AIR CARGO MANAGEMENT

ASSIGNMENT (AIRLINES CRASH REPORT)

Name: Muhammad Ismail

Class: BAM-8A
Roll no: 011
Submit by: M.Ismail AIR CARGO MANAGEMENT Submit to: Sir Inam

UPS BOING 747 CRASH

Introduction

On September 3, 2010, a Boeing 747-44AF departed from Dubai International Airport [DXB]
on a scheduled international cargo flight [SCAT-IC] to Cologne [CGN], Germany.

Within two minutes of boarding, about 32,000 feet away, crew advised Bahrain Area East
Air Traffic Control [BAE-C] to signal for on-board fire at the forward main deck and declared
a state of emergency.

Doha International Airport [DOH] Bahrain Air Traffic Control advised you to be ten hours and
a hundred miles away, is that enough? 'Clearance for Turnback and Decent.

The cargo on the main cargo deck was ignited at some point after departure. Three minutes
after the prior warning to crew, the fires made severe damage to flight control systems and
filled the upper deck and cockpit with continuous smoke.

Staff advised Bahrain East Area Control [BAE-C] that the cockpit was 'smoky' and that they
'could not see the radio', while the crew controlled the pitch during turnback and decent.
Differences were experienced. Up to tens of thousands of feet.

The smoke did not come to affect the ability of the crew to safely fly back to DXB for flight
duration.

At a descent of tens of thousands of feet, the captain's supplemental oxygen supply stops
working for five minutes and thirty seconds after the first audible alarm without any audible
or visual warning to the crew. As a result, the captain resigned. The captain left his seat due
to incompetence from the toxic gases and did not return to his place during the flight.

The first officer [F.O], the pilot flying outside the cockpit [PF], could not see the audio
control panel to re-display the initial flight displays or UAE frequencies.

All communications between the destination [DXB] and crew were diverted by BAE-C's VHF
range by emergency aircraft and relay aircraft due to fixed and reciprocating chimneys in the
cockpit.

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Submit by: M.Ismail AIR CARGO MANAGEMENT Submit to: Sir Inam

BAE-C then notified the Emirates Area Control Centre (EACC) in the United Arab Emirates via
landline, which contacted the Dubai ATC via landline.

When the plane reached the aerodrome in Dubai, it took off, the plane reached the left side
of DXB Runway 12 (RWY 12L), and then plummeted to 4500 feet at 34000 at the airport's
northern perimeter. Could not see PF primary flight display [PFD] or outside view of the
cockpit.

Pilot in Command Flying Sharjah International Airport [SHJ] is available at 10 nm. This
required a left-hand turn, slowing down the DXB moving eastward, slowing down, making a
shallow descent south of the airport before losing control of the aircraft, and making an
uncontrolled turn over terrain. Dynasty, nine nautical miles southwest of Dubai
International Airport.

"No survivors."

Findings

However, the flight crew did not or did not register the transponder emergency code
7700.ATCUs know the plane is in an emergency. DXB controllers were unaware that the
flight in an emergency. An emergency or assistance was required due to the complex
nature. Communication relay. There was no any radar data sharing from the UAE to Bahrain
ATC facilities. Bahrain had direct fodder; it goes to the UAE but there are no reciprocal
arrangements. This results in a lack of data. BAE-C ATCO does not have radar that uses the
SSR tracks of a crash flight. ATC facilities are not equipped with tuneable transceivers. The
crash transmitted the flight guard frequency at 121.5 MHz Not Heard by EACC or DXB ATC
planners due to 121.5 MHz frequency due to Low volume conditions.

Pack 1 was closed for unknown reasons and was not specified by staff. Cockpit smoke. The
prevention method was to pack one in a low flow when fire suppression was activated.
Applying more pressure to the cockpit area than ambient pressure, preventing smoke from
entering. It was not known in this example that this method works if the pack is active.
Described based on volume and smoke flow, this captain requests below 10,000 feet

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Submit by: M.Ismail AIR CARGO MANAGEMENT Submit to: Sir Inam

Conclusion

The General Civil Aviation Authority of the United Arab Emirates (GCAA) was investigating
the accident with the help of NTSB. The Bahraini government had decided to investigate the
accident on its own. UPS also sent its investigation team. NTSB sent flight data recorder and
cockpit voice recorder to the United States for analysis.

The GCAA released its final research report in July 2013, which indicated that the fires were
caused by the automatic separation of a cargo pallet material, which included more than
81,000 lithium batteries and other combustible materials. Smoke entered the cockpit as the
air conditioning pack 1 shut down for unknown reasons.

The investigation revealed that the cargo liner failed when the fire broke out and
contributed to the severity of the damage.

Recommendations

In October 2010, the Federal Aviation Authority issued a safety alert to operators by
pointing out that the board Flight 6 cargo contained large amounts of lithium-type batteries.
The FAA has banned passenger aircraft carrying heavy lithium batteries. Boeing has
announced that it will revising the Boeing 747-400f fire checklist to instruct pilots to keep at
least one of the three air conditioning systems in operation to prevent excessive smoke
accumulation on the flight deck.

The accident concealed concerns about the effects of smoke on the cockpit, raising
questions about whether smoke hoods should be introduced on commercial aviation. At the
time of the accident, the US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) had asked the US
Federal Aviation Administration (FAAA) to hold a cargo plane and put in place an automatic
fire extinguishing system. UPS Airlines complied with FAA regulations, stating that pilots
must depress the main cabin and climb to a height of at least 20,000 feet (6,100 meters)
from detecting fire to avoid losing oxygen flames.

