EXTINCTION OF

CRIMINAL
LIABILITY
Source: Reyes, Luis B. The Revised Penal Code, Criminal Law, Book One,
Articles 1-113. 2012. Eighteenth Edition. Quezon City: Rex Printing
Company, inc., pp.861-890
 Extinction in General
Article 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. –
Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
1. By death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and
as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefore is
extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs
before final judgment;Before final judgment After final judgment
Criminal Liability extinguished extinguished
Civil Liability extinguished not extinguished
Note: Civil liability exists only when the accused is convicted by final judgment.
Death of the offended party does not extinguish the criminal liability
of the offender, because the offense is committed against the State.
2. By service of the sentence;
Crime is a debt incurred by the offender as a
consequence of his wrongful act and the penalty is but the
amount of his debt. When payment is made, the debt is
extinguished. Service of sentence does not extinguish the
civil liability.

3. By amnesty, which completely extinguishes the

penalty and all its effects;
Amnesty is an act of the sovereign power granting
oblivion or a general pardon for a past offense, and is rarely,
if ever, exercised in favor of a single individual, and is usually
exerted in behalf of certain classes of persons, who are
subject to trial but have not yet been convicted. (Brown v.
Walker, 161 US 602)
Note: Civil liability is not extinguished by amnesty.
4. By absolute pardon;
Kinds of pardon:
 Absolute pardon is an act of grace proceeding
from the power entrusted with the execution of the laws
which exempts the individual on whom it is bestowed
from the punishment the law inflicts for the crime he has
committed.
 Conditional pardon is a contract between the
executive and the convict that the former will release the
latter upon compliance with the condition. One usual
condition is “not again violate any of the penal laws of
the country.”
 .

Amnesty Pardon
Blanket pardon to classes of persons, Includes any crime and is exercised
guilty of political offenses individually
May still be exercised before trial or The person is already convicted
investigation
Looks backward – it is as if he has Looks forward – he is relieved from
committed no crime the consequences of the offense, but
rights not restored unless explicitly
provided by the terms of the pardon
Public act which the court shall take Private act of the President and must
judicial notice of be pleaded and proved by the person
pardoned
Valid only when there is final Valid if given either before or after
judgment final judgment
Both do not extinguish civil liability
5. By prescription of the crime;
Prescription of the crime is the forfeiture or loss of the right of
the State to prosecute the offender after the lapse of a certain time.

6. By prescription of the penalty;

Prescription of the penalty is the loss or forfeiture of the right
of the Government to execute the final sentence after the lapse of a
certain time.

