Excerpts from Failed States and Institutions Decay (Ezrow and Frantz, 2013)

JUDICIAL INSTITUTIONS
The judicial institutions in Singapore represent an ideal case in terms of integrity,
accountability, efficiency, transparency and equal access. Though the autonomy of the
courts has been questioned, Singapore has ensured that the rule of law is adhered to as
consistently as possible. There are several features of the judicial institutions in
Singapore that are worth providing further detail.

Singapore has prioritized creating high quality judicial institutions by ensuring that the
staff is qualified and well taken care of. The recruitment process for the judicial
institutions in Singapore is rigorous and judges are regarded with high esteem in society.
Judges are recruited that have already amassed years of experience working in the public
sector. Though, judges must tread carefully when ruling on politically sensitive matters,
judges do not face constant political interference, and usually have long careers.iii Judges
in Singapore are also well paid. A Supreme Court judge earns US$500,000 a year.

Singapore, in particular, has made great strides in improving the integrity of its judicial
institutions through its adoption of a set of ten “commandments,” which detail its
approach to judicial integrity. This includes tenets such as “clear ethical markers and
guidelines for judges” and “performance standards for the judiciary and the judges.”iii

The judiciary regularly monitors its own performance to assess how the judicial
institutions can be improved. The courts use a research and statistics unit to gather
information about “emerging trends in crimes, the causes of criminal behavior, and the
effectiveness of sentencing options.”ivOther court programs and rehabilitation programs
are also evaluated.vvi

The judiciary in Singapore is also committed to ensuring that judges continue to be

trained after they’ve been appointed. Seminars are held that emphasize judicial skills and
professional knowledge. Training has been provided in mediation and negotiation. Since
the judicial institutions in Singapore use the latest technology, all those in the legal
profession are offered free workshops to provide awareness of the new technologies
being used.vii

Singapore is also the model state in terms of judicial efficiency. Reforms have taken
place focusing on aggressive case management and alternative dispute resolution. Cases
are heard within weeks of being filed. All of these reforms have been aided through using
technical innovation. Since 1995, case information is publicly available on-line.
Technology is used to video-tape testimonies for foreign witnesses, to record oral
testimonies and to file and manage cases. Electronic kiosks are used to pay certain fines
to avoid court appearances.

The judiciary in Singapore also receives high marks for access and fairness. Survey
research indicated that 97% of the people interviewed agreed that the courts administer
justice fairly to all.viii As many as 80%felt that the court fees are affordable and 95%
agreed that mediation services have made it more affordable to access justice.

Singapore has consistently received high marks on the rule of law index and it also
registers as one of the countries with the lowest scores on the corruption index. This has
translated into higher levels of foreign investment and economic growth. Singapore
ranks high on the ease of doing business index, and much of this is due to the quality of
its judicial institutions, to provide certainty to the business community that contracts are
honored, and that any conflict will be adjudicated in a fair and timely manner.

One of the modest success stories in Africa has been the judicial reform that took place in
Rwanda from 2003-2004. Several important improvements were made to the judicial
institutions that bear noting. There is now lifetime appointment for Supreme Court
Justices, who are appointed by the President after consultation with the cabinet and
election by the Senate. The executive does not have a role in the appointment of the
other judges.ix All potential judges have to be legally qualified. Judges also enjoy
security of tenure until retirement unless they are found guilty of serious misconduct or
incapacity.

To maintain integrity and accountability, the Office of Ombudsman can submit

complaints received to the courts about the behavior of some judicial officers, delays and
hearing of cases. Judges also have to be persons of integrity and cannot have a record of
misconduct or corruption. There is now a Code of Ethics for judges that requires
impartiality, integrity and diligence

Judges and court personnel with a record of corruption are dismissed. Judges cannot be
involved in business activities that may compromise their independence. Skills have been
enhanced through various training programs, which have received support from the
international community. Efforts have also been made to make proceedings speedier.
The procedure is simplified to make cases move faster. Though judicial independence in
Rwanda is still a work in progress, it is undeniable that important changes have taken
place for the better. This has all contributed to the perception that Rwanda has a high
regard for the rule of law, and correspondingly high growth rates have ensued since the
end of the conflict.