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Submit by: M.Ismail AIR CARGO MANAGEMENT Submit to: Sir Inam

VALUE JET 592 CRASH

Introduction

On May 11, 1996, at 1413:42 East Day, Douglas DC-9-32 crashed. 10 minutes after take-off
from Miami International Airport in Miami, Everglades Florida. Aircraft, N904VJ, Flight 592
as ValuJet Airlines, Inc. Operated by Two. The pilot, three flight attendants and a total of 105
passengers were killed. Visual meteorology. Conditions were in the Miami area during take-
off. Flight 592, operating under 14 CFR Part 121 for Destination, Instrument Flight Rules
Flight Plan Provisions William B. Hartsfield International Airport, Atlanta, Georgia.

In this Accident,110 workers were killed in a fire while trying to return to Miami on the
ValuJet DC-9-32 N904VJ Florida Everglades. ValuJet is a low-cost carrier from Atlanta,
Georgia, which began operations on October 26, 1993.ValuJet Flight 592 was a scheduled
flight from Miami (MIA) to Atlanta (ATL). DC-9 also carries a small amount of goods,
including mail-and-company-owned materials (COMAT). COMAT goods were returned to
the airline by Survitec, a subcontract management company based in Miami, Atlanta. It has
three tires and wheels, and the cabin has five oxygen emergency generator compartments,
labelled "Oxy Can - Empty" stored in the Forward Class de Cargo compartment. Seven
minutes after take-off, crews discovered the plane was on fire, but they tried to return to
MIA, but only 2 minutes later the plane made an impact on the ground.

Findings

During the recovery of debris from the swamps, it became clear that a huge fire had broken
out in the forward cargo compartment. An investigation by NTSB found that more than 100
of the 5 boxes of chemical oxygen generators were out of date, but still active, oxygen
generators. They say:

The expired oxygen generator was removed from three ValuJet MD-80 aircraft operating at
Sabeltech. However, during the board's investigation, many of the subtech mechanics who

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Submit by: M.Ismail AIR CARGO MANAGEMENT Submit to: Sir Inam

removed the generators were able to perceive the still danger to the generator, without
saying what items were in the subtech's shipping and delivery department, or whether they
were dangerous. Instead of disposing of the generators properly or at least should fitting
them with a safety cap should be designed to prevent their accidental activation, they can
be used in ValuJet to clean the maintenance area to prepare them for the trip by the
customer. Sent. Additionally, they are incorrectly labelled ...

The NTSB determined that one or more oxygen generators were active.

The aircraft carrier was properly secured and received the appropriate training time and
performance time prescribed by Federal regulations. There was no evidence that any pre-
existing health condition affected flight attendants

The flight attendants had completed the approval of ValuJet's Federal Aviation
Administration Passenger Training Program. The weather was not a risk factor Airliner was
equipped and maintained in accordance with Federal regulations. and authorized
procedures, and there was no evidence of mechanical malfunction or other variations in
aircraft structure, aircraft control systems, or powerplants that Operation of one or more
chemical oxygen oxygen machines in the cargo hold the plane started fire on ValuJet aircraft
592. One or more oxygen absorbs they may have worked for some time after the loading
process started, but probably later during take-off.

Conclusion

In its research report, the US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) determined the
Possible causes of the crash were a fire in the class D cargo compartment of the aircraft,
which was triggered by activating one or more oxygen generators, irregularly carried as
cargo:

 Sabertech failure to properly manufacture, package and locate unexpected chemical

oxygen generators before submitting them to the cartridge for the vehicle;
 ValuJet's failure to properly oversee its contract management program to ensure
compliance with maintenance, management training and hazardous material
requirements and practices; And

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Submit by: M.Ismail AIR CARGO MANAGEMENT Submit to: Sir Inam

 Failure of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to require smoke detection and
fire suppression systems in D cargo compartments.

Recommendations

Contributing to the risk of FAA's failure to adequately monitor heavy jet systems and
obligations ensures that ValuJet and contract maintenance include jet management of its
builders' number and a SabreTech channel repair certificate; FAA failure to adequately
respond to previous oxygen fires and a risk management plan and ValuJet failure to ensure
ValuJet and contract retention employees were aware of the “non-carry” carrier policy and
found out proper hazard training,

The safety issues discussed in this report include minimizing the risks posed by these fires in
categories D of property; equipment, training, and procedures for dealing with the aircraft
smoke and fire inside airplanes; guidance on the management of oxygen generators and
other dangerous parts of the aircraft; SabreTech's and ValuJet management systems
company items and risk items; ValuJet's management of its contract survives storage areas;
FAA employment with ValuJet and ValuJet contract depots’ risks and Research and Special
Programs Administration (RSPA) a system and undisclosed items that are harmful to U.S.
mail. and ValuJet procedures for boarding and counting of children in hangers. Safety
recommendations regarding these issues were in place made by FAA, RSPA, U.S. Service,
and the Air Transport Association. Establish a working standard for the rapid supply of
smoke drums; then confirm that all air carriers meet this standard through advanced smoke
detection systems, advanced flight training, or both. Requires that smoke detectors that are
approved for use by airlines have been installed in such a way that they are easily opened by
flight.

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