 14
al.[46]

Lucena B. Rallos v.
Honorable Justices
Gabriel T. Ingles, Pamela G.R. No.
July 19, 2012 This Court
Ann Abella Maxino and 202515
Carmelita Salandanan
Manahan[47]

G.R. No.
The instant petition August 1, 2012 This Court
202651
Issue and the Contending Parties' Claims

Lucena anchors the instant petition on the sole issue of whether or not the City of Cebu, Mayor Rama,
the presiding officer and members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod and the lawyers from the Office of
the City Attorney committed several acts of indirect contempt all geared towards preventing the
execution of final and executory judgments rendered by this Court in G.R. Nos. 179662 and 194111.

Lucena enumerates the allegedly contumacious acts of the respondents as the filing: (a) with the CA of a
Petition for Annulment of Final Decision/s and Order/s[48] again on the basis of the Convenio, which was
already presented and considered in the proceedings before the RTC, and despite the finality of the
decisions and orders rendered or issued relative to Civil Case No. CEB-20388; and (b) of several
motions[49] before the RTC in Civil Case No. CEB-20388 for the purpose of preventing or delaying the
execution of decisions and orders which had already attained finality.

The respondents, on the other hand, seek the dismissal of the instant action contending that: (a) the
rules on litis pendentia and forum shopping bar this Court from giving due course to Lucena's petition
since there are five other contempt proceedings filed involving the same issues and parties; (b) the
injunctive writs granted to the City of Cebu by the CA in CA-G-R. SP No. 06676 relative to the execution
of the decisions and orders in Civil Case No. CEB-20388 rendered the instant action as moot and
academic; (c) the legal remedies they availed of were all pursued to protect public funds; (d) the RTC
sheriff, in attempting to execute the decisions and orders in Civil Case No. CEB-20388, miserably failed
to comply with the requirements provided for by law, to wit, Section 305(a) [50] of the Local Government
Code, this Court's Admin. Circular No. 10-2000,[51] P.D. No. 1445 and Rule VIII of COA's Revised Rules
of Procedure; (e) in Parel v. Heirs of Simeon Prudencio,[52] this Court declared that a writ of execution
may be assailed when it varies the judgment, where there has been a change in the situation of parties
making execution unjust or inequitable, or when the judgment debt has been paid or satisfied; (f) it
would unduly overburden the City of Cebu to pay Php 133,469,962.55 for the subject lots the huge
portions of which are now occupied by settlers and establishments claiming to be owners, practically
leaving a very small and insignificant area for use; (g) in the case of City of Caloocan v. Hon.
Allarde,[53] this Court ruled that government funds maintained in any official depository may not be
garnished in the absence of a corresponding appropriation as required by law; and (h) the Sangguniang
Panlungsod cannot be compelled to pass an appropriations ordinance to satisfy the claims of the Heirs
of Fr. Rallos for to do otherwise would be to intrude into the exercise of a discretionary authority to
decide a political question.

This Court's Disquisition

The instant petition lacks merit.

Lucena engaged in forum shopping.

"Forum shopping is the act of litigants who repetitively avail themselves of multiple judicial remedies in
different fora, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the
same essential facts and circumstances; and raising substantially similar issues either pending in or
already resolved adversely by some other court; or for the purpose of increasing their chances of
obtaining a favorable decision, if not in one court, then in another."[54]

"Forum shopping exists when the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in
one case will amount to res judicata in another. Litis pendentia requires the concurrence of the
following requisites: (1) identity of parties, or at least such parties as those representing the same
interests in both actions; (2) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded
on the same facts; and (3) identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases, such
that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful,
would amount to res judicata in the other case."[55]

In the Verification and Non-Forum Shopping Certification[56] attached to the instant petition and
executed by Lucena, she admitted that there are five other pending actions for indirect contempt which
she filed relative to Civil Case No. CEB-20388. She, however, claims that the issues in the other five
petitions are different from that raised before this Court now.

Lucena's claim cannot be sustained.

A comparison of the instant petition with SCA No. CEB-38292[57] filed before the RTC of Cebu City,
Branch 14 follows:

In Arevalo,[60] this Court enumerated the three requisites of litis pendentia. There is a confluence of
these requisites relative to the instant petition and SCA No. CEB-38292.

Litis pendentia does not require the exact identity of parties involved in the actions. Although the
lawyers from the Office of the City Attorney are parties herein but are not made respondents in SCA No.
CEB-38292, they do not in any way represent any interest distinct or separate from that of the City of
Cebu and the public officers involved. Further, the instant petition superficially makes reference to the
Minute Resolutions rendered by this Court in G.R. Nos. 179662 and 194111 which Lucena claims had
lapsed into finality and should thus be executed. However, stripped of the unnecessary details, the reliefs
saliently sought in both the instant petition and SCA No. CEB-38292 are founded on the same set of
facts, to wit, the alleged non compliance by the respondents with the directives contained in the
dispositive portion of the Consolidated Order issued by the RTC on March 21, 2002 relative to Civil Case
No. CEB-20388. Finally, citation for indirect contempt in either the instant petition or SCA No. CEB-
38292 would amount to res judicata in the other considering the identities of the parties and issues
involved.

Since the elements of litis pendentia concur in the instant petition and SCA No. CEB-38292, this Court
so holds Lucena guilty of forum shopping.

"[T]he grave evil sought to be avoided by the rule against forum shopping is the rendition by two
competent tribunals of two separate and contradictory decisions. To avoid any confusion, this Court
adheres strictly to the rules against forum shopping, and any violation of these rules results in the
dismissal of a case."[61]

Further, "once there is a finding of forum shopping, the penalty is summary dismissal not only of the
petition pending before this Court, but also of the other case that is pending in a lower court. This is so
because twin dismissal is a punitive measure to those who trifle with the orderly administration of
justice."[62]

Even if in the higher interest of justice, this Court were to be exceptionally liberal and
gloss over Lucena's act of forum shopping, the instant petition would still be susceptible
to dismissal.

While this Court does not intend to downplay the rights accruing to the owners of properties
expropriated by the government, it bears stressing that the exercise and enforcement of those rights are
subject to compliance with the requirements provided for by law to protect public funds.

Lucena avers that the respondents willfully and maliciously defy the execution of final and executory
decisions and orders rendered or issued relative to Civil Case No. CEB-20388.

Such averment is untenable.

The respondents allege and Lucena does not refute, that the City of Cebu had already paid the Heirs of
Fr. Rallos Php 56,196,369.42 for a 4,654 sq m property or at a price of Php 12,074.85 per sq m. The
controversy remains and the parties resort to all legal maneuverings because the Heirs of Fr. Rallos
obdurately insist that they are still entitled to collect from the City of Cebu a balance of Php
133,469,962.55.

The Heirs of Fr. Rallos are bent on collecting the amount allegedly still unpaid by the City of Cebu in
accordance with the computations stated in the decisions and orders in Civil Case No. CEB-
20388. However, the Heirs of Fr. Rallos are impervious to the requisites laid down by law in enforcing
their claims. The requisites are two-fold as discussed below.

An appropriation ordinance should be passed prior to the disbursement of public funds.

"Even though the rule as to immunity of a state from suit is relaxed, the power of the courts ends when
the judgment is rendered. Although the liability of the state has been judicially ascertained, the state is at
liberty to determine for itself whether to pay the judgment or not, and execution cannot issue on a
judgment against the state. Such statutes do not authorize a seizure of state property to satisfy
judgments recovered, and only convey an implication that the legislature will recognize such judgment
as final and make provision for the satisfaction thereof." [63]

Section 4(1) of P.D. No. 1445 and Section 305(a) of the Local Government Code both categorically state
that no money shall be paid out of any public treasury or depository except in pursuance of an
appropriation law or other specific statutory authority. Based on considerations of public policy,
government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy
judgments rendered by the courts and disbursements of public funds must be covered by the
corresponding appropriation as required by law.[64]

In the case at bar, no appropriation ordinance had yet been passed relative to the claims of the Heirs of
Fr. Rallos. Such being the case, the respondents, as public officers, are acting within lawful bounds in
refusing the execution of the decisions and orders in Civil Case No. CEB-20388.

Despite the rendition of a final and executory judgment validating a money claim against
an agency or instrumentality of the Government, its filing with the COA is a sine qua
non condition before payment can be effected.

Section 26 of P.D. No. 1445 states that the COA has jurisdiction to examine, audit and settle all debts and
claims of any sort due from or owing to the Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies and
instrumentalities. Under Section 5(b), Rule II of COA's Revised Rules of Procedure, local government
units are expressly included as among the entities within the COA's jurisdiction. Section 2, [65] Rule VIII
lays down the procedure in filing money claims against the Government. Section 4, Rule X provides that
any case brought to the COA shall be decided within 60 days from the date it is submitted for decision or
resolution. Section 1, Rule XII allows the aggrieved party to file a petition for certiorari before this Court
to assail any decision, order or resolution of the COA within 30 days from receipt of a copy thereof.

This Court, in the case of University of the Philippines v. Dizon,[66] thus held that despite the existence of
a final and executory judgment validating the claim against an agency or instrumentality of the
Government, the settlement of the said claim is still subject to the primary jurisdiction of the COA.
Ineluctably, the claimant has to first seek the COA's approval of the monetary claim.[67]

Without compliance by Lucena and the Heirs of Fr. Rallos with the provisions of P.D. No. 1445 and the
COA's Revised Rules of Procedure, their lamentations that the respondents are unjustly refusing the
execution of the decisions and orders in Civil Case No. CEB-20388 do not hold any water.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is DISMISSED. Further, on account of Lucena
Rallos' act of forum shopping, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 14, is likewise directed to
dismiss her petition for contempt, docketed as SCA No. CEB-38292, which she filed against the
respondents.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C.J., (Chairperson), Castro, Bersamin, and Mendoza,* JJ., concur.

* Acting Member per Special Order No. 1502 dated August 8, 2013.

[1] Sometimes appears in the records as "Lucina B. Rallos".

[2] Rollo, pp. 3-56.

On December 5, 2007, this Court issued a Minute Resolution (id. at 111-112) denying due to (a) lack of
[3]

properly executed verification and certification of non-forum shopping, and (b) failure to show any
reversible error the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by the City of Cebu against the Heirs of Fr.
Rallos to assail the decision rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76656.

[4]On December 6, 2010, this Court issued a Minute Resolution (id. at 129) denying due to failure to
show any reversible error the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by the City of Cebu against Lucina
B. Rallos, et al. to assail the decision rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 04418.

[5] Docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-20388.

[6] Now parts of M.H. Aznar Street, Cebu City.

[7] With then Presiding Judge Benigno G. Gaviola; rollo, pp. 57-73.

[8] Id. at 74-76.

[9] Id. at 77-81.

[10] Id. at 81.

[11] Id. at 82-87.

Penned by Associate Justice Antonio L. Villamor, with Associate Justices Isaias P. Dicdican and
[12]

Stephen C. Cruz, concurring; id. at 88-106.

[13] Docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 76656

[14] Sec. 2. Modes of appeal.

(a) Ordinary appeal. The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in
the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which
rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party.
No record on appeal shall be required except in special proceedings and other cases of multiple or
separate appeals where the law or these Rules so require. In such cases, the record on appeal shall be
filed and served in like manner.

xxxx

[15] Sec. 9. Perfection of appeal; effect thereof. x x x

A party's appeal by record on appeal is deemed perfected as to him with respect to the subject matter
thereof upon the approval of the record on appeal filed in due time.

xxxx

Sec. 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal. An appeal may be dismissed by the Court of Appeals, on its
[16]

own motion or on that of the appellee, on the following grounds:

xxxx

(b) Failure to file the notice of appeal or the record on the appeal within the period prescribed by these
Rules;

xxxx
[17] Docketed as G.R. No. 179662.

[18] Rollo, pp. 111-112.

[19] Id. at 113-114.

Culled from the Decision rendered by the Court of Appeals on June 11, 2010 in CA-G.R. SP No.
[20]

04418; id. at 118.

[23] Issued by Honorable Geraldine Faith Econg.

Art. 2212. Interest due shall earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded, although the
[25]

obligation may be silent upon this point.

[31] Issued by Honorable James Stewart Ramon E. Himalaloan as Acting Presiding Judge; id. at 134-135.

[32]In this motion, it was alleged that a 1940 Convenio was discovered wherein the predecessors-in-
interest of the Heirs of Fr. Rallos supposedly obligated themselves to donate the two lots subject of the
instant controversy to the City of Cebu.

Exercise of Utmost Caution, Prudence and Judiciousness in the Issuance of Writs of Execution to
[37]

Satisfy Money Judgments Against Government Agencies and Local Government Units, issued on
October 25, 2000.

[38] Rollo, pp. 334.

No copy of the Order is attached to the rollo. This Court referred to the City of Cebu's Motion for
[39]

Reconsideration (id. at 139; Only the first page of the motion is found in the rollo.) to the said order to
determine the latter's contents.

[40] Id.

[41] Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 06676; id. at 141-163.

Penned by Associate Justice Ramon Paul L. Hernando, with Associate Justices Pampio A. Abarintos
[42]

and Victoria Isabel A. Paredes, concurring; id. at 339-341.

Penned by Associate Justice Gabriel T. Ingles, with Associate Justices Pamela Ann Abella Maxino and
[43]

Carmelita S. Manahan, concurring; id. at 345-347.

[44] Id. at 256-271. The respondents are the publisher and chief of reporters of Cebu Daily News.

[45] Id. at 272-280. The respondents are bank officers of Philippine Veterans Bank.
[46]Id. at 281-297. The respondents are mostly the same ones now involved in the instant petition before
this Court.

[47] Id. at 363-393. The respondents are justices from the CA Cebu Station.

[48] Id. at 141-163.

[49](1) Urgent Omnibus Motions to Quash the Writ of Execution and to Set Aside the Notice of
Garnishment; (2) Supplemental Urgent Omnibus Motions to Quash the Writ of Execution, and to Set
Aside the Notice of Garnishment; and (3) Motion for Issuance of Status Quo Order Pending Resolution
of [the City of Cebu's] Urgent Omnibus Motions to Quash the Writ of Execution and to Set Aside the
Notice of Garnishment.

[50]No money shall be paid out of the local treasury except in pursuance of an appropriations ordinance
or law.

[54]Arevalo v. Planters Development Bank, G.R. No. 193415, April 18, 2012, 670 SCRA 252, 264,
citing Pilipino Telephone Corp. v. Radiomarine Network, Inc., G.R. No. 152092, August 4, 2010, 626
SCRA 702, 728-729.

Sec. 2. Money claim. A money claim against the government shall be filed directly with the
[65]

Commission Secretary in accordance with the following:

a) Petition. A claimant for money against the Government, whose claim is cognizable by the Commission
Proper, may file a petition. The party seeking relief shall be referred to as "Petitioner" and the
government agency or instrumentality against whom a claim is directed shall be referred to as
"Respondent". The petition shall also be assigned a docket number as provided in these Rules.

b) Contents of Petition. The petition shall contain the personal circumstances or juridical personality of
the petitioner, a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting his cause of action, a citation of the
law and jurisprudence upon which the petition is based and the relief sought. The petition shall be
accompanied by certified true copies of documents referred therein and other relevant supporting
papers.

c) Filing of Petition. The petition shall be filed with the Commission Secretary, a copy of which shall be
served on the respondent. Proof of service of the petition on the respondent together with proof of the
payment of filing fee shall be attached to the petition.

d) Order to Answer. Upon the receipt of the petition, the Commission Secretary shall issue an Order
requiring respondent to answer the petition within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof.

e) Answer. Within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the said Order, the respondent shall file with
Commission Secretary an Answer to the petition. The answer shall be accompanied by certified true
copies of documents referred to therein together with other supporting papers. The answer shall (a)
point out insufficiencies or inaccuracies in the petitioner's statement of facts and issues and (b) state the
reasons why the petition should be denied or dismissed or granted. Copy of the answer shall be served on
the petitioner and proof of service thereof shall be attached to the answer.

f) Reply. Petitioner may file a Reply, copy furnished the respondent, within fifteen (15) days from receipt
of the Answer.

