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D/A ltr., 29 Apr 1980

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 SECRET
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON. D.C. 203(V',

ADAM-P (M)~ (17 Nor 67 FOR OT 2L ft 1967

SUBJEUT: Q..--_.U-- -earnedLessons Headquarters,

5th. Special Forces Group (Airbo Specal Forces L i

A, ' cJ4
Z:-1. Forwarded as inclosure is Operational Report - Lessons Learned,
iv Headquarters, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), 1st Special Forces
for quarterly period ending 31 October 1966. Information contained in
this repirt should be reviewed and evaluated by CDC in accordance with
paragraph 6f of AR 1-19 and by CONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c
J and d of AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported
to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to the Com-

SImandants of the Service Schools to insure appropriate benefits in the
Ifuture from lessons learned during current operationss and may be
"-adaptedfor use in developing training material.

+,S)+AC1JZ',
"BY ORDWor THE SECRETARY OF THE '> ARMY: DD
4. - • .

.1 mi- -. "- ENNETH G. WICKHAM

-l . Major General, USA
""-TheAdjutant General
DISTRIBUTION: J-~ U________
'Commanding General le
.US- Arm Combat-Development Coimand
US Continentil Army Command
Cowmandants
'US Army Comuand and General Staff College EJMADD UNCL"IFIED
US Army War College WBI SEARA72D FRWM
--,US Army Air Defeaýse School CLAS5I1Y ZVOLMUM
US Army Artillery and Missile School" IcJ.osure 1 requr•es
- US Army Armor School -special Hiili.,
-Army Chemical Corps School
VUS Kb le. toIi'
US Army Engineer School Nationals cep.. Nam
4 ' US Army Military Police School A
o x4epfhYB
US Army, Infantry School

'US Army Intelligence School 1 aIv 66

i)V
US Army Medical Field Service School

(CMOtiQ ~~2)/ 1 j

/ /99. 0

"" ,-.---------..-----

[
 SECRET NoFRN
Stib SPE.A! FORDES a-0UP (AIRBORNE)
fst SPECIAL FORCES

g2his document contLir• 0 10 Natlol•h;-

Defene of the Unitcci '-ttc:ý,it~1a tLb' •, ning Of the
ZopIomgeB Laws, Title, 13, 3. S. C., sction 7U53 and 79 4 % A
Zta tinami•ssion or th. rLVL1L'ti(tlo cf it- fatcnts i3. any
Sta 8UU~autho~rizt;A- ~ ~~L'
I Law.

rr

STATEMENT #2 CLASSIFIED
.In additionto security requirements which
c-x..st be met, this document is subject to spec-
.- ,.'ial export controls and each transmittal to
foreign governments or foreign nationals may
7:-7 be made only with prior approval of OACSFOR,
"-ATTN: FOR-OT-RDO Washington, D.C. 20310

-4OPUTlONAL REFORT d
FOR QUARTERLY PERIOD --
ENDING ý,f 0-O : •13
6

84320,
CY
F' OS2"7C 24 7 HQ USAEPAO.

___,, ,______
OW A AlN3 YEAR 9N1*11VALS 4-S-RET
NOFORN
R*CLA351FIWE AFTER '2 YEAR$
DOD vii 5sicQ* '
SECRETJ
VFK

...?_. . :.... , : • ,•,,

 UVRE p tW(P
DEPARMTM~N OF 'M~E APMY
HEM 2UARTEHS
5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (ALRBO4H), 1ST SPECIAL FORCES
APO San Frenoisoo 96240

AVGB-C 15 November 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966
(Rcs CSFOR.65)

flU: Commanding General

United States Army, Vietnam
APO US Iorces 96307

TIIUM- Commander-in-Chief
Un~ited States Army, Pacific
APO San, Fxancisco 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development

Department of the Ary
-Vashington D.C. 20310

SEcCTION 1 (S)% SIGNIPICA ORG.LNIZATION OR UNIT ACTIVITIES

1. kC) General: During the reporting period no large scale assaults
wia.inst Special Forces camps re initiated by Viet Cong forces, although
there were strong indications of large unit Viet Cong)build-ups in the vioin-
iy of Camps Khe Sanh, Tien oc and Ha Thanh in I C6xps; Plei Djereng, Due
Co, and Duo Lap in II Corps and Duo Phong, Loo Ninh, Trai Bi, Soui Da and
M~inh Thanh in III Corps. e Viet Cong did however initiate 275 small unit
actions against Specia ces camps, Forward Operating Bases and friendly
initiated combat operati ns. In most oases these actions were limited to light
probes which were quickl suppressed by friendly forces assisted by the rapid
response of flareships, Forward Air Controllers, airs trikes and artillery. In
contrast to past activity, the US Special Forces advised CIDG forces assumed
the aggressive attitude, seeking out and destroying the Viet Cong in his own

DOWNGRADI• G AT 3 YEAR INTEVALS '--7 8 "

MECIASSIFIED AYFT 12 YEARS I
DOD DIR 5200.10

CYS OF 40 YS _ _S67_ý ,F/S 5820A 66

G3----67

"r .. _. . . ... ._... . . . . . 0 5 7 3 - 8 7 4 4. 77'

.
 AVGB-C 15 November 1966 -
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Endi49 31 October 1966
(Rcs CSFOR65)
habitat. This aggressive attitude was most evident in the IV Corps Tactical
Zone. During this period there was a steady growth in the conduct of joint
CIDGA-AF combat operations within all of the Corps Tactical Zones. These
operations greatly enhnced the CIDG program in respect to relationship,
understanding and esteem of FiMAF personnel towards the CIDG and in combat
experience to the individual CIDG soldier. At the end of this period the
5th Special Forces Group was advising 37,721 CIDG personnel assigned to the
97 Special FQrces camps throughout the Republic of Vietnam (Inhl #1). In
addition, advisory influence was exerted over 13,986 BF and 14,152 PF troops
throUgh the assigned additional mission of the sector and subsector advisory
role. To determine the overall value and operational effectiveness of the

f
CIJG camps, two studies were conducted during this period. The first designed I
to determine the reaction to intelligence (Incl #2) and the second to deter-
mine the camp operational effectiveness (Inol #3) of each CIDG camp in country.
Both of these studies proved to be highly successful in their designed in-
tentions and were further implemented at the "C" detachment level. A marked
increase in Long Range Reconnaissance and Intelligence Gathering capabilities
vas attained with the implementation of Project OMEGA (Incl #4) and Project
SIGMA (Inol #5) in addition to the already existing Project DELTA (Incl #6).
The assets of these three special projects greatly increased our capability
of pxividihg reconnaissance and intelligence gathering support to ,I4AF
units in I, II, and III Corps Tactical Zones and to all CIDG camps throughout
the Republic. At'the direction of CWMUSMACV, the MACV Reconde School (Incl
#7) was organized, with operational responsibility being delegated to the
5th Special Forces Group (Airborne). This school, though still in its in-
fancy, has already proven its worth through the high quality of training
presented for the replacements assigned to reconnaissance units of US Combat
Forces, In other areas related to the support of our operational detachments
deployed in the field was the publication of the "A" Detachment Camp PlgaWn
'Handbook (Incl #9) to guide detachments in the planning and construction of a
oamp. and the publication of the "A"l Detachment Handbook (Incl #10) to assist
the detachment in the accomplishment of its mission. In order to reinfore any
Special Forces camp which was considered to be vulnerable or under the threat of
Imminent Viet Cong attack, a Camp Hardening Program (Inol #11) was initiated.
Briefings were conducted for numerous visitors to include Presidential Envoy Mr
Joe Holt and General Harold K. Johnson (Inol #12). These briefings greatly en-
hanced the overall understanding of, the Special Forces effort in Vietnam. During
the latter part of this quarter, the 21st Military Histoxy Detachment (Inol #13)
was attached to the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne). The 21st MM should
prove to be highly instrumental in the collection of infommation from the field
to supplement and augment the account of events as recorded by this Headquarters.
Emphasis was placed on morale factors during this period to include both the
!USAS? and CIJ)G personnel. In this respect, maximom participation in the R&R
program u=a stressed and a monthly magazine, The "Green Beret" (Inal #14) came
I
' into being, for the benefit and enjoyment of USASF personnel. As a morale
incentive for the CIDG forces, the "Order of the Green Scarf" (Inol #15)
was established for the recognition of success in combat of CIJ)G units*

C2IRIflENTI
2
 CONFIDENTIAL
AVGB-C 15 November 1966
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966

2. (C) intelligenoe: During this reportirg period the Group S-2

initiatea specific activities which will result in magnifying and increasing
Sthe
intelligence collection and production effort within the command* These
activitf.es included. Establishment of a Combined Intelligence Center (CIC)
at selected camps (oal #16); Consolidation of intelligence nets (Inol #17) ;
Specipl Forces Weather Obsurvation Program (Incl #18); The establishment of
the "C" Detachment Information Analysis Center (Inol #19); and the arrival
of tha 403rd Speci&l Operations Detachment. For the benefit of
intelligence personnel from subordinate detachments, ihree one week IPN
courses were conducted. The instruction, inoluding the intezrogation of
capidves and handling of captured documents and materiel1 was presented by
intelligence personnel from the S-2 section and the 519th M1E Battalion. The
course of instruction also included the actual interrogation by students of
enemy captives presently held by local GVN agencies. As a follow-up to the
instruction, the 5th Special Forces Group is publishing now regulations
yextaining to the procedures for handling, processing and exploitation of
eaptives, returnees, suspects, documents and materiel. The implementation
of these regulations will result in the sub0rdinate detachments receiving
maximum timely information and intelligenoe.

a. The weather exerts a definite and, at times, decisive influence

on military operations. In Vietnam, the 5th Weather Squadron of the 1st
Weather Group is specifically assigned the mission of providing weather ser.-
vice support to the US forces in Vietnam. Personnel resources available to
-the lst Weather Group in Vietnam do not pormit establishing the number of
weather observing stations needed to satisfy the requirement for weather
observations, It was,necessary, therefore, to call upon elements of the 5th
Special Forces Group (Airborne) to provide limited weather observations to
supplement those available from Air Weather Service and other meteorological
agencies. Detachments of the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) are ideally
located for this purpose, and have the additional advantage of having organic
communications to relay the observations to locations where they are needed
by forecasters. Accordingly, the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) and the6
lst Weather Group have published and distributed appropriate regulations and
handbooks, respectively, requiring observers at selected Special Forces cO=ps
to make surface weather observations (see Inol #18).

b. It has long been an accepted fact that the Special Forces "A"
detachment has been the Groupt s primary source of information. In many
cases in the past, however, the flow of infomation to higher headquarters
* has not been matched with an equal flow of timely intelligence feeding back
to the "A" detachment. An Information Analysis Center (IAC) has been organ..
ized at each of the four "C" detachments from personnel resources currently
on hand. At full strength, it will incorporate military intelligence au-..
mentation that has been coordinated with MWCV.-J2. The mission of the, ZA

CW1UIDETAL
 AV0JECT RNot CNIETA 33e~~toa
5~ovumber 1966
SUBJCT:C~pratona Reortfor Quarterl~y Period Ending 31 October 1966
(acs c;FoR~-65)
.0-' to absorb, collate and return expeditiously to the "A" detachment, timely]
intelligence. iBriofly, the IAC assimilates irfo~iation flowing in from the
"11"1 and "B" detachments, while at the same tine V~ping sources of info~ation
avo4.lab.Ac at Ccrps and higher level heedqu&atters. The infozmation. vhich is
.returned. to the "All detachment is not expected to bo, polishod, but will be
timely and nuil include order of battle info~ationg 'translations of documents$
rosults of PW intarrogations and zanalysis of current Viet (long capabilities
~uid intcuitions* At the same time this info~iation veill be fo~cwardcd to elements
of major US ocmbat units operating in tho vicinity of the "A"1 detachments,
Inolosuru i#19s, LOI-IAC9,outlines in detail the org~nization, procedures and.
responsibil~tios of ýthe "C"detachment and, the TIC.
c. A vital portion of the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) in.
telligence collection effort vill be provided by the 403rd SOD (RRU) which
arrived in Vietniam in October and is presently under the opera~tional control
of the 5th Special Forces Grou~p -(Airborne) Conmending Officer*
3- (C) 22eratiore and Training Activities:

a*
Plans:t
(1) During this quarter, the plan for the expansion of Project
DELTA capabilities wias implemiented and included in the 5th Special Forces
Group (Airbonie) concept of operations to achieve overall objectives through
CY1967 (I-acl #20)0
(2) The Miobile Guerrilla, Force concept (Iml #21) wWs also in-
cluded in the concept of operations.*
(3) A revised MN1VE will be submitted in the near future aupor-
-seding the onc which wa~s forwarded, on T June 1966.
b. Oprtos Throughout the entirety of Vietnam there was an
overall rise in the degree of effectiveness of copibat operations conducted=~
by CIDG forces both as separate units and in joint operations conducted with
INCIAP units. The aggressive attitude assuted by the CIDO forces proved to
have a devdatating impact on the Viot Cong# ouipeciahly in the IV Corps Tao-
tical. Zone, As a result of CIDO operations conducted country wiide,, a total
of e17 Viet Cong wiere killed during this q~ua~rter, establiahing a favorable
Vio-c Cong/CIDG kill rrAtio of' 3.2s1. This ratio reflecto an overall decraase
in.comparison to the previous quarterly period* Comparativo casualty figures
by Corps Tactical Zone and country vido arc ahown at itiolocuros #22, #23 #ý ..

and #25. Operations of mention and actions of interoat, by Corps TacticrA

Zona and a,-)ooial projeet oporationn, are outlined bolorts

TIAI

Im
 AVGB-C warENAL15 1oebr1966
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966
(RC6 CSTOR-.65)
!6 " (t)I .Coas oatioal Zone:
(a) Uardening of Camp Kho Sanh: Of the 9 CIDG campc in
I CTZ, the only one that could be considered "hardened" during this quarter
vas Camp Mhe Sanh. In September, General Westmoreland directed that XhU
Sanh be "hardened" to prevent a possible overwhelming enemy attack upon it.
The decision to harden Khe Sanh resulted from MICV J-2 intelligence estim-
ates that the NVA enemy had the capability of attacking the camp with large
forces, wLich would tend to cause sizeable US¶C reaction forces to reinforce
or to counterattack. Enemy forces of in excess of 3 divisions were estimated
capable of attacking US1M relief columns. Strengthening of Khe Sanh began
immediately to prevent this possible occurrence. Headquarters, 5th Special
Forces Group (Airborne), authorized nn increase in CIDG strength from 3 to 4
companies and directed that IJSASF personnel strength be augmented with spec-
ialists and technicians needed to implemont an increased intelligence colleo-
tion and terrain rcconnainsance and surveillance capability. In MAY con-
tributed to the hzairening by emplacing two 155=a howitzere and three 105=
howitzers in the camp; deploying the lIt Battaliont 3rd 7-rinou, around the
camp in a socurity mission; providina elamonts of a Navy constra-tion bat-
talion unit (Scabee) to ropair the datoriorated airstrip; obtaining Project
Delta assets for long range reconnaisseawo micsiofs in and noar the Khe Sanh
TAOR; and by directing USMQ C-123' dnoliation missions lowni in portions of
the TAOR. DIot|omont C-I, Danangt providod personnel and equipment to
atrengthon the USAF detachmonts intelligence and surveillance capability
and its operational capability; provided construction and barrier material
to increoae the defensibility of the cr•p; and defoliated the perimeter of
the camp bi hulionpt•1•, Lesuon learned during the harderdng of Gsap Kb. Saah
ra~ outlin•d in joction 2# Part I@
S(b) Viet Con Activity at CanD Ha Tkunuh: On the night of
10-il Soptemberp eneLm forces of an estim.tod battalion size conducted sim-
ultmaoun aasaultL on RF/PF outposts in the vicinity of Camp Ha Thanh and
conducted a heavy mortai/recoilloso riflo bi••bardment on the CIDG conp itself.
Poor cocznioations prevented the district chief from effectively communicating
with the OPfs. The OP's wore weak and the southern chain extending some 6
kilometers south of the CIDG coap could not be supported by fire., At approx-
inately 310130 hours the two OP1a adjacont to the airstrip and overlooking
the cr'.p 7oro ovorxzn, Prom those tvo OP's, the enemy wms able to place
-courato diroct firo into the camp. Tactical airocaft conducted continuous
airatrikcs on the enrey throughout the night, while flareships provided ilium-
inationo At dawn the enemy broke off the assault, but continued to occupy the
eove=n OP's to the south, while %±thdraL ing from the two OP~s adjacent to the
camp. On the evening of the 11th, the enemy renewed harassing mortar and re-
coilleas riflo fire on the camp. At approximately 2030 hours on the 12th, the
_ ecamp was reinforced by a riko Force company. Lessons leaxned during this
period of Viet Cong activity are discussed. in Section 2, Part I.