7. By marriage of the offended woman, as provided in

Article 344 of this Code.
Marriage of the offender with the offended woman after the
commission of any of the crimes of rape, seduction, abduction or
acts of lasciviousness, as provided in Article 344, must be
contracted by the offender in good faith. Hence marriage
contracted only to void criminal liability is devoid of legal effects.
Article 90. Prescription of crimes. – Crimes punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua or reclusion temporal shall prescribe in twenty
years.
Crimes punishable by other afflictive penalties shall prescribe in
fifteen years.
Those punishable by a correctional penalty shall prescribe in ten
years; with the exception of those punishable by arresto mayor,
which shall prescribe in five years.
The crime of libel or other similar offenses shall prescribe in one
year.
The offenses of oral defamation and slander by deed shall prescribe
in six months.
Light offenses prescribe in two months.
When the penalty fixed by law is a compound one, the highest
penalty shall be made the basis of the application of the rules
 In computing the period of prescription, the first
day is to be excluded and the last day
included. A month is computed as the regular 30-
day month.
 But as regards to a leap year, February 28 and 29
should be counted as separate days in
computing periods of prescription.
 Where the last day of the prescriptive period falls
on a Sunday or a legal holiday, the information
can no longer be filed on the next days as the
crime has already prescribed.
 Act No. 3326 is not applicable where the
special law provides for its own prescriptive
Article 91. Computation of prescription of offenses.
– The period of prescription shall commence to
run from the day on which the crime is discovered
by the offended party, the authorities, or their
agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the
complaint or information, and shall commence to
run again when such proceedings terminate
without the accused being convicted or acquitted,
or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not
imputable to him.
The term of prescription shall not run when the
offender is absent from the Philippine Archipelago.
Outline of the provisions:
1. The period of prescription commences to run from the day on
which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the
authorities or their agents.
2. It is interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information.
3. It commences to run again when such proceedings terminate
without the accused being convicted or acquitted or are
unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him.
Note: termination must be final as to amount to a jeopardy that would bar a
subsequent prosecution.
4. The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent
from the Philippines.
For continuing crimes, prescriptive period cannot begin to run because the
crime does not end.
The period of prescription commences to run from the date of commission of
crime if it is known at the time of its commission. (The offended part had
constructive notice of the forgery after the deed of sale, where his signature
had been falsified, was registered.)
Article 92. When and how penalties prescribe. –
The penalties imposed by final sentence
prescribe as follows:
1. Death and reclusion perpetua, in twenty
years;
2. Other afflictive penalties, in fifteen years;
3. Correctional penalties, in ten years, with the
exception of the penalty of arresto mayor,
which prescribes in five years;
4. Light penalties, in one year.
In prescription of crimes, it is the penalty
prescribed by law that should be considered;
in prescription of penalties, it is the penalty
imposed that should be considered.
Example: A commenced to serve the sentence and
after a month, he escaped and remained at large for
twelve years, in case he is captured thereafter, can he
be required to serve the remaining period of his
sentence? No. The penalty of prision correccional
already prescribed. Article 92 uses the words “the
penalties imposed by final sentence.”
Article 93. Computation of the prescription of
penalties. – The period of prescription of
penalties shall commence to run from the date
when the culprit should evade the service of
his sentence, and it shall be interrupted if the
defendant should give himself up, be captured,
should go to some foreign country with which
this Government has no extradition treaty, or
should commit another crime before the
expiration of the period of prescription.
Elements:
1. That the penalty is imposed by final sentence;
2. That the convict evaded the service of the sentence by
escaping during the term of his sentence;
3. That the convict who escaped from prison has not given
himself up, or been captured, or gone to a foreign country
with which we have no extradition treaty, or committed
another crime;
4. That the penalty has prescribed, because of the lapse of time
from the date of the evasion of the service of the sentence by
the convict

The following interrupts the prescriptive period:

1. In cases where our government has extradition treaty with another
country but the crime is not included in the treaty.
2. The acceptance of a conditional pardon interrupts the prescriptive
period.
Article 36. Pardon; its effects. – A pardon shall
not work the restoration of the right to hold
public office, or the right of suffrage, unless
such rights be expressly restored by the terms
of the pardon.
A pardon shall in no case exempt the
culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity
imposed upon him by the sentence.
Effects of pardon by the President:
1. A pardon shall not restore the right to hold public
office or the right of suffrage. Exception: When any or
both such rights is or are expressly restored by the
terms of the pardon.
2. It shall not exempt the culprit from the payment of the
civil indemnity. The pardon cannot make an exception
to this rule.

Limitations:
1. That the power can be exercised only after conviction;
2. That such power does not extend to cases of
impeachment.
Recebido v. People, 346 SCRA
881
Facts: On September 1990, Caridad Dorol went to the house of
Aniceto Recebido to redeem her property which Dorol
mortgaged to petitioner sometime in April 1985. Recebido
and Dorol did not execute a document on the mortgage but
Dorol gave petitioner a copy of the Deed of Sale dated June
16, 1973 executed in her favor by her father, Juan Dorol.
Caridad Dorol verified from the Office of Assessor that there
exists on its file a Deed of Sale dated August 13, 1979
allegedly executed by Dorol in favor of Recebido and that the
property was registered in the latter’s name. After
comparison, NBI Document Examiner found that the
signature was falsified.

