Daf Ditty Yoma 7: Tzitz and Tefillin

Rabbi with Tefillin 1925

Jan Styka (April 8, 1858 in Lemberg – April 11, 1925 in Rome) was
a Polish painter noted for producing large historical, battle-piece,
and Christian religious panoramas.

He was also illustrator and poet. Known also as a great patriotic speaker - his
speeches were printed in 1915 under the French title L'ame de la Pologne (The
Soul of Poland).

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The Gemara proceeds to analyze the tannaitic dispute between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda.
Abaye said: In a case where the front plate broke, everyone, including Rabbi Shimon, agrees
that the front plate no longer effects acceptance.

When they disagree is in a case where the front plate is not on his forehead but is hanging on a
peg. Rabbi Yehuda holds that the verse:

‫ ְוָנָשׂא ַאֲהֹרן‬,‫ֵמַצח ַאֲהֹרן‬-‫ ַﬠל‬,‫לח ְוָהָיה‬ 38 And it shall be upon Aaron's forehead, and Aaron shall
‫ֲﬠ ֹון ַהֳקָּדִשׁים ֲאֶשׁר ַיְקִדּישׁוּ ְבֵּני‬-‫ֶאת‬ bear the iniquity committed in the holy things, which the
‫ַמְתּ ֹנת ָקְדֵשׁיֶהם; ְוָהָיה‬-‫ ְלָכל‬,‫ִיְשָׂרֵאל‬ children of Israel shall hallow, even in all their holy gifts; and
‫ ְלָרצוֹן ָלֶהם ִלְפֵני‬,‫ִמְצחוֹ ָתִּמיד‬-‫ַﬠל‬ it shall be always upon his forehead, that they may be
.‫ְיהָוה‬ accepted before the LORD.
Lev 28:38

“And it shall be on the forehead of Aaron and Aaron shall gain forgiveness for the sin committed
in the sacred things”

means that the front plate atones for sin as long as it is on his forehead.

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And Rabbi Shimon holds that emphasis should be placed on the end of that verse: “It shall be
always upon his forehead that they may be accepted before the Lord.” From this, Rabbi Shimon
derived that the front plate always effects acceptance, even when it is not upon the High Priest’s
forehead, as what is the meaning of the word always in the verse?

If we say that it means that the front plate must always be on the High Priest’s forehead, do you
find that situation in reality? Doesn’t he need to enter the bathroom, when he must remove the
front plate bearing the name of God? Similarly, doesn’t he need to sleep, at which time he
removes the priestly vestments?

Rather, it means that the front plate always effects acceptance, whether or not it is on his
forehead.

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The Gemara asks: And according to Rabbi Yehuda as well, isn’t it written: “Always”? Clearly
it does not mean that the front plate must always be on his forehead. The Gemara answers: That
term: “Always,” teaches that the High Priest must always be aware that the front plate is on his
head, and that he should not be distracted from it. This is in accordance with the statement of
Rabba bar Rav Huna, as Rabba bar Rav Huna said: A person must touch the phylacteries
on his head and on his arm each and every hour, to maintain awareness of their presence. This is
derived by means of an a fortiori inference from the front plate:

Just as with regard to the front plate, which has only one mention of God’s name, the Torah
said: “It shall be always upon his forehead,” teaching that that he should not be distracted
from it, with regard to phylacteries, which have numerous mentions of God’s name in their
four passages from the Torah, all the more so one may not be distracted from them.

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The Gemara asks: And according to Rabbi Shimon, who says that the verse: “It shall be always
upon his forehead,” teaches that the front plate effects acceptance even when it is not on the High
Priest’s forehead, isn’t it also written: “On his forehead…and shall gain forgiveness”? The
Gemara answers: That verse comes to establish the place where the High Priest should position
the front plate, not to indicate that it effects acceptance only when it is on his forehead.

Summary
The tzitz effects acceptance for the blood, meat or cheilev of an offering that
became tamei.

A Baraisa states that the tzitz effects acceptance for the blood, meat or cheilev that became tamei
and then the avodah was done. This law applies whether the blood, meat or cheilev became tamei
unintentionally or internationally, through a mishap or willingly, and whether the offering was
offered by an individual or by a community. Thus, we see that even a communal offering is
acceptable in a state of tumah because of the tzitz. If tumah was permitted for the community, we
should not need the tzitz to effect acceptance for communal offerings.

The tzitz only effects acceptance of a private sacrifice.

The Gemara answers that when the Baraisa states that the tzitz effects acceptance, this is only
regarding a private offering, and communal offerings are only mentioned to teach us that they are
also valid whether they became tamei unintentionally, intentionally, through a mishap or willingly.
Whereas private offerings dependent on the effect of the tzitz, communal offerings are valid
because tumah is permitted regarding the community.

The tzitz can effect acceptance for a communal sacrifice that does not have a
fixed time.

Alternatively, the Gemara answers that the Baraisa is referring to communal offerings but it is
referring to offerings that do not have a set time. These offerings, even when brought for the
community, do not override the laws of tumah, so they will only be valid through the effect of the
tzitz and only when the offering itself is tamei.

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The tzitz only bears the sin of tumah.

It is said regarding the tzitz it shall be on Aharon’s forehead, so that Aharon shall bear a sin of the
sacred offerings. This teaches us that if the avodah of a sacrifice is done in a way that is normally
forbidden, the tzitz removes the invalidation and makes the offering acceptable. The verse cannot
be referring to the sin of piggul because it is already said regarding piggul, it shall not be accepted,
which means that the offering is invalid. The verse cannot be referring to nossar, because regarding
an offering that is nossar it is already said it shall not be considered, which means that this offering
is invalid. We must therefore assume that the verse refers to the tzitz only bearing the sin of tumah
which is unique in that it is permitted regarding the community.

There is a dispute whether the tzitz effects acceptance for sacrifices if it is not
on the forehead of the Kohen Gadol.

Rabbi Shimon maintains that the tzitz effects acceptance for offerings whether it is on the forehead
of the Kohen Gadol or not. Rabbi Shimon maintains that as long as the tzitz was intact when the
offering became tamei, the offering will be valid, regardless of whether the Kohen Gadol was
wearing the tzitz at the time the offering became tamei. Rabbi Yehudah, however, maintains that
the tzitz only effects acceptance when it is on the forehead of the Kohen Gadol, but when the tzitz
is not on the forehead of the Kohen Gadol, it does not effect acceptance. Rabbi Shimon said to
Rabbi Yehudah that the Kohen Gadol does not wear the tzitz on Yom Kippur when he performed
the “inner” avodah, i.e. the burning of the Ketores and the sprinkling of the blood of the chatas
bull and the he-goat. The “inner” avodah, even if performed in a state of tumah, is acceptable, even
though the Kohen Gadol is not wearing the tzitz at that time. This is proof that the tzitz effects
acceptance even when the Kohen Gadol is not wearing it. Rabbi Yehudah responded that there is
no proof from the Kohen Gadol on Yom Kippur, because tumah is permitted for him regarding the
community so there is no need to have the tzitz effect acceptance for communal offerings. The
implication from this dialogue is that Rabbi Shimon maintains that tumah is only overridden
regarding the community and the tzitz is required to effect the acceptance of communal offerings.

The dispute regarding the tzitz effecting acceptance is only when the tzitz is
intact and hanging on a peg.

If the tzitz is broken, both Rabbi Yehudah and Rabbi Shimon agree that it does not effect
acceptance. If the tzitz is intact and is hanging on a peg i.e. the Kohen Gadol is not wearing it, then
Rabbi Yehudah maintains that it does not effect acceptance. Rabbi Yehduah’s reasoning is because
it is said it shall be on Aharon’s forehead, so that Aharon shall bear a sin of the sacred offerings.
This implies that the tzitz only effects acceptance when it is on the forehead of the Kohen Gadol.
Rabi Shimon, however, maintains that the tzitz effects acceptance even when the Kohen Gadol is
not wearing it, because it is said it shall be on his forehead always to bring them favor before
HaShem. The verse cannot mean that the Kohen Gadol wears the tzitz constantly, because he must
go to the bathroom and he must sleep, and those are times when he is forbidden to wear the tzitz.
The word tamid, always, must mean that the tzitz always effects acceptance, whether the Kohen
Gadol is wearing it or not.

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One is required to touch his Tefillin constantly.

According to Rabbi Yehudah, the reason it is said regarding the tzitz the word tamid, always, is to
teach that the Kohen Gadol should never divert his attention from the tzitz. This is in accordance
with the law that a person is required to touch his Tefillin constantly so that he should not divert
his attention from them. This law is derived through a kal vachomer from the tzitz, because the
tzitz only has one mention of HaShem’s Name, and the Torah states it shall be on his forehead
always, which teaches us that the Kohen Gadol should not divert his attention from the tzitz, so
certainly regarding Tefillin, which contains numerous mentions of HaShem’s Name, a person
should not divert his attention from his Tefillin.

Tzitz and Tefillin

Rabba bar Rav Huna teaches that while wearing tefillin, one must not let his attention wander from
them. This is learned by kal v’chomer from the Tzitz worn by the Kohen Gadol. The Tzitz had
only one Name of Hashem inscribed upon it, and yet the Torah tells us, “It shall be upon his brow
constantly,” to teach us that he must constantly be aware that it rests on his brow. Tefillin have
Hashem’s Names written upon them numerous times. Kal v’chomer, one must constantly focus
his attention on them. According to the Rambam, this kal v’chomer has the status of a Torah
prohibition against being distracted from the tefillin while wearing them (Hilchos Tefillin 4:14;
see Chayei Adam 14:15).

Tosefos (s.v. Uma tzitz), on the other hand, understood that this is only a Rabbinic prohibition.
This debate has very relevant consequences. The Nimukei Yosef writes that if diverting one’s
attention from tefillin is a Torah prohibition, then a person who is unable to maintain his
concentration should not wear tefillin at all. If however diverting attention from tefillin is a
Rabbinic prohibition, they would not wish for us to forego a Torah obligation of tefillin, in order
to observe a Rabbinic prohibition (see Minchas Eliyahu 33:2, citing R’ M.D. Soloveitchik, shlita).