p CONFIDENTIAL

1 11

.I
AVGB.-C CONFIDENTIAL 15 Novewber 1966
SUBJT Operational Report for Quartorly Period Ending 31 October 1966
(Rca CSFOI.65)
(o) Activties at Canm Tion Phuoc: Durine this Quarter,
tvo sigificant actions occurred at Tion Phuoc. The firut of theso uws a.
combat engagement approximntely 5 kilmotore east of the camp bet'ioon two
CIDG oounpoies (plus) and elements of the NVA 72nd Battalion reinforced by
the local force V-13 conpary. The second incident was a Viet Cong attack on
a 38 man RF/PF/IA outpost on Nui Dong lill. Several loasonrw•wlre learned
duanwn those two incidents, and are disoussed in Section 2, Part I*

:•""• (2) '1 Comas Tactical Zones The most ,ignifiocant occurxrvoes
I CTZduring the quarterly period were the conversion of CIDO Camps 1h;Con
in
Ea Yang and Ploi Do Lin to Regional Force. In both instances, the conversion
wad effected successfully, bringing to light a number of areas for improve-
mont prior to further conversions., Some of the areas are being corrected at
this lovel. Most problem areas should be alleviated in future conversions
by the publication of the :2 sion .Ha.dook", Other problen areas that
arose were directly related to the authorizationg structure and support of
the Regional Force, which required decisions and action by higher headquarters.e

(3) 111 Cors Tactical Zones Activity in the III Corps area
Was limited to small unit contacts with Viet Cong forces, with no major signlif-
icant engagements. Combat operations were significant as a whole, in as much
as joint operations with MWAF units increased greatly over the previous
quarter. These operations have greatly enhanced the relationship between the
CIDO forces and the F3MAh units.

(4) IV Corns Tactical Zones Nunerous achievements were attained

in IV CTZ during this quarterly period. Among these were the successful con-
version of Camp An Phu from CIDG to Regional Force; combat operations on Phu
Quoo Island; a joint combat operation conducted by Camps Kinh Quan II and Moo
Hea; and relief operations conducted in conjunction with severe flooding
conditions throughpout the operational areas of camps in the H&ekong Delta.
(a) Conversion of CIDG Camp An Phus On 1 August 1966, Camp
An Phu was successfully converted from CIDG to Reegiol Force. The oonver-
sion of this camp was highly significant, not only due to the smooth change,.
over, but also because it had been the first Special Forces camp in the
Republic to assume the additional mission of the subsector advisory role. I
(b) Combat Onerations on Phu Quoc Island: On 10 September
offensive comb4t operations fashioned after the 'Nalayan Fan" Modus Operandi
-were initiated. In general, the tactics employed entail continuous recon-
naissance-ambush operations with a continually increasing TAOR. To date
these operations have been highly successful, both in the oounterguerrilla
and. intelligence fields 1(hin #26)6

CWNINUL
 AVGB-C 15 liovember 1966
ki"3JL'Cr. Opurational Rtoport f'or Quarte.ry Period Ending 31 October 1966

(O) Joint ODerution "Cunducte by Cagm2Ui, in Quan II and

Moo Hoag A Juint uoibat operation conducted on 16 October, by Dotauhment
A-414 -01o0 Houl) and DutuchmenL ,L-416 (Klnh (wutui II) proved to be significant
in that it displayed the vulnerability uf VC safe areas during the high water
puriodn ao thu rainy season; uphlutizod the importance and effectiveness of
waturbornu operations; Lid uxuiiplifiud the coordiration a•nd cooperation of
coubinod forces to include the US Navy (Inal #27).

(d) Relief Operationo: Due to extremely high water' level

durinq the uonth of September and October severe flooding conditions were
Sexperienced throughout the IV CTZ area, xrth several of the CIDG canps exper-
ienoing water levels of up to 16 feet inside the camp vialls. Relief oper-
ations conducted in support of tho caupo affected by the high waters included
daily food resupply runs; evacuation of CIDG dependents; construction and air
"landing/dropping of rafts and floating helicopter pads; continuous resupply
of construotion materials; evacuation of crew served weapons (105mm howitzers,
.50 cal MG, 4.2 in mortars etc.,) to prevent damagee standby TAC air, flare-
ships, gunships and FAC aircraft; and aiiborne radio relay aircraft during

I-
hours of darkness over vulnerable camps. The overall support provided was
outstanding to include that which was extended to the civilian population
I
throughout the area. Support provided to the civilian population is covered
in more detail in paragraph 5.

(5) PJ•ect 019A: Since activation, Projeot OTTZGA has conducted

two major operations. The most significant of these was Operation CLIfTON,'
conducted during the period 1-30 October, under operational control of I Force 2
V. The results of this operation (Inci ,•28) were highly profitable in the
intelligence gathered for use in planning future MUIF operations.
(6) P~ieet DELTA: During the reporting period Project DELTA
conducted the following activities.,

(a) Ceneral:

1. Operational days - 66

_
2.Training days -18
"".Movement days - 8
(b) Training:
i1t. During the period, 18 days of refreshek training
and special selected subjects Vae presented lo assigneod peoml.

CCONFIDENTIAL
AVGB..C UUhIDUMIJAL 25 soveinbor 1966 A)
SU'W3ECr:. oportjozialil1oport i'or Qww.tar1.y Period RWn11W 31 October 1966

~,A 21 duy course of iastrtIon on Liong RangeI

Patrol Tochniquos (LhrP chool Courise lir 5) was condil, ted during the month
of' AuI3 for 9 U~3 persouwi froci the 1st Cav D~ivisions 30 froci the 173rd
Bricade (,'ba); 10 frou the 4th Infantry Divisim; and 4 frau the 5th S7
G..1oUP (Abn).
(o) Conbat Opurations:

a.The following operations were conducted during thin

qui.xter:
OPMTIN
ERODCORPS IqIEA OPCOII

10-66 9 Auc - 5 Sep III W iIn Corp isad, I1Po~rceYV

1i1-66 9 Sep .lO0Sep II IFo~rce V
12-66 25 Sep - 4 Oct III CO, III Corps
13-66 14 Oct - CGII ITTN

~.During these operations Reconnaisatance and Road.

rumoer Tea=z and, ftnker Companies were coma~tted an follows:
opilw2AION HWO"1T TIMANiS R0AaILWUýfN1A TWISEI RAN~GER OPERATIONS

10-66 10 5 2
11-66 1 0 _
12-66 4 2 6
13-66 3 4 1
(7)
Prjet IG: Since activations Project SIiAL has am
dncted, 4 operations as follow~s:
(a) operation, SOIF (10-.18 Sep)
(b) operation SiiA.HO14 (14-16 Sep)
(0) Operation 12=,-LL (23 SeP- 5 Oot) I
(d) Operation POIMULLC (12-25 Oct)
The operations resulted in 48 VC killed; the discovery of VC land line
ao~icaitions systems and the gathering of a wealth of intelligence for
pla.nning of future operations,,

1) The following courase of instruction were coon~ucted at- the

~3aThn
1a TinVN8SF/cIWJ bmainbg Centers
Don

.-
-~~~~~~ - - - l.----
 AVpo-C
CONFIDENTIAL 15 November 1966
(/s
O 31 October 1966

COUiSE PaioD C0141VCTE.D GRADUATES

7th VNSF Officuri and i: 30 May - 27 Aug 109

Course
V193F Basic M! Course 25 Jul - 27 Aug 81
15th CRP Course 10 Jul - 22 Aug 132
16th CRP Course 31 Aug.- 3 Oct 119
17th CIDG Leadership Course
18th CIDfl Leadership Course
12 Jul - 17 Aug
24 Aug - 28 Sep
iTfOL:
137
715
j
(2) Airboat Training: Commencing on 15 October and contimuing
throughout the remainder of the montht Detachment C-4 (Can Tho) conducted air-
boat training for indigenous personnel.
d. Aviation: The 5th Special Forces Group (Aia'boze) received Amy
aviation support from the units under the operational control of the Group
Commander and from e.'oh Corps Tactical Zone on a mission request basis. The
Group Commander had operation l control of the 281st Aviation Company (AML),

I
7 CV-2B aircraft, and 3 U-LA aircraft. During the quarterly period, the 281st
Aviation Company (ANL) operated at 60, TOE aviator strength. Despite this
handicap, the unit flew 1749 missions in support of special combat operations
and 5,405 missions in support of the 97 Special Forces sites located through-
out South Vietnam. One hundred and six missions were flown in support of the
MACV Recondo School which condueted'its first class in September 1966. The
air movement section shipped 23.,814j,744 pounds of cargo 'and 7,132 troops from
_- the Special Forces Operational Base at Mha Trang. Cargo and troops were
moved through both the Air Force aerial port system utilizing C-123 and C-130
aircraft and the Special Forces air movement system using CV-2B and U-IA
aircraft. The combination of the aerial port system ana the Special Forces
air movement, system provided timely means of supporting 86,000 men through
airlanding and airdropping of supplies and equipment.

e. Combat Development: In the field of combat developments# the

5th Special Porces Grour (Airborne) has been quite selective in what it
approves' as necessary items to be procured. We have tested many items and
concepts, as the needs of our subordinate units run the gamut of military
and non-militaxy activities in South Vietnam. Hardware which has been approved
by this Headquarters, usually on a mission essential basis, has proven to be
invaluable. This quarter the items mentioned do not fall into the combat
development phase of operations. It is necessary to include them in this
portion because of the conceptual revisions involved in the employment of
equipment uch' as airboats and AA/TPS-5 --adar sets. As significant lessons
axe learned through the use of these items the results will be included for
Proper diseomination. The discussion' and observations ot airboats, PPS-5
radar sets, night observation devices, long shaft motors, chemilluninesoent
janels and uite marker ba12& are discussed in Section 2 Part I.

9
C"MF' 111L
AVGB-C
UBJECIE:
15 November 1966
Operational Repo t for Quarterly Period Ending 31 0otober 1966
'
(Rcs CbFORL.65)

a.General:
(1) During the reporting period the Logistical Support Center
in •Nh Trang, with a liaison detachment in Saigon, continued providing log-
istical support to all personnel in support of Parasol-Suitchback projects.
A thirty-four percent changeover of LSC personnel occurred during the re-
porting period.

(2) A logistical summary submitted by the "C" detachment S-4's

every Friday ras initiated. This report covers problem areas encountered
by the "C" detachments and also lists any critical supplies. When received
at the Logistical Support Center follow up action is then taken-

(3) Reorganization of S-4 Office. During the month of August

the S-4 Office and subordinate sections were reorganized. The administrative
section, hand receipt section and offices within the Logistical Support Cente±
were relocated within the building to provide oloser control and coordia-ign.

b. Su-py
(1) Requisitions for all classes of supplies and equipment
except class III snd V are still being submitted to the Counterlnsurgenoy
Support Office (CIS0) 2D Logistical Command, ATO 96248 Okinawa. However,
on 14 October 1966 an Interservice Support Agreement, DD Form 1194, was
initiated and approved between the United States Arxiy, Vietnam and the 5th
Special Forces Group (Airborne). This agreement constitutes authority to
requisition common class II & IV equipment and supplies and limited class I
from the Ist Logistical Command on a reimbursable basis. The 1st Logistical
Command rill bill the Counter Insurgency Support Office, Okinawa for those
items which are issued to the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne). Every
effort is being made to maintain an adequate stockage level (60 days) of
sufficient supplies and equipment at the Logistical Support Center.

Procurement action has been initiated for seventy-three

(2) i
"Radar Sets JUT/PPS-5. These sets will be allocated to selected operational
"A" det-ochments when received. The first twenty-four sets which arrive in
Vietnam from COITUS have been allocated to the Group by COOIZW V.

(3) Procurement action has been effected by the United States

Army Materiel CommAndl Washington, D.C. for one hundred and sixty 10 KWI
generators; Diesel,, Watercooled, USAF mor3pl NB-5. Standard US Arny 10 1X(
generatorspair oooledshave not proven satisfactory for PIR requirements.
The 10 kW generator is the prime source of power for all electrical equipment
to inlude food strpge cabinets and r;Wos in all Syecial ForPe3Oýq Cws.

10

NTIAL
13
l.U SUBJECT•AVG4
:eport
opertional O FIDENTIAL
for Qu ltery Periol Ending 351vnbr16
31 October 1966
CSCSFO 65 )
]
•(
When inst&llod they run continuously orp when possible, in altornatticn eith
another set. The present air cooledomodel generators were not designed for
extend•ad periods of operation in a warm climate. Therefore, it is felt that
. . procureent
the of tle more durable water cooleddiesel models will greatly
improve genera'tor life and provide the detachments with a far better power
souxce.
(4) Fourteen model miol, 105mm Howitzers were procured from
in.,ountry Sources during the reporting period. These weapons are being
utilized by the more isolated camps to improve their defensive positions
and to provide additional offensive supporting fires. Hoivitzers were issued
on the basis of two per detachment.
(5) An audit team from Combined Area Studies Group conducted
an inspection of stock record cards and associated supply records to include
the Logistimal Support Center' s Operational Fund during the month of August.
It 17" noted that procedures and expenditures were in accordance with per-
tinent regulations governing Parasol-Switchback projects.

(6) A total of one-hundred trucks, ambulance, front line

ton, U-718 were received during the reporting period. These trucks are
being issued to the '"C detachments for distribution to subordinate detach.
ments within their Corps areas.
(7) To drate twenty-four out of fifty-three airboats have been
received. Seventeen of those are operated by the Det C-4 IMike Force.

(8) During the reporting period Detachments 0-3 and C-4 Le ]

assumed the additional role of operating as forward supply points. This
duces the order-ship time for requisitions placed by the operational detach-
ments. A further benefit is that the supplies for any given area are now
placed under the control of the "C" detachment commands who in turn can
J
establish priorities based on a more intimate knowledge of the situations
which prevail within his Corps area. Also, rather than having all supplies
concentrated in one location they are dispersed. The only Corps area which
is not operating a forvcd supply point is II Corps. Duae to the size of 31
I
Corps it is felt that it would be better to operate forward supply points
from two locations. Presently plans are being made for their decentralization,
however, no date has been established for their conversion. All supplies for
II Corps detachments are being shipped from the Logistical Support Center.,

(9) Effective 1 September 1966 a system of Quarterly Droppage

vas instituted. Each "A" detachment is permitted $100 a quarter for droppage
of expendable and minor non-expendable items. This has greatly decreased the
number of Relief from Reaponsibility requests received by this Headguarters.

