1974 Book Reviews
been a certain "nationalization" of political
life). But, neither the few stimulating discus-
sions, nor the limited findings, nor the points
of relative consensus are of sufficient impor-
tance to make the book worthwhile. Nor, for
that matter, do the insightful, synthetic reports
by the various conference chairmen (Merle,
Lalumiere, Lavau, Dupeux, and Goguel) jus-
tify the book. Much of the value of these sum-
mary reports lies in their criticism of the papers
and their calls and suggestions for future re-
search.
The prime object of the symposium, how-
ever, was not to provide definitive answers but
rather to stimulate research in the area of
French local politics—an extremely laudable
goal. With the exception of Kesselman's The
Ambiguous Consensus, some monographs and
articles by Pierre Gremion and Jean-Pierre
Worms, and research conducted in Grenoble by
Suzanne Berger, Peter Gourevitch, Patrice
Higonnet, and Karl Kaiser, there has been a
notable and regrettable lack of interest in
French subnational politics. The proceedings of
the symposium clearly delimit a wide variety
of research projects which could and should
be undertaken. The participants in the confer-
ence quite freely and openly noted the absence
of information at their disposal and pointed out
a great deal of virgin terrain requiring explora-
tion. It is hoped that students of French politics
will respond to these calls to action. To the
extent that Les Facteurs locaux de la vie
politique nationale stimulates research in local-
level politics, it may be considered a successful
work.
WILLIAM R. SCHONFELD
University of California, Irvine
Pakistan: Failure in National Integration. By
Rounaq Jahan. (New York: Columbia Uni-
versity Press, 1972. Pp. 248. $12.50.)
Rounaq Jahan, a member of the Political
Science Department at Dacca University in
Bangladesh, is the author of this concise, read-
able study. The book emerged from Miss
Jahan's Harvard University political science
doctoral dissertation. In this volume the author
traces the course of Pakistan's political-eco-
nomic history in an effort to show the inability
and/ or reluctance of the country's leaders to
cope with the essential problem of nation build-
ing; i.e., the molding of ethnic diversity into a
unified polity. The focus for Miss Jahan's study
is East Pakistan, the more populated but terri-
torially smaller and even more impoverished
segment of this once two-winged state. Profes-
sor Jahan, who is herself a Bengali, draws the
311
reader's attention to the plight of her fellow
countrymen who were demanding justice and
equity as well as political understanding. Pakis-
tan's leaders, according to Miss Jahan, were
heavily weighted in favor of the west wing and
they came to see in East Pakistan a land fit
more for exploitation than development. As the
author emphasizes, Pakistan's leaders were
more inclined toward "state-building" than in
the creation of genuine community. The polit-
ical design which envisaged Pakistan as an inte-
grated state was never seriously pursued either
by the political leadership in the pre-1958 pe-
riod or later under the tutelege of the civil-
military bureaucracy. In the epilogue to her
book Professor Jahan notes that the dismem-
berment of the country and the establishment
of an independent Bangladesh may be con-
sidered a tragedy, but it came as no surprise.
This is a small book, and if one does not
include the time examining the numerous tables
and charts which the author has carefully se-
lected in support of her thesis, it should take
the average reader less than two hours to digest.
In part, the volume reads a little like a hand-
book, the central characters, organizations, and
issues being identified and briefly explained. In
another way it is somewhat polemical in the
sense that little effort is made to examine what
was transpiring in East Pakistan between the
numerous political aspirants and their seldom
harmonious organizations. The author's in-
sistence that the West Pakistan leadership's dis-
torted sense of superiority and latent male-
volence is the crux of the dilemma apparently
nullified any analysis of internal Bengali poli-
tics. True, Miss Jahan does refer to those
Bengalis who became the "instruments" of the
Karachi and later Islamabad power structure,
but unfortunately virtually nothing is said about
the incessant struggle for power in East Pakis-
tan, how this manifested itself, and what its
consequences have been and still are likely to
be in the new state of Bangladesh. While I
sympathize with Miss Jahan's overall thesis, it
seems only fair to point out that at least up to
the black days of March 1971 the East-West
Pakistan problem was hardly a conflict between
the forces of light on the one side and the forces
of darkness on the other. Unfortunately this is
an implicit suggestion in the book, and it indi-
cates that the matter will demand continuing
scholarly investigation.