g) Comment by Concerned Offices. Money claims, except court-adjudicated claims, shall first be assigned
by the Commission Secretary to the appropriate Central or Regional Office, for comment and
recommendation prior to referral to the Legal Services Sector for preparation of the decision and formal
deliberation by the Commission Proper.
G.R. No. L-11154 March 21, 1916
E. MERRITT, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, defendant-appellant.
Crossfield and O'Brien for plaintiff.
Attorney-General Avanceña for defendant..
TRENT, J.:
This is an appeal by both parties from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila in
favor of the plaintiff for the sum of P14,741, together with the costs of the cause.
Counsel for the plaintiff insist that the trial court erred (1) "in limiting the general damages which the
plaintiff suffered to P5,000, instead of P25,000 as claimed in the complaint," and (2) "in limiting the time
when plaintiff was entirely disabled to two months and twenty-one days and fixing the damage
accordingly in the sum of P2,666, instead of P6,000 as claimed by plaintiff in his complaint."
The Attorney-General on behalf of the defendant urges that the trial court erred: (a) in finding that the
collision between the plaintiff's motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital was due to the
negligence of the chauffeur; (b) in holding that the Government of the Philippine Islands is liable for the
damages sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the collision, even if it be true that the collision was due
to the negligence of the chauffeur; and (c) in rendering judgment against the defendant for the sum of
P14,741.
The trial court's findings of fact, which are fully supported by the record, are as follows:
It is a fact not disputed by counsel for the defendant that when the plaintiff, riding on a motorcycle, was
going toward the western part of Calle Padre Faura, passing along the west side thereof at a speed of
ten to twelve miles an hour, upon crossing Taft Avenue and when he was ten feet from the southwestern
intersection of said streets, the General Hospital ambulance, upon reaching said avenue, instead of
turning toward the south, after passing the center thereof, so that it would be on the left side of said
avenue, as is prescribed by the ordinance and the Motor Vehicle Act, turned suddenly and unexpectedly
and long before reaching the center of the street, into the right side of Taft Avenue, without having
sounded any whistle or horn, by which movement it struck the plaintiff, who was already six feet from the
southwestern point or from the post place there.
By reason of the resulting collision, the plaintiff was so severely injured that, according to Dr. Saleeby,
who examined him on the very same day that he was taken to the General Hospital, he was suffering
from a depression in the left parietal region, a would in the same place and in the back part of his head,
while blood issued from his nose and he was entirely unconscious.
The marks revealed that he had one or more fractures of the skull and that the grey matter and brain
was had suffered material injury. At ten o'clock of the night in question, which was the time set for
performing the operation, his pulse was so weak and so irregular that, in his opinion, there was little
hope that he would live. His right leg was broken in such a way that the fracture extended to the outer
skin in such manner that it might be regarded as double and the would be exposed to infection, for which
reason it was of the most serious nature.
At another examination six days before the day of the trial, Dr. Saleeby noticed that the plaintiff's leg
showed a contraction of an inch and a half and a curvature that made his leg very weak and painful at
the point of the fracture. Examination of his head revealed a notable readjustment of the functions of the
brain and nerves. The patient apparently was slightly deaf, had a light weakness in his eyes and in his
mental condition. This latter weakness was always noticed when the plaintiff had to do any difficult
mental labor, especially when he attempted to use his money for mathematical calculations.
According to the various merchants who testified as witnesses, the plaintiff's mental and physical
condition prior to the accident was excellent, and that after having received the injuries that have been
discussed, his physical condition had undergone a noticeable depreciation, for he had lost the agility,
energy, and ability that he had constantly displayed before the accident as one of the best constructors
of wooden buildings and he could not now earn even a half of the income that he had secured for his
work because he had lost 50 per cent of his efficiency. As a contractor, he could no longer, as he had
before done, climb up ladders and scaffoldings to reach the highest parts of the building.
As a consequence of the loss the plaintiff suffered in the efficiency of his work as a contractor, he had to
dissolved the partnership he had formed with the engineer. Wilson, because he was incapacitated from
making mathematical calculations on account of the condition of his leg and of his mental faculties, and
he had to give up a contract he had for the construction of the Uy Chaco building."
We may say at the outset that we are in full accord with the trial court to the effect that the collision
between the plaintiff's motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital was due solely to the
negligence of the chauffeur.
The two items which constitute a part of the P14,741 and which are drawn in question by the plaintiff are
(a) P5,000, the award awarded for permanent injuries, and (b) the P2,666, the amount allowed for the
loss of wages during the time the plaintiff was incapacitated from pursuing his occupation. We find
nothing in the record which would justify us in increasing the amount of the first. As to the second, the
record shows, and the trial court so found, that the plaintiff's services as a contractor were worth P1,000
per month. The court, however, limited the time to two months and twenty-one days, which the plaintiff
was actually confined in the hospital. In this we think there was error, because it was clearly established
that the plaintiff was wholly incapacitated for a period of six months. The mere fact that he remained in
the hospital only two months and twenty-one days while the remainder of the six months was spent in
his home, would not prevent recovery for the whole time. We, therefore, find that the amount of
damages sustained by the plaintiff, without any fault on his part, is P18,075.
As the negligence which caused the collision is a tort committed by an agent or employee of the
Government, the inquiry at once arises whether the Government is legally-liable for the damages
resulting therefrom.
Act No. 2457, effective February 3, 1915, reads:
An Act authorizing E. Merritt to bring suit against the Government of the Philippine Islands and
authorizing the Attorney-General of said Islands to appear in said suit.
Whereas a claim has been filed against the Government of the Philippine Islands by Mr. E. Merritt, of
Manila, for damages resulting from a collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General
Hospital on March twenty-fifth, nineteen hundred and thirteen;
Whereas it is not known who is responsible for the accident nor is it possible to determine the amount of
damages, if any, to which the claimant is entitled; and
Whereas the Director of Public Works and the Attorney-General recommended that an Act be passed by
the Legislature authorizing Mr. E. Merritt to bring suit in the courts against the Government, in order that
said questions may be decided: Now, therefore,
By authority of the United States, be it enacted by the Philippine Legislature, that:
SECTION 1. E. Merritt is hereby authorized to bring suit in the Court of First Instance of the city of
Manila against the Government of the Philippine Islands in order to fix the responsibility for the collision
between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital, and to determine the amount of the
damages, if any, to which Mr. E. Merritt is entitled on account of said collision, and the Attorney-General
of the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized and directed to appear at the trial on the behalf of the
Government of said Islands, to defendant said Government at the same.
SEC. 2. This Act shall take effect on its passage.
Enacted, February 3, 1915.
Did the defendant, in enacting the above quoted Act, simply waive its immunity from suit or did it also
concede its liability to the plaintiff? If only the former, then it cannot be held that the Act created any new
cause of action in favor of the plaintiff or extended the defendant's liability to any case not previously
recognized.
All admit that the Insular Government (the defendant) cannot be sued by an individual without its
consent. It is also admitted that the instant case is one against the Government. As the consent of the
Government to be sued by the plaintiff was entirely voluntary on its part, it is our duty to look carefully
into the terms of the consent, and render judgment accordingly.
The plaintiff was authorized to bring this action against the Government "in order to fix the responsibility
for the collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital and to determine the
amount of the damages, if any, to which Mr. E. Merritt is entitled on account of said collision, . . . ."
These were the two questions submitted to the court for determination. The Act was passed "in order
that said questions may be decided." We have "decided" that the accident was due solely to the
negligence of the chauffeur, who was at the time an employee of the defendant, and we have also fixed
the amount of damages sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the collision. Does the Act authorize us to
hold that the Government is legally liable for that amount? If not, we must look elsewhere for such
authority, if it exists.
The Government of the Philippine Islands having been "modeled after the Federal and State
Governments in the United States," we may look to the decisions of the high courts of that country for
aid in determining the purpose and scope of Act No. 2457.
In the United States the rule that the state is not liable for the torts committed by its officers or agents
whom it employs, except when expressly made so by legislative enactment, is well settled. "The
Government," says Justice Story, "does not undertake to guarantee to any person the fidelity of the
officers or agents whom it employs, since that would involve it in all its operations in endless
embarrassments, difficulties and losses, which would be subversive of the public interest." (Claussen vs.
City of Luverne, 103 Minn., 491, citing U. S. vs. Kirkpatrick, 9 Wheat, 720; 6 L. Ed., 199; and Beers vs.
States, 20 How., 527; 15 L. Ed., 991.)
In the case of Melvin vs. State (121 Cal., 16), the plaintiff sought to recover damages from the state for
personal injuries received on account of the negligence of the state officers at the state fair, a state
institution created by the legislature for the purpose of improving agricultural and kindred industries; to
disseminate information calculated to educate and benefit the industrial classes; and to advance by such
means the material interests of the state, being objects similar to those sought by the public school
system. In passing upon the question of the state's liability for the negligent acts of its officers or agents,
the court said:
No claim arises against any government is favor of an individual, by reason of the misfeasance, laches,
or unauthorized exercise of powers by its officers or agents. (Citing Gibbons vs. U. S., 8 Wall., 269;
Clodfelter vs. State, 86 N. C., 51, 53; 41 Am. Rep., 440; Chapman vs. State, 104 Cal., 690; 43 Am. St.
Rep., 158; Green vs. State, 73 Cal., 29; Bourn vs. Hart, 93 Cal., 321; 27 Am. St. Rep., 203; Story on
Agency, sec. 319.)
As to the scope of legislative enactments permitting individuals to sue the state where the cause of
action arises out of either fort or contract, the rule is stated in 36 Cyc., 915, thus:
By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not thereby concede its
liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or extend its liability to any cause not
previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to the
jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense.
In Apfelbacher vs. State (152 N. W., 144, advanced sheets), decided April 16, 1915, the Act of 1913,
which authorized the bringing of this suit, read:
SECTION 1. Authority is hereby given to George Apfelbacher, of the town of Summit, Waukesha
County, Wisconsin, to bring suit in such court or courts and in such form or forms as he may be advised
for the purpose of settling and determining all controversies which he may now have with the State of
Wisconsin, or its duly authorized officers and agents, relative to the mill property of said George
Apfelbacher, the fish hatchery of the State of Wisconsin on the Bark River, and the mill property of Evan
Humphrey at the lower end of Nagawicka Lake, and relative to the use of the waters of said Bark River
and Nagawicka Lake, all in the county of Waukesha, Wisconsin.
In determining the scope of this act, the court said:
Plaintiff claims that by the enactment of this law the legislature admitted liability on the part of the state
for the acts of its officers, and that the suit now stands just as it would stand between private parties. It is
difficult to see how the act does, or was intended to do, more than remove the state's immunity from suit.
It simply gives authority to commence suit for the purpose of settling plaintiff's controversies with the
estate. Nowhere in the act is there a whisper or suggestion that the court or courts in the disposition of
the suit shall depart from well established principles of law, or that the amount of damages is the only
question to be settled. The act opened the door of the court to the plaintiff. It did not pass upon the
question of liability, but left the suit just where it would be in the absence of the state's immunity from
suit. If the Legislature had intended to change the rule that obtained in this state so long and to declare
liability on the part of the state, it would not have left so important a matter to mere inference, but would
have done so in express terms. (Murdock Grate Co. vs. Commonwealth, 152 Mass., 28; 24 N.E., 854; 8
L. R. A., 399.)
In Denning vs. State (123 Cal., 316), the provisions of the Act of 1893, relied upon and considered, are
as follows:
All persons who have, or shall hereafter have, claims on contract or for negligence against the state not
allowed by the state board of examiners, are hereby authorized, on the terms and conditions herein
contained, to bring suit thereon against the state in any of the courts of this state of competent
jurisdiction, and prosecute the same to final judgment. The rules of practice in civil cases shall apply to
such suits, except as herein otherwise provided.
And the court said:
This statute has been considered by this court in at least two cases, arising under different facts, and in
both it was held that said statute did not create any liability or cause of action against the state where
none existed before, but merely gave an additional remedy to enforce such liability as would have
existed if the statute had not been enacted. (Chapman vs. State, 104 Cal., 690; 43 Am. St. Rep., 158;
Melvin vs. State, 121 Cal., 16.)
A statute of Massachusetts enacted in 1887 gave to the superior court "jurisdiction of all claims against
the commonwealth, whether at law or in equity," with an exception not necessary to be here mentioned.
In construing this statute the court, in Murdock Grate Co. vs. Commonwealth (152 Mass., 28), said:
The statute we are discussing disclose no intention to create against the state a new and heretofore
unrecognized class of liabilities, but only an intention to provide a judicial tribunal where well recognized
existing liabilities can be adjudicated.
In Sipple vs. State (99 N. Y., 284), where the board of the canal claims had, by the terms of the statute
of New York, jurisdiction of claims for damages for injuries in the management of the canals such as the
plaintiff had sustained, Chief Justice Ruger remarks: "It must be conceded that the state can be made
liable for injuries arising from the negligence of its agents or servants, only by force of some positive
statute assuming such liability."
It being quite clear that Act No. 2457 does not operate to extend the Government's liability to any cause
not previously recognized, we will now examine the substantive law touching the defendant's liability for
the negligent acts of its officers, agents, and employees. Paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code
reads:
The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent, but not when the damage should
have been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to do the act performed, in which case
the provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable.
The supreme court of Spain in defining the scope of this paragraph said:
That the obligation to indemnify for damages which a third person causes to another by his fault or
negligence is based, as is evidenced by the same Law 3, Title 15, Partida 7, on that the person
obligated, by his own fault or negligence, takes part in the act or omission of the third party who caused
the damage. It follows therefrom that the state, by virtue of such provisions of law, is not responsible for
the damages suffered by private individuals in consequence of acts performed by its employees in the
discharge of the functions pertaining to their office, because neither fault nor even negligence can be
presumed on the part of the state in the organization of branches of public service and in the
appointment of its agents; on the contrary, we must presuppose all foresight humanly possible on its part
in order that each branch of service serves the general weal an that of private persons interested in its
operation. Between these latter and the state, therefore, no relations of a private nature governed by the
civil law can arise except in a case where the state acts as a judicial person capable of acquiring rights
and contracting obligations. (Supreme Court of Spain, January 7, 1898; 83 Jur. Civ., 24.)
That the Civil Code in chapter 2, title 16, book 4, regulates the obligations which arise out of fault or
negligence; and whereas in the first article thereof. No. 1902, where the general principle is laid down
that where a person who by an act or omission causes damage to another through fault or negligence,
shall be obliged to repair the damage so done, reference is made to acts or omissions of the persons
who directly or indirectly cause the damage, the following articles refers to this persons and imposes an
identical obligation upon those who maintain fixed relations of authority and superiority over the authors
of the damage, because the law presumes that in consequence of such relations the evil caused by their
own fault or negligence is imputable to them. This legal presumption gives way to proof, however,
because, as held in the last paragraph of article 1903, responsibility for acts of third persons ceases
when the persons mentioned in said article prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of
a family to avoid the damage, and among these persons, called upon to answer in a direct and not a
subsidiary manner, are found, in addition to the mother or the father in a proper case, guardians and
owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise, the state, but not always, except when it acts
through the agency of a special agent, doubtless because and only in this case, the fault or negligence,
which is the original basis of this kind of objections, must be presumed to lie with the state.
That although in some cases the state might by virtue of the general principle set forth in article 1902
respond for all the damage that is occasioned to private parties by orders or resolutions which by fault or
negligence are made by branches of the central administration acting in the name and representation of
the state itself and as an external expression of its sovereignty in the exercise of its executive powers,
yet said article is not applicable in the case of damages said to have been occasioned to the
petitioners by an executive official, acting in the exercise of his powers, in proceedings to enforce the
collections of certain property taxes owing by the owner of the property which they hold in sublease.
That the responsibility of the state is limited by article 1903 to the case wherein it acts through a special
agent (and a special agent, in the sense in which these words are employed, is one who receives a
definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special
official) so that in representation of the state and being bound to act as an agent thereof, he executes
the trust confided to him. This concept does not apply to any executive agent who is an employee of the
acting administration and who on his own responsibility performs the functions which are inherent in and
naturally pertain to his office and which are regulated by law and the regulations." (Supreme Court of
Spain, May 18, 1904; 98 Jur. Civ., 389, 390.)
That according to paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code and the principle laid down in a decision,
among others, of the 18th of May, 1904, in a damage case, the responsibility of the state is limited to
that which it contracts through a special agent, duly empowered by a definite order or commission to
perform some act or charged with some definite purpose which gives rise to the claim, and not where
the claim is based on acts or omissions imputable to a public official charged with some administrative or
technical office who can be held to the proper responsibility in the manner laid down by the law of civil
responsibility. Consequently, the trial court in not so deciding and in sentencing the said entity to the
payment of damages, caused by an official of the second class referred to, has by erroneous
interpretation infringed the provisions of articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code. (Supreme Court of
Spain, July 30, 1911; 122 Jur. Civ., 146.)
It is, therefore, evidence that the State (the Government of the Philippine Islands) is only liable,
according to the above quoted decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, for the acts of its agents,
officers and employees when they act as special agents within the meaning of paragraph 5 of article
1903, supra, and that the chauffeur of the ambulance of the General Hospital was not such an agent.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from must be reversed, without costs in this instance.
Whether the Government intends to make itself legally liable for the amount of damages above set forth,
which the plaintiff has sustained by reason of the negligent acts of one of its employees, by legislative
enactment and by appropriating sufficient funds therefor, we are not called upon to determine. This
matter rests solely with the Legislature and not with the courts.
G.R. No. 206510 September 16, 2014
MOST REV. PEDRO D. ARIGO VS SCOTT H. SWIFT
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR, J.:
Before us is a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary
Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) under Rule 7 of A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, otherwise known as the
Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases (Rules), involving violations of environmental laws and
regulations in relation to the grounding of the US military ship USS Guardian over the Tubbataha Reefs.
Factual Background
The name "Tubbataha" came from the Samal (seafaring people of southern Philippines) language which
means "long reef exposed at low tide." Tubbataha is composed of two huge coral atolls - the north atoll
and the south atoll - and the Jessie Beazley Reef, a smaller coral structure about 20 kilometers north of
the atolls. The reefs of Tubbataha and Jessie Beazley are considered part of Cagayancillo, a remote
island municipality of Palawan.1
In 1988, Tubbataha was declared a National Marine Park by virtue of Proclamation No. 306 issued by
President Corazon C. Aquino on August 11, 1988. Located in the middle of Central Sulu Sea, 150
kilometers southeast of Puerto Princesa City, Tubbataha lies at the heart of the Coral Triangle, the
global center of marine biodiversity.
In 1993, Tubbataha was inscribed by the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO) as a World Heritage Site. It was recognized as one of the Philippines' oldest ecosystems,
containing excellent examples of pristine reefs and a high diversity of marine life. The 97,030-hectare
protected marine park is also an important habitat for internationally threatened and endangered marine
species. UNESCO cited Tubbataha's outstanding universal value as an important and significant natural
habitat for in situ conservation of biological diversity; an example representing significant on-going
ecological and biological processes; and an area of exceptional natural beauty and aesthetic
importance.2
On April 6, 2010, Congress passed Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10067, 3 otherwise known as the "Tubbataha
Reefs Natural Park (TRNP) Act of 2009" "to ensure the protection and conservation of the globally
significant economic, biological, sociocultural, educational and scientific values of the Tubbataha Reefs
into perpetuity for the enjoyment of present and future generations." Under the "no-take" policy, entry
into the waters of TRNP is strictly regulated and many human activities are prohibited and penalized or
fined, including fishing, gathering, destroying and disturbing the resources within the TRNP. The law
likewise created the Tubbataha Protected Area Management Board (TPAMB) which shall be the sole
policy-making and permit-granting body of the TRNP.
The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the US Navy. In December 2012,
the US Embassy in the Philippines requested diplomatic clearance for the said vessel "to enter and exit
the territorial waters of the Philippines and to arrive at the port of Subic Bay for the purpose of routine
ship replenishment, maintenance, and crew liberty." 4 On January 6, 2013, the ship left Sasebo, Japan
for Subic Bay, arriving on January 13, 2013 after a brief stop for fuel in Okinawa, Japan.1âwphi1
On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its next port of call in Makassar,
Indonesia. On January 17, 2013 at 2:20 a.m. while transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship ran aground on the
northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs, about 80 miles east-southeast of Palawan. No
cine was injured in the incident, and there have been no reports of leaking fuel or oil.
On January 20, 2013, U.S. 7th Fleet Commander, Vice Admiral Scott Swift, expressed regret for the
incident in a press statement.5 Likewise, US Ambassador to the Philippines Harry K. Thomas, Jr., in a
meeting at the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) on February 4, "reiterated his regrets over the
grounding incident and assured Foreign Affairs Secretazy Albert F. del Rosario that the United States
will provide appropriate compensation for damage to the reef caused by the ship." 6 By March 30, 2013,
the US Navy-led salvage team had finished removing the last piece of the grounded ship from the coral
reef.
On April 1 7, 2013, the above-named petitioners on their behalf and in representation of their respective
sector/organization and others, including minors or generations yet unborn, filed the present petition
agairtst Scott H. Swift in his capacity as Commander of the US 7th Fleet, Mark A. Rice in his capacity as
Commanding Officer of the USS Guardian and Lt. Gen. Terry G. Robling, US Marine Corps Forces,
Pacific and Balikatan 2013 Exercises Co-Director ("US respondents"); President Benigno S. Aquino III in
his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), DF A Secretary
Albert F. Del Rosario, Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa, Jr., Secretary Voltaire T. Gazmin
(Department of National Defense), Secretary Jesus P. Paje (Department of Environment and Natural
Resources), Vice-Admiral Jose Luis M. Alano (Philippine Navy Flag Officer in Command, AFP), Admiral
Rodolfo D. Isorena (Philippine Coast Guard Commandant), Commodore Enrico Efren Evangelista
(Philippine Coast Guard-Palawan), and Major General Virgilio 0. Domingo (AFP Commandant),
collectively the "Philippine respondents."
The Petition
Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations of the USS Guardian
cause and continue to cause environmental damage of such magnitude as to affect the provinces of
Palawan, Antique, Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental, Zamboanga del Norte,
Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, which events violate their constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful
ecology. They also seek a directive from this Court for the institution of civil, administrative and criminal
suits for acts committed in violation of environmental laws and regulations in connection with the
grounding incident.
Specifically, petitioners cite the following violations committed by US respondents under R.A. No. 10067:
unauthorized entry (Section 19); non-payment of conservation fees (Section 21 ); obstruction of law
enforcement officer (Section 30); damages to the reef (Section 20); and destroying and disturbing
resources (Section 26[g]). Furthermore, petitioners assail certain provisions of the Visiting Forces
Agreement (VFA) which they want this Court to nullify for being unconstitutional.
The numerous reliefs sought in this case are set forth in the final prayer of the petition, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Petitioners respectfully pray that the Honorable Court: 1.
Immediately issue upon the filing of this petition a Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO)
and/or a Writ of Kalikasan, which shall, in particular,
a. Order Respondents and any person acting on their behalf, to cease and desist all operations over the
Guardian grounding incident;
b. Initially demarcating the metes and bounds of the damaged area as well as an additional buffer zone;
c. Order Respondents to stop all port calls and war games under 'Balikatan' because of the absence of
clear guidelines, duties, and liability schemes for breaches of those duties, and require Respondents to
assume responsibility for prior and future environmental damage in general, and environmental damage
under the Visiting Forces Agreement in particular.
d. Temporarily define and describe allowable activities of ecotourism, diving, recreation, and limited
commercial activities by fisherfolk and indigenous communities near or around the TRNP but away from
the damaged site and an additional buffer zone;
2. After summary hearing, issue a Resolution extending the TEPO until further orders of the Court;
3. After due proceedings, render a Decision which shall include, without limitation:
a. Order Respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs, following the dispositive portion of Nicolas v.
Romulo, "to forthwith negotiate with the United States representatives for the appropriate agreement on
[environmental guidelines and environmental accountability] under Philippine authorities as provided in
Art. V[] of the VFA ... "
b. Direct Respondents and appropriate agencies to commence administrative, civil, and criminal
proceedings against erring officers and individuals to the full extent of the law, and to make such
proceedings public;
c. Declare that Philippine authorities may exercise primary and exclusive criminal jurisdiction over erring
U.S. personnel under the circumstances of this case;
d. Require Respondents to pay just and reasonable compensation in the settlement of all meritorious
claims for damages caused to the Tubbataha Reef on terms and conditions no less severe than those
applicable to other States, and damages for personal injury or death, if such had been the case;
e. Direct Respondents to cooperate in providing for the attendance of witnesses and in the collection
and production of evidence, including seizure and delivery of objects connected with the offenses related
to the grounding of the Guardian;
f. Require the authorities of the Philippines and the United States to notify each other of the disposition
of all cases, wherever heard, related to the grounding of the Guardian;
g. Restrain Respondents from proceeding with any purported restoration, repair, salvage or post salvage
plan or plans, including cleanup plans covering the damaged area of the Tubbataha Reef absent a just
settlement approved by the Honorable Court;
h. Require Respondents to engage in stakeholder and LOU consultations in accordance with the Local
Government Code and R.A. 10067;
i. Require Respondent US officials and their representatives to place a deposit to the TRNP Trust Fund
defined under Section 17 of RA 10067 as a bona .fide gesture towards full reparations;
j. Direct Respondents to undertake measures to rehabilitate the areas affected by the grounding of the
Guardian in light of Respondents' experience in the Port Royale grounding in 2009, among other similar
grounding incidents;
k. Require Respondents to regularly publish on a quarterly basis and in the name of transparency and
accountability such environmental damage assessment, valuation, and valuation methods, in all stages
of negotiation;
l. Convene a multisectoral technical working group to provide scientific and technical support to the
TPAMB;
m. Order the Department of Foreign Affairs, Department of National Defense, and the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources to review the Visiting Forces Agreement and the Mutual Defense
Treaty to consider whether their provisions allow for the exercise of erga omnes rights to a balanced and
healthful ecology and for damages which follow from any violation of those rights;
n. Narrowly tailor the provisions of the Visiting Forces Agreement for purposes of protecting the
damaged areas of TRNP;
