THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. NO. 172410 : April 14, 2008]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE TOLL REGULATORY BOARD (TRB), Petitioner, v.
HOLY TRINITY REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORP., Respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the
Decision1 dated 21 April 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 90981 which, in turn, set aside
two Orders2 dated 7 February 20053 and 16 May 20054 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos,
Bulacan, in Civil Case No. 869-M-2000.

The undisputed factual and procedural antecedents of this case are as follows:

On 29 December 2000, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Toll Regulatory Board
(TRB), filed with the RTC a Consolidated Complaint for Expropriation against landowners whose
properties would be affected by the construction, rehabilitation and expansion of the North Luzon
Expressway. The suit was docketed as Civil Case No. 869-M-2000 and raffled to Branch 85, Malolos,
Bulacan. Respondent Holy Trinity Realty and Development Corporation (HTRDC) was one of the affected
landowners.

On 18 March 2002, TRB filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the issuance of a Writ of Possession,
manifesting that it deposited a sufficient amount to cover the payment of 100% of the zonal value of the
affected properties, in the total amount of P28,406,700.00, with the Land Bank of the Philippines, South
Harbor Branch (LBP-South Harbor), an authorized government depository. TRB maintained that since it
had already complied with the provisions of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 89745 in relation to Section 2
of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the issuance of the writ of possession becomes ministerial on the part
of the RTC.

The RTC issued, on 19 March 2002, an Order for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession, as well as the Writ
of Possession itself. HTRDC thereafter moved for the reconsideration of the 19 March 2002 Order of the
RTC.

On 7 October 2002, the Sheriff filed with the RTC a Report on Writ of Possession stating, among other
things, that since none of the landowners voluntarily vacated the properties subject of the expropriation
proceedings, the assistance of the Philippine National Police (PNP) would be necessary in implementing
the Writ of Possession. Accordingly, TRB, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed with the
RTC an Omnibus Motion praying for an Order directing the PNP to assist the Sheriff in the
implementation of the Writ of Possession. On 15 November 2002, the RTC issued an Order directing the
landowners to file their comment on TRB's Omnibus Motion.
On 3 March 2003, HTRDC filed with the RTC a Motion to Withdraw Deposit, praying that the respondent
or its duly authorized representative be allowed to withdraw the amount of P22,968,000.00, out of
TRB's advance deposit of P28,406,700.00 with LBP-South Harbor, including the interest which accrued
thereon. Acting on said motion, the RTC issued an Order dated 21 April 2003, directing the manager of
LBP-South Harbor to release in favor of HTRDC the amount of P22,968,000.00 since the latter already
proved its absolute ownership over the subject properties and paid the taxes due thereon to the
government. According to the RTC, "(t)he issue however on the interest earned by the amount
deposited in the bank, if there is any, should still be threshed out."6

On 7 May 2003, the RTC conducted a hearing on the accrued interest, after which, it directed the
issuance of an order of expropriation, and granted TRB a period of 30 days to inquire from LBP-South
Harbor "whether the deposit made by DPWH with said bank relative to these expropriation proceedings
is earning interest or not."7

The RTC issued an Order, on 6 August 2003, directing the appearance of LBP Assistant Vice-President
Atty. Rosemarie M. Osoteo and Department Manager Elizabeth Cruz to testify on whether the
Department of Public Works and Highways' (DPWH's) expropriation account with the bank was earning
interest. On 9 October 2003, TRB instead submitted a Manifestation to which was attached a letter
dated 19 August 2003 by Atty. Osoteo stating that the DPWH Expropriation Account was an interest
bearing current account.

On 11 March 2004, the RTC issued an Order resolving as follows the issue of ownership of the interest
that had accrued on the amount deposited by DPWH in its expropriation current account with LBP-South
Harbor:

WHEREFORE, the interest earnings from the deposit of P22,968,000.00 respecting one hundred (100%)
percent of the zonal value of the affected properties in this expropriation proceedings under the
principle of accession are considered as fruits and should properly pertain to the herein
defendant/property owner [HTRDC]. Accordingly, the Land Bank as the depositary bank in this
expropriation proceedings is (1) directed to make the necessary computation of the accrued interest of
the amount of P22,968,000.00 from the time it was deposited up to the time it was released to Holy
Trinity Realty and Development Corp. and thereafter (2) to release the same to the defendant Holy
Trinity Development Corporation through its authorized representative.8

TRB filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the afore-quoted RTC Order, contending that the payment of
interest on money deposited and/or consigned for the purpose of securing a writ of possession was
sanctioned neither by law nor by jurisprudence.

TRB filed a Motion to Implement Order dated 7 May 2003, which directed the issuance of an order of
expropriation. On 5 November 2004, the RTC issued an Order of Expropriation.

On 7 February 2005, the RTC likewise granted TRB's Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC ruled that the
issue as to whether or not HTRDC is entitled to payment of interest should be ventilated before the
Board of Commissioners which will be created later for the determination of just compensation.
Now it was HTRDC's turn to file a Motion for Reconsideration of the latest Order of the RTC. The RTC,
however, denied HTRDC's Motion for Reconsideration in an Order dated 16 May 2005.

HTRDC sought recourse with the Court of Appeals by filing a Petition for Certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 90981. In its Decision, promulgated on 21 April 2006, the Court of Appeals vacated the Orders
dated 7 February 2005 and 16 May 2005 of the RTC, and reinstated the Order dated 11 March 2004 of
the said trial court wherein it ruled that the interest which accrued on the amount deposited in the
expropriation account belongs to HTRDC by virtue of accession. The Court of Appeals thus declared:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the assailed Orders dated 07 February and 16 May
2005 respectively of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan (Branch 85) are hereby VACATED and
SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Order dated 11 March 2004 is hereby reinstated.9

From the foregoing, the Republic, represented by the TRB, filed the present Petition for Review on
Certiorari, steadfast in its stance that HTRDC is "entitled only to an amount equivalent to the zonal value
of the expropriated property, nothing more and nothing less."10 According to the TRB, the owner of the
subject properties is entitled to an exact amount as clearly defined in both Section 4 of Republic Act No.
8974, which reads:

Section 4. Guidelines for Expropriation Proceedings. - Whenever it is necessary to acquire real property
for the right-of-way, site or location for any national government infrastructure project through
expropriation, the appropriate implementing agency shall initiate the expropriation proceedings before
the proper court under the following guidelines:

(a) Upon the filing of the complaint, and after due notice to the defendant, the implementing agency
shall immediately pay the owner of the property the amount equivalent to the sum of (1) one hundred
(100%) percent of the value of the property based on the current relevant zonal valuation of the Bureau
of Internal Revenue (BIR); and (2) the value of the improvements and/or structures as determined under
Section 7 hereof.

and Section 2, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

Sec. 2. Entry of plaintiff upon depositing value with authorized government depositary. - Upon the filing
of the complaint or at anytime thereafter and after due notice to the defendant, the plaintiff shall have
the right to take or enter upon the possession of the real property involved if he deposits with the
authorized government depositary an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property for
purposes of taxation to be held by such bank subject to the orders of the court. Such deposit shall be in
money, unless in lieu thereof the court authorizes the deposit of a certificate of deposit of a government
bank of the Republic of the Philippines payable on demand to the authorized government depositary.

The TRB reminds us that there are two stages11 in expropriation proceedings, the determination of the
authority to exercise eminent domain and the determination of just compensation. The TRB argues that
it is only during the second stage when the court will appoint commissioners and determine claims for
entitlement to interest, citing Land Bank of the Philippines v. Wycoco12 and National Power Corporation
v. Angas.13

The TRB further points out that the expropriation account with LBP-South Harbor is not in the name of
HTRDC, but of DPWH. Thus, the said expropriation account includes the compensation for the other
landowners named defendants in Civil Case No. 869-M-2000, and does not exclusively belong to
respondent.

