Professional Documents
Culture Documents
European Transition
European Transition
European Transition
H. Semih Yildirim**
College of Commerce
University of Saskatchewan
Saskatoon, SK S7N 5A7, Canada
Tel.: +1 (306) 966-2503
Fax: +1 (306) 966-2515
E-mail: yildirim@commerce.usask.ca
and
George C. Philippatos
* Earlier versions of this paper were presented various university workshops, and the 2002 EFMA Conference in
London, England, June 26-29, 2002. We wish to thank to R. E. Shrieves, M. C. Collins, H. Chang, G. Koutmos,
S. Ouandlous, Henri Pages, and various participants for their constructive comments and suggestions on earlier
versions of this paper. Financial support for data acquisition and summer research from the University of
Tennessee is also acknowledged.
** Corresponding author.
1
EFFICIENCY OF BANKS: RECENT EVIDENCE FROM THE TRANSITION
ECONOMIES OF EUROPE –1993-2000
Abstract
This study examines the cost and profit efficiency of banking sectors in twelve transition
economies of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) over the period 1993-2000, using the
stochastic frontier approach (SFA) and the distribution free approach (DFA). The managerial
inefficiencies in CEE banking markets were found to be significant, with average cost
efficiency level for 12 countries of 72 and 77 percent by the DFA and the SFA, respectively.
The alternative profit efficiency levels are found to be significantly lower relative to cost
efficiency. According to the SFA, approximately one-third of banks’ profits are lost to
inefficiency, and almost one-half according to the DFA. The results of the second-stage
regression analyses suggest that higher efficiency levels are associated with large and well-
capitalized banks. The degree of competition has a positive influence on cost efficiency and a
negative one on profit efficiency, while market concentration is negatively linked to
efficiency. Finally, foreign banks are found to be more cost efficient but less profit efficient
relative to domestically owned private banks and state-owned banks.
2
EFFICIENCY OF BANKS: RECENT EVIDENCE FROM THE TRANSITION
ECONOMIES OF EUROPE –1993-2000
1. Introduction
Over the last decade the banking markets in the transition economies of Central and
Eastern Europe (CEE) have gradually evolved from the traditional monobank system of the
tiered system of today. The governments, with financial and strategic support from
efficient banking system, based on market principles, for the transformation from central
planning to market economies and for converging toward the criteria for European
integration.1 New financial markets, institutions and channels of intermediation have been
established almost from scratch. Although many prudential regulations have been enacted and
supervisory systems have been formed to smooth the transformation and sustain the financial
stability, promoting banking sector efficiency still remains an important concern for many of
the CEE governments and the various international organizations that support the transition
process.
The performance of CEE banks is of research interest and policy relevance due to
several reasons: First, the importance and dominant role played by banks in the provision of
intermediation services and the capital formation process in transition economies. Since their
money and capital markets are still in a developing stage, the transition countries have
primarily bank-based financial systems and performance of the banking system plays a key
1
The first group of CEE countries including the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia
started negotiations with the EU in March 1998 while the second group of CEE countries–Bulgaria, Latvia,
Lithuania, Romania, and Slovakia – began negotiations in February 2000
3
role on economic growth and sound functioning of the industrial sectors. Secondly, the
competitive structure of the financial sector has significantly changed due to recent
participation.2 Thanks to less restrictive licensing policies, the number of foreign and
domestically owned private banks has substantially increased in transition countries over the
recent years. These developments in the region certainly have some efficiency implications
for operating performance and productivity in the financial systems. Finally, as the banks and
other financial institutions in the region are preparing for increased competition under the
European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), it is important to evaluate their ability to
compete and survive in an integrated European financial landscape. Therefore, for both
managerial and public policy concerns, it is extremely important to know the efficiency level
of banking operations in determining how the banking industry will respond to these
challenges and which banking firms are likely to prevail during the ongoing transition and
integration phase.
In light of the above discussion, our study evaluates the efficiency levels of
restructuring, and deregulation process. Although research on the efficiency of banks and
other financial institutions in the US and other developed countries is voluminous, there has
been very little previous research that focus on transition economies. Our study intends to fill
this gap. Despite the remarkable structural changes in transition economies this limited
academic attention can partly be explained by the unavailability of reliable data until recently.
Our study utilizes unbalanced panel data from 12 CEE countries over the period 1993-2000
2
The share of foreign ownership in terms of both total assets and capital currently exceeds two-thirds in many of
these countries, making the CEE banking sector the most open emerging market to foreign participation.
4
and employs the “stochastic frontier approach” (SFA) and the “distribution free approach”
(DFA) to estimate bank-specific efficiency relative to the predictive cost and profit functions
of banks that are efficient. We also analyze the potential correlates of efficiency by regressing
the inefficiency scores on numerous bank-specific and market-structure variables. Given the
current restructuring and deregulation efforts in these countries, the empirical results of this
study should be timely and helpful to the policymakers of the above countries, as well as to
banking scholars.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the
efficiency concepts and some salient literature. Section 3 discusses the data and methodology
employed. Section 4 presents the estimates of efficiency and Section 5 summarizes the results
The performance of depository financial institutions has been the subject of many
empirical studies, after the seminal works of Benston (1965) and Bell and Murphy (1968).
Early research on bank performance has given the most emphasis to the analysis of scale and
scope economies employing a cost function where all banks are implicitly assumed to operate
at approximately the same efficiency levels. Research on scale efficiency in the banking
industry usually detects a relatively flat U-shaped average cost curve and reports higher
efficiency levels for medium-sized banks than either large or small banks (Berger et al.,
1999).
