[G.R. NO. 139843.

July 21, 2005]

CONSUELO N. VDA. DE GUALBERTO, FE GUALBERTO-CHAVEZ, AMADOR GUALBERTO, CESAR

GUALBERTO, RODOLFO GUALBERTO, LUZVIMINDA GUALBERTO MIRANA, and VIRGINIA
GUALBERTO, Petitioners, v. FRANCISCO H. GO, RAYMUNDO J. GO, MIRIAM J. GO, MIRIAM G.
SON, VICENTE J. GO, BELEN GO, and ROSA JAVIER GO, Respondents.

An action for reconveyance of real property based on implied or constructive trust is not barred
by the aforementioned 10-year prescriptive period only if the plaintiff is in actual, continuous
and peaceful possession of the property involved. In DBP v. CA,16 the Court explained:

xxx. Generally, an action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust, such as
the instant case, prescribes in 10 years from the date of issuance of decree of registration.
However, this rule does not apply when the plaintiff is in actual possession of the land. Thus, it
has been held:

". . . [A]n action for reconveyance of a parcel of land based on implied or constructive trust
prescribes in ten years, the point of reference being the date of registration of the deed or the
date of the issuance of the certificate of title over the property, but this rule applies only when
the plaintiff or the person enforcing the trust is not in possession of the property , since if a
person claiming to be the owner thereof is in actual possession of the property, as the
defendants are in the instant case, the right to seek reconveyance, which in effect seeks to
quiet title to the property, does not prescribe. The reason for this is that one who is in actual
possession of a piece of land claiming to be the owner thereof may wait until his possession is
disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right, the reason for the rule
being, that his undisturbed possession gives him a continuing right to seek the aid of a court of
equity to ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect
on his own title, which right can be claimed only by one who is in possession."

G.R. No. 175073               August 15, 2011

ESTATE OF MARGARITA D. CABACUNGAN, represented by LUZ LAIGO-ALI, Petitioner,

vs.
MARILOU LAIGO, PEDRO ROY LAIGO, STELLA BALAGOT and SPOUSES MARIO B. CAMPOS AND
JULIA S. CAMPOS, Respondents.

As to when the prescriptive period commences to run, Crisostomo v. Garcia 82 elucidated as

follows:

When property is registered in another's name, an implied or constructive trust is created by

law in favor of the true owner. The action for reconveyance of the title to the rightful owner
prescribes in 10 years from the issuance of the title. An action for reconveyance based on
implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years from the alleged fraudulent registration or
date of issuance of the certificate of title over the property.1avvphi1

It is now well settled that the prescriptive period to recover property obtained by fraud or
mistake, giving rise to an implied trust under Art. 1456 of the Civil Code, is 10 years pursuant to
Art. 1144. This ten-year prescriptive period begins to run from the date the adverse party
repudiates the implied trust, which repudiation takes place when the adverse party registers
the land.83

From the foregoing, it is clear that an action for reconveyance under a constructive implied
trust in accordance with Article 1456 does not prescribe unless and until the land is registered
or the instrument affecting the same is inscribed in accordance with law, inasmuch as it is what
binds the land and operates constructive notice to the world.84

In the present case, however, the lands involved are concededly unregistered lands; hence,
there is no way by which Margarita, during her lifetime, could be notified of the furtive and
fraudulent sales made in 1992 by Roberto in favor of respondents, except by actual notice from
Pedro himself in August 1995. Hence, it is from that date that prescription began to toll. The
filing of the complaint in February 1996 is well within the prescriptive period. Finally, such delay
of only six (6) months in instituting the present action hardly suffices to justify a finding of
inexcusable delay or to create an inference that Margarita has allowed her claim to stale by
laches.

G.R. No. 148788               November 23, 2007

SOLEDAD CAÑEZO, substituted by WILLIAM CAÑEZO and VICTORIANO CAÑEZO Petitioners,

vs.
CONCEPCION ROJAS, Respondent.

A trust is the legal relationship between one person having an equitable ownership of property and
another person owning the legal title to such property, the equitable ownership of the former entitling
him to the performance of certain duties and the exercise of certain powers by the latter.21 Trusts are
either express or implied.22 Express trusts are those which are created by the direct and positive acts
of the parties, by some writing or deed, or will, or by words evincing an intention to create a
trust.23 Implied trusts are those which, without being expressed, are deducible from the nature of the
transaction as matters of intent or, independently, of the particular intention of the parties, as being
superinduced on the transaction by operation of law basically by reason of equity.24 An implied trust
may either be a resulting trust or a constructive trust.

