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31 Aug 1978 per DoDD 5200.10 document
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THIS DOCUhENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF

THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18,
U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. THE TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF
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NOTICE: When government or other drawings, specifications or other

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the fact that the Government may have formulated, furnished, or in any
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- =-J
- .- J
 G .OP--T
(0 Aug 66)bV
SUBJECT: sona 14um W - 4

to!vAR on17Noemer or rrto of,

rtunc jecio /(ffj ipmnt
00 TO: Assistant C oroieft for
irft s arorporMet, f o thi hant
of ther
AbyP , Wlabilnton, e)C.e Off c (SO .LChi A d s h

1. (1) This headquartet the-

ai-r he ba repqiaendorsed.-
2.r(U) Reference Paragraph 3, lot Indorsement: The MTOE wca
returned to ISARV on 17 November for preparation of Section 1fI, Equipment.

\ ~ 3. (C) Reference Paragraph 6b, Section I:

n. The unsat sfactory operation of the Army standardized air

cooled generator for counterinsurgency was reported to this headquarters
by Pacific Mobility Service office (PMSO). Chief, PMa, advised this
headquarters and USARV that the failure was due to the requirements for .4
b.Sreducing
the noise level and that the generators were either sand
* bagged or placed in buried CONEX boxes. In either case, insufficient
) cooling is suspected or the contributing cause of failure and similar 4-
- operating conditions will lead to early failurAt of the liquid cooled 4
4engines.

b. Since the air cooled generator is the standard generator 0 +

in the Army supply system for 10KW and below, ordering from the Air
) Force was necessary to obtain the liquid cooled models. '--

1 4. (C) Reference Paragraph 6b, Section I: The Star Light Scope,

FSN 1090-688-9954 has been declared a critical item by Comimanding
General, USARV, with distribution of assets under the direct manage-
ment of HQ USARV. The priority of distri ton of the scope to Special
Forces units is determined by CG USARVJ/9 _,_ ......

FOR THE CO IANDER IN CHIEF OD

14 Incl .: AGO -,
ne Asst AG
Is'

,- 0 '4 2o

17 '"L. - g.
03-:3-66 'V

SECRET IIQU
b~T I EkCT: Operational Papart-leasons Learned for the Period LKidirwb

1N. M,3AR.Wf, PACIFIC, AMO Sasi Francisoo 96556 17J~NL.

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Foree Developnt, Departawnt of the
Arm-.Y, Wansbington. D. C. 2031.0

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SFPFA{A17ED FROM CLASSIFIED DOD DI

SECRET ~ y-
5th PECIAL FORC) ESGRU (APslORNI)
1st SPECIAL FORCESkt I
SECHEI

YB

SECR] N
INCLOSURES TO OPERATIONAL RVPORP ON LIJ30 LEARNED (RCS C3GPO-28 (11))
SECTION : - Significant Organizational or Unit Activitiess

1. General (S-3)
2. Intelligence (S-2)
5. Operations and Training Activities (S-3)
4. Civil Affairs/Psychological Operations (CA/WO)
5. Personnel and Administration (S-1)
6. Logistical Activities (S-4)
7. Air Support (Air Movement)
0. Medical (Surgeon)
9. Signal (Sig off)
1o. CIDG Pinance (Pin Off)
11. Puture Plans (s-3)
SECTIOi II - Comander's Inolosures:

1. US Casualty Chart - 2d Quarter vs 1st Quarter (S-i)

2. Comparative CflG/VC Casualty Chart 1st Quarter vs 2d Quarter (S-i)
3' Trc.up Disposition List (S-3)
4. ;ap of Camps - Present and Proposed (S-3)
5. Smxiary of Engr Advisory Team Activit for 2d Qua'tter 66 (Rsr Off)
6. Surmiary of Delta Operations (Cos B-52)
7. CA Suceess StorygA/PO Off)
8. P0 Success Story CA/Po Off)
9. Operation Blue Star (8-3)
10. CIDG Participation In Operation Nathan Hale (S-3)
11. VC Buildup in Binh Lcng-Province (S-3)
12. Opening of Camp Trai Bi, TaY Ninh Provinoe (S-3)
13. VC Attack at An Phu, Chau Doe Province (S-3)
14. Contir~enoy Plans For the Support of Special Forces Camps in I
Corps (s-3)

Best Available Copy

 HFADQUARTERS
5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIP3ORIa.), 1ST SPECIAL FORCES
Al", US Forces 96240

AVUPI -C 10 August 1966

SUBJECT: Cc mand Operational Report on Lessons Learned (CS CSPO -28

(Rl)) for Period Ending 31 July 1966

Th U:

TO:

Sect n I. S±EDifoant Organization or Unit Activities.

GENAM:__
During the reporting period Viet Cong forces did not initiate large
scale assaults against any Special Porces camps, but numerous probes were
'auhed against Porwrd Operating Bases. Rapid reaction by flareships, FAC#
and airstrikes were decisive factors in our favor in most oases. The Viet
Cong have shown great reluctance to become decisively engaged. Navy losses
have been inflicted on Viet Cong logistical bases, Tons of r' diceal
- ig "....... t,-t aIwrA ditrt' dur g the
last ninety days. These losses, coupled with the flexible reas capab3iity
of airmobile TJUfcrces, have prvented the Viet Co! from massing large unitas
CIDG forces are cooperating rath P%4 forces in I, 1, and III Corpa They
proied blocking forces, screen the flanks of IY1 units, and obtain in-
telligenco thrcmgh the technique of saturation patrolling. The platoon size
patrol has proven to be the most effeotive size uni+ for medK.m and long range
operations in search of the Viet Cong. Though oamj .ny size operations are
'-'.ootiov when the VC position is Lmo when operating in conjunction
with FWU units t the platoon proviles enoed capability for reconnaissance
end ombat if nececsary. CIDG forces o* a fawdrable kill ratio and a

Fcre .~rWi

Ior
, - l.,nmlw ,., ii
 AVSP-C 10 August
SbBJCT: Command Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RcsCSAgsOe 1966
6
(I)) for Period ]nding 31 July 1966

favorable weapons lois ratio during thi. reporting period. Three AN/PPS-5
radar sets, with opcrators, wcre deployed to camps Dak Pek and Duc Co in
II Corps, and Camp Cai Cai in IV Corps. Excellent results were recorded
from the sot at Cai CAi. Large troop movemonts were monitored in Cambodia,
aid several'squad size probes around the perimeter of the camp were detected
prematurely. Detachment B-52 (Project Delta) was heavily committed in sup-
port of US units during the last 90 days. In addition to operational com-
mittments, Long Range Rooon Patrol training was conducted for members of the
lot Air Cavalry Division, the 3d Drigage, 25th Infantry Division, the 173d
Airborne Brigi0,, and the lot Brigade, 101st Abn Division. The first CIDG
onmp to be opened inside a War Zone was Camp Trai Bi in III Corps. Located
10 kn inside War Zone "C", this camp has made numerous contacts with the
Viet Cong. The camp was subjected to an artillery (70=.I Pack Howitzer) and
mortoz barrage on 23 July. Damage was not extensive and casualties were
light. The VC did not follow up the shelling with an assault. Intelligence
reports indicate a significant VC force in the campls TAaR.

2. Intelligence.
a. In order to improve the intelligence response at CTZ level, 5th
Special Porces Group intends to augment each C Detqchment with an Information
Analysis Center. The Information Analysis Center IA) is a functional in-
telligence organization'within the S2 section of an operational C Detachment.
It is formed to receive, process, analyze and exploit information which is
available at the C Detachment level, with the specific purpose of returning
thn information in usable form to the subordinate B and A Detachments. The
IAC receives information from several sources. The primary source is pro-
vided by subordinate units, to include USSP/LB A and B Detachments in the
field. Secondary sources are adjacent and higher headquarters, to include
US advised RVIT units, Pree World Military Porees, 'special military intelligence
collection agencies, as well as this headqusrterso The 3W10 will emphasize
three type6 of intelligence in support of the C Detachments1 mission; Combat
Intelligence, Counterintell.!gence, Internal Intelligence.

b. On 10 July, it wi. determined that a need for ol6ser coordination

between elements of the Group u-2 and S-3 Sections was needed. To this end,
Order of Battle Specialists from each CTZ were married up with Area Study
"Cota of respective CTZ 1s to form Area Speoi4 list Teams, The new system has
provided for a closer integration of operations and intelligince with an
added benefit of more rapid reaction to incoming inforriation.

3. Operations and Training.

a. CIDG Program: The paoifioer .on of the areas around camps Buon
Ea Yang and Plei Do Lim in II Corps, ani ismp An Phu in IV Corp., and Camp
In hu in IV Corps has progressed to thi poin'; that conversion is imminent.

2
oAlr1,0 4T/:'A
 4: A
AVSP-.C 10 August 1966
SUBJECT- Command Operational Report on Leasons Learned (RCS CSGPO-28
(Rl)) for Period Ending 31 July 1966
The scheduled date for conversion to Regional Force'units is 1 August. Total
CIB(1 troop strength at the end of thi6 period is 33,457* , There are 57 CIDG
camps presently siltated throughout the Republic of Viet Nam. Within the
pant three months CIDG units conducted in excess of 11,000 ambushes, includir
oearxch and destroy operaticno cid raids on fixed VO installations. Heaviest
dzmgo was inflicted on Viet Cong logistical cache locations. CIDG I.nitiated
offensivo operations resulted in 620 contacts,

b. Training:
(i) During the three months reporting period 624 studentV
,raduated from courses preuented at the Dong Ba Thin Training Center. 593
tudento arc presently enrolled in either CMG or Ix courses.

(2) L~DB Class # 6, which started during the previous quarter,

graduated 15 Officers and 89 Enlisted Men on 24 May 1966. Clans # 7 began
on 30 May vrith 25 Officers and 94 I0'a/M. Tho basic course was comploted
on 16 July and apecialized training is still in progress with the followinZ
breakdown:

(a) Officers Course 22

(b) Operations and Intell 20
(o) Weapons 18
(d) Demolitions 18
(e) Medics 21
(f) Communications 11
(3) LLDB Basic TratiinV Class # 1 graduated 79 students on 4
June. Class # 2 o menced on 28 Jno with 21 students, and Class # 3
began on 25 July with 96 studen'.s';

(4) Classes # 13 and # 14 for Coutat Recon Platoons gramuat3d,

on 30 May (127 students), and Ii July (128 students) respectively. Class E
15 began on 19 July with 132 students.
(5) CIDG Leadership Class # 15 on ed on'24 May with 120 grad-
uates and Class # 16 Graduate&1119 students on r- Trly, Class # 17 beg-Ti on
12 July with 137 students.

a.- %:
'
.) c- 10 companies is vchedule(7 ror 1Y 1967, bringing the
totnl strength of IIX com:.nies to 269 cortvnit s, t 132 men par eompr-.ny.

3
 C&/vf/v r/A
LVS (r) fC Pd J 1s t
SU3LJECT: CoIu.mand'
(Rl)) forOperational Report
Period Endiil 31 on
JulyLessons
1966 Learned R CSGPO-4

4. Civil Affairs and Psychological Operationq.

a. During the period 1 May 1966 through 31 July 1966, the 5th
Spocial Forces Group has placed maximum -tress on long-term, continuing
CA/T:JYOP Programs at every level of comand. Efforts have beten focu'ed I
on 'chiev:Lg program continuity by assignment of trained CA/PSYOP Officej
.andNCO's down through "A" Detachment level insofar as poijsible, In eachi
ful.tional area, primary emphsais is directed at self-help
3f] locally-procured building materials
projects, 'use_
m-.it of individual initiative among the wherever practicable, rund develop-.
p-opulace of operationnl areas.
b. Substantial progress has been realized in the development,
,-,f planned CA/PSYOP Progr ms vithin each detachment tactical a-ea of
;'enponibility. In coordination with I1DB counterparparts, VIS, USAIT) ,,
JUSPAO plus representatives from any other interested agencies, USASP
CA/TSYOP personnel have conducted surveys to determine local needs. Upon
conpltion, these surveys are i.nvaluable for annual planning, jogrspnw ng
.nd. budgeting. Detachment surveys and programs are establiphed for two
successive six-month periods. They are up-dated periodically to insure
that all plans and projects are maintained current.

c. During the three month reporting period ending 31 July 1966,

5,O91 civic action projects designed to gain the support of the local
civilians and to expand GVFT area of control were completed in Special
Porces operational areas. Included in thin figure are the construction
and/or repair of: 89 schools, 54 dispensarics, 13 hospitals, 72 bridges,
51 latrines, 15 fish ponds, 107 wells, 87 dwellingsu'and'55 VIS-Informa-
tion booths. Other projects included provision of 2,853,808 pounds of
food for over 72,00 refugees ohich are located in detachment oporational
areas. USASF and V1lSP Medics, and Special Forces trained Village Health
Workers treated 364,50O pati6nts in camp dispensaries wh:Llo conduct-
ing 1,155 CA medical patrols.
d. The CIDG Motivation and Indoctrina.tion Team :andtr the advisor-
ship of nine USASP advisors has been expanded irom 12 cadre to 59 cadre.
Organized into 12 five man '.mits, it is now cap-ible of training 680 men
per month. During this thiree month tspt'"ting p 3riodp 90,8 CIDG and 216
PP soldiers received motivc.tional tTainin" frcm UIP Teams. i

e. In order to increase protein contfn' of the Vietnamese daily

diet, numerous long range agriculture projects h~vo been :J itiated during
this reporting period. They include animnil hustzadryl feaily'Sgarens,
experimental farms, and fish pond, construction/s 'cckir*. In animi,-L
bandry prime breeding cows, bulls, higs, Eoats, icultry, and rabbits hus-have
been pur6hased and isasd to various o.)erationalt eb rwrtents for bree'i1g
purposes. Selected families food cad oare for th 3 female Lnim ls -until
the young are born and weaned, At thi time the :. mily is 'given several

4
6 -'AF/V rA'L
 ,

AVSiC 10 August 196G

3U'3.FCT: Command Operatioul Report on Lesuors Learned (RCS CSGPO-28
(fll)) for Period Ending 31 July 1956

of the offapring and h, adult famale, is pasued on to another family.