o. Declare the grant of immunity found in Article V ("Criminal Jurisdiction") and Article VI of the Visiting
Forces Agreement unconstitutional for violating equal protection and/or for violating the preemptory
norm of nondiscrimination incorporated as part of the law of the land under Section 2, Article II, of the
Philippine Constitution;
p. Allow for continuing discovery measures;
q. Supervise marine wildlife rehabilitation in the Tubbataha Reefs in all other respects; and
4. Provide just and equitable environmental rehabilitation measures and such other reliefs as are just
and equitable under the premises.7 (Underscoring supplied.)
Since only the Philippine respondents filed their comment 8 to the petition, petitioners also filed a motion
for early resolution and motion to proceed ex parte against the US respondents. 9
Respondents' Consolidated Comment
In their consolidated comment with opposition to the application for a TEPO and ocular inspection and
production orders, respondents assert that: ( 1) the grounds relied upon for the issuance of a TEPO or
writ of Kalikasan have become fait accompli as the salvage operations on the USS Guardian were
already completed; (2) the petition is defective in form and substance; (3) the petition improperly raises
issues involving the VFA between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America; and
( 4) the determination of the extent of responsibility of the US Government as regards the damage to the
Tubbataha Reefs rests exdusively with the executive branch.
The Court's Ruling
As a preliminary matter, there is no dispute on the legal standing of petitioners to file the present petition.
Locus standi is "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question." 10 Specifically, it is "a
party's personal and substantial interest in a case where he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as
a result" of the act being challenged, and "calls for more than just a generalized grievance." 11 However,
the rule on standing is a procedural matter which this Court has relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like
ordinary citizens, taxpayers and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the
subject matter of the controversy is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to
society, or of paramount public interest. 12
In the landmark case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.,13 we recognized the "public right" of citizens to "a
balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our constitutional history, is solemnly
incorporated in the fundamental law." We declared that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology
need not be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and polittcal rights guaranteed in
the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of transcendental importance
with intergenerational implications.1âwphi1 Such right carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from
impairing the environment.14
On the novel element in the class suit filed by the petitioners minors in Oposa, this Court ruled that not
only do ordinary citizens have legal standing to sue for the enforcement of environmental rights, they
can do so in representation of their own and future generations. Thus:
Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find
no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding
generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only
be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the "rhythm and
harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety. Such rhythm and harmony
indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and
conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other
natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to
the present a:: well as future generations. Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the
next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full 1:njoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology.
Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same
time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to
come.15 (Emphasis supplied.)
The liberalization of standing first enunciated in Oposa, insofar as it refers to minors and generations yet
unborn, is now enshrined in the Rules which allows the filing of a citizen suit in environmental cases.
The provision on citizen suits in the Rules "collapses the traditional rule on personal and direct interest,
on the principle that humans are stewards of nature." 16
Having settled the issue of locus standi, we shall address the more fundamental question of whether this
Court has jurisdiction over the US respondents who did not submit any pleading or manifestation in this
case.
The immunity of the State from suit, known also as the doctrine of sovereign immunity or non-suability of
the State,17 is expressly provided in Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution which states:
Section 3. The State may not be sued without its consent.
In United States of America v. Judge Guinto,18 we discussed the principle of state immunity from suit, as
follows:
The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent, now · expressed in Article XVI, Section 3, of
the 1987 Constitution, is one of the generally accepted principles of international law that we have
adopted as part of the law of our land under Article II, Section 2. x x x.
Even without such affirmation, we would still be bound by the generally accepted principles of
international law under the doctrine of incorporation. Under this doctrine, as accepted by the majority of
states, such principles are deemed incorporated in the law of every civilized state as a condition and
consequence of its membership in the society of nations. Upon its admission to such society, the state is
automatically obligated to comply with these principles in its relations with other states.
As applied to the local state, the doctrine of state immunity is based on the justification given by Justice
Holmes that ''there can be no legal right against the authority which makes the law on which the right
depends." [Kawanakoa v. Polybank, 205 U.S. 349] There are other practical reasons for the
enforcement of the doctrine. In the case of the foreign state sought to be impleaded in the local
jurisdiction, the added inhibition is expressed in the maxim par in parem, non habet imperium. All states
are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. A contrary disposition would, in
the language of a celebrated case, "unduly vex the peace of nations." [De Haber v. Queen of Portugal,
17 Q. B. 171]
While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable
to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of
their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an
affirmative act to satisfy the same,. such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages
awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as against the state itself although it has not been
formally impleaded. [Garcia v. Chief of Staff, 16 SCRA 120] In such a situation, the state may move to
dismiss the comp.taint on the ground that it has been filed without its consent. 19 (Emphasis supplied.)
Under the American Constitution, the doctrine is expressed in the Eleventh Amendment which reads:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens
or Subjects of any Foreign State.
In the case of Minucher v. Court of Appeals,20 we further expounded on the immunity of foreign states
from the jurisdiction of local courts, as follows:
The precept that a State cannot be sued in the courts of a foreign state is a long-standing rule of
customary international law then closely identified with the personal immunity of a foreign sovereign from
suit and, with the emergence of democratic states, made to attach not just to the person of the head of
state, or his representative, but also distinctly to the state itself in its sovereign capacity. If the acts giving
rise to a suit arc those of a foreign government done by its foreign agent, although not necessarily a
diplomatic personage, but acting in his official capacity, the complaint could be barred by the immunity of
the foreign sovereign from suit without its consent. Suing a representative of a state is believed to be, in
effect, suing the state itself. The proscription is not accorded for the benefit of an individual but for the
State, in whose service he is, under the maxim -par in parem, non habet imperium -that all states are
soverr~ign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. The implication, in broad terms, is
that if the judgment against an official would rec 1uire the state itself to perform an affirmative act to
satisfy the award, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages decreed against
him, the suit must be regarded as being against the state itself, although it has not been formally
impleaded.21 (Emphasis supplied.)
In the same case we also mentioned that in the case of diplomatic immunity, the privilege is not an
immunity from the observance of the law of the territorial sovereign or from ensuing legal liability; it is,
rather, an immunity from the exercise of territorial jurisdiction. 22
In United States of America v. Judge Guinto,23 one of the consolidated cases therein involved a Filipino
employed at Clark Air Base who was arrested following a buy-bust operation conducted by two officers
of the US Air Force, and was eventually dismissed from his employment when he was charged in court
for violation of R.A. No. 6425. In a complaint for damages filed by the said employee against the military
officers, the latter moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the suit was against the US
Government which had not given its consent. The RTC denied the motion but on a petition for certiorari
and prohibition filed before this Court, we reversed the RTC and dismissed the complaint. We held that
petitioners US military officers were acting in the exercise of their official functions when they conducted
the buy-bust operation against the complainant and thereafter testified against him at his trial. It follows
that for discharging their duties as agents of the United States, they cannot be directly impleaded for
acts imputable to their principal, which has not given its consent to be sued.
This traditional rule of State immunity which exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another
State without the former's consent or waiver has evolved into a restrictive doctrine which distinguishes
sovereign and governmental acts (Jure imperil") from private, commercial and proprietary acts (Jure
gestionis). Under the restrictive rule of State immunity, State immunity extends only to acts Jure imperii.
The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of
commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. 24
In Shauf v. Court of Appeals,25 we discussed the limitations of the State immunity principle, thus:
It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts
contrary to law and injurious to the rights of plaintiff. As was clearly set forth by JustiGe Zaldivar in
Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications, et al. vs. Aligaen, etc., et al. : "Inasmuch as the State
authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not acts
of the State, and an action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or
violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule of
immunity of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has been said that an action at law or suit in equity
against a State officer or the director of a State department on the ground that, while claiming to act for
the State, he violates or invades the personal and property rights of the plaintiff, under an
unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority which he does not have, is not a suit against the
State within the constitutional provision that the State may not be sued without its consent." The
rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for
perpetrating an injustice.
xxxx
The aforecited authorities are clear on the matter. They state that the doctrine of immunity from suit will
not apply and may not be invoked where the public official is being sued in his private and personal
capacity as an ordinary citizen. The cloak of protection afforded the officers and agents of the
government is removed the moment they are sued in their individual capacity. This situation usually
arises where the public official acts without authority or in excess of the powers vested in him. It is a
well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for
whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith, or beyond the
scope of his authority or jurisdiction.26 (Emphasis supplied.) In this case, the US respondents were sued
in their official capacity as commanding officers of the US Navy who had control and supervision over
the USS Guardian and its crew. The alleged act or omission resulting in the unfortunate grounding of the
USS Guardian on the TRNP was committed while they we:re performing official military duties.
Considering that the satisfaction of a judgment against said officials will require remedial actions and
appropriation of funds by the US government, the suit is deemed to be one against the US itself. The
principle of State immunity therefore bars the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court over the persons of
respondents Swift, Rice and Robling.
During the deliberations, Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio took the position that the conduct of
the US in this case, when its warship entered a restricted area in violation of R.A. No. 10067 and caused
damage to the TRNP reef system, brings the matter within the ambit of Article 31 of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). He explained that while historically, warships enjoy
sovereign immunity from suit as extensions of their flag State, Art. 31 of the UNCLOS creates an
exception to this rule in cases where they fail to comply with the rules and regulations of the coastal
State regarding passage through the latter's internal waters and the territorial sea.
According to Justice Carpio, although the US to date has not ratified the UNCLOS, as a matter of long-
standing policy the US considers itself bound by customary international rules on the "traditional uses of
the oceans" as codified in UNCLOS, as can be gleaned from previous declarations by former Presidents
Reagan and Clinton, and the US judiciary in the case of United States v. Royal Caribbean Cruise Lines,
Ltd.27
The international law of the sea is generally defined as "a body of treaty rules arid customary norms
governing the uses of the sea, the exploitation of its resources, and the exercise of jurisdiction over
maritime regimes. It is a branch of public international law, regulating the relations of states with respect
to the uses of the oceans."28 The UNCLOS is a multilateral treaty which was opened for signature on
December 10, 1982 at Montego Bay, Jamaica. It was ratified by the Philippines in 1984 but came into
force on November 16, 1994 upon the submission of the 60th ratification.
The UNCLOS is a product of international negotiation that seeks to balance State sovereignty (mare
clausum) and the principle of freedom of the high seas (mare liberum).29 The freedom to use the world's
marine waters is one of the oldest customary principles of international law. 30 The UNCLOS gives to the
coastal State sovereign rights in varying degrees over the different zones of the sea which are: 1)
internal waters, 2) territorial sea, 3) contiguous zone, 4) exclusive economic zone, and 5) the high seas.
It also gives coastal States more or less jurisdiction over foreign vessels depending on where the vessel
is located.31
Insofar as the internal waters and territorial sea is concerned, the Coastal State exercises sovereignty,
subject to the UNCLOS and other rules of international law. Such sovereignty extends to the air space
over the territorial sea as well as to its bed and subsoil.32
In the case of warships,33 as pointed out by Justice Carpio, they continue to enjoy sovereign immunity
subject to the following exceptions:
Article 30
Non-compliance by warships with the laws and regulations of the coastal State
If any warship does not comply with the laws and regulations of the coastal State concerning passage
through the territorial sea and disregards any request for compliance therewith which is made to it, the
coastal State may require it to leave the territorial sea immediately.
Article 31
Responsibility of the flag State for damage caused by a warship
or other government ship operated for non-commercial purposes
The flag State shall bear international responsibility for any loss or damage to the coastal State resulting
from the non-compliance by a warship or other government ship operated for non-commercial purposes
with the laws and regulations of the coastal State concerning passage through the territorial sea or with
the provisions of this Convention or other rules of international law.
Article 32
Immunities of warships and other government ships operated for non-commercial purposes
With such exceptions as are contained in subsection A and in articles 30 and 31, nothing in this
Convention affects the immunities of warships and other government ships operated for non-commercial
purposes. (Emphasis supplied.) A foreign warship's unauthorized entry into our internal waters with
resulting damage to marine resources is one situation in which the above provisions may apply. But
what if the offending warship is a non-party to the UNCLOS, as in this case, the US?
An overwhelming majority - over 80% -- of nation states are now members of UNCLOS, but despite this
the US, the world's leading maritime power, has not ratified it.
While the Reagan administration was instrumental in UNCLOS' negotiation and drafting, the U.S.
delegation ultimately voted against and refrained from signing it due to concerns over deep seabed
mining technology transfer provisions contained in Part XI. In a remarkable, multilateral effort to induce
U.S. membership, the bulk of UNCLOS member states cooperated over the succeeding decade to
revise the objection.able provisions. The revisions satisfied the Clinton administration, which signed the
revised Part XI implementing agreement in 1994. In the fall of 1994, President Clinton transmitted
UNCLOS and the Part XI implementing agreement to the Senate requesting its advice and consent.
Despite consistent support from President Clinton, each of his successors, and an ideologically diverse
array of stakeholders, the Senate has since withheld the consent required for the President to
internationally bind the United States to UNCLOS.
While UNCLOS cleared the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) during the 108th and 110th
Congresses, its progress continues to be hamstrung by significant pockets of political ambivalence over
U.S. participation in international institutions. Most recently, 111 th Congress SFRC Chairman Senator
John Kerry included "voting out" UNCLOS for full Senate consideration among his highest priorities. This
did not occur, and no Senate action has been taken on UNCLOS by the 112th Congress. 34
Justice Carpio invited our attention to the policy statement given by President Reagan on March 10,
1983 that the US will "recognize the rights of the other , states in the waters off their coasts, as reflected
in the convention [UNCLOS], so long as the rights and freedom of the United States and others under
international law are recognized by such coastal states", and President Clinton's reiteration of the US
policy "to act in a manner consistent with its [UNCLOS] provisions relating to traditional uses of the
oceans and to encourage other countries to do likewise." Since Article 31 relates to the "traditional uses
of the oceans," and "if under its policy, the US 'recognize[s] the rights of the other states in the waters off
their coasts,"' Justice Carpio postulates that "there is more reason to expect it to recognize the rights of
other states in their internal waters, such as the Sulu Sea in this case."
As to the non-ratification by the US, Justice Carpio emphasizes that "the US' refusal to join the UN
CLOS was centered on its disagreement with UN CLOS' regime of deep seabed mining (Part XI) which
considers the oceans and deep seabed commonly owned by mankind," pointing out that such "has
nothing to do with its [the US'] acceptance of customary international rules on navigation."
It may be mentioned that even the US Navy Judge Advocate General's Corps publicly endorses the
ratification of the UNCLOS, as shown by the following statement posted on its official website:
The Convention is in the national interest of the United States because it establishes stable maritime
zones, including a maximum outer limit for territorial seas; codifies innocent passage, transit passage,
and archipelagic sea lanes passage rights; works against "jurisdictiomtl creep" by preventing coastal
nations from expanding their own maritime zones; and reaffirms sovereign immunity of warships,
auxiliaries anJ government aircraft.
xxxx
Economically, accession to the Convention would support our national interests by enhancing the ability
of the US to assert its sovereign rights over the resources of one of the largest continental shelves in the
world. Further, it is the Law of the Sea Convention that first established the concept of a maritime
Exclusive Economic Zone out to 200 nautical miles, and recognized the rights of coastal states to
conserve and manage the natural resources in this Zone.35
We fully concur with Justice Carpio's vview that non-membership in the UNCLOS does not mean that
the US will disregard the rights of the Philippines as a Coastal State over its internal waters and
territorial sea. We thus expect the US to bear "international responsibility" under Art. 31 in connection
with the USS Guardian grounding which adversely affected the Tubbataha reefs. Indeed, it is difficult to
imagine that our long-time ally and trading partner, which has been actively supporting the country's
efforts to preserve our vital marine resources, would shirk from its obligation to compensate the damage
caused by its warship while transiting our internal waters. Much less can we comprehend a Government
exercising leadership in international affairs, unwilling to comply with the UNCLOS directive for all
nations to cooperate in the global task to protect and preserve the marine environment as provided in
Article 197, viz:
Article 197
Cooperation on a global or regional basis
States shall cooperate on a global basis and, as appropriate, on a regional basis, directly or through
competent international organizations, in formulating and elaborating international rules, standards and
recommended practices and procedures consistent with this Convention, for the protection and
preservation of the marine environment, taking into account characteristic regional features.
In fine, the relevance of UNCLOS provisions to the present controversy is beyond dispute. Although the
said treaty upholds the immunity of warships from the jurisdiction of Coastal States while navigating
the.latter's territorial sea, the flag States shall be required to leave the territorial '::;ea immediately if they
flout the laws and regulations of the Coastal State, and they will be liable for damages caused by their
warships or any other government vessel operated for non-commercial purposes under Article 31.
Petitioners argue that there is a waiver of immunity from suit found in the VFA. Likewise, they invoke
federal statutes in the US under which agencies of the US have statutorily waived their immunity to any
action. Even under the common law tort claims, petitioners asseverate that the US respondents are
liable for negligence, trespass and nuisance.
We are not persuaded.
The VFA is an agreement which defines the treatment of United States troops and personnel visiting the
Philippines to promote "common security interests" between the US and the Philippines in the region. It
provides for the guidelines to govern such visits of military personnel, and further defines the rights of
the United States and the Philippine government in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of
vessel and aircraft, importation and exportation of equipment, materials and supplies. 36 The invocation of
US federal tort laws and even common law is thus improper considering that it is the VF A which
governs disputes involving US military ships and crew navigating Philippine waters in pursuance of the
objectives of the agreement.
As it is, the waiver of State immunity under the VF A pertains only to criminal jurisdiction and not to
special civil actions such as the present petition for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan. In fact, it can be
inferred from Section 17, Rule 7 of the Rules that a criminal case against a person charged with a
violation of an environmental law is to be filed separately:
SEC. 17. Institution of separate actions.-The filing of a petition for the issuance of the writ of kalikasan
shall not preclude the filing of separate civil, criminal or administrative actions.
In any case, it is our considered view that a ruling on the application or non-application of criminal
jurisdiction provisions of the VF A to US personnel who may be found responsible for the grounding of
the USS Guardian, would be premature and beyond the province of a petition for a writ of Kalikasan. We
also find it unnecessary at this point to determine whether such waiver of State immunity is indeed
absolute. In the same vein, we cannot grant damages which have resulted from the violation of
environmental laws. The Rules allows the recovery of damages, including the collection of administrative
fines under R.A. No. 10067, in a separate civil suit or that deemed instituted with the criminal action
charging the same violation of an environmental law. 37
Section 15, Rule 7 enumerates the reliefs which may be granted in a petition for issuance of a writ of
Kalikasan, to wit:
SEC. 15. Judgment.-Within sixty (60) days from the time the petition is submitted for decision, the court
shall render judgment granting or denying the privilege of the writ of kalikasan.
The reliefs that may be granted under the writ are the following:
(a) Directing respondent to permanently cease and desist from committing acts or neglecting the
performance of a duty in violation of environmental laws resulting in environmental destruction or
damage;
(b) Directing the respondent public official, govemment agency, private person or entity to protect,
preserve, rehabilitate or restore the environment;
(c) Directing the respondent public official, government agency, private person or entity to monitor strict
compliance with the decision and orders of the court;
(d) Directing the respondent public official, government agency, or private person or entity to make
periodic reports on the execution of the final judgment; and
(e) Such other reliefs which relate to the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology or to the
protection, preservation, rehabilitation or restoration of the environment, except the award of damages to
individual petitioners. (Emphasis supplied.)
We agree with respondents (Philippine officials) in asserting that this petition has become moot in the
sense that the salvage operation sought to be enjoined or restrained had already been accomplished
when petitioners sought recourse from this Court. But insofar as the directives to Philippine respondents
to protect and rehabilitate the coral reef stn icture and marine habitat adversely affected by the
grounding incident are concerned, petitioners are entitled to these reliefs notwithstanding the completion
of the removal of the USS Guardian from the coral reef. However, we are mindful of the fact that the US
and Philippine governments both expressed readiness to negotiate and discuss the matter of
compensation for the damage caused by the USS Guardian. The US Embassy has also declared it is
closely coordinating with local scientists and experts in assessing the extent of the damage and
appropriate methods of rehabilitation.
Exploring avenues for settlement of environmental cases is not proscribed by the Rules. As can be
gleaned from the following provisions, mediation and settlement are available for the consideration of the
parties, and which dispute resolution methods are encouraged by the court, to wit:
RULE3
xxxx
SEC. 3. Referral to mediation.-At the start of the pre-trial conference, the court shall inquire from the
parties if they have settled the dispute; otherwise, the court shall immediately refer the parties or their
counsel, if authorized by their clients, to the Philippine Mediation Center (PMC) unit for purposes of
mediation. If not available, the court shall refer the case to the clerk of court or legal researcher for
mediation.
Mediation must be conducted within a non-extendible period of thirty (30) days from receipt of notice of
referral to mediation.
The mediation report must be submitted within ten (10) days from the expiration of the 30-day period.
SEC. 4. Preliminary conference.-If mediation fails, the court will schedule the continuance of the pre-trial.
Before the scheduled date of continuance, the court may refer the case to the branch clerk of court for a
preliminary conference for the following purposes:
(a) To assist the parties in reaching a settlement;
xxxx
SEC. 5. Pre-trial conference; consent decree.-The judge shall put the parties and their counsels under
oath, and they shall remain under oath in all pre-trial conferences.
The judge shall exert best efforts to persuade the parties to arrive at a settlement of the dispute. The
judge may issue a consent decree approving the agreement between the parties in accordance with law,
morals, public order and public policy to protect the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology.
xxxx
SEC. 10. Efforts to settle.- The court shall endeavor to make the parties to agree to compromise or settle
in accordance with law at any stage of the proceedings before rendition of judgment. (Underscoring
supplied.)
The Court takes judicial notice of a similar incident in 2009 when a guided-missile cruiser, the USS Port
Royal, ran aground about half a mile off the Honolulu Airport Reef Runway and remained stuck for four
days. After spending $6.5 million restoring the coral reef, the US government was reported to have paid
the State of Hawaii $8.5 million in settlement over coral reef damage caused by the grounding. 38
To underscore that the US government is prepared to pay appropriate compensation for the damage
caused by the USS Guardian grounding, the US Embassy in the Philippines has announced the
formation of a US interdisciplinary scientific team which will "initiate discussions with the Government of
the Philippines to review coral reef rehabilitation options in Tubbataha, based on assessments by
Philippine-based marine scientists." The US team intends to "help assess damage and remediation
options, in coordination with the Tubbataha Management Office, appropriate Philippine government
entities, non-governmental organizations, and scientific experts from Philippine universities." 39
A rehabilitation or restoration program to be implemented at the cost of the violator is also a major relief
that may be obtained under a judgment rendered in a citizens' suit under the Rules, viz:
RULES
SECTION 1. Reliefs in a citizen suit.-If warranted, the court may grant to the plaintiff proper reliefs which
shall include the protection, preservation or rehabilitation of the environment and the payment of
attorney's fees, costs of suit and other litigation expenses. It may also require the violator to submit a
program of rehabilitation or restoration of the environment, the costs of which shall be borne by the
violator, or to contribute to a special trust fund for that purpose subject to the control of the
court.1âwphi1
In the light of the foregoing, the Court defers to the Executive Branch on the matter of compensation and
rehabilitation measures through diplomatic channels. Resolution of these issues impinges on our
relations with another State in the context of common security interests under the VFA. It is settled that
"[t]he conduct of the foreign relations of our government is committed by the Constitution to the
executive and legislative-"the political" --departments of the government, and the propriety of what may
be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision." 40
On the other hand, we cannot grant the additional reliefs prayed for in the petition to order a review of
the VFA and to nullify certain immunity provisions thereof.
As held in BAYAN (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan) v. Exec. Sec. Zamora, 41 the VFA was duly
concurred in by the Philippine Senate and has been recognized as a treaty by the United States as
attested and certified by the duly authorized representative of the United States government. The VF A
being a valid and binding agreement, the parties are required as a matter of international law to abide by
its terms and provisions.42 The present petition under the Rules is not the proper remedy to assail the
constitutionality of its provisions. WHEREFORE, the petition for the issuance of the privilege of the Writ
of Kalikasan is hereby DENIED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice
3
"AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE TUBBATAHA REEFS NATURAL PARK IN THE PROVINCE OF
PALAWAN AS A PROTECTED AREA UNDER THE NIPAS ACT (R.A. 7586) AND THE STRATEGIC
ENVIRONMENTAL PLAN (SEP) FOR PALAWAN ACT (R.A. 7611), PROVIDING FOR ITS
MANAGEMENT AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES."
5
< http://manila.usembassy.gov/pressphotoreleases2013/navy-commander-expresses-regret-
concerning-uss-guardian-grounding.html>.
6
"Joint Statement Between The Philippines And The United States On The USS Guardian Grounding
On Tubbatata Reef," February 5, 2013. Accessed. at US Embassy website -
<http://manila.usembassy.gov/jointstatementguardiantubbataha.html>.
8
Id. at 156-191. In a letter dated 27 May 2013, the DFA's Office of Legal Affairs informed this Court that
it has received from the Embassy of the United States the Notice sent by this Court, with a request to
return the same. It said that the US Embassy "assert
G.R. No. L- 24548 October 27, 1983