At the outset, we call attention to a significant oversight in the TRB's line of reasoning. It failed to
distinguish between the expropriation procedures under Republic Act No. 8974 and Rule 67 of the Rules
of Court. Republic Act No. 8974 and Rule 67 of the Rules of Court speak of different procedures, with the
former specifically governing expropriation proceedings for national government infrastructure projects.
Thus, in Republic v. Gingoyon,14 we held:

There are at least two crucial differences between the respective procedures under Rep. Act No. 8974
and Rule 67. Under the statute, the Government is required to make immediate payment to the
property owner upon the filing of the complaint to be entitled to a writ of possession, whereas in Rule
67, the Government is required only to make an initial deposit with an authorized government
depositary. Moreover, Rule 67 prescribes that the initial deposit be equivalent to the assessed value of
the property for purposes of taxation, unlike Rep. Act No. 8974 which provides, as the relevant standard
for initial compensation, the market value of the property as stated in the tax declaration or the current
relevant zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), whichever is higher, and the value of
the improvements and/or structures using the replacement cost method.

xxx

Rule 67 outlines the procedure under which eminent domain may be exercised by the Government. Yet
by no means does it serve at present as the solitary guideline through which the State may expropriate
private property. For example, Section 19 of the Local Government Code governs as to the exercise by
local government units of the power of eminent domain through an enabling ordinance. And then there
is Rep. Act No. 8974, which covers expropriation proceedings intended for national government
infrastructure projects.

Rep. Act No. 8974, which provides for a procedure eminently more favorable to the property owner
than Rule 67, inescapably applies in instances when the national government expropriates property "for
national government infrastructure projects." Thus, if expropriation is engaged in by the national
government for purposes other than national infrastructure projects, the assessed value standard and
the deposit mode prescribed in Rule 67 continues to apply.

There is no question that the proceedings in this case deal with the expropriation of properties intended
for a national government infrastructure project. Therefore, the RTC correctly applied the procedure laid
out in Republic Act No. 8974, by requiring the deposit of the amount equivalent to 100% of the zonal
value of the properties sought to be expropriated before the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of
the Republic.

The controversy, though, arises not from the amount of the deposit, but as to the ownership of the
interest that had since accrued on the deposited amount.

Whether the Court of Appeals was correct in holding that the interest earned by the deposited amount
in the expropriation account would accrue to HRTDC by virtue of accession, hinges on the determination
of who actually owns the deposited amount, since, under Article 440 of the Civil Code, the right of
accession is conferred by ownership of the principal property:

Art. 440. The ownership of property gives the right by accession to everything which is produced
thereby, or which is incorporated or attached thereto, either naturally or artificially.

The principal property in the case at bar is part of the deposited amount in the expropriation account of
DPWH which pertains particularly to HTRDC. Such amount, determined to be P22,968,000.00 of the
P28,406,700.00 total deposit, was already ordered by the RTC to be released to HTRDC or its authorized
representative. The Court of Appeals further recognized that the deposit of the amount was already
deemed a constructive delivery thereof to HTRDC:

When the [herein petitioner] TRB deposited the money as advance payment for the expropriated
property with an authorized government depositary bank for purposes of obtaining a writ of possession,
it is deemed to be a "constructive delivery" of the amount corresponding to the 100% zonal valuation of
the expropriated property. Since [HTRDC] is entitled thereto and undisputably the owner of the principal
amount deposited by [herein petitioner] TRB, conversely, the interest yield, as accession, in a bank
deposit should likewise pertain to the owner of the money deposited.15

Since the Court of Appeals found that the HTRDC is the owner of the deposited amount, then the latter
should also be entitled to the interest which accrued thereon.

We agree with the Court of Appeals, and find no merit in the instant Petition.

The deposit was made in order to comply with Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8974, which requires
nothing less than the immediate payment of 100% of the value of the property, based on the current
zonal valuation of the BIR, to the property owner. Thus, going back to our ruling in Republic v.
Gingoyon16 :

It is the plain intent of Rep. Act No. 8974 to supersede the system of deposit under Rule 67 with the
scheme of "immediate payment" in cases involving national government infrastructure projects. The
following portion of the Senate deliberations, cited by PIATCO in its Memorandum, is worth quoting to
cogitate on the purpose behind the plain meaning of the law:

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. CAYETANO). "x x x Because the Senate believes that, you know, we have to pay
the landowners immediately not by treasury bills but by cash.

Since we are depriving them, you know, upon payment, 'no, of possession, we might as well pay them as
much, 'no, hindi lang 50 percent.

xxx

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. VERGARA). Accepted.

xxx

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. CAYETANO). Oo. Because this is really in favor of the landowners, e.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. VERGARA). That's why we need to really secure the availability of funds.

xxx

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. CAYETANO). No, no. It's the same. It says here: iyong first paragraph, diba? Iyong
zonal - talagang magbabayad muna. In other words, you know, there must be a payment kaagad. (TSN,
Bicameral Conference on the Disagreeing Provisions of House Bill 1422 and Senate Bill 2117, August 29,
2000, pp. 14-20)

xxx

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. CAYETANO). Okay, okay, 'no. Unang-una, it is not deposit, 'no. It's payment."

REP. BATERINA. It's payment, ho, payment."

The critical factor in the different modes of effecting delivery which gives legal effect to the act is the
actual intention to deliver on the part of the party making such delivery.17 The intention of the TRB in
depositing such amount through DPWH was clearly to comply with the requirement of immediate
payment in Republic Act No. 8974, so that it could already secure a writ of possession over the
properties subject of the expropriation and commence implementation of the project. In fact, TRB did
not object to HTRDC's Motion to Withdraw Deposit with the RTC, for as long as HTRDC shows (1) that
the property is free from any lien or encumbrance and (2) that respondent is the absolute owner
thereof.18

A close scrutiny of TRB's arguments would further reveal that it does not directly challenge the Court of
Appeals' determinative pronouncement that the interest earned by the amount deposited in the
expropriation account accrues to HTRDC by virtue of accession. TRB only asserts that HTRDC is "entitled
only to an amount equivalent to the zonal value of the expropriated property, nothing more and nothing
less."

We agree in TRB's statement since it is exactly how the amount of the immediate payment shall be
determined in accordance with Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8974, i.e., an amount equivalent to 100%
of the zonal value of the expropriated properties. However, TRB already complied therewith by
depositing the required amount in the expropriation account of DPWH with LBP-South Harbor. By
depositing the said amount, TRB is already considered to have paid the same to HTRDC, and HTRDC
became the owner thereof. The amount earned interest after the deposit; hence, the interest should
pertain to the owner of the principal who is already determined as HTRDC. The interest is paid by LBP-
South Harbor on the deposit, and the TRB cannot claim that it paid an amount more than what it is
required to do so by law.

Nonetheless, we find it necessary to emphasize that HTRDC is determined to be the owner of only a part
of the amount deposited in the expropriation account, in the sum of P22,968,000.00. Hence, it is
entitled by right of accession to the interest that had accrued to the said amount only.