Kal v’chomer:

Kal v’chomer is one of the thirteen tools through which we analyze the Torah in order to derive
halachic conclusions. On several occasions the Torah itself makes use of this tool. For example,
Moshe Rabbeinu said, “If Bnei Yisroel do not listen, how will Pharaoh listen, for my speech is
impaired” (Shemos6:12). If Bnei Yisroel did not wish to heed Moshe’s message, even though it
was for their benefit, then kal v’chomer Pharaoh would not wish to listen (Maharal, GurAryeh,
ibid). Kal v’chomer is essentially a rule of logic. If a logical imperative applies to a limited degree
in one case, and still is successful in bringing about a certain result; then if that same imperative
applies to an even greater degree elsewhere, it will certainly bring about the same result. When
making use of a kal v’chomer, one must always analyze what is the logical imperative, and why it
is reasonable to assume that it should bring about the said result. In the case of the Tzitz, we find
a kal v’chomer: the Tzitz has only one Name of Hashem, and one must focus his attention on it;
tefillin have many Names of Hashem, kal v’chomer that one must focus his attention on it. What
is the logical imperative of this deduction?

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Presumably, since the Names of Hashem are so holy, one may not wear them without focusing his
attention on them. However, this is an invalid kal v’chomer. The logical imperative that one must
focus his attention on the Name of Hashem applies equally to one Name, as it does to several
Names. Therefore, there is no kal and no chomer. Both are equally chamur.

To illustrate this point: could we say that if a person with one home must attach mezuzos to his
doors, kal v’chomer a person with two homes must attach mezuzos? True, both homes require
mezuzos, but the two homes are no more chamur than the one. The obligation of mezuza applies
equally to them all.

Based on this argument, the Brisker Rav, R’ Y.Z. Soloveitchik zt”l, suggested a different premise
to the kal v’chomer from Tzitz. We had previously assumed that the Kohen Gadol had to focus his
attention on the Name inscribed on the Tzitz. Not so.

The Kohen Gadol had to focus his attention on the Tzitz, since it was sanctified by the Name. Now
we can understand the kal v’chomer. If one Name has the power to sanctify the Tzitz, requiring
the Kohen Gadol to focus his attention upon it, then certainly the many Names inscribed upon the
tefillin sanctify them, requiring us to focus our attention upon them (Peninei HaGriz, p. 247; Toras
Ze’ev, 14).

Tefillin: a constant reminder

The Gemara states that one is required to touch his Tefillin constantly so he will not divert his
attention from them. The Tiferes Yisroel in Menachos (4:1; 2) writes that the word Tefillin is
derived from the word pallel, which means thought.

This teaches that when one is wearing Tefillin, he is forbidden to be distracted by thoughts other
than Torah and prayer. The Tur (O.C. 25) writes that the word Tefillin is derived from the word
pelilah, which means a sign and a testimony, as Tefillin are a sign to the world that the Divine
Presence rests on the Jewish People. It is interesting to note that the word for prayer is Tefillah,
which has the same etymology as the word Tefillin. Thus, although it is preferable to wear Tefillin
all day, one should at least wear Tefillin for the entire Shacharis prayer.

Atonement of the tzitz

The Gemora asks how Rabbi Yehuda, who says that the tzitz only atones if it is being worn,
explains the verse which refers to it as tamid – constant, and answers that it teaches that the kohen
must constantly be aware of it. This is consistent with Rabbah bar Rav Huna who says that from
the tzitz we learn that one must constantly touch his tefillin, to keep him aware of them. If we learn
from the word tamid that the kohen must constantly be aware of the tzitz, which has only one
mention of Hashem's name, certainly one must be constantly aware of the tefillin, which has many
mentions of Hashem's name.

The Gemora asks how Rabbi Shimon, who says that the tzitz atones even when it is not being
worn, explains the verse which says that it must be on Aharon's forehead, and answers that it

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teaches where Aharon is supposed to wear it. Rabbi Yehuda learns this from another verse, which
says that it will be “on his forehead, constantly.”

The Gemora notes that Rabbi Shimon actually agrees that we learn it from that other verse, and
from the first verse he learns that it only atones while it is fit for being on Aharon's forehead, as
opposed to when it is broken.

Rabbi Yehuda learns this from the fact that the verse says mitzcho – his forehead instead of simply
metzach – forehead, but Rabbi Shimon says this change doesn't teach anything.

HALACHA

RAMBAM Hil Tefillin 4:14

Orach Chayim 28:1

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 KEEPING ONE'S MIND ON THE TEFILIN

Rav Mordechai Kornfeld writes:1

The Gemara states that one may not remove his mind from his Tefilin while he wears them. This
prohibition is derived from the Tzitz of the Kohen Gadol. The Torah commands that the Tzitz must be
"constantly (Tamid) on his forehead" (Shemos 28:37), which means that the Kohen Gadol may not
remove his mind from the Tzitz while he wears it. The Gemara derives a Kal v'Chomer from the Tzitz
to the Tefilin: if one must keep his mind on the Tzitz, which has only one name of Hash-m on it, then
certainly one must keep his mind on the Tefilin, which has many names of Hash-m written in it.
(According to Tosfos (8a, DH u'Ma), this Kal v'Chomer is only an Asmachta mid'Rabanan.)

What is considered a "Hesech ha'Da'as," a mental interruption, from one's Tefilin while he wears them?

The SHA'AGAS ARYEH (#39) records two opinions. The first opinion is that of RABEINU
YONAH, as cited by the ROSH in Berachos (3:28). Rabeinu Yonah points out that the Gemara in
Sukah (26b) explicitly states that one is permitted to take a short nap ("Shinas Arai") while he wears
Tefilin. Why is a short nap permitted? It should be considered a "Hesech ha'Da'as," as one cannot
concentrate on his Tefilin while he is asleep.

Rabeinu Yonah answers that it must be that "Hesech ha'Da'as" does not mean that one must keep his
mind on the Tefilin constantly. Rather, it means that one may not act lightheadedly and frivolously
while he wears the Tefilin. As long as one's mood is somber and he conducts himself with awe of his
Creator, his lack of conscious focus on his Tefilin it is not considered a "Hesech ha'Da'as." One who
dozes off with his Tefilin upon him is not acting frivolously. On the contrary, while he dozes he is less
aware of the frivolities of this world, and thus dozing is not considered a "Hesech ha'Da'as."

1
https://www.dafyomi.co.il/yoma/insites/yo-dt-007.htm

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Rabeinu Yonah adduces support from the words of the RAMBAM that a "Hesech ha'Da'as" while one
wears Tefilin is defined as a mood of lightheadedness ("Kalus Rosh"). The Rambam (Hilchos Tefilin
4:25) writes that while a person wears Tefilin, he stands in awe of Hash-m and is not drawn after gaiety
and idle chatter.

The second opinion cited by the Sha'agas Aryeh is that of the RAMBAN in TORAS HA'ADAM (and
as cited by the TUR YD 388). The Ramban writes that a mourner may not wear Tefilin because his
grief prevents him from focusing on the Tefilin and thus causes a "Hesech ha'Da'as." Similarly,
the RAMBAM (Hilchos Tefilin 4:13) writes that a person who is in distress and whose mind is not
settled is exempt from the Mitzvah of Tefilin because he will not be able to concentrate properly on
them.
The Sha'agas Aryeh points out that the Ramban and Rambam apparently argue with Rabeinu Yonah's
understanding of a "Hesech ha'Da'as," because a person in mourning or in distress certainly is not in a
frivolous mood. They define "Hesech ha'Da'as" as a lack of focus on the Tefilin, unlike the way
Rabeinu Yonah defines "Hesech ha'Da'as." Others point out that this also appears to be the opinion
of TOSFOS in Shabbos (49a, DH she'Lo Yishan), who says that a person may not sleep in Tefilin
because sleeping ("Shinas Keva") is a "Hesech ha'Da'as."

The Sha'agas Aryeh notes that these Rishonim do not mean that one must keep his mind on his Tefilin
at all times, because that is impossible. Rather, they mean that one must not take his mind off the
Tefilin for more than a certain amount of time. The Sha'agas Aryeh asserts, based on the Gemara in
Sukah (26a) cited by Rabeinu Yonah, that the maximum amount of time that one may remove his mind
from his Tefilin is the time of a short nap ("Shinas Arai"), which is defined as the time in which person
can walk one hundred Amos. Before that amount of time passes, one must return his attention to the
Tefilin. Based on the assumption that the average person walks one Mil (2000 Amos) in eighteen
minutes, the time in which a person walks one hundred Amos is 54 seconds. (According to the Chazon
Ish's calculation that one walks four Amos in two to three seconds, the time of "Shinas Arai" is 50 to
75 seconds.)

The Sha'agas Aryeh proves that "Hesech ha'Da'as" is unrelated to frivolity from the fact that the
prohibition of "Hesech ha'Da'as" from one's Tefilin is derived from the Tzitz. If "Hesech ha'Da'as"
refers to a frivolous mood, then the verse which prohibits the Kohen Gadol from taking his mind off
the Tzitz is unnecessary, because the Tzitz is worn only in the Beis ha'Mikdash where lightheadedness
is forbidden altogether (Berachos 54a). Moreover, even outside of the Beis ha'Mikdash
lightheadedness is proscribed, as the verse states, "Lest you forget Hash-m, your G-d" (Devarim 8:11;
see also Avos 3:13).

A third opinion not cited by the Sha'agas Aryeh appears to be that of the TOSFOS YESHANIM (8a)
who says that the prohibition of "Hesech ha'Da'as" with Tefilin refers to passing flatulence. He
understands "Hesech ha'Da'as" to mean an act that is disrespectful to the Tefilin.

HALACHAH: As mentioned above, the TUR (YD 388) cites the Ramban's opinion, that severe
distress is considered a "Hesech ha'Da'as." However, the SHA'AREI TESHUVAH (OC 28:1) points
out that it is nearly impossible to avoid removing one's concentration from his Tefilin for the amount
of time the Sha'agas Aryeh mentions, and he quotes the Gemara that says that "the Torah was not given
to angels" (Berachos 25b, Yoma 30a). He concludes, therefore, that one may rely on the opinion of
Rabeinu Yonah, who says that "Hesech ha'Da'as" is defined as frivolousness. In fact, the Tur himself

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(in OC 44) cites the opinion of Rabeinu Yonah when he rules that one must be careful not to be
frivolous while he wears Tefilin.