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTITUTIONS
India presents an interesting case of institutional decay. At the time of independence,
India had a “venerable” bureaucracy. It was referred to as the “steel frame of the
empire.”x Entry into the civil service was competitive via nationwide examinations.
Slowly however, the administrative institutions began to erode. By the mid 1960s, the
autonomy of the bureaucracy was increasingly interfered with by politicians. Once the
agencies were exposed to political tampering, the quality of the administrative institutions
deteriorated. Politicians would use the administrative institutions to create jobs and
revenues for friends and supporters.xi Careers were short and characterized by rapid
rotation of people. The average tenure in some agencies was not more than 15 months.xii
Due to the short span of careers, the bureaucracy lacked corporate coherence. Individuals
had no long-term ties to the administrative agency that they worked for. Because jobs
were based on political connections, civil servants had no incentives to acquire expertise
or to be productive and efficient.xiii Political tampering also meant that there were no
disciplinary sanctions for misconduct.xiv The civil service became pervaded by
corruption, bribes, overstaffing, and wastefulness.xv India’s high levels of corruption may
also be due to the low salaries of civil servants. The starting salaries in India are
relatively much lower than in Japan, Singapore and Thailand.

Like India, Pakistan’s bureaucracy was once an institution of prestige-- based on

education and professionalism.xvi The bureaucracy retained control over the selection,
training and posting of members.xvii One of its biggest challenges today is that it does not
recruit talented candidates. Though Pakistan has used a Federal Public Service
Commission exam process, it has come under criticism for not being very difficult. The
recruitment process is not transparent. Once hired, training has not been rigorous. There
is little career development and civil servants are not paid well. Instead of equal
opportunities, a tradition of giving preferential treatment is still used. There are no
performance appraisal mechanisms to reward strong performance. Promotions are based
on loyalty and not merit. Senior positions in the civil service are given to members of the
military rather than specialists.xviii

Early on in Pakistan, there was little political interference from politicians with the
administrative institutions, and the bureaucracy maintained its autonomy. Political
interference became commonplace in Pakistan by the time Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (1971-
1977) came to power. Over 1,300 civil servants were purged including some of the elite
civil servants. A professional work ethic was not emphasized. Safeguards against
dismissals were eliminated. The civil service was quickly filled with close relatives and
associates of Bhutto. It has become “increasingly difficult for civil servants to get
postings, transfers or promotions without the support of a political patron.”xix These
practices continued under successive civilian governments.

Subsequent military leaders such as General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq (1978-1988) and

General Pervez Musharraf (2001-2008) dictated that at least 20% of the administrative
institutions were filled with members of the armed forces. Members of the military who
were inducted at the Captain level were placed in positions of seniority regardless of the
administrative qualifications or experience. As a result, the administrative institutions
were not professionally competent. The ineffectiveness of the administrative institutions
in Pakistan has seriously undermined the welfare of its citizens-- and the ability of the
state to provide social services and the rule of law.

In contrast, in Botswana and Mauritius the administrative institutions resemble more

closely the Weberian prototype. Civil servants are recruited on the basis of merit and
qualification. Administrative jobs require a rigorous entrance exam.xx The bureaucracy
is independent of political interference and political neutrality is expected.xxi The
President in Botswana is only allowed to make a few senior appointments. In Mauritius,
the Public Service Commission was set up in 1953 to serve as an agency for meritocratic
recruitment of civil servants. Public sector ethics have been clarified and enforced.xxii
Administrators in Botswana and Mauritius are also relatively well paid and advancement
is strictly based on merit, as opposed to connections. There are also transparent standards
for promotion. Employees also have the right to appeal personnel decisions.xxiii As a
result, corruption and patronage politics in Botswana and Mauritius have been relatively
absent.xxiv Botswana and Mauritius have also experienced sustained economic growth
and have fared better than other states in Africa on the human development index.