However, the academic research focus on bank performance has recently shifted to
frontier efficiency or X-efficiency, which measures inefficiency as the deviation from the
5
efficient frontier where best-practice firms operate. That is, the cost efficiency of an institution
characterized by minimum costs or input usage in the industry, holding scale and output mix
constant. Prior research concludes that cost inefficiencies in the range of 20 to 30 percent
dominate the effect of scale and scope diseconomies, generally found to be in the range of 5 to
10 percent (Berger and Humphrey 1991). Yet, there is no consensus among the researchers on
the efficiency concept, functional form, and estimation technique that yield the most accurate
efficiency measure.
The extant literature has employed various efficiency concepts and measurement
methods to estimate operational efficiency and to analyze the cross sectional determinants of
efficiency through the estimation of stochastic frontiers has received increasing attention
among the researchers over the last two decades. Literature offers numerous parametric and
non-parametric methods for the empirical estimation of such a frontier. The parametric
methods involve defining the frontier through a functional form such as Translog, which is
estimated by several econometric techniques. The non-parametric methods, on the other hand,
do not presume any explicit functional form for the frontier and construct it from the observed
methods, by not allowing any shocks to production and cost, consider any deviation from the
composed error model, which allows us to distinguish between inefficiency and other
6
The literature on the efficiency of financial institutions in the US and other well-
developed countries contains a large number of articles. Since this is not intended to be a
Nevertheless, it is beneficial to focus directly on some relevant studies that provide some
(1996) employ both the "stochastic frontier" (SFA) and the "distribution free" (DFA)
approaches to estimate a standard translog functional form for 15 developed countries over the
period 1988-1992. Initially they divide their sample into two groups of banks based on
“functionally-separated” banking, and then they further classify each group into "large" and
"small" sub-samples. They report that the cost inefficiency measures range from 15 percent
for large banks in universal banking countries to 27.5 percent for large banks in functionally-
operating less cost efficiently than their universal counterparts. They also find that, greater
efficiency is associated with higher profitability, lower total cost, smaller bank size and higher
level of loans.
Vander Vennet (1996) studies the effect of domestic and cross-border mergers and
acquisitions on the efficiency of credit institutions in Europe over the period 1988-1993 and
finds that cross-border acquisitions improve the efficiency levels of acquiring banks while
domestic consolidation does not. Bikker (1999) applies the stochastic cost frontier approach
to the European banking industry in order to measure the effect of increased competition on
3
See, among others, Berger, Hunter and Timme (1993), Berger and Humphrey (1997), and Berger and Mester
(1997) for an extensive review of literature on efficiency of financial institutions.
7
bank efficiency. He finds that, on average, Spanish, French and Italian banks appear to be less
efficient than those in Germany, the Netherlands and the UK, while banks in Luxembourg,
Belgium and Switzerland are the most efficient. Berg et al. (1993) use data envelopment
analysis to study the efficiency in Scandinavian banking markets and find the average
Swedish bank (78%) to be more efficient than the average Norwegian bank (57%), which, in
turn, is more efficient than the average Finnish bank (53%). Finally, Maudos et al. (2002)
analyzes the cost and profit efficiencies of banks for ten countries of The European Union by
employing panel data frontier approaches. They report average cost and profit efficiency
levels of 82.7% and 45% respectively, for ten countries considered. In their study, Austria and
Germany emerge as the most cost efficient countries while Luxembourg and Portugal stand
emphasize the fact that, out of 130 efficiency analyses of depository financial institutions,
covering 21 countries, only about 5 % examine the banking sectors of developing countries.
They note that the vast majority of the efficiency literature focus on the banking markets of
well-developed countries with particular emphasis on the U.S. markets (about 75%). The
relatively scant literature on bank efficiency in emerging markets focuses mainly on the
efficiency differentials among banks with different ownership status and asset size. This is
due to the fact that the banking systems in these countries are still in their infancy and markets
are usually characterized by high state-ownership, newly privatized domestic banks, and rapid
entry by foreign banks. The policy issues examined in these studies usually address the
8
domestic and foreign bank entry and operations, and existence of scale economies associated
contradicting results between developed and emerging banking markets. Domestic banks in
developed countries are generally found to be more efficient relative to their foreign-owned
counterparts (Berger et al., 2000). For example, prior research has found that domestically-
owned U.S. banks are substantially more cost efficient than are foreign-owned banks (Hasan
and Hunter, 1996; Mahajan et al.,1996; Chang et al., 1998). These results are consistent with
the notion that foreign banks with a driving motive of obtaining a quick market share
expansion will rely heavily on purchased funds, a relatively more costly way of financing
their investments compared to core deposits, which require setting up an extensive delivery
capacity and establishing a broad customer base (DeYoung and Nolle, 1996). An alternative
explanation is provided by Peek et al. (1999) who conjecture that the observed inefficiency of
foreign banks that enter the U.S. market through acquisition could be attributed perhaps to the
lower performance and efficiency of target banks compared to other domestic banks prior to
the acquisition. In contrast, the efficiency studies in emerging banking markets generally find
that foreign banks are more efficient than either state-owned banks or domestic private banks.
For example, Bhattacharya et al. (1997), Srivastava (1999) for Indian banks, Hasan and
Marton (2000) for Hungarian banks, and Isik and Hassan (2002) for Turkish banks find that
foreign banks are more cost efficient than domestic banks. Similarly, Ozkan-Gunay (1998)
and Hasan and Marton (2000) find foreign banks are more profit efficient than domestic and
state-owned banks in Turkey and Hungary, respectively. Claessens et al. (2001) find that
foreign banks in emerging markets are more profitable than their domestic counterparts.