Issue: Whether or not the crime charged had already prescribed

at the time the information was filed.
Held: The crime had not prescribed at the time of the filing of the
information. The petitioner is correct in stating that whether or not the
offense charged has already prescribed when the information was filed
would depend on the penalty imposable therefor, which in this case is
“prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not
more than 5,000.00 pesos.” Under the Revised Penal Code, said penalty
is a correctional penalty in the same way that the fine imposed is
categorized as correctional. Both the penalty and fine being
correctional, the offense shall prescribe in ten years. The issue that the
petitioner has missed, however, is the reckoning point of the
prescriptive period. The petitioner is of the impression that the ten-year
prescriptive period necessarily started at the time the crime was
committed. This is inaccurate. Under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code,
the period of prescription shall “commence to run from the day on
which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or
their agents, x x x.” In People v. Reyes, this Court has declared that
registration in public registry is a notice to the whole world. The record
is constructive notice of its contents as well as all interests, legal and
equitable, included therein. All persons are charged with knowledge of
People v. Desierto, 363 SCRA
585
Facts: This resolves the motion for reconsideration and second motion
for reconsideration filed by Cojuangco Jr., as well as the motion for
reconsideration filed by the Republic of the Philippines. On
September 23, 2002, the resolution of the Ombudsman in OMG-0-
90-2811 dismissing the Republic’s complaint was set aside and the
Ombudsman was ordered to proceed with the preliminary
investigation in said case and to exclude Teodoro Regala and Jose
Concepcion as defendants. Respondent Eduardo Cojuangco Jr and
petitioner Republic of the Philippines then filed their respective
motions for reconsideration of the aforesaid decision.
Cojuangco argues that: There is no evidentiary basis exists for
the Court’s finding that the offense had not prescribed; it was,
consequently, error for the Court to have found that the offense
charged had not prescribed and that the Court overlooked
respondent’s right to speedy disposition. On the other hand, the
Republic questions the Court’s ruling ordering the exclusion of
Held: (Cojuanco) It is not true that the Court has no evidentiary basis for
its finding that the offense had not prescribed. Since the ten-year
prescriptive period in violation of RA 3019 is governed by Section 2
of Act 3326, the complaint in this case was filed on March 2, 1990,
was well within the prescriptive period. The counting of the
applicable ten-year prescriptive period in this case commenced
from the date of discovery of the offense, which could have
been between February 1986 and the filing of the complaint on
March 2, 1990. Between these dates, at the most, only four years
had lapsed. Hence, the complaint was timely filed. The Court
likewise finds respondent’s contention in his motions that the seven-
year delay in the disposition of the preliminary investigation by the
Ombudsman warrants the dismissal of the case against him, without
merit.
In the case of Dela Pena v. Sandiganbayan, the petitioners
raised the issue of the delay of the conduct of the preliminary
investigation. Aside from the motion for extension of time to file
They slept on their right – a situation amounting to laches. The matter could
have taken a different dimension if during all those four years, they
showed signs of asserting their right to a speedy disposition of their
cases or at least made some overt acts, like filing a motion for early
resolution, to show that they were not waiving that right. Their silence
may, therefore be interpreted as a waiver of such right.
In Cojuangco’s case, records shows that the last pleading filed prior to
the resolution dated June 2, 1997 was respondent’s motion to
suspend filing of counter-affidavit, which was filed on May 15, 1991.
Between 1991 and 1997, respondent did nothing to assert his right
to a speedy disposition of his case. Clearly, his silence during such
period amounts to a waiver of such right.
(Republic) In the Regala and Castillo cases, the Court ordered the
exclusion of petitioners therein from the acts complained of in
connection with the legal services they rendered to the other
respondents. They are co-principals in the case for recovery of alleged
ill-gotten wealth.
They have made their position clear from the very
beginning that they are not willing to testify and they
cannot be compelled to testify in view of their
constitutional right against self-incrimination and of their
fundamental legal right to maintain inviolate the privilege
of attorney-client confidentiality.

During the pendency of this petition, respondent

Lobregat died on January 2, 2004. The death of an
accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal
liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon.
The motions for reconsideration filed by Cojuangco and
the Republic are denied with finality.
Presidential Ad hoc Fact-finding Committee on
Behest Loans v. Desierto, 363 SCRA 489