We are not persuaded by TRB's citation of National Power Corporation v. Angas and Land Bank of the
Philippines v. Wycoco, in support of its argument that the issue on interest is merely part and parcel of
the determination of just compensation which should be determined in the second stage of the
proceedings only. We find that neither case is applicable herein.
The issue in Angas is whether or not, in the computation of the legal rate of interest on just
compensation for expropriated lands, the applicable law is Article 2209 of the Civil Code which
prescribes a 6% legal interest rate, or Central Bank Circular No. 416 which fixed the legal rate at 12% per
annum. We ruled in Angas that since the kind of interest involved therein is interest by way of damages
for delay in the payment thereof, and not as earnings from loans or forbearances of money, Article 2209
of the Civil Code prescribing the 6% interest shall apply. In Wycoco, on the other hand, we clarified that
interests in the form of damages cannot be applied where there is prompt and valid payment of just
compensation.

The case at bar, however, does not involve interest as damages for delay in payment of just
compensation. It concerns interest earned by the amount deposited in the expropriation account.

Under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8974, the implementing agency of the government pays just
compensation twice: (1) immediately upon the filing of the complaint, where the amount to be paid is
100% of the value of the property based on the current relevant zonal valuation of the BIR (initial
payment); and (2) when the decision of the court in the determination of just compensation becomes
final and executory, where the implementing agency shall pay the owner the difference between the
amount already paid and the just compensation as determined by the court (final payment).19

HTRDC never alleged that it was seeking interest because of delay in either of the two payments
enumerated above. In fact, HTRDC's cause of action is based on the prompt initial payment of just
compensation, which effectively transferred the ownership of the amount paid to HTRDC. Being the
owner of the amount paid, HTRDC is claiming, by the right of accession, the interest earned by the same
while on deposit with the bank.

That the expropriation account was in the name of DPWH, and not of HTRDC, is of no moment. We
quote with approval the following reasoning of the Court of Appeals:

Notwithstanding that the amount was deposited under the DPWH account, ownership over the deposit
transferred by operation of law to the [HTRDC] and whatever interest, considered as civil fruits, accruing
to the amount of Php22,968,000.00 should properly pertain to [HTRDC] as the lawful owner of the
principal amount deposited following the principle of accession. Bank interest partake the nature of civil
fruits under Art. 442 of the New Civil Code. And since these are considered fruits, ownership thereof
should be due to the owner of the principal. Undoubtedly, being an attribute of ownership, the
[HTRDC's] right over the fruits (jus fruendi), that is the bank interests, must be respected.20

Considering that the expropriation account is in the name of DPWH, then, DPWH should at most be
deemed as the trustee of the amounts deposited in the said accounts irrefragably intended as initial
payment for the landowners of the properties subject of the expropriation, until said landowners are
allowed by the RTC to withdraw the same.

As a final note, TRB does not object to HTRDC's withdrawal of the amount of P22,968,000.00 from the
expropriation account, provided that it is able to show (1) that the property is free from any lien or
encumbrance and (2) that it is the absolute owner thereof.21 The said conditions do not put in abeyance
the constructive delivery of the said amount to HTRDC pending the latter's compliance therewith. Article
118722 of the Civil Code provides that the "effects of a conditional obligation to give, once the condition
has been fulfilled, shall retroact to the day of the constitution of the obligation." Hence, when HTRDC
complied with the given conditions, as determined by the RTC in its Order23 dated 21 April 2003, the
effects of the constructive delivery retroacted to the actual date of the deposit of the amount in the
expropriation account of DPWH.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated 21 April 2006 in CA-G.R. SP
No. 90981, which set aside the 7 February 2005 and 16 May 2005 Orders of the Regional Trial Court of
Malolos, Bulacan, is AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 September 17, 2018

G.R. No. 228680

SPOUSES FRANCISCO and DELMA SANCHEZ, represented by HILARIO LOMBOY, Petitioners

vs.
ESTHER DIVINAGRACIA VDA. DE AGUILAR, TERESITA AGUILAR, ZENAIDA AGUILAR, JUANITO AGUILAR, JR.,
AMALIA AGUILAR, and SUSAN AGUILAR, THE MUNICIPALITY of LAKE SEBU, represented by its Mayor, BASILIO
SALIF, NOEMI DUTA D. DALIPE in her capacity as ZONING OFFICER II, ZALDY B. ARTACHO, in his capacity as
CHAIRMAN AD HOC COMMITTEE ON LAND CONFLICT, HON. RENATO TAMPAC, in his capacity as PRESIDING
JUDGE of the 6TH MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT OF SURALLA-LAKE SEBU, Respondents

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside
the Decision   dated July 28, 2016 and the Resolution  dated October 10, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
1 2

No. 03481-MlN, which reversed and set aside the Decision  dated July 8, 2013 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Surallah,
3

South Cotabato, in Civil Case No. 1029-LS.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

On July 11, 2000, Juanito Aguilar sold to petitioner spouses Francisco and Delma Sanchez (Spouses Sanchez) a 600-
square-meter portion of his 33,600-square meter lot identified as Lot No. 71, Pls 870, located in the Municipality of Lake
Sebu, South Cotabato. On October 23, 2004, the heirs of Juanito Aguilar, namely, respondents Esther Divinagracia V da. de
Aguilar, Juanito's spouse, and their children, fenced the boundary line between the 600-square-meter lot of the spouses and
the alleged alluvium on the northwest portion of the land by the lake Sebu. The Spouses Sanchez protested the act of
fencing by Esther before the barangay, but since no settlement was reached, they filed a Complaint for Forcible Entry
against the heirs of Aguilar before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Surallah-Lake Sebu, Province of South
Cotabato. They claimed that under the law, they are the owners of the alluvium which enlarged their 600- square-meter lot. It
cannot, therefore, be fenced by the heirs of Aguilar. For their part, the heirs refute the existence of the alluvium. They assert
that the "alluvium" referred to is the 800-square-meter area beyond the 600-squaremeter lot of the spouses which has been
in their actual possession but was used, with their tolerance, by the spouses in connection with their operation of fish cages
in that portion of Lake Sebu abutting their lot.
4

On June 7, 2006, the MCTC rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint of the Spouses Sanchez.  It held that the
1âwphi1

spouses failed to controvert the prior actual physical possession of the heirs which was manifested by the improvements
found in the subject lot area consisting of 4 mahogany trees of about 12 to 26 years old, 1 lanzones tree of the same age, 2
coconut trees of about 30 years old, and other unidentified trees of about the same age. But since the spouses purchased
the 600-meter land adjacent to the land in question only on July 11, 2000, they could not have been in possession thereof
ahead of the heirs of Aguilar. Thus, the heirs are the ones in actual possession of the subject property and cannot be held
liable for forcible entry by stealth as alleged by the Spouses Sanchez. They merely protected their interests in manifesting
the metes and bounds of the area purchased from them by placing the bamboo fence. In addition, the MCTC was
unconvinced with the spouses' contention that the subject land is an alluvium. An alluvium is an area formed by running
water like a river or a creek. But in a lake like the subject Lake Sebu, the water is stagnant. Thus the land in question is a
natural surrounding of the lake which existed at the same time with the lake itself. Moreover, the MCTC pointed out that the
subject land is 800 square meters in size which is greater than the area purchased by the spouses so if there could be a
legal claimant, it is the government of Lake Sebu as foreshore or salvage zone for ·public use. Finally, on the conflicting
description of the deed of sale which states that the property is 600 square meters or 20 x 30 meters, on the one hand, and
boundary on the SW by the lake, on the other, the court held that the former should prevail as the same is the clearer
intention of the spouses. 5

On May 27, 2008, the MCTC issued a Writ of Execution ordering the Sheriff to execute its June 7, 2006 Decision by setting,
defining, and/or fixing the boundaries of the respective properties of the parties according to the following description in the
Deed of Sale: "A 600-square-meter portion of Lot 21, Pls 870 in Lake Sebu, South Cotabato with dimension of 20 meters
along the national highway and depth of 30 meters in rectangular shape. Bounded on the SE by national highway; on the
NW by Lake Sebu; on the NE by Lot 71, Pls 870 port; on the SW by Lot 71, Pls 870 port."  In implementing the same, the
6

MCTC authorized the Sheriff to engage the services of professional surveyors, if necessary. In his Report dated August 26,
2008, however, the Sheriff stated that he discontinued the execution because when the· surveyor measured the national
highway at 60 meters wide, Esther objected and claimed that the width of said highway is only 30 meters. Said
disagreement as to the width of the highway was submitted to the MCTC, which adopted the findings of the District
Engineer's Office that the width thereof is 58.53 meters. Based on said measurement, monuments were set on both sides of
the highway to determine the area of the spouses' 600-square-meter property. Thus, using the national highway as
reference point, the Sheriff adopted the plan prepared by the geodetic engineer showing that the edge or boundary line of
the 600-square-meter lot of the spouses in the northwest direction is the 20-square-meter wide public easement abutting
Lake Sebu.

