See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.

net/publication/334070231

The Review of the Commercial Quantum Key Distribution System

Conference Paper · December 2018

DOI: 10.1109/PDGC.2018.8745822

CITATIONS READS

6 659

2 authors:

Anton Pljonkin Pradeep Kumar Singh

Southern Federal University Jaypee University of Information Technology
28 PUBLICATIONS   120 CITATIONS    162 PUBLICATIONS   797 CITATIONS   

SEE PROFILE SEE PROFILE

Some of the authors of this publication are also working on these related projects:

Cross-Domain Collaborative Filtering View project

Software Quality Model and Assessment View project

All content following this page was uploaded by Anton Pljonkin on 20 December 2019.

The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file.

 The Review of the Commercial Quantum Key
Distribution System
Anton Pljonkin
Southern federal university
Taganrog, Russia
pljonkin@mail.ru
Abstract—A review of the existing commercial quantum
key distribution systems was conducted. The principle of
operation of a fiber-optic quantum key distribution system
with phase coding of photon states is described. The operation
of the system in the mode of forming quantum keys is
described. The synchronization process is analyzed, which
consists in detecting a time interval with an optical pulse. The
basic properties and parameters of auto-compensation
quantum key distribution system are reviewed. The images of
the current stand of the quantum-cryptographic network are
given. The stand includes two stations of the quantum key
distribution system with phase coding of photon states, two
servers and data transmission channels. It is shown that the
formation of a quantum key in the experiment is carried out at
a rate of 500 bits per second. The length of the quantum
communication channel in the experiment is 24 km. In this
case, the quantum channel consists of a conventional single-
mode optical fiber. Trends in the development of quantum key
distribution systems, as well as trends in the development of
protocols for quantum cryptography was conducted.
Keywords— quantum key, algorithm, synchronization,
photon pulse
I. INTRODUCTION
The main problem in the transfer of confidential
information is the distribution of the secret key between the
correspondents. To achieve absolute secrecy in the
transmission of messages is possible only by solving the
problem of key distribution. To protect the data, various
methods, algorithms and encryption protocols are used. The
security of existing telecommunications networks is limited
by the computational capabilities of the attacker.
The physical solution of the key distribution problem is
known as quantum cryptography and is based on the
encoding of the quantum state of a single particle [1, 2].
Quantum cryptography, as a promising direction, solving the
problem of key distribution has already taken a worthy place
among systems that provide confidential information
transmission. The essence of quantum cryptography lies in
the reliable distribution of a single key between legitimate
users. The attractiveness of the idea of quantum
cryptography is to create an absolutely random secret key. Its
secrecy and the impossibility of an unobtrusive audition by
an unauthorized person are based on the laws of quantum
physics. In contrast to the classical methods of cryptography,
which are based on mathematical patterns and potentially
lend themselves to deciphering. Now the research in the field
of quantum telecommunications is actively conducted. Even
today, corporations are creating the first samples of quantum
computers, which means that the future of classical
cryptography is under threat.
To ensure the absolute secrecy of the cryptographic
scheme, it is necessary to fulfill certain conditions: the key
XXX-X-XXXX-XXXX-X/XX/$XX.00 ©20XX IEEE
Pradeep Kumar Singh
Jaypee University of Information Technology
Waknaghat, Solan, H.P., INDIA
pradeep_84cs@yahoo.com
must be absolutely random, its length must be greater than or
equal to the length of the encoded message and the key can
be used only once.
Classical cryptographic systems often use only two rules
out of three. For example, using pseudo-random processes
when generating an encryption key. Or using a single
encryption key multiple times. But more often two rules are
violated at once: a standard length key is used to encrypt
long messages repeatedly. Classic cryptosystems are
vulnerable.
Practical implementation of quantum cryptography is
based on the quantum key distribution systems. If existing
encryption algorithms can be cracked by mathematical
improvements, then quantum cryptography is the only way
to solve the key distribution problem. At the heart of
quantum cryptography lie the following statements: it is
impossible to clone an unknown quantum state and it is
impossible to extract information about non-orthogonal
quantum states without perturbation. Consequently, any
measurement performed by an attacker will lead to a change
in the quantum state of the information carrier. The laws of
quantum physics cannot be violated.
In quantum cryptography, symmetric cryptosystems are
common [3]. In these systems, only one key is used for
encryption and for deciphering confidential information.
Messages sent along the lines of quantum communication, in
theory, can neither be intercepted nor copied. To date, real-