How, though, are the questions that the Sha'agas Aryeh asks on the opinion of Rabeinu Yonah to be
resolved, and how can the apparently conflicting rulings of the Tur (who cites both the Ramban and
Rabeinu Yonah) be reconciled?

Perhaps Rabeinu Yonah's intention is as follows. When the Torah commands that the Tzitz must be
"constantly (Tamid) on his forehead" (Shemos 28:37), it does not command the Kohen Gadol to avoid
lightheadedness, because the requirement to avoid lightheadedness is obvious and needs no additional
verse. Rather, the Torah commands that not only must the Kohen Gadol avoid all lightheadedness, he
also must take precautionary measures to prevent himself from coming to lightheadedness. Focusing
constantly on the Tzitz is one such precautionary measure. Similarly, when one wears Tefilin he must
take precautionary measures to prevent himself from coming to lightheadedness. This requirement to
take precautionary measures applies only to the Kohen Gadol while he wears the Tzitz and to a man
while he wears Tefilin. It does not apply to someone who merely stands in the Beis ha'Mikdash (he
must avoid lightheadedness, but he does not have to take precautionary steps to that effect).
With regard to the apparently contradictory rulings of the Tur, perhaps Rabeinu Yonah does not
disagree with the Ramban. It is possible that he does not limit the prohibition of "Hesech ha'Da'as"
specifically to "lightheadedness." Rather, perhaps he means that one may not let his mind become
totally involved in worldly matters while he wears the Tefilin (or Tzitz). Rabeinu Yonah may agree
that one may not wear Tefilin while he is in a state of mourning or overcome with grief. He mentions
the state of "lightheadedness" only as an example of a mood of one who is overcome by his emotions
and does not focus on matters of Kedushah.

(Rabeinu Yonah mentions lightheadedness only as an example of what a person might need to avoid
by focusing on the Tefilin constantly. A person does not need to attempt to avoid feelings of mourning
or grief, because there is no reason for an emotionally healthy person to be overcome suddenly with
such feelings. Moreover, focusing on the Tefilin will not necessarily help to avoid those feelings. When
the Ramban and Rambam mention mourning and grief as forms of "Hesech ha'Da'as," they are
discussing the act of donning Tefilin in the first place when one is already overcome with mourning or
grief.)

This is also the opinion of the RITVA in Sukah (26a) who says (in his answer for why one may sleep
"Shinas Arai" with Tefilin) that while one wears Tefilin he may not "turn his attention to mundane
matters," but he is not required to consciously focus on his Tefilin at all times. This might also be the
intention of the TOSFOS YESHANIM here (8a, DH Tefilin) in his second explanation.

Even TOSFOS in Shabbos (loc. cit.), who clearly argues with Rabeinu Yonah and prohibits one from
sleeping with Tefilin because of "Hesech ha'Da'as," may agree that one is not required to think about
the Tefilin at every moment. When one goes to sleep with Tefilin he actively renders himself unable to
think about his Tefilin, and thus that act is considered a "Hesech ha'Da'as." (A short nap, though, is not
considered a "Hesech ha'Da'as," because one does not render himself unable to think about his Tefilin
for a significant duration of time.) As long as one is awake and in a solemn mood with the fear of G-
d, his mind is not considered to be removed from his Tefilin even though he might not actually be
thinking about them at every moment.

In conclusion, the mental state indicated by "Hesech ha'Da'as" is defined in three different ways: 1.
being overcome with emotion or frivolity, which distracts one's focus from fear of Hash-m (Rabeinu

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Yonah); 2. actively putting oneself in a state in which it is not possible for him to think about Tefilin
(Tosfos in Shabbos); 3. acting in a disrespectful manner towards the Tefilin (Tosfos Yeshanim).

It is worth noting that the MAGEN AVRAHAM (OC 44:2) cites the ruling of the BACH who says
that it is a "Mitzvah Min ha'Muvchar" not to remove one's concentration from the Tefilin at all. (M.
Kornfeld)

Bringing Sacrifices When the Community is Impure

Steinzaltz (OBM) writes:2

Generally speaking someone who is tameh – has become ritually defiled by contact -cannot
participate in the Temple service in any way. There is, however, an exception: the case of tumah
hutrah be-tzibur – if the majority of the Jewish people are tameh, then the sacrificial service can
take place, performed by kohanim who themselves are tameh.

Most of our daf is devoted to an examination of the disagreement between Rav Nahman and Rav
Sheshet with regard to the question of tumah hutrah be-tzibur – how to understand the rule
permitting sacrifices to be brought when the majority of the community is tameh. Rav Nahman
explains that tumah hutrah be-tzibur means that the rules of tumah simply do not apply under these
unusual circumstances. According to Rav Sheshet, however, the rule is really that tumah dehuyah
be-tzibur – not that the Torah totally permits it, rather that the need to bring sacrifices in this case
“pushes aside” the existing prohibition about tumah, even as the prohibition remains.

To explain this concept, it is important to note that the question of hutrah (permitted)
vs. dehuyah (pushed aside) is not unique to questions about ritual purity in the Temple and its
sacrifices. We find a similar discussion with regard to the rules of Shabbat, when a number of
different circumstances will permit melakhot – activities on Shabbat – that are, ordinarily,
forbidden.

Regarding Shabbat we find that approaches differ based on the reason that the activity needs to be
done. When communal sacrifices are brought in the Temple on Shabbat it is clear
that Shabbat is hutrah. Such activities are totally permitted. On the other hand, potential life-and-
death situations, when we certainly will allow activities to be done on Shabbat to save the
individual, are likely considered dehuyah. It is thus important to limit activities to
those melakhot that are essential, and anything that can be done without transgressing forbidden
activities on Shabbat should be done in that way (see Shulhan Arukh Orah Hayyim 328 for a
discussion of these issues).

2
https://steinsaltz.org/daf/yoma7/

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Raphael Magarik writes:3
When I was a child, I envied priestly headwear. Specifically, Catholic priestly headwear. Sure, the
Jews in my neighborhood wore fur streimels and fancy wigs, but they had nothing to rival the
pope’s miter: tall, majestic, bejeweled.

That was before I learned about the tzitz, a frontplate (or in a more fanciful translation, “rosette”),
which Exodus commands be attached to Aaron’s hat: “You shall make a frontlet of pure gold and
engrave on it the seal inscription: ‘Holy to the Lord.’ Suspend it on a cord of blue, so that it may
remain on the headdress; it shall remain on the front of the headdress. It shall be on Aaron’s
forehead, that Aaron may take away any sin arising from the holy things that the Israelites
consecrate, from any of their sacred donations; it shall be on his forehead at all times, to win
acceptance for them before the Lord.” (Exodus 28:36-38)

The tzitz, like the pope’s miter, distinguishes the high priest from everyone else. But it’s more than
a fancy accessory. Like a spiritual vacuum cleaner, it sucks up the sins committed by unwitting
Israelites trying to bring sacrifices; if you goof and bring one pigeon when you were supposed to
bring two, Aaron has you covered. In a sense, the high priest, wearing this remarkable headpiece,
is himself a sacrificial offering — in particular, the offering of offerings, the backstop of
atonement, the guarantor of the entire Israelite ritual system.

The tzitz is also discussed on today’s daf in intimate, even comic detail. Rabbi Shimon, according
to the Talmud, asks how the tzitz can always remain on the high priest’s forehead, since: doesn’t
he need to enter the bathroom? — where he presumably cannot bring God’s holy name. (Rabbi
Shimon concludes that the “always” belongs with the second half of the sentence, as if the verse
read, “it shall be on his forehead, in order that they may always find favor before God.” ) But the
bit that interests me most occurs at the very end of the daf:

Rabba bar Rav Huna said: A person must touch his tefillin regularly. This is a kal
va’chomer inference from the frontplate (tzitz): Just as with regard to the frontplate, which
has only one mention of God’s name, the Torah said: “It shall be always upon his forehead,”
teaching that that he should not be distracted from it, so too with regard to tefillin, which
have numerous mentions of God’s name in their four passages from the Torah, all the more
so one may not be distracted from them.

Rabba bar Rav Huna understands the Torah’s injunction on the high priest — “It shall be always
upon his forehead” — as not simply physical, but also mental. Not only must he wear them at all
times, he must be aware of them too.

In the ancient world, rabbinic Jews wore tefillin not just at morning prayers, but likely all day.
Rabba bar Rav Huna insists one should regularly touch one’s tefillin throughout the day to avoid
distraction. He reaches this conclusion via a strange argument: if the high priest must avoid
distraction while wearing the tzitz, which has only one measly mention of the divine name, well
then, all the more so one must avoid distraction while wearing tefillin, which contain many.

3
Mykewishlearning.com

16
Counter-intuitively, Rabba bar Rav Huna privileges tefillin, an everyday ritual object, over the
tzitz, the unique, magical rosette worn by the high priest.

Or maybe that’s the point. When ordinary people wear tefillin, they too get to be high priests.
When you place God’s name on your forehead, you are transformed into the unique object of
God’s attention, the spiritual center of your own private Temple. In that moment, you fulfill the
verse: “Let me be a seal upon your heart, like the seal upon your hand. For love is fierce as
death.” (Song of Songs 8:6). Better pay close attention.

Rabbi Johnny Solomon writes:4

Towards the end of our daf we are taught the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda that when the Torah speaks
of how the tzitz (the special golden band engraved with the name of God and worn by the Kohen
Gadol) ‘shall be always (‫ )תמיד‬upon his forehead’ (Shemot 28:38), it means‫ שלא יסיח דעתו ממנו‬- that
he needs to maintain a constant conscious awareness of the tzitz while wearing it. To achieve this
end, we are taught (see Meiri on Yoma 7b; Rashi on Shemot 28:38) that the Kohen Gadol should
intermittently touch his hand onto the tzitz and thereby remind himself that he is wearing a sacred
object bearing the name of God.