Twhvo 850 egg inoubato;-s were also purchased. They are being used as a
VJ. pilot project to deterLine foasn-bility of hatchery production at the
"A" Detachment level. Thirteen "A" Detachments have constructed fish
ponds which arc. managed by CIDG or local civilians trained at USASP/InloP
Pishery Schl3 in Nha rT'rrxg.

f. Motivation and indoctrination of the CIDG remains one of the

primary trAsks for all persons advising the C.LXG. A new program to com-
pleriont the 141' and the troop indoctrination and education program has
boe1. ins cituted. This program has received additional emphasis because
the CIIX are the most valuable assets of the CIDG program, Overall ef-
fectiveness of camp operations and the very survival of the USASP per-
sonnol often depend on effectiveneoss of CIDG. Through the use of power-
fll rublic address systems and tape recorders9 selected daily propaganda
mes.anges are delivered, interspersed appropriate music appealing
irith
to emotions and attitudes of strl!ce force members, The objective here
iE. to develop and solidify the loyalty, dependability, and fighting
pirit of these personnal. In turn, the CIDG soldier is made aware of
his role in this war, the advantqges of Iis positionp GVN objectives,
and VCIAVA activities.
g. S-5 at SPOB bba Trang,'has published a PSYOP Guide for opcr-
ational "A" Detachments. The guide, pert of a handbook covering a wide
variety of subjects pertinent to operations at the "A" Detachment level
provides information for innediate implementation and emphasized opZ:a-
tionil aspects of PSYOP. It is expected that the PSYOP Guide wiTl. be of
rneat assistance to those CA/PSYOP personnel who have already had exper-
ience at the "A" Deta'uient level.
h. Recent reports reflect the valuable contributions being
nade by the PSYOP companies throughout the four Corps in their support of
Special Forces Operations. The May mnd June CA/PSY0P Monthly Evaluation
heports stress the contributions of these oompanies. In'the recently
publ*shed CA/PSYOP Guide for Operational "A" Detachmentsl CA/PSYOP per-
connel are iL.rged to consult these PSYOP Companies for advice and support.

i. Ta,. recorders and loudsp ea3ers hn been distributed to

most of the "A" )ctachments as of this dite. Recorders and loudspeakcers
for the remaining detachments are currcrtly in supply channels and dio-
tribution will be completed in the ncx": two 0eelo. These units will be
invaliuable in support of lmil PSYOP L.gvams. Thc.y are lightweight,
portable, and posocas the capubility tcr voniecrVi, mount. Their many
" usou include: "rall-no, news broadassst, propagari speeches, ndoctrin-
aton messages, and support of the C17.1- Camp Com Li~crs Information
P,.ogram,. Tajes of appropriate music .itv also be, i disseminated to be
-Acsd in conjunction writh the above opctYtionv.

4714 n/ ' "v

}%5
 c O/L'r'oeIVrAL.
AVSP.C 10 August 1966
SUJCT: cMand Ooperational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS CSGPO-28
(Ri)) for Period Ending 31 July 1966

J. Forthethrgmonth;?Ltk tin.
k orpiod, statistics reveal the
following: r4,851,250 leaflets diescminatcd 298 PSYOP rallies conducted,
391 airborne -lOads-oaker mission cEonductc d 682 Chieu. HoiIs or re-.
tuXe&b. _-Most _6inifibant its the fact thdf the Chieu Hoi returnees con-
tinue to inoreaso. There can be no doubt tlut this promam continues to
be a most effective PSYOP effort within 5th SFGA.

k. Inclosures 7 ond 8 provide typical examples of CA and PSYOP

projects conducted during this reportinM period.

5. Peroroel Administrative Activities.

'a. Toonly significnt departure from previous personnel reports
"isthe fact tlht TDY Dctachments nxe no longer attached to the 5th S1PGA for
a sx month period. All 5th Group personnel are PCS for the noia~l tour aith
ihe.xception of a few engineer personnel.
b. The HTO(-E submitted on 7 June 1966 is still pending final Pl -
rovl by D&.

6. Logistical Activities.
a. General-
(1) During the neriod I Ma to 31 July 1966 the Logistical
Support Center of the Special Forces Operational Dse in ahTrWan con-
tinued to provide overall logistical support including supply, maintenancep
novenents, food service and construction to the Special Forces operstional
detnchments and the Civilian Irregular Defense Group spread througitout the
le:th and breadth of the Republic of Vietnam.

(2) P1es continued for the deentralization of the !tgisti-

cal system doTm to the C detachment level ii. order for the C detaolu ent to
support the Special Forces Ope:.ctionol det4chments in each Corps ar a as is
currently practie* in I Corps. Decentralik ation will result in moz o res.
ponsive support to the suported units due t- the closer proximity o the
supply source and -ill allow for optinuz ut*'..ization of available ai-craft.
It rill also allow for continiul.ty of t ;he a r.)ply flow in concert witlI U3SAV
OPL0r 79-66 should :,emy ictioniresult .n a t.?0porary paralysis of the Log-
istical Support Ceirder in Nha ,. De-achi mit C-4 in Can The has acclwleted
a warehouse facilit and in now recivi 1 su-,rylies for. the detaohme;,.4 in IV
C1Z. Although thei: logistical 'ouior r,Till I e limited in scope because of
the sall area in ,7 Lich they have to corlact ticir logistical operatin, they
will be able to be ln fillng requd.altio: s or. .'ast-moving, high-demani type
items by the end cf August. It :%s currea;ly ' r,.ed to have Detachnerit C-3,
Rion Hoa decentra 1 zod in Septembc.a and )..tc z ent C-2, Plei~u deoentzlilied
in Novembor.
(3) 5th St-ecirl ioroas Reg "00-1 t "Loisticsf was update anc
reviedo It is c, nsolilated and .repaced sll I :evious logistical and iupply
regulations vmd f: lled .n ma.ny in-or:ttio. gay previously existing bec;.usa
of 1;he lack of rr.t-ten iuidance. In Aditton "[eg 219-2, "Camp Cons tructioh"
unc updr.ted and r visod.
b..Cl' Coumwd (" tonal Report on Lessons LeaLJd (RCS CSOPO-28
(RI"'for perioc' endin 31 July 192
(4) Conversion of three CIDG cim'ps to Regional Force has
benn 0,nijt-t ;'nr All property on the RF TO" 'I.d be turned ovcr tf "hv 'Wae
Arroliements are to be olfoctod for rei.iburaeaent in kind of all con-
vc-rted items. All other property declared fission eweential is being -

Iev.n& to the IdICV Advisory Tea, for a perioduot to exceed 90 days,

ft..: w:hich it will be retuined to the CIIO prQuLrnz.

b. Supply:
(1.) DurinG the reporting porio,. new equituont was intro-
duced into the supply systo:.. The : Batrr. Boot' which was unsuitable be-
cuso of pocr quality wans replaced by ?n indi-,onous . jungle boot nro-
cured in Japoan which I.ut.s a lonkor ear th:rA the "Bata Boot". Also a
light veightv tightly ,:oven nylon hanmock n. pancho wore purchased for-
iisuS to i.he CIDG. S-iilar in texture and w-i'ht to a parachute canopy,
uisil- carried on the individual soldier, an,. vaterpr,)of, these two
iteus at eproximately :'2.00 apiece replaced the standard US poncho
%iiich alone coste "5.65e Stalight scopes wiere requested for each "A"l
Detachment, but excepo for a few provid c.d by ACTIV, they have not as
yet been received. Kerosene three burner stoves t;ere received and issued
to ti fitld in order to supplement existing butane stoves ,hich are
internittenly out of butane gas in the fieltl due to a bottle shortage.
I0K water cooled generators were ordered by the counterinsurgency
1OK
Support Office through Air Farce Can .els based on reco;.mendations fron
the field that the gas driven, air cooled 5 ind OIC standard Arny genera.-
tors -:re not proving satisfactory for ndntenance and life. INat~i*.Is
hondling equipment totalling $637,ooo 1=0 ordered for the decentralizantion
£rogr :m. 150 Q" ton ruwltifueled trucks and 150 D,-151 1lso
" ton trucks ',eze
p.ceL on order in nAdition to sufficieat air items for a capatilty of
dro -. no heavy loads frou C-130 aircraft. 54 airboats have been ordered
tud. ore lue-in during the next qturter.
(2) After analyzing the reasons behind periodic depletions
of cc;r,.,n stocked items it was deterniinod that the Requisitioning Objective
(no) and the stock levels irere 'o low. The Requisitioning Objective was
raised to 90 days frw.i the previous 60 days and an additional 50/a of cozion-
ly stocked items was placed on request.

(3) Pexsonnel of LSC worked during the evening hours to

ognp1ete a 40.: 100 foot warehouse in order to store and nailnin a reserve
level of rice which is oritical to the CIID progrm. Periodic shortages of
rice developed from transportation and procurement proble' :s in Sai,'on.

Maintenance:
(4)
(a) During the period 1. May to 31 July there has been
a 3ta.o.dy increase of work performed by the LSC Haintenanoe Facility. The
aork load has increased by ay:)roxlmately 51 over the previous period of
time.
(b) A s udy wms made to determine the necessary tools
required ior a B and C Detaolmiont automotive'repair faoility.. Rcqusitioaio
for these itcm have been subuitted. Furt:.er, one (1) shop vWi has been ro-
auested for this location*
(o) Construction f a new maintenace ahop building idth
office conrenced in Iay. Target date for copletion soretine in August.
7
o-146
 ,~on ..... on., L
0-A-P/l0< oyVf/A 1 Aut 19V
* "'2,r'to'lrte')rt o~ h
£r,Aerio,: endirr, 31 July 1),66
f0) T

(d) In order o a&sist the Det.ch.cnt-Ls PLL's (Pr....