11... •&L

l~4
 1,UONID~ENIAL, --
.AVGB-C 15 November 1966
StJBJEC~2
S Operational Report for Qunrterly Period Ending 31 October 1966

(10) Regulation 75-1, 1"llfunction Reports Ammunition and Ek-

plosives. This regulation was published and distributed on 26 September.
(ii) Regulation 725-i1 Issues of Supplies and Equipment haterial
Priority Systems was published on 30 September. This regulation establishes
command policy and prescribes procedures for the assigrient of Issue Priority
Designators (IPD) to requisitions prepared by the Logistical Support Center
in support of Parasol.-Switchback Projects.
(12) Regulation 750-2, Vehicle Bumper Markings, dated 25 Sep-
tember 1966, was written and published. This regulation prescribes a uniform
system of vehicle bumper mazr•d.g to be used throughout the 5th Special Forces
Group (Airborne).
(13) During the past three monthl nine LST's and one deep draft
vessel arrived from Okinawa with cargo for the 5th Special Forces Group (Air-
bor-e)
(14) Because of the critical nature and high pilferage rate of
medical supplies the Logistical SuppoxA Center has commenced consolidating
shipments and packing these supplies in locked emna oontainen. A key ,
or copy of the combination used is forwarded by mail to the requesting detach-
ment.
(15) During the past six months mazy supplies which were shipped
either from COITUS depots or Okinawa would arrive at Cam Rahn Bay without
advance notification. As a result bi-weekly checks are now being made at
the port facilities in Cam Rahn Bay for our supplies. This has eliminated
misrouted and lost supplies arriving through that facility.
(16) With the decentralization of each Corps area the requisi-
tioning procedure from the forward supiply point to the Logistical Support
Center will have to be changed* It is proposed that the system established
be similiar to that which is presently in effect between the Logistical
Support Canter and the Counterinsurgency Support Office. That is, the for-
wiard supply point maintain a stockage list of all fast-noving items within
the CIDG program. The stockage list is based upon the requirements of the
particular Corps area and may be revised every fifteen days based upon
current needs and demands. When the "C" detachment submits their stockage
list the amount on hand will be annotated and the difference automatically
shipped to them in bulk lots.

c. Rigger Section:

* (I)
During the period covered the Rigger Section had an average
assigned strength of 41 EE and one WO. Nine riggers included in the above j
total are performing duty with the "C" detachments. j

12
I CF ENTIAL

S..
• -,.. 5,1 3
r AVOB-C (asCNFIDENTIAL 15 November 1966
SBE.CTs Oprtic-UI Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966

supiswr(2) Durin th roporti ~ o th fo~LUW±.Q quantities of

suplis wreridged frardropanailnd

AUZt 5,376,114 234,682 5,610,796

Sote~6#572t439 460,379 78O32#f)18
October 3.0087;201 2838929
Total pounds (3 mouth poriod): 23,814#744
(3) Durin~g the geportiW~ period the followitS arohutoo were

August WO7 265 1s467 60

September 693 541 4,73.8

October 887 650 1,199 206

Total parachutes packed (3 month period): 7,813
(4) Nine tons of assorted munitions wer-- rigged for emergency
resupply and positioned adjacent to the riggirg ramp. In adlitionpeighteen
air drop pallets complete with. A..7A straps attacbsd were prepositionod near
the rigging ramp. This provides readiness back..upw~hen, emergency rigging is
required for non-standard loads and will result in a, time savlings should. sueb
situations axise.

(5) During the past three months,,man~y changes were made within
the rigging warehouse itself resulting in an increase in storage space and
-iorking area. Because of an increase in the amount of parachutes and air
items being kept on handait was necessaxy to constru~ct storage bins, These
bins (56) are being utilized for the storage of all packed parachutes. Fur-
ther, since the Vietnamese Special riorces are soon to get their own parachute
packing facility, they have moved their equipment to the support area which
has resulted in an additional 600 square feet of storage space being made
available. During the interim period, they still utilize our facilities for
repacek. As a tesult of these improvements and the move of the Vietnamese
Special Forces, equipment which was previously stored in' conex containers is
now being stored within the parachute shed. As a result, 28 oonex container
have been released and turned overý to BUD~l.----~

13
1NJJDENTIAL

t~~~~'I 7__________
 £AWB-C
UUSJJ 8C'aaOp ,tinal
Report for QuArterly Period
15 November 1966
dng 31 October 1966
1
4* Food '-rvicet
(1) ,,L,.airennts
which av procued. for the
-,.r Jar~in have indigenous long range patrol rations
inormeod 50%over the pwt% six months. I
This i rsultad in ci.Waw output on the part of the contractor in Japan.
It is Wt howevor t .at quantities iresently being received will satisfy
MuUM~ts during tht' next six months.

()) Since thie let Logistical Commnd commenoed purchasing food

on the ooacday in Dalat for U.S. units, it vas felt that this would effect
food prieo it. that area, Many of the food contractors for the CIDG prograna
am purohasir from this araa. A check was made by the Food Service Offioer
and it mu detondned that if the present procurement rate by the 1st Log-
istioal Conad oontinuestho CIDG food contractors will remain unaffected@
HeUover, an inonae in quantities demanded by the U.S. units would result
in a rise iA 4ýriceoe~
a* Naintenance Facilityli
- I
(1) The Repair Parts Section of the Logistical Support Center
was moved ft the Supply Section to the Maintenance Facilitye This section
has the resaonsibility of handling all requisitions submitted by the using ,
detaohments 9 maintaining a stock control section (recording demand and
establishing requisitioning objectives) and ordering all parts for stockae 4
either from the Coumterinsurgency Support Office or through the newly estab-.4
lished Interaervice Support Agreement with United States Amy,, Vietnam.

(2) Me bulk of all repair parts are now being shipped by US

Mail from the local APO. This has greatly enhanced small items reaching their
destination without the possibility of pilferage and has eliminated the long
F lead time fozmerly experienced in waiting for an aircraft load to accumulate.
A4rcrft schedules are fuzpished daily by Air Movements to the Maintenance
Facility so that items (usually those which are heavy and bulky) may be shipped
out on opportune aircraft as soon as possible. The average time used to
process spare parts requisitions has been reduced. to between one and three
A days*
(3) Within the Maintenance Facility several new buildings and
projects bave been completed:

(a) Two new covered automotive bays were oonstructed with

an inspection pit built into the floor to facilitate ease of inspection. The
inspection pit is equipped with interior lights and electric outl.ets for
drop cords.

(b) An A frame was made with an electric hoist to assist

inliftig out old A in 74e ut tivVe shop.

ICOFIDENTIAL

7 -
 SCONFINF, NTIAI.
SAVGB4., p i November 1966
S / 7
s• • tionl Report for Quarterly Period ftii 31 October 1966
?Ros CSoF0.65)
(c) A new, shop office and. production control center were
established axd axe not: functioning.

(d) A.new machine shop equipped with a five foot bed lathe
machine with ten inch throw, a portable milling machine which'oan be attached
to the lathe, a grinding machine, a table mounted drill press, a seyan foot
high apeed adjustable drill press capable of honing out oylindeis of engine
blocks, a valve grinding machine, and a locally fabricated machine for re-
facing scored broke drums havo been added to in-axe-a the ainatenancte mp-
i.ort capability.
(a) The new paint shop, tire shop, generator shop, and
weldina shop are also now Operationalo
(f) A shed is being constructed which ,w.il accomodate much
of the work that is presently being done outside. This will provide an add,.
itional 300 squaxe foot of covered work area.
(g) A Group Motor Pool was established in the old Logiatioal
Support Center vehicle holding area. The motor pool takes care of all 1st
echelon maintenance for the headquarters vehicles* 14tox stables are perfored
oach morning at 0715 hours and all vehicles are proparly dispatched before
leaving the facility. This has improved control and acc itability of all
wheeled vehicles.
(h) The refrigeration and rewind shops were moved from the
Power Plant to within the Maintenance Pacility. These moves consolidated. all
maintenance activities within the SPOBI
(4) A new, up to date Prescribed Load List (PLL) was submitted
to the Counterinsurgency Support Office during October. This list comprises
some 4,700 line items (repair parts), and covers virtually all of the different
makes and models of equipment now supported by the 5th Special Forces Group
(Airbozhe). The main goal of this PLL is to achieva for each separate det-
acbmentg a specified amount of repair parts to enable them to better perfo=
maintenance on their asaigned equipment.
(5) During this quarter a I-obile Maintenance Contact Team was
-formed. The mission of the team is to provide the operational detachments
with a direct support maintenance capability. Further benefits result in
that the contact team provides refresher or additional training to the USASF
personnel on new items brought into the supply system, The team is also
able to ma~k accurate evaluatj~ons Of M n bai6A.

15J15

-4"Fl
AVGB-C 15FOLTA
iH ovember 1966
_pez.onma Report ±a ..... _ Period Ending 3 to1 1966 /

(6) Construction has commenced on a consolidated Materiel

Hardling Equipment and Heavy Egin.eer Equipment Pools This oonsolidation wrill
net closer maintenance supervision of this equipmentq particularly thd NEE.
Miiv4rs will be asigned to each piece of equipment to inolude night crows

I
so that twenty-four hour support can'be provided when required or when re- A
coivi•g supplies from out of country.
(7) In order to reduce equipment deadlin , the Signal Service
Message was instigated. This has proven to be the fastest method of re-
ocoiVing support and replaces the .ormal requisitiou. The Signal Service
Message is used when equipment is deadlined which seriously impares the
opýrationsl capability of the unit. Requests received each day are filled
when received if parts are available and miiled o= air W4Aped the same day
uhonever possible.

(8) Since Special Forces' entry in Vietnam much of the equip-

ment ihioa has been issued is no longer in the normal A=my supply system or
is nonstandard. As a result repair parts replacement has become increasingly
difficult and costly. Therefore, whenever this equipment is uneconomically
re-•airable it is cannibalized for the remaining repair parts and thm tu=-ed
in through nozmal property disposal channels. This eliminates an out.,dated
item of equipment from our system and pydc paix pts for the remain..
equipments,
fe Re&Vdre and Utilities:

(1) During the reporting period the following- _Vyxtim

projects were completed:
of ~(a) Two vanls were dug which are ppodu
of water pe ho'urs

(b) Three ground water s-torage taaiks capable of atorIng

90,000 gcl! of water were built.
(o) A repaire and utilities buildingvith offices and.
supply room was. finished,
(d) A seven meter by forty meter two sto•ij BOO capable of
housing forty-two officers us completed.
(e) Two two-story troop billets were finished which are
capable of -housing eigh*-.two eni~ist~od personnel.
(f) A wing was added to the headquarters building which
includes a classified briefing room.

16

..- - -----
- -,-
--

K.
 SUE
AVGB-C 15 November 1966
SUWE • 0perational Report for Quarterly Period ED" 31 October 1966
(Rcs C3F)-65)

"(2) The following construction projects have been started but

=ae not complete:

(a) Ton troop billots for the 281st Avn Co.
(b) A second wing for the headquarters building which will
• contain the oow-anA and staff offices.

A PX extension which vill increase the flooz space by

220 square meters.

(3) In order to cut dovmn on in-country spending a stockage list

of all materials for the Repairs and Utilities Section x= made up and consol-
idated for order from the Couniterinaurgency Support Office. In addition to
wcutting down on in-country spending, it is felt that zaterial of a, better
quality will be received thus decreasing replacement requirements.

(4) With the expansion of facilities in the Special Forces

Operational Base it Sao determined that the power for operating vas insuff-
icient. As a result, transformers which will boost voltage from 220 volts
at the source to 25,000 volts on the lines and back to 200 volts at the
destination vill be installed. This v.ill eliminate loss of power through the
lines and also the use of individual tranaformers in each building.
5. () Cvl afairs:
a. During this reporting period, the 5th Special Forces Group (Air-
borne) has continued to attack problem areas in order to maintain the impetus
of the overall Group program in civil affairs and psychological operations.
Increased efforts in all functional areas have led to significant expansion
of the total program, 'particularly in the e of agriculture, health and
sanitation, education, and public information. Emphasis has also intensified
on the implementation of long-term plJaaUing and programming to assure program
continuity and to facilitate determination of per-sonnel and budgetary re-
quirements. Command emphasis has focused on the integration of military
operations, intelligence, civic action and psychological operations with the
Vietnanese National Revolutionary Development Program.

b. During the three month reporting period ending 31 October 19b6,

1,814 civic action projects designed to gain the support of the local civilians
and to erpand th OVIN area of control and influenco were completed in Special
SForces operational vxeas. Included in this figure are'the construction and/or
repair of: 123 schools; 2W dispensaries, 11 hospitals, 36 bridges, 39 latrines,
29 fish ponds, 33 wells, 526 delli.s, and 37 VIS information, bo-tha. Oathe

CONFIDENTIAL
17

4-'

=1••
. /-;
 CO4FIDEKTIAL
AVGB-C 15 Novomber 1966
3 =CT: Operational Report for Quaarterl Pariod, EnLU 31 October 1966;
(ACS CSFOL-65)
projects included provision of 1,459,769 pounds of food for over 18,127
aefugees who are located in detac•hment operational areas* USSASP and VNSP
medics, and Special Forces tzained Village Hamlet Workers treated 343,349
patients in oimp dispensaries while conducting 1,425 civic action medical
patrols.

ce In an effort to bolster the medical progTams of the GVN in the

hanlets of rural Vietnam, the 5th SFUA has sponsored a twelve week training
program for Hamlet Health Visitors. The four "C" detachments coordinated
vith the Provincial Medicine Chiefst for instruotors, facilities, training
aidn and necessary clinical facilities and field trips. Phase I of the
program includes six weeks of classroom instruction in anatomy and pbjsiology,
first aid, sanitation, symptom diagnosis and treatment, phaxmooology, and
administsation. Phase II ig on-the-job training presented in the hamlet and-
includes midwifery training, malaxia control, and village sanitation. During
this phase the student conducts daily sick calls, house calls, and presents
instruction to the hamlet members. The 5th SFGA will assist with salaries
for the students for six months, commencing at the time of their enrollment.
During this period the GVII will put these people on the Province payroll, and
%illassume responsibility for them at the end of the period. At presen•s
there are 119 students uni r.oing this training in all four Corps Tactical
Zones.___

d. A motor maintenance program with the purpose of training az&

qualifying selected CIDG personnel t-o perform lot and 2nd echelon maintenace
and repair on vehicles and generators has been initiated during this quarter.
One individual from each CIG company is selected for attendance at the course.
The 120 hour program of instr-ction includes classes on the iundamentals and
repair of the lubrication, coo.itrg, fuel, electrical and engine systems of
military vehicles. The course inoludes 40 hours on trouble-shooting and
maintenance of generators. To date there have been 96 graduates from this
course; all have received a graduation kit of basic mechanics tools.

e, During the quarter, attention has continued to be placed on the

agricultural program with emphasis on making the GVN system work. Fifty'
head of breeding cattle were obtained through the Ministry of Agriculture,
with 30 already delivered into II CTZ. This was a first fot the GVN, and is
proof that the system can work. By continuing this programp there will be
an increase in livestock, along with an improved economy and diet. The
kitchen-garden program continues to expand iith over 883 pounds of new see&
shipped this quarter. The harvest of major grair is now in progress. Fish
ponds are continuing to yield excellent results. 151 new ponds have been
stocked with Tilipia fish this quarter. This program has been very bene-
ficial in those arca wuhere the population is suffering' from a lack of
protein in their diet, such as in the Central Highlands. I Corps has been
successful in promoting rice banks in five districts. Rice is deposited at

18
CNI0ENTIAL

JI

- ----------------------------
-,.---~-.---~- - -'-'-----•.,"
 .AVGB-C CONFIDENTIAL ovember 1966

SUBJECT; Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 51 October 1966

2(Rcs CSF0R.65)
the district warehouse, to be dravn by the depositor on request. This pro-
gram was slow in starting, but is beginning to catch on. It produces the
favorable result of denying the Viet Cong access to large stores of rice,
in addition to giving the people real confidence in their system of govern-
mente
f. The Mid-Autumn Festival (Tet Trung Thu) was celebrated country
wide during the week of 25-30 September. Every detachment sponsored parties
and presented the children with candy, toys, and other gifts. The officials
of the GVN at all levels were on hand to deliver-speeches and help in the
distribution of gifts. Many districts provided commodities from their own
resources, which helped to make tho festival a complete success.

g. 18,127 refugees returned to GVN control in the detachments

operational areas during this quarter. Every effort has been made to use
USAID and GYN resources to provide for the refugees. 1,459,769 pounds of
food and 90,853 pounds of clothing were distributed by detachments to
provide for refugee needs. To handle emergency influxes of refugees,the
S-5, 5th'SFGA maintains a prepackaged "Alpha" kit which contains food,
clothing, medical supplies, and building materials to care for 100 refugees
for thirty days.

h. Thle highlight of the civic action effort was the flood disaster
relief provided to IV CTZ. Task Force Flood Relief was formed in September
consisting of USASF, IACV, USAID and GVN personnel of IV CTZ. Ptiority
supply and communication channels were established-so that Corps, Division
and USASF units could provide for their respective areas. Mass immunizations
were accomplished prior to the flooding. Emergency food and medical supplies
were requisitioned and on hand when needed. GVN supplied both boat and
vehicular transport for moving dependents and civilians out of flooded areas.
On 30-31 October, the Nha Trang area council solicited donations for the
refugees of IV CTZ. This is the first time that one area of VN has come to
the aid of another with financial assistance.