The Gemara (Yoma 7b-8a) then draws a comparison between the tzitz (on which God’s name was
written), and tefillin (in which God’s name is written repeatedly), and it teaches us that just as the
Kohen Gadol maintained a constant conscious awareness of the tzitz by intermittently touching it,
so too, those who wear tefillin must also maintain a constant conscious awareness of the fact that
they are wearing a sacred object, bearing many expressions of the name of God, and that this can
be achieved by intermittently touching their hand onto their tefillin (nb. this is done when touching
the arm and head tefillin during the recitation of the Shema - although some people may choose to
do so more often).

What we learn from here is that even a Kohen Gadol wearing the holy tzitz, and even someone
wearing sacred tefillin, cannot be presumed to maintain a constant conscious awareness of the
holiness of what they are wearing and bearing, and that each needs to deliberately nudge
themselves to keep the right level of sacred attentiveness.

Today, we can only learn the laws of the tzitz, and most of those who wear tefillin only do so
during their prayers. Still, while a Jew may not physically bear the name of God, they
metaphorically do, and when they are clearly visible as a practicing Jew, this is certainly the case.

And this is why each of us need to find ways to nudge ourselves to maintain our spiritual
consciousness and our sacred attentiveness – at home, in the street, while driving, and while in the
mall - because even if we are not wearing an object with the name of God, by being Torah
observant, we are most certainly bearing the name of God.

4
Www.rabbijohnnysolomon.com

17
 The Role and Symbol of the Tzitz
Rabbi Michael Rosensweig writes:5

Parshat Tezaveh delineates the fashioning of various garments that the kohen gadol must
wear in order to carry out his duties in the Beit ha-Mikdash. Perhaps the most intriguing
component of his eight-piece wardrobe is the golden tzitz crown(Shemot 28:36-38; 29:6;
39:30-31), which is actually not even a garment, but merely an adornment (tachshit) (Sukah
5a). It is, after all, this tachshit that bears the powerful yet mysterious message of "kodesh la-
Hashem". While some commentators (Rashbam 28:36) insist that this phrase refers also to the
ephod and hoshen, and others argue that it applies to the entire bigdei kehunah (Meshekh
Hakhmah 28:36), the fact that these words are not only written but engraved upon the tzitz, is
surely significant. Moreover, only this element of bigdei kehunah contributes directly to the
effectiveness of the korbonot (see Rashbam, op. cit). The tzitz neutralizes the disqualifying
factor of tumah (defilement) at least with respect to those ingredients of the korban- the
blood, kemitzah, and eimurim- that are offered directly on the mizbeach (see Pesachim77a,
81a, Menachot 25a).

The midrash (Tanchumah on Bamidbar 31:6) simply identifies "kelei ha-kodesh" as the tzitz.
It is striking that the Torah in parshat Pekudei (39:30-31) concludes its report of Kelal
Yisrael's compliance with the mandate to develop the various implements of
the mishkan and avodah by indicating that the tzitz had, indeed, been properly fashioned. The
Netziv (Ha’amek Davar, 39:31) notes that the reference to the tzitz in this context appears out
of order with respect to the other begadim relative to the original charge. He explains that the
Torah begins and ends its inventory Kelal Yisrael's accomplishments with the two most
important creations-contributions, the aron, and the tzitz! The tzitz clearly emerges as a
crucial component in the avodah. What accounts for the symbolic and substantive import of
this simple ornament?

Perhaps its significance lies precisely in its simplicity, and in the unambiguous, yet ambitious
character of the message, kodesh la-Hashem, that it bears. Precisely because it seems self-
evident that the entire purpose and structure of the avodat ha-korbonot is Divine
sanctification, it is possible that the necessary focus of attention on the halachically complex
issues of detail and implementation might obscure that basic truth, threatening to undermine
the entire enterprise. Furthermore, as the Ramchal notes in his famous introduction to the
Mesillat Yesharim, it is often the most basic truths that we ignore and abuse precisely because
we presume their self"-evidence.

Certainly, with respect to the high stakes and special opportunity inherent in the avodah, the
Torah demands that the self- evident is still insufficient. It is possible that this motif also
demands an exclusive and purist motivation. Ulterior or additional motives are inconsistent
with the purist, ideal world of the avodah. [The link between this issue and the need for
"lishmah" requires further discussion.]

5
https://www.torahweb.org/torah/2003/parsha/rros_tezaveh.html

18
In any case, given these perspectives, it is unsurprising that the simple, yet powerful theme of
"kodesh la-Hashem needs to be omnipresent. It is the visible crown(nezer) to the
whole avodah enterprise that must be a constant (28:38)-"ve-hayah al mizho tamid le-razon
lahem lifnei Hashem". An analysis of its very designation, "tzitz", confirms this theme.

The midrash, and numerous commentators ranging from ancient to modern times (Torah
Shelemah, Rashbam, Rav Hirsch), links this term with the verse "meitzitz min
hacharakim" (Shir ha-Shirim 2:9) to convey that the visibility of this ornament and its
engraved message is indispensable to its function both as bigdei kehunah and as a means of
facilitating korbonot, even neutralizing potential obstacles to kapparah, such as tumah.
Indeed, one perspective (Yuma 7b; Menachot 36b) demands constant awareness of the
presence of the tzitz. The kohen gadol is obligated to exercise total concentration, excluding
any minor distraction (hesech ha-daat).

The demanding themes that underpin the tzitz, also provide for flexibility in the bringing of
sacrifices, as long as and because this ideal has not been fundamentally contravened. Thus,
the simple yet powerful theme of "kodesh la-Hashem" facilitates the bringing of
defiled korbonot.

It is interesting that more subtle violations like pigul, notar and yotzei cannot be sanctioned
or rectified by means of the tzitz (Menahot 25a). It is possible that this is due to the fact that
these circumstances always reflect improper input or initiative, ulterior motivations, and a
disrespect for the boundaries of "kodesh la-Hashem" (See R. Hirsch, 28:36). They contradict
the very foundation upon which ritzui tzitz stands.

Similarly, while theirs is a halachic consensus that ritzui tzitz is effective with respect to
blood, kemitzah, and eimurim, all of which are totally consumed by the mizbeach, and thus
unequivocally absolutely dedicated to Hashem, the impact of the tzitz on the meat of
the korbon whose status is more complex as it is also consumed by the kohanim, is subject to
debate. With the possible exception of tumat tehom, which can't be identified in advance,
the tzitz does not sanction flaws connected with the improper status of the
functioning kohen (See, also, Rav Hirsch's explanation of this phenomenon.).

The tzitz is a particularly apt crown for the kohen gadol whose very persona and function
mirrors the ideal of a total dedication to Hashem that is unequivocal and on constant display.
The Torah establishes that the kohen gadol continues to serve even as an onen- "u-min ha-
mikdash lo yeitzei".

Radvaz (hil. kilayim 10:32) explains that the kohen gadol's absolute dedication to avodat
Hashem dictates that even personal grief be set aside in favor of his public spiritual duties.
According to some interpretations, Rambam distinguishes between regular kohanim and
the kohen gadol, permitting only the latter to don his vestments while he is not actually
involved in the avodah (hil. keli ha-mikdash 8:12; hil. kilayim 10:32). The rationale that is
sometimes advanced is that the kohen gadol is always perceived as involved in the avodah.
Perhaps the continuing impact of the tzitz and the theme of the exclusive focus of

19
the avodah that it projects contribute to this halachic condition, as well. [Of course, this issue
is linked to the debate between R. Yehudah and R. Shimon- Yoma 7b.]

The fact that the kohen gadol presides over the entire range of the avodah of Yom Kippur, the
day of "kulo la-Hashem", encompassing both the daily tamid as well as the singular entrance
into the kodesh ha-kodoshim, reinforces this theme. [Of course, the tzitz is not included in
his bigdei lavan, but understandably it may be superfluous in that context.] Indeed, R.
Abraham b. Harambam suggests that the expression "kodesh la-Hashem" itself refers also to
the kohen gadol who bears the message!

While the actual tzitz adorns only the kohen gadol and its direct function and impact is limited
to the avodah, the theme of kodesh la-Hashem and the broader ideal it conveys extends to all
Jews. Chazal linked the tzitz to the tefillin that play such a crucial role in our daily life.
The gemara (Zevachim 19a) establishes that the tefillin of the kohen gadol was to be placed
between the tzitz and mitznefet.

Moreover, the gemara (Menachot 36b) derives the need for constant vigilance and
involvement with the tefillin and the exclusion of any kind of distraction (hesech ha-dat) based
on the paradigm of the tzitz. [In fact, the Rambam only records this consideration in the
context of hil. tefilin (4:14). (see above). The exact character of this relationship is
complicated. See Tosafot Yoma 8a s.v. u-mah and Shaagat Aryeh, no. 38.] The Meshech
Chochmah (28:36) tries to demonstrate that the tzitz constitutes the equivalent of Hashem's
tefilin (based on Berakhot 6b).

In fact, the tzitz in symbol and substance embodies both in its themes of ambition and
exclusivity the special reciprocal relationship between Hashem and Kelal Yisrael. It is no
surely no coincidence that Chazal explicitly limit the actual sanctioning and appeasing (ritzui)
impact of the tzitz to Kelal Yisrael (Zevachim 45a).

At the same time, Chazal (Yevamot 60b) establish that the tzitz is linked to the punishment of
those enemies, like the benot midyan, who try to corrupt Kelal Yisrael, by diluting that ideal
commitment, thereby creating a rift between Hashem and his people. Or ha-Hayim (28:37)
connects "kodesh la-Hashem" to the verses in Jeremiah (2:3)-"kodesh yisrael la-Hashem,
reishit tevuatah". He explains that the ideal of the tzitz characterizes the unique bond
between Am Yisrael and Hashem, differentiating us from all other nations.

The multiple associations of "kodesh la-Hashem" defining the simple, yet powerful
foundation of the avodah, the kohen gadol, and the reciprocal relationship of Kelal
Yisrael and Hashem continue to be a source of inspiration and ambition. It does, in fact,
constitute an omnipresent crown- "nezer hakodesh (29:6; 39:30) "al mizho tamid"(28:38) that
adorns our spiritual life. May we merit that our commitment to this theme continue to be
received "lerazon lahem lifnei Hashem" (28:38).