SECURITY INSTITUTIONS
Much of the international community has focused on the process of rebuilding
Afghanistan’s military. This case study illustrates the challenges involved in building
security institutions that have eroded considerably.

The Afghan military has never been professionalized, centralized or accountable to the
government. Early on, efforts to conscript troops have always met with resistance.
Recruits have been poorly paid, and soldiers have resisted working under a centralized
command. The military prior to the Soviet invasion was badly factionalized with a tense
divide between officers and troops. Poor pay is still a problem today. The Ministry of
Defense does not pay the salaries to the troops and only guarantees an irregular supply of
food. Even the best units suffer from chronic under supply. As a result, discipline is low
and desertion levels are very high, some saying as high as 50%.xxv xxvi

Recruitment methods of the military have often been patrimonial. Prior to 1963, the
military was filled with primarily Pashtuns. Efforts were made to reform the recruitment
methods by enlisting more troops from other ethnic groups with limited success during
the 1960s and 1970s. Any merit-based recruitment has since been abandoned. The
military is still very Tajik heavy, particularly at the top levels, which is unsurprising
given that the former Minister of Defense Mohammed Fahim (2002-2004) is an ethnic
Tajik.xxvii Pashtun recruits have been dropping out in high numbers, accusing the Tajiks
of mistreatment. The Pashtun belt is particularly sensitive to the fact that the army is
dominated too heavily by Tajiks.xxviii

Military appointments have also been strictly based on political considerations not merit.
Most of the commanders are politically allied to the Minister of Defense. To illustrate,
37 of the 38 generals chosen were Tajiks. More problematic is the fact that most of these
new generals have no professional army background at all.

The Afghan army has also lacked the equipment and training to secure the national
territory, and this is still the case today. Yet, even if the military were to receive more
sophisticated equipment (as it had in 1978), it still lacks the human resources to operate
it. For example, it has been difficult to recruit pilots or technicians. Training programs
have also been cut short.

Due to the low allure of the military, troops have not wanted to leave their homes; this is
why it has proven easier for the Afghan state to rely on local militias to spontaneously
defend their own territories rather than a national professionalized army.xxix The Afghan
military never attempted to seriously disband these local militias. Due to recruitment
problems, private militias have been absorbed into the national army, but they have
remained loyal to local warlords and commanders.

Additionally, the military still contends with many militias that operate outside of the
national army structure but are supposedly part of the Afghan National Army. This has
also made the chain of command confusing. These units are exempted from being
trained by the US because they may have patrons other than the Ministry of Defense.xxx

As a result of all of these problems, the military capabilities of the Afghan National Army
are “abysmal.” Even chasing small guerrilla units is beyond their capability. Building a
professionalized Afghan military is considered one of the most important tasks for state
builders (see chapter nine), but one that appears to be insurmountable.

Cuba under Fidel Castro represents a case where the security institutions are of high
quality. The Cuban military enjoys high levels of esteem and respect and it has earned a
reputation for diligence. Military training has been rigorous in Cuba. The military is
well paid and corruption in the military is very low. Recruitment is not based on
communal ties; the recruitment process is uniform and based on merit. Promotions are
also based on expertise not political loyalty. The Cuban military has seen a rise in more
experienced and professional officers who are less “infatuated” with Fidel Castro’s
leadership.xxxi

The military is well organized and retains its hierarchical structure.xxxii It has worked on
eliminating military factionalism and is unified and cohesive. As a result, the Cuban
military has been particularly effective in global conflicts, such as when it sent troops to
Angola to support the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA).xxxiii Of
Cuba’s involvement in the Angola, the US State Department noted Cuba’s “tactical
finesse” and successful “projection of power on the ground.”xxxiv There have been no
coups or coup attempts in Cuba since Castro.

