Friends and Foes: Human Rights, the Philippine Left and Duterte, 2016-2017

Jayson S. Lamchek and Emerson M. Sanchez

Abstract

The Philippine left’s short-lived high-level association with the government of Rodrigo
Duterte from 2016 to 2017 vexed scholars and observers, whether sympathetic or critical
to the left. Against the charge that the left was simply subordinated as a political force to
Duterte’s multi-class populist or fascist project, the paper argues that the left during this
period was both friend and foe of Duterte, the president who promised both an aggressive
War on Drugs and socio-economic reforms. It situates the left-Duterte relationship within
the history of progressive engagement by new political actors with elite democracy in the
Philippines since 1987. The friend-and-foe or dual strategy analysis recovers some of the
richness of the left’s engagement with Duterte. This contributes to Philippine political
history by providing a profile of progressive engagement involving a set of actors
different from those that have been previously analysed, viz., national democrats rather
than social democrats and an increasingly authoritarian administration explicitly
espousing anti-human rights rhetoric. We specify the conditions for the emergence of the
left-Duterte relationship, its unfolding in key issues, and the tipping points that led to its
collapse. The findings underscore the complexities and extreme difficulty of transforming
Philippine politics through progressive engagement.

Keywords: human rights, Rodrigo Duterte, authoritarianism, militant left, dual strategy

Introduction

The Philippine left’s short-lived high-level association with the administration of Rodrigo
Duterte, forged at the beginning of his presidency in 2016 and formally dissolved in
2017, vexed scholars and observers. An observer sympathetic to the left said leftists

1
never believed Duterte’s own claim to be the country’s “first leftist president” (Palatino,
2017). For Bello (2019, p. 109), a critic of the militant left, leftist leaders in Duterte’s
Cabinet provided a “left gloss” to Duterte’s highly original brand of fascism which also
featured a heated middle class and an ideologically incoherent populist political style.

How shall we make sense of the left-Duterte relationship? In this paper, we provide a
view of the left-Duterte relationship that highlights the left’s dual strategy towards
Duterte, or what we call a friend-and-foe relationship. We focus on the period from the
start of Duterte’s term in June 2016 when prominent leftist leaders joined Duterte’s
Cabinet until leftist lawmakers from the Makabayan bloc in the House of Representatives
bolted out of the administration’s super-majority coalition in September 2017. We argue
that the militant left was both friend and foe of the Duterte administration during this
period. The emphasis on the left’s use of a dual strategy enables a more capacious view
of this relationship. Previous commentators (Bello, 2017; Holmes & Thompson, 2016)
have tended to emphasise that the left’s alliance with Duterte demobilised or neutered left
criticism of Duterte’s War on Drugs. In this paper, we consider that issue and also go
beyond it by looking at whether and how the left influenced policy making and
implementation towards its own agenda. Thus, we situate the left-Duterte relationship in
a broader inquiry into progressive engagement with the political system in the
Philippines.

This paper situates the left-Duterte relationship in the larger canvass of Philippine
political history. The left-Duterte relationship is part of a history of progressive
engagement by non-traditional or new political actors with the Philippines’ elite-
dominated political system since the restoration of formal liberal democracy by the 1987
Constitution. Alliances between social movements and the Philippine government are not
new. In the past, groups with radical and transformative agendas had some form of
alliance with previous administrations, e.g., during the terms of Ramon Magsaysay
(1953-1957) (Clarke, 1998), Corazon Aquino (1986-1992) (Clarke, 1998; Grodsky,
2009), and every administration since (Clarke, 1998; Eaton, 2003; Franco, 2004; Juliano,
2015; Reid, 2008). After the downfall of Marcos in 1986 until Duterte’s ascent to power

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in 2016, moderate progressive movements engaged successive administrations striving
for a liberal democratic image. At the end of Noynoy Aquino’s term in 2016, progressive
engagement with government had been largely reduced to semiclientelist relations (Reid,
2008) between traditional politicians and leaders of NGOs and POs from the social
democratic and independent socialist stream (socdems, for short). Aquino’s successor
Rodrigo Duterte represented a very unusual opportunity and risk as subject of progressive
engagement. Duterte was a new kind of politician who capitalised on his signature
political style marked by his aggressive “War on Drugs” and anti-human rights rhetoric
to take on more established elite families with larger electoral machineries. During the
presidential campaign, Duterte also made bold pronouncements proclaiming the desire to
end long-standing armed conflict with communists through peace negotiations, and to
pursue many elements of what can be regarded as a progressive agenda.

Moreover, the non-traditional political actors that were positioned to engage Duterte in
2016 were newer, in sense that they were not the socdems. Instead, they were the militant
left, which we simply call “left” in this paper, a network of groups and individuals
ideologically aligned with the national democrats (natdems). The natdems pursue
different forms of contention with the state, including armed struggle. The Communist
Party of the Philippines (CPP) has been waging one of the world’s longest Maoist
uprisings since 1968 through its armed wing, the New People’s Army (NPA), and its
underground united front, the National Democratic Front of the Philippines (NDFP).
Organisationally distinct from the CPP-NPA-NDFP, political parties, non-government
organisations (NGOs) and people’s organisations (POs) within the militant left also
mobilise for the transformation of Philippine society into a “national democracy” but
through street protests and legislation. Foremost of these groups are the coalition
BAYAN (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, New Patriotic Alliance), and the leftist bloc in
parliament called MAKABAYAN (Makabayang Koalisyon ng Mamamayan, Patriotic
Coalition of the People). Moreover, the natdems carry out advocacy and activism for
human rights that are at odds with Duterte’s anti-human rights rhetoric. The paper thus
contributes to Philippine political historical scholarship by offering a profile of
progressive engagement that was especially fraught.

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With the forging of an alliance between the left and Duterte in 2016, the militant left was
thrust into an engagement or association with government at a high level similar to where
the socdems had been in post-Marcos administrations. In contrast to socdem-government
formations, however, the left-Duterte relationship was a more fraught political formation
because of the militant left’s more radical socio-economic agenda and the Duterte
regime’s explicit anti-human rights rhetoric. As allies, the natdems could test and
translate Duterte’s pronouncements into progressive policies through not only
cooperation but also contention (see Table 1. Cooperation and Contention between the
Militant Left and Duterte: Selected Issues and Events, July 2016 to Sept 2017). However,
Duterte’s aggressive approach to illegal drugs also tested the militant left’s ability and
willingness to champion human rights.