Facts: On March 24, 1997, Atty. Orlando Salvador (PCGG

Consultant) filed with the Ombudsman a complaint
against Calinog-Lambunao Sugar Mills inc., alleging that
the presence of two or more of the eighth criteria
mentioned under Memorandum No. 61 will classify the
account as Behest Loan.
On May 29, 1997, the Ombudsman dismissed the
complaint on the ground of prescription. “The entire
series of transactions was by public instruments, duly
recorded, the crime of estafa committed in connection
with said transactions was known to the offended party
when it was committed and the period of prescription
commenced to run from the date of its commission.” On
October 28, 1999, the Ombudsman manifested to the
Court his willingness to have the case remanded to his
Office for preliminary investigation.
Held: Looking closely at the provisions of R. A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act), the law provides for its own prescriptive period. However,
since R.A. No. 3019, as amended, is a special law, the applicable rule in the
computation of the prescriptive period is provided in Act No. 3326, Section 2
as amended. This implies that if the commission of the crime were
known, the prescriptive period shall commence to run on the day the
crime was committed. However, if the violation of the special law was
not known at the time of its commission, the prescription begins to run
only from the discovery thereof, i.e., discovery of the unlawful nature of
the constitutive act or acts. In cases involving violations of R. A. No.3019
committed prior to the February 1986 Edsa Revolution that ousted
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, we ruled that the government as the
aggrieved party could not have known of the violations at the time the
questioned transactions were made. Moreover, no person would have
dared to question the legality of those transactions. Thus, the counting of
the prescriptive period commenced from the date of discovery of the
offense in 1992 after an exhaustive investigation by the Presidential Ad
Hoc Committee on Behest Loans. As to when the period of prescription was
interrupted, the second paragraph of Section 2, Act No. 3326, as amended,
provides that prescription is interrupted "when proceedings are
instituted against the guilty person." In this case, the prescriptive period
was interrupted upon the filing of the complaint with the Ombudsman
on March 24, 1997, five (5) years from the time of discovery in 1992.
Del Castillo v. Torrecampo, 394
SCRA 221
Facts: On May 17, 1982 (Barangay Election Day), the accused
conducted himself in a disorderly manner, by striking the
electric bulb and two kerosene petromax lamps lighting the
room where voting center no 24 is located, during the
counting of the votes in said voting center plunging the room
in complete darkness, thereby interrupting and disrupting the
proceedings of the Board of Election Tellers. On January 14,
1985, the trial court rendered judgment and declared
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt. During the
execution of judgment, petitioner failed to appear which
prompted the presiding judge to issue an order of arrest of
petitioner and the confiscation of his bond. However, petitioner
was never apprehended. He remained at large. Ten years
later, on October 24, 1997, petitioner filed before the trial court
a motion to quash the warrant issued for his arrest on the
ground of prescription of the penalty imposed upon him.

Issue: Whether or not the penalty imposed has prescribed.

Held: From the four elements of Article 93, it is clear that
the penalty imposed has not prescribed because the
circumstances of the case at bench failed to satisfy the
second element, to wit – “That the convict evaded the
service of the sentence by escaping during the
service of his sentence.” Article 93 provides when the
prescription of penalties shall commence to run. Under
said provision, it shall commence to run from the date
the felon evades the service of his sentence.
Pursuant to Article 157 of the same Code, evasion of
service of sentence can be committed only by those who
have been convicted by final judgment by escaping
during the term of his sentence. The assailed decision of
the Court of Appeals is based on settled jurisprudence
and applicable laws. It did not engage in judicial
legislation but correctly interpreted the pertinent
laws. Because petitioner was never placed in
confinement, prescription never started to run in his
Cristobal v. Labrador, 71 Phil
34
Facts: Teofilo Santos was convicted of the crime of estafa. He
was given pardon by the president but even prior to his
pardon he was already holding the position as the
municipality president of Malabon, notwithstanding his
conviction. Miguel Cristobal, on the other hand, averred that
Santos should be excluded from the list of electors in
Malabon because he was already convicted of final judgment
“for any crime against property”. This is pursuant to CA 357 of
the New Election Code. The lower court presided by Alejo
Labrador ruled that Santos is exempt from the provision of
the law by virtue of the pardon restoring the respondent to his
“full civil and political rights, except that with respect to the
right to hold public office or employment, he will be eligible for
appointment only to positions which are clerical or manual in
nature and involving no money or property responsibility.”