It is true that in express trusts and resulting trusts, a trustee cannot acquire by prescription a
property entrusted to him unless he repudiates the trust.25 The following discussion is instructive:

There is a rule that a trustee cannot acquire by prescription the ownership of property entrusted to
him, or that an action to compel a trustee to convey property registered in his name in trust for the
benefit of the cestui que trust does not prescribe, or that the defense of prescription cannot be set up
in an action to recover property held by a person in trust for the benefit of another, or that property
held in trust can be recovered by the beneficiary regardless of the lapse of time.
That rule applies squarely to express trusts. The basis of the rule is that the possession of a trustee
is not adverse. Not being adverse, he does not acquire by prescription the property held in trust.
Thus, Section 38 of Act 190 provides that the law of prescription does not apply "in the case of a
continuing and subsisting trust."

The rule of imprescriptibility of the action to recover property held in trust may possibly apply to
resulting trusts as long as the trustee has not repudiated the trust.

xxxx

While implied trusts may be proved by oral evidence, the evidence must be trustworthy and received
by the courts with extreme caution, and should not be made to rest on loose, equivocal or indefinite
declarations. Trustworthy evidence is required because oral evidence can easily be fabricated.36 In
order to establish an implied trust in real property by parol evidence, the proof should be as fully
convincing as if the acts giving rise to the trust obligation are proven by an authentic document. An
implied trust, in fine, cannot be established upon vague and inconclusive proof.37 In the present case,
there was no evidence of any transaction between the petitioner and her father from which it can be
inferred that a resulting trust was intended.

As previously stated, the rule that a trustee cannot, by prescription, acquire ownership over
property entrusted to him until and unless he repudiates the trust, applies to express trusts
and resulting implied trusts. However, in constructive implied trusts, prescription may
supervene even if the trustee does not repudiate the relationship. Necessarily, repudiation of
the said trust is not a condition precedent to the running of the prescriptive period. 44 A
constructive trust, unlike an express trust, does not emanate from, or generate a fiduciary relation.
While in an express trust, a beneficiary and a trustee are linked by confidential or fiduciary relations,
in a constructive trust, there is neither a promise nor any fiduciary relation to speak of and the so-
called trustee neither accepts any trust nor intends holding the property for the beneficiary.45 The
relation of trustee and cestui que trust does not in fact exist, and the holding of a constructive trust is
for the trustee himself, and therefore, at all times adverse.

Second, the action is barred by laches. The petitioner allegedly discovered that the property was
being possessed by the respondent in 1980.47 However, it was only in 1997 that she filed the action
to recover the property. Laches is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to it has either abandoned or declined to assert it.48

Mendizabel, et al. vs. Apao, et al., G.R. No. 143185, February 20, 2006

An action for reconveyance of registered land based on implied trust prescribes in 10 years, the
point of reference being the date of registration of the deed or the date of the issuance of the
certificate of title over the property. This is especially if the plaintiff is in possession of the
property at the time of the filing of the complaint that the 10 – year prescriptive period applies
only when the person enforcing the trust is not in possession of the property. If a person
claiming to be its owner is in actual possession of the property, the right to seek reconveyance,
which in effect seeks to quiet title to the property, does not prescribe. The reason is that the
one who is in actual possession of the land claiming to be its owner may wait until his
possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right. His
undisturbed possession gives him a continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to
ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his
own title, which right can be claimed only by one who is in possession.

[ G.R. No. 227894, July 05, 2017 ]

JOSE S. OCAMPO, PETITIONER, VS. RICARDO[1] S. OCAMPO, SR., RESPONDENT.

The Facts

Petitioner Jose S. Ocampo and respondent Ricardo S. Ocampo are full-blooded brothers being sons of the late
[5]
Basilio Ocampo and Juliana Sunglao.

The present case arose from a complaint filed by respondent against petitioner for partition and annulment of
[6]
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 102822 ("Subject Property").

In the complaint, respondent alleged that he and petitioner are co owners of the Subject Property, which was a
conjugal property left by their parents, consisting of a 150-square meter lot and the improvements thereon located at
2227 Romblon Street, G. Tuazon, Sampaloc, Manila. The Subject Property was originally registered in their parents'
[7]
names under TCT No. 36869.

Respondent claimed that petitioner and his wife, Andrea Mejia Ocampo, conspired in falsifying his signature on a
notarized Extra-Judicial Settlement with Waiver ("ESW") dated September 1970, and effecting the transfer of the
property in the name of petitioner under TCT No. 102822, which was issued on November 24, 1970. Based on a
finding by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) that respondent's signature was forged, an Information was filed
against petitioner, the notary public, and two others. Respondent requested for partition of the property, but petitioner
[8]
refused to do so and secretly mortgaged the property for P200,000.00.

The Petition

Petitioner claims that the ESW, being a notarized document, enjoys a prima facie presumption of authenticity and due
execution. He claims that there was no clear and convincing evidence to overcome this presumption.