Our understanding of the militant left as both friend and foe of the Duterte administration
is inspired by the dual strategy analysis in social movement scholarship. Social
movements often simultaneously cooperate and contend with state institutions, i.e., they
make use of a “dual strategy” (Cohen & Arato, 1992). Since the 1990s, social movement
scholarship showed the engagement strategy of social movements with formal state
institutions (Goldstone, 2004; Oommen, 1990; Giugni & Passy, 1998; Santoro and
McGuire, 1997). Earlier scholarship commonly depicted social movements that mounted
contentious collective action outside state institutions (Tilley, 1993). Schlosberg and
Dryzek (2002), however, described the environmental movement in the United States as
using a dual strategy. As the state’s position on environmentalism changes, the movement
can favour cooperation over contention or vice versa. Suh (2011) also used the concept of
dual strategy to explain the actions of the feminist movement in South Korea. She said
that a dual strategy is possible with democratisation (as one of the conditions), where an
open state and democratic parties enable social movements to take part in authoritative
institutions (Suh, 2011). Our case is distinct from the cases examined by Schlosberg &
Dryzek (2002) and Suh (2011), in terms of the structure of the movement and the
political context. First, both studies (Schlosberg & Dryzek, 2002; Suh, 2011) examine
cases of movements with distinct groups pursuing either contention or cooperation with

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the state. In contrast, our case features groups pursuing cooperation and contention who
belong to the same collective. Second, the cases of Schlosberg and Dryzek (2002) and
Suh (2011) are set in a fairly democratic context, while ours is situated in a context with
authoritarian tendencies, in particular, a penchant for explicit anti-human rights rhetoric.
These two differences make our case’s informal alliance more untenable and susceptible
to have a tipping point leading to a breakdown of the engagement.

“New Actors” in Philippine Elections and Government, 1986-2016: Situating the

Natdems in the History of Progressive Engagement with Elite Democracy

This section relates the ascent of the left in the period from 1986-2016 as “new actors”
trying to transform elite democracy through the political system. Among the most
important questions for research into post-Marcos Philippine politics is “whether new
actors in civil society can effectively challenge traditional actors in political society in
ways that lead to democracy's consolidation” (Eaton, 2003, p. 470). Scholars agree that
the downfall of the Marcos dictatorship led to the restoration of an elite democracy, that
prevailed before Martial Law, in which a few clans or dynasties dominated politics and
policy making. Traditional politicians (or trapos, a pejorative term which means
“dishrag” in Filipino) make use of extensive clientelist relationships with local power
brokers to obtain votes in exchange for particularistic favors and to thwart progressive
legislation. (see e.g., Anderson, 1988; Sidel, 1999; Wurfel, 1988) At the same time,
however, new actors emerged in the scene after 1986 who were dedicated to reforming,
transforming or overthrowing the political system, including human rights organisations.
The emergence of new political actors raises the question of what impact they have on
the system.

This question has often been considered in relation to non-government organisations

(NGOs) and peoples’ organisations (POs) of the social democratic or independent
socialist varieties (socdems). Socdems have embraced the argument that for progressives
to have an impact, they must propose policies and actively engage policy implementation
rather than merely “expose and oppose”, which was the dominant mode of political

5
action during the authoritarian period. (Constantino-David, 1994; Silliman & Noble,
1998) In pursuit of such a strategy, these actors have mobilised to elect their
representatives or allies in elective posts and have also sought appointments in key
government posts. (Eaton, 2003; Franco, 2004; Quimpo, 2005)

Given the historical domination of the electoral system by traditional actors, the 1987
Constitution, which was drafted with the participation of new actors, reserved a space
within the political system for non-trapos through the party-list elections. The
Constitution modestly provided that 20% of seats in the House of Representatives shall
be filled by representatives of marginalised sectors of society to be elected through the
party-list system. The electoral efforts of new actors have subsequently focused on
building parties for party-list elections. However, the party-list system has major flaws as
a vehicle of progressive engagement with the political system. It has only been
implemented through legislation in 1995. Moreover, the enabling law imposes substantial
impediments on participating parties, providing that no party may get more than three
seats, awarding one seat to a party for every 2 percent of the votes cast that it obtains.
Thus, smaller parties have been prevented from gaining a seat while supporters of bigger
parties have either been limited to the maximum three seats or forced to disperse their
efforts by forming several parties. (See, e.g., Franco, 2004, pp. 117–118) More
perversely, groups associated with elite-dominated parties or trapos have been allowed to
contest party-list seats since 2007, turning party-list seats from counterweight to
extension of trapos’ power and influence. The trapos’ capture of the political system is
further sealed by the blockage of the anti-dynasty law, another key constitutionally
mandated political reform. (Eaton, 2003)

The fate of NGOs and POs who have gained access to power in successive post-Marcos
administrations through appointments in executive positions are thus also important to
analyse. Following on their success in opposing Fidel Ramos’ attempt to extend his term
of office through constitutional change, well-known NGO leaders were rewarded with
Cabinet positions in the Joseph Estrada government. Most notably, Estrada named
Horacio “Boy” Morales, a former communist organiser and president of the NGO

6
Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement, as Secretary of the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR). Estrada also appointed Leonor Briones (Secretary of Education), Edicio
dela Torre (chairman of the Technical Skills and Development Authority) and Karina
Constantino-David (head of the Housing and Urban Development Coordination
Committee). The appointment of these new actors into key positions accomplished little
in terms of their reform agenda; on the contrary, through them Estrada burnished his pro-
poor image (Reid, 2008, p. 22) even while anti-reform elite interests dominated his
government’s policy-making. Land distribution actually declined under Morales’ DAR
(Morales & Putzel, 2001, pp. 3–15; Reid, 2008, p. 24), frustrating high expectations from
peasant groups for vigorous implementation of the land reform law. (Franco, 2004, pp.
118, 124) Indeed, as Estrada’s corruption became harder to ignore, socdems increasingly
emphasised the oppositional mode of political mobilisation honed during the Marcos
years. This was exemplified in Constantino-David’s resignation from the Cabinet and
culminated in the EDSA II uprising, in which the socdem NGO-PO coalition Kompil II
played a leadership role in street mobilisations.