9
Leightner and Lovell (1998) and Laeven (1999) also find that foreign banks exhibit higher
Regarding bank size, Hasan and Marton (2000) show that larger banks are more cost
and profit efficient than smaller banks in Hungary. Similarly, Srivastava (1999) reports the
existence of economies of scale in the Indian banking market. Leaven (1999) presents
evidence that small Thai banks are less profit efficient than medium and large banks. By
contrast, Isik and Hassan (2002) find a negative relationship between banks size and cost
efficiency for Turkish banks. Accordingly, Leightener and Lovell (1998) find that size is
negatively associated with productive efficiency for both domestic and foreign banks in
Thailand.
Our analysis comprises two stages. In the first stage, we employ the standard translog
specification to obtain efficiency estimates for individual banks in the sample. Since the
production technologies of banks are unknown a priori, we estimate the efficiency measure as
the deviation from the efficient frontier where best-practice firms operate. In this approach, a
frontier is established from the estimated cost or profit function of banks in the data while the
inefficiencies or deviations from the frontier are represented by the error terms. In the second
stage, we explore the determinants of efficiency with certain bank-specific and industry-
banks using two different optimization concepts—cost minimization and alternative profit
maximization. In this respect x-efficiency refers to the degree of managerial success on using
inputs and outputs in a manner that will minimize costs and maximize profits. Under cost
minimization, the inefficiency arises from sub-optimal choices of input quantities given input
10
prices and output quantity, whereas under profit maximization, the inefficiency originates
from sub-optimal choice of output quantities given output prices or sub-optimal output prices
given quantities. The following sub-section outlines the basic model, which is estimated under
Cost efficiency scores measure the performance of a banking firm relative to the best-
practice bank that produces the same output bundle under the same exogenous conditions. The
C =C (y,w,z,u,e) (1)
where, C measures total costs for bank, including both operating and financial costs; y is a
vector of outputs; w is a vector of input prices; z represents the quantities of fixed bank
parameters (bank capital, fixed assets, off-balance sheet items, etc.); u is the inefficiency term
that captures the difference between the efficient level of cost for given output levels and
input prices and the actual level of cost; and e is the random error term. Assuming the
inefficiency and random error term are multiplicatively separable from the rest of the
ln C= f(y,w,z) + ln u + ln e (2)
where f denotes a functional form. After estimating a particular cost function, the cost
efficiency for bank i is measured as the ratio between the minimum cost (Cmin) necessary to
11
where umin is the minimum ui across all banks in the sample. Under this formulation, an
efficiency score, say 0.90, implies that the bank would have incurred 90 percent of its actual
Profit efficiency measures how close a bank is to attaining the maximum possible
profit as a best-practice firm on the frontier for given levels of input and output prices
(quantities) and other exogenous market variables. Previous literature offers two different
specifications for the profit maximization objective, namely “standard” and “alternative”
(non-standard) profit functions. (Humphrey and Pulley, 1997; Berger and Mester, 1997). The
standard profit function assumes that output markets are perfectly competitive so that banks
are price-takers in both output and input markets while alternative profit specification assumes
that banks can have some power in determining output prices. Thus, standard profit function
is specified as a function of input and output prices, whereas alternative profit function is
Berger and Mester (1997) note that the alternative profit specification is preferred over
standard profit specification when (1) there are differences in the quality of banking services,
(2) markets are not perfectly competitive so that banks might have some market power in
pricing their outputs, (3) outputs are not completely variable, so that banks can not achieve
every output scale and product mix, and (4) output prices are not available. Since banks in our
sample belongs to a diverse group of countries that differ in market structure, regulation, and
quality of banking services provided, it will be more appropriate to employ alternative profit
assumption of standard profit function does not reflect the realities of transition banking since
12
markets are still considered to be in their developing stage.4 Finally, specifying profits as a
function of output quantities rather than output prices avoids the problem of having to
measure output prices, which are basically not available in our case.
The alternative profit specification employs the same set of exogenous variables as the
cost function in Equation (1) with the only difference that profit replaces total cost as the
dependant variable in the frontier regression. Therefore, the alternative profit frontier is given
by
P = P ( y,w,z u, e) (4)
where P is the variable profits of the firm, which includes all the interest and fee income
earned less total costs, C, used in the cost function. The profit function can be written in log
terms:
where θ is a constant added to every bank’s profit to make it positive so that the natural log
can be taken. Profit efficiency is measured by the ratio between the actual profit of a bank and
the maximum possible profit that is achievable by the most efficient bank.
where umax is the maximum ui across all banks in the sample. For example, profit efficiency
score of a bank, say, of 80% means that the bank is losing about 20% of its potential profits to
4
This assumption is not also consistent with the findings of Yildirim and Philippatos (2003a) that banks in
majority of the CEE countries operated under monopolistic competition over the years 1993-2000.
13
3.2 Estimation Techniques
The biggest challenge in frontier efficiency studies has been separating inefficiencies
from random error. Four main frontier approaches, each with different sets of arbitrary
assumptions on the probability distributions of inefficiency and random error terms, have been
utilized. These approaches are (a) data envelopment analysis (DEA), (b) thick frontier
approach (TFA), (c) stochastic frontier approach (SFA), and (d) distribution free approach
(DFA).5 Berger, Hunter, and Timme (1993) report that there is no simple rule for selecting
which of these methods can be best used to describe banking data and these methods do not
The DEA approach is a non-parametric linear programming technique, where the set
of frontier observations are those using proportionally less of each input for a given set of
outputs and using the correct proportion of inputs given their respective prices. The DEA,
which focuses primarily on technical efficiency, does not allow for random errors, assuming
that all deviations from the estimated frontier represent inefficiency. Under the TFA, a lowest
and highest cost quartiles of banks are estimated from a cost function. The maintained
assumption here is that the error terms within the lowest and highest cost quartiles reflect
statistical noise, while the differences between the lowest and highest cost quartiles represent
In order to measure the efficiency level of CEE banks, this study employs two
different parametric techniques: the stochastic frontier approach (SFA) and the distribution
free approach (DFA). The SFA asserts that managerial or controllable inefficiencies can only
increase costs (reduce profits) above (below) best-practice frontier and that random
5
See Bauer et al. (1997) for a comprehensive review of these approaches.