i
The impeachment process for judges is a lengthy one, but the president does exercise discretionary power.
ii
Ross Worthington, "Between Hermes and Themis: An Empirical Study of the Contemporary Judiciary in
Singapore," Journal of Law and Society 28, no. 4 (2001): 498.
iii
US AID, “Reducing Corruption,” 8.
iv
Karen Blochlinger, "Primus Inter Pares: Is the Singapore Judiciary First among Equals?," Pacific Rim
Law & Policy Journal 9 (2000): 606.
v
Blochlinger, “Primus Inter Pares,” 607.
vi
Surveys of the judiciary have indicated that it is well respected. As many as 97% surveyed claimed that
they have full confidence in the fair administration of justice, regardless of language, race, religion or class
and 98% agreed that the courts independently administer justice according to law (Subordinate Courts of
Singapore, Research Bulletin No. 23: Survey on Public Attitudes & Perceptions of the Singapore
Subordinate Courts; from Blochlinger, “Primus Inter Pares,” 615)
vii
Blochlinger, “Primus Inter Pares,” 607.
viii
Blochlinger, “Primus Inter Pares,” 614.
ix
Rugege, "Judicial Independence,” 417.
x
Evans, The State as Problem,” 172.
xi
Sondhi, “Combating Corruption,” 4.
xii
Evans, The State as Problem,” 173.
xiii
Ministries created to train civil servants and deal with public grievances were undermined by frequent
cabinet reshuffling (Dwivedi, “Imperial Legacy, Bureaucracy,” 263)
xiv
Dwivedi, ““Imperial Legacy, Bureaucracy,” 265.
xv
Quah, “Curbing Corruption,” 241.
xvi
Saeed Shafqat, “Pakistani Bureaucracy: Crisis of Governance and Prospects of Reform,” The Pakistani
Development Review 38, 4, part II, (Winter 1999): 997.
xvii
Wilder, “Pakistan & Afghanistan,” 20.
xviii
Nasir Islam, “Colonial Legacy, Administrative Reform and Politics: Pakistan 1947-1987,” Public
Administration and Development 9 (1989): 279.
xix
Wilder, “Pakistan & Afghanistan,” 21.
xx
David Sebudubudu, “The Institutional Framework of the Developmental State in Botswana” The
Potentiality of “Developmental States” in Africa: Botswana and Uganda Compared, Dakar, CODESRIA
(2005): 82
xxi
Goldsmith, "Africa's Overgrown State,” 539.
xxii
Kiiza, Julius, “Institutions and Economic Performance in Africa: A Comparative Analysis of Mauritius,
Botswana and Uganda,” Research Paper, UNU-WIDER, United Nations University 73 (2006): 13.
xxiii
Goldsmith, "Africa's Overgrown State,” 539.
xxiv
Sebudubudu, “The Institutional Framework,” 84.
xxv
Antonio Giustozzi, “Military Reform in Afghanistan,” Bonn International Center for Conversion Brief
28 (2003): 25-28.
xxvi
The Ministry of Defense had been paying the commanders, but Giustozzi argued that most of the
money spent by the Ministry of Defense is pocketed directly by the commanders. (pg. 25)
xxvii
Though Tajiks constitute 25% of the Afghan population, 40% of the army is Tajik.
xxviii
Giustozzi, “Military Reform,” 28.
xxix
Thomas. Barfield, "Afghanistan is Not the Balkans: Ethnicity and Its Political Consequences from a
Central Eurasian Perspective." Publication of the Central Eurasian Studies Society 4, no. 1 (2005): 8.
xxx
Giustozzi, “Military Reform,” 27.
xxxi
Suchlicki, The Cuban Military, xv.
xxxii
Mani, “Military Entrepreneurs.”
xxxiii
The MPLA was a Marxist-Leninist party that had fought for independence against Portugal and then
later had to fight for control of the Angolan state against anti-communist parties.
xxxiv
Gilbert M. Joseph and Daniela Spenser, eds. In from the Cold: Latin America’s New Encounter with
the Cold War (Durham, NC: Duke University Press Books, 2007), 128.