In the succeeding Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo administration, socdems again filled the top
ranks of a number of government agencies, but that they fared better than their
predecessors in their transformational goals is debatable. Most notably, Corazon “Dinky”
Soliman, former national secretary of the Caucus of Non-Government Development
Organisations (Code-NGO), was appointed to head the Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD). Arroyo also appointed Teresita “Ging” Quintos-Deles to head the
National Anti-Poverty Commission (NAPC), and Alberto Gonzales as special adviser. In
these roles, they pushed for the implementation of a marginal government program of
targeted spending on a small number of villages, even while the Arroyo government’s
neoliberal economic policies deepened inequality. Controversially, Code-NGO’s close
ties with the Arroyo government helped it raise 1.4 billion pesos through the Poverty
Eradication and Alleviation Certificate (PEACe) bonds to fund its projects. (Clarke,
2013, pp. 82–87)

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The relationship between trapos and socdems during the Estrada and Arroyo
administrations is insightfully summed up by the term “semiclientelism” (Reid, 2008).
By this term, Reid highlighted the incorporation of new actors into extensive clientelist
relations. Trapos secure the new actors’ loyalty and support in exchange for limited
access to power and resources. In this arrangement, trapos take advantage of the
fracturing of radical class-based demands into the particularistic project-based interests of
development NGOs and their client communities in order to convert new actors into
another pillar of elite democracy. (Reid, 2008, pp. 19–20, 29, 36)

The succeeding Benigno Aquino administration only serves to strengthen the dismal
record of socdems’ engagement with trapos thus far. Akbayan, the political party
founded by socdems and ex-natdems, formally allied with the Liberal Party and
supported Aquino’s presidential candidacy. As a result, it was rewarded with government
posts including the appointment of former Akbayan presidents Roland Llamas and Joel
Rocamora as Presidential Adviser and Secretary of NAPC, respectively; former party-list
representatives Mario Aguja and Daniel Edralin as members of boards of Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS) and Social Security System (SSS), respectively; and
Risa Hontiveros as member of the PhilHealth board; among others. Despite access to
President Aquino, Akbayan’s leaders struggled to deliver meaningful gains for its mass
bases, including the substantial implementation and extension of the agrarian reform law,
an end to labour contractualisation, and the protection of striking workers of Philippine
Airlines (Juliano, 2015, pp. 30–33). Many within and outside the party thought
Akbayan’s close association with trapos had a modulating or “demobilizing effect” on
their reform advocacies (Juliano, 2015, p. 31). So disillusioned were unionists, peasants,
fisherfolk, and indigenous peoples within its ranks that its coalition partners the rural
sector organization PAKISAMA left Akbayan while the labor federation SENTRO
vocally called on it to ditch the alliance with Aquino (Juliano, 2015, p. 30).

While the socdem and independent socialist project faltered, the natdems have made
parallel and vigorous efforts to try and make use of the same channels of reform within
the political system. However, the political activities of the natdems have attracted less

8
thought from scholars, except primarily to disparage them for their “instrumentalist”
approach to democratic exercises (Quimpo, 2005). The prevailing orthodoxy looks at the
natdems as not genuinely interested in democratisation but only in seizing power through
an outdated vanguardist and Maoist revolutionary model. After 1986, scholars focused on
explaining the rapid decline and marginalisation from politics of the Communist Party of
the Philippines (CPP) largely in terms of internal rifts, ideological weaknesses and
strategic mistakes (P. Abinales, 1996; Reid, 2008; Rocamora, 1994). Often noted in this
regard is the CPP’s “error” in boycotting elections before the fall of Marcos, illustrating
how ideological rigidity and disdain for bourgeois elections led to missing out on a share
of power (Weekley, 1996).

However valid those analyses may have been, the fact remains that natdem parties, NGOs
and POs have also endeavoured to promote concrete alternative policies derived from
their program of national democracy through electoral struggle and legislation. The
continued armed struggle by the CPP-NPA gave these militant leftist groups opportunity,
through the peace negotiations, to advance more radical and redistributive goals. The
militant left pressed for peaceful negotiated settlement of the armed conflict between the
government and the NDF, considering negotiations as a unique opportunity to obtain
major and comprehensive concessions from the elite classes. Socdems in government
also supported peace negotiations, often as negotiators for the government side, but
primarily with the more limited view of obtaining the pacification of the countryside for
development projects.

Moreover, the militant left did not wither away as critics had predicted or hoped, but had
slowly regrouped. And despite being targeted for violent repression for being “fronts” of
the CPP, they had won mass support that eclipsed that of the socdems. The natdems
resumed participation in elections with the creation of the Partido ng Bayan (PnB) as
early as 1987, fielding candidates for both houses of Congress (Quimpo, 2005). Bernabe
Buscayno, founder and former commander of the New People’s Army, the CPP’s armed
wing, led the PnB ticket running for Senator. The PnB was unsuccessful - managing to
elect only two candidates in the lower house - in part because their campaign was the

9
target of harassment and violence. Two candidates were gunned down within months of
the election; Buscayno barely survived an assassination attempt (Coronel et al., 2004).

In 2001, the militant left formed Bayan Muna and vigorously participated in the second
partly-list elections. Bayan Muna gathered less votes than PnB in 1987 but still emerged
with the largest share of party-list votes in 2001 (more than 1.7 million votes). It eclipsed
the performance of the socdems who had prioritized electoral struggle from the
beginning. While garnering 11.3% of the votes cast in that election, Bayan Muna’s
representation in the lower house was limited to the maximum three seats provided by
law (Eaton, 2003, p. 480). In the succeeding party-list elections, the militant left
increased their seats in the lower house by dispersing their efforts into several party-list
organisations, reaching eight seats by 2007 and a cumulative vote of three million for the
Makabayan bloc in 2010. Bayan Muna also fielded candidates for the Senate by entering
into alliance with traditional parties; in the 2016 elections, its Senatorial candidate Neri
Colmenares lost but finished 20th place with 14.48 % of the votes cast (Coloma, 2019).

In its electoral struggle, the militant left is faced with the same limitations encountered by
NGOs and POs discussed above. Additionally, left-wing party-list organisations have the
handicap of being targets of military counterinsurgency operations. Thus, the very
survival of the militant left in the open political arena through to 2016, not to mention
their positioning as the leading non-traditional actor to engage the newly elected
administration in 2016, was an astonishing albeit little-noted event.