14
fluctuations or uncontrollable factors can increase or reduce costs (profits). Therefore, the
model assumes that inefficiency measures, (ln u), which represent the departure from the
efficient frontier follow an asymmetric half-normal distribution, while random fluctuations are
distributed as two-sided normal with a zero mean and variance σe2.6 Jondrow et al. (1982)
propose a model, which specifies a functional form of the distribution of the one-sided
The DFA tries to avoid the arbitrary assumptions of the stochastic frontier approach,
where panel data are available. This approach also separates the composite error term into
inefficiency and statistical noise components. However, it assumes that there exists a core
inefficiency for banks, which persists over time while the random error part vanishes out over
time (Berger, 1993). According to the DFA, inefficiency estimate of a bank is determined by
the difference between average residual of the bank i, (lnui), and the average residual of the
bank on the frontier (lnumin), assuming that the random errors will cancel out over time. The
where lnumin is the average residual for the bank with the lowest average cost residual. The
most efficient bank is represented by an efficiency score of 1 and the other banks are assigned
efficiency scores between 1 and 0. Under this framework, an efficiency score (EFF) of 0.90
implies that the bank would have incurred 90 percent of its actual costs had it matched its
6
Economic theory does not say much about the distribution of the inefficiency component of composite error
term. Various distributions have been proposed in the SFA literature for ui, which can only be observed
indirectly. The most widely used distribution assumption for ui is half normal distribution, which is also
employed in this study. Alternate model specifications include the exponential distribution and the gamma
distribution.
15
Berger (1993) emphasizes the fact that the random error component, ln e, may not
cancel out completely during the sample period. Therefore, some banks might have extreme
average residuals in both ends of the distribution. To mitigate the problem caused by the
extreme values, prior research calculated additional efficiency measures derived from
truncated distributions of the ln ui. That is, observations that fall below the pth percentile are
set equal to the pth percentile value, and observations that exceed the (1-p)th percentile are set
equal to the (1-p)th percentile value. Keeping up with the literature, we truncate the
We employ the multiproduct translog functional form to estimate the cost and
alternative profit frontiers and derive the efficiency measures. The cost frontier function is
represented by:
2 2 2
ln(C / w3 z) = α0 + ∑αl ln(wi / w3 ) + 0.5 ∑ ∑ω lh ln(wl / w3 ) ln(wi / w3 )
l =1 l =1 h =1
3 3 3
+∑ β k ln(yk / z) + 0.5 ∑ ∑β kj ln(yk / z) ln(y j / z)
k =1 k =1 j =1
3 2
+ ∑ ∑δ
k =1 l =1
lk ln(yk / z) ln(wl / w3 ) + ϕ1 ln Z + 0.5ϕ2 (ln Z )2
3 2
+ ∑ τ k ln(yk / z) ln Z ) + ∑ ς l ln(wl / w3 ) ln Z + ln eti + ln uit (8)
k =1 l =1
where wi and yi are input prices and output amounts and z is the equity capital. The
dependent variable, total cost, is the sum of interest expenses, personnel expenses and other
16
operating expenses.7 We impose the regular restrictions of symmetry and linear homogeneity
for input prices in estimating the parameters of Equation (8) as the following:
3 3 3
β kj = β jk , ωlh = ω hl ; ∑α l = 1,
l =1
∑ωlh = 0 ,
h =1
∑δ
l =1
lk = 0. (9)
Cost and input prices are normalized by the price of capital before taking logarithms to
impose linear input price homogeneity. Since we do not decompose the efficiency measure
into technical and allocative components, the cost functions are not estimated using the input
share equations.
The alternative profit frontier estimation employs essentially the same specification in
cost equation with some minor changes. For the profit frontier estimation the dependent
variable ln(C / w3 z ) is replaced with ln( P / w3 z ) and the inefficiency term is -u. Cost, profit
and output variables are normalized by equity capital (Z). This normalization controls for
heteroscedasticity, scale biases, and other estimation biases in addition to providing a more
economic meaning since the dependant variable in profit function essentially becomes ROE, a
Still a controversial issue in banking literature is the definition of banking inputs and
outputs, and more specifically the treatment of deposits in this respect. The two competing
approaches that determine what constitutes inputs and outputs of banks are the production and
7
Some authors assert that fitting a single translog function over a sample of banks that vary widely in size and
product mix will create a specification bias. They propose the use of non-parametric techniques such as kernel
regression, spline-augmented, or Fourier flexible approximations. (See McAllister and McManus 1992 , Mitchell
and Onvural 1996, Berger, Leusner, and Mingo 1997) However, Berger and Mester (1997) find that choosing a
fourier flexible form over standard translog model does not have important effect on the measure of average
industry efficiency or on the rankings of individual banks. They report that the average efficiency measures are
only 1 percent lower when Fourier specification employed. The limited number of observations in the present
data prevents us from employing Fourier approximations. One approach to mitigate this problem would be to
estimate separate cost functions over subsets of the firms in the sample (See Dowling and Philippatos, 1990).
8
For detailed discussions of this normalization see Berger and Mester (1997,1999) and Berger and DeYoung
(2001).