6. (C) Psychological operations:

a, Perhaps the most outstanding psychological operations success

to date in Vietnam was that of publicizing the National Constituent Assembly
elections held on 11 September. A total of 81% of eli~gble voters cast
their ballots on election day. The rems~kable aspect of this PSYOP campaign
was that it was conducted almost completely by the Vietnamese. VIS personnel
worked tirelessly, utilizing all available media in'a concerted effort to
reach every potential voter. USASF provided advice, assistance, and certain
material support in coordination with local JUSPAO representatives, however,
VIS personnol did a generally outstanding job of organizing rallies, meetings,
conferences, and orientation sessions dealing with the election. Represent-
atives from Province and District traveled extensively among rural villages
and hamlets and disseminated election information.

19

TIAI
 iAUGWL-0A 25 November 1966
SLLJECTi Operational lReport for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966
(Rcs CskOL-65)

b. Tra:ning of CA/PSYOP Teams has been moving forward aggreesively

and ii reaping valuable dividends in many "A" detachments. *At Phu Tuo (Det-
achent A---224) the team has been issued distinctive scarves, thus providing a
sense of identity and purpose. Team members have becone well-known in the
local area and are gtatly respected fur their assistance to the populace.

They provide medical asdistance, assist with CA projects, and unceasingly

"spread the word" relative to 0V0 programs and objectives. Detachment C-4
conducted three separ•ct tuo-ueek training courses at Can The for tn CA/
PSYOP Teams.

c. The Chiou Eoi program continues to provide tangible evidenae of

the value of psychological operations, as the number'of Hoi Chanhs has shown
a generally rising trend this quarter. A total of 1,557 Hoi Chanhs have
returned to GVX control as of 31 October 1966, within USASF operational areas.
Fariliecs and friends of local force VC soldiers are increasingly being ex-
ploited to urge those individuals to return home to wives and families. The
truth of GVN promises of good treatment to retunees is now firmly established
in most areas. It is anticipated that with continued ARVNiFWMAF military
victorics and increasingly difficult conditions for the VC, the program will1
gnin even greater momentum.

d. Flood relief activities in. IV CTZ during September and October

proved to thousands of citizens that their government could and would
provide for their needs in an emergency. GVN administrativo officials plunged
enthusiastically into the task of furnishing food, clothing, shelter, and
medical treatment to homeless flood victims. Doubtful political beliefs ware
largely forgotten in an effort to provide humanitarian relief supplies to
overy'needy civilian. Follow-up psychological activities via radio news-
paper, leaflets, and posters publicized the relief program to the wn-a-.mum

e. Circu.1ation of the Montagnard Newspaper in i1 CTZ has been in-

creased from 2,000 to 5,000 to 7,000 copies per month during this quarter.
The newspaper is printed in Vietnfmese as well as three of the most common
Hontagard dialects -nd is read avidly by villagers. Although the low
literacy rate is sometimes a limiting factor, those individuals who can read
have boon reading or relating news items to other villagers on numerous
occasions. The popularity of this newspaper serves as a vivid example of
the "hunger for news" among rural citizens of Vietnam,

f. Assignment of more than twenty CA/PSYOP officers to "A" 4etach-

ments during October will provide a tremendous boost to the 5th SFGA CA/PSYOP
Programa. The majority of these officers are school-trained and all woee
thoroughly briefed on all aspects of the Group Program prior to their dploy-
rment to specific "A" camps. 3

g. Integration of PSYOP has been stressed to all commanders as a

prime consideration during planning for and conduct of all military operations.

20
CW IDNTIAL

[ •...:.,:•::_
 AVGB- C CONFIDENTIAL 3
SUBJEC: Operational Report for Quarterly-Period Ending 31 October 1966
(Cscs45)
Additionally, emphasis has been placed upon evaluation of results of PSYOP
efforts after each operation. Such evaluations have assisted in determin-
ation of overall effectiveness of those activities and have, on various
ocoasioas, disolosed a need for follow-up activities, for adjustment of
propaganda the=e, or for' addition or deletion of specific appeals.
Sh. eMotivation Indoctrination Program training for CIDG troops has
been conducted at the following "All detachments during this reporting period:

(I) Khe Sanh A-101

(2) Tra Bong A-1007
(3) Cung Son A-221
(4) Dong Tre A.222
(5) Ben Soi A-321
(6) Soui Da A-322
(7) Duo Phong A~-343
(8) Tvu.en-Nhon A-415
(9) Phu. Quoc A-426
1(0o)' Tan CAu A-428
io The attached inolosures, #29, #30, #31# and #329 represent suo-
cessful implementation of Civil Affairs and Psyoh6logical Operations tectgu
when applied in a timely and conscientious manner.
7, (C) , Personnel and Administration:

a. Authorized Personnel Changes: Current and projected operational

requirements has necessitated a fiwther evaluation of the MTOE which was
subaitted to USARV on 7 June 1966. The results of this evaluation. will be
reported in the nerb ORLL.

b. Personnel Attrition:
(1) Assignd strength 31 Oct 66, 2589.
(2) Casualty fig.res are listed in inclolue #2,.23
c. Liegal Assistance: On 15 August 1966, a legal handbook (Inal #33)
* 7was published and distributed throughout the command. This handbook was designed
to provide legal guidance and assistance to 5th SF (Abn) members who might
f "be directed subsequently to conduct investigations, serve on courts and
boards or perform other activities of a legal natux•,.

21
 AVGB-C ONFIENTIAL 15 Novemb~er 1966
SLUNXCT Operational Report for Qu~arterl.y Period Endling 31 October 1966j

d.. Visitors: The 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) hosted 29$
distinguished visitors and 14 standard visitors during the reporting period.
Both classified and unclasai.Vied. briefings '.:ere given.

a. Aiards and Decorations: 994 awards and decorations were pro-

cessed. The breakdcori is as follows:

Distinguished Flying Cross - 1

Distinguished Service Croso - 3.
Silver Star - 15
Legion of Merit - 5
Bronze Star 'IV" - 60
Bronze Star Medal - 195
Aix Medal - 309
Amay Commendation Medal - 68
Purple Heart - 80
Array Commendation Medal "V"l - 17
Air Medal 'I'" - 6
Combat Infantrymants Badge - 230
Combat Medical Ba4Ee - 7
f. Turn. over of Personnels The 5th Special Forces Group (Airbo~e)
experienced a personnel turnover of approxi~mately 25%.

g. R & R: An improved system was instituted giving allocations

directly to 'IC" detachments, A., total or 148 personnel went Rn& R in Am~t
159 inM September and 134 in October.
8. (C) Medical:j
a, A 40 bed CIDG treatment hospital has been recently completed 'at
Pleiku.. This facility will be jointly staffed by USASF and UNST~. This
hospital vill provide capability for medical and surgical dare to CIJ)G and.
their dependents to include most majo~r suxgical procedures.
b, English-Vietniamese Language Tapes - This language phrase tapeI
prepa~red'by the 5th SFGA Surgeons Section has, been distributed to all det-
achments. This tape is to be used by USASF medical personnel to aid in
eliciting a history from civilian and. CIDG personnel--providing for better
patient-ýmedic xelations and better treatment.

c. Medical Civic Action - Outpatient treatment figures reached a

high in August 1966 with 127 ,231 patients treatd. 'Figures for September
are 1170023, October treatment figures axe 3-16,1315.

2I
-AA

_4
 SAvGB.,, : UNFIDENTIAL z
AVGB..C C FWNAL15 November 1966
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period EIng 31 October 1966
• (RC cs Fs i.5)
d. The Special Forces Village Health Workers o.'ourse has beenL approved
by the GVN Ministry of Health to be taught b., Special Fc.?ces personnel. USAID,
41iLPHAP, Province Chiefs and Medical Chiefs, and UXK haVe rarticipated in
these training programs. To date tro course-i - 11 students each - have been
completed in I CTZ - 26 students are presently enrolled at Detachment C-4.

e. Pour two man training teams arrived in RVN on 10 September. They

are presently deployed at training CIDG medics and instructing in the Village
Health Workers Course in each Corps area. To date these teams have cqpetIe
the following:
C-1: 11 students - Village Health Workers Course. 22 students
CIDG basic medic course.

C-2: Two CIDG basic medic courses - 4Z students. 40 students

presently enrolled in a basic CIM medic course.

C-3: 26 students in CIDG basic medic school. 26 students in

Hamlet Health 1.orxkers School - began 9 October 1966.
C-4: 48 students have completed the basic CIDG medic course.
22 and 26 each class - II classes. Hamlet Health Wdrke Course i- sarea
with 26 students.
f. The U.S. Army Special Forces (Airborne)t Walter Reed Institute
of Research Survey Team has recently arrived in RVN. This group is attached
to the 5th SPGA. This survey team is in the process of doing research on
diseases of military medical importanae in RVN. Personnel will be based at
remote area "A" detacbments to mun disease surveys in these areas.

g. The medical supply warehouse and system has been reorganized.

An inventory was conducted and new improved shipping procedures have been in-
stituted. We have experienced a very high incidence of pilferage of medical
supply items during shipment process.

9.a (C) Su l
u,. ,Commications Traffic:
(1) Total traffic count has continued to increase during this
reporting period for a total of 8,349 messages handled by the SPOB comm
center. The corn centers at subordinate headquarters handled an average of
3,069 messages. The traffic count has been steadily increasing each month
and can be expected to rise even more whesn all point-to-point long line
teletype circuits become operational. At present, diffibulties are being ex-
perienced with the speed in which the traffic can be handled ovar the o z

* 23

Kmdot • o •
I'
AVGB-C CONFIDENTIA 15 November 1966
SUBJECT: Operational Voyert for Qur4iterly Period Ending 31 October 166
(RCS C3F'O-Ca5)

(2) To solve this problem, a request was made for six long
line point-to-point circuits betvwen this headquarters and subordinate units
over the fixed troposcatter system. Aýn approval for the circuits hau been
granted, but installation and activatio* of the circuits are pendi" avail..
ability of ohaxnels on the tropo-systen. "

b. Base Radio Communication System AN/TSC-26(U):

(1) Information has reached this headquarters that the AN/TSC-26

will be shipped to the 5th SFG (Abn) in the near future. The arrival date in
RVN is unknown at present. The big problem we are now facing is obtaini
qualified personnel to man this gear. !ýn intensified training program D r
assigned Special Forces communications personnel will be required before the
equipment can be put into use. Another major problem encountered is the
frequency authorization. The rated power out-put of the AN/TSC-26 is 2,500
watts and special authorization for frequencies is required.

(2) Training of commtnications personnel can be acoomplished

within the 5th SFG (Abn). However, to expedite the training and the eventual
I
committment of the AN/TSC-26 into operations, 2,500 watt frequoncies must be
authorized. A request to MACV-.Y6 has been initiated*

C. AN/PRC-74 Radio Set:

(1) The AN/PRC-74 radio set is used for portable long-range

field communications. It is considered an excellent radio except for the
weight and size. The use of the originally designed dry battery pack is too
heavy for long-range patrols and requires seventy each BA-30 batteries. When
a nmnber of batteries go bad, all batteries muist be replaced due to having
no means available in the field to check them. This involves carrying a
large supply of batteries.
(2) A study was made by the electronics maintenance personnel
of this headquarters to determine what improvements, could be made. As a
result, a new lightweight rechargeable nickel-cadmium battery pack has been
locally designed and developed for the ANNARC-74 Radio Set. At present, two
mnelundergoing
Sets are
(See #8). field tests and the preliminary reports are satisfactory.
10. (C) Enieer:

a, On 22 August 1966 three five man engineer KB teams arrived from

539th Engineer Detachment, Ist SlN (Abu), 1st SF on Okinawa. These teams re-
placed four KB teams which returned to Okinawa on 24 August upon completing
their six month TDY tours*

b, The mission of thooe engineer KB teams was to assist in new CIDG

camp, construction. TWAs asaistaae was in tho 4 Q 04V = _#ient

_ _ 24
t.ICJ7 AVGB-C
SECRET 15 November 1966
SUBJECT: Operationral Report for Quarterly Period rndinz 31 October 1966
S(RCS CSFOL-65)

support, technical advice, and construction supervisory skills. Alsoi a

three man KA team arrived in cowuitry to provide the control element for the
TO teams. In addition the KA teau leader became the aoting Group Engineex.
Ac. During the months of Augumt, September, and October the KB teams
{ wurked on five now CIDG camps. Duo Phong and Trai Bi camps were completed
and jork continmues at Dak Seang, Duc Lap, and Loc Ninh.
i (S) CIDC'izuqaco:

a. On 1 August 1966, the official piastre conversion rate was

changed from 79.2MVN to $1.00 US to a now rate of 80.0ST to $1.00US. This
* change represented a currency devaluation and resulted in a paper loss to
CIDG Finance of $57,135.74. One advantage of the new rate is that cuzewoy
conversion is much simpler now.

b. On 20 Angust 1966,persomnel from. CIDG Finance began making

audit/assistance visits to all Special Forces detachment Funds Officers.
The purpose of these visits is to make on-site audits of Funds Officers
records and to render assistance when needed. The plan is to visit all
Special Forces detachments on a six month cycle basis. A total of 40 det-
achnents have boon audited to date. Detailed reports of these inspections
are maintained on file in the CIDG Finance Office. The audits thus far
have proven nutually advantageous to the command and to the respective
detachments. Detailed financial problems have been resolved on the spot
and CIM3 Finance personnel have gained valuable inf6mation on a first hand
basis to use for progmrtaning and budgeting purposes.

co An audit team from CA.S Okinava made a detailed inspection of

CIDG Finance records and procedures on 30.and 31 August 1966. The auditors
4 noted the many improvements that had boon made since the last audit in Oct-
ober 1965 and were satisfied with the accau~ting procqd;=.s a n w dontrols
presently in effects,

d. The 1Y 1967 Budget and the FY 1968 Command Budget Estimates

* have been revised and will be submitted thru MACV to USARPAC on 2 November
1966. These budget revisions were necessitated by the extensive organizational
changes vithin 5th Special Forces Group (Airbonne) and the new Concept of
Operations for CY 1967. Current PY 1967 and Py 1968 requirements are as
follows:
S1968
SIn-Country O&MA 8 45,498,000 $ 54,99o,000
Oct-of-Country
O&ML $ 21,125,000 $ 22,951,000
PEUA $ 31.210.000 S 31,911.000
I, S97,833,0oo $109,852,0o0

25I

SE-ET -. .

N" ýTT

_*3
 CONFIDENTIAL 15 1966
AVGB-C 1 oebr16
SUMCT: Operational Report fox Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966
(OcS CSFOL-65)
12. (C) Copptroller:

a. On 5 July 1966 the Office of the Comptroller was established

as a prinoipal staff section in the command. The CIDG Finance Section was
placed under the supervision of the Comptroller. Previously the CIDG Fin-
ance Office had boon the action agency for monitoring costs and processing
requests for expenditux-es of funds. This was found to be an undesirable
situation in that the officre was sMa~ped with day to day accounting work and
finance personnel, undostmdnably, were not familiar with the special type
requirements for funids often necessary in an organization such as this*
The codptroller section was staffed with personnel, both officers and en-
listedl, ho have previous experience in Special Forces and with Special
Forces in Vietm=.