‫ היסח הדעת בתפילין‬The Tzitz and Tefillin.

20
 Eliezer Eisenberg writes:6

The Kohen Gadol wears the Tzitz, the gold band embossed with Hashem's name, on his
forehead, always, for their appeasement before Hashem. Ex 28:38

‫ ְוָנָשׂא ַאֲהֹרן‬,‫ֵמַצח ַאֲהֹרן‬-‫ ַﬠל‬,‫לח ְוָהָיה‬ 38 And it shall be upon Aaron's forehead, and Aaron shall
‫ֲﬠ ֹון ַהֳקָּדִשׁים ֲאֶשׁר ַיְקִדּישׁוּ ְבֵּני‬-‫ֶאת‬ bear the iniquity committed in the holy things, which the
‫ַמְתּ ֹנת ָקְדֵשׁיֶהם; ְוָהָיה‬-‫ ְלָכל‬,‫ִיְשָׂרֵאל‬ children of Israel shall hallow, even in all their holy gifts;
‫ ְלָרצוֹן ָלֶהם ִלְפֵני‬,‫ִמְצחוֹ ָתִּמיד‬-‫ַﬠל‬ and it shall be always upon his forehead, that they may be
.‫ְיהָוה‬ accepted before the LORD.

‫והיה על מצח אהרן ונשא אהרן את עון הקדשים אשר יקדישו בני ישראל לכל מתנת קדשיהם והיה על מצחו תמיד‬
'‫לרצון להם לפני ה‬

It is difficult to know exactly what the "tamid/always" means in this passuk. This is a machlokes
Reb Shimon and Reb Yehuda in Yoma 7b, our daf as Rashi says-

‫ אלא תמיד לרצון להם‬,‫ שהרי אינו עליו אלא בשעת עבודה‬,‫והיה על מצחו תמיד – אי איפשר לומר שיהא עליו תמיד‬
‫ ואם‬,‫( עודהו על מצחו מרצה‬:'‫אפילו אינו על מצחו שלא היה כהן גדול עובד באותה שעה ולדברי האומר )בבלי יומא ז‬
.‫לאו אינו מרצה נדרש על מצחו תמיד ללמד שימשמש בו בעודו על מצחו שלא יסיח דעתו ממנו‬

Reb Yehuda holds Tamid means that while he wears it he must constantly be cognizant of its
presence and its kedusha. Reb Shimon holds it means that the Tzitz brings Ratzon - appeasement
of the Ribono shel Olam" -constantly, even if it is not being worn at that moment.

The Gemara at the end of the daf says that if we learn like Reb Yehuda, then if the Tzitz, which
has the written name of Hashem only once, mandates constant respectful awareness, how much
more so this is true for Tefillin which have Hashems name written twenty-one times.

Tosfos says that this kal vachomer has got to be derabanan, because it's obviously not technically
correct. True, the Tzitz only has Hashem's name once, but it's exposed, while those in the Tefillin
are covered. (Tosfos is consistent with Rabbeinu Tam's shittah brought in Menachos 32b that
there's no din of hiddur when the cheftza is covered.)

Other Rishonim disagree with Tosfos and hold that the kal vachomer is Deoraisa. Rav Sternbuch

6
https://beisvaad.blogspot.com/2017/03/titzaveh-shemos-2838-wearing-is.html

21
in his Taam Vadaas here explains the machlokes Rishonim and why those that hold it's deoraysa
aren't bothered by Tosfos' question.

He says that those that hold that it's deoraysa say that the reason for the issur hesech hadaas by the
tzitz is because when it's worn correctly such that the wearer fulfills the mitzvah, then the person
himself becomes spiritually elevated - holy - and that elevated spiritual status which derives from
the Tzitz mandates issur hesech hadaas. When wearing something has the effect of making you
holy, you can't be meisi'ach daas from that object. (The Kal vachomer assumes that it is the sheim
on the Tzitz that makes you holy, and since Tefillin has more sheimos, it must make you even
more holy.) If so, it doesn't matter whether the sheimos that cause that aliyah are exposed or
covered.

The other Rishonim hold that the issur hesech hadaas is because of the Kavod of the Kedusha of
the Sheim, not the Kedusha it engenders in you. If so, you can say that there's not as much chiyuv
kavod for a covered Sheim than an exposed Sheim. Chazal made a din derabanan that assers hesech
hadaas by tefillin. Maybe that made this din derabanan because tefillin is similar to the Tzitz, and
even though there's no kal vachomer, there remains a good svara to show kavod to the sheimos
even though they are covered.

The machlokes is whether the reason you can't be meisi'ach daas is because of the kedusha it
creates in you, or because of kavod of the sheim itself. (As I hinted above, an alternative pshat
would be they're arguing whether there's a din of hiddur on something that is covered, i.e.,
Rabbeinu Tam in Menachos 32b and the Mordcheh in Tefillin 969, brought in the Rama OC 32:4.
Or, they all hold like R"T and they're arguing whether the issur hesech hadaas has the gedarim of
hiddur. The way Reb Berel explained it was the machlokes is whether the issur is because of the
Sheim, or because of the chalos kedusha on the Tzitz that results from the Sheim, which is very
close to Rav Sternbuch, but not helpful to where I'm going with this.)

Here are his words.

‫והיה על מצחו תמיד כ"ח ל"ח‬

‫במסכת יומא ז' ע"ב למדו מפסוק זה כי הכהן הלובש את הצפן אסור לו להסיח דעתו ממנו והוסיפו עוד ללמוד בק"ו‬
‫מצען לתפילין מה צקו שאין בו אלא אזכרה אחת אמרה תורה על מצחו תמיד שלא יסיח דעתו ממנו תפלין שיש בהן‬
‫אזכרות הרבה שהציץ אין בו אלא שם אחד ואלו יש בהם אחד ועשרים שם של יו"ד ה"א בשל ראש וכמותן בשל יד‬
‫רמב"ם על אחת כמה וכמה ובתוס' שם הקשו דהא הק"ו הוא ק"ו פריכא דמה לציץ שכן השם בגלוי מה שאין כן תפלין‬
‫שהאזכרות מתופין בעור ומכח קושיא זו הסיקו התוספות שאין הק"ו ק"ו גמור מדאורייתא אלא סברא היא לחכמים‬
.‫לתקן שאסור להסיח דעת מתפלין מכח ק"ו זה‬

‫ נראה לבאר דפליגי על התוס' בסברת איסור‬, ‫ולדעת הראשונים הסוברים שאיסור היסח הדעת בתפלין הוא מדאורייתא‬
‫ דמהתוס' מוכח דפירשו דאיסור היסח הדעת הוא שמסיח את‬. ' ‫ ומשום הכי לא קשיא להו קושית התוס‬, ‫היסח הדעת‬
‫ מחמת קדושתה של האזכרה חייב הוא שלא‬, ‫ דמי שנושא עליו אזכרה‬, ‫דעתו ממה שהוא כעת נושא עליו את האזכרות‬
‫ אולם הראשונים דפליגי‬. ‫ דיש לחלק בין אזכרה מגולה לאזכרה מחופה‬, ‫ ולכן הקשו התוס' שפיר‬. ‫להסיח דעתו ממנה‬
‫ והאיסור הוא‬, ‫ אלא דע"י שלבוש בציץ חלה בו בעצמו קדושה‬, ‫יש לפרש בדעתם שאין האיסור מחמת נשיאת הציץ‬

22
 ‫ דאיזה סברא היא לחלק בין‬, '‫ ולהכי לא קשיא לדידהו כלל קושיית התוס‬. ‫שלא להסיח דעתו מקדושתו שלו עצמו‬
.‫ דגם כשהאזכרות מחופות שפיר מקדשות את האדם הלובשן‬, ‫אזכרה מגולה לאזכרה מחופה‬

‫ דהא איסור היסח הדעת בציץ ובתפלין אינו אלא כשלובשם‬, '‫ויש להביא ראיה לדעת הראשונים דפליגי על התוס‬
‫ ואי יסוד‬. ‫ בודאי אין איסור היסח הדעת כלל‬, ‫ אבל אם אוחזם בידו‬, ‫ הציץ על מצחו והתפלין בזרועו ובראשו‬, ‫כדינם‬
‫ מאי נפ"מ איכא בין נושאן‬, '‫ וכמו שביארנו דהכי מוכח מקושיית התוס‬, ‫איסור היסח הדעת הוא מחמת נשיאת האזכרות‬
.‫ וכנ"ל‬, ‫ יתבאר היטב‬, '‫ אמנם כדעת הראשונים החולקים על התוס‬. ‫כמצותן או כידו‬

‫ אבל אם אינו‬, ‫והנה דעת רבנו יונה )עי' בשאג" א סי ' ל"ט( שאיסור היסח הדעת מתפלין הוא בשחוק וקלות ראש דוקא‬
‫ וצ "ל שדעת רבנו יונה הוא‬. ‫ אינו עוכר כאיסור‬, ‫ אע "פ שאין בתפלין בדעתו ומחשבתו‬, ‫עוסק בשחוק וקלות ראש‬
‫ אבל לשטות הראשונים רס "ל‬. ‫ והם לא החמירו לאסור רק בשחוק וקלות ראש‬, ‫כדעת התוס' דהק"ו אינו אלא מדרבנן‬
. (‫ אסור לו להסיח דעתו מהתפלין כלל )עיי"ש בשאג" א שהביא שכן דעת הרמב"ם והרמב"ן‬, ‫דהק "ו הוא מדאורייתא‬

One thing all the Rishonim agree on is that the issur hesech hadaas only applies when he's wearing
them as required by the mitzvah, but not if he's just holding them or wearing them in a way or
during a time that he does not fulfill the mitzvah.

(I think it's interesting to think about this in the context of the Beis Halevi about wearing and
carrying Tefillin. Obviously, this is a din in the Tzitz, not a wristwatch or a hat, but the idea is that
there's a difference between a hat-wearing man and a man carrying a hat, who could not be
described as a hat-carrying man. Or it's like the din of tznu'im by shatnez in Kesuvos and Shabbos,
which applies even when it's on their body. I'm not sure where this will go, but that's where I'm
holding now.)