17
the intermediation approaches (Sealey and Lindley, 1977). Production approach considers
labor and physical capital as inputs and number of processed accounts as outputs. The
intermediation approach considers deposits as inputs (and thus considers interest on deposits
as a component of total costs, together with labor and capital expenses) and defines loans and
investments as outputs. We adopt the intermediation approach and following Berger and
Humphrey (1992) and specify deposits as both inputs and outputs of banks. Accordingly, in
this study, banks are modeled as multi-product firms that produce 3 outputs (loans,
investments, and deposits) and employ 3 inputs (borrowed funds, labor, and physical capital).9
Loans (Y1) are measured as the sum of all loan accounts intermediated by banks less non-
performing loans.10 Investments (Y2) is the sum of total securities, equity investments and
other investments. The third output (Y3) is the produced deposits (the sum of demand,
savings, and time deposits). These outputs are produced by using three inputs: borrowed funds
(X1), labor (X2), and physical capital (X3). The price of borrowed funds (W1) is estimated as
interest expenses divided by customer and short term funding plus other funding. The price of
labor (W2) is defined as the ratio of personnel expenses to total assets.11 The price of physical
capital (W3) is measured as the ratio of other operating expense to fixed assets. Table 1
provides the summary statistics for model parameters in thousands of US dollars for 2000 and
12 countries.12
9
For each output category, zero values are replaced by a small positive number 0.001 to allow logarithms to be
taken, as in several previous studies.
10
Due to the unavailability of asset-specific data we cannot disaggregate loans into their various components.
11
Due to the unavailability of data on the number of employees we cannot employ the ratio of personnel
expenses to number of workers as unit price for labor. Using the ratio of personnel expense to total assets as
labor cost is a common approach in efficiency studies that employ BankScope data.
12
Similar statistics for individual countries are not reported here to save space but available from authors upon request
18
The equity capital (Z) is included in the model for several reasons. First, it controls for
absorb financial shocks, risk-averse managers might hold higher level of equity than that of
cost minimizing level. Therefore, failure to account for risk preference might lead to label
otherwise optimally behaving bank, given its managerial risk preference, as inefficient.
Furthermore, higher level of equity implies lower default risk, all else being equal. The default
risk in return, affects the cost and profit of the bank through the risk premium the bank has to
pay for borrowing (Mester, 1996). Given the reality of high insolvency risks due to significant
non-performing loans, including equity becomes very important for the study of transition
banking. Berger and Mester (1997) also notes that inclusion of equity in the analysis may
account for the scale bias arising from differences in bank dependence on borrowed funds
since large banks usually depend more on borrowed funds. Finally, equity constitutes an
alternative to deposits in funding loans and investments, and therefore can significantly affect
costs and profits. Since equity financing is generally the most costly way of funding assets,
neglecting the equity level will bias the efficiency scores in favor of banks with high reliance
on equity.13
3.4 Database
The banks in our sample constitute a fairly large proportion of the banks in the
transition economies of Europe over the period of 1993-2000. Financial statement data for the
banks were taken from Fitch-IBCA's BankScope date set. The countries included are the
13
Since equity values reported for some banks were negative we applied the following transformation. The
absolute value of the minimum equity value in the sample plus 1 is added to each bank’s equity so that the
logarithm is defined.
19
Czech Republic, Estonia, Croatia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, FYR of Macedonia, Poland,
Romania, Slovenia, the Slovak Republic, and the Russian Federation. Albania, Bulgaria, and
Yugoslavia were excluded form the initial sample due to lack of complete information. The
the final sample, banks had to be classified as commercial banks or cooperative banks in the
BankScope data set and they must have all the model variables available at least for three
years. Bank holding companies, investment banks and securities houses, saving banks, real
estate and mortgage banks, non-banking credit institutions, and other specialized
governmental credit institutions are excluded from the initial sample to make the data more
comparable across countries. 96 % of the firms in the sample are consisted of commercial
banks, and the remaining 4 % were cooperative banks. Due to the log linear specification in
the estimated model, observations that have negative value on any of the explanatory
variables are also dropped from the sample. The selection process yielded a unbalanced panel
with 2042 observations belonging to 325 banks over the sample period. Not all the banks were
in continuous operation over the entire period due to failures, mergers, and de novo entry.
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of bank characteristics under investigation for each
country for 1999. All data are reported in US$ as the reference currency and corrected for
inflation. Differences in the average banks size are substantial. The average Czech bank has
more assets ($2.08 billion in 1999) than does the average bank in other CEE countries,
followed by Polish and Hungarian banks. However, the average Polish bank has generated
more loans than the average bank in other countries, followed by Czech and Estonian banks.
On average, banks in the Czech Republic and Poland have the highest equity capital on their
20
4. Empirical results
The mean cost and profit efficiencies obtained from the frontiers that were estimated
by two different methods, i.e. SFA and DFA, are presented in Tables 3 and 4.14 Furthermore,
we reported the results in four different truncation points (0, 1, 5, and 10%). The frontier
models we estimated all had R-squared values of 0.95 or higher and plausible parameter
estimates. The simple correlation between total assets and the absolute cost residual for each
As expected, the level of efficiency changes significantly with the level of truncation
applied. For example, the average cost efficiency measured by the DFA for the overall sample
changes from 45% to 66% when only 1% of extreme values are replaced by the value of
truncation point. The inefficiency level increases to 72% with 5% truncation. This might be
due to persistent random factors that do not factor out completely over the sample period as
assumed by the DFA approach. Following the prior literature, we will focus our analysis on
According to the SFA results at 5% truncation point, the average cost efficiency level
for 12 CEE countries under examination is 77%. This result suggests that, on average, about
one-fourth of the bank resources are wasted during the provision of banking services in
transition economies. The results of the analysis are comparable to that of previous studies of
developed banking markets that are typically in the vicinity of 20% to 30%. According to
these results Poland and Slovenia appears to be the most efficient countries while the Russian
Federation and the three Baltic States (Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia) are the least efficient.