"b. Activities in the section have included the publication of an

Administration and Functions Manual (Inol #34) to Insure standardization of
correspondence and to outline responsibilities within each staff section. A
joint directive was published, establishing for the first time, a standard
leave, AWOL, and hospitalization policy for CIDG personnel. Previous to this
each detachment had some type of local SOP that often provided only the most
minimu explanation and control. Several discrepancies in financial admin-
istiation were corrected. These included unauthorized payment of bonuses to
VNSF personnel working with special projects in the command. The VNSF is a
WAP ftinded organization and the funds available to the 5th Special Forces
Group (Airbome), cannot be used to support them in any way.

o A pilot program for centralized fBmding at the "C", detachment

level proved successful in I CTZ. Primary purpose of the program is to
relieve the subordinate "A" detachments of the administrative burden of
keeping pay caxds and preparing payrolls each month. It also provides for
closer monitoring of expenditures by higher headquarters. The program is
scheduled to go into effect in all CTZ's on 1 November 1966.

d. A reduction in the number of civilians employed by the command. '

and the standardization of wage scales has been effected. Continuous men-
itoring of the level of civilian employees continues. In many cases per-
sonnel such as carpenters or electricians were pe=an=t ea loyees only so t
they would be available when xequired.

e. Budgetary savings allowed for the development of new incentive

pay scales for CIDG personnel in the more hazardous duties. Extra combat
pay is now authorized for personnel who axe members of a Combat Reconnaissance
Platoon. Savings also have allowed the payment of parachute proficiency pay
to those special indigenous personnel whose duties require them to perfor.

-. ° ..--
- .•-
-" - - - - - - -
 S~CO encu TIuAI
AVGB-C
SUBJECT: C"'I
operati.onal Report for Quarterly AL
Period Ending1531 November
October 1966
1966

f. A review of death gratuity benefits paid by the CIDG program J

reveals that benefits were ins'fficient cz conpared to benefits paid to
Regional Force and Popular Force rersonnel. Sufficient funds were not
available to immediately align the scale with those of the RF/PF program.
It was determined that an additional 2000$VN in death benefits would be
paid to survivors of CIDG personnel. 2000$VN being the average price for a
burial in Vietnam. Sufficient funds were budgeted in the revised FY67
budet to allow equalization of the death gratuity scales.

g. Operational changes and increased operational requirements made

it necessary to revise the FY 1967 budget and the FY 1968 budget estimate.
In October a liaison trip was made to the Counterinsurgency Support Office
(CISO) on Okinawa to revise the out-of-country portion of the budget. This
close liaison with CISO has assisted in the development of realistic require-
ment levels and better understdndirg by CISO of the present and future op-
e.rational plans of the command*
h. In-country changes to the budget included an increase in Combat
* Pay for the combat reconnaissance personnel, and increase in the wage scale
for civilian employees, and it also anticipated a rise in subsistence costs
throughout the country. Other increases were dcue to increased personnel
requirements made necessary by operational commitaents°

i. Seveial years ago when the ViSF vas placed in command of the
C1DG program, they were experiencing a shortage of radio operators. An
agreement was made at that time to substitute civilian operator for military
operators until sufficient military operators, could be trained. The agree-
mant was nade because of operational necessity not only to keep the VISF
operatioAl but to provide a back up for Special Forces couarunications if
required. Since neither the VNSF nor the WiAP program could provide funding
in support of these civilians, it was agreed that Switheback funds would be
used to pay them. A study by the Comptroller revealed that the number of
civilian radio operators has increased rather than decreased, despite the
training of military operators by USASF. It is granted that increased' oper-
ational comnittmentE, have required additional radio operators, however, the
study revealed that Lj many areas, especially at VIISP "B" and "C" detachment
levels, there was an overage in radio operators. Additionally the V1SF was
slow in providing personnel to the communications school for training. The
3P has now agreed to begin a positive program of elimination of the civ-
ilian radio operators. The VNSF has agreed to provide sufficient input into
the communications school to accejeat4 -e -plagqnw f•t.eo ±U _=4
operators•
o. One of- the unforecastod expenditures made during the quarter wa
associated with the attachment-of the 281st Aviation Company to the 5th
Special Forces Group (Airborne). This unit arrived with no prior p]rovisaý

27-
AVGB..C
SUIBJECT:
CON IDENTIAL 15 N
Opcrational Report for Quarterly Poriod Ending 31 October 1966
CSFOR-65) S(MRo

for billets nor a suitable area for aircraft parking and maintenrnce fac-
1966
J
ilities. In the interest of operational necessity, a substantial amount of
money was spent to build a hard stand for helicopters, a maintenance facility,
troop billets and unit orderly room and supily room. Funds expended have
been included in the revised Ff 1967 budget. j
k. The Comptroller has initiatod two reports during this quarter,
The first is a moaithly survey submitted )y all principal and special staff
-
j
section, BHC and Signal Company. The report is intended to reflect those
changes in administraticn rand operational techniques that iLp-ove the effio-
iency of the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne).

1. The second report is a nonthly statistical summaxy. Primarily,,

this sumiary is to provide the Coamander viith a quick reference list of
statistical subjects ranging from theater attendance to critical shortages
of supply items. The summary is distributed to subordinate commands to
provide then with a means for comparing their activities with other subor-
dinate commands within the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne).o

SECTION 2 1C) CWOMKMAI

RS' OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMDATIONS -

PM I -Observations (Lessons Learned)

4
1. (U) Personnel: None.

2. (C) O•erations:
a. ITENI: Reinforcement of Canp Khe Sanh (Source: Bet C-l)

DISCUSSION: The CG, III MAF ordered the 3rd Marine Division to
reinforce Khe Saynh with one battalion of Marines, whose mission was to pro-
vide security to the camp out to a range of 6,000 meters (120ma mortar range).
On 30 September the ist Battalion, 3rd riarines (1/3 Mar) reinforced with 2
Marine 155mm hovitzers and 3 105mm, howitzers arrived at Khe Sanh. Detach-
nent B-52 (Project DELTA) began reconnaissance operations in and near the
Khe Sanh TAOR in October, operating under the OPCON 6f the CG, I Corps.
Since the reinforcement of Khe Sanh wag accomplished, the possibility of a
heavy enemy attack has lessened. Also, although the 1/3 11ax rere present
only for security purposes, their presence enabled the CIDG to conduct more
MIMOu s operations of longer range and duration.
ODSERVATION: Timely reinforcement of Khe Sanh appears to have
frustrated eamy plans to attack the camp and/or draw reinfo'•ciDg relief
collin into a trap. Presence of 1Tarine reinforcements to secure the camp
pezitted long range and nmerous CIDG offensive operations. Reinforcements
i with
long raue a W enabled CIDG patrols to operate at increased distances

28

•nFIDEWENIiAl

44 1-
 ' SCONFIDENTIAL
I
AVCF..' 15 Novenber 1966
ZUJLCT"' Operctit-nal Repurt for Quorterly Period Ending 31 October 1966
(RCS CSFOR-65)
whilo enjoying -rtillery fire support. Reinforcement with a reoonnaissance
Sii unit provided increased secuvitjy to the distric~t by extending the capability
of reconliosance and surveillance.
I
b, ITF.: Coordination between units and forces (Source: Dot C-I)
around Cc=,n Kho 3'anh.

DISCUSSION: Within the Khe Sanh TAOR there are the following
units or organi .tions operating under the cornand of the individamls in-
dicated:

UNIT SIZE COL¶AND

USA&,t Dot 4-101 A Dot USASF A Det CO

VNSF Dot A-101 A Dot VNSF A Dot CO
CIDG 3 Co's, 1 CRP VIISF A Det CO
RF 1 Co District Chief
P•F 447 Pers District Chief
PAT 1 Co Distxict Chief
ARVN 4/2 Regt 1 Bn ARVN Bn CO
mS?±c i/3 mar IBn USU( Bn CO
SOG Dot unk SOG Det CO
Tiger Hound Dot unk Tiger Hound Det CO

In addition to those forces, a-cross the border in Laos, adjacent to the Khe
San•k TAOR, is the Royal Lao 33rd Battalion, which is a friendly force. Within,
the Khe Sanh district there are 4 ARVLK1 105m howitzers, 3 USMC 105mm howitzers,
and 2 USMC 155nm howitzers. These forces do not operate under the command
or OPCOT of a single individual. Unity of command is totally lacking. The
only unification existant is the CIC, under the control of the USASF A Det-
achment Commander, and a cooperative artillery fire control center under the

OBSFRVATION: Lack of a single task force commande becausA

each unit desires to retain autonomy defies the basic principle of unity
of command. A task force commander with a control heedquarters could better
control and coordinate all operations and actions. Political considerations
in this particular cose override tactical considerations, which could prove
to be to the detriment of accomplishing assigned missions.

c. l lM: Use of iARVN Scout Dogs (Source; Det C-1)

DISCUSSION: Camp Tien Phuoc employed 6 AMVR handlers and scout

dogs on 1 operation in October. The dogs and handlerb were not capable of
nooting the physical demands of long range patrolling. Terrain covered vas

29
L QUEWnLTAL

( .. : .,. .. ..-', .-" I

e S€CONFIDENTIAL
AVGB-C 15 November 1966
JUI3JCT: Operational Report for Qu1=tcW4 Period Entding 31 October 1966
c (RCS CSFOR-65)

rice paddies, dikes, aid bruph covered low hills. Weather vas fair. ARVN
hand ors alzo rofused to take point and work their dogs properly.
OBSERV4TION: LEMI dogs a-nd handlers are of little value on
long range patrol operations in I Co.Vs Tactical Zone.
4. I Night Combat Aasault Landing (Source: Det A-104, Ha Mumh)
DISCUSSION: On the night of 12 September, 1 company of Mike
Force personnel reinforced Camp Ha Thanh by conducting a night combat assault
landing by CV-2 aircraft. Illumination for the landing was provided by
flareship.
OBSERVATION: This technique of landing, using illumination
provided by'f2sreships, was highly successful and caght the enemy completely
by surprise.
e. I_.A: Alternate Fixing Positions for Camp Uortars (Source: Det A-104)
DISCUSSION: The enemy knew in advance the location of the camp's
mortars, which enabled him to place accurate recoilless rifle fire on those
positions. The. results were that the 4.2 in mort-a was destroyed and seve•al
men killed and wounded.
OBSERVATION: Alteraate firifig positions for mortars should be
prepaxed and the mortars should be frequently moved to different positions.
Considerations should be given to the emplacement of dummy mortars in un-
occupied positions.

f. ITEM: AlE Skyraiders for Resupply Missions (Source: Dot C-l)

DISCUSSION: Leaflet containers can be used for free dropping

supplies to long range patrols. The AlE tactical fighter bomber-aircraft is
c.pable of carrying 11 leaflet containers that can be filled'with patrol
supplies. In the absence of panels or signal lights on a DZ, the tactical
aircraft can drop with a high degree of accuracy on any distinguishable ter-
rain feature. Commmications between the patrol and the AlE aircraft can
be facilitated by tile FM capability of the aicaft.

OBSERVLTION: AlE aircraft can provide an accurate and effective

neans of freedropping supplies to long range patrols. The aircraft is cap-'
able of providing undetected daylight resupply to troops behind enemy lines,
as the aircraft is not normally associated with air resupply ty"e missions.

30

,•~~~~~~~- ... -- U.I ,I£=

A~

M•••--
 AYGB-C COFDNIL15 November 1966
-AUIJECT:Oporational Report for Quarturly Period Ending 31 October 1966

C. ITM.,I Waterborne Operatio-w (Source; Det C-4)

Sconducted DISCUSSION:
on 16 and
by Detachaents AL-414 Octobera a joint waterborne operation
b was
A-416, utilizing 26 plastic assault boats
and 6 US Wavy IM boats. The operation wTas supported by 2 sections of gun-
ships and 1 co=nd and control helicopter. High flood waters throughout
the area ld forced the Viet Cong to move their caches to higher grounds,
leaving then vulnerable to friendly initiated combat operations. The high
water level also reduced the effectiveness of VC mines and booby traps; res-
tricted the VC s mobility to sampans and forced hin to contend with effects
of the flood, thereby reducing his alertness to attack. The results of this
operation are discussed in inclosure 127.

OBSERVATIONt This operation was highly successful for the

following reasons:
(1) USASF/VNSF/CIDG flexibility in reacting to contact at an
unexpected time and place with rapidity and aggressiveness.

(2) The fire superiority provided by the large number of crew

served weapon employed on waterbome operations.

(3) Superior mobility of the friendly force.

(4) Viet Cong vulnerability to attack during flooded conditions.

3. (U) Training and Organization:

a. IUiE___: Waterborne Unit Organization (Source: Det C-4)

DISCUSSION: If USASF/VISF do not have CIDG companies organized

into boat crews, confusion occurs during the embarking and debarkizg and
unit integrity is lost.,,

OBSERVATION: CIDG companies organized into boat crews and

trained in boat operations obtained better results. Platoons and squads
equipj4Arith sampans with 6 hp motors can be effectively used as a quick.'re-
action force.

b. I': V:aterborne Tactics (Source: Det C-4)

DISCUSSION: CIDG units are unfamiliar with boat tactics at
the beginning of each rainy season. This causes unnecessary casualties and
delay in gaining the advantage over tile Viet Cong.j
OBSERVATION' Units that receive boat tactics at the base
capp prior to operations achieve better results.

31
 U
€NFIDF.NTiAL 3.5Noebr1
0j1"J=`T; Oerartioal Reporj-t for Quarterly Period Endinc 31 October 1966

c. i~Small 'Unit Txticti (sources Det C-4)

.,.DI.CUSSION: CIDG unit.3 contact the enemy unexpectedly. Some
-)f
.n±1their
theleadeorx becone confoed mainly as a result of their inability to
situn~ion"

OBSErIVATION. Units that have received training at Dong Ba Thin

Center are sui'ficiently, traixiod in smwll unit tactics# enad react
Utxt:ining

quickly and effectively :i an engagement.

4. MC Intollianco: .

a, I Increased IntelliGence Collection d (Source: Grou -2)

Production.
DISCUSSION: The demand for sound and timely intelligence winl
continue to oand and will t'nd to become more sophisticated as the problem
of locating the enemy becones :•re difficult. With the increase of intell-
igence a,'oncies in RVN the value of zooadj.ntj and repo-rting timely intell-
igence becomes uije apparent.
4.Forcoes Group '(Airborne) receive sound and timely intelligence, W~elligence"
OBSERVATION: To insure that detachments of the 5th, Special' 0.1
Analysis Centers have been o:Jganized at the "C" detachment level. Further-
nere, as the enecy threat increased in the vicinity of specific Special
Forces caxps, Combined Inulligence Centers were organized at these "A"-
c&os to collate all intelligence (athei'od in the vicinity of the canp by
vadriou= sources f.r the purpose of providing timely intelligence to 'that
specific "Al det'~chnent commander. These tWo organizatins are discussed in
inclosures #19 and #16 resl)octively.

b. ITE..: Consolidation of Intelligence Nets (Source:, Group S-2)

DISCUSSION: With the present emphasis placed on collection, nets'
Lnd source control, "A" detaphment Intelligence Sergeants are 'required to,.
;)end much of their time on the administration of these pro4gas. .Howevey' a,
noticeable fact in the field is that muoh of the Intelligeice Sergeant's time
inu not "d cnnot be spent on sophisticated intelligence colllection nets.
OBSERVATION: Ccnsiderritions and proposals for cement haAle
been forva d t subordi.to dets nts (reference Inel #17).
c. IT:_i: licather Observations and. Reporting at ('@1@: Group S-2)
apecific locations within RVN.