Issue: Whether or not Santos should not be excluded as an

elector.
Held: It should be observed that there are two limitations upon
the exercise of this constitutional prerogative by the Chief
Executive, namely: (a) that the power be exercised after
conviction; and (b) that such power does not extend cases of
impeachment. Subject to the limitations imposed by the
Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be restricted or
controlled by legislative action. It must remain where the
sovereign authority has placed it and must be exercised by the
highest authority to whom it is entrusted. An absolute pardon not
only blots out the crime committed, but removes all disabilities
resulting from the conviction. In the present case, the disability
is the result of conviction without which there would be no
basis for disqualification from voting. Imprisonment is not the
only punishment which the law imposes upon those who violate
its command. There are accessory and resultant disabilities,
and the pardoning power likewise extends to such
When granted after the term of imprisonment has expired,
absolute pardon removes all that is left of the consequences
of conviction. In the present case, while the pardon
extended to respondent Santos is conditional in the
sense that "he will be eligible for appointment only to
positions which are clerical or manual in nature involving
no money or property responsibility," it is absolute insofar
as it "restores the respondent to full civil and political rights."
Upon the other hand, the suggestion that the disqualification
imposed in paragraph (b) of section 94 of Commonwealth Act
No. 357, does not fall within the purview of the pardoning
power of the Chief Executive, would lead to the impairment of
the pardoning power of the Chief Executive, not
contemplated in the Constitution, and would lead furthermore
to the result that there would be no way of restoring the
political privilege in a case of this nature except through
legislative action.
Pelobello v. Palatino, 72 Phil 441

Facts: Gregorio Palatino was the mayor elect of

Torrijos, Province of Marinduque. Florencio
Pelobello filed a quo warranto proceeding alleging
that Palatino is no longer qualified to hold office
because he was already convicted before and
was even imprisoned. Because of such conviction
and imprisonment, Pelobello averred that Palatino
is already barred from voting and being voted
upon. Palatino also invoked paragraph (a) section
94 of the Election Code which supports his
contention.

Issue: Whether or not Palatino is eligible for public

Held: In the case at bar, it is admitted that the respondent
mayor-elect committed the offense more than 25 years ago;
that he had already merited conditional pardon from the
Governor-General in 1915; that thereafter he had
exercised the right of suffrage, was elected councilor of
Torrijos, Marinduque, for the period 1918 to 1921; was
elected municipal president of that municipality three times in
succession (1922-1931); and finally elected mayor of the
municipality in the election for local officials in December,
1940. Under these circumstances, it is evident that the
purpose in granting him absolute pardon was to enable
him to assume the position in deference to the popular
will; and the pardon was thus extended on the date
mentioned hereinabove and before the date fixed in
section 4 of the Election Code for assuming office. We
see no reason for defeating this wholesome purpose by a
restrictive judicial interpretation of the constitutional grant to
the Chief Executive. We, therefore, give efficacy to
executive action and disregard what at bottom is a
People v. Nery, 10 SCRA 244
Facts: On 15 November 1954, in a market stall in Bacolod City, the
accused, Soledad Nery, received from Federico Matillano two
diamond rings to be sold by her on commission. The agreement
was for the accused to deliver on the following day, the sum of
P230.00 to her principal, to whom the accused had represented
having a ready buyer, and whatever overprice could be obtained
in the sale would be retained by the accused as her
commission. Soledad Nery failed to show up on the following
day; after several days, in a casual encounter with Federico
Matillano, she claimed that her prospective buyer withdrew from
the transaction and that she was looking for another buyer. His
patience exhausted, Federico brought the matter to the attention
of the police authorities of Bacolod on 5 January 1955. Soledad
was found and brought to the police station; she promised, in
writing, to deliver the price of the rings or the rings on 25
January 1955. The accused failed to comply with her promise.
Issue: Whether or not the criminal liability of the accused is extinguished
by novation.