14
For the SFA, we estimated the frontier cost function and the inefficiency measures using the algorithm, based
on the model developed by Aigner et al. (1977). The residuals are computed following the approach by Jondrow
et al. (1982).
21
The cost efficiency levels estimated by the DFA at 5 % truncation are slightly lower
than those estimated by the SFA. The overall efficiency measure is 0.72 for the entire sample.
The 72% efficiency measure means that the average bank needs 28% more resources to
produce the same output as the average efficient bank. Based on the DFA results, Poland has
the highest average efficiency level (82%) and Lithuania has the lowest (63%). Given the
relatively well-developed nature of the Polish banking industry this result does not come as a
surprise. This result might partly be attributed to the increased foreign participation with more
efficient operating techniques in Poland. The highly concentrated structure of the banking
markets and the lack of competition might be the reasons for such low scores of efficiency in
the Baltic States. For example, the Estonian banking market is highly concentrated and the
three largest domestic banks controlled more than 95% of total assets at the end of June 2000.
The efficiency scores of other countries range between 65% and 81%, implying that an
average bank in these countries can reduce its operating costs by 19% to 35% if it can adjust
its operations according to the bank at the frontier. Overall, the results imply that, banks in
transition economies can significantly reduce their production costs if they can utilize their
The results of the alternative profit efficiency estimation are presented in Table 4. Here
too, the levels of efficiency measures significantly vary with the level of truncation chosen.
As in many previous researches, the alternative profit estimates are lower than those of cost
efficiency (Berger and Mester (1997) for US banks; Maudos et al. (2002) for 10 EU member
countries). According to the SFA, approximately one-third of banks’ profits are lost to
22
4.1 Correlates of cost and profit efficiency
Having documented the efficiency scores of each national banking industry, the next
step is to determine whether the efficiency levels can be explained by bank-specific or country
specific factors. For this purpose, we provide an explanatory analysis through examining the
Several bank- and industry-specific factors may influence the efficiency of a particular
bank. Some of these factors may be neither inputs nor outputs in the production process, but
rather circumstances faced by a particular bank. The variables consist of two groups-the first
representing firm-specific attributes, and the second encompassing the nature of the market
and regulatory structure in effect over the period examined. The bank-specific variables
included in the regressions are: size (LNTA=log of total assets measured in thousands of US
assets); risk (LOANS/TA= total loans over total assets, LLR/TL= Loan loss reserves as a
fraction of gross loans); funding (CSTF=customer and short term funding over total funds;
IBDP/TOTDEP= interbank deposits over total deposits) and off-balance sheet activity
The LNTA and EQTY variables are included in the model to examine the effect of
bank size and capitalization on efficiency. Strong capital structure is essential for the banks in
transition economies since it provides additional strength to withstand financial crises and
lower capital ratios in banking imply higher leverage and risk, and therefore greater borrowing
costs. Thus, the efficiency level should be higher in better-capitalized banks. Since efficient
23
banks are likely to be better in credit evaluation we expect to get a negative coefficient on the
LLR/TL variable. We do not have any a priori expectation on the signs of the coefficients of
There are several ways by which market structure can affect the performance of
that under the setting of asymmetric information and uncertainty, competitive pressures serve
as the most effective instrument in fostering productive efficiency (Hart, 1983). Competition
motivates management to operate closely to their production frontier and also, under the
agency framework, provides the principals with relevant information for monitoring
barriers are subject to a lesser degree of market discipline since the degree of competition they
face will be relatively low. Therefore, we hypothesize that increased competition will improve
bank efficiency. In order to account for the effect of the degree of competition (COMP), we
use the Panzar and Rosse (1987) H-statistic as computed previously in Yildirim and
Philippatos (2003a).15
concentrated markets can exercise market power to earn monopoly profits and enjoy the
luxury of operating in inefficient levels. The ICR3 variable, which represents the market share
of the largest three banks in the industry, is used to capture the effect of market concentration
on bank efficiency. Two competing theories that explain the linkage between market
concentration and firm performance are the “structure-performance paradigm” (Mason, 1939;
15
H statistic is the sum of the elasticities of the reduced-form revenues with respect to input prices. Panzar and
Rosse (1987) show that H statistic is equal to 0 in monopoly, 1 in perfect competition and between 0 and 1 under
monopolistic competition.
24
Bain, 1951) and the “efficient structure hypothesis” (Demsetz, 1973). Structure-performance
paradigm asserts that concentration is the result of market power and conjectures a negative
relation between concentration and efficiency. The efficient structure hypothesis, in contrast,
argues that efficient firms grow large at the expense of inefficient firms, and therefore
anticipates a higher efficiency in concentrated markets. Hence, we do not have a strong ex-
The GDP variable represents the growth rate in country domestic product and is used
as a proxy for local economic conditions. Favorable economic conditions will affect positively
the demand and supply of banking services, and will possibly improve bank efficiency. To
distinguish between foreign and domestic banks we included the FOREIGN dummy variable.
domestically owned private or state banks. Similarly SPEC variable is used to distinguish
between commercial and cooperative banks and accounts for the effect of bank specialization.
We also specified the LISTED dummy variable to account for any systematic differences in
The second stage regressions were estimated using GLS fixed-effects estimators,
where the standard errors were calculated using White’s (1980) correction for
heteroscedasticity. Table 5 reports the results of the estimation. Both regressions include
country and time-specific fixed effects which are not reported. Overall, most of the
The coefficient on the size variable is positive and statistically significant at the 1 %
level, indicating that, on average, larger banks attain a higher level of cost efficiency in their
25
operations. This might be the result of the relaxation of asset restrictions in the banking
system that allowed the banks to grow and venture into different banking business practices,
and to accrue some economies of scale and scope. Profit efficiency on the other hand does not
seem to be linked to asset size at any conventional significance levels. The level of equity
capital is positively related with efficiency in both models. This finding is consistent with the
results of the previous research that usually report higher cost and profit efficiency levels for
well-capitalized banks. Banks with higher ratio of loans to assets are found to be more cost
that a higher level of problem loans is associated with lower cost and profit efficiency levels.