32
CONFIDENTIAL

-- _ o

S~.-- m~ffi----.--.--..
 AvYCFI CONFIDENTIAL 15 November 1966
SUBJECT. ~(RCS
Oporatioinal Report for QnuArterly Poriod Endinz 31 October 1966
CSFOR-65)

DISCUSSION: Due to the lack of personnel required to establish

additional weather observing stations, adequate Weather observations were not
"available to combat and support units in the vicinity of specific "A" detach-
ment oamps. The weather would have a definite and deoisive influence on
vilitary operations conducted by ard/or for the Special Forces detaolzment.
Such ims the case during the Ashau battle and the problems encountered by
the US Aix Force in support of the camr

OBS.FVATIO•: To provide for adequate weather observations and

re•orting, the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) and the lst Weather Group
(USAF) drafted a Special Forces Weather Observation Program (Inol #18). The
results will be valuable to combat Mad support elements should they be called
upon to aid in the defense of a camps conduct joint operations, or provide

c. ITZ._: Handling, Processing and Exploitation (Source: Group S-2)

of Captives, Reaturwes, Suspects, Documents and Mateoriel.
DISCUSSION: "A" detachments in the field have not received the
benefits of timely information from captives and captured documents because
they were required to place emphasis on the almost immediate movement of these
-to 2I or uext higher US channels.
OBSERVATION: The 5th Special Forces Group (Airboio) is pub-
"* Qlishing appropriate regulations outlining guidance and prvocedures so that all
friendly elements will receive mazium timely information and intelligence.
-The regulations allow maximum use and exploitation of captives, returnees
and captured documents by USASF detachments within the purview of current
,1WCV directives and regulations. An item of interest is that the regulation
"states that captives will be evacuated when they axe no longer considered
"-to be of intelligence value. This allos the detachment commanders to em-
l hasizetactical exploitation rather than evacuation.

. T& Issue of HT-l Radios to Agents (Source: Det AP-1OI, Iho Sanh)
DISCUSSION. YACV issued 20 HT-I radios to Detachment A-1OI for
touseu
nt issue to he sahTAORe
indigenous agents throughout and nea the Khe
C.W+th

The purpose of the radios was to increase the rapidity of intelligence reports
and to provide an early ýarning system to the district. However, agents were
S-rot receptive to receiving and using the radios. Only six were actually
- issued. The primary problem is that the radio is rather lcrge, difficult to 4

hide or conceal, and subsequently places an agent in fear of being discovered

"by the enemy. Another observation is that to be effective, there must be sev-
. ,al.- frequencies, to prevent the entire net from being compromised by loss
anrizent and rAdio. Detachment A-1OI returned some HT-l' s for crystal
an7ýf
frequency changes. A final observation is that the base station must be cap-
able of monitoring the different frequencies assigned, and the base m=st oper-
ato continuouslye

33 .. .

,- ------- -'---, --..--------- ,-,- .. I ,

_ • - , " . . .. . . . :. A
__ . .,,• . . • ,• ,:: ,.t, tt.•:'

•__ ,_ .. -,. / .!'• . . . ..

I i
-F
AVGBC TIAL November 1966
SUBJECT; Operational Report for Quarterly Period Endixz 31 October 1966

OBSERVATION: A smaller, "~re compact radio then the HT-1

should be issued to agjents both to allay their psychological fear as well - . .
as to give a physical means of reducing the pzcbability of compromise of
the agent. Several frequencies are required for security of the intell-
igence net, and a baso receiving station capable of continuous nonitorxi ;
on all chann ls is required.

0. 1CTZ1i Radar Set AN/PiS-5 (Source: Det C-.4)

DILSCU.SSION: Employment of the xedr set in the IV Corps area
during the rainy season is ineffective. Water causes a reflection of the
signal producing distortion and a false road out. Most detachments are -

surounde4 by water for 8 months out of the year.

OBSERVATION: A more effective surveillance instrument should

be programmed for the IV Corps area in lieu of the AN/PPS-5. Probably a
more effective device because of the flat open toarain would be the st4L-
light s pgpc large.

If. ITM-18
Intelligence Center (0C1).
Establishment of a Combined (Sources Dot C-1)t

DISCUSSION: COMSWACV directed a CIC be established to enable

an incroased intelligence collection, coordination and analysis capability.
The Detachment A-10 Commander was directed to head it. All organizations
and agencies operating in the area were directed to feed intelligence inform-
ation to the CIC. Personnel assignments made to the CIO were a director, an
intelligence sergeant, an :intelligence specialist, a clerk, a USMC Interrog-
ation tean, and interpreters. A liaison team from the 3d Marine Division was
attached. An RTT was installed at Khe Sanh to expedite the flow of intellig-
once back to Detachment C-1. The CIC submits a daily intelligence summary.
OBSERVATION: The CIO has unified collection, analysis and
dissemination of intelligence being generated and assures dissemination of
intelligence in the Khe Sanh area*. It permits more accurate intelligence
being generated and assures dissemination to all units and agencies which
have a reuiremant for the intelligence.

5. (U) Logistics:
a. ITM: Breake of Rice Bags when Air Dr=pped (Source: Group S-4)

DISCUSSION: Previously, the Logistical Support Center was ex-

periencing an extremely high rate of breakage of rice bags when delivered by
method of rigging
air drop. In order to eliminate this problem the following of
has been utiJ ed.: 1irast z±ep is to place the 50 kilo • r..et, inside a.

54234

- ,

"U:, wL -.
 AVGB-C (J /LL~S i z~)15 November 19661
SUBJECT: Opera tiornal Report for Quarterly Period Znding 31 October 1966
31 (Rcs CSFORL65)
100 kilo rice bag and secure with twine. Secondly place 2 heavy duty card-
board boxes on the delivery pallet and load each box with 5 bags of' rice and.
secure with A-7 straps. Attach 3 cargo parachutes to the load and i~t is
ready for ai.r drop.

OBSMIiVATION: Since utilizing this method we have received no

complaints concerning loss of rice due to breakage. Attached photo shows
the finished product prepared for air drop.

4i'

44

35

- ~~ ~ ~ ~
_ - /- V- - -- ---
.hVGB-C L/vCLP~/15 November 19661
SUBJICT*: Opera tionril Report for Qwlrterly Period Fain 31 October 1966
(Rcs CSFOR.65)

b. IM1M: Aix- Delivery of Livestock (Sourcet Group S-4)

lISC7USSIONI When air dxopping livestookepreviously used con-I

tainers were dii~g~-ig thus releasing the livestock and allowing them
to free fall resulting in a complete loss of the cattle. To overcome thisI
problem a mod~ified sling consisting of 4 A-7A straps sewn to a heavy rice
bag is constru~cted. After securing the cow in the haxness, place it in the
orate and attach the remainder of the A-7A straps mi.th the sling harness
directly to the main D rings. Attach 3 G-13 cargo parachutes and the losAd
is ready for d~el1ivery.

riginve OBSERVATION: Since adopting this method of delivery, no live-

stock haebe ujc ofree fall, Attached photographs outline the
rigingprocedures used.

36I
~4ri~ A/
 AVQB-/V L eid ni November 1966
15~s/
6BE;:Operational Report for Quate=toý1 PeidOnig c1tober 1966I
(RCS CSFOR..65)

f/A,~- rIL 2t.:-

 /JA/B-? 15 November 1966
azl,=T: Perationa.1 Report for Quar~terly Period Ending 31 October 1966
(RcsCSGFUL65)

38
-A
AVGB-O .i 'C' 15 N~ovember 1966
~U2~J~C p~tioiial Recport for Q~uz.rtccly Perod d~ing 31 Otober 1966
(RJtc C" 11-..65)

r. -4

39

tfA
'4
AVOB-C COME IR A 15 November 1966
SWJBECT: Operational Report for Quarttrly Period Endi 31 Ootober 1966
(Rcs Cs-JL65)
c. ITE: Resurfacing of i4he Saxih Airstrip (source: Doet0)
with Aluminum Planking.

DISCUSSION: The airstrip at Khe Sanh was a badly deteriorated

pierced steel planking (PSP) with an intended 0-130 capability. The PSP
had so deteriorated that it presented hazardous obstacles to aircraft. A
Seabee team, working around the clock, removed the old PSP and resurfaced
the strip with noncozroding'aluminum sheet planking in 5 days. Without the
improvement of the airstrip, the large increase in air traffic necessary
to sustain the increased troop strength in the area would not have been
possible. _
p|

OBSEIRVATION: The new aluminum planking now available for

surfacing airstrips can be laid rapidly by skilled engineers, and the
aluminum planking has an all weather capability and a long durability.
Every effort should be maAe to surW Seq_ _ ea• aiartips with alum-
inum planking.

6. (C) Other: . .

a, ITM. Establishment of Comptroller Section (Source: Gp Compt)

DISCUSSION: The abundance of accounting transactions by CIDG
finance made it extremely difficult for that office to closely monitor and
evaluate expenditures in the command.

OBSERVATION: Establishment of the Comptroller Section has al-

lowed a sepcrate monitoring agency to analyse and evaluate expenditures.

b. I=.•_: Administration'and Functions Manual (Source: Gp Compt)

DISCUSSION: To replace several Group regulations and command

letters governing administrative procedures, one principal source was •re-
quired. In addition, a document was required axplainin organization of the
command and a narrative of job resp=&aJ=liWt fr• •pal and special
staff sections.
OBSERVATION: The publication of the Administrative and Functions
Manual has standardized administrative procedures throughout the 'command and
assisted in better understandin of job positions and staff responsabilities.

c. I : CI1DG Leave, AWOL and Hospitaliz&tion (Soqice: Gp Compt)

Policy.

DISCUSSION: Since there was no standard policy for leave, AWOL

or hospitalization for the CIDG program, much confusion existed as to how
wmich leave a CIDG soldier was _JthoizeAd what conatituted an AWOL and' how

40
I
AVGB-C 15 November 1966
SUBJECT: Operatioxial Report for Quarterly Period zading 31 October 1966
#2 | (Cos CSFOL-65)

long a man is carried oa the payroll after he has been hospitalized. Many
local SOP's wore developed by subordinate commanders but there were many
instances of misundeiatanding and mismanagement.
OBSERVATION: Publication of the CIDG leave, AWOL and hospital-
ization policy has established a firm standard for the command and eliminated
confusion and misurdorstanding.

d. ITM: Centralized Funding System (Source: Gp Compt)

DISCUSSION: A pilot program of centralized funding in I Corps
proved successful. It eliminated the requirement for preparation of pay-
rolls, maintonance of pay cards, paying of contractors and civilian laborers
plus keeping volumes of records of expenditures at the "A" detachment level.
A favorable side effect was revealed in that money wam saved by centralized
purchase of foodstuffs and materials in larger units# The system also allowed
a standardization of pay procedures and close monitoring of expenditures by a
higher headquarters. The priimary purpose was to eliminate the administrative
burden in the "A" detachments.
"OBSERVATION: The centralized funding system will go into effect
Sin all Corps Tactical Zones on 1 November 1966.

e. ITEM. : Responsive Airlift System (Source: Gp Avn Off)

DISCUSSION: The 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) operates
a supply system which is separate from the normal Army supply system. Pro-.
curement, accounting, storage, and supply delivery are all designed to sup-
port this quick zeaction system. The supply distribution responsibility of
Special Forces in Vietnam is approximately equivalent to that found in a
US Army separate Corps. Virtually all supplies must go by aircraft because
of the generally insecure areas in which Special Forces camps are habitually
located. Twenty of the 66 camps with airfields are capable of air landing
CV-2B resupply aircraft onily. The existing ground commanders operational
control of the CV-2B aircraft provides a system with 24 hours or less res-
Donse time to routine missions. Additionally, the present operational system
of the CV-2B can provide emergency response in 1 hour or less if a camp is
attacked.

7 OBSERVATION: A portion of the airlift must be provided in a

system, such as exists now, which will bc rosponaivo to the Coonanders, 5th
Specir- Forces Group (Airborne), from prepaxation to delivery. The present
system with the CV-2B under the operational control of the ground commander
Sprovides that required responsive system needed by Special Forces to perfom
its assigned mizzion.
Xf. IT: Hamlet Health Visitor' s Program (Source: Gp 8-5)

41
UKF , TIAL

tW

. .Z°
 v Op•to CONFI'|NTMIA 15 November 1966
SSULJ : Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966
41V
DJTCUSSIOIX; The zuccess'cf this program depends greatly on the
training aiid• -ind facilities obt&J,.jr-d; rpu+he follow-up and inspection of
Phase II TrainLia. IL Jo imperative thot the IMV be placed in the Provinciaal
budget and tha.t eoch M V ia p 1. regularly*'

* OCo;WRVATION: JUSPAO urd USAID can be effectively used to pro-

vide the traiiCtn aidi and to follow-up on the budgeting of the MNV.
I
g. _TZI: Agriv-,_lturaJ Program (Source: Gp S-5)

DISCLUSSIOIs: Cattle, fish and seed may be obtained through the

inistry of j ricuituxo for local programs.
EPVATiON5 .Coordination must be made at National level to
obtain cattle. In thre future such xequests will be coordinated with Asst
S-5 in Saigon La oxder that he may obtain them through the Minister of
A riculture-

h. !T'M.: Refugees (Source: Gp S-5)

DIVCUSSION: To handle emergeny influxes of refugeesa a pre-
packaged kit containing essential r&*.iof supplies is required to ease the
sup)ply commiimonutz of the detachment affected.
0BMVTL7ON: An "aphbl" kit is locatee at SFOB for this purpose,
but additional long•o term aid must be obtained through USAID and W21 to
sustain the re-Pugees.

i. IMA•. Eloetions (Source: Gp S-5)

DSCOJ3OSN: VIS personnel organized ralll.cs, meetings, cvnf-
crences 2I • ,xiedtati;ou sess-±.ns and. -. ed all available media to reach ervaS
potential voter.

OBSERVATTON: USASF personnel must not become involved with cand-

idates bat mist be avkilable for Ld7•ice and should supply on request loud-
speakers, tape recorders anC other public address devices.o

j. IT~rL: CIDJG CA/7.I ~aj (Source: Op S-5)I

DISCUSSION: These teams have become well knoun and provide
invaluabre :•, s.Lstanco in medical nd. civic action programs.
OBSERVATION: Special identification devices, i.e., scarves
etc., should be utilized to give theec teams a sense of identity and pride.
Selection of persormel for these teams should remiain limited to the highly
motivate&, dynamic, and trained person.

4.2
}
,j IL
AVGB-C
SUBJECT: Operational
COFOKIL15 Novembe 1966
Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966
(ReS CSnoP65)

k9 ITM Newspapers (Source: Op S-5)

DISCUSSION: Vietnamese language newspapers presenting national
and local interest neus, as woll as motivation articles are well accepted by
the population.
OBSERVATION: Common dialects as well as VN language papers are
read avidly, and in areas of low literacy those who can read pass the woxd
to the illiterate. This device has an unlimited PSYOP potential.
1. ITEK: Enlisted Medical Personnel (Source: Gp Suzg)

DISCUSSION: Many datachments are short medics4 There is a

critical shortage of Special Forces trained medics Aroy-wi6e. Many Veplace-
merit medics are oompleteiy without experience and onry partially trained.
This situation shows little sign of improvement during the next 6 months.
OBSERVATION: Each medic coming to 5th SFMA should be interiewed
by the Group Surgeon and a reoonmmendation as to his assignment be made, based
upon his training#, exerience, rank,, and the detachments vith the greatest
need for replacements.
m. IrEM: Indigenous troops recruited from (Source: Gp Surg)
certain areas of II CTZ are carrying strains of malaria
resistant to chloroquine.
DISCUSSION: For these personnel the weekly chloroquine pro-
phylaxis is inadequate. They constitute a reservoir of a potentially dang-
erous disease located in proximity to USASF personnel. When committed to
field operations in excess of 10 days duration many of these troops will,,
become combat ineffective due to development of clinical malaria.
OBSERVATION: Mike Force personnel at Detachments C-l, C-2
&-I B-50 should be screened by the WRAIR - USASP Medical Research Team to
find the matlaia aarriers. Curative theiapy should be undertaken. Malaria
discipline must be stressed at all times* CUloroquine and Dapsone prophylaxis
should be instituted where indicated, Efforts should be increased to pro- i
vide somethi more substantial than the usual ' igenous rations for those
troops at least every 7 days to prevent the malWa outbreaks coincident to
a lowered mntritional state and physical stress. i
. IT: Airboats (Source- Gp S-3)

DISCUSSION: Twenty-two airboats were received duing October.