Held: The accused in the present case insists that there is no prohibition
in our law to prevent the parties to a contract to novate it so that any
incipient criminal liability under the first is thereby avoided. It may be
observed in this regard that novation is not one of the means
recognized by the Penal Code whereby criminal liability can be
extinguished; hence, the role of novation may only be to either
prevent the rise of criminal liability or to cast doubt on the true
nature of the original basic transaction, whether or not it was such
that its breach would not give rise to penal responsibility, as when
money loaned is made to appear as a deposit, or other similar disguise
is resorted to. Criminal liability for estafa is not affected by
compromise or novation of contract, for it is a public offense which
must be prosecuted and punished by the Government on its own
motion though complete reparation should have been made of the
damage suffered by the offended party. The fact, therefore, that the
accused herein had, with the consent of the offended party, assumed
the obligation of paying the rentals, which he collected, out of his own
salary after he had committed the misappropriation, does not obliterate
Llamado v. CA, 270 SCRA 423
Facts: Accused Ricardo Llamado and his co-accused
Jacinto Pascual were the Treasurer and President,
respectively, of the Pan Asia Finance Corporation. Leon
Gaw, delivered to accused the amount of P180,000.00,
with the assurance of Aida Tan, the secretary of the
accused in the corporation, that it will be repaid on 4
November 1983, plus interests thereon at 12% plus a
share in the profits of the corporation, if any. On the said
date, Leon Gaw deposited the check in his current
account but it was dishonored by the drawee bank.
Informing Llamado of the dishonor of the check.
Accused offered in writing to pay Gaw of the amount
equivalent to 10% thereof on 14 or 15 November 1983,
and the balance to be rolled over for a period of ninety
days. Llamado failed to do so. Gaw filed a complaint
against Llamado and Pascual for violation of BP 22.
Pascual remained at large. Llamado contends he signed
blank checks and leave them with Pascual.
Held: The "novation theory" does not apply in the case at
bar. While private complainant agreed to petitioner's offer to
pay him 10% of the amount of the check on November 14 or
15, 1983 and the balance to be rolled over for 90 days, this
turned out to be only an empty promise which effectively
delayed private complainant's filing of a case for
Violation of BP 22 against petitioner and his co-accused.
As admitted by petitioner in his Memorandum, private
complainant was never paid as agreed upon. Petitioner's
argument that he should not be held personally liable for the
amount of the check because it was a check of the Pan Asia
Finance Corporation and he signed the same in his capacity
as Treasurer of the corporation, is also untenable. The third
paragraph of Section 1 of BP Blg. 22 states: “Where the
check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the
person or persons who actually signed the check in
behalf of such drawer shall be liable under this Act.”
People v. Maneja, G.R. No. L-
47684
Facts: The sole question raised in this appeal is
whether the period of prescription for the
offense of false testimony which, in the instant
case, is five years (Art. 180, No. 4, in relation
to art. 90, Revised Penal Code), should
commence from the time the appellee,
Dionisio A. Maneja, adduced the supposed
false testimony in criminal case No. 1872 on
December 16, 1933, as the lower court
held, or, from the time the decision of the
Court of Appeals in the aforesaid basic case
became final in December, 1938, as the
prosecution contends.
Held: The period of prescription shall commence to run
from the day on which the crime is discovered by the
offended party, the authorities or their agents. (Art. 91,
Revised Penal Code.) With regard to the crime of false
testimony, considering that the penalties provided therefor in
article 180 of the Revised Penal Code are, in every case,
made to depend upon the conviction or acquittal of the
defendant in the principal case, the act of testifying falsely
does not therefore constitute an actionable offense until
the principal case is finally decided. And before an act
becomes a punishable offense, it cannot possibly be
discovered as such by the offended party, the authorities
or their agents. The penalty for the offense of false
testimony is the same, whether the defendant in criminal
case No. 1872 were convicted or acquitted, is of no moment,
it being a matter of pure coincidence. The four cases
enumerated in article 180 of the Revised Penal Code — and
the instant case falls on one of them — uniformly presuppose
a final judgment of conviction or acquittal in the basic case as
Yapdiangco v. Buencamino, 122 SCRA
713
Facts: On February 1, 1965, the City Fiscal of Quezon
City filed before the City Court an information for slight
physical injuries allegedly committed by Rafael
Yapdiangco on December 2, 1964 against Mr. Ang
Cho Ching. On September 10, 1965, the petitioner-
appellant moved to quash the criminal prosecution on
the ground that the information having been filed on
the sixty first day following the commission of the
offense, the sixty days prescriptive period had lapsed.
On September 14, 1965, the City Court of Quezon
City denied the motion to quash stating that the 60th
day fell on a Sunday and considering the rule that
when the last day for the filing of a pleading falls on a
Sunday, the same may be filed on the next
succeeding business day, the action had not
prescribed.
Held: The law requires or permits the filing of the information within two
months or sixty days from the date the crime was discovered by the
offended party. The 60th day or last day for the filing of the information
in this case fell on a holiday. If we follow the ordinary rule of time
computation based on the common law, which, in construing
statutes of limitations excludes the first day and includes the last
day unless the last day is dies non in which event the following
day is included, the stand of the respondents-appellees would be
correct. The rules contained in Section 31 of the Revised
Administrative Code and Section 1, Rule 28 of the Old Rules of Court
do not apply to lengthen the period fixed by the State for it to prosecute
those who committed a crime against it. The waiver or loss of the right
to prosecute such offenders is automatic and by operation of law.
Where the sixtieth and last day to file an information falls on a
Sunday or legal holiday, the sixty-day period cannot be extended
up to the next working day. Prescription has automatically set in.
The remedy is for the fiscal or prosecution to file the information on the
last working day before the criminal offense prescribes.
Cabral v. Puno, 70 SCRA 606
Facts: On the complaint of private respondent Silvino San Diego, the
Provincial Fiscal filed an Information on September 24, 1974 with
respondent court, accusing petitioner Eugenio Cabral of the crime of
Falsification of Public Document for allegedly falsifying on August 14,
1948 the signature of Silvino San Diego in a deed of sale of a parcel
of land. Before arraignment, petitioner moved to quash the
Information on the ground of prescription of the crime charge. After