This result might suggest that efficient banks are very effective in evaluating credit risk
(Berger and DeYoung, 1997). Cost-efficient banks also appear to have higher customer and
short tem funds in total funding and low interbank deposit ratios. These two measures,
however, have no significant correlation with profit efficiency. Finally, banks with higher
level of off-balance sheet activities are found to be significantly more cost and profit efficient.
Among the market structure variables, the degree of competition has a positive
influence on cost efficiency and a negative one on profit efficiency. These results suggest that
the banks operating in more competitive and contestable markets are under more pressure to
control their costs and cannot earn higher profits by exercising their potential market power.
Consistent with this result, the negative and highly statistically significant relationship
between industry concentration ratio and profit efficiency implies that profitability is not the
result of concentration or market power. The GDP variable is positively linked to cost
efficiency but negatively linked to profit efficiency. Regarding the impact of bank ownership,
results suggest that foreign banks operating in transition countries appear to be more cost
26
efficient but less profit efficient relative to domestically owned private banks and state-owned
banks. The dummy variable representing bank specialization is significant only in the cost
efficiency case indicating that commercial banks are less cost efficient relative to cooperative
banks. Finally, public trading dummy (LISTED) did not yield any significant relationship in
5. Conclusion
The prospects for the financial services world have substantially changed over the last
decade. This is particularly true for the transition economies of Eastern Europe that have
gone through a historic transformation from central planning to a market-based system. This
study has examined the cost and profit efficiency of banking sectors in twelve transition
economies of Europe, by employing the stochastic frontier approach (SFA) and the
distribution-free approach (DFA). An unbalanced panel of CEE banks is studied over the
period 1993-2000. We first estimated the average cost and profit efficiency levels for a panel
of 325 banks over an 8-year period for twelve countries. We then regressed these efficiency
scores to see whether they depend on any particular bank-specific or industry-specific factors.
As in most previous studies of bank efficiency, we find that the average bank deviates
substantially from the best-practice frontier. The managerial inefficiencies in CEE banking
markets were found to be significant, with average cost efficiency level for 12 countries 72
and 77 percent by DFA and SFA. Overall, these average estimates suggest that an average
bank would have incurred 23 to 28 percent less of its actual costs had it matched its
performance with the best-practiced bank. According to our results Poland and Slovenia
appears to be the most cost efficient countries while the Russian Federation and the three
27
Baltic States (Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia) are the least efficient. The alternative profit
efficiency levels are found to be significantly lower relative to cost efficiency. According to
SFA, approximately one-third of banks’ profits are lost to inefficiency, and almost one-half
The results of the second-stage regression analyses suggest that higher efficiency
levels are associated with large and well-capitalized banks. Further, banks that heavily rely on
core deposits in funding their assets are found to be more efficient. Consistent with most prior
research, higher level of problem loans is associated with lower efficiency levels. Regarding
the effect of market structure on bank performance, the higher level of competition in banking
markets is associated with lower cost and higher profit efficiency, while market concentration
is negatively linked to efficiency. Favorable economic conditions seem to improve only cost
efficiency. Finally, foreign banks operating in transition countries are found to be more cost
efficient but less profit efficient relative to domestically owned private banks and state-owned
banks.
As a caveat, we note that these results should be interpreted with great care since
previous research found that average efficiency estimates differ substantially across different
estimation approaches and efficiency concepts even for the same sample. Like other
stochastic frontier approaches the estimation results from SFA and DFA may be affected by
the distributional assumptions of the annual residuals of each bank. (Bauer et al. 1998).
We believe that this research contributes to the body of knowledge concerning the
policymakers to review the results of their efforts in promoting financial stability and creating
an efficient, properly supervised financial system for both the transitional economic reforms
28
and the preparations for accession to the European Union. Regarding the future path of the
CEE banking markets we would like to make the following remarks. It is clear that, the
integration of the European markets as well as the ongoing global financial liberalization will
force the CEE banking firms to improve their efficiency. As a result of the elimination of
regulatory barriers to foreign entry, the banking firms will feel heightened competitive
pressures from large European financial institutions that are currently operating at relatively
low margins. In response to growing domestic and international competition, banks will be
optimal production plans, upgrading their operations through new technology, and reducing
excess capacity through merging with more efficient banks. Banks will also have to search for
alternative ways to increase production capacity such as offering new services and products
and focusing on non-interest income-generating activities. Since only the most efficient
institutions will survive these challenges, the inefficient banks will either be acquired or
eventually be driven out of market by the competition. Increased efficiency in the banking
industry will affect positively the customers of those banks since reduction in costs will be
reflected as lowered prices and improved service quality. Increased efficiency will also
improve the capacity of the banking industry to generate financial innovations and meet better
the reasons for underperformance in CEE banking industries. The next stage of research can
quality and regulatory issues. It will also be of interest to extend the analysis to other sectors
29
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32
Table 1 Summary Statistics for Model Parameters*
Variable Mean ($000) Std Dev Minimum Maximum
Y1 (Loans) 375745.14 887784.54 0 8631164.93
Y2 (Investments) 397894.68 977042.86 11.07 8968847.69
Y3 (Deposits) 550507.11 1530905.94 0 16408895.6
X1 (Borrowed Funds) 757116.5 1818418.05 0 17826757.81
X2 (Labor) 15185.77 44077.24 0.5 819737.22
X3 (Physical Capital) 16663.7 48526.43 4.36 649857.76
W1 (Price of Borrowed Funds) 31.75 1331.32 0.0003 56042.37
W2 (Price of labor) 2.20836 25.757 0.001 1038.18
W3 (Price of Physical capital) 0.0233 0.0330431 0.0003 1.112
C (Total cost) 107544.95 400582.02 13.08 13397311.31
P (Earnings before tax) 13499.63 60255.81 1 615735.09
Z (Equity Capital) 83677.68 161045.35 15.604 1599000
*
All measures are adjusted for inflation in 2000 US$, except for unit costs.