WENCESLAO VlNZONS TAN, THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, APOLONIO THE SECRETARY OF

AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES JOSE Y. FELICIANO, respondents-appelllees,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, APOLONIO RIVERA, THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND
N ATURAL RESOURCES JOSE Y. FELICIANO, respon dents-appellees,RAVAGO COMMERCIAL
CO., JORGE LAO HAPPICK and ATANACIO MALLARI, intervenors,

Camito V Pelianco Jr. for petitioner-appellant.

Solicitor General for respondent Director.

Estelito P. Mendoza for respondent Ravago Comm'l Co.

Anacleto Badoy for respondent Atanacio Mallari.

Mariano de Joya, Jr. for respondent Jorge Lao Happick, Jr.

MAKASIAR, J:

This is an appeal from the order dated January 20, 1965 of the then Court of First Instance of Manila,
Branch VII, in Civil Case No. 56813, a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary
prohibitory injunction (p. 2. rec.), which dismissed the petition of petitioner-appellant Wenceslao Vinzons
Tan on the ground that it does not state a sufficient cause of action, and upon the respondents-
appellees' (Secretary of Agriculture and Natural resources and the Director of Forestry) motion to
dismiss (p. 28, rec.).

Sometime in April 1961, the Bureau of Forestry issued Notice No. 2087, advertising for public bidding a
certain tract of public forest land situated in Olongapo, Zambales, provided tenders were received on or
before May 22, 1961 (p. 15, CFI rec.). This public forest land, consisting of 6,420 hectares, is located
within the former U.S. Naval Reservation comprising 7,252 hectares of timberland, which was turned
over by the United States Government to the Philippine Government (P. 99, CFI rec.).

On May 5, 1961, petitioner-appellant Wenceslao Vinzons Tan submitted his application in due form after
paying the necessary fees and posting tile required bond therefor. Nine other applicants submitted their
offers before the deadline (p. 29, rec.).

Thereafter, questions arose as to the wisdom of having the area declared as a forest reserve or allow
the same to be awarded to the most qualified bidder. On June 7, 1961, then President Carlos P. Garcia
issued a directive to the Director of the Bureau of Forestry, which read as follows:

It is desired that the area formerly covered by the Naval Reservation be made a forest
reserve for watershed purposes. Prepare and submit immediately a draft of a proclamation
establishing the said area as a watershed forest reserve for Olongapo, Zambales. It is also
desired that the bids received by the Bureau of Forestry for the issuance of the timber
license in the area during the public bidding conducted last May 22, 1961 be rejected in
order that the area may be reserved as above stated. ...

(SGD.) CARLOS P.
GARCIA

(pp. 98, CFI rec.).

On August 3, 1961, Secretary Cesar M. Fortich of Agriculture and Natural Resources sustained the
findings and re comendations of the Director of Forestry who concluded that "it would be beneficial to the
public interest if the area is made available for exploitation under certain conditions," and

We quote:

Respectfully forwarded to the honorable, the Executive Secretary Malacanang. Manila

inviting particular attention to the comment and recommendation of the Director of Forestry
in the proceeding in indorsement in which this Of fice fully concurs.
 The observations of responsible forest officials are most revealing of their zeal to promote
forest conservation and watershed protection especially in Olongapo, Zambales area. In
convincing fashion, they have demonstrated that to declare the forest area involved as a
forest reserve ratify than open it for timber exploitation under license and regulation would
do more harm than of to the public interest. To convert the area into a forest reserve
without an adequate forest protection force, would make of it a 'Free Zone and Logging
Paradise,' to the ever 'Problem Loggers' of Dinalupihan, Bataan . . . an open target of
timber smugglers, kaingineros and other forms of forest vandals and despoilers. On the
other hand, to award the area, as planned, to a reputable and responsible licensee who
shall conduct logging operations therein under the selective logging method and who shall
be obliged to employ a sufficient number of forest guards to patrol and protect the forest
consecration and watershed protection.

Worthy of mention is the fact that the Bureau of Forestry had already conducted a public
bidding to determine the most qualified bidder to whom the area advertised should be
awarded. Needless to stress, the decision of the Director of Forestry to dispose of the area
thusly was arrived at after much thought and deliberation and after having been convinced
that to do so would not adversely affect the watershed in that sector. The result of the
bidding only have to be announced. To be sure, some of the participating bidders like Mr.
Edgardo Pascual, went to much expense in the hope of winning a virgin forest concession.
To suddenly make a turn about of this decision without strong justifiable grounds, would
cause the Bureau of Forestry and this Office no end of embarrassment.

In view of the foregoing, it is earnestly urged that the Director of Forestry be allowed to
proceed with the announcement of the results of the bidding for the subject forest area (p.
13, CFI rec.).

The Office of the President in its 4th Indorsement dated February 2, 1962, signed by Atty. Juan Cancio,
Acting Legal Officer, "respectfully returned to the Honorable Secretary of the Department of Agriculture
and Natural Resources for appropriate action," the papers subject of Forestry Notice No. 2087 which
was referred to the Bureau of Forestry for decision (p. 14, CFI rec.).

Finally, of the ten persons who submitted proposed the area was awarded to herein petitioner-appellant
Wenceslao Vinzons Tan, on April 15, 1963 by the Bureau of Forestry (p. 17, CFI rec.). Against this
award, bidders Ravago Commercial Company and Jorge Lao Happick filed motions for reconsideration
which were denied by the Director of Forestry on December 6, 1963.

On May 30, 1963, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Benjamin M. Gozon — who
succeeded Secretary Cesar M. Fortich in office — issued General Memorandum Order No. 46, series of
1963, pertinent portions of which state:

xxx xxx xxx

SUBJECT: ... ... ...

(D)elegation of authority to the Director of Forestry to grant ordinary timber licenses.

1. ... ... ...

2. The Director of Forestry is hereby authorized to grant (a) new ordinary timber licenses
where the area covered thereby is not more than 3,000 hectares each; and (be the
extension of ordinary timber licenses for areas not exceeding 5,000 hectares each;

3. This Order shall take effect immediately (p. 267, CFI rec.).

Thereafter, Jose Y. Feliciano was appointed as Acting secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
replacing secretary Benjamin M. Gozon. Upon assumption of office he Immediately promulgate on
December 19, 19b3 General memorandum Order No. 60, revoking the authority delegated to the
Director of Forestry, under General Memorandum order No. 46, to grant ordinary timber licenses, which
order took effect on the same day, December 19, 1963. Pertinent portions of the said Order read as
follows:

xxx xxx xxx

SUBJECT: Revocation of General Memorandum Order No 46 dated May 30, 1963 —

 1. In order to acquaint the undersigned with the volume and Nature of the work of the
Department, the authority delegated to the Director of forestry under General
Memorandum Order No. 46, dated May 30, 1963, to grant (a) new ordinary timber licenses
where the area covered thereby is not more than 3,000 hectares each; and (b) the
extension of ordinary timber licenses for areas not exceeding 3,000 hectares each is
hereby revoked. Until further notice, the issuance of' new licenses , including amendments
thereto, shall be signed by the secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.

2. This Order shall take effect immediately and all other previous orders, directives,
circulars, memoranda, rules and regulations inconsistent with this Order are hereby
revoked (p. 268, CFl rec.; Emphasis supplied).

On the same date that the above-quoted memorandum took effect, December 19, 1963, Ordinary
Timber License No. 20-'64 (NEW) dated April 22, 1963, in the name of Wenceslao Vinzons Tan, was
signed by then Acting Director of Forestry Estanislao R. Bernal without the approval of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources. On January 6, 1964, the license was released by the Office of the
Director of Forestry (p. 30, CFI rec.; p. 77, rec.). It was not signed by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources as required by Order No. 60 aforequoted.

On February 12, 1964, Ravago Commercial Company wrote a letter to the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources shall be considered by tile Natural Resources praying that, pending resolution of the
appeal filed by Ravago Commercial Company and Jorge Lao Happick from the order of the Director of
Forestry denying their motion for reconsideration, OTI No. 20-'64 in the name of Wenceslao V. Tan be
cancelled or revoked on the ground that the grant thereof was irregular, anomalous and contrary to
existing forestry laws, rules and regulations.

On March 9, 1964, acting on the said representation made by Ravago Commercial Company, the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources promulgated an order declaring Ordinary Timber
License No. 20-'64 issued in the name of Wenceslao Vinzons Tan, as having been issued by the
Director of Forestry without authority, and is therefore void ab initio. The dispositive portion of said order
reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Office is of the opinion and so holds that O.T.
License No. 20-'64 in the name of Wenceslao Vinzons Tan should be, as hereby it is,
REVOKED AND DECLARED without force and effect whatsoever from the issuance
thereof.

The Director of Forestry is hereby directed to stop the logging operations of Wenceslao
Vinzons Tan, if there be any, in the area in question and shall see to it that the appellee
shall not introduce any further improvements thereon pending the disposition of the
appeals filed by Ravago Commercial Company and Jorge lao Happick in this case" (pp.
30-31, CFI rec.).

Petitioner-appellant moved for a reconsideration of the order, but the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources denied the motion in an Order dated March 25, 1964, wherein this paragraph
appears:

In this connection, it has been observed by the Acting Director of Forestry in his 2nd
indorsement of February 12, 1964, that the area in question composes of water basin
overlooking Olongapo, including the proposed Olongapo watershed Reservation; and that
the United States as well as the Bureau of Forestry has earmarked this entire watershed
for a watershed pilot forest for experiment treatment Concerning erosion and water
conservation and flood control in relation to wise utilization of the forest, denudation,
shifting cultivation, increase or decrease of crop harvest of agricultural areas influenced by
the watershed, etc. .... (pp. 3839, CFI rec.; p. 78, rec.).

On April 11, 1964, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, acting on the separate appeals
filed by Jorge Lao Happick and Ravago Commercial Company, from the order of the Director of Forestry
dated April 15, 1963, awarding to Wenceslao Vinzons Tan the area under Notive No. 2087, and rejecting
the proposals of the other applicants covering the same area, promulgated an order commenting that in
view of the observations of the Director of Forestry just quoted, "to grant the area in question to any of
the parties herein, would undoubtedly adversely affect public interest which is paramount to private
interests," and concluding that, "for this reason, this Office is of the opinion and so holds, that without the
necessity of discussing the appeals of the herein appellants, the said appeals should be, as hereby they
are, dismissed and this case is considered a closed matter insofar as this Office is concerned" (p. 78,
rec.).

On April 18, 1964, on the basis of the denial of his motion for reconsideration by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, petitioner-appellant filed the instant case before tile court a
quo (Court of First Instance, Manila), Special Civil Action No. 56813, a petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus with preliminary prohibitory injunction (pp. 1-12, CFI rec.). Petitioner-appellant claims
that the respondents-appellees "unlawfully, illegally whimsically, capriciously and arbitrarily acted without
or in excess of their jurisdiction, and/or with grave abuse of discretion by revoking a valid and existing
timber license without just cause, by denying petitioner-appellant of the equal protection of the laws, by
depriving him of his constitutional right to property without due process of law, and in effect, by impairing
the obligation of contracts" (P. 6, CFI rec.). Petitioner-appellant prayed for judgment making permanent
the writ of preliminary injunction against the respondents- appellees; declaring the orders of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources dated March 9, March 25, and April 11, 1964, as well as
all his acts and those of the Director of Forestry implementing said orders, and all the proceedings in
connection therewith, null and void, unlawful and of no force and effect; ordering the Director of Forestry
to renew OTI No. 20-'64 upon expiration, and sentencing the respondents, jointly and severally, to pay
the petitioner-appellant the sum of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.000) by way of pecuniary
damage, One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) by way of moral and exemplary damages, and
Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000-00) as attorney's fees and costs. The respondents-appellees
separately filed oppositions to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, Ravago Commercial
Company, Jorge Lao, Happick and Atanacio Mallari, presented petitions for intervention which were
granted, and they too opposed the writ.

The Director of Forestry in his motion to dismiss dated April 24, 1964, alleges the following grounds: (1)
that the court has no jurisdiction; (2) that the respondents may not be sued without their consent; (3) that
the petitioner has not exhausted all available administrative remedies; (4) that the petition does not state
a cause of action; and (5) that purely administrative and discretionary functions of administrative officials
may not be interfered with by the courts. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources joined the
motion to dismiss when in his answer of May 18, 1964, he avers the following special and affirmative
defenses: (1) that the court has no jurisdiction to entertain the action for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus; (2) that the petitioner has no cause of action; (3) that venue is improperly laid; (4) that the
State is immune from suit without its consent; (5) that the court has no power to interfere in purely
administrative functions; and (6) that the cancellation of petitioner's license was dictated by public policy
(pp. 172-177, rec.). Intervenors also filed their respective answers in intervention with special and
affirmative defenses (pp. 78-79, rec.). A hearing was held on the petition for the issuance of writ of
preliminary injunction, wherein evidence was submitted by all the parties including the intervenors, and
extensive discussion was held both orally and in writing.