Indeed, the exclusion of left-wing parties in the political arena is an important theme in
Philippine history, beginning with the exclusion of the Democratic Alliance (DA) that
then fed into the continuation of armed struggle by the Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan
(HMB) (Quimpo, 2005, pp. 7–8). It is a theme that continues with Philippine
counterinsurgency targeting aboveground natdems, feeding into the CPP-NPA rebellion.
In hindsight, this theme was only briefly interrupted with the left-Duterte relationship. In
2001, the militant left had been in the forefront of mobilisations and street protests
against the Estrada administration and had supported the ascendancy of Gloria

10
Macapagal-Arroyo through street mobilisations culminating in the EDSA II uprising.
Thus, Arroyo had initially accommodated calls from the militant left to negotiate
demands for thoroughgoing reforms through the peace negotiations with the NDF.
However, talks quickly broke down. As Arroyo sought to consolidate military support for
her regime, she renewed and expanded counterinsurgency to include Bayan Muna and
other aboveground left-wing groups with assistance from the United States’ global
counterterrorism campaign. (Amnesty International, 2006; Holden, 2009; Lamchek,
2019, pp. 60–65; McCoy, 2011, p. 498ff) This resulted in hundreds of deaths and
disappearances of left-wing activists. Left-wing legislators were charged with conspiring
to topple the government alongside leaders of the CPP-NPA-NDF before the case was
thrown out by the Supreme Court. (Amnesty International, 2006, pp. 11–12)
Transnational human rights mobilisation aimed at stopping the killings, culminating in
the visit and damning report by the United Nations special rapporteur Philip Alston,
raised the cost of such violations. This moved the succeeding Benigno Aquino
administration to adopt a security strategy that officially confined counterinsurgency to
the CPP-NPA-NDF; killings of leftist activists somewhat abated though did not
completely disappear.

Emergence of the Left-Duterte Relationship in 2016: From Davao to the Cabinet

One may ask how was an alliance possible between Duterte and a left movement that saw
itself as a radical democratising force, given Duterte’s open endorsement of mass killings
and anti-human rights rhetoric? Duterte’s history of cooperation with the natdems and
progressive elements of his campaign pronouncements were key.

Duterte had been successful in working with natdems while Duterte was mayor of Davao
City. This working relationship with Mayor Duterte existed despite his notoriety for
supporting and fomenting drug-related extrajudicial killings. According to Teddy Casiño
(2016), militant left groups expressed “principled opposition” to killings, but still worked
with Mayor Duterte on other issues. In Davao, NGOs’ and POs’ engagement with
Duterte resulted in establishing some social programs in the city (Palatino 2017).

11
Importantly, Duterte has also facilitated the release in Davao City of high-level military
captives of the CPP-NPA, furthering the peace negotiations with the Philippine
government. Duterte was closely associated with Leoncio Evasco, a former communist
rebel whom Duterte met while he was a public prosecutor and whom he recruited to be
his chief of staff when he became mayor. Duterte was also a student of CPP founder Jose
Maria Sison, and became a member of the leftist youth organisation Kabataang
Makabayan (Patriotic Youth). During the presidential campaign, Sison expressed
glowing personal endorsements of Duterte and his good working relationship with the
left, even though the Makabayan bloc officially supported the candidate Grace Poe. Sison
viewed these credentials as good reasons to believe that peace talks could be successfully
pursued with the Philippine government should Duterte be elected.

Furthermore, some of Duterte’s campaign promises aligned with the left’s agenda.
Duterte made campaign pronouncements to “end labour contracting”; criticised the
environmental costs of large-scale mining; showed antipathy towards the country’s
alignment with the United States, promising “independent foreign policy”. He also
promised to make food and healthcare affordable and accessible. Most importantly,
Duterte promised to restart the peace talks with both Moro separatists and communists
engaged in armed conflict with the government, and to release political prisoners.

Duterte’s gestures towards the left became more convincing when Duterte asked the CPP
to nominate individuals to his cabinet, resulting in the appointment of well-known
natdem activist leaders. Peasant movement leader Rafael Mariano was appointed
secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR); former community organiser
and professor Judy Taguiwalo as secretary of the Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD); and former leftist party-list representative Liza Maza as secretary
of the National Anti-Poverty Commission (NAPC). These appointments mirrored those
of Boy Morales (DAR); Dinky Soliman (DSWD); Ging Deles and Joel Rocamora
(NAPC) in previous administrations, and indicated a new high level of association with
government for the natdems. While appointments of socdem leaders to these position had
been rewards for political support for the appointing presidents, Duterte’s appointments

12
of natdems was meant to jumpstart peace negotiations with the National Democratic
Front of the Philippines (NDFP). Duterte also released CPP officials Benito and Wilma
Tiamzon from detention.

An Explicitly Anti-Human Rights Rhetoric: the Challenge for the Left

This section discusses the “War on Drugs”, a key flashpoint in the left-Duterte
relationship. An explicitly antagonistic rhetoric towards human rights was an integral part
of Duterte’s signature governance style. And since the left held itself out to be an
advocate of human rights in the country, particularly in the context of counterinsurgency,
human rights issues tested the left’s relationship with Duterte in a fundamental way.
Logistical challenges also meant the left’s response had been subject to delay. This
section thus provides deeper context that allow an appreciation of the very fraught nature
of the left-Duterte relationship.

A. Setting the Scene: Duterte’s Challenge to Human Rights

A few remarks about the level of (dis)respect for human rights in the Philippines in 2016
will help add some depth to the challenge faced by the left as a champion of human rights
in its relations to Duterte. When the War on Drugs emerged in the Philippines, human
rights had already been battered by post-9/11 political rhetoric that disavowed the
applicability of human rights standards to the fight against terrorism. (Dunne, 2007). This
was justified supposedly because terrorism posed a new kind of threat that required
radical departures from existing legal standards (de Londras, 2011; McKeown, 2009).
Having been the main targets of counterterrorism since the Arroyo administration with
US support, the natdems are well aware of the connection between discourse explicitly
antagonistic to universal human rights, on the one hand, and violence, on the other hand.
The natdems had been part of campaigning that led to the push back from international
human rights advocates for more human rights-friendly pronouncements about the need
to counter terrorism while respecting human rights (Lamchek 2019, 145 ff; Flynn, 2007;
Foot, 2007; United Nations General Assembly, 2006). However, Duterte’s illegal drug

13
war reignites a war on human rights, replacing “terrorism” with the supposedly
extraordinary threat posed by illegal drugs. It brazenly tramples on human rights by
disregarding due process as understood under both international and Philippine laws and
blatantly attacking human rights defenders.

The lack of due process stems from the extreme punitive rhetoric of Duterte’s War on
Drugs that, first, arguably allows law enforcers to kill suspects. Killings have never
before been endorsed as a solution to street-level crimes; thus, the policy and Presidential
rhetoric represent a new nadir in punitive language. The government provides only a
semblance of legal justification which comes short of acknowledging the extralegal
nature of the killings that have been committed by police in the execution of the War on
Drugs. Second, in official rhetoric, there is no distinction made between the bigger
syndicates, small-time peddlers, and even drug users – everyone is equally condemned to
be targeted, indicating a new lack of regard for the need to weigh individual
responsibility.

Unsurprisingly, Duterte adopted a combative stance against human rights advocates. He

accused human rights activists of aiding the drug trade and threatened to use violence in
order to silence them. The few politicians, like Senators Leila de Lima and Antonio
Trillanes, who have offered pointed and sustained criticism of the drug war have been
targeted for silencing.