hearing said motion, Judge Juan F. Echiverri, granted the motion to
quash and dismissed the Information on the ground of prescription.
The order of dismissal was predicated upon said court's finding that
the factual averments contained in the notion to quash were
supported by the evidence. Private prosecutor, who was not present
during the hearing of the motion to quash, filed a motion dated April 8,
1975, for the reconsideration of said Resolution. This was opposed by
petitioner on the ground that San Diego can no longer intervene in the
criminal case, having filed a civil action in April 1974 against the same
accused (Eugenio Cabral) on the basis of the same factual averments
Held: The Solicitor General recommends giving due course to the petition and
the reversal of the challenged order. According to the Solicitor General, the
Resolution of March 25, 1975 dismissing the Information on the ground of
prescription of the crime became a bar to another charge of falsification,
including the revival of the Information. This is more so, because said
Resolution had already become final and executory inasmuch as the
Fiscal neither sought its reconsideration nor appealed therefrom within the
reglementary period of fifteen (15) days after his receipt of a copy thereof on
March 31, 1975. When the Fiscal moved to reinstate the case on May 21,
1975, or about two months from receipt of a copy of the order of dismissal,
the same had already long been final. We agree with the Solicitor
General. The Rules of Court is explicit that an order sustaining a
motion to quash based on prescription is a bar to another prosecution
for the same offense. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code also provides
that "prescription of the crime" is one of the grounds for "total
extinction of criminal liability." Petitioner was charged with the crime of
falsification under Article 172, sub-paragraphs (1) and (2) of the Revised
Penal Code. Here, San Diego had actual if not constructive notice of the
alleged forgery after the document was registered in the Register of
People v. Carino, 56 Phil 109
Facts: On or about June 5, 1928, in the municipality of Goa, Camarines
Sur, the aforenamed accused, Victorino Cariño and Daniel Obias,
being election inspectors duly appointed in precinct No. 4 of said
municipality for the general election held on that date, with the sole
purpose of favoring one Vicente Oliquino, falsify the copies of the
election returns in said precinct sent to the provincial and municipal
treasurers, sign them and with the full knowledge of falsifying the
results of the election the accused made it appear therein that the said
Vicente Oliquino had obtained 110 lawful votes for the office of
councilor, when as a matter of fact, and which the defendants positively
knew, as indeed they stated in the other copy of the election return
which was placed in the valid ballot box, that said Vicente Oliquino
obtained only 67 lawful votes in said precinct. That these frauds were
discovered in connection with the election protest filed against said
Vicente Oliquino in civil case No. 4562, in which, by order of the court,
the ballot boxes for said precinct No. 4 were opened on October 10,
1928. The trial court convicted Victoriano Cariño and Daniel Obias of
the crime charged and sentenced them to six months' imprisonment, a
fine of P200 each, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency,
to pay the costs, and to be deprived of the right of suffrage, besides
being disqualified to hold a public office for a period of seven years.
Victoriano Cariño and Daniel Obias filed an appeal.
Held: The difference between the Election Law and the Penal Code in
the matter of prescription consists in this, that according to the Code,
if the commission of the crime is unknown, prescription begins
upon its discovery and the commencement of judicial
investigation looking to its punishment; whereas according to the
Election Law, if the discovery of the offense is incidental to
judicial proceeding in any election contest, prescription begins
when such proceedings terminates. The discovery in question
was not incidental to judicial proceeding in said election contest, but,
that, even before the filing of the motion of protest, the contestants
and their election watchers, with knowledge of the falsification
committed by the inspectors, in connection with the count of the
votes and the preparation of the election returns on June 6,
1928, had sufficient reason to denounce such falsification to the
fiscal. Therefore, the general rule established that the year for the
prescription of the crime charged in the information began to
run when the offense was committed. And inasmuch as the
falsification of the election returns took place on June 6, 1928, it is
evident that the information filed on July 22, 1929, is outside of
the year provided by law. Wherefore, the judgment appealed from
is reversed, and the appellants Daniel Obias and Victorino Cariño
People v. Joson, 46 Phil 380
Facts: On the 6th day of June 1922, on the occasion of the
general elections which were being held on said day in
the municipalities of Virac and Bato, Province of Albay,
the above-named accused, conspiring and intentionally
write, prepare and cause to be written, distributed,
published, divulged and posted in different public places
within the municipalities of Virac and Bato several
posters and bills reading as follows: “Voters, bear in mind
our sufferings, hemp is cheap, due to Vera, and rice is
dear, due to Martinez” and is calculated to belittle and
defeat Jose O. Vera and Pedro Martinez. In accordance
with the foregoing order on April 28, 1923, an "order of
arrest" was issued, signed by said judge. On the same
date and without having been actually arrested under
said order of arrest, all of the defendants appeared in
court and gave "bail bonds" for their liberty. Nothing
further seems to have occurred in the prosecution of said
action until the 22d day of January, 1924.
Held: In accordance therefore with that section, the filing of the
complaint in the present action on the 28th day of April, 1923, had
the effect of interrupting the running of the prescriptive period
mentioned in section 71 of Act No. 3030, and that the actual arrest
of the defendants was not necessary to interrupt the running
of the period of prescription or limitation. Moreover, it may be
added that when the defendants voluntarily appeared after the
complaint was presented against them and gave bonds for their
appearance at any time they may be called, no arrest is necessary.
Voluntary appearance relieves the necessity of an actual
arrest. The record contains no explanation why the prosecution of
the present case was delayed from the 28th of April, 1923, to the
20th of March, 1924. Such delay should not be permitted. In view
of all of the foregoing, the presentation of the complaint within
the year of prescription interrupted the running of the
prescriptive period and the action was not barred by
prescription; that the lower court committed the errors complained
of by the Attorney-General; that the cause was improperly
dismissed, and it is hereby ordered and decreed that the record
should be returned to the court whence it came, with direction that
the prosecution proceeds as speedily as possible.
People v. Puntilos, June 15,
1938

