Carlito W Aceron Jr September 19,2020

JOSE JESUS M. DISINI vs. THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE

G.R. No. 203335, February 11, 2014

Facts of the Case;

Republic Act No. 10175, which is known as “The Cybercrime Prevention Act of
2012” is enacted into law by President Aquino on September 12, 2012. It aims to
address the legal issues concerning abuses of acts while using computer systems and
internet as medium of communication. Among those punishable acts are
cybersquatting, cybersex, child pornography, forgery, identity theft, fraud, illegal access
to data and libel.
Herein, Petitioners tend to argue that some of the provisions of Republic Act 10125 or
the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, void and unconstitutional especially those of
Sec. 6 and Sec. 4(c)(4), which reads;
“Sec. 6. All crimes defined and penalized by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and
special laws, if committed by, through and with the use of information and
communications technologies shall be covered by the relevant provisions of this
Act: Provided, That the penalty to be imposed shall be one (1) degree higher than that
provided for by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and special laws, as the case
may be.”
The petitioner argued that it is invalid and unconstitutional since it produces the
following chilling effect; a.) instill fear on users that would hinder the right of freedom of
expression, b.) the penalty imposed is being one degree higher compared to those
imposed on ordinary crimes on the Revised Penal Code, c.) the prescriptive periods of
the said cybercrimes become longer.

Section 6 merely states that there shall be existing crimes committed with the use of
information and communication technology or internet as a qualifying circumstances.
There is a distinction between a crimes committed through the use of internet and
crimes which are committed using other means. The former uses the internet as means
to hack the victims’ privacy, personal information, files, data and is able hide himself
without being identified while the latter does not use internet as medium of
communication to commit crimes. The former causes greater harm or injury on ordinary
computer users which are not technology oriented and could escalate even more
damages. Thus, this distinction creates a basis for higher penalties for cybercrimes.
“Sec 4(c)(4), Libel. — The unlawful or prohibited acts of libel as defined in Article 355
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, committed through a computer system or any
other similar means which may be devised in the future.”

The elements of libel are the ff: (a) the allegation of a discreditable act or condition
concerning another; (b) publication of the charge; (c) identity of the person defamed;
and (d) existence of malice.

The libel provision of the cybercrime law incorporates of that provisions of the RPC on
libel which the petitioner challenged that the constitutionality of Section 4(c)(4), which
penalizes online libel that may effectively tramples upon the right to freedom of
expression and for them, it carries with “presume malice” by which the latest
jurisprudence already replaces it with "actual malice" as a basis for conviction.
There is an "actual malice" when the offender makes defamatory remarks or statement
with the intent to damage someone reputation whether it is true or not. It is not a
conclusive proof of evidence with regards to gross or extreme negligence. It requires
high level of awareness to the offender to established his guilt even more stricter when
the offended party is a public person.
Libel is not a protected speech under the Constitution, therefore, there is no reason to
qualify the freedom of expression to unjustly destroy someone’s good reputation, unless
it falls within the sphere of protected speech under the Constitution.

Issue:
Whether or Not Section Sec. 6 and Sec. 4(c)(4) of the RA 10175 or Cybercrime
Law is unconstitutional?

Ruling:
Section 6 as VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL that imposes penalties one degree higher
when crimes defined under the Revised Penal Code are committed with the use of
information and communications technologies

Section 4(c)(4) that penalizes online libel as VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL with
respect to the original author of the post; but VOID and UNCONSTITUTIONAL with
respect to others who simply receive the post and react to it
Case Summary and Outcome
The Supreme Court of Philippines ruled that several provisions of the Cybercrime
Prevention Act of 2012 violated freedom of expression and privacy. Fourteen
petitioners, including the Philippine Bar Association, the National Press Club, a number
of other NGOs and prominent academics, challenged twenty-one provisions of the
Cybercrime Act. The Court held that Sections 4(c)(3), 12, and 19 of the Act were
unconstitutional. It found that Section 4(c)(3) restricted freedom of expression by
prohibiting the unsolicited transmission of commercial communications, such as spam.
Section 12 was declared in violation of the right to privacy because it lacked sufficient
specificity and definiteness in collecting real-time computer data. Section 19 was found
to violate the rights against unreasonable searches and seizures, which gave the
government the authority to restrict or block access to computer data without a judicial
warrant.

Facts
The case arises out of consolidated petitions to the Supreme Court of the Philippines on
the constitutionality of several provisions of the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, Act
No. 10175.
The Petitioners argued that even though the Act is the government’s platform in
combating illegal cyberspace activities, 21 separate sections of the Act violate their
constitutional rights, particularly the right to freedom of expression and access to
information. 
In February 2013, the Supreme Court extended the duration of a temporary restraining
order against the government to halt enforcement of the Act until the adjudication of the
issues.