functioning quantum communication systems have been
created. The efforts of developers are now aimed at
increasing the range of communication and improving the
characteristics of fiber optic components.
Quantum key distribution is a technology based on the
laws of quantum physics to create a string of random bits for
two remote users, which is used as a cryptographic key. It is
believed that quantum key distribution systems can meet the
requirements of absolute secrecy when encrypting messages.
A symmetric cryptosystem generates a shared secret key and
distributes it among legitimate users. Such a key, or rather a
bit array, was called a "one-time notebook".
II. HISTORY OF QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY
The history of quantum cryptography began back in the
late 1960s, when Columbia University student Steven
Wiesner told Charles Bennett the idea of quantum banknotes.
They cannot be faked in principle, because it is excluded by
the laws of nature. The essence of the idea was to place
several quantum objects on each banknote. These can be, for
example, traps with photons, each of which is polarized at a
certain angle in one of two bases. Either at an angles of 0 and
90, or 45 and 135 degrees. The serial number is printed on a
banknote, but the combination of polarizations and bases
corresponding to the number is known only to the bank. To
counterfeit such a banknote, the counterfeiter must measure
the polarization of each photon. However, he does not know
in which basis each of them is polarized. If he makes a
mistake with the basis, the polarization of the photon will
change and the counterfeit banknote will be incorrectly
polarized.
At the same time, Wiesner proposed using the same
principle to protect information and this technology is now
close to implementation. Wiesner's ideas were not avowed
immediately. Back in the early 1970s, Wiesner sent his
article on quantum cryptography to the journal IEEE
Transactions on Information Theory. But the language of the
article seemed too complicated for editors and reviewers.
Only in 1983 this article was published in the journal ACM
Newsletter and it was the first publication about the
fundamentals of quantum cryptography in the history.
Initially, Wiesner and Bennett considered the option of
transmitting encrypted messages using quantum "carriers."
At the same time, eavesdropping would corrupt the message
and would not allow it to be read. Then they came to an
improved version - the use of quantum channels for the
transfer of one-time "cipher-tags". That is encryption keys.
Quantum communication systems are based on the use of
quantum properties of information carriers. If in ordinary
telecommunications networks the data is encoded in the
amplitude and frequency of the radiation or electrical
oscillation, then in the quantum ones it is encoded in the
amplitude of the electromagnetic field or in the photon
polarization. Of course, much more expensive and
sophisticated equipment will be required, but these tricks are
justified. The fact is that the transmission of information
through the quantum channels provides one hundred percent
protection against "wiretapping". According to the laws of
quantum mechanics, measuring the properties of a particular
quantum object, for example measuring the polarization of a
photon, inevitably changes its state. The receiver will see that
the state of photons has changed, and this cannot be
prevented in principle. These are the fundamental laws of
nature. The first successful experiment on quantum data
transfer was carried out by Bennett and Gilles Brassard in the
end of October 1989, when a protected quantum channel was
established at a distance of 32 cm. The setup changed the
polarization of photons, but the power supply noise varied
differently depending the polarization. In October 2007, the
methods of quantum cryptography were first applied in a
large-scale project. The quantum secure communication
system, developed by the Swiss company IdQuantique, was
used to transmit voting data at the parliamentary elections in
Geneva. Thus, the Swiss votes were protected like no other
information.
A lot of research groups around the world are developing
devices for "restoring" quantum data. The so-called quantum
repeaters, which are capable of "animating" photons.
Scientists are studying the phenomenon of quantum
entanglement, in which the states of two or more objects
(atoms, photons and ions) are connected. If the state of one
of the pair of entangled photons is measured, then the state of
the second one will immediately become definite, and the
states of both of them will be uniquely related. For example,
if one photon turns out to be polarized vertically, then the
second one is horizontal and vice versa. If you distribute
pairs of entangled photons between two remote partners,
they both get the same sequence. It can be used as an
encryption key. This is a truly random sequence that cannot
be guessed or calculated. If someone tries to spy entangled
photons, the correlation between them will be lost and it will
be impossible to extract the key from them.
To date, real-functioning quantum communication
systems have been created (see Fig. 1).
The efforts of developers are now aimed at increasing the
range of communication, increasing the speed of forming a
quantum key, improving the characteristics of fiber optic
components.