Nevertheless, the spouses received a Notice dated February 17, 2009 from the Zoning Section of the Municipality of Lake
Sebu informing them that based on the findings of its own survey team, the "150-square-meter" lot along Lake Sebu is
owned by the heirs of Aguilar. Thus, in accordance with Section 5(g) of the Zoning Ordinance of the Municipality of Lake
Sebu, the privilege on the utilization of the municipal waters shall be given first priority to the legal owner of the land
alongside the lake unless otherwise waived by him to others.   In another Notice dated March 10, 2009, the Municipality
7

directed the spouses to demolish their fish cages or refer the case to the Ad Hoc Committee on Lake Sebu Water Dispute.
But after the referral, said Committee ruled in its Decision dated June 19, 2009 that the land area in excess of the 600-
square-meter property purchased by the spouses belongs to the heirs of Aguilar. As such, said heirs have priority to utilize
the lake waters abutting the land. 
8

On May 22, 2010, the spouses filed a Complaint for Annulment of Judgment with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction and Damages before the RTC seeking to annul the June 7, 2006 Decision of
the MCTC for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or for rendering judgment over a non-existent parcel of land since
there is no excess of the 600-square-meter portion to speak of. 9

On July 8, 2013, the RTC granted the spouses' complaint and annulled the June 7, 2006 MCTC Decision. It rendered
erroneous and without legal basis the findings of the MCTC that there is a portion of land between the 600-square-meter lot
and the lake in the following manner:

The record of this case shows that when the writ of execution of the decision rendered by the court a quo in the forcible
entry case filed thereat by plaintiffs (spouses Sanchez) was implemented, the parties did not agree as to the point of
reference when the survey was conducted in order to establish the 600-square-meter area bought by plaintiffs (spouses
Sanchez) from the defendants (heirs of Aguilar). Thus, the court a quo directed the District Engineer's Office of South
Cotabato to fix the width of the national highway in order to serve as the point of reference in locating the 600-square- meter
area. The said Office of the District Engineer found that the width of the national highway is 58.53. It must be remembered
that when the implementing sheriff had the area surveyed, the surveyor told them that the width of the national
highway is sixty meters, while the defendants (heirs of Aguilar) insisted that it is only thirty (30) meters. As
explained in his Report, the implementing sheriff informed the court that if .the sixty-meters width of the national
highway is made as a point of reference, the lot of the plaintiffs will go downwards to the lake. Considering then
that the width of the natiional highway was found by the District Engineer's Office to have measured 58.53 meters,
or almost sixty (60) meters, the length of the lot in question therefore must have reached the edge of the lake.
Except however for the easement that the landowner has the obligation to follow, the lot allegedly claimed by the
defendants (heirs of Aguilar) as alluvium has no basis because the 600- square-meter area purchased by the
plaintiffs (spouses Sanchez) from them went downwards to the lake by reason of the 58.53 width of the national
highway. The defendants (heirs of Aguilar) could not include the area which is part of the national highway in the
600-square-meter lot they sold to the plaintiffs (spouses Sanchez), thus, inevitably, if there is any alluvium that was
formed at the back portion of the lot abutting the lake, it is part or accessory of the lot sold to the plaintiffs
(spouses Sanchez) by them.

The notice, therefore, sent by the Zoning Office of the Municipality of Lake Sebu for the plaintiffs (spouses Sanchez) to
demolish the fish cages built by them and to remove any improvement put up by them in the area abutting their lot, is not
proper and no basis in view of the findings of this court that it is the plaintiffs (spouses Sanchez) who are the legitimate
owners of the alleged lot formed by said alluvium, if there is any. Considering likewise the findings of this court that
there is no more lot abutting the lake waters except that of the plaintiffs (spouses Sanchez) by reason of the
findings of the width of the national highway by the District Engineer's Office, which is and should be the point of
reference, plaintiffs are declared the legal owners of the said lot in question as it is part of the 600 square meters
bought by them from the defendants (heirs of Aguilar).  10

On July 28, 2016, however, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC Decision. First, the appellate court ruled that the MCTC
Decision cannot be annulled on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. It is clear that the
MCTC acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the Spouses Sanchez as they are the ones who filed the forcible entry
complaint before said court. As to the nature of the action, the MCTC likewise had jurisdiction since under the law, it
exercises exclusive original jurisdiction over ejectment suits.   And, second, the CA held that the spouses' complaint is
11

already barred by laches since it was only on May 22, 2010, or 4 years after the issuance of the June 7, 2006 MCTC
Decision that the spouses filed their complaint for annulment. In fact, the challenged decision had already been executed
more than a year prior to the filing of the complaint. Thus, the spouses' action must necessarily be dismissed,.  12

Furthermore, in a Resolution dated October 10, 2016, the CA rejected the contention of the Spouses Sanchez that the
appeal of the heirs of Aguilar must be denied since their counsel failed to comply with the MCLE requirements. Under En
Banc Resolution dated January 14, 2014, the failure of a lawyer to indicate in his or her pleadings the number and date of
issue of his or her MCLE Certificate of Compliance will no longer result in the dismissal of the case and expunction of the
pleadings from the records. Nonetheless, failure will subject the lawyer to disciplinary action.  13

On January 26, 2017, the Spouses Sanchez filed the instant petition essentially insisting that the ruling of the RTC must be
upheld in view of the findings of the Sheriff that since the width of the national highway is almost 60 meters wide, the lot of
the spouses must have gone downwards towards the lake, and thus any portion of land beside said lake must be considered
as part of the land purchased by the spouses from Aguilar.

The petition is bereft of merit.