The author is correct in stating that the
"growing inability and unwillingness to form a
national party or a national coalition was an
indicator of the process of national disintegra-
tion during the Ayub regime," (p. 142) but it
312 The American Political Science Review
is also true that Ayub declined to use ruthless
methods to forge such a party or coalition. Pak-
istan was never intended to be a one-party
state. Ayub did aim at a future merger of his
Basic Democracies and the Pakistan Muslim
League, but little serious effort was put into this
activity after 1966. Ayub's dependence on the
higher bureaucracy, while unfortunate, was still
a more civilized approach to the problem of
governing the country in the absence of co-
herent political organization. There is nothing
in the historic record, as in so many countries
in Afro-Asia, to suggest that Ayub was de-
termined to impose a single-party apparatus on
the country and liquidate all those who dis-
agreed with his peculiar perception of a mod-
ern Pakistan nation. Ayub made many mis-
takes, and he certainly was insensitive to popu-
lar complaints, particularly those emanating
from East Pakistan. He was no doubt ill-
equipped for the responsibility which he as-
sumed in 1958, but it is still difficult to classify
him as an unrepentent dictator.
Students of Pakistan studies should welcome
this volume, particularly as it represents one of
the few books to concentrate its attention on
the subject of political decay. The book is per-
haps another first step in our attempt to under-
stand the political collapse of a country whose
economic indicators as late as 1968 pointed to
significant material progress. It is not too late
to recall that hardly three years before the es-
tablishment of the state of Bangladesh the Har-
vard economists insisted that Pakistan might
well stand as a model for other developing so-
cieties. Apparently the foreign experts were no
more aware of this impending disaster than
were their Pakistani counterparts. Gustav F.
Papanek, an advisor to Pakistan's Planning
Commission and a former Director of Harvard
University's Development Advisory Service is
representative of this professional group. In
1967 Papanek wrote: "The economic per-
formance of Pakistan in the last few years has
been primarily the result of good economic
management—sensible policies and plans. Most
important has been Pakistan's pragmatic ap-
proach to the role of government and private
enterprise." Pakistan's Development: Social
Goals and Private Incentives (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press,
1967, p. 270). One can only wonder at this
time whether a more equitable policy of dis-
tributive justice could have saved the old Pak-
istan design, but it is fairly clear that many
well-meaning people were looking and working
in the wrong direction.
LAWRENCE ZIRING
Western Michigan University
Vol. 68
Conspiracy at Matsukawa. By Chalmers E.
Johnson. (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1972. Pp. x, 460. $10.95.)
Conspiracy at Matsukawa is a detailed study
of how the Japanese judicial-legal system ap-
plied the U.S.-inspired revision of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, in force since 1949. The
case involved charges of conspiracy to sabotage
a government railway train in August 1949,
required five court actions, and ended when a
final Supreme Court decision dismissed the
charges fourteen years later. A revisionist, the
author argues that the revised Code was not
wisely conceived, was not necessary, was im-
perfectly applied, and did not improve the
quality of Japanese criminal justice. He also
offers a secondary case study of social change
seen in three aspects: the role of U.S. occupa-
tion policy, the influence of labor in Japan's
economic miracle, and American attempts to
inject democracy into the Japanese judicial
processes.
The research on the Matsukawa case is
meticulous and exhaustive, the organization and
mastery of documentary and other materials is
outstanding. The study is skillfully presented
with the drama and suspense of a detective
story. The inefficiency of initial police and pros-
ecution work, the improper use of confessions,
the absence of true adversary proceedings in the
initial trial, the continued evidence of a pro-
tective bureaucracy operating in the procuracy
and the courts are easily demonstrated. So too
is the fact that the final correction of judicial
injustice came as a result of older traditional
practices and not those of the new Code. In-
cluded is a full account of the major political-
public mass movement also important in rem-
edying judicial injustice. The comparisons of
the pre-1949 traditional continental system and
that of the revised Code are useful and valuable.
In sum, the Matsukawa case study is a fine
descriptive analysis of key facts as they de-
veloped in this case. Since the author uses this
case to peg his revisionist argument, the real
problem is to demonstrate that the Matsukawa
case was typical of the system.
The heavy use of color, details, journalistic
captions for chapter titles; the chronological
approach; and the absence of an organization
by problems, functions, or a systems analysis,
impede such a demonstration. Were the re-
forms of the Supreme Command for the Allied
Powers (SCAP), necessary to achieve the ends
sought? Were they efficiently instituted or care-
fully sandbagged by bureaucratic opposition?
Were the errors of justice due to the new pro-
cedures or to inheritances of traditional prac-
tice? Were the errors of police and procuracy