Fig. 1. Commercial quantum key distribution systems.
Quantum key distribution technology based on the laws
of quantum physics to create sequences of random bits,
which is used as a cryptographic key for two remote users. It
is believed that the QKD systems can meet the requirements
of absolute secrecy when encrypting messages. A symmetric
cryptosystem generates a shared secret key and distributes it
among legitimate users for both encryption and decryption of
messages. An attacker attempting to investigate transmitted
data cannot measure photons without distorting the original
message. Legal users on an open channel compare and
discuss signals transmitted on a quantum channel, thereby
verifying them for the possibility of interception. If they do
not find any errors, then the transmitted information can be
considered randomly distributed and secret, despite all the
technical possibilities that a cryptanalyst can use.
For the last several years, the development of quantum
cryptography technology is provided by improving the
characteristics of fiber-optic modules and components.
International companies are constantly expanding the range
of high-tech components of fiber optics. The most popular
components for improving the quantum key distribution
technology are single photon sources, single photon counting
modules, fiber optic phase modulators, random number
generators.
The development of commercial prototype QKDSs is
carried out by the many laboratories [4-9]. However, only a
few QKD systems of MagiQ and IDQuantique have been
successfully implemented and brought to commercial
use [10, 11]. We note that both optical fiber QKD systems
operate according to an auto-compensation scheme with
phase coding of photon states. Such systems are
characterized by stable operability under varying external
conditions.
III. FIRST QUANTUM PROTOCOL
QKD systems operate under the control of quantum
protocols [12]. There are several protocols of quantum
cryptography based on the transmission of information by
coding the states of single photons, for example: BB84, B92,
Koashi-Imoto, SARG04 and their modifications. Note that
under the signal in QKD systems is meant the transmitted
quantum state of the photon. The first protocol that was
implemented in QKD systems is called BB84. Note that this
protocol has more effective modifications. And in the last
system of quantum key distribution one-way protocol COW
is applied.
The figure (see Fig. 2) shows the known scheme of the
protocol BB84. In a simplified form, the scheme is as
follows. According to the protocol BB84, the sender
generates photons with a random polarization.
Fig. 2. BB84 quantum protocol scheme.
The receiver receives these photons, randomly chooses a
way to measure the polarization and informs through the
open channel which method is chosen for each photon
without revealing the measurement results themselves. After
that, the sender on the same open channel reports whether the
type of measurement for each photon was chosen correctly.
As a result, a raw key is formed.
IV. SYNCHRONIZATION
The operation of the QKD system is impossible without
synchronization [13-15]. The most important component of
the two-pass QKDS operation is the synchronization of the
transceiver and coding stations. During the synchronization
process, optical pulses propagate from the transceiver station
to the coding one and back. Note that the transmission of
synchronizing signals from the transceiver station to the
coding one is always carried out in multiphoton mode.
Multiphoton mode is necessary for the implementation of the
protocol of quantum cryptography when optical signal is
transmitted in direct way. Synchronization in the
implemented commercial QKDS includes two stages.
The first stage is initiated with the initial configuration of
the QKDS and consists in determining the moment of
receiving of the optical pulse by single-photon
photodetectors of the transceiver station. This happens by
measuring the length of the path of propagation of the optical
pulse from the transceiver station to the coding and vice
versa. The second stage of synchronization is a component of
the algorithm of the quantum cryptography protocol and is
necessary for controlling phase modulators in the process of
forming a quantum key.
Analysis of the literature and experimental studies of a
two-pass auto-compensation QKDS with phase coding of
photon states show that the synchronization process is
realized in a multiphoton mode. Here the average number of
photons in a pulse is measured in tens of thousands. It is
established that at the synchronization of QKDS, single-
photon photodiodes operates in a linear mode. The latter
potentially makes it easier for an attacker to organize
unauthorized access to a fiber-optic communication channel
(to a quantum channel). The purpose of unauthorized access
can be not only to read information, but also synchronize the
equipment of the attacker with the aim of interfering with the
operation of the QKDS. An attack "Trojan Horse" can serve
as an example of the most approximate to the practical
implementation. It provides the substitution of original
messages transmitted from the transceiver to the coding
station with messages from the attacker. General scheme of
this attack is presented on the figure (Fig. 3).
Fig. 3. Optical power removal scheme. Y-type – optical divider; Det –
detectors.