Scr .ic' Load Lists) have been submitted to help facilitate the detachn|ent
rej,.ir poits program.
(5) Engineer Construction:
(a) LYurin the reporting oe .-iod four two story buile,-
ings ithin the Si nal Corplex were completed, The fifth building is 7.;
finaished. A pover plant uilding for the L.FIOB has been conploted. The
necossery equipment to provide the power has b en ordered, however to 4-e
',.s not arrived.
(b) Six existing buildings h,.ve been enlarged. A four
,ore" extension was added to five BCa's providjing additional living spa C
for 10 officers. The Person el Office was enlarged by erecting a roo2,
-c ring a floor, and co:.structing end w, ll between buildings.
(c) Construction on dhe Group Officer' a Club conienocd
;,iUh scheduled completion date by 4 So)teu'ber.
7. thir Movenent,
n. Logistical fovenont of Suplies - Tons:

Jan - 3,673 April - 4,T366

Feb - 3,170 May - 5,098
Mar -4j6 June
11, 498 Tons 14,139 Tons
During the 2d Quarter of 1966 the Air Movement Section of LSJ moved
23" nore supplies, exactly 2,641 tons, than during the 1st quarter, Note-
worth, tas the amount of supplies moved during the month of May which totaled
over 16 Laillion pdunds of all classes of supplies. This was the first tinw
that the LSC has issued and moved over 10 million pounds of supplies in one
nonth°
This achievement is due in part to a transportation system never before
used by this group, namely Sealift. This section moved approximately 889 tons
of supplies, to C-1 Da Nang and C-4 Can Tho by WT. This system proved very
effective for everyone concerned for the folloiing reasons:
(1) 'zhe LSTs w :re easily obtained through the Traffic Management Agency,

(2) Each LST was capable of hauling several million pounds of supplies
a.t one time.
(3) Bulk supplies frora ,SC area were easily transported to the ship
ith ~a minimum of preparation, it.coj,.:rrison to the preparntion necessary for
airlift. Once the supplies arived at the bedch, the Alaskan Barge Coqp;vn.y
took on the responsibility of loading the WT. They were capable of loa ding/
off loading 700 tons of supplies daily.
(4) Upon arrival of the LT et Cmi The, the supplies were off-loaded by
Pn Army Traneportation Co(Stevedore) and transported by them to the C-4 loca-
tion. The C-4 supply perso, el had only to off-load the supplies frou this
co-_ any' s trucks. At Da Nang, port perw-.iel off-loaded the LOT rnd loaded
C-l's trucks. Doth Sealift operations took betv ;en 4 to 5 days to corpltuo
and wore cocopliihed in a very smooth and efficient manner ty all oonoc ruod.
The Sealift system is nw considered at integrated part of the LSC movemont"
plan nnd will be utilized vhenever bull: supply requirements warrant its use.
8
4C vwNF/Lo CA' 77AJ L
 ,., "IA
.oA' Ai 1-/A
. 10 August 1,, I
APX""Lti X.1 Ruport on Leu~ons Ioz.Qn (RCS OGIo-TXj
-. ()) forfe;.iod emvinC 31 July 1966

b. Logistical Aircraft Support:

(I) C-123 Aircraft - the group continued to receive a mini .m of
three C-123s in direct support on a daily bas-.e durinc the quarter. There
ii-,s an average of 3 sorties pjraircraft daily, t.ms , the ISC could count oxi
izoving approxiuately 90,000 lbs of supplies per doy by C-123. However, dur.-
in thto la Lter 2art o, June an increased amount of aircraft maintenance rr.-
sul ted in a 2o cezcellntion of ac 4&eduled misions. Once a direct spPor
ircraft ,oes doxn for maintenance, there is vary littV-le chance of a subs ti-
tute being provid:d by the Air Fcrco.
(2) C-130 Aircraft - as outlined in the previous qw'xterly v.port,
th~oi aircraft coatinue to make a t'ortendous difference in tho logistics1
;.irlift capabilities of the LSC. During ;he first two quarters of 1966,
tuese ,ircraft hc-ve averaged over 3 million pounds of supplies moved monthly.
.X C-130s have been used piedoriinantly to uovO supplies in bulk to Dotntch-
ments 0-i and C-4. At these locations the bulk supplies are broken dom -1.nd
uove1 by smaller aircraft, i.e. C-123 and GV2 , to the"A" Campsites.
(3) CV2B Aircraft - each of the "C' Detachnents continues to xr-
ceive at least one CV2B Caribou in direct su.. rot on a-daily basis. These
aircraft provide the necessary airlift support to camps with short, unia-
proved airstrips. Hero at -ie LSC, four CV2Bs continue to provide daily
5.upnort to "A" Camrs wuithin II and III Corps. T'hese 4 direct support air-
crn;fi averaged over ij- rillion pounds per nonth during the quarter. These
* ircraft 1rovide the rrou- cormnder and the L'K; with a flexible airlift
capability, ready to react to rapidly changirk; needs.
(4) Lessons Learned - Utilization of Logistical Aircraft - the
increased logistical sugiort of the group couitry-wide, has dictated to a
&Tec.tcr need of C-130 support. This increasev 4%*. more supplies airlifted
to our detachments duking the 2d half of Ff 66, has verified the requireuent
far decentralization at the "V' Detachment level. There, the supplies are
broken doWn for issue to the "A" aW_ "B" detachnents and airlifte! by C-123z
.. d CV2::s. In es-encef this system typifies -Lo forward supply point con-
cort norjally utilized within a field arny area by the Army Division locr.ted
therc. During the last tu quarters of FY 66, the utilization of C-130 air-
craft in support of the Special Foices logistical program, and in particulr
t' decentralizatim prograi., has proved to be rapid, continuous and a voy3.
efficient ,iethod of gettiag all clasz,es of supplies to the lowest echelon
of corua(nd within the 5th 6FCrA.
c. Airdrop capabilities-
The airdrop method of resuppl under normal operating conditions
n-.ounted to approximately 7.1, of all deliveries made to the group's '."
oi' s coutry-irie during tho 2d half of FY 66. This figure clearly indi-
cites t'at the group' s airdrop crpabili Z-o can still be considered a nort<.-
,ea s of resupplying our cajpe. Presentl:, no "stabdard" army airdrop iev-
tbsd ic employed by the group because the rjorit of airdrops are made Iro::
tVe t. ilgate of the 0-123 aircraft. The airdrd- me*hod employed by the
6Toup is a tactical method developed in Vistiua for use with the C-123 air-
craft. Under this method clustered 0-13 parachutes were used on loads
.reighing up to 1500 pouids. The nux.ibe-. of parachutes used on each load wns
b.,A.d on the 500 lbs cargo carryir capability of the G-13 (1500 lbs lo.d re-
quire-. 3 G-13 parachute clustered). This nethod has proved to be effective
an econaoioal as well as very accurate with a low malfunction rate.

aol/Dv L
/avr,
 .,.,
uc v, .',,iofna.,.,L o- ~ Leason l er-
, d (RC3 U.-..PO.28'
(il)) for-Period ending 31 Jul.: 196( P

In April tle rigger platoon began usin the T-7A Cargo parachute
-:.ich .,as issued to the erou- in lieu of the G-13. At the outset sevorLl
Oi, crepancics axose while airdrop,'ing loads that had T-7A parachutes
cluz Lered on them. The tfipal discrepancy , the fact that mn.ny of the
T-7A canopies were danmcgcL dtiing the openine shock, and appiroxmately 5,
of all parachutes rialfunctionod, i.e. Mac XVest or Streamers duw-ing thcse
airdxops. In order to xrointain our airdroo capability using -7A car~o
a-r='c'uteo, which h.vo the sane rated capa zity as the G-13, .veral tezt
a-L-,opj were perforued ;-ftor overal adjustments were made to the par.-
chutQ and lmod. The test drops prove( , concretlythat th T-7A parachu:;e
coul be used with his tactical airdrop uethod, if the follmwing adjuzt-
ne Cs or modifications .are mado.
(1) Us. a skirt hesitator on the canopy of all T-7A cargo clutes.
This hesitator is notii.- nore that a tic ra.de mround the lowcr skirt of
the canopy using 30 lb cotton tape. This tie provents the canopy from
opcning while it is still in tlhe prop blast of the aircraft. (It elayn
opering approximately 1 second). It also enables all parachutes that are
clustered to open simulaneously, thus reducing the canopy damaeo caused
by one chute opening sooner tan the others, -,hich results in a total loa2
opening shock on the one canopy.
(2)
The cargo carzyig capkacity of the T-7A mrachute was reduced
fron 500 lbs to 400 lbs per chute for use #itlin the group. Ay load
xmi, hing over an increment of 400 lbs requires an additional T-7A, thus, a
1000 lbs load nov requires 3 T-7An clustered.
(3) In clustering T-7, cargo chutes, their attachuent to the load
Lu~tbe as close together as possible. This adjustment reluces the poo-
sibility of one chute opening sooner than the others.
(4) All airdrop loads consisting cf fragile items or easily broken
c'ntainors, i.e. rice bags, cement bags or bottles, were rigged with a
iiiu of one layer of honeycorb. This honeyoonbg and dissipator, ab-
sorbs up to 7% of the ground impact shook felt by the load. It is es-
tiriatod that 25 of normal break:ge caused by ground impact is reduced by
the use of the honeyconb Ltetl.
(5) Lessons learned in Aird-rop:
The tactical airdrop method from the C-123 and CV2B aircraft
continues to be normal means of resupplying the SF camps countrywide.
Airdrop is required whore no airstrip exist or where an airstrip has becone
unsafe for landing- due to weather or enety action. It iz also the normal
or planned method of resupplying ano Special Forces Car-l under enea at-
tack, therefore its operational use must be guardnteed at all times. Dur-
inG the past quarter a change in cargo parachutos available to the group
(T-7A fcr G13) temporarV' roeucew! theoperational capability of the air-
drop nethod of resupply. however, %making several adjuskents (outlined
above) in the packing of the T-7A cargo rarachute and the riing of the
airdrop loads within the (Tcoup, which xere tested on actwil airdrop miss-
icr ., "%he airdrop capability of the grvup it; again fully operational.
?:eairdrop method enplored by the Croup continues to af.lovt airdropping
oi* lacA.s fro a nininun altitude of 350 feet, at an airspeed of 130 knots.
his imethod provides for i:raot acuracy which far exceeds the normal low
velocity nethod of airdrop; a criteria that must be guaranteed hen re-
surplying 3F Cmps that ire under eneq- attack.
- ,v,IO v r/A L
 _nn
Olr
-
t.' oJ/, ,1'A i N:
.'.
ct
.1l tort cn Lejons Le,.-I (AC.' (;GPO-28
1>.

(11)) for iocrio. ,ndrie 31 July1966

a. CIDG - Depandz.nt dispensary an,' maternity ward: In Juno 1966

tPo UM.DD znd 5th ,A s Sectin spored n. prntly jointly
s u.ffind Main 20 bed faciiit7 in the Nha Trang LD medical corapound.
. Cfi]- Troo" I)::.'on.rary: P!,aro h:',ve bon finalized for thiz
f, ili ty of 50 beds to be st.. ed jointly by theLL])r n. the 5th -F(GA :ur-
.'s Section. Construction is pro,-w'.d for Au.3ust 1966. This facility
- I ; bo used at a trairing center for tho LLDB and CIDC uedica.
c. Viotnamseo phrvmso book for sic!.k call. This booklet preparud
5th SVGA Surgeon aa'published by USAID pnid JUSP..O is being distribu-
-y2:
ted to all riedical personicl in their orpanization. ' second printing hc
bu "nde to fill rvquc.ts fru other US rodical personnel.
d. 'ledical Civic Action: A new non-:hly high for outpatient
treltieiit of indigenun personnl was roached in July 1966 with a total of
122,000 troatrients. This ronresents 10r oZ tie entire UO3ARV treeatuent
fi"o-re for Tche nondi.
o. Special Forces 'Xxilet Health ',:orker Training Course: The
first cycle of .his course has been succoczsfully given to 11 students at
Detachuent C-i. A second course for 13 students vill begin on 1 Auust at
2 utachmnt C-. USAID has proposed to the OVI. -rii:syzy of Health tiint the
Special Forces Hanlet Health training prograzi be used as a basis for a nEa-
tio.,al Hamlet Health Workcer school with a training center at each C DetXch-
:nt. USAID, HILPHAP, IL' Province liedical Chiefs and other ciTilian e.:.d
auili cn y personnl would partici-)at;e in t::instruction.
f. 'DY Ie.'ic Tz-,ngTeai" The first four training teams have
coa3eted their tour and retu=ed to Ist SWA and 156th oedical Detachcent,
0.1 iian. Personnel traino, included 168 Uu;..P me.ics 193 CIDO medics and
11 Hlanlet Health Uorkora. Pour 2 -an traini-ag teams have been requested
'rc:i lst bPGA, Oktinara CW ojil enter RTIT on or about 1 September 1966 to
c':.:: inue this program.
g. Laboratory Support: The ArgW Redioal "72esearch Team - Vietnanr
(i-LtR) has provided srodia to 5t1h ,FGA for the collection of bacteriologi-
cal 3pec:uens and will perform studies on mtaiwial submitted to assist in
the -iognosis of disease. This media and ins-b itions for its use have
becn iscued to all detachmients.
h. Dapson (DDS) l.axia Prophylaxis: 5th 3FGA personnel from
.rojVct Delta were part of a study group using -this drug. During the stdy
Proj...ct Delta operated in on area of high tmlaria endemnioity and sustained
no ; 1aria casualties. During operations in the same area Voveaver 1965,
13 of 23 Delta Project pcrson: el dCivelored malexia.