Compounding the challenge for the militant left within the Duterte government is the
apparent popularity of the War on Drugs. Despite the human rights issues detailed above,
a poll conducted (Social Weather Stations [SWS], 2017) one year into the police-led
campaign found strong public approval for the drug war. According to the survey, a clear
majority of Filipinos (77%) were satisfied with the campaign against illegal drugs (SWS,
2017). This rate roughly corresponds with perception that the campaign is effective in
reducing the number of drug abusers. Seventy one percent (71%) thought that there were
less drug addicts in their area compared to six months earlier. The survey findings also
indicate that although respondents prefer due process and many doubt that those killed

14
actually fought against the police, and although there is awareness that the poor were
targeted, many respondents still support the War on Drugs.

Undoubtedly, Duterte appealed to the hidden worries of Filipinos about the proliferation
of illegal drugs, a concern very seldom elevated into an electoral issue. Many of Duterte’s
supporters felt newly empowered through his can-do attitude (Curato 2017), which
furthermore defied legal and constitutional restrictions and the liberal democratic ethos of
post-Marcos national politics. However, Duterte did not merely tap into the public’s
latent anxieties but fostered and grossly exaggerated them. He elevated the drug problem
as an existential issue of national security. To justify a crisis response, the extent of the
drug problem was greatly magnified; furthermore, Duterte offered an overblown but final
solution, saying he was willing to slaughter millions. In his first State of the Nation
Address in June 2016, Duterte made the estimate that 3.7 million Filipinos were drug
addicts. So serious is the sway of drugs, he says, that the country was in danger of turning
into a “narco state” (Quimpo, 2017).

B. The left’s human rights work

The left’s human rights work, a regular feature of natdem activism since the period of
Marcos’ authoritarianism in the 1970s and 1980s, places the left in a precarious
relationship with Duterte. Despite the rapport achieved as a result of the adoption of
confidence-building measures in the resumption of peace talks between the Duterte
government and the communists, leftist commitment to a left-Duterte alliance was far
from stable. The War on Drugs was a potential spoiler for the alliance.

Leftists were pioneers in human rights work and have built the first human rights
organisations in the Philippines. Silence over or acquiescence to the drug war and its
brute enforcement would contravene the left’s commitment to human rights principles, or
at least the reputation of its human rights organisations. Notwithstanding the left’s high-
level association with Duterte, it was expected of leftist human rights organisations to
speak out and act against the drug-related killings. However, it should be considered that

15
there are some contextual differences between the state’s political killings and drug-
related killings that presented logistical challenges for these human rights organisations.

Leftists pioneered human rights work in the Philippines when they founded the Task
Force Detainees of the Philippines during the Marcos regime (Clarke, 1998). The
organisation’s growth from the 1970s was due to the backing of the Catholic Church,
underground activists, and foreign funding (Clarke, 1998). Later, other human rights
groups were organised, foremost the militant left-allied group Karapatan. The brutal
repression of dissent during the Marcos dictatorship meant that documenting and
campaigning against extrajudicial killings were a staple of human rights work since the
1970s. In the Arroyo administration (1998-2004), an aggressive government
counterinsurgency policy that targeted above-ground legal organisations of the left
triggered a spike in extrajudicial killings of leftist activists. Hundreds of leaders and
members of peasant organisations, workers unions, church groups, and party-list groups
were killed in military operations. Because of this work, extrajudicial killings have been
an issue close to the left as leftists have traditionally been the foremost victims, at least
until the War on Drugs.

The work of these human rights organisations sometimes seized national and
international attention. Years of documentation by Karapatan and other groups and
transnational campaigning work that, at its peak, involved the United Nations special
rapporteur Philip Alston, successfully put a spotlight on the phenomenon and raised the
stakes for the violators. Outside of the state and the media, leftist human rights
organisations were the only entities with any sort of capacity or experience documenting
massive human rights violations of any kind, especially for the purpose of future legal
prosecution.

Because of the militant left’s human rights work, they were expected to be a staunch
critic of the War on Drugs and to use their resources to help victims and their families.
Nevertheless, there were differences between extrajudicial killings in the
counterterrorism context, which leftist human rights organisations were accustomed to,

16
and the extrajudicial killings in the new context of the War on Drugs. First, in the
counterterrorism context, the families of victims would often themselves belong to
political organisations, a fact which facilitated their speaking out against the perpetrators
of the violations. In contrast, police often chose victims of drug-related killings for the
very low likelihood of their families making any sort of complaint; thus, the very poor
have been more often victimised. This then means that documenting witnesses’
testimonies and obtaining evidence has been more challenging, since paralegals and
lawyers first need to establish rapport with victims’ families, who are often too afraid to
speak out. Second, in terms of sheer number, the drug-related killings are of a different
order of magnitude than the counterinsurgency killings. Thus, taking on the task of
documenting them in the traditional way, i.e., the taking of sworn statements from
witnesses, would stretch any organisation’s capabilities. These factors undoubtedly
contributed to slowing down the response on the part of leftist human rights organisations
in the opening salvo of the War on Drugs. However, they did not erase the basis for an
oppositional position. In any case, leftists did eventually find ways to work around these
obstacles.

Friend and Foe: A Dual Strategy towards the Duterte Administration

A. Friendship constrains: the militant left’s restrained opposition to the “War on

Drugs”

Did the left’s alliance with Duterte constrain it in its human rights advocacy role? This
key question illustrates the friendship aspect of the friend-and-foe relationship between
the left and Duterte. In the early days of the alliance, some observers noted that the left’s
appetite for critique, particularly its advocacy of human rights as against the drug war,
was dampened by appointments in the administration (for example, Holmes &
Thompson, 2016). One may ask if this criticism of the left is warranted. The militant left
actually issued statements expressing their opposition to the “War on Drugs” as soon as
Duterte took his oath of office. What is uncharacteristic is their lack of street protests in
the early months of the Duterte administration, particularly from July to November 2016.

17
A cursory inventory of their responses to the drug war from June 30, 2016 to August
2016 show that certain leaders of the left initially defended Duterte from allegations of
extrajudicial killings (see e.g., ABS-CBN News, 2016). On July 1, 2016, the CPP also
issued a statement heeding Duterte’s call to support the anti-drug campaign in the
countryside, but said they will target drug lords and syndicates, not drug users, and called
for due process in anti-drug operations (Communist Party of the Philippines, 2016). But
as soon as Duterte took office and in the succeeding weeks, the militant left’s tone
became more clearly contentious, as they called for due process to be upheld, spoke up
against the killings, and expressed unequivocal condemnation of the drug war (Sanchez,
2017, 289–90). The CPP also later condemned the drug war, calling it “anti-people” and
“undemocratic” (Bueza, 2016).