Time and again, the Court has ruled that a petition for annulment of judgment is a remedy in equity so exceptional in nature
that it may be availed of only when other remedies are wanting, and only if the judgment, final order or final resolution
sought to be annulled was rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction or through extrinsic fraud.   Its objective is to undo or set
14

aside the judgment or final order, and thereby grant to the petitioner an opportunity to prosecute his cause or to ventilate his
defense. Being exceptional in character, it is not allowed to be so easily and readily abused by parties aggrieved by the final
judgments, orders or resolutions. Thus, the Court has instituted safeguards by limiting the grounds for the annulment to lack
of jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud, and by prescribing in Section 1 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court that the petitioner should
show that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available
through no fault of the petitioner.   In this regard, if the ground relied upon is lack of jurisdiction, the entire proceedings are
15

set aside without prejudice to the original action being refiled in the proper court. If the judgment or final order or resolution is
set aside on the ground of extrinsic fraud, the CA may on motion order the trial court to try the case as if a timely motion for
new trial had been granted therein.  16

In the instant case, the Spouses Sanchez anchored their Complaint for Annulment of Judgment on the alleged lack of
jurisdiction of the MCTC. Jurisdiction is the power and authority of the tribunal to hear, try and decide a case   and the lack
17

thereof refers to either lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defending party or over the subject matter of the action.
Lack of jurisdiction or absence of jurisdiction presupposes that the court should not have taken cognizance of the complaint
because the law or the Constitution does not vest it with jurisdiction over the subject matter. On the one hand, jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant or respondent is acquired by voluntary appearance . or submission by the
defendant/respondent to the court, or by coercive process issued by the court to such party through service of summons. On
the other hand, jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations of
the complaint and the relief prayed for. Thus, whether the plaintiff is entitled to recovery upon all or some of the claims
prayed therein is not essential. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by the Constitution or by law and not by
agreement or consent of the parties. Neither does it depend upon the defenses of the defendant in his/her answer or in a
motion to dismiss.  18

Here, the Court agrees with the appellate court that the MCTC had both jurisdictions over the person of the defendant or
respondent and over the subject matter of the claim. On the former, it is undisputed that the MCTC duly acquired jurisdiction
over the persons of the spouses Sanchez as they are the ones who filed the Forcible Entry suit before it. On the latter,
Republic Act No. 7691 (R.A. No. 7691) clearly provides that the proper Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), MTC, or Municipal
Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) has exclusive original jurisdiction over ejectment cases, which includes unlawful detainer and
forcible entry. 
19

Despite this, the Spouses Sanchez insist that the MCTC could not have had jurisdiction over the disputed land area in
excess of their 600- square-meter lot. This is because since the District Engineer's Office found that the width of the national
highway is almost 60 meters wide, the edge of their 600-square-meter lot must have gone downwards and necessarily
reached the edge of the 20-meter wide public easement abutting the Lake Sebu. Thus, the heirs of Aguilar could not have
been in "actual physical possession" of a non-existent lot for the disputed area belongs to them. The Court, however, is· not
convinced. As duly noted by the CA, the area beyond the 600-square-meter lot abutting Lake Sebu, whether it is a lot
claimed to be in "actual physical possession" of the heirs of Aguilar or a public easement, refers to the "alluvium" lot area
claimed by the Spouses Sanchez as their own in their forcible entry complaint. It is clear, therefore, that the MCTC had
jurisdiction over the subject matter, which, in this case, is the 600-square-meter lot and its alleged alluvium.

It bears stressing, moreover, that the Spouses Sanchez explicitly brought the subject matter to the jurisdiction of the MCTC.
They cannot now deny such jurisdiction simply because said court did not rule in their favor. The Court has consistently
ruled that jurisdiction is not the same as the exercise of jurisdiction. As distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction,
jurisdiction is the authority to decide a cause, and not the decision rendered therein. Where there is jurisdiction over the
person and the subject matter, the decision on all other questions arising in the case is but an exercise of the jurisdiction.
And the errors which the court may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are the proper
subject of an appeal. 20

Thus, the issue of whether the MCTC erred in dismissing the forcible entry complaint, ruling that the heirs of Aguilar were in
actual physical possession over the subject property should have been raised by the Spouses Sanchez in an appeal before
the RTC. But as the records reveal, the spouses did not do anything to question the decision of the MCTC, merely allowing
the same to attain finality. In fact, the sheriff had already started its execution. Moreover, without even providing any
explanation for their delay, it was only on May 22, 2010, or four (4) years after the issuance of the MCTC ruling on June 7,
2006, that the spouses filed the instant Complaint for Annulment of Judgment. On this matter, the Court must emphasize
that an action for annulment of judgment based on lack of jurisdiction must be brought before the same is barred by laches
or estoppel.  On the one hand, laches is the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that
21

which by exercising due diligence could nor should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right
within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to
assert it. On the other hand, estoppel precludes a person who has admitted or made a representation about something as
true from denying or disproving it against anyone else relying on his admission or representation.   To the Court, the failure
22

on the part of the Spouses Sanchez to file either an appeal of the MCTC Decision or the instant complaint for annulment of
judgment for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, four (4) years to be exact, despite receiving notice and
knowledge of the said decision, constitutes laches that necessarily barred their cause.

Indeed, the attitude of judicial reluctance towards the annulment of a judgment, final order or final resolution is
understandable, for the remedy disregards the time-honored doctrine of immutability and unalterability of final judgments, a
solid cornerstone in the dispensation of justice by the courts. The doctrine of immutability and unalterability serves a two-fold
purpose, namely: (a) to avoid delay in the administration of justice and, thus, procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of
judicial business; and (b) to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which is precisely why the
courts exist. As to the first, a judgment that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and is no longer to be
modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to correct an erroneous conclusion of fact or of law, and whether
the modification is made by the court that rendered the decision or by the highest court of the land. As to the latter,
controversies cannot drag on indefinitely because fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice demand
that the rights and obligations of every litigant must not hang in suspense for an indefinite period of time. 
23

In the end, the Court deems it proper to note that an ejectment case, such as the forcible entry complaint filed before the
MCTC below, is a summary proceeding designed to provide expeditious means to protect the actual possession or the right
to possession of the property involved. The sole question for resolution in the case is the physical or material possession
(possession de facto) of the property in question, and neither a claim of juridical possession (possession de Jure) nor an
averment of ownership by the defendant can outrightly deprive the trial court from taking due cognizance of the case.
Hence, even if the question of ownership is raised in the pleadings, the court may pass upon the issue but only to determine
the question of possession especially if the question of ownership is inseparably linked with the question of possession. The
adjudication of ownership in that instance, however, is merely provisional, and will not bar or prejudice an action between
the same parties involving the title to the property. 
24

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated July 28, 2016 and the
Resolution dated October 10, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 03481- MIN are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 68166. February 12, 1997]

HEIRS OF EMILIANO NAVARRO, Petitioner, v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND HEIRS OF

SINFOROSO PASCUAL, Respondents.

DECISION

HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:

Unique is the legal question visited upon the claim of an applicant in a Land Registration case by
oppositors thereto, the Government and a Government lessee, involving as it does ownership of land
formed by alluvium.

The applicant owns the property immediately adjoining the land sought to be registered. His registered
property is bounded on the east by the Talisay River, on the west by the Bulacan River, and on the north
by the Manila Bay. The Talisay River and the Bulacan River flow down towards the Manila Bay and act as
boundaries of the applicant's registered land on the east and on the west.

The land sought to be registered was formed at the northern tip of the applicant's land. Applicant's
registered property is bounded on the north by the Manila Bay.

The issue: May the land sought to be registered be deemed an accretion in the sense that it naturally
accrues in favor of the riparian owner or should the land be considered as foreshore land?

Before us is a petition for review of: (1) the decision1 and (2) two subsequent resolutions2 of the
Intermediate Appellate Court3 (now the Court of Appeals) in Land Registration Case No. N-84,4 the
application over which was filed by private respondents' predecessor-in-interest, Sinforoso Pascual, now
deceased, before the Court of First Instance5 (now the Regional Trial Court) of Balanga, Bataan.

There is no dispute as to the following facts:

On October 3, 1946, Sinforoso Pascual, now deceased, filed an application for foreshore lease covering a
tract of foreshore land in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan, having an area of approximately seventeen (17)
hectares. This application was denied on January 15, 1953. So was his motion for reconsideration.