5. S1,nal.
a. Total tvtffic cayunt again continued to increase'durizg the re-
po2ti,- period with a grada'. riao f-- an ave:ee total of 6,255 messn- es
&han.led by the SFOB cor/cjn A r whereas the oorn/centers at subordinate
headru,.=tcrs handled an aver. js totel of 3,315 messages. The t6toal traffic
cowult is again expected to i . &cease as 'aore intelligence information is
transmitted betwen Hqs an' la Oerally batweod SF0B, C and B detachments due
to 'hrL proposed establislrt o ' an intelligenoe analysis center at "C" ae't-
level,
"~ . n
vc:,c-.nt "A
 AVjF'.C COV '/OX le /,q 10 A 3ust 1"

(i1)) fo eriod ending 31 Jul, 1966 0 "

b. b. Co B, (Sis-al) a±.ter concucting lengthy operations

:,uwtests concluded that the combined comm/center transmitter and rceiver
Jvoi.ouvi field did not provide so:tisfactora, interferenoe-,free conunic.tli -
tj Lubordinate stations. This vias due primexiy to the close proxiuity of
tr-.I:L'it end receive antormas and the operation of several different uo : :.,
i.:'. PRio teletype, oil' .le/side brnd oi6e awd kAi voice netz through I'..)
.j:jtu .itcM', 'icldo. A uurvoy of 1)ooible r.; to..-a fiuLd sites was con,,-tcd
by 'le Group Siial Offic- r -.nd the decision was made to acquire a piece of
r -Al ustato located at -2rur - Dun in the Di.-n j.ca h District of lIanh Ao:%
Prviaco. The pcope. ty ,.olsistiw of a 500 foot by 500 foot soccer field w n
foriu'ly z-cquired thro :;h the province chief on or about 15 July 1966. "ur-
rnAt plans ,= to uonc-n-uct A,transitter builCMin, pow.r building and nine
(!) 50 f antenna toxrs on tlis property. The cignal complex receiver 2ite
:i i rennin in ite pre-ont location.
o. Lon6 lin-s circuit requirement for this unit have been submit-
ted to U)IV, "AW. 1Lqs 5th bSGA is roqueating point to point teletype ind
voice circuits from Co E, cofr;/ccnter, I[ha Txarg to each "C" Detac'r .et -4id
D-5 Sacgon. these ire circui'os would provide 24 hour a day full duplex
teloetype service and voice comuunications ith ciciwediate restortioh
rAiority in the event of circuit outage. The group radio-teletype net ;>CA
te ,r.p sint'le/side band net would t.on become the okup comtUnicationr-
0!y-teu , It is anticipated that upon con.-,]et:on of the wire syston the nes-
sa .; dling capacity of RO3l a.d "C" de acauants will be materially in-
ci0.aa (I.
.. The mequiremont for radio frequoncies in the high frequency
bird(2 to 12 {C.S) continues to increase as the group expands. Liaison
vioitc by the Group Sigrxa Officer to USAiW Signal Section and 1iLCV J-6
.?U'.1; J,'l 19 6 disclosod the fact that additional solo user radio- frc-
cIu4cics in the 2 -o 12 ICS rnn~e are just not avnilable, due to conrestion
in these bands, The 2 to 12 ICZ bands are the nest widely used fretuencie"
at r1itrmedit e distance in Vietnam. The ralio frequency Officer at .CN J-6
a a L1. Utat if 5'd, ZFGA ceuld utilize high frequencies in the 12 to 20 .C6
run m, fautiorizltion would not be a problem as sufficient frequencies ,.re
a.-vail.ble for issue in thic band. Expeik-enttion is under way to deter-
'isx if this frequency ra-ne can be utilized on chort distanco, :L,, high
,requanoy rndio nets.
e. CIhG NP IF Conivrsic i" The camp conversion program of con-
vertire CIDG companies to RF/PF companies is currently undorway in II CTZ
as certain caups attain the reqWxents for change over. Some problem
have aisen as to ,hat type azd how much signal equipment would be retained
by 'he camps and how much would be remowd. A perinvent transfer loan pro-
-ran ,'as initia~ed in II CV7 and the following 4rr' ":.auto were nmde:

PeAnMt M fL I Loan
TA..312/YT 20 ea 7R-20 3 en
SB-9931GT 1 ca T-1 24 ea
1C-292 3 8% A1,/PfRC-25 3 0a

Boun En. Iag

TA-312/Pf 20 es TR-20 3 ea
IC-202 I es liT-i 40 ea
ALT/PIE-IO 3 ea -B..22/PT 1 e
AN/GRC.,87 1 es A.PRC-25 1 es,
 10 August lr',
SiJ :,'
,: Command Oporational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS CSGPO.28
(PI1)) for period onling 31 July 1966

Itc.s pernantly Lransforred because taey are on RF/PF 'ME. Itens on:
loa, will not impair installation of Ban Don and other oamps as they will
be returned prior to actua-l need at the ne comps.
f. L-6P'SfC Cryptogra;iic: A.sv udy of -zesent traffic volume of on(.
tie .- ,7d encrypted riesaa(;es shows sufficient sinilarity in work load bethi-v
f Detachtknts to justiC; alloc,.tion of the :j .6/'LE ( ochanical One Tie
PaP Enci-)her/Decipher Device) to ll "IDetac.xnents. If the ,,-6/TSZC i;: tu
be utilized, allocation shoule be one per !] Detach,,ent.
(I) Introduction of t .eHL-6/T3C "ill probably incre so oto aoiunt
of e.ory,ted messages transmitted from B to A dtacimets since many 2csage3
now sent in the clear trill be encrypted e.ue to faster uethod of operaticn of
the T[L-6/'±SEC.
(2) Tlhe more stxrinc ent pysical security requirements of the L-6/
.,u should not be disadvantageous since iia-oveents in ,many "B" Detaclu.ents
c :tor.phic facilities are planned and in sohe oases undernay.
(3) ...b rocomended operational requirement will be for 20 each J7-
6/-:3 for delivery in FY 68-69. Allocations to be as follows:
1 2
II1P 5
IV CZ 3
B-52 1
C-5 1
LSF0B Flor-t 1
Total 20
V)i. (S) CIDG Pinarme:
a. CIDO Finance -~repareed and submitted the Fiscal Year 1967
IVIc
Coui.zd Operating budget thru !d.CV to 'JSARML on 3 ]Jay 66.* FY 67 re-
quirerients were submitted as follows:
In-Cotuitry 4&44.e7 million
Out-of-Country
U _,& 16.8
PflMA _32.
Total 94,2 million
b. Fiscal Year 1960 Coi-and Budget Estimatewuas prepared rnr Sub-
ritteO. thru~ "1011 to USARPA on 5 Jul 66. On 2 June 66t CID13 inance Officer
_:Ad Group S-4 representative maede a 10 day liaison trip to CISO in Okinaix
for the purpcse of preparing the out-of-country portion of the budget esti-
::ate. As a result of thintrip e 67 requirements as submitted in eryho 67
d Oprequest were updated and included in the N, 68 budget estirate. Fl
6 nd 68 requirements were submitted as follous:
x"I 67FY 68 million
In-Country M.7A $41.9 million 7
Out-of-Country
t 19 7 .3

Total $ 92.3 million $99.3 million

Sr
 C o iad ~ ~ e~(10 July 1966
Op(': ~3 Ail~.- &XPO2I'

c. In June, 1'rfr.'L ,-Pruiounccd :'. 3Wj., pay increase for all

'A'-' pzeorlel retroactivc, to 1June 1966. Therfore it becari necezccery
tc r.ti-%c pay :-nd allow;.,kncna for all C1.1K' pal-afilitary forces in a liko
r.,owunt, This raiue ruoulturi- in L- 5 million dollar increase V', Fy 67 rc-
yj-irenents for p: . (Idallovime:;.
d. On 23 Jtute, (uiiiDG Finance 0O'1icer VMS informaed that the r;.
for Ixlktre conversioni nt the official ratc. had boon chanted frouA 72.7'>
t),1.00 US, to a new rate of 79.2.-'11i to - 1.00 L"'- This c .ange result-ied ki
a PaPer loss of 3150, 3Qon the CIDG ]i;ancc. records as of 1 Ju::17.
e. 5th JVAJIQ.; 37-1 iau revised eifective 1 July 66. lr~r.lucl.'.
ini t:-e revised regulat~on are a ne~.. ,,,y ~c)ofor IiI~Force and St-i]:e
Porco P-rsonn-el, the now -.ui ci~tence rates for V~c Corps reas, o.c.
'CXIene.iture limitation- for supplies :ad equiprmcat, caip cons tr1octi :x,
'civil Affaira/Psy Opn-, re-aurir "nd nuAltelicnce, and intelligenco.
f. (,JDG Finace C-fficer ect!abli-:ed a nev coct code str~c;r'-
%:'ac~i wtill reflect iao;:e tc.urate dr-ta %y type, of expondi;;-ure. Basically
z e a.7 cost codes proviouwly used were conoolidated into 20 cost codes,
a- !by aignil'icantl:r reducin(; t' tuL.eccsircodn o ot 2 t
:z&c~rcport preparation.
g. 3D'i Message -173653, dated 14 July 1966J', eata'3lisheJ tlic f7
27 tohbacl: innu. l Fuding oC as £0). 3o~r
In- ( Ountzi UJ& -t -.34.4 milion~
kat-of-cov.antry

Lotl $824 rilo

In country fund alloc.-tion for the lrt quartor FIY67 vrs 6.16
million dollara. This level of funding ias not considered sufficiezt to
03v 'r the projected level of expenditure3 eurina the first quarter, art
:ri.ydue to the recent pay increase in st~sistance. Accordingly ar.
cll=z% o'.dtted requosting an additional 4~2 million all~cation. To-.
sxe
os~o775985,*, dated 29 Jul 19661 increaaed the let quartext allocation
)- .n
2 illion to a nowi total of 10.6 million dollars.
11.
Future Plane:
a. A contingency cossesment of all CIflC camps for possilAe con-
vorzion to RP is ini pro~rress. Det:%tluent A-426 at frri. Ton i3 scheduled t-.,
replaced by a U~CV Adviaory, teer or.. 15 Veptomber.
A stnff Stuay in ii progresi -to concider noving the DOe-
thint now located at Chan Doe, .71 Corpa, to the Ca flau peninaula,p
.n uirleteniined nrrwib.or of subortlint "'. Dot~oJ~z;-.ts.

b. Two news erns twe p1' .zed at ',.,n Don and Duo . in wcs tern
UI Corps. A C-130 airfield wili ot! cmistiuctod ,tt one of these csaipa to
aiot conventional unjt a cstab jq'#iin.3 a tan axea for large,- s'cale
2'oertaiona. The dotac:ment.- Xor theme caups vrill be assigned frozi
1 lcdi Do i~n and Duon En Yang; iwhich wro converted on 1 AuGust.

.....- A1
 /-"

CrP3-B :
'2,J-CT: Comand Operational 1eport on Lessons Learned (R191
(R1)) for period ending 31 July I,16 /
c. An expansion of the Project Delta capability
' boia/tt110icjd
to Qnable i'M...3 units in II and III Corps to Iave pe=3* ontiDelta- 4po

of the expanded concept is VLT 30 Au

.I
t 1966.
,.--./
/
,I ) V
unit avUihcrble for their use. Aticipated date for op, rationr cdine.,

14 Incl 1,riiy
1 C. P 1, -- 0

15
 UO~ CLSUALTY CHART -2D 'svrV3.RST QuAia 66

16 17

JA65 -To
0 4

ThCOSJTU1TO SLOIT1 II to Operatio-ar1. Rupot.t on Lessons Learned (ROS

CSGPO-28 (Ri)) 31 July 1566
 CORP-AkATIVIE CIDG/VC CASUALMf FIGURES

I CTZ II c'fz III CTZ IV UTZ

!:VC ~IG VC (;ID VO CIDG VC CIDG
loit Quarter 75 058 619 111 183 78 493 83
2nO Quarter 95 22 457 100 191 44 121 59

KYA rdTION:
1St Quarter 1.2:1 5. 6:1 2-3:1 5.9:1
2hd Quarter 4.3:1 4.5:1 4,.3:1 2.0s1

PNCT0BULL, 2 YO SJLCTI014; II to Ope.-ational Reiport on Lessons Learned(RCS

CSGPC-28 (111)).)1 Ju:Lyi1966

44

14
 C3n
UhV w
0. '0

- -C-

'C Mv Cr .4

cv

.,E0,.
00

44~~~~vC' -nU '--

- n NA~ N
m1 N;

.Cpl 0 .