After the said hearing, on January 20, 1965, the court a quo, from the evidence received, resolved not
only the question on the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction but also the motion to dismiss,
declared that the petition did not state a sufficient cause of action, and dismissed the same accordingly.
To justify such action, the trial court, in its order dismissing the petition, stated that "the court feels that
the evidence presented and the extensive discussion on the issuance of the writ of preliminary
mandatory and prohibitory injunction should also be taken into consideration in resolving not only this
question but also the motion to dismiss, because there is no reason to believe that the parties will
change their stand, arguments and evidence" (p. 478, CFI rec.). His motion for reconsideration having
been denied (p. 488, CFI rec.), petitioner-appellant Wenceslao Vinzons Tan appealed directly to this
Court.

Petitioner-appellant now comes before this Court, claiming that the trial court erred in:

(1) holding that the petition does not state a sufficient cause of action: and

(2) dismissing the petition [p.27,rec. ].

He argues that the sole issue in the present case is, whether or not the facts in the petition constitute a
sufficient cause of action (p. 31, rec.). Petitioner-appellant, in his brief, presented a lengthy discussion
on the definition of the term cause of action wherein he contended that the three essential elements
thereon, — namely, the legal right of the plaintiff, the correlative obligation of the defendants and the act
or omission of the defendant in violation of that right — are satisfied in the averments of this petition (pp.
31-32, rec.). He invoked the rule that when the ground for dismissal is that the complaint states no cause
of action, such fact can be determined only from the facts alleged in the complaint and from no other,
and the court cannot consider other matters aliunde He further invoked the rule that in a motion to
dismiss based on insufficiency of cause of action, the facts alleged in the complaint are deemed
hypothetically admitted for the purpose of the motion (pp. 32-33, rec.).

A perusal of the records of the case shows that petitioner-appellant's contentions are untenable. As
already observed, this case was presented to the trial court upon a motion to dismiss for failure of the
petition to state a claim upon which relief could be granted (Rule 16 [g], Revised Rules of Court), on the
ground that the timber license relied upon by the petitioner- appellant in his petition was issued by the
Director of Forestry without authority and is therefore void ab initio. This motion supplanted the general
demurrer in an action at law and, as a rule admits, for the purpose of the motion, ail facts which are well
pleaded however while the court must accept as true all well pleaded facts, the motion does not admit
allegations of which the court will take judicial notice are not true, nor does the rule apply to legally
impossible facts, nor to facts inadmissible in evidence, nor to facts which appear by record or document
included in the pleadings to be unfounded (Vol. 1, Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 ed.,
p. 505, citing cases).

It must be noted that there was a hearing held in the instant case wherein answers were interposed and
evidence introduced. In the course of the hearing, petitioner-appellant had the opportunity to introduce
evidence in support of tile allegations iii his petition, which he readily availed of. Consequently, he is
estopped from invoking the rule that to determine the sufficiency of a cause of action on a motion to
dismiss, only the facts alleged in the complaint must be considered. If there were no hearing held, as in
the case of Cohen vs. U.S. CCA Minn 1942,129 F. 2d 733), "where the case was presented to District
Court upon a motion to dismiss because of alleged failure of complaint to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted, and no answer was interposed and no evidence introduced, the only facts which the
court could properly consider in passing upon the motion were those facts appearing in the complaint,
supplemented be such facts as the court judicially knew.

In Llanto vs. Ali Dimaporo, et al. (16 SCRA 601, March 31, 1966), this Court, thru Justice Conrado V.
Sanchez, held that the trial court can properly dismiss a complaint on a motion to dismiss due to lack of
cause of action even without a hearing, by taking into consideration the discussion in said motion and
the opposition thereto. Pertinent portion of said decision is hereby quoted:

Respondents moved to dismiss. Ground therefor is lack of cause of action. The Court
below granted the motion, dismissed the petition. The motion to reconsider failed. Offshoot
is this appeal.

1. The threshold questions are these: Was the dismissal order issued without
any hearing on the motion to dismiss? Is it void?

WE go to the record. The motion to dismiss was filed on February 1, 1961 and set for hearing on
February 10 following. On February 8, 1961 petitioner's counsel telegraphed the court, (r)equest
postponement motion dismissal till written opposition filed.' He did not appear at the scheduled hearing.
But on March 4, 1961, he followed up his wire, with his written opposition to the motion to dismiss.
Adverting to the 5-pa
Petitioner-appellant not only failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, but also failed to note that his
action is a suit against the State which, under the doctrine of State immunity from suit, cannot prosper
unless the State gives its consent to be sued Kawananakoa vs. Polybank, 205 U.S. 349; Siren vs. U.S.,
7 Wall. 152; Sec. 16, Art. XV, 1973 Constitution).

The respondents-appellees, in revoking the petitioner-appellant's timber license, were acting within the
scope of their authority. Petitioner-appellant contends that "this case is not a suit against the State but
an application of a sound principle of law whereby administrative decisions or actuations may be
reviewed by the courts as a protection afforded the citizens against oppression" (p. 122, CFI rec.). But,
piercing the shard of his contention, We find that petitioner-appellant's action is just an attempt to
circumvent the rule establishing State exemption from suits. He cannot use that principle of law to profit
at the expense and prejudice of the State and its citizens. The promotion of public welfare and the
protection of the inhabitants near the public forest are property, rights and interest of the State.
Accordingly, "the rule establishing State exeraiption from suits may not be circumvented by directing the
action against the officers of the State instead of against the State itself. In such cases the State's
immunity may be validly invoked against the action as long as it can be shown that the suit really affects
the property, rights, or interests of the State and not merely those of the officer nominally made party
defendant" (SINCO, Phil. Political Law, 10th ed., p. 35; Salgado vs. Ramos, 64 Phil. 724; see also Angat
River Irrigation System vs. Angat River Workers' Union, G.R. No. L-10943-44, Dec. 28, 1957, 102 Phil.
789, 800-802; Mobil PhiL vs. Customs Arrastre Service, 18 SCRA 1120, 1121-1125; Bureau of Printing
vs. Bureau of Printing Employees' Association, 1 SCRA 340, 341, 343).
Both the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Director of Forestry acted in their
capacity as officers of the State, representatives of the sovereign authority discharging governmental
powers. A private individual cannot issue a timber license.

Consequently, a favorable judgment for the petitioner-appellant would result in the government losing a
substantial part of its timber resources. This being the case, petitioner-appellant's action cannot prosper
unless the State gives its consent to be sued.

IV

Granting arguendo, that petitioner-appellant's timber license is valid, still respondents-appellees can
validly revoke his timber license. As pointed out earlier, paragraph 27 of the rules and regulations
included in the ordinary timber license states: "The terms and conditions of this license are subject to
change at the discretion of the Director of Forestry, and that this license may be made to expire at an
earlier date, when public interests so require" (Exh. D, p. 22, CFI rec.). A timber license is an instrument
by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public
welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause; it is
only a license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public
welfare as in this ceise

"A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract
between the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted;
neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation" (37 C.J. 168).
Thus, this Court held that the granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property
or property rights (People vs. Ong Tin 54 O.G. 7576). In the case of Pedro vs. Provincial Board of Rizal
(56 Phil. 123), it was held that:

A license authorizing the operation and exploitation of a cockpit is not property of which the
holder may not be deprived without due process of law, but a mere privilege which may be
revoked when public interests so require.

The welfare of the people is the supreme law. Thus, no franchise or right can be availed of to defeat the
proper exercise of police power (Surigao Electric Co., Inc. vs. Municipality of Surigao, 24 SCRA 898,
Aug. 30, 1968). The State has inherent power enabling it to prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety,
and welfare of society (Edu vs. Ericta, 35 SCRA 481, Oct. 24,1970).

As provided in the aforecited provision, timber licenses are subject to the authority of the Director of
Forestry. The utilization and disposition of forest resources is directly under the control and supervision
of the Director of Forestry. However, "while Section 1831 of the Revised Administrative Code provides
that forest products shall be cut, gathered and removed from any forest only upon license from the
Director of Forestry, it is no less true that as a subordinate officer, the Director of Forestry is subject to
the control of the Department Head or the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (See. 79[c],
Rev. Adm. Code), who, therefore, may impose reasonable regulations in the exercise of the powers of
the subordinate officer" (Director of Forestry vs. Benedicto, 104 SCRA 309, May 5, 1981). The power of
control of the Department Head over bureaus and offices includes the power to modify, reverse or set
aside acts of subordinate officials (Province of Pangasinan vs. Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, 30 SCRA 134, Oct. 31, 1969; Montano vs. Silvosa, 97 Phil. 143, 144, 147-148).
Accordingly, respondent-appellee Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources has the authority to
revoke, on valid grounds, timber licenses issued by the Director of Forestry. There being supporting
evidence, the revocation of petitioner-appellant's timber license was a wise exercise of the power of the
respondent- appellee (Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources) and therefore, valid.

Thus, "this Court had rigorously adhered to the principle of conserving forest resources, as corollary to
which the alleged right to them of private individuals or entities was meticulously inquired into and more
often than not rejected. We do so again" (Director of Forestry vs. Benedicto, supra). WE reiterate Our
fidelity to the basic policy of conserving the national patrimony as ordained by the Constitution.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, THE ORDER APPEALED FROM IS HEREBY
.AFFIRMED IN TOTO. COSTS AGAINST PETITIONER-APPELLANT.

SO ORDERED,

US v. Ruiz (Consti1)
 US v. Ruiz
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CAPT. JAMES E. GALLOWAY, WILLIAM I. COLLINS and ROBERT
GOHIER, petitioners, vs. HON. V. M. RUIZ, Presiding Judge of Branch XV, Court of First Instance of
Rizal and ELIGIO DE GUZMAN & CO., INC., respondents.
En Banc
Doctrine: implied consent
Date: May 22, 1985
Ponente: Justice Abad-Santos

Facts:

 At times material to this case, the United States of America had a naval base in Subic, Zambales.
The base was one of those provided in the Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the
United States.
 US invited the submission of bids for Repair offender system and Repair typhoon damages. Eligio
de Guzman & Co., Inc. responded to the invitation, submitted bids and complied with the requests based
on the letters received from the US.
 In June 1972, a letter was received by the Eligio De Guzman & Co indicating that the company
did not qualify to receive an award for the projects because of its previous unsatisfactory performance
rating on a repair contract for the sea wall at the boat landings of the U.S. Naval Station in Subic Bay.
 The company sued the United States of America and Messrs. James E. Galloway, William I.
Collins and Robert Gohier all members of the Engineering Command of the U.S. Navy. The complaint is
to order the defendants to allow the plaintiff to perform the work on the projects and, in the event that
specific performance was no longer possible, to order the defendants to pay damages. The company
also asked for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the defendants from entering
into contracts with third parties for work on the projects.
 The defendants entered their special appearance for the purpose only of questioning the
jurisdiction of this court over the subject matter of the complaint and the persons of defendants, the
subject matter of the complaint being acts and omissions of the individual defendants as agents of
defendant United States of America, a foreign sovereign which has not given her consent to this suit or
any other suit for the causes of action asserted in the complaint." (Rollo, p. 50.)
 Subsequently the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint which included an opposition
to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. The company opposed the motion.
 The trial court denied the motion and issued the writ. The defendants moved twice to reconsider
but to no avail.
 Hence the instant petition which seeks to restrain perpetually the proceedings in Civil Case No.
779-M for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court.
Issue/s:

 WON the US naval base in bidding for said contracts exercise governmental functions to be able
to invoke state immunity

Held:
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the questioned orders of the respondent judge are set aside and
Civil Case No. is dismissed. Costs against the private respondent.

Ratio:
 The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another
State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of
independence and equality of States. However, the rules of International Law are not petrified; they are
constantly developing and evolving. And because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been
necessary to distinguish them-between sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and private,
commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity now extends only to
acts jure imperil (sovereign & governmental acts)
 The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of
commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated
differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed
to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply
where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case the projects are an
integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the United States and the
Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the highest order; they are not utilized for nor
dedicated to commercial or business purposes.
 correct test for the application of State immunity is not the conclusion of a contract by a State but
the legal nature of the act

REPUBLIC v. SANDIGANBAYAN, GR No. 104768, 2003-07-21

Facts:
Immediately upon her assumption to office following the successful EDSA Revolution, then President
Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order No. 1 ("EO No. 1") creating the Presidential Commission on
Good Government ("PCGG"). EO No. 1 primarily tasked the PCGG to recover all... ill-gotten wealth of
former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close
associates. EO No. 1 vested the PCGG with the power "(a) to conduct investigation as may be
necessary in order to accomplish and carry out the purposes of this... order" and the power "(h) to
promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purpose of this order."
Accordingly, the PCGG, through its then Chairman Jovito R. Salonga, created an AFP Anti-Graft Board
("AFP Board") tasked to investigate reports of... unexplained wealth and corrupt practices by AFP
personnel, whether in the active service or retired.
. On 27 July 1987, the AFP Board issued a Resolution on its findings and recommendation on the
reported unexplained wealth of
Ramas.
Evidence in the record showed that respondent is the owner of a house and lot located at 15-Yakan St.,
La Vista, Quezon City. He is also the owner of a house and lot located in Cebu City. The lot has an area
of 3,327 square meters.
Affidavits of members of the Military Security Unit, Military Security Command, Philippine Army,
stationed at Camp Eldridge, Los Baños, Laguna, disclosed that Elizabeth Dimaano is the mistress of
respondent. That respondent usually goes and stays and sleeps in the alleged house... of Elizabeth
Dimaano in Barangay Tengga, Itaas, Batangas City and when he arrives, Elizabeth Dimaano embraces
and kisses respondent. That on February 25, 1986, a person who rode in a car went to the residence of
Elizabeth Dimaano with four (4) attache cases filled with money and... owned by MGen Ramas.
Sworn statement in the record disclosed also that Elizabeth Dimaano had no visible means of income
and is supported by respondent for she was formerly a mere secretary.
Taking in toto the evidence, Elizabeth Dimaano could not have used the military equipment/items seized
in her house on March 3, 1986 without the consent of respondent, he being the Commanding General of
the Philippine Army. It is also impossible for Elizabeth Dimaano to... claim that she owns the
P2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars for she had no visible source of income.
Thus, on 1 August 1987, the PCGG filed a petition for forfeiture under Republic Act No. 1379 ("RA No.
1379") [4] against Ramas.
The Amended Complaint alleged that Ramas was the Commanding General of the Philippine Army until
1986. On the other hand, Dimaano was a confidential agent of the Military Security Unit, Philippine
Army, assigned as a clerk-typist at the office of Ramas from 1 January 1978 to
February 1979. The Amended Complaint further alleged that Ramas "acquired funds, assets and
properties manifestly out of proportion to his salary as an army officer and his other income from
legitimately acquired property by taking undue advantage of his public office and/or... using his power,
authority and influence as such officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and as a subordinate and
close associate of the deposed President Ferdinand Marcos."
The Amended Complaint also alleged that the AFP Board, after a previous inquiry, found reasonable
ground to believe that respondents have violated RA No. 1379.[6] The Amended Complaint prayed for,
among others, the forfeiture of respondents' properties,... funds and equipment in favor of the State.
Ramas filed an Answer with Special and/or Affirmative Defenses and Compulsory Counterclaim to the
Amended Complaint. In his Answer, Ramas contended that his property consisted only of a residential
house at La Vista Subdivision, Quezon City, valued at P700,000, which was not out... of proportion to his
salary and other legitimate income. He denied ownership of any mansion in Cebu City and the cash,
communications equipment and other items confiscated from the house of Dimaano.
Dimaano filed her own Answer to the Amended Complaint. Admitting her employment as a clerk-typist in
the office of Ramas from January-November 1978 only, Dimaano claimed ownership of the monies,
communications equipment, jewelry and land titles taken from her house by the
Philippine Constabulary raiding team.
After presenting only three witnesses, petitioner asked for a postponement of the trial.
The Sandiganbayan noted that petitioner had already delayed the case for over a year mainly because
of its many postponements. Moreover, petitioner would want the case to revert to its preliminary stage
when in fact the case had long been ready for trial. The Sandiganbayan... ordered petitioner to prepare
for presentation of its additional evidence, if any.
During the trial on 23 March 1990, petitioner again admitted its inability to present further evidence.
Giving petitioner one more chance to present further evidence or to amend the complaint to conform to
its evidence, the Sandiganbayan reset the trial to 18 May 1990. The
Sandiganbayan, however, hinted that the re-setting was without prejudice to any action that private
respondents might take under the circumstances.
Private respondents then filed their motions to dismiss based on Republic v. Migrino.[9] The Court held
in Migrino that the PCGG does not have jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute military officers by
reason of mere position... held without a showing that they are "subordinates" of former President
Marcos.
On 18 November 1991, the Sandiganbayan rendered a resolution, the dispositive portion of which
states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the Amended Complaint, without
pronouncement as to costs. The counterclaims are likewise dismissed for lack of merit, but the
confiscated sum of money, communications equipment, jewelry and land titles are ordered... returned to
Elizabeth Dimaano
Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
The Sandiganbayan dismissed the Amended Complaint on the following grounds:
(1.)
The actions taken by the PCGG are not in accordance with the rulings of the Supreme Court in Cruz, Jr.
v. Sandiganbayan[10] and Republic v. Migrino[11] which involve the same issues.
(2.)
No previous inquiry similar to preliminary investigations in criminal cases was conducted against Ramas
and Dimaano.
(3.)
The evidence adduced against Ramas does not constitute a prima facie case against him.
(4.)
There was an illegal search and seizure of the items confiscated.
The raiding team seized these items: one baby armalite rifle with two magazines; 40 rounds of 5.56
ammunition; one pistol, caliber .45; communications equipment, cash consisting of
P2,870,000 and US$50,000, jewelry, and land titles.
Issues:
The Issues
PCGG's Jurisdiction to Investigate Private Respondents
Second Issue: Propriety of Dismissal of Case
Before Completion of Presentation of Evidence
Third Issue: Legality of the Search and Seizure
Ruling:
The primary issue for resolution is whether the PCGG has the jurisdiction to investigate and cause the
filing of a forfeiture petition against Ramas and Dimaano for unexplained wealth under RA No. 1379.
We hold that PCGG has no such jurisdiction.
The PCGG created the AFP Board to investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of AFP
personnel, whether in the active service or retired.[15] The PCGG tasked the AFP Board to make the
necessary recommendations to appropriate government agencies... on the action to be taken based on
its findings.[16] The PCGG gave this task to the AFP Board pursuant to the PCGG's power under
Section 3 of EO No. 1 "to conduct investigation as may be necessary in order to accomplish and to carry
out the purposes of this... order." EO No. 1 gave the PCGG specific responsibilities, to wit:
SEC. 2. The Commission shall be charged with the task of assisting the President in regard to the
following matters:
(a)
The recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his
immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether located in the Philippines or
abroad, including the takeover and sequestration of all business... enterprises and entities owned or
controlled by them, during his administration, directly or through nominees, by taking undue advantage
of their public office and/ or using their powers, authority, influence, connections or relationship.
(b)
The investigation of such cases of graft and corruption as the President may assign to the Commission
from time to time.
The PCGG, through the AFP Board, can only investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt practices
of AFP personnel who fall under either of the two categories mentioned in Section 2 of EO No. 1. These
are: (1) AFP personnel who have accumulated ill-gotten wealth during the... administration of former
President Marcos by being the latter's immediate family, relative, subordinate or close associate, taking
undue advantage of their public office or using their powers, influence x x x;[17] or (2) AFP personnel
involved in other... cases of graft and corruption provided the President assigns their cases to the
PCGG.[18]
Petitioner, however, does not claim that the President assigned Ramas' case to the PCGG. Therefore,
Ramas' case should fall under the first category of AFP personnel before the PCGG could exercise its
jurisdiction over him. Petitioner argues that Ramas was undoubtedly a... subordinate of former President
Marcos because of his position as the Commanding General of the Philippine Army. Petitioner claims
that Ramas' position enabled him to receive orders directly from his commander-in-chief, undeniably
making him a subordinate of former President
Marcos.
We hold that Ramas was not a "subordinate" of former President Marcos in the sense contemplated
under EO No. 1 and its amendments.
Mere position held by a military officer does not automatically make him a "subordinate" as this term is
used in EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A absent a showing that he enjoyed close association with former
President Marcos. Migrino discussed this issue in this... wise:
A close reading of EO No. 1 and related executive orders will readily show what is contemplated within
the term `subordinate.' The Whereas Clauses of EO No. 1 express the urgent need to recover the ill-
gotten wealth amassed by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos,... his immediate family, relatives, and
close associates both here and abroad.
EO No. 2 freezes `all assets and properties in the Philippines in which former President Marcos and/or
his wife, Mrs. Imelda Marcos, their close relatives, subordinates, business associates, dummies, agents,
or nominees have any interest or participation.'
Applying the rule in statutory construction known as ejusdem generis that is-
`[W]here general words follow an enumeration of persons or things by words of a particular and specific
meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as
applying only to persons or things of the same kind or class as... those specifically mentioned
T]he term "subordinate" as used in EO Nos. 1 & 2 refers to one who enjoys a close association with
former President Marcos and/or his wife, similar to the immediate family member, relative, and close
associate in EO No. 1 and the close relative, business associate,... dummy, agent, or nominee in EO
No. 2.
There must be a prima facie showing that the respondent unlawfully accumulated wealth by virtue of his
close... association or relation with former Pres. Marcos and/or his wife.
Ramas' position alone as Commanding General of the Philippine Army with the rank of Major
General[19] does not suffice to make him a "subordinate" of former President Marcos for purposes of
EO No. 1 and its amendments. The PCGG has to provide a prima... facie showing that Ramas was a
close associate of former President Marcos, in the same manner that business associates, dummies,
agents or nominees of former President Marcos were close to him. Such close association is manifested
either by Ramas' complicity with former
President Marcos in the accumulation of ill-gotten wealth by the deposed President or by former
President Marcos' acquiescence in Ramas' own accumulation of ill-gotten wealth if any.
This, the PCGG failed to do.
Petitioner's attempt to differentiate the instant case from Migrino does not convince us. Petitioner argues
that unlike in Migrino, the AFP Board Resolution in the instant case states that the AFP Board conducted
the investigation pursuant to EO Nos.
1, 2, 14 and 14-A in relation to RA No. 1379. Petitioner asserts that there is a presumption that the
PCGG was acting within its jurisdiction of investigating crony-related cases of graft and corruption and
that Ramas was truly a subordinate of the former President. However, the... same AFP Board
Resolution belies this contention. Although the Resolution begins with such statement, it ends with the
following recommendation:
V.
RECOMMENDATION:
Wherefore it is recommended that Maj. Gen. Josephus Q. Ramas (ret.) be prosecuted and tried for
violation of RA 3019, as amended, otherwise known as "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act" and RA
1379, as amended, otherwise known as "The Act for the Forfeiture of Unlawfully
Acquired Property."[20]
Thus, although the PCGG sought to investigate and prosecute private respondents under EO Nos. 1, 2,
14 and 14-A, the result yielded a finding of violation of Republic Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379 without any
relation to EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A. This absence of relation to EO No. 1... and its amendments
proves fatal to petitioner's case. EO No. 1 created the PCGG for a specific and limited purpose, and
necessarily its powers must be construed to address such specific and limited purpose.
Moreover, the resolution of the AFP Board and even the Amended Complaint do not show that the
properties Ramas allegedly owned were accumulated by him in his capacity as a "subordinate" of his
commander-in-chief. Petitioner merely enumerated the properties Ramas allegedly owned... and
suggested that these properties were disproportionate to his salary and other legitimate income without
showing that Ramas amassed them because of his close association with former President Marcos.
Petitioner, in fact, admits that the AFP Board resolution does... not contain a finding that Ramas
accumulated his wealth because of his close association with former President Marcos
Such omission is fatal. Petitioner forgets that it is precisely a prima facie showing that the ill-gotten
wealth was accumulated by a "subordinate" of former President Marcos that vests jurisdiction on PCGG.
EO No. 1[22] clearly premises the creation... of the PCGG on the urgent need to recover all ill-gotten
wealth amassed by former President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close
associates. Therefore, to say that such omission was not fatal is clearly contrary to the intent behind the
creation of the
PCGG.
However, other violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act not otherwise falling under the
foregoing categories, require a previous authority of the President for the respondent PCGG to
investigate and prosecute in accordance with Section 2 (b) of Executive Order
No. 1. Otherwise, jurisdiction over such cases is vested in the Ombudsman and other duly authorized
investigating agencies such as the provincial and city prosecutors, their assistants, the Chief State
Prosecutor and his assistants and the state prosecutors. (Emphasis... supplied)
The proper government agencies, and not the PCGG, should investigate and prosecute forfeiture
petitions not falling under EO No. 1 and its amendments. The preliminary investigation of unexplained
wealth amassed on or before 25 February 1986 falls under the jurisdiction of the
Ombudsman, while the authority to file the corresponding forfeiture petition rests with the Solicitor
General.
After the pronouncements of the Court in Cruz, the PCGG still pursued this case despite the absence of
a prima facie finding that Ramas was a "subordinate" of former President Marcos. The petition for
forfeiture filed with the Sandiganbayan should be... dismissed for lack of authority by the PCGG to
investigate respondents since there is no prima facie showing that EO No. 1 and its amendments apply
to respondents. The AFP Board Resolution and even the Amended Complaint state that there are
violations of RA Nos. 3019 and