“Acceptance of a conditional pardon interrupts

the prescriptive period because it is similar to
a case of one fleeing from this jurisdiction.”
Tanega v. Masakayan, February 28,
1967
Facts: Adelaida Tanega was convicted of slander by the City
Court of Quezon City. Found guilty once again by the Court of
First Instance, she was sentenced to 20 days of arresto
menor, to indemnify the offended party, Pilar B. Julio, in the
sum of P100.00, with the corresponding subsidiary
imprisonment, and to pay the costs. The Court of Appeals
affirmed. Back to the Court of First Instance of Quezon City,
on January 11, 1965, directed that execution of the sentence
be set for January 27, 1965. On petitioner's motion, execution
was deferred to February 12, 1965, at 8:30 a.m. At the
appointed day and hour, petitioner failed to show up. This
prompted the respondent judge, on February 15, 1965, to
issue a warrant for her arrest, and on March 23, 1965 an
alias warrant of arrest. Petitioner was never arrested. Then,
on December 10, 1966, petitioner, by counsel, moved to
quash the warrants of arrest of February 15, 1965 and March
23, 1965. Petitioner's ground: Penalty has prescribed. On
December 19, 1966, the respondent judge ruled that "the
penalty imposed upon the accused has to be served",
Held: For prescription of penalty of imprisonment
imposed by final sentence to commence to
run, the culprit should escape during the
term of such imprisonment. Adverting to the
facts, we have here the case of a convict who
— sentenced to imprisonment by final
judgment — was thereafter never placed in
confinement. Prescription of penalty, then,
does not run in her favor.