Subsequently, petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, also now deceased, Emiliano Navarro, filed a

fishpond application with the Bureau of Fisheries covering twenty five (25) hectares of foreshore land
also in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan. Initially, such application was denied by the Director of Fisheries on the
ground that the property formed part of the public domain. Upon motion for reconsideration, the
Director of Fisheries, on May 27, 1988, gave due course to his application but only to the extent of seven
(7) hectares of the property as may be certified by the Bureau of Forestry as suitable for fishpond
purposes.
The Municipal Council of Balanga, Bataan, had opposed Emiliano Navarro's application. Aggrieved by the
decision of the Director of Fisheries, it appealed to the Secretary of Natural Resources who, however,
affirmed the grant. The then Executive Secretary, acting in behalf of the President of the Philippines,
similarly affirmed the grant.

On the other hand, sometime in the early part of 1960, Sinforoso Pascual filed an application to register
and confirm his title to a parcel of land, situated in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan, described in Plan Psu-
175181 and said to have an area of 146,611 square meters. Pascual claimed that this land is an accretion
to his property, situated in Barrio Puerto Rivas, Balanga, Bataan, and covered by Original Certificate of
Title No. 6830. It is bounded on the eastern side by the Talisay River, on the western side by the Bulacan
River, and on the northern side by the Manila Bay. The Talisay River as well as the Bulacan River flow
downstream and meet at the Manila Bay thereby depositing sand and silt on Pascual's property resulting
in an accretion thereon. Sinforoso Pascual claimed the accretion as the riparian owner.

On March 25, 1960, the Director of Lands, represented by the Assistant Solicitor General, filed an
opposition thereto stating that neither Pascual nor his predecessors-in-interest possessed sufficient title
to the subject property, the same being a portion of the public domain and, therefore, it belongs to the
Republic of the Philippines. The Director of Forestry, through the Provincial Fiscal, similarly opposed
Pascual's application for the same reason as that advanced by the Director of Lands. Later on, however,
the Director of Lands withdrew his opposition. The Director of Forestry become the sole oppositor.

On June 2, 1960, the court a quo issued an order of general default excepting the Director of Lands and
the Director of Forestry.

Upon motion of Emiliano Navarro, however, the order of general default was lifted and, on February 13,
1961, Navarro thereupon filed an opposition to Pascual's application. Navarro claimed that the land
sought to be registered has always been part of the public domain, it being a part of the foreshore of
Manila Bay; that he was a lessee and in possession of a part of the subject property by virtue of a
fishpond permit issued by the Bureau of Fisheries and confirmed by the Office of the President; and that
he had already converted the area covered by the lease into a fishpond.

During the pendency of the land registration case, that is, on November 6, 1960, Sinforoso Pascual filed
a complaint for ejectment against Emiliano Navarro, one Marcelo Lopez and their privies, alleged by
Pascual to have unlawfully claimed and possessed, through stealth, force and strategy, a portion of the
subject property covered by Plan Psu-175181. The defendants in the case were alleged to have built a
provisional dike thereon: thus they have thereby deprived Pascual of the premises sought to be
registered. This, notwithstanding repeated demands for defendants to vacate the property.

The case was decided adversely against Pascual. Thus, Pascual appealed to the Court of First Instance
(now Regional Trial Court) of Balanga, Bataan, the appeal having been docketed as Civil Case No. 2873.
Because of the similarity of the parties and the subject matter, the appealed case for ejectment was
consolidated with the land registration case and was jointly tried by the court a quo.

During the pendency of the trial of the consolidated cases, Emiliano Navarro died on November 1, 1961
and was substituted by his heirs, the herein petitioners.
Subsequently, on August 26, 1962, Pascual died and was substituted by his heirs, the herein private
respondents.

On November 10, 1975, the court a quo rendered judgment finding the subject property to be foreshore
land and, being a part of the public domain, it cannot be the subject of land registration proceedings.

The decision's dispositive portion reads:

"WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered:

(1) Dismissing plaintiff [private respondent] Sinforoso Pascual's complaint for ejectment in Civil Case No.
2873;

(2) Denying the application of Sinforoso Pascual for land registration over the land in question; and

(3) Directing said Sinforoso Pascual, through his heirs, as plaintiff in Civil Case No. 2873 and as applicant
in Land Registration Case No. N-84 to pay costs in both instances."6chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The heirs of Pascual appealed and, before the respondent appellate court, assigned the following errors:

"1. The lower court erred in not finding the land in question as an accretion by the action of the Talisay
and Bulacan Rivers to the land admittedly owned by applicants-appellants [private respondents].

2. The lower court erred in holding that the land in question is foreshore land.

3. The lower court erred in not ordering the registration of the and is controversy in favor of applicants-
appellants [private respondents].

4. The lower court erred in not finding that the applicants-appellants [private respondents] are entitled
to eject the oppositor-appellee [petitioners]."7chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On appeal, the respondent court reversed the findings of the court a quo and granted the petition for
registration of the subject property but excluding therefrom fifty (50) meters from corner 2 towards
corner 1; and fifty meters (50) meters from corner 5 towards corner 6 of the Psu-175181.

The respondent appellate court explained the reversal in this wise:

"The paramount issue to be resolved in this appeal as set forth by the parties in their respective briefs is
whether or not the land sought to be registered is accretion or foreshore land, or, whether or not said
land was formed by the action of the two rivers of Talisay and Bulacan or by the action of the Manila
Bay. If formed by the action of the Talisay and Bulacan rivers, the subject land is accretion but if formed
by the action of the Manila Bay then it is foreshore land.

xxx

It is undisputed that applicants-appellants [private respondents] owned the land immediately adjoining
the land sought to be registered. Their property which is covered by OCT No. 6830 is bounded on the
east by the Talisay River, on the west by the Bulacan River, and on the north by the Manila Bay. The
Talisay and Bulacan rivers come from inland flowing downstream towards the Manila Bay. In other
words, between the Talisay River and the Bulacan River is the property of applicants with both rivers
acting as the boundary to said land and the flow of both rivers meeting and emptying into the Manila
Bay. The subject land was formed at the tip or apex of appellants' [private respondents'] land adding
thereto the land now sought to be registered.

This makes this case quite unique because while it is undisputed that the subject land is immediately
attached to appellants' [private respondents'] land and forms the tip thereof, at the same time, said land
immediately faces the Manila Bay which is part of the sea. We can understand therefore the confusion
this case might have caused the lower court, faced as it was with the uneasy problem of deciding
whether or not the subject land was formed by the action of the two rivers or by the action of the sea.
Since the subject land is found at the shore of the Manila Bay facing appellants' [private respondents']
land, it would be quite easy to conclude that it is foreshore and therefore part of the patrimonial
property of the State as the lower court did in fact rule x x x.

xxx

It is however undisputed that appellants' [private respondents'] land lies between these two rivers and
it is precisely appellants' [private respondents'] land which acts as a barricade preventing these two
rivers to meet. Thus, since the flow of the two rivers is downwards to the Manila Bay the sediments of
sand and silt are deposited at their mouths.

It is, therefore, difficult to see how the Manila Bay could have been the cause of the deposit thereat for
in the natural course of things, the waves of the sea eat the land on the shore, as they suge [sic] inland.
It would not therefore add anything to the land but instead subtract from it due to the action of the
waves and the wind. It is then more logical to believe that the two rivers flowing towards the bay
emptied their cargo of sand, silt and clay at their mouths, thus causing appellants' [private respondents']
land to accumulate therein.

However, our distinguished colleage [sic], Mr. Justice Serrano, do [sic] not seem to accept this theory
and stated that the subject land arose only when x x x Pascual planted 'palapat' and 'bakawan' trees
thereat to serve as a boundary or strainer. But we do not see how this act of planting trees by Pascual
would explain how the land mass came into being. Much less will it prove that the same came from the
sea. Following Mr. Justice Serrano's argument that it were the few trees that acted as strainers or
blocks, then the land that grew would have stopped at the place where the said trees were planted. But
this is not so because the land mass went far beyond the boundary, or where the trees were planted.