Reb Avrohom Wagner, in a comment, was me'oreir that according to Rav Sternbuch's svara, even
those Rishonim that hold the Kal Vachomer is deoraysa, and who require constant awareness,
would agree that one may take a nap in tefillin. This is based on the Keren Orah (Menachos 36b)
who says there is no mitzva or kiyum of tefillin or tzitzis when one sleeps. Since the issur hessech
hadaas only applies when one fulfills the mitzvah, when one sleeps there would be no issur hessech
hadaas.

I responded that this would be an excellent answer to the Shaagas Aryeh's question on the Tur in
the beginning of his teshuva 39. He asks on the Tur that he paskens like the Ramban in OC, that
one must be constantly aware of his tefillin, but in YD he says that sheinas ara'i is allowed. We
can now answer that while sleeping there is no issur of hessech hadaas.

Here's the Shaagas Aryeh.

23
 ‫אחר שנתברר בסימן הקדום שתפילין אסוריו בהיסח הדעת ראוי לברר מה נקרא היסח הדעת הנה הרא"ש כתב בפרק‬
‫מי שמתו )ס' כ'ח( אהא דאמר בפ"ב דסוכה כ"ו ע"ב הנכנס לישן ביום רצה חולץ רצה מניח וא"ת היאך שינת עראי‬
‫מותר והלא אסור להסיח דעתו מהם ובשעה שמתנמנם נמצא שמסיח דעתה והיה אומר ה"ר יונה מתוך דברי ר' משה ז"ל‬
‫מצאנו תירוץ לדבר זה דודאי היסח דעת לא הוי אלא כשעומד בקלות ראש ובשחוק אבל כשעומד ביראה ומתעסק‬
‫לצרכיו אף על פי שעוסק במלאכתו ובאומנתו ואין דעתו עליהם ממש אין זה נקרא היסח דיעת דאי לא תימא הכי היאך‬
‫יכול אדם להניח תפילין כל היום וכן נמי כשנתנמנם אין כאן היסח הדעת כי הוא שוכח הבלי עולם ואין כאן קלות ראש‬
‫ע"כ‬

‫ונראה לי דהא דר"י פליג אההיא שכתב הרמב"ן בספר תורת האדם ומביאו הטור י"ד סימו שפ"ח ומיבעי ליה לאבל‬
‫לאותובי דעתו ולכוין לבו לתפילין שלא יסיח דעתו מהם הילכד מנה להן בישוב דעתו אבל בשעת בכי והספד לא מנח‬
‫להו ע"כ והרי בשעת בכי והספד של האבל אין כאז שחוק וקלות ראש אדרבה באותו שעה הוא עומד בכובד ראש‬
‫ובהכנעה ואפילו הכי אוסרו להניח תפילין משום היסח הדעת ובוודאי אין שום טעם לחלק בין היכא שכבר מונחים עליז‬
‫לבא להניחו באותו שעה לענין היסח הדעת ומה שאסורים משום היסח הדעת בבא להניחן בתחלה הוא הדין אם הניחן‬
‫כבר גמי אסורים משים היסח הדעת ועוד דבשעת הנחה לא שייך היסח הדעת שהרי עוסק בהנחתן וממשמש בהן והדבר‬
‫ברור שמה שמסיים הרמב הילכך מנח להו כו' היינו אפילו במונחים עליו עבר חולץ להו והאי לא מנח להו דקאמר היינו‬
‫שאיו מניחן להיות עליו אלא חולץ להו וזה פשוט‬

‫ותימה לי על הטור שבי"ד העתיק דברי הרמב"ן ובא"ח סימן מ"ר כתב אסור לישן בהו אפילו שינת עראי‬
‫כשאוחזן בידו אבל כשהן בראשו פורס עליהן סודר וישן בהן שינת עראי ולא הוי היסח הדעת אלא כשעומד‬
‫בשחוק ובקלות ראש ע"כ והם דברי ה"ר יונה והמה תרתי דסתרי אהדדי‬

‫‪Please be aware that Rav Sternbuch's svara is really implicit in a rishon - Rabbeinu Elchanan‬‬
‫ואומר הר"ר אלחנן דטעמא דהיסח הדעת לא שייך אלא כשהוא ( ‪brought in the Tosfos Yeshanim in Yoma 8a‬‬
‫‪). And even without the svara, Rabbeinu Elchanan serves to answer the Shaagas Aryeh's‬ניעור‬
‫‪kashe.‬‬

‫‪Reb Avrohom very helpfully added the Keren Orah, which follows from Rav Sternbuch's svara‬‬
‫‪and helps to explain Rabbeinu Elchanan. (It is, admittedly, not like the Magen Avraham that holds‬‬
‫‪that there is a kiyum hamitzva - at least of tzitzis - when you're sleeping.) With all this in hand, it's‬‬
‫‪very reasonable to say that this, namely Rav Sternbuch's svara and the Keren Orah, is the poshut‬‬
‫‪pshat in Rabbeinu Elchanan. (It is certainly a better pshat than the achronim say - such as‬‬
‫)‪the Kedushas Yomtov #33 who wants to read the Rosh's Rabbeinu Yonah into it.‬‬

‫‪- Note: Rav Sternbuch's idea that the Tzitz has a special influence of kedusha on its wearer echoes‬‬
‫‪something the Aruch Hashulchan says. Although every mitzva elevates a person's kedusha, and‬‬
‫‪," but some mitzvos have a greater effect, and this special‬אשר קדשנו במצוותיו" ‪that's why we say‬‬
‫‪quality requires awareness and gratitude. The Aruch Hashulchan is in 25:12-13.‬‬

‫‪24‬‬
 ‫יא‬
‫וכתב רבינו הרמ"א שכן פשט המנהג בבני אשכנז שמברכין שני ברכות‪ .‬וטוב לומר תמיד אחר הברכה שניה "ברוך שם‬
‫כבוד מלכותו לעולם ועד"‪ .‬עד כאן לשונו‪ .‬משום חשש ספק ברכה לבטלה‪ ,‬כמו שכתבתי בסימן ר"ו דכשהוציא שם‬
‫שמים לבטלה יאמר "ברוך שם כבוד מלכותו לעולם ועד"‪ ,‬עיין שם‪.‬‬
‫ואינו מובן כלל‪ ,‬דממה נפשך‪ :‬אם הדבר מרופה בידינו‪ ,‬דלכן יאמר "ברוך שם כבוד מלכותו לעולם ועד"‪ ,‬למה לנו‬
‫לברך שתים? נברך אחת כדין כל ספק ברכות‪ .‬ואם הדין ברור בידינו‪ ,‬אם כן למה לנו לומר "ברוך שם כבוד מלכותו‬
‫לעולם ועד"? ובאמת הלבוש השמיט זה‪.‬‬
‫)וגם הב"ח פקפק בזה‪ ,‬והמעדני יום טוב כתב שהוא לרווחא דמילתא‪ .‬וצריך עיון‪(.‬‬
‫ובפשוטו נוכל לומר דבני אשכנז פסיקא להו דצריך שני ברכות‪ ,‬ורק רבינו הרמ"א רפיא בידו‪ .‬ולשנות המנהג אי‬
‫אפשר‪ ,‬ולכן פסק כן‪ .‬ולפי זה מי שלבו נוקפו יכול לברך ברכה אחת‪ .‬ושמענו שאיזה גדולים היו מהדרים לענות "אמן"‬
‫בין של יד לשל ראש‪ ,‬והיו חושבים זה להפסק לענין לברך על של ראש לכל הדעות‪.‬‬
‫)ובבית יוסף באמת תמה על מהר"י בן חביב שנהג כן‪ ,‬דמי מכריחו ליכנס בספק ברכה לבטלה‪ ,‬ולהציל עצמו באמירת‬
‫"ברוך שם כבוד מלכותו לעולם ועד"? עיין שם‪(.‬‬

‫יב‬
‫ולעניות דעתי נראה דאמירת "ברוך שם כבוד מלכותו לעולם ועד" אינו מטעם ספק ברכה אלא מטעם אחר‪ .‬ואף‬
‫שהפוסקים כתבו שהוא מטעם זה‪ ,‬מכל מקום המנהג נראה לי מטעם אחר‪ :‬דהנה כבר דקדקנו דאיך אפשר לברך שתי‬
‫ברכות על דבר אחד?‬
‫וגם יש מי שהקשה על עיקר שיטת רבינו תם‪ ,‬שהרי שנינו בתוספתא דברכות פרק ששי‪ ,‬וכן כתב הרמב"ם בפרק‬
‫ראשון ממעשרות‪ ,‬דאם מפריש תרומה ותרומת מעשר ומעשר שני כאחת – מברך ברכה אחת לכולן‪ .‬ואם כן איך יתקנו‬
‫שני ברכות על שני התפילין?‬
‫)הגר"א סעיף קטן י"ז‪ .‬ותירוצו של הארצות החיים תמוה‪ ,‬עיין שם‪(.‬‬