1379. Thus, the PCGG should have recommended Ramas' case to the Ombudsman who has
jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation of ordinary unexplained wealth and graft
cases.

Petitioner's argument that private respondents have waived any defect in the filing of the forfeiture
petition by submitting their respective Answers with counterclaim deserves no merit as well.
Petitioner has no jurisdiction over private respondents. Thus, there is no jurisdiction to waive in the first
place.
Consequently, the petition should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction by the PCGG to conduct the
preliminary investigation. The Ombudsman may still conduct the proper preliminary investigation for
violation of RA No. 1379, and if warranted, the Solicitor General may file the... forfeiture petition with the
Sandiganbayan.[32] The right of the State to forfeit unexplained wealth under RA No. 1379 is not subject
to prescription, laches or estoppel.[33]
Based on the findings of the Sandiganbayan and the records of this case, we find that petitioner has only
itself to blame for non-completion of the presentation of its evidence. First, this case has been pending
for four years before the Sandiganbayan dismissed it. Petitioner... filed its Amended Complaint on 11
August 1987, and only began to present its evidence on 17 April 1989. Petitioner had almost two years
to prepare its evidence. However, despite this sufficient time, petitioner still delayed the presentation of
the rest of its evidence by filing... numerous motions for postponements and extensions. Even before the
date set for the presentation of its evidence, petitioner filed, on 13 April 1989, a Motion for Leave to
Amend the Complaint.
The Sandiganbayan overlooked petitioner's... delays and yet petitioner ended the long-string of delays
with the filing of a Re-Amended Complaint, which would only prolong even more the disposition of the
case.
Moreover, the pronouncements of the Court in Migrino and Cruz prompted the Sandiganbayan to
dismiss the case since the PCGG has no jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute the case against
private respondents. This alone would have been sufficient... legal basis for the Sandiganbayan to
dismiss the forfeiture case against private respondents.
Thus, we hold that the Sandiganbayan did not err in dismissing the case before completion of the
presentation of petitioner's evidence.
Petitioner wants the Court to take judicial notice that the raiding team conducted the search and seizure
"on March 3, 1986 or five days after the successful EDSA revolution."[39] Petitioner argues that a
revolutionary government was operative at that time... by virtue of Proclamation No. 1 announcing that
President Aquino and Vice President Laurel were "taking power in the name and by the will of the
Filipino people."[40] Petitioner asserts that the revolutionary government effectively withheld the
operation of... the 1973 Constitution which guaranteed private respondents' exclusionary right.
Moreover, petitioner argues that the exclusionary right arising from an illegal search applies only
beginning 2 February 1987, the date of ratification of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner contends that all
rights under the Bill of Rights had already reverted to its embryonic... stage at the time of the search.
Therefore, the government may confiscate the monies and items taken from Dimaano and use the same
in evidence against her since at the time of their seizure, private respondents did not enjoy any
constitutio
The EDSA Revolution took place on 23-25 February 1986. As succinctly stated in President Aquino's
Proclamation No. 3 dated 25 March 1986, the EDSA Revolution was "done in defiance of the provisions
of the 1973 Constitution."[41] The resulting government was indisputably a revolutionary government
bound by no constitution or legal limitations except treaty obligations that the revolutionary government,
as the de jure government in the Philippines, assumed under international... law.
The correct issues are: (1) whether the revolutionary government was bound by the Bill of Rights of the
1973 Constitution during the interregnum, that is, after the actual and effective take-over of power by the
revolutionary government following the... cessation of resistance by loyalist forces up to 24 March 1986
(immediately before the adoption of the Provisional Constitution); and (2) whether the protection
accorded to individuals under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("Covenant") and
the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("Declaration") remained in effect during the interregnum.
We hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative during the interregnum.
However, we rule that the protection accorded to individuals under the Covenant and the Declaration
remained in effect during the interregnum.
During the interregnum, the directives and orders of the revolutionary government were the supreme law
because no constitution limited the extent and scope of such directives and orders. With the abrogation
of the 1973 Constitution by the successful revolution, there was no... municipal law higher than the
directives and orders of the revolutionary government. Thus, during the interregnum, a person could not
invoke any exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights because there was neither a constitution nor a Bill of
Rights during the interregnum
To hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution remained operative during the interregnum
would render void all sequestration orders issued by the Philippine Commission on Good Government
("PCGG") before the adoption of the Freedom Constitution. The sequestration... orders, which direct the
freezing and even the take-over of private property by mere executive issuance without judicial action,
would violate the due process and search and seizure clauses of the Bill of Rights.
During the interregnum, the government in power was concededly a revolutionary government bound by
no constitution. No one could validly question the sequestration orders as violative of the Bill of Rights
because there was no Bill of Rights during the interregnum. However, upon... the adoption of the
Freedom Constitution, the sequestered companies assailed the sequestration orders as contrary to the
Bill of Rights of the Freedom Constitution.
Thus, to rule that the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution remained in force during the interregnum,
absent a constitutional provision excepting sequestration orders from such Bill of Rights, would clearly
render all sequestration orders void during the interregnum.
Nevertheless, even during the interregnum the Filipino people continued to enjoy, under the Covenant
and the Declaration, almost the same rights found in the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution.
The revolutionary government, after installing itself as the de jure government, assumed responsibility
for the State's good faith compliance with the Covenant to which the Philippines is a signatory. Article
2(1) of the Covenant requires each signatory State "to respect... and to ensure to all individuals within its
territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights[45] recognized in the present Covenant." Under Article
17(1) of the Covenant, the revolutionary government had the duty to insure that "[n]o one shall be...
subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence."
The Declaration, to which the Philippines is also a signatory, provides in its Article 17(2) that "[n]o one
shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property."
The revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration during the interregnum.
Whether the revolutionary government could have repudiated all its obligations under the Covenant or
the Declaration is another matter and is not the issue here.
Suffice it to... say that the Court considers the Declaration as part of customary international law, and
that Filipinos as human beings are proper subjects of the rules of international law laid down in the
Covenant. The fact is the revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the
Declaration in the same way it repudiated the 1973 Constitution. As the de jure government, the
revolutionary government could not escape responsibility for the State's good faith compliance with its
treaty obligations under international law.
uring the interregnum when no constitution or Bill of Rights existed, directives and orders issued by
government officers were valid so long as these officers did not exceed the authority granted them by
the revolutionary government.
However, the Constabulary raiding team seized items not included in the warrant. As admitted by
petitioner's witnesses, the raiding team confiscated items not included in the warrant, thus:
It is obvious from the testimony of Captain Sebastian that the warrant did not include the monies,
communications equipment, jewelry and land titles that the raiding team confiscated.
The seizure of these items was therefore void, and unless these items are contraband per se,[53] and
they are not, they must be returned to the person from whom the raiding seized them.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The questioned Resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan dated 18 November 1991 and 25 March 1992 in Civil Case No. 0037, remanding the
records of this case to the Ombudsman for such appropriate action as the evidence may... warrant, and
referring this case to the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue for a determination of any tax
liability of respondent Elizabeth Dimaano, are AFFIRMED.

EPG Construction Co. vs. Vigilar (Consti1)

Second Division

Buena, March 16, 2001

Topic: Sovereignty - Suits not against the State - Justice and Equity

Facts:
 In 1983, the Ministry of Human Settlement (MHS), through the BLISS Development Corporation,
intiated a housing project on a government property along the east bank of Manggahan Floodway in
Pasig
 The MHS entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with Ministry of Public Works and
Highways (MPWH) where the latter undertook to develop the housing site and construct thereon 145
housing units
 By virtue of the MOA, MPWH forged individual contracts with petitioners EPG, Ciper, Septa, Phil.
Plumbing, Home Construction, World Builders, Glass World, Performance Builders, and De Leon
Araneta Construction for the construction of the housing units
 Under the contracts, the scope of construction and funding covered only around "2/3 of each
housing unit"
 Petitioners agreed to undertake and perform "additional constructions" for the completion of the
housing units despite the fact that there was only a verbal promise, and not a written contract, by the
MPWH Undersecretary Aber Canlas that additional funds will be available and forthcoming
 Unpaid balance for the additional constructions amounted to P5,918,315.63
 Upon a demand letter from the petitioners, on November 14, 1988, DPWH Asst. Secretary
Madamba opined that payment of petitioners' money claims should be based on quantum meruit (what
one has earned) and should be forwarded to the Commission on Audit (COA)
 In a Letter of the Undersecretary of Budget and Management dated December 20, 1994, the
amount of P5,819,316.00 was then released for the payment of the petitioners' money claims under
Advise of Allotment No. A4-1303-04-41-303
 In an indorsement dated December 27, 1995, the COA referred anew the money claims to the
DPWH
 In a letter dated August 26, 1996, respondent Secretary Gregorio Vigilar denied the subject
money claims
 Petitioners filed before the RTC of QC, Branch 226 a Petition for Mandamus to order the
respondent to pay petitioners their money claims plus damages and attorney's fees.
 Lower court denied the petition on February 18, 1997
Issue:
1. Whether or not the implied, verbal contracts between the petitioners and then
Undersecretary Canlas should be upheld
2. Whether or not the State is immune from suit
Holding:
1. Yes.
2. No.
Ratio:
1. While the court agrees with the respondent that the implied contracts are void, in view of
violation of applicable laws, auditing rules, and lack of legal requirements, it still finds merit in the
instant petition
 The illegality of the implied contracts proceeds from an express declaration or prohibition
by law, not from any intrinsic illegality
 "in the interest of substantial justice," petitioners-contractors' right to be compensated is
upheld, applying the principle of quantum meruit
 Even the DPWH Asst. Sec. for Legal Affairs recommends their compensation; even the
DPWH Auditor did not object to the payment of the money claims
2. The respondent may not conveniently hide under the State's cloak of invincibility against suit,
considering that this principle yields to certain settled exceptions.
 The State's immunity cannot serve as an instrument perpetrating injustice
Petition granted. RTC decision reversed and set aside.

[ G.R. No. L-23139, December 17, 1966 ]

MOBIL PHILIPPINES EXPLORATION, INC., PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. CUSTOMS

ARRASTRE SERVICE AND BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.

DECISION
BENGZON, J.P., J.:

Four cases of rotary drill parts were shipped from abroad on S.S. "Leoville" sometime in November of
1962, consigned to Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc., Manila. The shipment arrived at the Port of
Manila on April 10, 1963, and was discharged to the custody of the Customs Arrastre Service, the unit of
the Bureau of Customs then handling arrastre operations therein. The Customs Arrastre Service later
delivered to the broker of the consignee three cases only of the shipment.
On April 4, 1964 Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc., filed suit in the Court of First Instance of Manila
against the Customs Arrastre Service and the Bureau of Customs to recover the value of the undelivered
case in the amount of P18,493.37 plus other damages.
On April 20, 1964 the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that not being
persons under the law, defendants cannot be sued.
After plaintiff opposed the motion, the court, on April 25, 1964, dismissed the complaint on the ground
that neither the Customs Arrastre Service nor the Bureau of Customs issuable. Plaintiff appealed to Us
from the order of dismissal.
Raised, therefore, in this appeal is the purely legal question of the defendants' suability under the facts
stated.
Appellant contends that not all government entities are immune from suit; that defendant Bureau of
Customs as operator of the arrastre service at the Port of Manila, is discharging proprietary functions
and as such can be sued by private individuals.
The Rules of Court, in Section 1, Rule 3, provide:
"SECTION 1. Who may be parties. Only natural or juridical persons or entities authorized by law may be
parties in a civil action."
Accordingly, a defendant in a civil suit must be (l) a natural person; (2) a juridical person or (3) an entity
authorized by law to be sued. Neither the Bureau of Customs nor (a fortiori) its function unit, the
Customs Arrastre Service, is a person. They are merely parts of the machinery of Government. The
Bureau of Customs is a bureau under the Department of Finance (Sec. 81, Revised Administrative Code);
and as stated, the Customs Arrastre Service is a unit of the Bureau of Customs, set up under Customs
Administrative Order No. 8-62 of November 9, 1962 (Annex "A" to Motion to Dismiss, pp. 13-15, Record
on Appeal). It follows that the defendants herein cannot be sued under the first two abovementioned
categories of natural or juridical persons.
Nonetheless it is urged that by authorizing the Bureau of Customs to engage in arrastre service, the law
thereby impliedly authorizes it to be sued as arrastre operator, for the reason that the nature of this
function (arrastre service) is proprietary, not governmental. Thus, insofar as arrastre operation is
concerned, appellant would put defendants under the third category of "entities authorized by law" to be
sued. Stated differently, it is argued that while there is no law expressly authorizing the Bureau of
Customs to sue or be sued, still its capacity to be sued is implied from its very power to render arrastre
service at the Port of Manila, which, it is alleged, amounts to the transaction of a private business.
The statutory provision on arrastre service is found in Section 1213 of Republic Act 1937 (Tariff and
Customs Code, effective June 1, 1957), and it states:
"SEC. 1213. Receiving, Handling, Custody and Delivery of Articles. The Bureau of Customs shall have
exclusive supervision and control over the receiving, handling, custody and delivery of articles on the
wharves and piers at all ports of entry and in the exercise of its functions it is nereby authorized to
acquire, take over, operate and superintend such plants and facilities as may "be necessary for the
receiving, handling, custody and delivery of articles, and the convenience and comfort of passengers and
the handling of baggage, as well as to acquire fire protection equipment for use in the piers: Provided,
That whenever in his judgment the receiving, handling, custody and delivery of articles can be carried on
by private parties with greater efficiency, the Commissioner may, after public bidding and subject to the
approval of the department head, contract with any private party for the service of receiving, handling,
custody and delivery of articles, and in such event, the contract may include the sale or lease of
government-owned equipment and facilities used in such service.
In Associated Workers Union, et al. v. Bureau of Customs, et al, L-21397, resolution of August 6, 1963,
this Court indeed held "that the foregoing statutory provisions authorizing the grant by contract to any
private party of the right to render said arrastre services necessarily imply that the same is deemed by
Congress to be proprietary or non-governmental function". The issue in said case, however, was whether
laborers engaged in arrastre service fall under the concept of employees in the Government employed in
governmental functions for purposes of the prohibition in Section 11, Republic Act 875 to the effect that
"employees in the Government x x x shall not strike," but "may belong to any labor organization which
does not impose the obligation to strike or to join in strike", which prohibition "shall apply only to
employees employed in governmental functions of the Government x x x".
Thus, the ruling therein was that the Court of Industrial Relations had jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the case, but not that the Bureau of Customs can be sued. Said issue of suability was not
resolved, the resolution stating only that "the issue on the personality or lack of personality of the Bureau
of Customs to be sued does not affect the Jurisdiction of the lower court over the subject matter of the
case, aside from the fact that amendment may be made in the pleadings by the inclusion as respondents
of the public officers deemed responsible for the unfair labor practice acts charged by petitioning
Unions".
Now, the fact that a non-corporate government entity performs a function proprietary in nature does not
necessarily result in its being suable. If said non-governmental function is undertaken as an incident to
its governmental function, there is no waiver thereby of the sovereign immunity from suit extended to
such government entity. This is the doctrine recognized in Bureau of Printing, et al. v. Bureau of Printing
Employees Association, et al., L-15751, January 28, 1961:
"The Bureau of Printing is an office of the Government created by the Administrative Code of 1916 (Act
No. 2657). As such instrumentality of the Government, it operates under the direct supervision of the
Executive Secretary, Office of the President, and is charged with the execution of all printing and
binding, including work incidental to those processes, required by the National Government and such
other work of the same character as said Bureau may, by law or by order of the (Secretary of Finance)
Executive Secretary, be authorized to undertake xxx.' (Sec. 1644, Rev. Adm. Code.) It has no corporate
existence, and its appropriations are provided for in the General Appropriations Act. Designed to meet
the printing needs of the Government, it is primarily a service bureau and, obviously, not engaged in
business or occupation for pecuniary profit.
xxxx
"x x x Clearly, while the Bureau of Printing is allowed to undertake private printing jobs, it cannot be
pretended that it is thereby an industrial or business concern. The additional work it executes for private
parties is merely incidental to its function, and although such work may be deemed proprietary in
character, there is no showing that the employees performing said proprietary function are separate and
distinct from those employed in its general governmental functions.
"Indeed, as an office of the Government, without any corporate or juridical personality, the Bureau of
Printing cannot be sued. (Sec. 1, Rule 3, Rules of Court.) Any suit, action or proceeding against it, if it
were to produce any effect, would actually be a suit, a ction or proceeding against the Government itself,
and the rule is settled that the Government cannot be sued without its consent, much less over its
objection. (See Metran vs. Paredes, 4-5 Off. Gaz. 2835; Angat River Irrigation System, et al. vs. Angat
River Workers Union, et al., G.R. Nos. L-10943-44, December 28, 1957.)"
The situation here is not materially different. The Bureau of Customs, to repeat, is part of the
Department of Finance (Sec. 81, Rev. Adm. Code), with no personality of its own apart from that of the
national government. Its primary function is governmental, that of assessing and collecting lawful
revenues from imported articles and all other tariff and customs duties, fees, charges, fines and penalties
(Sec. 602, R.A. 1937). To this function, arrastre service is a necessary incident. For practical reasons said
revenues and customs duties can not be assessed and collected by simply receiving the importer's or ship
agent's or consignee's declaration of merchandise being imported and imposing the duty provided in the
Tariff law. Customs authorities and officers must see to it that the declaration tallies with the
merchandise actually landed. And this checking up requires that the landed merchandise be hauled from
the ship's side to a suitable place in the customs premises to enable said customs officers to make it, that
is, it requires arrastre operations.[1]
Clearly, therefore, although said arrastre function may be deemed proprietary, it is a necessary incident
of the primary and governmental function of the Bureau of Customs, so that engaging in the same does
not necessarily render said Bureau liable to suit. For otherwise, it could not perform its governmental
function without necessarily exposing itself to suit. Sovereign immunity, granted as to the end, should
not be denied as to the necessary means to that end.
And herein lies the distinction between the present case and that of National Airports Corporation v.
Teodoro, 91 Phil. 203, on which appellant would rely. For there, the Civil Aeronautics Administration
was found to have for its prime reason for existence not a governmental but a proprietary function, so
that to it the latter was not a mere incidental function:
"Among the general powers of the Civil Aeronautics Administration are, under Section 3, to execute
contracts of any kind, to purchase property, and to grant concession rights, and under Section 4, to
charge landing fees, royalties on sales to aircraft of aviation gasoline, accessories and supplies, and
rentals for the use of any property under its management.
"These provisions confer upon the Civil Aeronautics Administration, in our opinion, the power to sue
and be sued. The power to sue and be sued is implied from the power to transact private business. x x x.
xxxxx
"The Civil Aeronautics Administration comes,under the category of a private entity. Although not a body
corporate it was created, like the National Airports Corporation, not to maintain a necessary function of
government, but to run what is essentially a business, even if revenues be not its prime objective but
rather the promotion of travel and the convenience of the travelling public. x x x"
Regardless of the merits of the claim against it, the State, for obvious reasons of public policy, cannot be
sued without its consent. Plaintiff should have filed its present claim to the General Auditing Office, it
being for money, under the provisions of Commonwealth Act 327, which state the conditions under
which money claims against the Government may be filed.
It must be remembered that statutory provisions waiving State immunity from suit are strictly construed
and that waiver of immunity, being in derogation of sovereignty, will not be lightly inferred. (49 Am.
Jur., States, Territories and Dependencies, Sec. 96, p. 314; Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Com., 359
U.S. 275, 3 L. Ed. 804, 79 S. Ct. 785.) From the provision authorizing the Bureau of Customs to lease
arrastre operations to private parties, We see no authority to sue the said Bureau in the instances where
it undertakes to conduct said operation itself. The Bureau of Customs, acting as part of the machinery of
the national government in the operation of the arrastre service, pursuant to express legislative mandate
and as a necessary incident of its prime governmental function, is immune from suit, there being no
statute to the contrary.
WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ., concur.
Makalintal, J., concurs in the result.
MUNICIPALITY OF SAN FERNANDO v. JUDGE ROMEO N. FIRME, GR No. 52179, 1991-04-08
Facts:
While private respondents Juana Rimando-Baniña, Laureano Baniña Jr., Sor Marietta Baniña, Montano
Baniña, Orja Baniña and Lydia R. Baniña are heirs of the deceased Laureano Baniña Sr. and plaintiffs in
Civil
Case
Collision among (1)

At about 7 o'clock in the morning of December 16,1965, a collision occurred involving a passenger jeepney...
driven by Bernardo Balagot and owned by the Estate of Macario Nieveras
(2)... a gravel and sand truck driven by Jose Manandeg and owned by Tanquilino Velasquez

(3)... and a dump truck of... the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union and driven by Alfredo Bislig.

several passengers of the jeepney including Laureano Baniña Sr. died as a result of the injuries they
sustained and four (4) others suffered varying degrees of physical... injuries.
the private respondents instituted a complaint for damages against the Estate of Macario Nieveras and
Bernardo Balagot, owner and driver, respectively, of the passenger jeepney,... Jeepney driver, & owner in
their defense filed a case against Municipality of San fernando.

However, the aforesaid defendants filed a Third Party Complaint against the petitioner and the driver of a
dump truck of petitioner.
the private respondents amended the complaint wherein the petitioner and... its regular employee, Alfredo
Bislig were impleaded for the first time as defendants. Petitioner filed its answer and raised affirmative
defenses such as... lack of cause of action,... non-suability of the State
In the case at bar, the respondent judge deferred the resolution of the defense of non-suability of the State
amounting to lack of jurisdiction until trial. However, said respondent judge failed to resolve such defense,
proceeded with the trial and thereafter rendered a... decision against the municipality and its driver.
Issues:
whether or not the respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion when it deferred and failed to
resolve the defense of non-suability of the State amounting to lack of jurisdiction in a motion to dismiss.
Ruling:
The respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion when in the exercise of its judgment it
arbitrarily failed to resolve the vital issue of non-suability of the State in the guise of the municipality.
However, said judge acted in excess of his jurisdiction when... in his decision dated October 10, 1979 he
held the municipality liable for the quasi-delict committed by its regular employee.
Anent the issue of whether or not the municipality is liable for the torts committed by its employee, the test of
liability of the municipality depends on whether or not the driver, acting in behalf of the municipality, is
performing governmental or proprietary functions.
the distinction of powers becomes important for purposes of determining the liability of the municipality for
the acts of its agents which result in an injury to third... persons.
It has already been remarked that municipal corporations are suable because their charters grant them the
competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts committed by them in
the discharge of governmental functions and can be held... answerable only if it can be shown that they were
acting in a proprietary capacity.
In permitting such entities to be sued, the State merely gives the claimant the right to show that the
defendant was not acting in its governmental capacity when the injury was committed or... that the case
comes under the exceptions recognized by law. Failing this, the claimant cannot recover.
In the case at bar, the driver of the dump truck of the municipality insists that "he was on his way to the
Naguilian river to get a load of sand and gravel for the repair of San Fernando's municipal streets."
Hence, We rule that the driver of the dump truck was performing duties or tasks pertaining to... his office.
"the construction or maintenance of roads in which the truck and the driver worked at the time of the accident
are... admittedly governmental activities."
After a careful examination of existing laws and jurisprudence, We arrive at the conclusion that the
municipality cannot be held liable for the torts committed by its regular employee, who was then engaged in
the discharge of governmental functions.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of the respondent court is hereby modified,
absolving the petitioner municipality of any liability in favor of private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Principles:
Consent to be sued broken down in simple terms:

The doctrine of non-suability of the State is expressly provided for in Article XVI, Section 3 of the
Constitution, to wit: "the State may not be sued without its consent."
Stated in simple parlance, the general rule is that the State may not be sued except when it gives consent to
be sued. Consent takes the form of express or implied consent.
Express consent may be embodied in a general law or a special law. The standing consent of the State to
be sued in case of money claims involving liability arising from contracts is found in Act No. 3083. A special
law may be passed to enable a person to sue the... government for an alleged quasi-delict, as in Merritt v.
Government of the Philippine Islands (34 Phil 311). (see United States of America v. Guinto, G.R. No.
76607, February 26, 1990, 182 SCRA 644, 654)
Consent is implied when the government enters into business contracts, thereby descending to the level of
the other contracting party, and also when the State files a complaint, thus opening itself to a counterclaim.
Municipal Corporations and their suability

Municipal corporations, for example, like provinces and cities, are agencies of the State when they are
engaged in governmental functions and therefore should enjoy the sovereign immunity from
suit. Nevertheless, they are subject to suit even in the performance of such... functions because their charter
provides that they can sue and be sued.
SUABILITY v LIABILITY

A distinction should first be made between suability and liability. "Suability depends on the consent of the
state to be sued, liability on the applicable law and the established facts. The circumstance that a state is
suable does not necessarily mean that it is... liable; on the other hand, it can never be held liable if it does not
first consent to be sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed itself to be
sued. When the state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff... the chance to prove,
if it can, that the defendant is liable." (United States of America v. Guinto, supra, p. 659-660)
Liability of municipal corporations

It has already been remarked that municipal corporations are suable because their charters grant them the
competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts committed by them in
the discharge of governmental functions and can be held... answerable only if it can be shown that they were
acting in a proprietary capacity.
In permitting such entities to be sued, the State merely gives the claimant the right to show that the
defendant was not acting in its governmental capacity when the injury was committed or... that the case
comes under the exceptions recognized by law. Failing this, the claimant cannot recover.
G.R. No. 208566 November 19, 2013 BELGICA vs. HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR, et al,
Respondents
G.R. No. 208566 November 19, 2013
GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA JOSE M. VILLEGAS JR. JOSE L. GONZALEZ REUBEN M. ABANTE and QUINTIN PAREDES SAN
DIEGO, Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR, et al, Respondents
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

NATURE:
These are consolidated petitions taken under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, all of which assail the constitutionality of the Pork Barrel
System.
FACTS:
The NBI Investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-blowers who declared that JLN Corporation (Janet Lim Napoles)
had swindled billions of pesos from the public coffers for "ghost projects" using dummy NGOs. Thus, Criminal complaints were filed
before the Office of the Ombudsman, charging five (5) lawmakers for Plunder, and three (3) other lawmakers for Malversation, Direct
Bribery, and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Also recommended to be charged in the complaints are some of the
lawmakers’ chiefs -of-staff or representatives, the heads and other officials of three (3) implementing agencies, and the several
presidents of the NGOs set up by Napoles.
Whistle-blowers alleged that" at least P900 Million from royalties in the operation of the Malampaya gas project off Palawan province
intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone into a dummy NGO. Several petitions were lodged before the Court similarly seeking
that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional

G.R. No. 208493 – SJS filed a Petition for Prohibition seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional, and a writ of
prohibition be issued permanently
G.R. No. 208566 - Belgica, et al filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer For The Immediate Issuance of
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction seeking that the annual "Pork Barrel System," presently embodied in
the provisions of the GAA of 2013 which provided for the 2013 PDAF, and the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds, such as the
Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, be declared unconstitutional and null and void for being acts constituting grave
abuse of discretion. Also, they pray that the Court issue a TRO against respondents

UDK-14951 – A Petition filed seeking that the PDAF be declared unconstitutional, and a cease and desist order be issued restraining
President Benigno Simeon S. Aquino III (President Aquino) and Secretary Abad from releasing such funds to Members of Congress
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto are unconstitutional considering
that they violate the principles of/constitutional provisions on (a) separation of powers; (b) non-delegability of legislative power; (c)
checks and balances; (d) accountability; (e) political dynasties; and (f) local autonomy.
2. Whether or not the phrases (under Section 8 of PD 910,116 relating to the Malampaya Funds, and under Section 12 of PD 1869, as
amended by PD 1993, relating to the Presidential Social Fund, are unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue delegations of
legislative power.
HELD:
1. Yes, the PDAF article is unconstitutional. The post-enactment measures which govern the areas of project
identification, fund release and fund realignment are not related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow
legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution. This violates the
principle of separation of powers. Congress‘role must be confined to mere oversight that must be confined to: (1) scrutiny
and (2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws. Any action or step beyond that will undermine the
separation of powers guaranteed by the constitution.
Thus, the court declares the 2013 pdaf article as well as all other provisions of law which similarly allow legislators to wield
any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation or enforcement of the budget, unrelated to congressional
oversight, as violative of the separation of powers principle and thus unconstitutional.
2. Yes. Sec 8 of PD 910- the phrase “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President”‖
constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately
determine the limits of the President‘s authority with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used.
It gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows
him to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law.”

Section 12 of PD 1869, as amend

(b) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects” was declared constitutional. IT INDICATED PURPOSE
ADEQUATELY CURTAILS THE AUTHORITY OF THE PRESIDENT TO SPEND THE PRESIDENTIAL SOCIAL FUND ONLY FOR
RESTORATION PURPOSES WHICH ARISE FROM CALAMITIES.

(b)” and to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the
Office of the President of the Philippines” was declared unconstitutional.IT GIVES THE PRESIDENT CARTE BLANCHE AUTHORITY
TO USE THE SAME FUND FOR ANY INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECT HE MAY SO DETERMINE AS A ―PRIORITY‖. VERILY, THE LAW
DOES NOT SUPPLY A DEFINITION OF ―PRIORITY INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS‖ AND HENCE, LEAVES THE
PRESIDENT WITHOUT ANY GUIDELINE TO CONSTRUE THE SAME.
ed by PD 1993- the phrases:
BOCEA vs. Teves Case Digest
0

Facts:

On January 25, 2005, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law R.A. No. 9335 which took effect on
February 11, 2005. RA No. 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau
of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and
employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a
Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all officials and
employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of employment status. Each Board has
the duty to (1) prescribe the rules and guidelines for the allocation, distribution and release of the Fund; (2) set criteria
and procedures for removing from the service officials and employees whose revenue collection falls short of the target;
(3) terminate personnel in accordance with the criteria adopted by the Board; (4) prescribe a system for performance
evaluation; (5) perform other functions, including the issuance of rules and regulations and (6) submit an annual report
to Congress.

Petitioner Bureau of Customs Employees Association (BOCEA) directly filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
before the SC to declare R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR unconstitutional. Petitioner contended that R.A. No. 9335 is a bill of
attainder because it inflicts punishment upon a particular group or class of officials and employees without trial. This is
evident from the fact that the law confers upon the Board the power to impose the penalty of removal upon employees
who do not meet their revenue targets; that the same is without the benefit of hearing; and that the removal from
service is immediately executory.

Issue:

Whether R.A. No. 9335 is a bill of attainder proscribed under Section 22, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.

Held:

No. A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment on individuals or members of a particular group
without a judicial trial. Essential to a bill of attainder are a specification of certain individuals or a group of individuals,
the imposition of a punishment, penal or otherwise, and the lack of judicial trial.

R.A. No. 9335 does not possess the elements of a bill of attainder. It does not seek to inflict punishment without a judicial
trial. It merely lays down the grounds for the termination of a BIR or BOC official or employee and provides for the
consequences thereof. The democratic processes are still followed and the constitutional rights of the concerned
employee are amply protected. (BOCEA vs. Teves, G.R. No. 181704, December 6, 2011, 661 SCRA 589)
Garcia vs. J. Drilon and Garcia, G. R. No. 179267, 25 June 2013
Nature of the Case: Petition for Review of Republic Act (R.A.) 9262

Facts: Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition before the RTC of Bacolod City a Temporary Protection Order against her
husband, Jesus, pursuant to R.A. 9262, entitled “An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective
Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes.” She claimed to be a victim of physical, emotional,
psychological and economic violence, being threatened of deprivation of custody of her children and of financial support and also a victim
of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner.

The TPO was granted but the petitioner failed to faithfully comply with the conditions set forth by the said TPO, private-respondent filed
another application for the issuance of a TPO ex parte. The trial court issued a modified TPO and extended the same when petitioner
failed to comment on why the TPO should not be modified. After the given time allowance to answer, the petitioner no longer submitted
the required comment as it would be an “axercise in futility.”

Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction and TRO on, questioning the constitutionality of the RA
9262 for violating the due process and equal protection clauses, and the validity of the modified TPO for being “an unwanted product of
an invalid law.”

The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO but however, denied the petition for failure to raise the issue of constitutionality in
his pleadings before the trial court and the petition for prohibition to annul protection orders issued by the trial court constituted collateral
attack on said law.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, this petition is filed.

Issues: WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition on the theory that the issue of constitutionality was not raised at the earliest
opportunity and that the petition constitutes a collateral attack on the validity of the law.

WON the CA committed serious error in failing to conclude that RA 9262 is discriminatory, unjust and violative of the equal protection
clause.

WON the CA committed grave mistake in not finding that RA 9262 runs counter to the due process clause of the Constitution

WON the CA erred in not finding that the law does violence to the policy of the state to protect the family as a basic social institution

WON the CA seriously erredin declaring RA 9262 as invalid and unconstitutional because it allows an undue delegation of judicial power
to Brgy. Officials.

Decision: 1. Petitioner contends that the RTC has limited authority and jurisdiction, inadequate to tackle the complex issue of
constitutionality. Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute. The question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible time so that if not raised in the pleadings, it may not be raised in the trial and if not
raised in the trial court, it may not be considered in appeal.

2. RA 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws. Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope
Workerkers’ Union, the Court ruled that all that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the
classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of the
law; not limited to existing conditions only; and apply equally to each member of the class. Therefore, RA9262 is based on a valid
classification and did not violate the equal protection clause by favouring women over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the
Senate extends its protection.

3. RA 9262 is not violative of the due process clause of the Constitution. The essence of due process is in the reasonable opportunity to be
heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of one’s defense. The grant of the TPO exparte cannot be impugned as violative
of the right to due process.

4. The non-referral of a VAWC case to a mediator is justified. Petitioner’s contention that by not allowing mediation, the law violated the
policy of the State to protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution cannot be sustained. In a memorandum of
the Court, it ruled that the court shall not refer the case or any issue therof to a mediator. This is so because violence is not a subject for
compromise.