The left quickly became contentious, in clear language, to the excesses of the drug war as
soon as Duterte assumed office. Critics of the left, however, ask why then did natdems
remain in Duterte’s cabinet and why did the Makabayan bloc not bolt out of the pro-
administration supermajority coalition with elite political parties in the House of
Representative until 2017? For Bello (2017), Duterte was able to use the peace talks as
leverage for compromises from the left. Thus did Duterte “subordinate the militant left as
a political force” (Bello 2017, 85–86). We offer a different interpretation of the events to
Bello’s view that Duterte simply subordinated the left, though Duterte certainly tried to
do so. Instead, in the next section, we highlight the left’s contention against the Duterte
administration even as it considered Duterte an ally. (See Table 1) The section further
substantiates the argument that the left was both friend and foe, engaging in both
contentious and cooperative actions to advance its own agenda.

B. Testing friendship: the left’s dual strategy in key socio-economic issues

Certain socio-economic issues, viz., free mass housing for the urban poor, land reform,
and undercutting pork barrel for legislators, provided the left with opportunities to test its
friendship with the Duterte administration. Their conduct reveals and emphasises the
contention part of the friend-and-foe relationship.

18
During the campaign, Duterte promised progressive reforms and reached out to the left.
The left reciprocated with supportive pronouncements, and symbolically, by refraining
from street protests directed at Duterte. Most conspicuously, on Duterte’s first State of
the Nation Address in July 2016, the natdems did not burn an effigy of the President as
had been customary, with street rallyists proclaiming the rally was not “anti-
administration” (Cruz, 2016).

However, at the same time, BAYAN opposed the continuation of neoliberal economic
policies (Sanchez, 2017). IBON Foundation (2016), a think tank close to the natdems,
underlined the incongruence between Duterte’s campaign pronouncements on labour
contracting and national industrialisation and the actual policies pursued by his economic
officials. The CPP and the NDFP voiced total rejection of Duterte’s neoliberal economic
policies by proposing a Comprehensive Agreement on Socio-Economic Reforms
(CASER) through the peace talks with the Duterte government.

Notwithstanding the appointment of natdem leaders in the Duterte cabinet, Reyes

clarified that BAYAN has not given up contention with the state. “We are more than ever
determined to arouse, organize and mobilize now given the favorable conditions,” he said
(Viray, 2016, para. 3). He added that they will continue to fight against policies and
programs that are unfavourable to the masses and continue their presence in the streets.
Reyes further emphasised the continuing need for thoroughgoing reforms that were
negotiated with the revolutionary left. He said, “the [CPP] and the revolutionary forces
could not just lay down their arms and join the government without having any
meaningful peace agreement, because that would be capitulation” (Viray, 2016, para. 7).

While the natdems short of enshrined the peace talks as the most crucial venue for
achieving thoroughgoing reforms, some militant left groups also tested the possibilities
and limits of the left-Duterte alliance in other ways. An example of this was Kadamay,
the movement of informal settlers advocating for free mass housing for the poor. In
March 8, 2017, informal settler families organised by Kadamay took over some 5,000

19
idle public housing units in Pandi, Bulacan. Kadamay had discovered that some 15,000
public housing units in Bulacan alone were unoccupied for years by the intended
beneficiaries, police and military personnel, who had rejected the housing units for being
substandard. Fruitless negotiations with the government’s housing agencies since July
2016 for idle houses to given to informal settlers led to the takeover. NAPC Secretary
Lisa Maza had supported and joined the Kadamay mobilisation. Eventually, Duterte
agreed to assign the idle units to the occupying families. But in the same breath, Duterte
vowed to repel further takeovers of idle assets by force, rebuking Kadamay’s act as
“anarchism”. (Arcilla, 2018; Dizon, 2019; Orejas, 2017; Pasion, 2017) The episode
showed that Duterte meant to draw clear boundary lines for further natdem
experimentation.

The pattern of pushing boundaries and being either rebuked or frustrated by lack of
support from Duterte is discernible in other high-profile moves of the natdem Cabinet
members. As Secretary of Agrarian Reform, Rafael Mariano urged Duterte to order a
two-year moratorium on the conversion of land to non-agricultural uses which would take
out lands from coverage of the agrarian reform law. Mariano had also ordered an
inventory and revalidation of converted lands with the aim of recovering undeveloped
lands for distribution to the landless. (Mayuga, 2017) Mariano’s proposed moratorium
had met with strong opposition from Duterte’s economic team and Duterte eventually
rejected the draft executive order to this effect. As DSWD Secretary, Judy Taguiwalo had
introduced changes to pre-existing welfare programs meant to undercut their use in
perpetuating patronage politics and corruption. She ordered field office staff to disregard
referrals made by legislators in identifying beneficiaries of welfare assistance and relief
under the Protective Services Program. She also proposed to review the implementation
of the former president Aquino’s flagship conditional cash-transfer program to the
poorest families to prevent corrupt practices. (Espina-Varona, 2016) These moves tended
to disrupt the use of these funds as pork barrel, and trapos quickly perceived them as
such. Duterte’s lack of support for these daring moves ensured that in the ensuing conflict
with trapos at the legislature over the confirmation of their appointments, the leftist
Cabinet appointees were defenceless.

20
The challenge in the dual strategy of social movements is in effectively balancing
cooperation and contention to achieve relevant gains and to avoid costly disadvantages.
The existence of natdems in government and in the pro-administration supermajority
coalition in Congress could have given them access to resources and opportunities to
push for reforms as the socdems had in previous administrations. Previous trapo
administrations had rewarded socdem leaders with limited access to resources in order to
incorporate them into preexisting clientelist relations. The natdems may have been
similarly recruited, but their attempts at reform using their alliance with Duterte met with
less hospitality from elite actors. The conduct of the drug war, Duterte’s top priority, was
immune from their influence as critics. As for the peace talks, upon the success of which
thoroughgoing socio-economic reforms largely depended at least from the viewpoint of
the natdems, these too were subjected to uncertainty notwithstanding a glowing start. As
Duterte increasingly pivoted towards a military approach to the revolutionary left, the
natdems in government and Congress could only but plead with him for more patience
with the peace negotiations. The situation changed in November 2016.

Tipping Point: Resuming Radical Opposition to Authoritarianism

An event that decisively broke the friend-and-foe relationship between the left and
Duterte occurred on November 18, 2016, when the Marcos family, with Duterte’s
authorisation, buried their late patriarch, president-dictator Ferdinand Marcos, at the
Heroes’ Cemetery. Given the historical animosity between the left and the Marcos
administration, the burial of Marcos in the Heroes’ Cemetery was a contentious issue in
the left-Duterte alliance; indeed in hindsight and in a sense, the most contentious one.

