LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F.

SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF

ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC.
[MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President,
HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the
President, MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as Director, Malacañang
Records Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of
Printing, respondents.

1. G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985

Doctrine: Laws to be enforceable and valid must be published in the Official Gazette or
otherwise effectively promulgated.

Facts:

Invoking the people’s right to be informed on matters of public concern, petitioners seek
a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish in the Official
Gazette the various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.
Respondents contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not an absolutely
needed requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for
their own effectivity dates.
Issue:
Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is necessary for laws which expressly
provide for their effectivity in order for them to be in force and effect.

Ruling:

Article 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the
Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear
object of Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 638 is to give the general public
adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as
citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the
application of the maxim, “ignorantia legis non excusat.” It would be the height of
injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law which he
had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
 2. G.R. No. 63915 – 136 SCRA 27 – Civil Law – General Principles – Publication of
Laws – Presidential Proclamations

Invoking the people’s right to be informed on matters of public concerns as well as the
principle that laws to be valid and enforceable they must be published in the Official
Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, Lorenzo Tañada et al seek a writ of
mandamus to compel Juan Tuvera (then executive secretary to President Ferdinand
Marcos) to publish and/or to cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various
Presidential Decrees (PDs), Letters of Instructions (LOIs), Proclamations (PPs),
Executive Orders (EOs), and Administrative Orders (AOs) issued by the then president.

ISSUE: Whether or not the various PDs et al must be published before they shall take
effect.

HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court held that the fact that a PD or LOI states its date of
effectivity does not preclude their publication in the Official Gazette as they constitute
important legislative acts, particularly in the present case where the president may on
his own issue laws. The clear objective of this provision is to give the public general
adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct.
Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the
maxim ignorantia legis non excusat (Ignorance of the law excuses no one from
compliance therewith). Publication is indispensable.
Tañada vs. Tuvera 136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985) 146 SCRA 446 (December 29,
1986)
TAÑADA VS. TUVERA

136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985)

FACTS:

Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as
the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official
Gazette, petitioners filed for writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to
publish and/or cause to publish various presidential decrees, letters of instructions,
general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementations and
administrative orders.

The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the
case, contending that petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute
becomes valid and enforceable.

HELD:

Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official
Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of
this provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are
to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication,
there would be no basis for the application of the maxim ignoratia legis nominem
excusat. It would be the height of injustive to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for
the transgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive
one.

The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the
Official Gazette…. The word “shall” therein imposes upon respondent officials an
imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the constitutional right of the people to be
informed on matter of public concern is to be given substance and validity.

The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a

requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by
law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. The Court
declared that presidential issuances of general application which have not been
published have no force and effect.
TAÑADA VS. TUVERA

146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)

FACTS:

This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985.
Respondent argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it
was “otherwise” as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become
effective immediately upon their approval.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws
which are not as to their publication;
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation.

HELD:

The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and
not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted.
This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective
immediately upon approval, or in any other date, without its previous publication.

“Laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly
speaking, all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply
to them directly. A law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion
of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid,
the law must invariably affect the public interest even if it might be directly applicable
only to one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole.

All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a
condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a
different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to

inform the public of the content of the law.

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the
Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The
Supreme Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or
modify it if it finds it impractical.

The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible.

J. Cruz:

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the
shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules
cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a
valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people.
The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot faint, parry or cut unless the
naked blade is drawn.
G.R. No. L-19650             September 29, 1966

CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC., petitioner-appellee,

vs.
ENRICO PALOMAR, in his capacity as THE POSTMASTER GENERAL, respondent-
appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General for respondent and appellant.

Ross, Selph and Carrascoso for petitioner and appellee.

FACTS:
 
Caltex conceived a promotional scheme which will increase its patronage for oil
products called “Caltex Hooded Pump Contest.” The contest calls for participants to
estimate the number of liters a hooded gas pump at each Caltex station will dispense
during a specified period. To participate, entry forms are only needed which can be
made available upon request at each Caltex station. No fee is required to be paid nor
purchase has to be made prior to participating. Foreseeing the extensive use of mails to
publicize the promotional scheme, Caltex made representations with the postal
authorities to secure advanced clearance for mailing. Caltex, through its counsel,
posited that  the contest does not violate anti-lottery provisions of the Postal Law. The
Postmaster General Palomar declined the grant of the requested clearance. Caltex
sought a reconsideration. Palomar maintained that if the contest was pursued, a fraud
order will be issued against Caltex. Thus, this case at bar.
 
ISSUES:
 
1.       Whether or not the petition states a sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief
2.       Whether or not the proposed contest violates the Postal Law
 
RULINGS:
 
The Court held that the petition states a sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief
since it qualifies for the 4 requisites on invoking declaratory relief available to any
person whose rights are affected by a statute to determine any question of construction
or validity. To the petitioner, the construction hampers or disturbs its freedom to
enhance its business while to the respondent, suppression of the petitioner’s proposed
contest believed to transgress the law he has sworn to uphold and enforce is an
unavoidable duty. Declaratory relief is available to any person "whose rights are
affected by a statute . . . to determine any question of construction or validity arising
under the . . . statute and for a declaration of his rights thereunder" (now section 1, Rule
64, Revised Rules of Court). In amplification, this Court, conformably to established
jurisprudence on the matter, laid down certain conditions sine qua non therefor, to wit:
(1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be between
persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking declaratory relief must
have a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue involved must be ripe
for judicial determination
 
Likewise, using the rules of Statutory Construction in discovering the meaning and
intention of the authors in a case clouded with doubt as to its application, it was held
that the promotional scheme does not violate the Postal Law in that it does not entail
lottery or gift enterprise. Using the principle “noscitur a sociis’, the term under
construction shall be understood by the words preceding and following it. Thus, using
the definitions of lottery and gift enterprise which both has the requisites of prize,
chance and consideration, the promo contest does not clearly violate the Postal Law
because of lack of consideration.
G.R. No. L-22301             August 30, 1967
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG, defendant-appellant.
Francisco P. Cabigao for defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General F. R. Rosete
and Solicitor O. C. Hernandez for plaintiff-appellee.