C--4

NW
WN A-^
 N 0

(r) W% NO W

Lt'0

1-4 '0-

C~i E'- cn C4 '1 0 - 0V)- '

' CE N
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 THE GVE~RNMu'ENT OF
THE REPUBLIC or VIETNA
F!R5T MIUTARY ZONE MVW O

A10 E ANH

PROVINCE
PRVNEPOPULATION 0
Q UANG
Quang Nam 6Z9t0 Quang-Tri
Oueng NqQa 701,000

Qwon g Tin .353.000

Quang Ti 29", 000HU

Thuc Thmi 483,000 HUEN~-Ad
THUA
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CHIEF TOWN CHE(F TOWVN k - w
PqEWLAT~@ +%I/&Ll 4V
Hoi An 19,000 7
Guaol~Not% 10,EDOC
Ta3mK y 11,000
Guano Ti-i 121 000 JANG NA
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Do Nang 102,000
C-I
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POINEA~V
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DISTRIC BO NA RIST 1 04 HA T 2N A* 1, Qang N. o iCTC*

AUTONOMOUSCITYAL'lo

41Iu
 THEG7~ERNENTOF HE REPUBLIK OF VIET PAM
SECOND MILITARY ZONE,

PPROVINCE
PROVINCE OAKTPLATEAU 01A-4
A- 241 AT
Binh Dinh 862.000
8B Thuan 262,000 I~O -
VOOAM

Derlac 1 49,000 0-24 10 63o

Konf~um 93,000 it KONTUMSo
Khanh Hoc 9 0EE
Lam Dong 68,000 A-241

Phu Son 51,000 A-252 % %

349,0PL Pleiu 0Lul
Phu Yen
Plemik 183,000 A-251 *i.t AANA' LEIKU ry- B2

Quoing Duc 34,000PL~i D0 LI

UN0 A A
Tuyen Duc 75,000 A-254 ifA-2

% PHU-BSON 0 o~
CHEFTOAN POPULATIONa* A-253 4 '" * Hou Bon ,D ONG TkE

Gum Nh3n 52.0(0 1 A-224 v-rv

Phan Thiel 62,O0 111 PHU -TNYE-,q,4N
Bon M-Thuol 3 3 , 0 0 0 U0JNBLECH /Pu-E Hoc
Konlum 20.000 A-38 0VA.(CIN O
SAN DO A-22
Nha Thong 57,000X
Bo
L1, 00 0AN ME TUT, DARLAC %%
Phan Rang 25,000 *A
Ha LoN
B EA YANG % rAA
3 0
Tuy Hon 2.,000 OUIC LAP I

Gic Nghic 3,000 , HAHH SF08I

Dalcl 60,000 %0.VO~%1F KMN4 -50

ESTIM4ATED AS OF ,JANUAftV I%$_ICPeS- D ATAj % A5v

lp 100jllCTI~lO 1 _.,'Y
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LEGEND TAN RAI YN 1

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REGIONAL BOUNDARIES , PA YM, "mLn

DISTRICT BOUNDARIES50 pw O

* AUTONOMOUS CITY -*hn

PROviN4CAL CAPITAL he

ADMNISTRATIVe ORGANIzAlION

U50M /Pt's ADMIN DIVISInON

OT~A?
NT UOFFCAL)ST9
 I HE~ cIQVEftsMEN THE
I REP UbUCO-F i~tI NAHi
THIRD MILITARY ZONE
MINH4 THMAH MON QUAN .0C N!l
A- F CHON TI4ANH 3'
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N

IOk
AS AUOrST IVr'
OFN ARF hucc 85 A' L.* '4.
UNOFICIAL BOJAIE .im .y 0-o 62,00 Ti 1,0

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NATONL APTA*
UN 3,Z

PRVNILCAIA RPROV;NCEr. PROIC0 C PHET -23r CHIE Tl

Elmo Hoo
3<5~~4,00r, S o a0
N
ST~ATIOA, ONARY PCInE
Bin 2-2,00IN' PITA CITY~ 3O4,000N*
IOA
AMI REG L OUNAi 5 Bz DInhr. 8 0 010 G n h
A 28,
1000
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015TICTBOUDARESCotn Son*** 2 6, 000 Sor.*
KCoen)C 2,000
CAPTALNLrv CAPMAL

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CAPITAL
PRVNCA L*~on 67,00 Phoc binh *T LOB
 Tilit GOVERNM4ENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIEYNAM
FOURTH MILITARY ZONE
TAN CH4AU tr,-421:1) CAI CA! (A-4L2)" 'f !NH TI-:ANf; THON'I -A-4

AN.j JL-42,1'

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(A-422)IF PROINC OW

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Ba 4000
DONe. hnhHigJ 1

m~. AT3ALBAnDR Go rg 183 000 GoLong 10en

7, 000
AinXyn Gong
402 00 uam Lofg 48000
REG;ONSo a
XONDRuSKen 6 8, 003 Tru;hGin 1 8, 000
F'ROVINCc
BONALE ieP 296 000
3n Coo Lot+ 50,000
Chou_ D~Tocg 4 4,000 Chou hI 1003
DITIC
OUCARE Phong IDrn 276.000 Can Tha 37,000
Vor nhB in 268000 Pori ',Vinh 20.000
LEEN Dh Luong S91 000 MVynh Lon 6731000
NAT13NCAL BOUNITRL GoRg 18300 G on 0 0

DISTRICT
BONi AAIIT~V 64 DELGAIO
0019cHo,65 AS 0Fe APRIL

A O i NTI A IAO N n N L D 9D
CAPITAL I 0 L ITAR
Inh
MRVrhL ZONE 00

AS OF AUGUST 1#69
UJOPI / PU9. AONIN OIVIIION
(VNO.'FICIAL)
 X
5WH SPMCIAL F E GROUP (1AwoENO), JST SPECIAL FORCES
APO U8 Forces 96240
AVSF-C "

SUrJECT: Suar:n.ry of Engine, Advirory Activitieb for Second ',na rter 66

period1. 30In the previous

April operat
1966 the em f lessons
t report 'on
n.3 h learned covering th
peid3 A~ 96the emplo; M6 t concept of' the 2nginoer Advisory Tc.-ms
from the 539th Engineer Detachment, lst Spooial Forces Group was establi:ALr;..
Team organization xna also given as well a3 initial starting locations. ."Le
0c
oriiu#al construction schedule for the toew" conssted of fifteen differ,
loctiov's rqtdrig engineer assistance irn some form. Yhie original scheCxley
is iindicated below by camp m1.th the ones icceiving some engineer help so :in-
dicated:
COUPS U1MA LOCATION D 5IPTION EITGR A3 2(, -6
I Ha Thanh Airfield rehab Yes
I Thuong Duo New o.mp conet
I Minh Long ;TM camp const
II C1Mg Son Rehab road & idrfiold Yes
II Luong Son Y,..; camp cont Yes
II Polei i(leng New camp cont Yes
II 1U, Seang Ne camp rrjroasmnts YeB '4
II Ia Tay Rev camp oonnt
III Xom Cat Camp drainage Yes
III Due Phuog yo ; camp mact Yes
III Duo Hue lie-- camp onsaessmonts Yes
IV Ba Xoai New ca orst Yes
IV Ynh Quan II He' camp oonst Yes
IV Don Phuo Reopen odd camp
IV Tan Chou Irew camp const
2. In addition to the locations dosigmed on the initial constructioi'
program several other locations reoeivod Lirect engineer assistance an'd IeCrouS-
ritris rere visited and received technical .assistanoe or advice in variousforns.
The assistance offered to eid received by the camps ims quie varied aC. 1;3 en
excellent example of the versatility of .he Specie.l Action Forces Elngine&-
4dvisory Teams capabilities in a oounterinsurgency atmosphere. A list oi' cow
of the projects and a description of the %ork performed is given bel&'i.:
AR114
-U'..*1Z LOCATIM JOB DISuRI-fION
II Tan Rai Irflold conet
II Dong Ba Thin ,ator br;tas;,ent"
.,UGLO3UIrfl 5 l 0'2CTIOII II to, Cpera'bio% report on Lessons Learned (RCS G1C-Pu-2!
(m,))3i Jui 1966,

.,

iU'
 'CORPS AREA. . CAT10!4 JOB DECRIPTION
LII PleIku Generator survey

II Kontum Sand filter desi n

II Polei aron perry ponst
O Da Tang Bunker design
11h: STIQ gHo a bldr expansion
projetsa o Trnd Standards cap oonst

III Tmti Bi o e omp oonst

17 Cai ,Cai Earthmoving

TV Binh Thong Hydro jet well

III Augst
Bien Hoa camp oonst
h~zsbc~n mae bBien
III th Hoa
5lth Singapore
Rpec
l ce Gou prefab
to bldg
cniueorlrg n!
IDa Nang Demol rig A Shu

I Kheanh Dozer eovery

3. Prom February t h eguit the Engineer Teams completed fifty-five

projects and more still
emains to be done. A second construction schedule
hAstnhad bn tken th epeoi:tl Fcpes Group to ontinue. to enlame no
"improvothe CIDG program' To upport this construstion p ogrm Group Ii
requested continued engiteer euppofrom icACV fo the next six mouths.
Tfo's request has been
cour.try in August. a roved the rep
bnd tco are scheduled to arive in

urring he toelim problem

d equipment, areas
moviW the enountered
equipment nhe
tei
",toh Lzqbeen re have beeq
oived, in pro-
spare parts,
emd limited delays in th6 procurement and shipment o:V con truction materiels.
Action- has been taken %0o expodite shipment of equipmnt t( the teams, more
detail plarniu-,.- should eliiute.:bhe -logistical -1,oblom, the load tino
for spare parta hams been!absorbed by the "eplaced teams. Detail planning
ishould help to eliminateithe problems encountered in mov ent of equipment.
With these problems solved conaiderable progress o:n ,c s. in the fitturo.

I I.

11C1,OURE 5 T0 SECTIC( TI to Operatioml Reprt on e l .ina Learnd (RC& L.Cff-

28 (Ri )31 July 1966
 ,0. '/o:. -( -ASTIALO

.S1JjAY C1. DEL',4. OPEPIATI dS

1. General: During the reporting peoiod Project Delta worked as

folloVw3:
a. Ope~tional Days - 57
b. alning Days - 35
2. Personnels
a. By direotion of COl 5th SM1A, a TUCR has been submitted to
mee c the expanding requirements of Project Delta. Implementation of
this ''UCR ill not only allow the US portion of Project Delta to parallel
the current Viotnamese organiztion but will aleo allo i the operation of
'. capacity LRRP training school. This training school is currently
ba .ng conducted by order of CG, 00]IACV.
b. By order of CO, 5th JFGA, this mit's a econ Section is being
maintained with a 20C:5 overhead.
3. Training: The following training programs were conducted:
a. Refresher training for U3/VN Reoon Teams and the four Air-
boine Rartecr Companies. This training ended irith local operations in
the Nha i'rang area.
b. WNely assigned US/VIT Delta personnel Attended a 21 day Long
R'.ukTe Recon Patrol training program designed to prepare them for assigm-tent
zith tiis unit's Recon Section. The course further served to eliminate
t'o';e not having the mental and physical stamina needed to perform the
Delta mission.
c. A total of 18 US person el and 7 VH personnel from the 173d
Abn Bde a.' ended a 14 day IMP training program.
d. A total of 33: rsonnel from the 25th Inf Div attended a
21 day LRRP training program.
e. A tozal of 11 persom.el from the lot Air Car Div attended r.
1 dcj LTRP traini.-, program.
f. A total of 26 VII QIDG personnel attended refresher airborne
traini.j and participated in small DZ airborne exercises.
"..... 4-rvement. All o.vements during tIe poriod were conductedby-
,tactical aircraft ith the only exception being one vehicular convoy.
5. Combat Operations:
a. Four reconnaissance operations were conducted. Reoon Team.
vrere committed to find targete, verify intelligence, and conduct tactical
air strikes on, or guide reaction forces to targets discovered. Recon
o'c=ations wore as follows:
o_____ DATE C..OPS ARE,
/
TEMA C0MOIL
6-66 05 May - 12 ;Tay IM, VII Team
7-66 23 .W7y - 18 Jun It VIT Team
i3-66 25 Jun - 02 Jul I1 V11 Team
9-66 15 Jul - 29 Jul I: Vl Team
I7,CiLSbu 6 TO SLCTIOIT II to Operatior l Report Qn Lessons Learned (RCS ,
20 (R1))31 July 1966.
strikes,
, "bo !J
.rin. 166 or
2( Team
!tMV,'0 flew 166 hours, co'iduoted. 9 air
in direct suppor of Delta Opurationc.j

CC,
up Iti)B
Lgh Command redisi.,nated the UIDG Roadrunner
Pezornn th,'7' I..DB Ri!::nnaissaxc Comando Teamo. (Short title LLDB Re.
condo Toea'. Th teams have the sane general mission; infiltration
t:n'o the c;: :.is) of p'pulatic.i tnd heavy trail net-; outfitted as local
iv£ Cong. !'t pr.::s it Pro.,e6,- Delta ha. five aoe.loyable LLDD Recondo

6. Rcarcb t.n Develio.)omont. A special panel review concerning

.L r,.'qiireme,,ts
special ma-,'r.V efor this unit -aas hold during the month
o.. Jutly. "b findint:s of this pcnol were that the fourteen items cur-
rc.ntly reqt'irod 'y tis urit to better accomplish its current mission
nre not: ciiC i . US ArmySupply Channels or are currently being de-
.14oned. N.cess;ary iLems of equipment have been requisitioned'under
specical eutI!,)ri2ation, reference letter this 1'qdated 2 Aug 66, Subject
Le"ter of J tiicatinn(V). (Subject matter of letter classified SIi:).

7. Coirlvnnler' s PRec/mmendationi:
. jAt Projecit Delta continue to be assipned missions at no
low:or than C11 -s leve) assigned AOs by Corps, and have Corps &sets
available.
b. 'Nat Proj ct Delta be issued the material items in the
above refere-J.,'-d latt as soon as possible.
c. 1 _at Prol)ect Delta continue to be authorized a 20, overage
in its Pecon..,,ction.