‫יג‬
‫ולכן נראה לי דברכת "על מצות תפילין" היא ברכת הודאה כמו שכתבתי מקודם‪ ,‬בהיות מצוה זו הקשר הגדול‬
‫שמקשר את ישראל לאביהם שבשמים‪ .‬לזה אנו מברכים ברכת הודאה‪ ,‬להודות להשם יתברך על הטוב‬
‫הזה‪ .‬ובהיות שעיקר הקשר הוא בפסוק "שמע ישראל"‪ ,‬ולכן אנו אומרים "ברוך שם כבוד מלכותו לעולם ועד" כמו‬
‫שיעקב אבינו ענה כן בעת שהשבטים אמרו "שמע ישראל"‪ ,‬כדאיתא בפסחים )נו א(‪.‬‬
‫וראיה לזה מלשון "תפילין" עצמה‪ ,‬שכתב הטור לשון "פלילה"‪ ,‬שהן אות ועדות לכל רואינו שהשכינה שורה עלינו‪...‬‬
‫עד כאן לשונו‪ .‬וזהו פירושו‪ :‬דעל מצות תפילין‪ ,‬כלומר על מה שהשם יתברך התחבר אלינו – אנו נותנים לו יתברך‬
‫שבח והודיה על זה‪.‬‬
‫)עיין בית יוסף שהביא מזוהר "פנחס"‪ :‬אמר רבי שמעון‪ :‬תפילין‪ ...‬ברכה אחת לתרווייהו‪ ...‬עד כאן לשונו‪ .‬וכתב שיש‬
‫לומר דכוונתו דברכת "להניח" קאי אתרווייהו‪ ,‬ולעולם צריך שתים‪ ,‬עיין שם‪ .‬ולעניות דעתי וודאי כן הוא‪ .‬שהרי‬
‫בתיקוני זוהר חדש )דפוס ווילנא דף מו ע"ב( אומר על קרא ד"אחת דיבר אלהים שתים זו שמעתי" וזה לשונו‪ :‬ובגין‬
‫דמסיטרא דימינא ושמאלא "שתים זו שמעתי" )כן צריך לומר( – צריך לברכא עלייהו תרין ברכאין‪ ,‬חד "להניח" על‬
‫של יד וחד "על מצות" על של ראש‪ .‬ואם סח בנתיים – מברך על של ראש שתים‪ .‬אבל מסיטרא דעמודא דאמצעיתא‬
‫איתמר "אחת דיבר אלהים" )כן צריך לומר(‪ ,‬ולא צריך אלא ברכתא חדא‪ ...‬עד כאן לשונו‪ .‬ונראה דהכי פירושו‪ :‬דמצד‬
‫עצם הברכה על המצוה – די באחת‪ .‬וזהו "עמודא דאמצעיתא"‪ ,‬תפארת זו התורה כדאמרינן בברכות נח א‪ ,‬והתפארת זו‬
‫מתן תורה‪ .‬ורק מימינא ושמאלא‪ ,‬שהם חסד וגבורה‪ ,‬צריך שני ברכות‪ :‬האחת גזירת מלך והוא "גבורה"‪ ,‬והשנית‬
‫הודאה על ההתקשרות והוא ימינא "חסד"‪ .‬ודייק ותמצא קל‪(.‬‬

‫‪To which Avrohom Wagner comments:‬‬

‫‪Perhaps with his yesod we can answer another kushya: the Rosh says that from the fact that one‬‬
‫‪may sleep a shinas aray in tefillin we see that there is no problem with being meisiach daas from‬‬
‫‪tefillin, only with being in a matzav of sechok vekalus rosh. The Rambam and Ramban learn that‬‬
‫‪there is a problem with hesech hadaas even without kalus rosh. How, then, do they explain the‬‬

‫‪25‬‬
permissibility of shinas aray? According to the yesod you cite here, perhaps we can say that they
hold that the requirement of daas sass is related to the kedusha engendered in the gavra, rather than
the kavod of the Sheim. As such, when the person is sleeping, and thus not in a maztav to channel
the added kedusha of tefillin (as the Keren Orah in Menachos says that one sleeping even shinas
aray west is pottur from tefillin), he has no problem with being meisiach daas.

And Eliezer replies:

You are assuming that the Ramban/Rambam would allow sheinas ara'i. The Shaagas Aryeh in the
beginning of 39 assumes that they would NOT allow it, and because of that he asks that the Tur in
YD that allows it contradicts his psak in OC like the Ramban on hesech hadaas.

I would, however, slightly modify what you said, and say that your excellent application of Rav
Sternbuch's svara would ANSWER the Shaagas Aryeh's question.

1. For readers that are unfamiliar with the Keren Orah Rav Wagner mentioned, it's in Menachos
36b.

2. That Keren Orah, by the way, is what I'm someich on to not wear tztzis when I sleep, even
during the day, like Shabbos or Shvuos. (Not really, I don't because my father didn't. But that's the
answer for people that ask.)

3. Truth is, Rav Sternbuch's svara is really implicit in the Rabbeinu Elchonon brought in the Tosfos
Yeshanim in Yuma 8a.

The Tzitz7
Harav Yaakov Medan writes:8

I.

And you shall make a plate (tzitz) of pure gold, and engrave upon it, like the engravings of a signet,
“Holiness to the Lord.” And you shall put it on a blue lace, that it may be upon the mitre; upon the
forefront of the mitre it shall be. And it shall be upon Aharon’s forehead, that Aharon may bear
the iniquity of the holy things, which the children of Israel shall hallow in all their holy gifts; and

7
Translated by David Strauss

8
https://www.etzion.org.il/en/parashat-tetzaveh-tzitz

26
it shall be always upon his forehead, that they may be accepted before the Lord. (Shemot 28:36-
38)

The connection between the tzitz and the mitzva of tzitit is evident both from the similarity
between their names and from the lace of blue found in each of them. The tzitzit serves as a
reminder of Gods commandments, and the tzitz comes to bear "the iniquity of the holy things" and
to bring about God's favorable acceptance of the sacrifices, even if mishaps occurred while they
were being offered.

What is the "Iniquity of the Holy Things"?

For what [mistake in sacrifice] does the tzitz lead to pardon? Concerning blood, flesh, and fat,
which become unclean, whether by mistake or willfully, whether by accident or voluntarily,
whether [the sacrifice] was offered up by an individual or by the entire community. (Yoma 7a)[1]

An offering that contracted ritual impurity must be burned, and it is forbidden to offer it on the
altar. But if it was offered on the altar, the tzitz effects pardon, so that it is favorably received by
God. A similar phenomenon is the atonement achieved by the goat sin-offering, whose blood is
brought into the Holy of Holies, where the High Priest sprinkles it upon the kaporet and before
the kaporet:

And he shall make atonement for the holy place, because of the uncleanness of the children of
Israel and because of their transgressions in all their sins; and so, shall he do for the Ohel Mo'ed,
which remains among them in the midst of their uncleanness. (Vayikra 16:16)

According to halakhic tradition,[2] this goat sin-offering atones for the sins of defiling the Temple
or the sacrificial offerings, which includes the entry of a ritually unclean person into the Temple.

It is difficult to accept the possibility that two such central elements in the sacrificial service –
the tzitz upon which is engraved the name of God and the goat sin-offering whose blood is brought
into the Holy of Holies – relate only to atonement for defiling the sacrifices and for an unclean
man entering the Temple. It may be assumed that these cases of impurity were not that common.
It seems that the Halakha is teaching us that the ritual impurity of the Temple and the sacrifices
reflects a fundamental problem in the relationship between God and His people in many areas.

27
These problems wear away at the sanctity of the Temple and lead to its impurity and the impurity
of the sacrifices. The Torah says something of the sort in the tokhacha (passages of rebuke):

And I will not smell the savor of your sweet odors. (Vayikra 26:31)

The tzitz, which effects pardon for sacrifices offered in a state of ritual impurity so that they should
be accepted favorably and as a sweet odor, and the goat sin-offering whose blood is sprinkled
inside the Holy of Holies, which achieves atonement for the defilement of the Temple, lead to God
dwelling among the people of Israel in the midst of their uncleanness and despite their sins.

In this way the tzitz, is similar to tzitzit, which also addresses a fundamental problem – forgetting
God's commandments, which leads a person to stray after his own heart and his own eyes.

II.

Chazal clarify another role of the tzitz:

The tzitz achieves atonement for impudent deeds, for here it is written: "And it shall be upon
Aharon's forehead," and there it is written there: "And you did have a harlot's
forehead" (Yirmeyahu 3:3). (Arakhin 16a)[3]

What is this impudence referred to here, and how does the tzitz achieve atonement for it?

Impudence is the opposite of shame. It entails doing something that a person should be ashamed
to do, but not being ashamed of it; one does it knowingly and publicly:

He used to say: The impudent is [destined] for Gehinnom, and the shame-faced is [destined] for
the Garden of Eden. (Avot 5:20)

This is apparently the meaning of the verse, "And you did have a harlot's forehead; you did refuse
to be ashamed" (Yirmeyahu 3:3), cited by the gemara in Arakhin. The prophet rebukes the harlot

28
for refusing to be ashamed, despite the fact that harlotry is an activity about which one ought to be
ashamed. Below we will offer a different way to understand this verse.

Usually, Halakha associates impudence with a person who is prepared to lie through his teeth. A
person is ordinarily ashamed of any lie that he utters, and in particular when the listener knows
that it is a lie:

For Rabba said: Why does the Torah say that one who admits part of his opponent's claim must
take an oath? Because there is a presumption that no one would take up such an impertinent attitude
towards his creditor [as to give a complete denial to his claim]. (Bava Metzia 3a and elsewhere)

For R. Hamnuna ruled: If a woman said to her husband, "You have divorced me," she is believed,
for there is a presumption that a woman would not take such an impertinent attitude toward her
husband [and make such a false assertion]. (Yevamot 116a and elsewhere)

We learn from the words of Rabba[4] that if a person admits to part of a claim brought against
him, it is clear to us that the plaintiff is indeed his creditor; the dispute between them is limited to
the sum of the debt. The Torah imposed an oath upon the defendant on the assumption that he
would not dare to swear falsely to his creditor but will rather speak only the truth. But if he is
impudent, he will be impertinent toward his creditor and lie even under oath!

We learn something similar from R. Hamnuna. A married woman is ashamed to say in the presence
of her husband that she is not his wife because he has divorced her if that is not true. But if she is
impudent, she is liable to utter this lie.

Let us go back to the bold-faced harlot referred to by Yirmeyahu. In Yirmeyahu's prophecy as

well, it seems that the woman's impudence expresses itself in her bold-faced lies and in her claim
that she had never engaged in harlotry. The people of Israel who deny their sins are likened in this
prophecy to that woman. Here are a few select verses from that same prophecy:

How can you say, “I am not polluted, I have not gone after the Ba'alim”? See your way in the
valley; know what you have done. (Yirmeyahu 2:23)

29
As the thief is ashamed when he is found, so is the house of Israel ashamed: they, their kings, their
princes, and their priests, and their prophets. (2:26)

Yet you say, “Because I am innocent, surely His anger has turned from me.” Behold, I will enter
into judgment with you, because you say, “I have not sinned.” (2:35)

And you did have a harlot's forehead; you did refuse to be ashamed. (3:3)

The harlot in Yirmeyahu's parable claims that she had not been defiled, that she had not
sinned, but time after time she is caught like a thief, "as the thief is ashamed when he is found."
The woman lies without shame.