Facts:

The accused was convicted in violation of Sec. 878 in connection to Sec. 2692 of the
Revised Administrative Code as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 56 and further
amended by R.A. 4. On August 13, 1962, the accused was discovered to have in its
possession and control a home-made revolver cal. 22 with no license permit. In the
court proceeding, the accused admitted that he owns the gun and affirmed that it has no
license. The accused further stated that he is a secret agent appointed by Gov. Leviste
of Batangas and showed evidences of appointment. In his defense, the accused
presented the case of People vs. Macarandang, stating that he must acquitted because
he is a secret agent and which may qualify into peace officers equivalent to municipal
police which is covered by Art. 879.

Issue:

Whether or not holding a position of secret agent of the Governor is a proper defense to
illegal possession of firearms.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court in its decision affirmed the lower court’s decision. It stated that the
law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be unlawful for any
person to . . . possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor,
or any instrument or implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of
firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition." The next section provides that "firearms and
ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines], the Philippine Constabulary, guards in the
employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant
governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of
provincial prisoners and jails," are not covered "when such firearms are in possession of
such officials and public servants for use in the performance of their official duties.
The Court construed that there is no provision for the secret agent; including it in the list
therefore the accused is not exempted. 
G.R. No. L-34568 March 28, 1988
RODERICK DAOANG, and ROMMEL DAOANG, assisted by their father, ROMEO
DAOANG, petitioners,
vs.
THE MUNICIPAL JUDGE, SAN NICOLAS, ILOCOS NORTE, ANTERO AGONOY and
AMANDA RAMOS-AGONOY, respondents.

Facts:

On 23 March 1971, the respondent spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy filed a petition
with the Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, seeking the adoption of the
minors Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos.

The petition was set for hearing on 24 April 1971 and notices thereof were caused to be
served upon the Office of the Solicitor General and ordered published in the ILOCOS
TIMES, a weekly nespaper of general circulation in the province of Ilocos Norte, with
editorial offices in Laoag City.

On 22 April 1971, the minors Roderick and Romel Daoang, assisted by their father and
guardian ad litem, the petitioners herein, filed an opposition to the aforementioned
petition for adoption, claiming that the spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy had a
legitimate daughter... named Estrella Agonoy, oppositors' mother, who died on 1 March
1971, and therefore, said spouses were disqualified to adopt under Art. 335 of the Civil
Code

After the required publication of notice had been accomplished, evidence was
presented. Thereafter, the Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte rendered its
decision, granting the petition for adoption

Hence, the present recourse by the petitioners (oppositors in the lower court).

Issues:

whether or not the respondent spouses Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos-Agonoy
are disqualified to adopt under paragraph (1), Art. 335 of the Civil Code.

Ruling:

"Art. 335. The following cannot adopt:

(1) Those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or children
by legal fiction;
We find, however, that the words used in paragraph (1) of Art. 335 of the Civil Code, in
enumerating the persons who cannot adopt, are clear and unambiguous. The children
mentioned therein have a clearly defined meaning in law and, as pointed out by the
respondent judge, do not... include grandchildren.

We find, however, that the words used in paragraph (1) of Art. 335 of the Civil Code, in
enumerating the persons who cannot adopt, are clear and unambiguous. The children
mentioned therein have a clearly defined meaning in law and, as pointed out by the
respondent judge, do not... include grandchildren.

Well known is the rule of statutory construction to the effect that a statute clear and
unambiguous on its face need not be interpreted; stated otherwise, the rule is that only
statutes with an ambiguous or doubtful meaning may be the subject of statutory
construction.

The Civil Code of Spain, which was once in force in the Philippines, and which... served
as the pattern for the Civil Code of the Philippines, in its Article 174, disqualified persons
who have legitimate or legitimated descendants from adopting. Under this article, the
spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy would have been disqualified to adopt as they
have... legitimate grandchildren, the petitioners herein. But, when the Civil Code of the
Philippines was adopted, the word "descendants" was changed to "children", in
paragraph (1) of Article 335.

Adoption used to be for the benefit of the adaptor. It was intended to afford to persons
who have no child of their own the consolation of having one, by creating through legal
fiction, the relation of paternity and filiation where none exists by blood relationship. The
present tendency, however, is geared more towards the promotion of the welfare of the
child and the enhancement of his opportunities for a useful and happy life, and every
intendment is sustained to promote that objective[9]. Under the... law now in force,
having legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or children by legal
fiction, is no longer a ground for disqualification to adopt[10].

Principles:

Well known is the rule of statutory construction to the effect that a statute clear and
unambiguous on its face need not be interpreted; stated otherwise, the rule is that only
statutes with an ambiguous or doubtful meaning may be the subject of statutory
construction