0. (U) 1roblem Areas and Reco.mendations: None.

Ii LO2MUR 6 TO 'j,",CTICIT to Operatioral Report on Lessons Learned(RC d;G2G-

2f. '(Ei))3i July :966
" C A0 ) Ur-,.b 'IA L

) _1

t-
i1
 0 0
DETACMIT A-502
5MI SPECIAL WORCES GROUP (AI3R01E), lot SPECIAL VORCES
APO US Forcer,96240

31 July 1966

SUBJECT: Sucooes Story, Dai Dien Four Develcirnt Program

VIUM Comnding Offier

Detachnent B-50
APO S-5
ATT~lUS Forces 96240

TO: Commandilng Offioer

5th SF Gp (Abn), lot Sy
APO US Forces 96240

1. G eral. ThEi report aovers .he three (3) month period 1 May
1966 thi_ 1 JiZy 1966. It is limited to the Dai Dien bur Area of Dien
KbaMh District and the progress mide in the fields of civil affaime and
psychological o:?enmtions.

2. Approach. The initial step for development as to provide se-

curity. Since Jancuazy 1966, this step has been fairly well accomplished.
Starting in Waroh, a s=vey of the civio action and payoyologioal opera-
tions situation was oonduoted. Based on this mnuvey of basic needs,
de3ires and support available, a logi-eal priority of projects noa devel-
oped.
3- Local Govermen t. Continued progress has been made in develop-
ing a a u -orklng relationship with the District Chief. His improved
cooperation has been very helpful. Village and hmalot officials are
taking an aotive part in the development of the area. There has boeen
some question as to the effectiveness of the Political Action Teams
aroigned to the Dai Dien villages. Although they have not boon the oom-
plate solution, they have made a definite impact on the area and have
oontributed to the general development. You can seldom distinguish PAT
personnel from the surrounding population. Therefore, a cursory glance
mv load to the conclusion that they no longer operate in the area. ieu-
ever, they are working effectively. Accomplishments of the Political
Action Tows are incorporated into other seotions of this report.

II ULC:U1XI 7 TO 3ECTIOI II to Operatdoal Report on Lessons Learned (RCU

CO3GM-28 (nI)) 31 July 1966
 0 0
SUjEC.Vs Sueooss Stozy, Dal Dien Pour Dovoloptuint Promra 31 Jul 5

4. I[enith and Sanitation. The April aurvoy sho-rod an obvious need

for iaprovanonts in both publio and personal a.-nitation. Ulceratod
sores, stomach oremps :utkd diarrhea usro ooLv n disorders. Continuous
riodic-a patrols nnd swnitation lootures Kave led to a marked dooease in
o~m -u.nd skin Li enaos and an improvement in the general health appoarance
of the children. The District Chief 1as seleoted fourteen vill"er3 to
-ttoneL the next Village Health Workers course in Nha Trug. i Two diaporna-
riu now operate in the area, one of hiioh xas opened urith the assilitano
3f ZA. The District Chief has hired two men to clern up the market on
the approach to the Dni Dien bridge.
5 Education. Adoqnte schools and teachors are available. In
Jan'.' -iyp all sohools iore closed. Prior to the end of the school year ll
sohoolsore= at least pprtirlly operational. 'Tis includes eleven (ii)
~blio and three (3) private schools. Several schools needed repairs and
theo w:eroe accomplished on a jelf-holp b sie during the vaontion. The
sohel donxged by terrorists vas reprsed imrodiately. Sahool supplies nd
reaterias have been distributed. 1laterias for school furniture are being
ljlrol,-sed rith cost code 907 -ad revolving revolutionaqr development funds.

6. Qo:ul ture. iiaintaining security is the greatest aid to the

acriclturo program. The quantity and vnriety of crops raised is excel-
lent. In July, the detachment acquired an 850 egg in-cubator. The baby
chioks produced Trill be given to peasants to raise as a food supply and
future breeding. The initi l supply of eggs came from improved breeding
stock in the United States. Thirty ducks are being raised by this detach-
ment for breeding purposes. Presently Ne have 45 ose that were captured
fzon the VC and brought here to. faotten prior to shipping them va a meat
source to Special Forces detaolmonts in isolated areas of Vietnam. The
Province Animal Husbandry Chief was olled upon to solve the worm problem
in hogs. The Group Veterinarian m-ae an inspection trip in early July to
check for any diseases in aninals. As securit, improves the fruit or-
oaLrds in the foothills will be accessiblo for harvest.

7. Welfare and RelfuMe. There is no reftgee problem in the Dai

Dion Four area. Indemnification payments hMve been made to some but not
-l famdlies with dnaaged homes. MIany hoeros showr evidence of recent
rc!-.-r wiork.

6. Transoortation. Improved transportation faoilities rere eon-

Gidured to be one of the greatest needs in the April survey. It is in
thi.; field that the greatest progress Ias been made.

a. Every hamlet nov has at lest one main road wTich has been
ic ded and ditched. The local population under dir-otion of their bamlot
Chiof finished the roads -nd ditohc after the rough tork was done by road
£ -radrs. Cowaeroial transportation Ias.mcvcd into tie n=a. Buses run
t.rioo daily from Dai Dion to 11ha Trang,. Tri-L-arbro tas Intercommect the
lhzu=ets a,"nd
Dien I]anh.

2
I C-UJ-iUE 7 TO SECTIOU II to Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RC3
CGPO-L2 (11)) 31 July 1966
 SUBJECT, Suooeus Stor, Dr-i Dion Pour Development Pio6T:.j 31 Jull

b. The PAT in Dai Dion Phu ajolsted ihe vill reop in ofnstuc-
:L, . one pmotor -ndo, 65 foot long brilge the trbuta
veoEs of the SO-W
3/4 of the hamlet
C.i River. Prior to thin const ction, stre isolted fo,
bo DA Dioen Four ble. Th villGe Clhoopuhtav.teo that 6,000 people
10jo
t is oimple baboo bridco ilyP PlATul : no
cing in by UID nn
bridge. In
2i00 to build a. perment vehicular personnelhe moed e vllero
IAT are busily prep- lng $.pilis. T

ot The !Detin brdl aor o th &)N-, Cato River from Dion Khrh to
D ::
on nIts
hc bon confiL toed I mjor problie tLeDi the re-openine of the
.A US Riginoor Conillny has Just oomplote-d placsing motel desiking ,zid
iuoitnl soupporta on the bride A.ess ro-du hve been raised r the dook.-
in , of the brigo rAiood 5 foot. Recent ro..inu hqe so completely
f the nroa th,% it i doubtful if the bridge could have been
1oo,,1d etd
orrtin; the improvcrmto r:%Io.

2 Commercial Deeoten Commercial development h s progre sed in

irest relation to seourity, All old stores and severdl now store lavo
boon oLenid.n o blaok nith shops Ilivo soontly boon opened t

10. Re orpulantrol. Both P rd PAT oire ctive in onforin the

2000 hourii o-rOe c uctnugfe-e PAti personnel have oved from the Dion
May
30t l a to nom outlying villneoo. There is a Nationt l PolOe Repro-
tiVO (Dopty linziet Chief for Youth -'and Securty) in eaoh lummlot.
Upon recommendation of th*o C/PbTOP Offioerp the District, Chief has ia-
ploeriants the fmily insu book Book havo bon oonploted for Pur Le
for e- p.rtioul.x h.-A et
Once the books extra o cot.mplot, rids re oondunted
~to J~toot wW or missing poroonn.

-i. PTyohovroA!l iOroinr f.The Diarto ViS is fapirly a dtivo

-,,-thin Dion khwanh. In the D .i Dion rour nroap Asuictitat Hamlet Chiefs
for Propagomdla have aizplrvad rtW pro-OVII i storc runil health information
i'ostc~s. Te PAT has put urp rmu , poatorf., -zrd hold group disoussions oon-
o -rrdii the GMT;.

t obvious naevolopment of the

12. SCi 107
Te hto been a vt :
Dai Dian )
Four e)1 The9(-oojpied
homes are allLas roc-.inod un-uued the fMers sona-
and as for'
rerefor a neil season, land which several
oni being roplnnted. Nowe' crops rn livestok iwo apparent throughout
tl'., .,r:i. The population haes boozaod, -.nd w'os".ith it vLll~up and hLilct
ellot~s ~re.accepting
more of thecir kititics tund reo- blte. r
it; little ovidance that thij areno yrs ever ontestcc'* The greatest im-
provem~ents have been in the area oif tranport-.tion £.%Klities. Fourteen
schools. have been re-opened. Pidas and Catholic, Cl rohes have been
~re-built. The ovorrll impression of the %rmea is that )f prosperity and
contentment.

-jort on Les :c no Learned (RCco

lI, CSMI : 7 TO SUCY10- II to Ope:atiova AI
R)) 31 July 94 6
-2 01Z
 DMfAC~aMIAET t-109
5TH S'?ECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIHBO%-:E), IST SPECIAL FORCES
APO US Forcos 96337

27 July 1966
SUBJECT: Sucocess Story, C,1p Thuong Duo

TIMM: Commanding Officer

Detaotuient C-l, 5th SFGA
AT.- S-5
APO US Foroo6 96337

TO: Comanding Officer

5th SF Gp (Abn), lot SF
APO US Forces 96240

1. General:

a. Operation !MSTRAC :as conduoted at Det A-109, Thuong Duo,

22-24 Jtuio. The purpose o1" this combined CA/PSVOP-Ledical operation wus
to extend the area of influence of the MM;4 in the Thuong Duo area by pro-
vidir.g much needod medical treatmnt, food supplies and selected propa-
--nde. to tLie population in the A-109 operational area.

b. The follourig U1ilitay"uits and civilian agencies partici-

1,ated: Dot C-1, Det A-I09, 5th SFGA; Dot A-153 LLDB; Dot 16,41st CA Ce;
244th PSYOP Co; Public Health Division USAID; VIS; US Navy; RTH National
Police; and Intenational Rescue Service.

2. Sequence of Eveats'
a. Six daya prior to the operation, medical and CA supplies
-. era aaembled at Detachment C-I for shipment. Supplies for 5,000 people
worel aosembled, vith a rese~ for en people remaining
Pdditional3O0
at Det C-I.

b. A trio-man PSYOP teau from the 244th PSYOP Ce arrived at Dot

A-109 and began broadcasting loudspeaker messages and showing public
health movies.

Oc During th next t.o days neocessaj supplies were moved into

the detachment area, along vith a number of pro-planned leaflets for hand
i diatribution and airdrop.
LCI $OJUh a TO SECTIOT II to Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS
CxGPO-2g (01)) 31 July 1966

___
 ' C
7 Su3JECT. Sucoces Story, Camp Thuonr Duo (cent) 27 Jul 66
. d. The dV proooding the oporation mout of the personnel to" p*,)'
tioipato arrived at Thuong Duo. They inoluded: Dr. William Grimaloy,
Public Health Directorg USAID Region I; Lt (U87) William Adamest 3rd A,
Suroon; and Captain Donald Lucast C-I Surgeon plus medical personnel fr0oI
Dat.crxment C-1. A Navy lab technician -.s also in the group with a por-
table field lab.
e. On 22 Juno in a field at the edge of the district toun of
Thuon. Duo in three lrge tents made fron o-rgo parachutes, the operation
boaan. Prior to commencement of treatrient, the district chief made q
short speeoh explaining the purpose of EDSTrnC and asking for full ooopor-
ation of local residents. .. .

f. During the morning loUdspeaker aircraft flev the entire area

anoukoiina the event.

g. At the entrance to the troatmont area, uhioh ,'as cordoned off

for control purposesp the toam medios from A-109# along with the CIDG medios
=d m interpreter, examinod the local residents and sent them to one of
the throo tents for treatmont,

h. They sent the most seriously ill to the first tent where the
three dootors, a medical assistant, and to interpreters worked.
i. In the second tent, medics from C-1 and the 41st CA Co treated
minor ills and dispensed medicine as prescribed by the doctors. Heoro also
the Group Dental 8irgeon worked. During the three days he pulled more tla.
500 teeth. The portable lab ias also in the area.
j. CA/PSYOP supplies, including bulgar wheat, oandy, leaflets
,nd comic books, vere distributed i the third tent. Also in a corner of
this tent, each person Ts interviewed by intell.igence personnel.

k. The Operation continued in this marner for the three days.

On the final day at.0215 an estimated company of 90 mortared Camp Thuonk
Duo nd attacked an FOB. They adjusted morta rw odas to within 13 paces
of oithor end of the tent wh re CA and medical pcrsonnel wera billeted.
Friendly casualties were light# but 8 VC yere killtd and 5 woundI A1near
the FO. As an interesting sidelightj candy that .3ad been given out
during LIEDSTRAC uns found in the pookets of some of the dead VC.
1. Following the three days of the init: .,, phase of NEDSTRAC,
A-109 medics rith their LLDB and CIDG ooun tairt medical
%otizmied
treatnents on a regular basis concurrently vith lop*-rZange CA projects.