Many observers saw the Marcos burial as payback for Imee Marcos’s contribution to
Duterte’s campaign funds, an unprincipled act that offended many people who sacrificed
a lot in the anti-dictatorship struggle. Duterte’s decision contributed to the rehabilitation
of the Marcos family and clearly displayed his approval of authoritarianism. BAYAN
categorically opposed conferring “any official honors for the dictator Marcos, whether as

21
a hero, soldier, or former president” (Sanchez, 2017, 293). Progressive groups attempted
to block the burial, but the Marcos family, supported by the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, swiftly buried the former dictator. BAYAN took an active role in the protests
that afternoon. A few days later on November 25, BAYAN organised their first protest
against Duterte, calling on the public to hold him accountable for the burial (Sanchez,
2017).

Street protests by militant left groups over the Marcos burial prompted or allowed more
radical expression of opposition over other issues for the left. Most notably, on
December 10, BAYAN and its allies organised a huge street protest for International
Human Rights Day. Their demands included “an end to impunity in the war on drugs, as
the death toll rises and as state agents are emboldened by presidential pronouncements”
(Sanchez, 2017, 294).

The relationship between Duterte and the militant left worsened in the succeeding
months. Drug-related killings continued to escalate. Progressive cabinet members were
not confirmed by the Commission of Appointments. The peace process had been very
shaky. Militarisation of the countryside escalated as the administration attacked militant
left activists, including human rights organizations. Finally, in September 2017,
Makabayan bolted out of Duterte’s super-majority coalition. These events taken together
showed a full breakdown of the alliance took place.

The militant lawmakers’ statement announcing their separation from the super-majority
coalition encapsulated the left’s experience during the Duterte administration. The
militant lawmakers said they initially supported Duterte for his progressive promises.
However, they said the administration unravelled into a “fascist, pro-imperialist and anti-
people regime,” because Duterte halted the peace talks, declared martial law in
Mindanao, and pursued a foreign policy dependent on China (Cayabyab, 2017, para. 2)
“Worst of all, his ‘war on drugs’ has turned into a campaign of mass murder of the poor,
for which he shows no signs of turning back.” (Cayabyab, 2017, para. 7).

22
Conclusion

The Philippine left’s dual strategy did not result in its becoming institutionalised to any
degree comparable to the Korean women’s movement (Suh 2011) or the mainstream of
the US environmental movement (Schlosberg and Dryzek 2002). While the employment
of a dual strategy makes the institutionalisation or mainstreaming of the left movement
possible, this outcome remains precarious. This is because, as Suh (2011, 445)
emphasizes, “movement institutionalization is a consequence of concurrent strategic
choices and strategic alignment by both parties”, i.e., the social movement and the state.
Inclusion does not ensure influence. Where the state does not see the social movement as
linked to any of its core imperatives, the social movement’s capacity to influence policy
will be severely limited to the level of symbolic recognition or marginal rewards
(Schlosberg and Dryzek 2002, 789).

Our friend-and-foe analysis of the militant left’s actions towards the Duterte
administration in the period covered shows that the left’s opposition to drug-related
killings, while clear, was restrained by their avoidance of street protests. However, it is an
exaggeration to argue that Duterte simply subordinated the left as a political force. The
left continued contentious actions against neoliberal economic policies and at various
times tested the boundaries of the alliance to actualise Duterte’s promises of progressive
reforms. However, given the clearly widening disparity between Duterte’s progressive
promises and what he has been able to deliver, the left’s strategy of cooperation and
contention with Duterte could not last. The War on Drugs continued to take its toll in the
tens of thousands and defined the regime. Duterte also failed to champion the left’s
proposed socio-economic reforms. It simply became untenable for the left to justify their
high-level association with Duterte. The Marcos burial issue tipped the scales toward
radical opposition for the left, leading to the severing of their alliance with Duterte
several months down the road.

The breakdown of the left-Duterte alliance can bode well for resisting human rights
violations. If polling data are to be believed, there is substantial public approval for the

23
War on Drugs despite substantial disbelief in police denials of extrajudicial killings,
despite substantial awareness that it is the poor who suffer the brunt of the killings, and
despite almost universal preference for keeping suspects alive. The saddening but
inevitable inference is that many people accept killings because they think the War on
Drugs works – scaring addicts out of existence or at least out of sight – and that collateral
damage is unavoidable. The left’s capabilities and deep experience in exposing and
challenging extrajudicial killings and organising victims of abuse are important assets in
countering government propaganda and people’s apathy towards victims of the War on
Drugs. For the left, responding effectively to the challenge of the War on Drugs would
mean that leftist human rights advocates are expanding their work to champion victims
who have been targeted not because of their political activities but for their own sakes.
That leftists are already doing this is evident in their role in organising families of victims
of drug-related killings, who under the banner of Rise Up for Rights and for Life, filed a
communication in August 2018 with the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court.
Leftists are also instrumental in mobilising lawyers and paralegals under the banner of
MANLABAN (Mga Manananggol Laban sa Extrajudicial Killings or Defenders Against
Extrajudicial Killings) who now represent many of these families in demanding justice
(Espina-Varona, 2017).

From a broader view of the history of progressive engagements with post-Marcos

administrations, the failure of the left-Duterte alliance also underscores and confirms the
extreme difficulty of pursuing reform of and within the Philippines’ elite democracy. To
the militant left, alliance with Duterte represented an opportunity to achieve substantial
concessions from elite classes through peace negotiations and high-level policy making
or implementation. On hindsight, its calculation may have been rather too wishful, having
failed to take into account Duterte’s own need for bases of power from the military and
police establishments as he battles other elite families and establishes himself as the
national boss. (Kreuzer, 2017) As the Philippines lurches even more clearly towards
authoritarianism, radical opposition not progressive cooperation will become more
relevant.

24
Acknowledgement

The authors thank the editor and the anonymous reviewers for their useful feedback. We
are grateful to Anabelle Ragsag for referring us to relevant sources. For helpful
comments on an earlier version of this article, we also thank Selen A. Ercan, and the
organisers and participants of the workshop on “New Challenges for Rights and
Consciousness and Civil Society in Asia” held at the University of Melbourne’s Asia
Institute in 2018.