33
Table 2 Descriptive statistics of banks in sample by country average for 1999
Assets Deposits Other Equity Loans Investment
Country N funding securities
Czech Rep. 23 2080406.6 1624421.6 133993.74 181037.25 824995.62 1022069.07
Estonia 4 853797.76 596246.13 77872.34 117707.83 497291.66 247507.28
Croatia 35 371027.14 239724.81 47188.73 55213.97 197176.16 165395.22
Hungary 30 955514.74 747333.03 47471.45 82570.47 407301.88 458503.72
Lithuania 9 283078.5 233102.49 8186.64 29750.64 146475.77 71032.55
Latvia 20 153242.88 132194.78 1500.94 14950.45 69846.75 62257.78
FYR of Macedonia 10 97645.31 63878.15 496.53 16536.54 41953.39 47531.04
Poland 43 1912469.2 1630925.3 7222.85 172547.94 967080.4 779226.86
Romania 27 318874 252160.32 3128.1 48889.57 97394.2 170034.02
Russian Federation 80 535235.56 378220.24 14861.45 69694.85 228825.34 226358.92
Slovenia 20 687551.78 560575.39 24718.57 70852.66 377501.9 274026.27
Slovakia 18 846286.35 738380.42 11147.26 46441.51 484277.61 356381.25
All quantity variables are in thousands of US dollars and corrected for inflation.
Total number of banks N = 319 for 1999.
Total observations over 9 years (1993-2000) = 2042
34
Table 3 Cost Efficiency Measures
Stochastic Frontier Approach (SFA) Distribution Free Approach (DFA)
Czech Republic 0.725 0.748 0.769 0.802 0.478 0.627 0.705 0.756
Estonia 0.698 0.715 0.742 0.764 0.403 0.666 0.685 0.724
Croatia 0.768 0.792 0.814 0.837 0.597 0.697 0.724 0.785
Hungary 0.730 0.754 0.788 0.803 0.457 0.587 0.712 0.748
Lithuania 0.602 0.654 0.692 0.735 0.415 0.541 0.628 0.674
Latvia 0.658 0.711 0.732 0.779 0.387 0.596 0.667 0.726
FYR Macedonia 0.728 0.752 0.768 0.794 0.432 0.712 0.745 0.774
Poland 0.745 0.801 0.854 0.835 0.444 0.738 0.824 0.841
Romania 0.714 0.735 0.748 0.792 0.450 0.700 0.733 0.785
Russian Fed. 0.629 0.702 0.723 0.750 0.410 0.624 0.650 0.714
Slovenia 0.738 0.792 0.827 0.844 0.472 0.766 0.814 0.854
Slovakia 0.656 0.755 0.775 0.800 0.409 0.642 0.687 0.755
Overall 0.699 0.743 0.769 0.795 0.446 0.658 0.715 0.761
35
Table 4 Profit Efficiency Measures
Stochastic Frontier Approach
(SFA) Distribution Free Approach (DFA)
Czech Republic 0.642 0.671 0.695 0.712 0.331 0.416 0.429 0.521
Estonia 0.624 0.666 0.701 0.714 0.342 0.382 0.435 0.530
Croatia 0.542 0.592 0.648 0.660 0.300 0.444 0.560 0.684
Hungary 0.435 0.522 0.573 0.594 0.274 0.530 0.615 0.671
Lithuania 0.601 0.650 0.680 0.699 0.357 0.371 0.489 0.580
Latvia 0.635 0.674 0.704 0.716 0.401 0.420 0.456 0.555
FYR Macedonia 0.667 0.680 0.698 0.719 0.380 0.394 0.461 0.568
Poland 0.564 0.609 0.664 0.670 0.310 0.430 0.548 0.667
Romania 0.375 0.461 0.550 0.566 0.294 0.482 0.554 0.608
Russian Fed. 0.472 0.540 0.595 0.608 0.275 0.557 0.571 0.605
Slovenia 0.580 0.627 0.670 0.676 0.314 0.403 0.523 0.633
Slovakia 0.635 0.673 0.692 0.701 0.370 0.348 0.456 0.557
Overall 0.564 0.614 0.656 0.670 0.329 0.431 0.508 0.598
36
Table 5 Regression Analysis of potential correlates of efficiency
Variable Cost Efficiency Profit Efficiency
Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value
Intercept 0.889 13.12*** 0.726 12.47***
GDPGROWTH Growth rate in state real domestic product 0.004 6.12*** -0.021 -10.17***
Dummy variable that equals 1 if bank is a
SPEC -0.065 -4.94*** 0.024 1.12
commercial bank, 0 otherwise
Dummy variable that equals 1 if more than
FOREIGN 50% of the bank assets are owned by foreign 0.033 3.98*** -0.079 -5.12***
banks; 0 otherwise
Dummy variable that equals 1 if bank is
LISTED -0.004 -0.46 0.008 0.75
publicly traded, 0 otherwise
Adjusted R2 0.34 0.26
*,**,*** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively
All regressions also include country and time dummy variables which are not reported.
37