Theoretically, Eva (attacker) is able to generate copies of
optical pulses intercepted from the transceiver station and
send them to the coding station. It is established that under
this attack scheme, the percentage of quantum errors in the
formation of a key with the presence of an attacker does not
exceed the specified threshold. Thus, legitimate users Bob
and Alice are not able to recognize the presence of an
attacker in the quantum channel of fiber optic transmission
line.
Commercial auto-compensated QKDS with phase coding
of photon states Clavis2 operates on the basis of a single-
fiber cable in a two-pass scheme. Such an implementation
considerably complicates the attacker's task of unauthorized
access to the quantum communication channel. However, in
2008, a group of scientists from the Norwegian University
showed the possibility of hacking such quantum
cryptographic systems. As in the scheme described above, an
attacker simulates the operation of a transceiver and a coding
station. The moment of arrival (interception) of an optical
pulse during a direct passage does not give complete
information to an attacker about the operation of a QKD
system (as in the case of using a two-wire circuit). The
decisive moment is the appearance of an optical pulse in the
backward propagation of a reflected signal in a quantum
channel. Thus, by withdrawing part of the energy of a
multiphoton pulse at two points of the optical path (with
forward and backward propagation of the optical pulse as in
the slide) during the synchronization, the attacker is able to
calculate the delay of the reflected optical signal for further
simulation of the coding station. Data on the delay time of
the optical signal allows, at the right time, to send imitation
signals to the photodetectors of the transceiver station. Thus,
an attacker can exploit the vulnerability of the
synchronization process in multi-photon transmission to
obtain additional data on the parameters of the quantum
communication channel. Recall that synchronization means
the determination of the propagation path length of the
optical pulse. The path length is not only the quantum
communication channel itself, but also the lengths of all the
fiber-optic components inside the stations. The optical path
includes direct and reverse propagation of the signal. The use
of a powerful optical pulse at synchronization is necessary to
increase the probability of a correct detection of the signal
time interval. At the preparatory stage of preliminary
synchronization, the transceiver station generates gating
pulses for single-photon avalanche photodiodes.
Simultaneously the delay time is gradually increases
relatively to the moment of emitting of the pulse. This
determines the Coarse Delay time. Physically, this search is
performed by step-by-step switching of the counter by
intervals. Intervals are called time windows. The procedure
consists in the accumulation of triggers in each time window.
Each trigger is the registration of photons by avalanche
photodetectors. At the second stage of preliminary
synchronization, a more accurate calibration of the pulse
recording time takes place. The previously defined time
interval preceding and following it in time intervals are
divided into time intervals called Fine Delay. Each of the
three intervals is divided into 17 subintervals. Next, a time
window with the largest number of pickups of the
photodetectors is searched. This determines the value of the
Fine Delay time. The result of the synchronization operation
is the detection of a signal time window with duration of 10
ps.
As noted earlier, the QKD system consists of two
stations. The transceiver station is called "Bob", the coding
station is "Alice". The stations are connected by a fiber-optic
transmission line (a quantum channel), which is made from a
single-fiber single-mode optical cable. The construction of
the stations has a standardized size for mounting 19 inches.
Optical signals are transmitted from the transceiver station to
the coding and back through one optical path.
Note that the function of the QKD system consists not in
data protection, but in the formation and distribution between
correspondents of quantum keys. Let's show on a simple
example how the scheme of application of quantum keys for
encryption of transmitted messages works. The Fig. 4 shows
a simple scheme of a quantum-cryptographic network [16].
This is a valid stand that uses 512-bit keys. The structure of
the stand includes: a QKD system consisting of two stations;
two servers with software and a data network. Interaction of
servers with QKD systems is carried out via USB service
channel.
Fig. 4. Quantum-cryptography experimental stand. Point to point topology.
The trusted communication channel is realized on the
basis of a single-fiber single-mode optical fiber. The data
transmission network is configured in a point-to-point
topology. Keys are generated and accumulated in the buffer
zone. This occurs in a cyclic mode. On the basis of Ethernet,
a virtual VPN tunnel based on IPsec is organized.
Authentication and encryption are configured for each
channel being created for each direction and for each
protocol. On servers, files with key material are generated.
The peculiarity of the formation scheme is that the files and
their contents are not transmitted over the network, but are
generated directly on the servers. The files are identical and