On the other hand, the picture-exhibits of appellants' [private respondents'] clearly show that the land
that accumulated beyond the so-called boundary, as well as the entire area being applied for is dry land,
above sea level, and bearing innumerable trees x x x. The existence of vegetation on the land could only
confirm that the soil thereat came from inland rather than from the sea, for what could the sea bring to
the shore but sand, pebbles, stones, rocks and corrals? On the other hand, the two rivers would be
bringing soil on their downward flow which they brought along from the eroded mountains, the lands
along their path, and dumped them all on the northern portion of appellants' [private respondents']
land.

In view of the foregoing, we have to deviate from the lower court's finding. While it is true that the
subject land is found at the shore of the Manila Bay fronting appellants' [private respondents'] land, said
land is not foreshore but an accretion from the action of the Talisay and Bulacan rivers. In fact, this is
exactly what the Bureau of Lands found out, as shown in the following report of the Acting Provincial
Officer, Jesus M. Orozco, to wit:

'Upon ocular inspection of the land subject of this registration made on June 11, 1960, it was found out
that the said land is x x x sandwitched [sic] by two big rivers x x x These two rivers bring down
considerable amount of soil and sediments during floods every year thus raising the soil of the land
adjoining the private property of the applicant [private respondents]. About four-fifth [sic] of the area
applied for is now dry land whereon are planted palapat trees thickly growing thereon. It is the natural
action of these two rivers that has caused the formation of said land x x x subject of this registration
case. It has been formed, therefore, by accretion. And having been formed by accretion, the said land
may be considered the private property of the riparian owner who is the applicant herein [private
respondents'] x x x.

In view of the above, the opposition hereto filed by the government should be withdrawn, except for
the portion recommended by the land investigator in his report dated May 2, 1960, to be excluded and
considered foreshore. x x x'

Because of this report, no less than the Solicitor General representing the Bureau of Lands withdrew his
opposition dated March 25, 1960, and limited 'the same to the northern portion of the land applied for,
compromising a strip 50 meters wide along the Manila Bay, which should be declared public land as part
of the foreshore' x x x.8

Pursuant to the aforecited decision, the respondent appellate court ordered the issuance of the
corresponding decree of registration in the name of private respondents and the reversion to private
respondents of the possession of the portion of the subject property included in Navarro's fishpond
permit.

On December 20, 1978, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforecited decision. The
Director of Forestry also moved for the reconsideration of the same decision. Both motions were
opposed by private respondents on January 27, 1979.

On November 21, 1980, respondent appellate court promulgated a resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration filed by the Director of Forestry. It, however, modified its decision, to read, viz:

"(3). Ordering private oppositors Heirs of Emiliano Navarro to vacate that portion included in their
fishpond permit covered by Plan Psu-175181 and hand over possession of said portion to applicants-
appellants, if the said portion is not within the strip of land fifty (50) meters wide along Manila Bay on
the northern portion of the land subject of the registration proceedings and which area is more
particularly referred to as fifty (50) meters from corner 2 towards corner 1; and fifty (50) meters from
corner 5 towards corner 6 of Plan Psu-175181. x x x9chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On December 15, 1980, we granted the Solicitor General, acting as counsel for the Director of Forestry,
an extension of time within which to file in this court, a petition for review of the decision dated
November 29, 1978 of the respondent appellate court and of the aforecited resolution dated November
21, 1980.
Thereafter, the Solicitor General, in behalf of the Director of Forestry, filed a petition for review entitled,
"The Director of Forestry vs. the Court of Appeals."10 We, however, denied the same in a minute
resolution dated July 20, 1981, such petition having been prematurely filed at a time when the Court of
Appeals was yet to resolve petitioners' pending motion to set aside the resolution dated November 21,
1980.

On October 9, 1981, respondent appellate court denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the
decision dated November 29, 1978.

On October 17, 1981, respondent appellate court made an entry of judgment stating that the decision
dated November 29, 1978 had become final and executory as against herein petitioners as oppositors in
L.R.C. Case No. N-84 and Civil Case No. 2873 of the Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court)
of Balanga, Bataan.

On October 26, 1981, a second motion for reconsideration of the decision dated November 29, 1978
was filed by petitioners' new counsel.

On March 26, 1982, respondent appellate court issued a resolution granting petitioners' request for
leave to file a second motion for reconsideration.

On July 13, 1984, after hearing, respondent appellate court denied petitioners' second motion for
reconsideration on the ground that the same was filed out of time, citing Rule 52, Section 1 of the Rules
of Court which provides that a motion for reconsideration shall be made ex-parte and filed within fifteen
(15) days from the notice of the final order or judgment.

Hence this petition where the respondent appellate court is imputed to have palpably erred in
appreciating the facts of the case and to have gravely misapplied statutory and case law relating to
accretion, specifically, Article 457 of the Civil Code.

We find merit in the petition.

The disputed property was brought forth by both the withdrawal of the waters of Manila Bay and the
accretion formed on the exposed foreshore land by the action of the sea which brought soil and sand
sediments in turn trapped by the palapat and bakawan trees planted thereon by petitioner Sulpicio
Pascual in 1948.

Anchoring their claim of ownership on Article 457 of the Civil Code, private respondents vigorously
argue that the disputed 14-hectare land is an accretion caused by the joint action of the Talisay and
Bulacan Rivers which run their course on the eastern and western boundaries, respectively, of private
respondents' own tract of land.

Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under said Article 457, requires the concurrence of the
following requisites: (1) that the accumulation of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that
it be the result of the action of the waters of the river; and (3) that the land where the accretion takes
place is adjacent to the bank of the river.11 Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited, while
alluvium is the soil deposited on the estate fronting the river bank;12 the owner of such estate is called
the riparian owner. Riparian owners are, strictly speaking, distinct from littoral owners, the latter being
owners of lands bordering the shore of the sea or lake or other tidal waters.13 The alluvium, by
mandate of Article 457 of the Civil Code, is automatically owned by the riparian owner from the moment
the soil deposit can be seen14 but is not automatically registered property, hence, subject to acquisition
through prescription by third persons.15chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Private respondents' claim of ownership over the disputed property under the principle of accretion, is
misplaced.

First, the title of private respondents' own tract of land reveals its northeastern boundary to be Manila
Bay. Private respondents' land, therefore, used to adjoin, border or front the Manila Bay and not any of
the two rivers whose torrential action, private respondents insist, is to account for the accretion on their
land. In fact, one of the private respondents, Sulpicio Pascual, testified in open court that the waves of
Manila Bay used to hit the disputed land being part of the bay's foreshore but, after he had planted
palapat and bakawan trees thereon in 1948, the land began to rise.16

Moreover, there is no dispute as to the location of: (a) the disputed land; (b) private respondents' own
tract of land; (c) the Manila Bay; and, (d) the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers. Private respondents' own land
lies between the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers; in front of their land on the northern side lies now the
disputed land where before 1948, there lay the Manila Bay. If the accretion were to be attributed to the
action of either or both of the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers, the alluvium should have been deposited on
either or both of the eastern and western boundaries of private respondents' own tract of land, not on
the northern portion thereof which is adjacent to the Manila Bay. Clearly lacking, thus, is the third
requisite of accretion, which is, that the alluvium is deposited on the portion of claimant's land which is
adjacent to the river bank.