5. There is no undue delegation of judicial power to Barangay officials. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on any part of any branch of the Government while executive power
is the power to enforce and administer the laws. The preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutor is an executive, not a judicial,
function. The same holds true with the issuance of BPO. Assistance by Brgy. Officials and other law enforcement agencies is consistent
with their duty executive function. The petition for review on certiorari is denied for lack of merit.
Imbong v. Ochoa (G.R. No. 204819)
Facts:
The increase of the country’s population at an uncontrollable pace led to the executive and the
legislative’s decision that prior measures were still not adequate. Thus, Congress enacted R.A. No.
10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH
Law), to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized, access and information to the full
range of modern family planning methods, and to ensure that its objective to provide for the peoples’
right to reproductive health be achieved. Stated differently, the RH Law is an enhancement measure to
fortify and make effective the current laws on contraception, women’s health and population control.
Shortly after, challengers from various sectors of society moved to assail the constitutionality of RH Law.
Meanwhile, the RH-IRR for the enforcement of the assailed legislation took effect. The Court then issued
a Status Quo Ante Order enjoining the effects and implementation of the assailed legislation.
Petitioners question, among others, the constitutionality of the RH Law, claiming that it violates Section
26(1), Article VI of the Constitution, prescribing the one subject-one title rule. According to them, being
one for reproductive health with responsible parenthood, the assailed legislation violates the
constitutional standards of due process by concealing its true intent – to act as a population control
measure. On the other hand, respondents insist that the RH Law is not a birth or population control
measure, and that the concepts of “responsible parenthood” and “reproductive health” are both
interrelated as they are inseparable.
Issue:
Whether or not RH Law violated the one subject-one title rule under the Constitution
Ruling: NO
Despite efforts to push the RH Law as a reproductive health law, the Court sees it as principally a
population control measure. The corpus of the RH Law is geared towards the reduction of the country’s
population. While it claims to save lives and keep our women and children healthy, it also promotes
pregnancy-preventing products. As stated earlier, the RH Law emphasizes the need to provide Filipinos,
especially the poor and the marginalized, with access to information on the full range of modem family
planning products and methods. These family planning methods, natural or modern, however, are
clearly geared towards the prevention of pregnancy. For said reason, the manifest underlying objective
of the RH Law is to reduce the number of births in the country. The Court, thus, agrees with the
petitioners’ contention that the whole idea of contraception pervades the entire RH Law.
Be that as it may, the RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule.
In Cawaling, Jr. v. COMELEC, it was written: It is well-settled that the “one title-one subject” rule does not require
the Congress to employ in the title of the enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or
catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is
comprehensive enough as to include the general object which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the
persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation.
Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of the rule “so as not to
cripple or impede legislation.”
In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law shows that both “reproductive health”
and “responsible parenthood” are interrelated and germane to the overriding objective to control the
population growth. As expressed in the first paragraph of Section 2 of the RH Law:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons
including their right to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human
development, the right to health which includes reproductive health, the right to education and
information, and the right to choose and make decisions for themselves in accordance with their
religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood.
The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law must not be “so
uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the
enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or
indicating one subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting
any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act.”
Considering the close intimacy between “reproductive health” and “responsible parenthood” which bears
to the attainment of the goal of achieving “sustainable human development” as stated under its terms,
the Court finds no reason to believe that Congress intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the
contents of the assailed legislation.
The Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to certain
provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court is
hereby LIFTED, insofar as the provisions of R.A. No. 10354 which have been herein declared as
constitutional
EMMANUEL PELAEZ v. AUDITOR GENERAL, GR No. L-23825, 1965-12-24
Facts:
During the period from September 4 to October 29, 1964 the President of the Philippin... es,... pursuant to
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, issued Executive Orders No... creating thirty-three (33)...
municipalities... etitioner Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice-President of the Philippines and as taxpayer, instituted
the present special civil action, for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction, against the Auditor
General, to restrain him, as well as his representatives... and agents,... from passing in audit any expenditure
of public funds in implementation of said executive orders and/or any disbursement by said municipalities.
Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that said Section 68 has been
impliedly repealed by Republic Act 2370 and constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power.
Respondent maintains the contrary view and avers that the present... action is premature and that not all
proper parties referring to the officials of the new political subdivisions in question have been impleaded.
Subsequently, the mayors of several municipalities adversely affected by the aforementioned executive
orders because the latter have... taken away from the former the barrios composing the new political
subdivision intervened in the case.
Hence, since
Republic Act No. 2370 became effective, barrios may "not be created or their boundaries altered nor their
names changed" except by Act of Congress or of the corresponding provincial board "upon petition of a
majority of the voters in the... areas affected" and the "recommendation of the council of the municipality or
municipalities in which the proposed barrio is situated." Petitioner argues, accordingly: "If the President,
under this new law, cannot even create a barrio, can he create a municipality which is... composed of several
barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities?"
Petitioner contends that the President has no power to create a municipality by executive order.
Issues:
President has... power to create a municipality by executive order.
Ruling:
Wherefore the Executive Orders in question are hereby declared null and void ab initio and the respondent
permanently restrained from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said
Executive
Orders or any disbursement by the municipalities above referred to.
The power to create a municipality is legislative in character.
MENDOZA VS PEOPLE

G.R. NO. 139759, January 14, 2005

FACTS:

The trial court convicted accused Danilo Mendoza, petitioner herein, for homicide
wherein the victim was Alfonso Nisperos. Petitioner does not seek acquittal but merely
prays that the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense be
considered in his favor.

Herein petitioner narrated the antecedent facts as follows:

 That during a drinking spree, he had an altercation with a certain Willy Baluyot.
 Feeling bad, he slammed the table with a pitcher containing water. Then he left.
 At a distance, he heard the victim calling him. When they were close to each other,
the victim blamed him for his conduct. He apologized but the victim started
stabbing him with a knife.
 He tried to parry the attack as he retreated. That moment, his back was against
the wall. He then grappled for the knife which he was able to wrench from the
victim. They rolled over on the ground. At that point, he repeatedly stabbed the
victim with his own knife.

On the other the hand, the prosecution, to prove that the petitioner was the aggressor
presented Loreta Nisperos, mother of the victim.

Loreta said:

 Alfonso Nisperos, stepped out of their house. When he returned, he told her that
he saw a person near their cow tied to a tamarind tree.
 Alfonso then went out again to check on the person he saw. After a short while,
Loreta suddenly heard Alfonso screaming “Mother, help me!”
 She rushed to her son. She found him lying, face down, with petitioner on top of
him, stabbing him with a knife.
 She then approached petitioner, pleading to him not to kill her son. But instead of
heeding her plea, he suddenly attacked her with his knife, hitting her right arm.
Petitioner then dashed away from the scene.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of

incomplete self-defense

RULING:

No, the petitioner cannot be accorded with privileged mitigating circumstance of

incomplete self-defense.

Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim should be clearly established to make
the claim of self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, acceptable.

In the case at bar, the court found that there was no unlawful aggression on the part of
the victim. This element being absent, petitioner cannot be accorded the privileged
mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense.
G.R. No. 199890
FIRST DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 199890, August 19, 2013 ]

JEROME M. DAABAY, PETITIONER, VS. COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS.,

INC., RESPONDENT.

DECISION
REYES, J.:
This resolves petitioner Jerome M. Daabay's (Daabay) Verified Petition for Review [1] ,
which assails the Decision[2] dated June 24, 2011 and Resolution[3] dated December 9,
2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 03369-MIN.

The case stems from a complaint for illegal dismissal, illegal suspension, unfair labor
practice and monetary claims filed by Daabay against respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers
Phils., Inc. (Coca-Cola) and three officers of the company.[4] The records indicate that the
employment of Daabay with Coca-Cola as Sales Logistics Checker was terminated by the
company in June 2005,[5] following receipt of information from one Cesar Sorin (Sorin)
that Daabay was part of a conspiracy that allowed the pilferage of company property. [6]

The allegations of Sorin were embodied in an affidavit which he executed on April 16,
2005.[7] The losses to the company were also confirmed by an inventory and audit
conducted by Coca-Cola's Territory Finance Head, Silvia Ang. Such losses comprised of
cases of assorted softdrinks, empty bottles, missing shells and missing pallets valued at
P20,860,913.00.[8]

Coca-Cola then served upon Daabay a Notice to Explain with Preventive Suspension,
which required him to explain in writing his participation in the scheme that was reported
to involve logistics checkers and gate guards. In compliance therewith, Daabay submitted
an Explanation dated April 19, 2005 wherein he denied any participation in the reported
pilferage.[9]

A formal investigation on the matter ensued. Eventually, Coca-Cola served upon Daabay a
Notice of Termination that cited pilferage, serious misconduct and loss of trust and
confidence as grounds. At the time of his dismissal, Daabay had been a regular employee
of Coca-Cola for eight years, and was receiving a monthly pay of P20,861.00, exclusive of
other benefits.[10]

Daabay then filed the subject labor complaint against Coca-Cola and Roberto Huang
(Huang), Raymund Salvador (Salvador) and Alvin Garcia (Garcia), who were the
President and Plant Logistics Managers, respectively, of Coca-Cola at the time of the
dispute.[11] On April 18, 2008, Executive Labor Arbiter Noel Augusto S. Magbanua (ELA
Magbanua) rendered his Decision[12] in favor of Daabay. He ruled that Daabay was
illegally dismissed because his participation in the alleged conspiracy was not proved by
substantial evidence. In lieu of reinstatement and considering the already strained
relations between the parties, ELA Magbanua ordered the payment to Daabay of
backwages and separation pay or retirement benefits, as may be applicable. The
dispositive portion of ELA Magbanua's Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the

dismissal of complainant Jerome Daabay as illegal, and ordering respondents to pay
complainant his backwages in the amount of [P]750,996.00.

Additionally, respondents are hereby ordered to pay complainant his separation pay at
one (1) month for every year of service, or his retirement benefits based on the latest
Collective Bargaining Agreement prior to his suspension/termination.

Other claims are hereby ordered dismissed for failure to substantiate.

SO ORDERED.[13]
Dissatisfied, Coca-Cola, Huang, Salvador and Garcia, appealed from ELA Magbanua's
Decision to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). Daabay filed a separate
appeal to ask for his reinstatement without loss of seniority rights, the payment of
backwages instead of separation pay or retirement benefits, and an award of litigation
expenses, moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.

The NLRC reversed the finding of illegal dismissal. In a Resolution [14] dated August 27,
2009, the NLRC held that there was "reasonable and well-founded basis to dismiss
[Daabay], not only for serious misconduct, but also for breach of trust or loss of
confidence arising from such company losses."[15] Daabay's participation in the conspiracy
was sufficiently established. Several documents such as checkers receipts and sales
invoices that made the fraudulent scheme possible were signed by Daabay. [16] The NLRC
also found fault in Daabay for his failure to detect the pilferage, considering that the
"timely recording and monitoring as security control for the outgoing [sic] of company
products are necessarily connected with the functions, duties and responsibilities reposed
in him as Sales Logistics Checker."[17] Notwithstanding its ruling on the legality of the
dismissal, the NLRC awarded retirement benefits in favor of Daabay. The dispositive
portion of its Resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal of complainant is DENIED for lack of

merit, while that of respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. is GRANTED.

Accordingly, the assailed 18 April 2008 Decision of the Executive Labor Arbiter is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new judgment is
entered DISMISSING the present complaint for want of evidence.

Let, however, this case be REMANDED to the Executive Labor Arbiter or the Regional
Arbitration Branch of origin for the computation of complainant's retirement benefits in
accordance with the latest Collective Bargaining Agreement prior to his termination.

SO ORDERED.[18]
Coca-Cola's partial motion for reconsideration to assail the award of retirement benefits
was denied by the NLRC in a Resolution[19] dated October 30, 2009. The NLRC explained
that there was a need "to humanize the severe effects of dismissal"[20] and "tilt the scales
of justice in favor of labor as a measure of equity and compassionate social
justice."[21] Daabay also moved to reconsider, but his motion remained unresolved by the
NLRC.[22] Undaunted, Coca-Cola appealed to the CA.

The CA agreed with Coca-Cola that the award of retirement benefits lacked basis
considering that Daabay was dismissed for just cause. It explained:
We are not oblivious of the instances where the Court awarded financial assistance to
dismissed employees, even though they were terminated for just causes. Equity and social
justice was the vague justification. Quickly realizing the unjustness of these [s]o-called
equitable awards, the Supreme Court took the opportunity to curb and rationalize the
grant of financial assistance to legally dismissed employees. Thus, in Philippine Long
Distance Telephone Company v. National Labor Relations Commission, the Supreme
Court recognized the harsh realities faced by employees that forced them, despite their
good intentions, to violate company policies, for which the employer can rightfully
terminate their employment. For these instances, the award of financial assistance was
allowed. But, in clear and unmistakable language, the Supreme Court also held that the
award of financial assistance should not be given to validly terminated employees, whose
offenses are iniquitous or reflective of some depravity in their moral character. x x
x.[23] (Citation omitted)
Thus, the dispositive portion of its Decision dated June 24, 2011 reads:

FOR THESE REASONS, the writ of certiorari is GRANTED; the portion of the
Resolution promulgated on 27 August 2009 remanding of the case to the Executive Labor
Arbiter or the Regional Arbitration Branch of origin for computation of retirement
benefits is DELETED.

SO ORDERED.[24]
Daabay's motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution[25] dated December 9,
2011; hence, this petition.

It bears stressing that although the assailed CA decision and resolution are confined to
the issue of Daabay's entitlement to retirement benefits, Daabay attempts to revive
through the present petition the issue of whether or not his dismissal had factual and
legal bases. Thus, instead of confining itself to the issue of whether or not Daabay should
be entitled to the retirement benefits that were awarded by the NLRC, the petition
includes a plea upon the Court to affirm ELA Magbanua's Decision, with the modification
to include: (a) his allowances and other benefits or their monetary equivalent in the
computation of his backwages; (b) his actual reinstatement; and (c) damages, attorney's
fees and litigation expenses.

We deny the petition.

We emphasize that the appeal to the CA was brought not by Daabay but by Coca-Cola,
and was limited to the issue of whether or not the award of retirement benefits in favor of
Daabay was proper. Insofar as CA-G.R. SP No. 03369-MIN was concerned, the
correctness of the NLRC's pronouncement on the legality of Daabay's dismissal was no
longer an issue, even beyond the appellate court's authority to modify. In Andaya v.
NLRC,[26] the Court emphasized that a party who has not appealed from a decision may
not obtain any affirmative relief from the appellate court other than what he had obtained
from the lower court, if any, whose decision is brought up on appeal. [27] Further, we
explained in Yano v. Sanchez,[28] that the entrenched procedural rule in this jurisdiction
is that a party who did not appeal cannot assign such errors as are designed to have the
judgment modified. All that he can do is to make a counter-assignment of errors or to
argue on issues raised below only for the purpose of sustaining the judgment in his
favor.[29] Due process prevents the grant of additional awards to parties who did not
appeal.[30] Considering that Daabay had not yet appealed from the NLRC's Resolution to
the CA, his plea for the modification of the NLRC's findings was then misplaced. For the
Court to review all matters that are raised in the petition would be tolerant of what
Daabay was barred to do before the appellate court.

Before the CA and this Court, Daabay attempts to justify his plea for relief by stressing
that he had filed his own motion for reconsideration of the NLRC's Resolution dated
August 27, 2009 but the same remained unacted upon by the NLRC. Such bare allegation,
however, is insufficient to allow the issue to be disturbed through this petition. We take
note of Daabay's failure to attach to his petition a copy of the motion which he allegedly
filed with the NLRC. It is also quite baffling why Daabay does not appear to have
undertaken steps to seek the NLRC's resolution on the motion, even after it remained
unresolved for more than two years from its supposed filing.

Granting that such motion to reconsider was filed with the NLRC, the labor tribunal shall
first be given the opportunity to review its findings and rulings on the issue of the legality
of Daabay's dismissal, and then correct them should it find that it erred in its disposition.
The Court cannot, by this petition, pre-empt the action which the NLRC, and the CA in
case of an appeal, may take on the matter.

Even as we limit our present review to the lone issue that was involved in the assailed CA
decision and resolution, the Court finds no cogent reason to reverse the ruling of the CA.

Daabay was declared by the NLRC to have been lawfully dismissed by Coca-Cola on the
grounds of serious misconduct, breach of trust and loss of confidence. Our
pronouncement in Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. NLRC[31] on the issue of whether an
employee who is dismissed for just cause may still claim retirement benefits equally
applies to this case. We held:

At the risk of stating the obvious, private respondent was not separated from
petitioner's employ due to mandatory or optional retirement but, rather, by
termination of employment for a just cause. Thus, any retirement pay provided by
PAL's "Special Retirement & Separation Program" dated February 15, 1988 or, in the
absence or legal inadequacy thereof, by Article 287 of the Labor Code does not operate
nor can be made to operate for the benefit of private respondent. Even private
respondent's assertion that, at the time of her lawful dismissal, she was already qualified
for retirement does not aid her case because the fact remains that private
respondent was already terminated for cause thereby rendering nugatory
any entitlement to mandatory or optional retirement pay that she might have
previously possessed.[32] (Citation omitted and emphasis ours)
In ruling against the grant of the retirement benefits, we also take note of the NLRC's lone
justification for the award, to wit:

Where from the facts obtaining, as in this case, there is a need to humanize the severe
effects of dismissal and where complainant's entitlement to retirement benefits are even
admitted in [Coca-Cola's] motion to reduce bond, [w]e can do no less but tilt the
scales of justice in favor of labor as a measure of equity and compassionate
social justice, taking into consideration the circumstances obtaining in this
case.[33] (Emphasis ours)
Being intended as a mere measure of equity and social justice, the NLRC's award was then
akin to a financial assistance or separation pay that is granted to a dismissed employee
notwithstanding the legality of his dismissal. Jurisprudence on such financial assistance
and separation pay then equally apply to this case. The Court has ruled, time and again,
that financial assistance, or whatever name it is called, as a measure of social justice is
allowed only in instances where the employee is validly dismissed for causes other than
serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character.[34] We explained
in Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v. NLRC[35]:

[S]eparation pay shall be allowed as a measure of social justice only in those instances
where the employee is validly dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct or
those reflecting on his moral character. Where the reason for the valid dismissal is, for
example, habitual intoxication or an offense involving moral turpitude, like theft or illicit
sexual relations with a fellow worker, the employer may not be required to give the
dismissed employee separation pay, or financial assistance, or whatever
other name it is called, on the ground of social justice.

A contrary rule would, as the petitioner correctly argues, have the effect, of rewarding
rather than punishing the erring employee for his offense. And we do not agree that the
punishment is his dismissal only and that the separation pay has nothing to do with the
wrong he has committed. Of course it has. Indeed, if the employee who steals from the
company is granted separation pay even as he is validly dismissed, it is not unlikely that
he will commit a similar offense in his next employment because he thinks he can expect
a like leniency if he is again found out. This kind of misplaced compassion is not going to
do labor in general any good as it will encourage the infiltration of its ranks by those who
do not deserve the protection and concern of the Constitution. [36] (Emphasis ours)
Clearly, considering that Daabay was dismissed on the grounds of serious misconduct,
breach of trust and loss of confidence, the award based on equity was unwarranted.

Even the NLRC's reliance on the alleged admission by Coca-Cola in its motion to reduce
bond that Daabay is entitled to retirement benefits is misplaced. Apparently, the
supposed admission by Coca-Cola was based on the following:

In support of its motion to reduce bond, Coca-cola seeks leniency for its failure to include
in the posting of the bond the monetary award for [Daabay's] retirement benefits which,
as directed by the Executive Labor Arbiter, should be computed in accordance with the
latest Collective Bargaining Agreement prior to his termination. Coca-Cola explains that
the amount of the retirement benefits has not been determined and there is a need to
compute the same on appeal. x x x.[37]
It is patent that the statements made by Coca-Cola were in light of ELA Magbanua's
ruling that Daabay was illegally dismissed. Furthermore, any admission was only for the
purpose of explaining the non-inclusion of the amount of retirement benefits in the
computation of the appeal bond posted with the NLRC. Coca-Cola's statements should be
taken in such context, and could not be deemed to bind the company even after the NLRC
had reversed the finding of illegal dismissal. And although retirement benefits, where not
mandated by law, may still be granted by agreement of the employees and their employer
or as a voluntary act of the employer,[38] there is no proof that any of these incidents
attends the instant case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated June 24, 2011 and
Resolution dated December 9, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 03369-
MIN are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C.J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, and Mendoza,* JJ., concur.

* Acting Member per Special Order No. 1502 dated August 8, 2013.

[1] Rollo, pp. 3-38.

Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo A. Camello, with Associate Justices Abraham B.

[2]

Borreta and Melchor Quirino C. Sadang, concurring; id. at 39-48. [6] Id. at 40.