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Table 1. Cooperation and Contention between the Militant Left and Duterte: Selected Issues and Events,
July 2016 to Sept 2017

PEACE TALKS
DATE COOPERATION CONTENTION
25 Jul 2016 In his first State of the Nation Address, Duterte
declares a unilateral ceasefire with the CPP-NPA-
NDF.
21 Aug 2016 Government declares ceasefire in
response to the CPP declaration of a
seven-day ceasefire before the first round
of peace talks
10 Oct 2016 Agreement reached on a framework for the
Comprehensive Agreement on Social and
Economic Reforms (CASER) with the broadly
worded objectives
08 Dec 2016 Duterte says he had given the NDF “too much,
too soon”; conditions release of 130 political
prisoners on the NDF signing a bilateral ceasefire
deal.
Feb 2017 Duterte terminates the peace talks; NDF
consultants arrested
May 2017 Acrimony heightens as NPA escalates attacks in
Mindanao following Duterte’s Martial Law
declaration there
05 Dec 2017 Duterte formally designates NPA a terrorist
group
WAR ON DRUGS
DATE COOPERATION CONTENTION
01 Jul 2016 CPP accepts Duterte’s call for assistance in the But CPP calls for due process in police
War on Drugs. operations.
07 Jul 2016 BAYAN calls for due process and investigations
of extra-judicial killings.

12 Aug 2016 CPP calls the War on Drugs “anti-people”.

10 Dec 2016 Leftist-organised street protest against drug-

related killings and attack on activists; effigy—a
fascist monster—symbolising “Duterte’s
authoritarianism” burned
25 Feb 2017 Leftists join protest against War on Drugs and
Duterte’s authoritarianism during the anniversary
of EDSA uprising.
Sep 2017 Leftist-organised protests sparked by the killing
of Kian delos Santos

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LAND REFORM
DATE COOPERATION CONTENTION
06 Sep 2016 Mariano bares DAR plan to distribute 400,000
hectares to beneficiaries by 2019 that can
potentially be disagreeable to land-owning
politicians; urges Congress to pass bill providing
for free land distribution to qualified beneficiaries
12 Sep 2016 Duterte convenes the highest agrarian reform
policy-making body the Presidential Agrarian
Reform Council (PARC), after ten years of
inactivity. Following the meeting, Mariano says
Duterte fully supports agrarian reform and
announces that DAR is drafting an Executive
Order (EO) for the President’s signature
suspending land conversion for two years.
14 Sep 2016 First draft EO halting land conversion submitted
to Duterte; Mariano orders review and
revalidation of converted lands for reversion to
beneficiaries
Oct 2016 Duterte’s economic secretaries and Vice
President and housing chief Leni Robredo oppose
moratorium
05 May 2017 Duterte’s daughter Mayor Sara Duterte joins
opposition to Mariano’s appointment as DAR
Secretary before the Commission of
Appointments (CA)
06 Sep 2017 Mariano’s appointment rejected by CA

HOUSING FOR URBAN POOR

DATE COOPERATION CONTENTION
Aug – Oct Kadamay consultations on “Relocatees Agenda”
2016 with relocated urban poor families in Bulacan
and other homeless living in the vicinity
30 Aug 2016 On a visit to Saint Martha Homes relocation site,
Bulacan, Housing chief Leni Robredo discusses
“Relocatees Agenda” with Kadamay. In a speech,
Robredo bares that 80% of public housing for
police and military personnel were unused and
lay idle even as construction of socialized
housing was already off-target by 5 million
houses.
05 Sep 2016 “Manifesto of unity” between Kadamay and
chiefs of housing agencies

06 Nov 2016 Kadamay’s Urban Poor Summit attended by

6,400 members
02 Dec 2016 Robredo’s agency agrees to distribute idle public
housing units to urban poor

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05-06 Dec Kadamay’s Urban Poor March to Malacañang
2016 Palace seeking direct dialogue with Duterte;
Duterte snubs request
08 Feb 2017 Duterte attends National Housing Authority
(NHA)-convened Housing Summit but
Kadamay’s proposal was not discussed

08 Mar 2017 10,000 families occupy idle public housing units

in Bulacan
13 Mar 2017 Duterte calls Kadamay action “anarchy” and
threatened eviction
27 Mar 2017 Dialogue between the NHA and Bulacan
occupants result in occupants’ agreement to
undergo validation
04 Apr 2017 In a speech during the Philippine Army's But Duterte vows to crush further takeovers
Anniversary in Fort Bonifacio, Duterte
announces occupants can stay in housing units
PORK BARREL AND WELFARE ASSISTANCE
DATE COOPERATION CONTENTION
04 Jul 2016 Taguiwalo announces intention to shift DSWD
approach from targeted assistance to universal
social services that can potentially be
disagreeable to politicians.
26 Jul 2016 Taguiwalo announces no new beneficiaries under
DSWD’s conditional cash transfer program PPPP
pending its review for corruption
06 Aug 2016 Taguiwalo issues Memorandum Circular (MC)
No. 9 to curb “aid patronage” directing DSWD
field staff to disregard referral letters from
legislators and officials evaluating assistance
requests under the Protective Services Program
21 Sep 2016 Taguiwalo grilled over MC 9 by Congressmen in
budget hearing
05 Nov 2016 Commission on Audit recommends continuation
of moratorium on accepting new PPPP
beneficiaries following performance audit
17 Feb 2017 Solicitor General recommends acquittal of Janet
Napoles, jailed mastermind of largest pork barrel
scam
16 Aug 2017 Taguiwalo rejected by CA

MARCOS’ BURIAL AT THE HEROES’ CEMETERY

DATE COOPERATION CONTENTION
07 Aug 2016 Duterte authorised the interment of Marcos Sr. at
the Heroes’ Cemetery, a move opposed by the
militant left.
Aug – Sep The Supreme Court heard oral arguments after

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2016 six petitions were filed against Marcos’s
interment at the Heroes’ Cemetery. Leftists and
Martial Law victims were among the petitioners.
10 Nov 2016 The Supreme Court ruled in favour of the
interment of the former dictator at the Heroes’
Cemetery.
18 Nov 2016 The Marcos family, with support from the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, swiftly interred the
former dictator’s body at the Heroes Cemetery.
Sporadic protests erupted in the afternoon. Bayan
said in a statement: “It is a wakeup call. Years of
political accommodation and the failure to
achieve true justice have brought us here. When
we say ‘never again,’ we say it with a greater
sense of urgency because a Marcos restoration
has just become very real” (Sanchez 2017, p.
300).
25 Nov 2016 Bayan held its first major protest directed against
Duterte, dubbed #BlackFriday, demanding justice
for all Marcos human rights victims and all the
victims of continuing human rights violations and
state fascism. They called on the public to hold
Duterte accountable for his actions.

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