A change in priority which necessitated pA i of the airboats into the
C-141 traffic schedulo delayed their arxivalo One in-count*,, transportation

43
c IDXTA

•.. .-- - ,• 2I•-"- .. .. 4

A.VL-C
SUHTEJrT
CONIDENTIAL 15NYbr16
Operational Report for quarterly Pen' i Ending 31 October 1966
aain was 4 problem. Airboats cannot be carried by CH-47 aircraft in the
t
shippirg configuration so LST! were uLod to wmve the boats from Saigon to
Can Thu. Three weeks of training wore given to the drivers and mechanics.
Upon pre•-service cLeckout and testiAg, three taometer cables and one mag-
noto failed. The parts, except -or the magneto, were replaced through Air
Force obmnel".
OBSERVATIONs There appes-rs to be a problem on -opair parts
availability. The original contract vias amended to add spare parts and tools
but these items have yet to '.uxve. Detachment C-4 has instituted satisfac- _

tory controls on the airboats to insure proper utilization. Once training ,

"ha- been completed# the airboats vill be used in platoon elements of six
boats and attached for operations to the "A" detachments uhich need them. -
mitenance failities 41 be located at "B" and "C" detachment levels,
o. 11121 ADPPS. 5 Rad Sets (Source: Gp S-3) )
! OssIN: The 5th Special Forces Group (Airbon~e) has three
.AN'/PPF:-Q,, These sets have been deployed at the "A" detachment level since _
the•i receipt. The original set with a 1200 sweep hat b'en modified by an
attaciment which 6 ives the capability of a 3600, sweep. The sets have the
saze problems r, all other radars in that continual =aintelnance is necessary
to keep them :peratinnal. Replacement parts are not plentiful at this time
thus causing some delay in repairs wh" a set breaks down. The personnel to
-man the sets must be trained and ail&cited fro• Signal Company, 5th SFG
resources until the WOE authorizing additional personnel ir approved.
Theae sets are shifted as the thwoats in a given area increase and decrease. I -

OBSERVATICAG: These sets I ave proven to be extremely valuable

in assistinC the curtailment of VT movment in the vicinity of namps which
havA them. The sets have been rotatcA to new areas on an average of once
cach two mon;hs. The operators are profio.LeLt after about ten hours .n the
-et. The sets are down f'r maintenance apýproximately 1/5th of the time.

p. ILTJ: Night Observation Devices (Source: Gp S-3)

-DISCUSSION,: 5th SFGA has 25 starlight soopes. 24 short range ,
and onE medium range. These items huve been 'distributed to Tuhe, "A" detach-
ments for use on offensive operations and ambushes. The adjusatent knobs on ,
the short range scope wear out rather rapidly Pnd thus the replacement of , -
these is necessary, The medium range NOD is a great asset to a Special
Forces camp because the ,Aevice destroys the enamy's capability of movirg
undetocted into proximity of the camp undar OV&j of 'daznesso

"OBSTATJON1 It would be a tremendous asset if these itm im, I

be izsued to each in Vietnam.
amc-,a
S44 N

CO1gEuA
S• .. .. ••.•i
:•,
 Re port f6r
Oafa
-pe 15 November 1966
Period Ending 31 October 1966
W EST: Oporation.(
(RCS CSFmk-5) " QuErte-ay
.
*7 q. IT•'•; - LonShaft Motors (Source:. Dot C-4)
DI['CUS;1ON: A study was made by .Detachment 0-4 conce=ring
the use of long asaft motors to provide the power source for uaoving personnel
aad supplies via plastic assault boats and small sampans in the delta region
of Vietn•m, Two Briggs and Stratton engines axe coupled directly to shafts
101 in length driving 6" propellers. The aavngs in manpower and t'ime over
moving those items by paddle coupled withi the ease of obtalnin3•; apaxe parts
off of the local economy makes a favorable situation.
OBSERVATION: The project was not given favorable action because
a survey test conducted by ACTIV in July 1965 listed too many disadvantagesa
namoly: No way to turn a long shaft powered boat except by stopping the
engines and turning by paddle; long shafts are mush slower than outboard
motors; long shaft designs foul in reeds and rice paddies in shorter distances
than outboard motors; and finally because outboard motors are on band and
the Briggs and Stratten. engines would have to be pumchased.
To IEETL; 0hemiluminascev t Panels (Sourcet. Gp S-3)
DI_U'USSION: ACTIV save sixteen panels to 5th 0FGA for test
and evaluation. These items were broken down among the special mission
units of this organization, They were used by both reconnaissance and
combat small unit patrols and by paxsonnel on operations to mark resupply
drop zonea. The panels worked well except for acouple of factors. They
cannot be turfl',eLoff except by buxying them when the need for ill=Jmited
markers has passed. They do not funtion properly when wet
OBSERVATION: Any mission on ihich a Chemiluninesoent Panel
would be used can bL accomplished with a G.e flaahligit with appropriate
les covers.

a. IT.2.U: Site I B1loo6

T101r (Source: Op S-3)
DISCUSSION: Site Marker Balloons were given to the 5th 31G
by ACTIV for test and evaluation. The Site Marker Balloons wereused by
reconnaissance patrols 6f the special missions teams of this organization.
They wexe ,used for position fixes by aircraft to elimi te the excessive
asunt of traffic over the air when a ground team is given a fix by a PAC.
The balloons worked very well, the gas bottleks were fairly light and the
balloons easy to fill and ieal. The balloons could work their aW through
light and medium overhead canopy but could not get through heavy overhead
jungle camopy.
OBSERVATION; Use of these balloons could be a great aid in
certain terraisa
45
1C-fiWlnETiAl
 II
etor
(Rcs CSFxmR.65) Quarter1, Period Endi 31 October 1966

PART II - Beomendt ions

a. Communioations Traffic:

(1) Reference: Section 1, paragraph 9a.

(2) That action be taken to increase the number of long line
?oint-to-Point Circuits to meet the expanding requivments. throughout the
RVN, enabline this headquarters to establish a fixed station teletjpe com-
munications capability commensurate to its need.
b. Base Radio Cormunionaion System, ANI/Tsc-26(u)
(1) Referece: Section 1, paragraph 9b 6
(2) Recommend that a factory trained tech-rep Westrex Commun-
ications, IhQw Rochelle, N.Y., be provided to the 5th SEU (Abn) to assist in
the initial training of cadre personnel on the operations and malatename
of the AN/TSC-26 Radio Sets.

c.. AUiRC:Z4 Radio Set:

(1) References Section 1, paragraph 9c and i'nosure #8.
(2) Recommend that a representative from ECa Labs be made
aware of the development of the new light ueight rechargeable nickel-cadmi,
battery pack and that action be initiated to have then manufactured and
issued to Special Forces units in, quantity equal to thC =MMb of A/=.7
RaBio Sets on .and.
2. (C) Intelligence& !Ith the increase of various intelligence agencies
in Vietnam it is becoming -ppAza6t that there is a definite need for a type
of intelligence agency organized, for the purpose of collating all intelligence
gathered by these wirious agenc.es and making'it immediately responsive to
the needs of the local conrbat ".4it commanders. Organizations of this type
are the "C" detachment IAC "d "A" detachment CIC as previously discussed in
this report. It is recowend that similar organizations be established
within each Corps Tactical Zone so that all tactical units at every cozAmnd
level can be provided with timely intelligence fraw the =ay intellige--e
agencies rwithin the Corps,

/ FBA•L ."•

4j. Troop Dispositio iist Colonel

4-.ReAction. to Inel~neAna4ysi CcOnM'Sdi-

46

J _._
 1VGB-C
1 ovmer16
e iowl bport fbo Q=-t
SUJET ~ t COrl(ys Peid~ii 'g~~bx
amp Effectivekw'Aayi Cs 1-8 o22y)

Projct SGMAActivationi
Project DELTA ergnato
~*MACV Recondo Sdhool (Cys 1-8 only)
8. Zgiokel-Cadmium Battery frANi/Pz30,74 (Cys 1-8 only) .
90 "A Detachment CM 84ngHandbook (Cyp 1-8 only)
10.1 A eahet Handbo (dye. 1-8 only)
11. ,Cm adnn
12. VstrBriefings
13. 21st MiiayHistory Detachm2ent
14. re ee Magazine (Cys,1-8 only)
A%5 Ore o heOeen'Scarf
-16e Combined Intelli~gence Center
17. Consolidation of Intelligence Note
381", Spec"~ Forces Weather obserring Progam (Cys 1-ti on1v),
190, Info~iatiou Analysis Center (Cys 1-8 oa1~r)
20. L049 Range Recon Force Concoapt 7- -
7- obile Oi11Zri11A Forces --
-022.0 Viet Cong Camialties z:
-24. CIDG Casualtiee
25.- RF/PF casualties,
260pezations on Phu Quo
7.Joint Ki~nh Quan nI and Moo Hoa Operation
~28- Project 'WA After Action Re~rta Oyu ClI1nTO (Cys X_8
3 n
29.N~nki
& Lc SUoozS Sto]ry
30:- Dak ft Stwows SD4Jtory
31. Cambined Foraes Success Story-<=*-W-"*-
32. Kinli Q=a II &McesasStory
33. Legal Handbook (Cys 1-8 only)

34.~~~~~~~
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 COWFIDENTIAL

To QW A-SOS

MR KUM U.&C ,

"w...i@V UNSMISMI-S

ANNU~~~~~~
T P2TNA MP TOINLlN am
ANIM (A 4WU. Nmh N T S
3AM
MM3MM M Aj
KO it"NTJA
 CONFI DENTIALI
X CORPSI
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 CONFIDENTIAL
X~ CORPS
CA A3(-1
VON PHUC (A-430
THOUNO THOI (A-425) IN THAWN TWO* (A-413)

CHAUDOCMOC NOA (8-41)

%,,' 4 KIN

Tu a .- TUYI[M WHOM IA-41S)

Cho - h %

Ko~ -- 'S.
%- Lo 9 X-

/C "i T HOGUAM 29 A-416)

PHIU QUOC (A-42SI.
(A-427)--. s
PHU QUOC

HA TIEN (A- 41a1- -0

Log -w.*& TWO (C.4)

VINN GIA (A-41t).-

BA XOAI (A -4at)---

&IN" HUNS IA-41I)-_ aw

1. _ --IWTERNATIONALSOUNOARY
CORPSOIC BOUNDARY
-DISTRICT BOUNDARY
COASTLINE

ANNEX 4 TO INCLOSURE I TO OPERATIONAL REPORT

FORt QUARTERLY PERIOD gNIO IId 03101 3564ZIt
iROB Caron-EGo

CONFIDENTIAL
 REACTION TO INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

1. 1umse: The purpose of this analysis was to determine the effect-

iveness o operations in reopect to reaction to intelligenceo

2. Preparation: The analysis was prepared on a monthly basis, begin-

ning with January 1966 and oontinz~ng through Octobers An acetate overlay
was prepared listing all operations conducted in a one month period, and an-
other was prepared posting 0B information. By comparing the overlays in
ohronoloGical sequence, the pattern of offensive operations could be compared
to the reported location of VC forces. The general direction of operations
and location of VC umiits were then ioolated by the use of a specially pre-
pared template (Annex #1). To further propare the analysis for compactness
and dissemination to subordinate units, the overlays showing the operations
and the OB were photographed. The first photograph (Annex #2) showed the
operations conducted. The second photograph (Annex #3) showed the OB zid
the third photograph (Annex #4) showed the operations and 0B together.
3. Conduct of Analysis: To determine whether or not the detachments
were reacting to intelligence# the overlays were placed on the map with the
template on t-p. Through isolation by area of VC unit locations and oper-
ations conducteds, the determination was made. Pot eoznplet assuming that
an "A"l detachment reports VC units located in areas 2, 39 6, and 7, and the
majority of offensive operations also took place in those areas, it could
be assumed that the CIDG forces had been operating where they expected to
encounter VC fordes. If the majority of operations were taking place in
areas 1,4, and 8, then it would appear that the unit was not seeking out the
VC forces even though they were aware of the VC locations.
4. Conclusions: The analysis for each Corps Tactical Zone was ex-
pressed in percentages (Annex #5) of operations and intelligence reports
by area. The conduct of major US unit activities within camp TA'±t's which
tend to limit the scope of operations was taken into account. Also the fact
that operations into areas without intelligence indicators was considered.
Overall, the analysis proved highly successful in pointing out the camps
effectively controlling their area of responsibility as well as those camps
which displayed weakness. Based on this analysis, guidance was given to
those detachments requir14 itt and assistance, where needed, was given.

S57

2-1
Inclosure #2 to Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966
(RCS CSFOR-65)
 10I

58I

32--
CFIO-6I
(CS
196
0tobr
31
A~~~~ex~
2t #1tRPr frQatr, eidEd
~ ~rt~~ 1lsr
 - i7k- -* -

-~j14

ý404

NI
2-2-1
Ax~ex #2 to Inclosuwe #2 to Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending
31 October 1966 (ECS CSFOL-65)
 2+4

.- , **-5* *

of 4

- V .44

$ ,-4, ,,,, 4 • i
t
t 4.i 4
• -- - . - .,- •. .

-,-" -, -, . . . . - . !-, . -.

31 October 196 (RCS ..R.6.- - . S

oI
S ~I J

2-3-1
Annex #3 to Inolosure j• to00perational Report for Qtarterly Period Endiri•
31 October 1966 (ROS CSFOR-65)

80i
 H1A TIE-

I~~~~~**4ýt 4:.

2-4-1
Annex #4, to Inolosure #2 to Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending
31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)
 FE-E"TwrAXI OF PMERTAGE OF
NO, MAJOR OM ONNPE IN~ELL RPTS BY ARL " A)

A101 37 40%--40 o.0%-3,494

im m 24-4,5 2C%-5i9
20%,.2,6 3o/,.6ilo
20%-3,7 3A-/, 12
10%-7, 1

A-102 52 2V.-4,8 p2%-4jS

TnN PHUOC 25V%,7 30%45
25%.-2t6 30%-3,0'
20%.12C%-9,12

A-103 29 49J-415 25%-3

GIA VUC 25%-8,4 2-
20%w3 i7 2-
1W,;.-216 25%-10
A-104 29 40%-1;5 40i. ,5
EATA40-.3 i7 40%-3i7
116 - 2i6 1$-.2j6
10%-4,9 1c/34,B
A-105 20 45f%.1 i2 NO Signiificanit
XHM D3C 3%-M, lntell Rated
2Q•-.5,6,7,8 CC-3 or Higbeher
A-106 19 3/%-3,7 4%-5 ,9
BAT2 3c%.1 30%-3
i~26 2clN.6'

A-107 32 60%-1,2
TRA Box; 35%-3 i4 35%-4i8
5.-6,7 10Y5,7 ,1O0

A-108 LOCAL SCUBITY

NH LONG
A-109 29 4%-i 45%-4 ,8

2-5-1
kinex #5 to Inolosure #2 to Operationial Report for QuArterly Period Endiz~
31 Oatober 1966 (RCs CSFO..65)

-" 62
4
 CAMP EFFCTIVEN4ESS ANALYSIS3

1. pu-posur This analysis was conducted to determine the overall

operational effectiveness of each Speoial Forces caap throughout the Republic
of South Vietnan. Two factors were to be determined; first, was the camp

operating; and second, ware the operations effective?