their contents are an array of keys and their identifiers.
Search for the necessary keys in the files is done by their
identifiers. The length of the key is set when generating files
ranging from 32 to 512 bits. The keys are integrated into the
IPsec protocol configuration simultaneously on remote
servers. The speed of key formation by the QKD system in
the experiment is about 500 bit/sec. To integrate the quantum
keys into the VPN tunnel encryption algorithms, keys of the
required length are copied to the appropriate IPsec protocol
configuration area.
V. CONCLUSION
A review of the existing commercial quantum key
distribution systems was conducted. The principle of
operation of a fiber-optic quantum key distribution system
with phase coding of photon states is described. The images
of the current stand of the quantum-cryptographic network
are given. Today, existing systems of quantum
communication are used in banks, corporations and
commercial structures. Note that scientific laboratories are
developing the systems of quantum distribution of various
types [17, 18]. For example, systems with polarization
coding. Recently, experiments were performed on the
quantum coupling between ground stations and a satellite.
The keys were transmitted along the optical beam.
Of course, to date, quantum systems are not perfect.
Quantum computers are already being created. The
development of quantum computers potentially threatens the
security of classical cryptosystems. Thus, quantum
cryptography will inevitably come into our daily life. This
applies to each of us. Quantum cryptography is not only
some kind of military or espionage secrets, these are credit
card numbers, they are medical records. Each of us has a lot
of confidential information, and the more open the world
becomes, the more important it is for us to control access to
it.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
Work is performed within the grant of President of
Russian Federation for state support of young Russian
scientists МК-2338.2018.9 ―Creation of an automated
algorithm for integrating quantum keys into the data network
while providing enhanced security against unauthorized
access to the quantum communication channel‖.
REFERENCES
[1] Gisin N. et al. Quantum cryptography. Rev. Mod. Phys. 2002. Vol.
74, № 1. P. 145–195.
[2] Bennet C. H. et. al. Experimental quantum cryptography. J. Cryptol.
1992. Vol. 5. P. 3–28.
[3] Stucki D. et. al. Quantum Key Distribution over 67 km with a plug &
play system. Quantum Phys. 2002. P.8.
[4] Broadbent A.., Schaffner C.. Quantum cryptography beyond quantum
key distribution. Des. Codes, Cryptogr. № 78. P. 351–382.
[5] Makarov V. Quantum cryptography and quantum cryptanalysis.
Science And Technology. 2007. № March. 1-158 p.
[6] K.Y. Rumyantsev, A.P. Pljonkin Security of synchronization mode of
quantum keys distribution system. Izvestiya SFedU. Engineering
sciences. 2015. №5(166). P. 135−153.
[7] V. Kurochkin, A. Zverev, J. Kurochkin, I. Riabtzev, I. Neizvestnyi.
Quantum Cryptography Experimental Investigations. Photonics.
2012. № 5. P. 54 – 66
[8] L. Lydersen, C. Wiechers, C. Wittmann, D. Elser, J. Skaar, and
V. Makarov, Hacking commercial quantum cryptography systems by
tailored bright illumination, Nat. Photonics 4, 686 (2010).
[9] S. Sajeed, A. Huang, S. Sun, F. Xu, V. Makarov, and M. Curty
Insecurity of detector-device-independent quantum key distribution,
Phys. Rev. Lett. 117, 250505 (2016).
[10] A.P. Pljonkin, K.Y. Rumyantsev. Single-photon Synchronization
Mode of Quantum Key Distribution System. India, New Delhi,
2016, P.531–534. DOI: 10.1109/ICCTICT.2016.7514637.
[11] K.E. Rumyantsev, A. P. Pljonkin. Preliminary Stage Synchronization
Algorithm of Auto-compensation Quantum Key Distribution System
with an Unauthorized Access Security. International Conference on
Electronics, Information, and Communications (ICEIC). 2016.
Vietnam, Danang. P. 1–4. DOI:
10.1109/ELINFOCOM.2016.7562955. WOS:000389518100035.
IDS: BG5KP.
[12] K.E. Rumyantsev, A.P. Pljonkin. Synchronization algorithm of
quantum key distribution system with protection from unauthorized
access. 2015 Workshop on Recent Advances in Photonics (WRAP).
Electronic ISBN: 978-1-5090-3921-0. DOI:
10.1109/WRAP.2015.7805988. WOS:000392633700046. ISBN:978-
1-5090-3921-0.
[13] A.P. Pljonkin, Features of the Photon Pulse Detection Algorithm in
the Quantum Key Distribution System. ICCSP '17 Proceedings of the
2017 International Conference on Cryptography, Security and Privacy
Pages 81-84. Wuhan, China — March 17 - 19, 2017. ACM New
York, NY, USA ©2017. ISBN: 978-1-4503-4867-6. Doi:
10.1145/3058060.3058078.
[14] Pljonkin, A.; Rumyantsev, K.; Singh, P.K. Synchronization in
Quantum Key Distribution Systems. Cryptography 2017, 1, 18.
doi:10.3390/cryptography1030018
[15] Yuen, H. P. (2016). Security of Quantum Key Distribution. IEEE
Access, 4, 724–749.
[16] Anton Pljonkin, Konstantin Rumyantsev. Quantum-cryptographic
network. East-West Design & Test Symposium (EWDTS), 2016
IEEE. Electronic ISSN: 2472-761X. DOI:
10.1109/EWDTS.2016.7807623.
[17] Distribution, Q. K., & Cases, U. (2010). GS QKD 002 - V1.1.1 -
Quantum Key Distribution; Use Cases. Innovation, 1, 1–32.
[18] Chan, P., Lucio-Martínez, I., Mo, X., & Tittel, W. (2011). Quantum
Key Distribution. Distribution, 20. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-
04831-9.

View publication stats