2
I UOSUL 8 TO .ECTIOU II to Operational R iport on Lessons Learned (RCS
CoGP0-28(f11)) 31 July 1966

I
3UJJECT: Suocesu Stozy, Caup Thuong Duo (sent) 27 Jul 66

3. Summ ,
Doring the three days over 2,100 villgers were treated. Desire
to come under government ontrol was exhibited in that the VC issued usa=-
ings for local inhabitants to stay ay from the olinic. Crowds wore
har or the last day of the operation, oven after the VC had mortared the
treatment area early the same morning. Thuong Duc has taken a giant step
to'ards VI control.

4. Conclusionst

Operations oi this typo can be Invaluable if well planned and

executed. Using the combined resources of military and oi iriian agenoici
loads to inoreasingly greater oooperation and more effective treatment.
Even greater emphasis should be plaoed on GVI participation in future
operations of this type.

s..bert G. IHeuver
t/noDEwf C. HEUVE
Captain, QA(C
CO, Det A-109

IILUUPE a TO Z0C'IOV II to Oper:-j tual Report on Lessons Learned (RICb

AVo-2 (1i)) 31 Jaly 1966
 - ......

OPE"%LTIO~i BLUL STAR

Operation "Blue Str". a recovcry and burial operation of casualitioa

during the battle of Camp A Shau (YO 494834), V initiated on 18 May 1966
consisting of 31 U-ASF from Dot C-1 0 Da Iang. Under the coimand of LTC
Fc .y, C Det Comwander, the Specil Forces troops wero helilifted by 7 "-A4
nd 2 li!-1 helicopters provided ly the 163d US sarino 1Helicoptor SquiMlyn
frort Hue Phu Bai to Camp A Shau. Approximately t'irty-to uinutes were
spent on the ground clearing the area of booby trapst burying the remainz
of indi6enous person'el and rotrieving the remains of the 5 USASF killed
Ju,'ing the battle. This operation reaulted in the recovery of the remains
of 4 U-6F1' and tl:- s burial of 24 indigenous ,personnel found in the open. Im
int.inue ground search was conducted to locate the reains of the remaining,
U,.ASF soldier bu to no avail. Only f3cattered enemy groundfire was received
durirv. the return flight to Hue/Phu 2ai uhich put one or tro holes into the
nirc;,It %riuthno damage or casualties. Operation Blue Star ias successful
in' that it urs accomplished profi ciently and itithout the loss of additional
li~y ..

INUCLOs'W .9 ICO SECTION I to Operational Rep r t c Lessons Learned (RCS

CSGPO-26 (nI))1 July. 1966.
 CIDG PAI1TICIPAJI II I "OPL~dTIO14 ]U'fAI HALE"

.2coordiin~tion rd c'ffootivexioss of Joint Operations involvig (i

trooipi n~nd convention:,.1 unitLs are de.3cribed in this operation.
Th254th C00 Corpny, froxi 1V%.W DoniC '1'rep ni-222, Phu Yen Provinct:,
w:hile perforiniii %routine road security mission bett.een the La Hai 1V'O2 i :±
Don Trc' ii overrn. On 180230 June, a Viet ConCg Battalion attacked a
ovcnrran Vic 254-th CIDG Comipany, which %wa s occuy-ing three outposts vicini..
P'","3745. ' riondly Oorces, although sttstLaming heavy casualties during -
: utilt on(' subsequent tithdraial, killed to;- VC -nd captured three A
a Iu.t riL'lci, ono i-2 carbine, Lt~o 2k.carbines, and several hand gra~..
N_- ct ligChtp -222 Ldispatched a relief force in-to the area, contact
rLad-o n 1tVA815 June at tho Out-.ost iuith an estimated ninet.- VC. 1-n air: tX1 :.
cl.!upo. the position 1rr the friendly qatrol, forced the ener -tc' floL. iy
dioorder. Tactical aircraft co:-ttinucd to deliver ordnance on targets :1,- 2
pect. d enonrj locations throueiout the erea. In order to exploit the tatic.±
,,itUation developed through CIDC. effarts3 end reoct to the intelligence thuts
~ahcclamcnL3 Oj tl-.L 101st Airborne and 1st Air Cavalry -Divisions arriv-d
z':, :Xc for subuequent doploy,-e3nt. On 23 June,, hro companies of -m)c lot
Thtlion, 327th Lifantry, 101st _irborne Uivision %ere haelilifted into vic
.'070, -.;here they ..dere i:im-ediately engaged by units of the 18-B North Vi,-t-
nir-zea.e.-;:
_aiLeiit. AIs n result of th fierce Lightlling which had developc(,
Lh~:tt'cbrc .'-alion was Jeployed in support of the companies in contact. These
unu; in turn were reinforced by four battalions of the 1st C-vlry Division,
CLV i-rauies from DonSe Tro, the M~ike Parve from PYleiku end Delta Recon > ~9~
Tzt'j-o heavy contact had been maintained. In an attempt to find, fix ~
J:tZ, zoy -the U7VA forces, which thrxeatened Don,- -.te -nd its suxroiziding arc-
th ,Is t Air Cavalry Division du.-loyed am add .tional Z' -rigade to the flonj'; -
ar~,t us dubbing the entire endeavor "Operation &-.than Hale".*U~J z
convc;. iorvO. units9 included snall rangae Agache Ilecon Patrols, Soccurity l1tuoon,
Lon.- T2,nc Recon Patrols, 3pccial Fa-trols ad tCorrI)oaW size Patrols. On 26 Juine,
follou:ing,, 1he detection of a Viet ConG buildup in Phu Yen Province,Dec>i:t
B3-22 noved a rortiard OP element to Tiy Hon to co-locate with the Forwadx ;11
of Whc let Cavalry Division (.1'irmobile), maintaininE formal liaison w.ht e~
roitis postiare the D Detacament Co.zmiander controlled "All Detachrients -t
Phii '.uo, Cung Sons Dong Tre and Van Canh, ciaid one companiy of the Mike r"orce
-,!hi' c conducting joint opei:ations vith the first Cavalry Division and the
3J0lsL Airborne Division. .he size and nwission of the UIDG wfae as followis'
one coripany of the- a.ke Farce (177 CJJDG and 5 LhdiASF) conducted saturatio,!
pnatrolz in the Kylo Valley; three CIDG comp~anies trithi 7 Uia&'U conductedl
-;craonine missions, addition~l CIiJC froria Dang kre provided artilleryj sectirit'--r
con~uc ted. Apache Recon Patrols; Cam.) Curia ;.on provided one company for raod
,,ocuri ty ond -irovided a perimeter for an 4xtillery flsttery. Twelve Delt .
.':n.:oet-,s vere also emploj.ed on TIo; Vange "Recoiur-isbaloe patrols, tiu
-crc-t~y .It'ective in loccitin.. larfge Vt,1A !iovementst andJ in which oanG 0onl-
:I-n,*l forces wecre notified red ciployc! in the 1reas. On 30 June, ie

i-LIabt 10 10 II to
i'UIT' o -rational R~eport on essons Learned (x
'~''O.8(111))31 July 1966 1
 -. Qi~cr~Of
2 i.ro.1.3ct Del~ on'. Airboriaz ',!.a:er Coopvp..:v. Conduc-'..;
.r I~ault ixn the vicz-*i' " ol 905G25, cvxvimuir ; u:i i. ' til~ I~i& L
c x&:, %ad as:een ,-6oL.:..c to rr orte _:LenTj*orC0 con

j-
f. .co1T~rz.ie9 -lua tc.-C, on
Julr .;itsj r. *, .1, r-v t~xee
dcm.3 -Lwo C
111

iC 3ixte,:n
rod .'rr "Cperat' on
....01t hirtee
v~vri
cn Z-:
w~/V~
c twv~ng beena ki
.Wr

I
L -crc'
. cU3:) Ie.~t:ineJ In, 'one 'mirdred .;.Jx£.-y-t-n_ iz, rons 'I ,?l
C. vr1c. in "0ticfl.

I: o.'tion r p~rov.
(%.KL.?' '.o be - 6ct44::11y .3uccesr .".

S io bit
1., - l 'cilolw '-A ;: Off(c vf:L1Qfl of U1ozc o1io"

7
"li

2/
.2 0 10 p.:atonl-'ep,, o LOSOS area
 VC O3uild',p in Bidi Lo rPiovince

i11
in "1] igenco =.tivity.
a~ for thW.3 period ce~itcred in Binth Long Province.
nets, intrrogz-tion o captured
d VC, and captured VC docur=n '.
indictted that the VC vould conce timte its 'Monsoon Campaign in the pro-
vince. On 3 ',ay a CIDG company on an operation east of Loc i.nh (VU72507t.;
cz.np made contact with a VC conpany size umitt resulting in an one hour
fire firht in the vicinity of of XV210071I IDuring the encounter certain
doctunmcts were captured indicatirC that the VC vwould at . ck Loc Ninh UIG
c':x. and District Ileadqu .rters ir,,ediately follaring reconnaisaanbe missions,
zchc'-u-1d to be conducted 8-9-10 May. OLher documonts captured proved to be
n intelli-ence csti!.mte of the Loo Nini are:. to include a VC plan of r tt:.ck.
GeneraliL' .hc plan of ;attack called for, the ,m;rloymont of four retiiments,
one of "Jthh .!ould be reinforced vrith 8 ,nti-aircraft gnis for the final t-
tacl: of the objective. The reecin-.nto wbao identified x.s Q762, 0.763, ie. tio
101st Re+iment of the 35th Division. ''he fourth t.as later identified a "!-
Q761. Objectives outlined in the docwncnt inoluded target A-I alleged -:A L.:
the Leo Ninh Special Forces Cnmp and t,oxget A-2, the Loc Hinh District llc.d-
cuarters tnd air strip. Caoh tar3pt .as to be aitaoked by one regiment.
ic t'.ird and fourth rcginontb a-sig'3 missio.s were to out hi h.r.y 13 to
,recludi reinforcemert, a~-d to rea rw.bush the Iiigh.;y and landing zonc~ tc
; revent pos:ible reinforoenont by heliborne ope. ations. One of the rejiuerts
:ould aYso fiuicti(x as a re-.ction fce'ce. In reaction to whL, was coiAdarrz'"
to bo vrlid intelligenoe of an i-p ing attack, the lutlti-Purpose R1eacticn
(:.IKZ) force trith a strength of 441 ,troops vas airlifted to Loo Ninh on 6 '-y
to reinforce z'nd improve the defensive posture of the camp, secure the air-
field, F'nd to conduct limited oporntions to seek out VC units operating L-:
te c_rea. On 8 Hay the 5th ARM.T Division reinforced the area with th_. 9th
i-K :1og4ment. Numerous contacts wore made by he LqKE force and CLX- luits
.th strall VC elerients and sirens rcf extensive activity ias noted but no majcr
contact mas ride until 17 Hay 66.: The contact was made near the Canbodian
border vicinity XUT5803 by the ".IE force and one company of CIDG. The cc-it:ct
,r-.-i th a superior force. The IYIKE force 'Md CIDG company were forced to
'e:2: conttct and withdrma, On 19 ILiy 66 the ldt US Infantry Division rei -for-
,xx' 1oc ;,inh irith the 1st Drigade. The 1st US Infantry Division tro, ps con-
Cttc ted extensive operations but *xere unable to make any significant contac..
They were extracted froci the are4. on 25 May. The VC irmediately increase '"
th.:ir activities r.t indications viere that they would carry out their i-in1.
:'i:sion even though their plaz' had been com_romiaed, Dased on theq,*1iictionz
of V2 continuation on their plans the lst US :nfanixy Division re'6rned to Bin:-
bon" Province in strength in eoprly June. Thdr mission was to s4cure ai(* defcend
cziticol installations and to 'condout operations to locate ani" destroy the four
VC T o ients ro.ported In the I'Movince, Since that time there has been nuncrous
contacts a-d three major bat;les have be, n fought with the VC. Bo,'y coun.t of
VQ ki'led oni 31 July .was 133!. .