Even assuming that the ESW is void or inexistent, petitioner argues that the action filed by respondent is barred by
the doctrine of estoppel by laches. The ESW was executed and notarized on September 30, 1970. However, it was
only on July 1, 1992 that respondent filed the present case for partition and annulment of title, claiming that the ESW
was forged. Thus, petitioner argues that there was an unreasonable delay on respondent's part to assert his rights
and pursue his claims against petitioner.

The Issue

Petitioner raises the following grounds in support of his petition:

1. The CA erred in finding that the preponderance of evidence lies in favour of the view that the signature of
the respondent is not genuine.

2. The CA erred in sustaining that the ESW is a void or inexistent contract.

3. The CA erred in ruling that the action to declare the nullity of the ESW is not barred by laches.
Essentially, the principal issue in this case is whether or not the CA committed reversible error in upholding the RTC's
findings.
 The Court's Ruling

Prescription has not set in

We find it proper to delve into the more important issue to be resolved, that is, whether the action for annulment of
title and partition has already prescribed. It must be pointed out that the issue of prescription had already been raised
[24]
by petitioner in his Motion to Dismiss  dated August 5, 1992. This motion was granted by the trial court in its
[25]
Order  dated January 21, 1994. However, respondent appealed this Order with the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
[26]
No. 45121. The CA then rendered a Decision  dated March 30, 2001, nullifying the order of dismissal of the trial
court. The CA essentially ruled that the case for partition and annulment of title did not prescribe. The CA Decision
was eventually affirmed by the Second Division of this Court in G.R. No. 149287 by virtue of a minute
[27]
Resolution  dated September 5, 2001, which became final and executory and was entered into the Book of Entries
of Judgments on October 16, 2001.

Accordingly, the resolution in G.R. No. 149287 should have written finis to the issue of prescription. Nonetheless, to
finally put to rest this bothersome issue, it behooves this Court to further elucidate why the respondent's action and
right of partition is not barred by prescription. The CA explained that prescription is inapplicable. While the
appellate court's observation is proper, it is inadequate as it fails to sufficiently explain why the rule on the
imprescriptibility and indefeasibility of Torrens titles do not apply.

In the recent case of Pontigon v. Sanchez, We explained thus:

Under the Torrens System as enshrined in P.D. No. 1529, the decree of registration and the certificate of title issued
become incontrovertible upon the expiration of one (1) year from the date of entry of the decree of registration,
without prejudice to an action for damages against the applicant or any person responsible for the fraud. However,
actions for reconveyance based on implied trusts may be allowed beyond the one-year period. As elucidated in
Walstrom v. Mapa, Jr.:
[N]otwithstanding the irrevocability of the Torrens title already issued in the name of another person, he can still be
compelled under the law to reconvey the subject property to the rightful owner. The property registered is deemed to
be held in trust for the real owner by the person in whose name it is registered. After all, the Torrens system was not
designed to shield and protect one who had committed fraud or misrepresentation and thus holds title in bad faith. In
an action for reconveyance, the decree of registration is respected as incontrovertible. What is sought instead is the
transfer of the property, in this case the title thereof, which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another
person's name, to its rightful and legal owner, or to one with a better right. This is what reconveyance is all about.
Yet, the right to seek reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust is not absolute nor is it
imprescriptible. An action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust must perforce prescribe in ten
years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the property. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, an action for reconveyance of a parcel of land based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten (10)
years, the point of reference being the date of registration of the deed or the date of the issuance of the certificate of
title over the property.

By way of additional exception, the Court, in a catena of cases, has permitted the filing of an action for reconveyance
despite the lapse of more than ten (10) years from the issuance of title. The common denominator of these cases
is that the plaintiffs therein were in actual possession of the disputed land, converting the action from
reconveyance of property into one for quieting of title. Imprescriptibility is accorded to cases for quieting of title
since the plaintiff has the right to wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is questioned before initiating an
action to vindicate his right.[28] (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
Given the falsity of the ESW, it becomes apparent that petitioner obtained the registration through fraud. This
wrongful registration gives occasion to the creation of an implied or constructive trust under Article 1456 of the New
[29]
Civil Code.  An action for reconveyance based on an implied trust generally prescribes in ten years. However, if the
plaintiff remains in possession of the property, the prescriptive period to recover title of possession does not run
[30]
against him. In such case, his action is deemed in the nature of a quieting of title, an action that is imprescriptible.

In the case before us, the certificate of title over the subject property was issued on November 24, 1970. Yet, the
complaint for partition and annulment of the title was only filed on July 1, 1992, more than twenty (20) years since the
assailed title was issued. Respondent's complaint before the RTC would have been barred by prescription. However,
based on respondent's submission before the trial court, both petitioner and respondent were residing at the subject
property at the time the complaint was filed.