This is the sota mentioned in the Torah. She betrays her husband and commits adultery
with another man, and when her husband brings her to be examined in the Mishkan or the Temple,
she swears by the name of God (by stating "Amen, Amen") that no other man had relations with
her. The water that causes the curse, in which God's name is found, attests to her guilt or innocence.
If she lied with her oath, the water will exact punishment from her.

The tzitz, on which God's explicit name is engraved, atones for impudence, which might
be a false oath taken in His name. God's pure name engraved on the tzitz atones for the name of
God that was desecrated with a false oath. The simple understanding is that the tzitz does not atone
for the person who took the false oath, but rather for the people of Israel in whose midst God's
name had been desecrated – by presenting God's pure name.

We find that the tzitz played a similar role in the incident involving King Yannai and the Sages of
Israel:

It once happened that King Yannai… Elazar son of Po'ira said to King Yannai: "O King Yannai,
the hearts of the Pharisees are against you." "Then what shall I do?" "Test them by the plate
between your eyes." So he tested them by the plate between his eyes. Now, an elder named Yehuda
son of Gedidya was present there. He said to King Yannai: "O King Yannai! Let the royal crown
suffice you, and leave the priestly crown to the seed of Aharon." For it was rumored that his mother
had been taken captive in Modi'im. (Kiddushin 66a)

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One of the Sadducee sages, Elazar son of Po'ira, told the king that the Pharisees had not accepted
the fact that in addition to being the king, he also served as the High Priest. He suggested to the
king that he clarify the matter by standing them before him while wearing the tzitz on his forehead.
Standing before the name of God engraved upon the tzitz, the Sages would be forced to speak the
truth. Standing them before the explicit name engraved on the tzitz was equivalent to having them
swear by the name of God, like the priest who makes a sota swear by the name of God in the
Temple. And, indeed, the Pharisee sages – Yehuda son of Gedidya and his colleagues – were
compelled to tell the truth in front of the tzitz, namely that they did not accept his priesthood. They
did this even though they knew that they were liable to pay for their words with their lives, which
is what indeed happened.[5]

III.

The Temple is "the place which the Lord your God shall choose to cause His name
to dwell there" (Devarim 12:11). Regarding two places in the Temple it is stated
explicitly that God causes His name to rest there.

The first is on the forehead of the High Priest:

And you shall make a plate (tzitz) of pure gold, and engrave upon it, like the engravings of a signet,
“Holiness to the Lord”… And it shall be upon Aharon’s forehead. (Shemot 28:36-38)

The second place is on the altar:

An altar of earth shall you make to Me, and you shall sacrifice on it your burnt-offerings, and your
peace-offerings, your sheep, and your oxen; in all places where I cause My name to be
pronounced, I will come to You and I well bless you. (Shemot 20:21-22)

God put His name on the altar, and in this way the altar strengthens the oaths taken alongside it:

If any man trespasses against his neighbor and an oath is laid upon him to cause him to swear and
the oath comes before your altar in this house. (I Melakhim 8:31)

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The name of the Almighty that was placed on the altar is liable to be profaned if the person taking
an oath is bald-faced and his mouth proclaims a lie. The desecration of the altar is liable to cause,
openly or in hidden manner, that the offerings brought upon it will become impure. This will
happen due to the absence of God's assistance, or because of the priests' contempt for their service
on the altar that was desecrated with a false oath. The tzitz comes to atone for the altar and for the
ritually impure sacrifices brought upon it, as well as for the impudence and brazenness that led to
the desecration of God's name at the altar with a false oath.

The tzitz achieves atonement when it rests on the forehead of the High Priest,[6] about which the
prophet said:

The Torah of truth was in his mouth, and iniquity was not to be found on his lips… For the priest's
lips should keep knowledge, and they should seek Torah at his mouth. (Malakhi 2:6-7)

The High Priest with the tzitz on his forehead is not impudent and he never lies. He achieves
atonement through the name of God on his forehead for the impudence of the sota who swears
falsely and for the impudence of every bald-faced man who takes a false oath in God's name.

[1] We have brought only one baraita regarding this issue. The discussion concerning the atonement achieved by the tzitz is replete

with disagreements that extend across many passages in the Talmud.

[2] See Shevuot 2a-b; 7b; 8a-b; and especially 12b.

[3] And similarly Zevachim 88b.

[4] The gemara (ad loc.) understands the words of Rabba differently, and the Halakha is certainly in accordance with that

understanding. But the principle that we attribute to him is correct even according to the gemara. We will not expand upon this

point.

[5] There is a (contrasting!) similarity between the tzitz, which brought the Pharisee sages to challenge Yannai's combining of the

monarchy with the High Priesthood, and the tzitzit, which brought Korach to challenge the monarchy-High Priesthood combination

of Moshe and Aharon. Parashat Korach immediately follows the Torah section dealing with tzitzit, and Chazal put into Korach's

mouth the question to Moshe about "a garment that is entirely blue" (see Yerushalmi, Sanhedrin 10:1, and elsewhere).

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[6] In accordance with the opinion of R. Yehuda in Yoma 7b; according to R. Shimon, the tzitz achieves atonement even when it is

not on the High Priest's forehead.

Wearing Tefillin All Day

Halakhic Positions of Rav Joseph B. Soloveitchik

R. Aharon Ziegler writes:9

We tend to look askance at someone wearing Tefillin in the afternoon. To most of us it’s a strange sight
and we wonder why that person had not donned his Tefillin in the morning like the rest of us. It does not
occur to us that the person might indeed have put them on in the proper time of the morning hours but he
harbors a need to wear them all day long. Is that really wrong or is it perhaps meritorious to wear then all
day long?

From the Gemara Menachot it certainly appears that the Amora’im wore their Tefillin all day long. The
Gemara asks (36a), “Until when may one wear his Tefillin?” And the answer of the First Tanna is, “until
the sun [finishes] setting”, R’ Ya’akov states, “he may leave the Tefillin on until pedestrians have vanished
from the market”, and the Chachamim state, “until the time of sleeping”. Furthermore, the Rambam states
explicitly (Hilchot Tefillin 4:25), that the Kedusha of Tefillin is so great, that as long as one wears them on
the head and arm, his personality will remain humble and G-d fearing. Therefore, one should make every
effort to wear them all day long, for that is indeed the proper Mitzvah. And then the Rambam adds, that it
is told about Rav, the disciple of Rabbeinu HaKadosh that all his life no-one saw him walking four Amot
without Torah, without Tzitzit, or without Tefillin. Then Rambam concludes, although it is meritorious to
wear Tefillin all day there is a special Mitzvah to wear them during Tefillah.

Rav Soloveitchik analyzed this Mitzvah by stating that from the perspective of simply fulfilling the Mitzvah
of binding the Tefillin, as found in Devarim 6:8. “U’KESHARTAM LE’OT AL YADECHA VE’HAYU
LETOTAFOT BEIN EINECHA” (You should bind them as a sign upon your arm and let them be ornaments
between your eyes), one fulfills that aspect of the Mitzvah by merely donning them for a few minutes a
day. However, from the perspective of the Gavrah, the person, the effect and Kedusha that the Tefillin have
and leave upon the person that aspect of the Mitzvah deserves a greater length of time, and wearing them
all day long is not hard to understand. Tefillin is the only Mitzvah of the Torah that even the non-Jewish
world will look upon us with awe and respect, as the Torah states, “Then all the people of the earth will see
that the Name of HaShem is proclaimed upon you and they will revere you” (Devarim 28:10). So, although
it is not our minhag to wear the Tefillin all day, nevertheless, the concept of doing so is certainly a
meritorious one.

The Shulchan Arukh (OC 37:2, echoing the Tur ibid.) writes:

‫מצותן להיות עליו כל היום אבל מפני שצריכים גוף נקי שלא יפיח בהם ושלא יסיח דעתו מהם ואין כל אדם יכול ליזהר‬
:‫בהם נהגו שלא להניחם כל היום ומכל מקום צריך כל אדם ליזהר בהם להיותם עליו בשעת קריאת שמע ותפלה‬
The commandment is to have [the Tefillin] on all day, but because they a clean body that he won't
flatulate while [wearing] them and he won't be distracted from them and not every man can be
9
https://www.torahmusings.com/2018/05/wearing-tefillin-all-day/

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careful about them, they are accustomed to not wear them all day, but nevertheless every man must
be careful to have [the Tefillin] on him at the time of the reading of Shema and Tefillah.
Basically: every minute is a Mitzva and it's most important to wear Tefillin during Shema and
Tefillah.

If you have to choose, it would seem Shacharit is more important than Mincha for reasons like you
get Shema as well as Tefillah and we generally take the first opportunity to do Mitzvot ("Zerizin
Makdimin"). Plus, people are out and about in the afternoon usually so it's not easy to have Tefillin
around.

In general nowadays most communities do not don Tefillin at Mincha, and doing so in those places
could constitute Yuhara (see Igrot Moshe OC 4:34), yet there have been many individuals over the
years who have been careful to don Tefillin at Mincha, at least in private (see eg. Magen Avraham
OC 37, B'Yitzchak Yikarei ibid., Ma'aseh Rav 63, Ben Ish Chai I Vayaqhel 6, etc.). Some are
particularly careful about this on fast days, to help make up for the lost blessings on food when
working towards 100 blessings (Beit Yosef 46).

Rav Eliyashiv was asked this and was quoted in Sefer Vayishma Moshe 2: Teffilin.

He was asked if there is an inyan to wear talis and teffilin all day. He answered that a talis it isn’t
necessary since one wears a talis katan, and regarding tefilin a person needs a guf naki. He was
then asked if one knows with certainty that he will have a guf naki is it them an inyan to do it.

He answered "Halevei" that one can do such a thing and if one can do such a thing then a bracha
should be upon him.

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