L0~U T11 ( .'Ci°IOV

E, II to Operations leprt on Lessons Learned (RCS CGL 0-
2% 'ill) July 1966.
 Opuning of Camp frai Di, Tay ITinh Province

On 22 Jun 66 the !MIX" force Mado a helibonie assault on frai Bi

(. 11i702), Tay Nirh Provincep in p.ropni'tion for tho opo:-dA, of new Cl JO
there. The ".F met no resistr.nce o. the grouw durir-. the initial
a J Li2lt. Th-e A Detachment along vithl five CIDW coitanies, the 35th
.CV.\ T, .ner Ba talion, and a cou.iny of 1iW Thngineors travelled by
convoy fron "rzx Sup (.0166555), Tay Ninh Province, up hig',u'ay 22
and closed. into the proposed camp site without incident on 23 June.
± cspreucd u:e oi the area by Vie% ConrV is app,-xent due tc the ex-
t. 'i:ive fortified base areas and ti-4-s discovered. There have been
two i].jor encounters ,ith the VG. Th(e first involved ,z operation which
a .. force ccw:ny ias conducting, -. -...oxiv:-tcly four kilometers nea th
of t, c.ri,. At 041400 • 1. ostim.tce X ba. .:.lion was engaged. Due ,o
.i'e nitcrior firo power of dhe 1iC ba%,alion the !'a" compiany %as forced to
,.. lhdr.x!. . second "' comrnny its committed to reinforce but due to the
den o jiuiale growrth to.ey wore unable to deploy into a position where
fi'rc sir)ariority could be gained. Both coripnmicn :ithdr xt under ooher
of _Air -and 105m 1rty support. A combined o- rtion utilizing the
!V -:1 tho 35th .nxW,')r Battalion was later conducted in the area in an
, ci., t to loce;te ,nd destroy the VO, however contact could not be re-
. ,cl..Th, second .,jor action '.cuo a VC initiated artillery atvack
-inzt ihae camp location. VC forces began shelling t--e camp writh 7011n
P ck t[ofitzers nt 232320 July. k':-proxii.ately 1 0 rou.Ids ;are fired.
Dix t was not extensivw , nd the VC did not fo).lov up the barrage it.th
an assault. The rcpik" dcrloin nit of a VLO and a flareship along with
coiu.ter mortar fire rriy '1ve Literrupted plans for an infantry attack.
A: of 31 Jvly the construction of the Camp is approxinately fifty per-
ce:i t corplete.

III(:-1)
0;131'
1 July1ECTIi966 II Opercti A Repor
.°m c! 3saohs ma3med (RCS C3CPO-
1I 3
 oCw ito ut the PoiU, Chan Door, An

f ~oer
.aicenoral
o :4hVC Situntion:
DatlinCon., Intelligence
ner(Xreports
51st received
vi)nd he6t on 7 t in-
iicate ti,.ta VC meeting h.d t ou place on 24 April to discuss and
I'on.late plans for attacks ar,inst outposts an i Phu district, Chau
oc. P hrovive,
durin. the riiny season. PDdtiipants in the meeting
..... r e. th Doe Proince Cof issione loon Plu District Co -
1 ioiner,1 24th VC Bat tlion Comnde t 521
a t Bn), and 64
the
a Battalin Coinrd in 261st n). Intelligenoe reports ontinued,
iLmt attack would ccur in tle Lieiat future. On 16
cura.ent intelligence atr cnly indicated thyte.t t21o VC battlion thce
"Ah
n ad 261st, vculd
theCandattack ;1G latan BF oupt ly
h h-An
,rlon-eoit eu '-Mt -. d Doni that night B.sed n this accurm ortica
of
Li7cnrienco, all CIDG and r ti5ts
e he area were placed on a ie,--'
tla
tle t. An oush force, consisi of one platoon IPF' 1 platoon F,
200 161' td 2 tras
USAfro dispatched toTeuar t vteloy bridge along ther,
supply routes to the POB's and OPas, nd also.to act an the initial i
'viaction force f Ulr its in th northern protioa of the district in the
evenIt .;f a W; attack.
.Concep~t of Clp 'ration:

a. At 0325 hours oit 19 May, the 261at VC battalion reinforced

by the 67th Vl dttalion with an estiated strength of 7009 laun thed
1 . ttck against the CIKhow :ny at hinh Binh cad oplntely sur-
renclded ta'eir posItion. The VC force employed 81mf mortars, 60m mortars,
coniducted
57Ii Vlavul" .305
";*{um~an rifle,
recoilless typerocket
OasecultS
launcher, IG umutes.
every 1.5-20 Simultaneously
d small arms fire, sad

the outpost
bF at Mianh An, mred by a platoon of PP ;tnd the recomlais-
sance platoon erom camp An Phu, cme under attack by i estimated fce o2
i200 VC from the 512th VC battalion. The 512th Bn employed 81M mortar
57ix-i Recoilless3r rifle, III; and st-all rrm fire during the assaut, Anti-
r _ircraft grubs w'o.ce also employcil urion the arrival of a "Puff" ship over
the area. At 03 hours,
07:) the Vhaush theeat
foene bridge site ambuyhed a
" orpolition sqvad attempting
n blo the bridge. At 040 hours on the
19ti, theP outpost at nnh C Bit h,bo Phui , Yhon. Hoi, and Don Ki coe
,wfer hainedo 3mal a fire, wheh continued fr approxe mtely to
iourn( ;t each Icttion. o
b. a At 0515 hcat a raction foe of 3 platoons CIDG 2
t-uv!i t' he VIJ. Camp Cormander depar-ted An Phu, linked up wilth the.con
rfbuuh party at the bridge then proceeded to Xhanh Binh to relieve thoe
tzckuac on the su romde,: CIDG company. By the time the reaction force
r- che Khanh Binh, at 000 hours the VCofhad
netrated
hou ands occupy-
10. meters of the outer perimeter defensive t.reneh; Zffetive heavy
frc placed on the VC lines by the reaction force forcing the VC to
,,ri-'hdrair fern Khanh Birth into Caubodia. 'ran their sactuar in Ccmbodia
h-.hVC continued to place 31xi mortar and I fire onL the CIDG positions
unlill 10':0 hoars. At 1100 hours, the VC: broke off the attack on -thn RI=&m
An 0129.nOd ithdrew north approxioately 2 kilometers.
co On 20 .y at 0300 hoixrs, a company of VC launched a second
at'k- ck against the Pri OP at Khanh An, The OP at this time wae being sp
l
portal by t company of Re gional Force troops, causing th-) VC to be unsuc-
cessful -in, their attack whioh they broke off -'t 0320 hours,, A second at-
L~ck r uinst the 0110 compny (no-i rei)-Xorced) at Khanh Binh v-_s initiated
I3 'CO 3 C'rI" II to OP9Matio=r4m
1NE.U pjr'w on ocn e ed(C
A, 0-29 01)); 31 July 1966,
.. ..
 CY -1, ostimzwted WO . "t 0130 hour' on 20 lja'. L secod reaction force
consiiting of 3 plnt of CIDG, 2 VNSIT',.I 2 USAS? djf4ted An Phu at
0500 hoxus. An 81m mortar, mmxmed by Z V,0F and 2 CIJ.I. was set up
. pproxirately
.. 1800 meters from tiv, battle area to give supporting fire
Whilo the remainder of the reaction force moved into contact Trith the
'C .ho had once again surronded the CIDG positions at Khanh Binh. Tho
VC broke contact at 0600 hours and once agnin withdrew into Ca .liea.
At 0700 hours, the CIDG company ras Tdthdrawn from 1hath Binh an, re-
-lacod ;-rith a comp:,ny of fresh troops. Although the VC had withdrrwn
fro the CIDG positions at Kha::h Binh, the PF 01, 2 kilonaters north,
still s-rrouadod and receiving harrassing fire. A relief operat-
icn for the 0P was'requested from Province hecdquanters, but was not
ap roved. Iowaver, a ClDG force moved to the OP and ole.red the in-
e(Uato area.
d, A third at ack was launched agair.3t the CIDG post at Khanh
.;inh by ran estimated 200 VC at 2045 hours, 20 May, his ansault was
liwited to I G and small armr fire .:hichindicated that the VC had spent
their crov served ;eapon -amuition or were preparing for a large scale
assault. A flare ship and a gun ship arrived over the area approximatki.d
25 ni;antes l-ater giving illu.iination and fire support. Under heavy suy p-
ressirng fire from the quff" ship, the VC were forced to withdraw, limi-
tiag, heir actions to the sov:th side of the CIDG pooitions until finally
breakini off the attack at 0300 hours on 21 May.
e. On 21 iay, a temporar-j F02 was established at the Don Ki I'
outpost, cone:Uting of 1 platoon of PF, and 2 VJAF.An 81m mortar ms
nooted, with the capability of supporting both 1KhanJ Dinh and Khanh An.
't 2020 hours the VC launched a fourth attack against the CIDG compw.y
,,t YlKanh Binh i ith an estimated strength of 200. A "puff" ship arrived
over the area at 2200 hours, providing illuminati-on end fire support, but
was Teatly hampered by 050 caliber MG fire from a Cnabodian outpost app-
ro:-i. :.'tely 2 kilometers, fron lhanh Dinh. The VC broke off the attack nt
2210 hours, but contiiUod to horss the CIDC- positions with 81ms mortar
fire until 2345 hours.
f. A fifth attack ,-inst the OIDG at la anh Binh was launched
at 2030 hours on 22 May by an estimated 200 VC, supported by 60mm mortar
and LLE fire. The CIDG forces were supported by 31 mortar fire fron
the temporary FOB at Don Ki and 155mm howitzer fire from Ix Phu. The VC
attack vas broken up and they were forced to vithdrai at 2110 hours.
g. On 24 Tiay, a multi com-wy search and destroy mission ir-'s
no~uied to clear the VC from the oarethus preventing then from gaining
foothold. Friendly elements consisted of 1 company Hike Force, I comany
of TCK, 1 compay of CITY., 2 VNSF and 2 USLS?. The operation w.a initiated
ri th 155mm howitzer and 81mm mortar concentrations being fired into the vrea.
Uy'on entering the oprational area the Mike Force established heavy" contact
w.ith the VC at 0910 horso An airstrike was received at 1035 hours, oovcr-
ing the area with rockets, napalm and strafing runs in close support of ".ho
attacking ground forces. At 1325 hourw, contact with the VC was lost -nd
the operatian ras terminated.
h. Throughout the entire period V 19-24 313yP CIDG and PF forces
in the northern half of An Phu district were in ovn+..nua1 contact with the
VC.
Ii;(LO',TUI0 1 3 T1 SECTION II to Ope'cational Report W :,essons Learned ( ,
0CZGP0-29 (RI)) 31 JWuly 1966
2
 C5oncltuoion
" . The:i!t lii.-aconet employed in An Phu Ltriot was a wil
orgy-nized and highly effective force, providing etremely aocutmto in-
17cr.v tion in a timely ianner.
b, Tlhe CIDG and PP forces ,--ntained rthigh state of morale
rnd fightin ,effectiveness throughout the period iind defended their
poesitions i - mt outstanding rimmer,
a. Kad the ambush party not been sent to the bridge site on
the night of 18 V7ay the VC would have'sucoessfully destroyed the bridae,
causing a lengthy dGVo in the reaction forces reaching the battle are,.
which could have resulted in a docidre victo y for the VC.
d. Air sup,)o.t that was received vas exceptionally vell exe-
cuted wnd proved highly instnnontr-l in the defense o the FODB Cnd OP' ,
tio~aevor air support was lackin ii- quantity as indic 'low:
letei
MYE M1,;o"M APPROVEDI DI~SATP! VaZ

Flare Ship 3 2
Gun 3hips (Helicopter) 2 1
'2AC Air 2 1
.MD rVAC 4 1 (us) 3
TO AL: 11 5 6

tLOU-U 13 TO SECTI0IT II to Operational Report on tessons Learned (Ci

,-GPO-20 (Ri)) 31 July 1966.

3
 - Xi U:Y rblj~ 'AL JUrI'011 Ul' srX.Tsi I IniCOI

US Arzy Special Forces camps are located in five of the provincea

of I CTZ. They are situated in areas of limited visibility and low olaud
cover. "he adverse weather situation worsens d.-zing the Autumnal 1Ionsoor,
season, -rid
the cccmpsiten are sUTounded by dense jungle growth and stecep
LioLuit.ine. Prior to the employment of U% Forues in I Corps the CI for-
ces conducted unilateral operations only. In most cases CIIM units iere
Uie only Povernment influence i; the aren.
Duri%- the pnst year, an pnrticularly during4the past quarter, V,'
infiltration from North Vietnw- has becoae a cause for concern. To
catiter the potential threat this buildup pos s to Spocia.l Forces csnpc
contingency plans aeve been formulated to strengthen their defensive
*Josturc and enhance their operatio-al capability. The battle of A Shau
on 9-!0 Februrxy confirmed the necessity for flexible support capability
for camps irninently in dnnger of or actually under attack, even in poor
uc' thor.

.he I Corps Senior Advisor (UG III liAF) and detachment commander,
C- , joiatly developed a responsive system for relieving camps under h1c.vy
rl1,soure fro,, Viet Cong/iimA forces. This systen includes the rapid do-
plo i.t of Airnobile artillery, direct air/ground coa,*Iunications ith
oui,,o.ti ~aircraft, direct co!...uications iith F,IL. forces, and the
u'p of Sky Spot bombing teclniques.

iiCLO*3Li .' 14 TO SEC II to Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RC"-

31I

PO-28 (n)) 31 July 1966.