ESSO LONGFORD DISASTER

Esso Longford explosion happen on Friday 25th September 1998, there were a
fractured in vessel of GP1 which is heat exchanger GP905 release hydrocarbon vapors and
liquid. Other heat exchanger GP922, had developed leaks at the flanges before the accident
and repairing has being made while GP905 failed. The temperature of GP905 has drop from
its normal operating temperature which is 100ºC may cause from loss of lean oil flow. Then,
lean oil has stopped when pumps tripped and were not restarted. In the meantime, cold rich
oil and cold condensate continued to flow through GP905 and cause temperature to drop. The
rupture at GP905 release a large volume hydrocarbon in the form of vapor and the vapor
ignited giving rise of explosion and fire.

Moreover, the company had neglected to commission a HAZOP. Analysis of the heat
exchange system, which would almost certainly have highlighted the risk of tank rupture
caused by sudden temperature change. Esso's two-tiered reporting system (from operators to
supervisors to management) meant that certain warning signs such as a previous similar
incident (on 28 August) were not reported. The company's safety culture was more oriented
towards preventing lost time due to accidents or injuries, rather than protection of workers
and their health

The consequences of this disaster are plant need to shut down immediately and
supplies of natural gas in Victoria were halted for 9-12 days while it is primary gas supplier.
During the crisis, the industry has loss economical around A$1.3 billion. However, there two
Esso’s employees were killed and eight employees were injured. The statutory law of the
accident is Major Hazard Facilities regulations to regulate safety at plants that contain major
chemical hazards.