2. Preparations "This analysis was prepared on a monthly basis, begin-

ning with January 1966 and continuing through October. Three graphi were
prepared for each cawp, commencing with January 1966 and allowing for con-
tinuation until July 1967, To complete these graphe, combat operation
statistios were extracted from existing records and plotted on the graphs as
follows a

a. Gra h # Thin graph contained the nwber of CIDG present for

duty (ucarleti; total oparations conducted (green); and total night operations
conducted (black). This gave a comparison of operations condaucted versus
present for duty strength. In addition it cvlpaxed night operations to total
operations conducted.

"b, Grah #2: This graph contained company operations conducted

(black); platoon operations (green); friendly initiated contacts (brown);
VC initiated contacts (scarlet); friendly casualties (blue); end VC casualtties
(red). This gave a comparison of the overall effectiveness of the operations
conducted in respect to the results attained.

a. Graph #s This graph contained company operations (black);

platoon opertions (grean); squad operations (red) ; company initiated con-
tacts (scarlet); platoon initiated contacts (blue); and squad initiated con-
tacts (brown). This gave a comparison of the three size operations to the
contacts made, determining which size operation (coompany, platoon or squad)
was more effective in obtainn results.

3. Conclusions: This analysis was successful in detezining the two

basic requirements, whether or not the oamp was operating and if the operations
were effective. Based on the results of this study, recommendations and guid-
ance was prepared and disseminated where needed, A complete set of graphs
wea prepared for each camp and was distributed to the appropriate "C" det-
achments for contimance of the study. An example of the graphs is shown
on the following pas (graphs omitted from copies 9 throughip).

3-1

Inclosure #3 to Operational Report for Quarterly PeXiod Ending 31 October 1966

(RCS oS oR 5) 6
631
-470 OP -

I~ dw

to 7

elk* ;11114' -

-- 7

11 4

IA-A

~-*~
~- 4&W
 230 ALua
"11f22

210 -

200

190

ISO
170

160j
150 ' -

180
13D

120j
110J
100

901
s0

70. 1

60

50

40--

20

10/ .

J F M A X J J A S 0 N D J F N X ,A J

I
 SECRET
PROJECT OLMGA

1. (C) GEWJSRAL: Per verbal instructions of COMUS•UCV to develop a

plan for the consolidation of all in-country DELTA type Special Force assets
in order to provide a responsive long range reoonnaisshco'and reactio fore
capability for the oos ndero of I Force V, Bad II Fero V, Project alJ - -

activated.

2. (S) OROANIZATION: Project OLMGwas organized as a modified "B"

dotachment, undet tho designation of Detachment B-50, 5th Special Forces
Group (Airborne), with the following elemonts organized from existing CIDG
assets:

3 Commando Compamies
1 Camp Defense Compaqy
0 Reconnaissance Teams (Recondo)
4 Roadrunner Teams
3- (C) AW-I!XI To provide lone range reconnaissance and reaction
force capabilitios for the commander of Force V, in conjunction with con-
vwntionol force operations.

4-1

Inclosure #4 to Operational Report for Quarterly Period Eding 31 October 1966

f SECRET
 SECRET
PROJECT SIGMA

S-
1. (C) GE L: Per verbal instmictians of CCUSUAOCV to develop ai
plan for the ocnsolidatico of all in-co try DELTA type Special Forces assets
in order to provide a responsive long range reconnaissanc6 and reaction force
capability f6k the commanders of I Fopoe V and II Force V. project SIG)&
was activated.

2. (S) ORGANIATIWK: Project SIGEA was organized as a modifiod "B"

Detaobmet, imder the desigaatian of Detachment B-56, 5th Special Forces
Group (Airboze), with the following elements organized from existing CIDG
assets:

3 Commando Companies
1 Camp Defense Company
8 Reonmnaissance Teams (Recondo)
4 Roadrunner Teams
3.. (C) VISSICf: To provide long range reconnaianmoe and reaction
force capabilities for the commander of II Force V• ki.oonjmotimn with
ocxventi.qa force operations.

5.1
Inclouure #5 to Operhtimal Report for Quarterly Period Bding 13 October
1966 (RCS CSFCEt-65)

SECRET
i8 GO7
 PRWET DEZALI
1. (C) GHTRIALs Por verbal instructions of CCNISCV to develop a
plan for the consolidation of all in-country DELTA type Special Forces assets
in order to provide a reaponsive long range recoaissance and oeaotion
force capability for the oadmaders of I Force V and II Force Vp project
DELTA was reorganizoed
2. (S) ORGANIZATICIS Project DELTA remained orgaazjmed as a miodified
"I'" Detachment, .widerthe designation of Detaobmnt B-52, 5th Special Faroes
Group (Airbone) with the following olements retained from existing DJLT!
assets:

91st Airborne Panger Battalion (6 companies)

1 Camp Defonse Company
12 Reconnaissan e Teams (Rewrdo)
5 CIDG ioadrwer Team
3. (C)' -SSICK: Project DELTA's mission ma realgiod to provide the
Senior Advisors of I and IV Corps Taotical Zones with lang range reconnaisaance
and interdiction capabiity and to fgther provide a HA7V Reserve capability
for in-O0,oZtry operations.

6-1

Inolopuro, #6 to Operational Report for Quarterly Period 1iding 31 October

1966 (CR0 CFOR.-65)

SECRET
0a
 THIS INCLOSULW OM.ITED FROM COPIES 9 T0UGH 50

S7-1
Inclosure #7 to Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October
1966 (RCS CSPOR.-65)
"G49-S-6
i 69
 TIMS
= WAS HMAI 1 gvA

DKO~E-- PRTIOALREOR 8UATEY~RIOD

FORI* PE OWIN
at mobu ") 213 IULUIz
 SECIET

* iua I196, (Osz2. w. 0. i~~

TMO I and) dirooted
tom saff'bodeveloP a xIwoDw
avalL
MWpas~i

2o W5 2w pup'Oow vu to prov~io aninem U PUx

VG t4M af UoS La? ~tG(zV Gaa aA &do1d in 5FA 31-168n~10
7.4 57) Goad be ewaio*sgaId tiraind and bucc~o ~anilable to

a r'esut of the 00MWV d~irect~ys a mawvy of in-ooit'

39 (5) Am
matet md won
-pbdt 4ooplsahd in oi'daa to sest~absh a fim
Immta of 41kawabin±ge
4. (a) In z'oopwu to this 1MWV mmvvo tho cos 5ti-i S1(hbn) 1st sF

aqa, ne
10t
~ WV&i
20t hay196 u lao~bI~to
(Soto x o5

C)
(3 Ae a zosult1 vorbal approval mms given to tho 00,0 5th SFGL by
01n. Wsal an 21 July~ 1966 to imitiato final y~r for' a IcMz2
Mapj Patrol Schwool. Izzitia1~y this school wo~uld trAin sWlotod por-
sca. f=~ COMMrtdnalm US urito that uars locatod In SMN
6.(3) on 4 sapt 1966a otficial N=;pprvva for apolv=mt 60
atmiet, aim. IRP School -. w samt to the Goo 5th sFU by imosag #' 4W%9

7. (5) Th mosO3a f-athroa dircted that tho sebool, would be I=

s az H=Bondo Scho a. =d that a ditdtiivt±
WMACT patch lxahd bo do-
admed. TWA patch to be mom~ orar by schwo1 lstractores Gbtxkat wb
gradted muccosat43,y f vmm thes coiwoo, and bv mw~berv of =Utvo- Lozg
aws Pa&vlo~i (SOO inal 71
SECRET
 i~ uooctod
~'g 1actefO*d tq& tbli job *am 0 at SQ

avO1-a to t~wGt 5h~ wa lot as to0&0cuab

Ltan~ia~y t~I~d
~~a~od ~ awt an nxad

In ixlu to UEw1L o2aoxua om~oiL~rs U2

ratAt~i

XMto= pb2s tto am (1) 1z~t ~ um

Uadd
cxurzazdw1

PorWino In acw' to oboozm and nR~m ca 4ZMo-aobooat o~

Afttwbod t cc 3U a aiat tho caft touoIW3dml.~

~.(U) an tinwt =AsaIO2I laocC tw 11WV amw Stoou-6f

bo= n 13qy Mtbhb (~57) axwf m

Caulo&dV
obaob0 we tdr"o a)

soAf n olv

be 5th ,W
 10d. (U) DuinaZ3 tho oo~w5 of ititu atudamto ium' tro1ed
Ia tri'od cmd iwovon wo~wdn m1 taclx.~po of long rortCo patr*MnaD
th~at haive Won capociaflly uucosaftl in tbo VSiot N= cont~ict. 09oo
±zml 5) Oditionallys thcy ivro ta4Ai tho uco if colocted pl.oeo
of oqiipiciA and Q1oola of tho tradow tht could waAeist tb= lin
~.o~lin1iKmt of tiolr Rocaosxim
~am=p (sec lzn 6)
110 (U) 0CC6 Wmmoa~rlmd =~do bin tirot of~cical visit, to tho
Hocmd Sdiool on 15 Sopt 66.) IVrtrv thxis vigdtip ho um rnsiofod on
tho atntuB and1 opora on of tho achool,, mw~o of atudmxts partia-

cm.wtod 1ty NeJ A.o, J*ut o' wem Imodato~t fbllomd

by a domnotratiu on tho uco of tho 1tOudre rJigo (Sw i±cl, 7)
Gone 1Wzo orol aOcUcq2aic- by Lt C.(x. So Larawi 1 00 IMf end
Cal Fo Jo, Ml1ys 00p 5th SMIO ait SF* =a than shom a rape O2±nbinW
-apo3Ump rd notrat5.on followod by a d -.-
tiled inapoctiorx arA om2.o-
mation of opocio2.37 ocloctod a±ond~t unad by moxwx~r of a M~cý'ndc)
T=m %A tiioV -ro aetualv cixi~aod ia cadat rcconansanc Cor -7t±j=0
(SooS ncl 6 andS.)
12o (U) Mudme thdim, vsit to thio ocdoo~ G=4,~xozo~x pk
to itho firat clam;, that %ma in movor4ionn ids apooch, ho. avtosood tho
value of -Wd the uraont nood for the knj; flao Patrol lIn SMVs; hmp by
miccoofui enlc~m-nt of LRR t~ho ozW could hz-ve msO cramd
CZ0?od
-fr .f1ro xn= bruCht ceaino b him iii eA uva %Aicr ho tbov~i1 ba %M
R*Ofbli Om lxa~van also o2~ii tho vo aod"iibh

ooin4 appmoI~atOu ton (10) your Q0o Thiio OonX1Mcain 0oxrls 10t16it
Alitwm *rd&L-Amoi 11o 1znIicctod thrat thowo rd c~rnrid tho moaninM of
1b~wmonozoo .JOc~±t~dv~thu -'.ots Ihrd hitUM acti4. thlat WOO
 13. (U) Zrn fgti oUfoan1 Hoomdo cimaz (aw)j67) jmum cc
10 (A %"t om.s o po= Auy ±t tirn wihat~m

To mun at the 2st~I kgwl;, Bo iza 1

~os~1~1'ot1a It 1, Urn 1VOCO

%dicAl GhM" GU Wýl%4C

(6 (sagZ)(
*I2 (=

ft OGCMMV Ift va* 4WN ahs Inv now wPi u

74

0 al
'13 SECRET
AVHCC.C*I (15 Nov 66)
SMJFCTS
let Wd
Operational Pfport-Leosons Learned for the Period Phndin
31 October 19A6 (RC?4 CVPJ-69)
I
HNW tAIRMMS, UIDT STATIT AP•M• VTPT•AM, APO San Wrancisco 96307
1 1 JAN 1967
10# Coqmander in Chief, United states Amy, Pacific, AT1'0t00t G0-OC
APO 96558
I. ?his headquarters has reviewed the Oterational Report-1oesons
Learned for the period eending 31 October 1966 from Headouarters, 5th
Special Forces Grout (airborne).
2a Pertinent comments are to followst

a. Reference Subraragraph 6 D, Part 1, Section 2t The 5th

Scecial Torces Grout has been issued 70 Starlight Scones. On 6 Jamsary
1967 they were authorized to requisition 30 more. Other units are known
to be experiencing similar difficulties. One, the ?75th Maintenance Bat-
talion, has submitted an bouiment Tunrovement Record (PIR) on the knob.
This headouarters has initiated a recommendation to the 5th Snecial
Poarces Grout) that it also sutbmit an !TR.
b. Reference Parsirath la, Part 11, Pape 46: Concur. Reouests
for Doint to point teletwyee circuits were sent directly to MACV J-6 for
action. Point to voint teletyve circuits have been installed ir the
followinp units: B-55, C-I, C-2, and C-3. The C-3 circuit was rMrovided
using 13 Field Porce Vietnam tactical assets. All others are using or
wil! use the M.S. The circuit to netachment C-4 (Can Tho) is rireentlv
not activated due to lack of available channels.
c. Reference Parapranh'1b, Pert TT, Pave 461 Concur. Mr.
Allphant Kubiluis, Lihon bystets, Inc, Westrx Comm Div, is due to arrive
by 9 January 1967. He will be assixned to the 5th 5vecial Forces Group.
His contract is valid until 31 July 1967.
4. Reference Parapranh Ic, Part TI, 'Pce 46t Concur. Cur-
rent product'nn of the A•/RC-74 incornorates a nickel-cadmium battery
case and BD.J18 mi-cad cells. In addition, the !lectronics Comuand has
devlovted a dry batte" pack using 2 BA-16's (AN/ORC-25 battery). The
new dry battery Pack should be available about l&th muarter, rV 67.

SECRET ,
UI-i;I;A VIF:IL'CI.ASSIi ED'I) w ,vI.. t..AT, S C T3-S-G7
FAUX LlwtAll ILL) iNLLOUMLU G4_5_67-

I
 SECRET

kAV1rC-m
SUBJ!T.
(15 %wo 66)
Ovorationa1 Re!n8wt-Lessbons Le'arned for the %Mwod %Adiw
31 octuber 1966 (im mlm-..65)
$
e. Referen~e 'Paragraph 29 Section~ TX, Pave lkt Concuir. The
gagiaewtation of 110 1inte11irence rwoisome1. for the 5th ~m19ta1 Fare"s
GmicD has been approved bv the %ecrstary of Do? mis*. De4moyment of
there r,.oomWel tis cheduled "or V' 67.
FOR 1'P COMANDF~t

Ai TmcIO
ne lot Lt. AGC
/Ales A~swo Gom

SECRET
FRO .'~ R
J1IATED

y-k~w1
 SECRET

8SU L U M: (.15
OPWOP-OT o p 11oV66)
erat o n a3 e oom 2d
wt -Dwb Le Ind
r e (C)
for "di o Par io dR Jin
31 October 1 R WlFoR-65) (U) - 5th 870, 1.st BY
IQ# 3 AR5 MCI•M * M aolAft
0 "a P 14 FEB1967 q

TO: Assistant chimp at Utmsn tbw l111s 1qmat k "Par tS t at thm

Az=W %hahjjjae, D. 0. 20sO
(C) This headquarters concurs in the basic report as indorsed
With the fol1oVing comments:
a. Reference: Paragraph 3a(3), Settion I, jw 4. The
revised MMV for 5th Special Forces Group in pending resolution at
Headqart8rs ARyV in order to stay vithin personnel ceiling.

b. Reference paragraph lid, Section 1, pap 25. 7he

revised FY67 Budget and FY 1968 Cm d Budget Estates submitted by
KACV vere approved by SECMW. The revision of the FY67 Badget provides
4 for 73 PPS-j Radar sets for 5th Special Forces Group.

FOR T CONAMM fIN CHIEF:

K 3I mdAu,
n"c
AGe

R~EGRADED COI•XIrNmA• WI
SEPARATD FROM SECRET
34 iniAtA
OPT AGO

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS3

DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS*
DOD DIR 520.010
SECRET
JQ USa,-Ad

I'

-Ad---