Second, there is no dispute as to the fact that private respondents' own tract of land adjoins the Manila
Bay. Manila Bay is obviously not a river, and jurisprudence is already settled as to what kind of body of
water the Manila Bay is. It is to be remembered that we held that:

"Appellant next contends that x x x Manila Bay cannot be considered as a sea. We find said contention
untenable. A bay is part of the sea, being a mere indentation of the same:

'Bay. An opening into the land where the water is shut in on all sides except at the entrance; an inlet of
the sea; an arm of the sea, distinct from a river, a bending or curbing of the shore of the sea or of a lake.'
7 C.J. 1013-1014."17chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The disputed land, thus, is an accretion not on a river bank but on a sea bank, or on what used to be the
foreshore of Manila Bay which adjoined private respindents' own tract of land on the northern side. As
such, the applicable law is not Article 457 of the Civil Code but Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of
1866.

The process by which the disputed land was formed, is not difficult to discern from the facts of the case.
As the trial court correctly observed:

"A perusal of the survey plan x x x of the land subject matter of these cases shows that on the eastern
side, the property is bounded by Talisay River, on the western side by Bulacan River, on the southern
side by Lot 1436 and on the northern side by Manila Bay. It is not correct to state that the Talisay and
Bulacan Rivers meet a certain portion because the two rivers both flow towards Manila Bay. The Talisay
River is straight while the Bulacan River is a little bit meandering and there is no portion where the two
rivers meet before they end up at Manila Bay. The land which is adjacent to the property belonging to
Pascual cannot be considered an accretion [caused by the action of the two rivers].

Applicant Pascual x x x has not presented proofs to convince the Court that the land he has applied for
registration is the result of the settling down on his registered land of soil, earth or other deposits so as
to be rightfully be considered as an accretion [caused by the action of the two rivers]. Said Art. 457 finds
no applicability where the accretion must have been caused by action of the
bay."18chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The conclusion formed by the trial court on the basis of the foregoing observation is that the disputed
land is part of the foreshore of Manila Bay and therefore, part of the public domain. The respondent
appellate court, however, perceived the fact that petitioners' own land lies between the Talisay and
Bulacan Rivers, to be basis to conclude that the disputed land must be an accretion formed by the action
of the two rivers because private respondents' own land acted as a barricade preventing the two rivers
to meet and that the current of the two rivers carried sediments of sand and silt downwards to the
Manila Bay which accumulated somehow to a 14-hectare land. These conclusions, however, are fatally
incongruous in the light of the one undisputed critical fact: the accretion was deposited, not on either
the eastern or western portion of private respondents' land where a river each runs, but on the
northern portion of petitioners' land which adjoins the Manila Bay. Worse, such conclusions are further
eroded of their practical logic and consonance with natural experience in the light of Sulpicio Pascual's
admission as to having planted palapat and bakawan trees on the northern boundary of their own land.
In amplification of this, plainly more reasonable and valid are Justice Mariano Serrano's observations in
his dissenting opinion when he stated that:

"As appellants' (titled) land x x x acts as a barricade that prevents the two rivers to meet, and
considering the wide expanse of the boundary between said land and the Manila Bay, measuring some
593.00 meters x x x it is believed rather farfetched for the land in question to have been formed through
'sediments of sand and salt [sic]... deposited at their [rivers'] mouths.' Moreover, if 'since the flow of the
two rivers is downwards to the Manila Bay the sediments of sand and silt are deposited at their mouths,'
why then would the alleged cargo of sand, silt and clay accumulate at the northern portion of
appellants' titled land facing Manila Bay instead of merely at the mouths and banks of these two rivers?
That being the case, the accretion formed at said portion of appellants' titled [land] was not caused by
the current of the two rivers but by the action of the sea (Manila Bay) into which the rivers empty.

The conclusion x x x is not supported by any reference to the evidence which, on the contrary, shows
that the disputed land was formed by the action of the sea. Thus, no less than Sulpicio Pascual, one of
the heirs of the original applicant, testified on cross-examination that the land in dispute was part of the
shore and it was only in 1948 that he noticed that the land was beginning to get higher after he had
planted trees thereon in 1948. x x x

x x x it is established that before 1948 sea water from the Manila Bay at high tide could reach as far as
the dike of appellants' fishpond within their titled property, which dike now separates this titled
property from the land in question. Even in 1948 when appellants had already planted palapat and
bakawan trees in the land involved, inasmuch as these trees were yet small, the waves of the sea could
still reach the dike. This must be so because in x x x the survey plan of the titled property approved in
1918, said titled land was bounded on the north by Manila Bay. So Manila Bay was adjacent to it on the
north. It was only after the planting of the aforesaid trees in 1948 that the land in question began to rise
or to get higher in elevation.
The trees planted by appellants in 1948 became a sort of strainer of the sea water and at the same time
a kind of block to the strained sediments from being carried back to the sea by the very waves that
brought them to the former shore at the end of the dike, which must have caused the shoreline to
recede and dry up eventually raising the former shore leading to the formation of the land in
question."19chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In other words, the combined and interactive effect of the planting of palapat and bakawan trees, the
withdrawal of the waters of Manila Bay eventually resulting in the drying up of its former foreshore, and
the regular torrential action of the waters of Manila Bay, is the formation of the disputed land on the
northern boundary of private respondents' own tract of land.

The disputed property is an accretion on a sea bank, Manila Bay being an inlet or an arm of the sea; as
such, the disputed property is, under Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, part of the public
domain.

At the outset, there is a need to distinguish between Manila Bay and Laguna de Bay.

While we held in the case of Ignacio v. Director of Lands and Valeriano20 that Manila Bay is considered a
sea for purposes of determining which law on accretion is to be applied in multifarious situations, we
have ruled differently insofar as accretions on lands adjoining the Laguna de Bay are concerned.

In the cases of Government of the P.I v. Colegio de San Jose,21 Republic v. Court of Appeals,22 Republic
v. Alagad23, and Meneses v. Court of Appeals,24 we categorically ruled that Laguna de Bay is a lake the
accretion on which, by the mandate of Article 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, belongs to the
owner of the land contiguous thereto.

The instant controversy, however, brings a situation calling for the application of Article 4 of the Spanish
Law of Waters of 1866, the disputed land being an accretion on the foreshore of Manila Bay which is, for
all legal purposes, considered a sea.

Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of August 3, 1866 provides as follows:

"Lands added to the shores by accretions and alluvial deposits caused by the action of the sea, form part
of the public domain. When they are no longer washed by the waters of the sea and are not necessary
for purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of special industries, or for the coast-guard
service, the Government shall declare them to be the property of the owners of the estates adjacent
thereto and as increment thereof."

In the light of the aforecited vintage but still valid law, unequivocal is the public nature of the disputed
land in this controversy, the same being an accretion on a sea bank which, for all legal purposes, the
foreshore of Manila Bay is. As part of the public domain, the herein disputed land is intended for public
uses, and "so long as the land in litigation belongs to the national domain and is reserved for public uses,
it is not capable of being appropriated by any private person, except through express authorization
granted in due form by a competent authority."25 Only the executive and possibly the legislative
departments have the right and the power to make the declaration that the lands so gained by action of
the sea is no longer necessary for purposes of public utility or for the cause of establishment of special
industries or for coast guard services.26 Petitioners utterly fail to show that either the executive or
legislative department has already declared the disputed land as qualified, under Article 4 of the Spanish
Law of Waters of 1866, to be the property of private respondents as owners of the estates adjacent
thereto.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review is hereby GRANTED.

The decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) in CA G.R. No. 59044-R dated
November 29, 1978 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The resolution dated November 21, 1980 and
March 28, 1982, respectively, promulgated by the Intermediate Appellate Court are likewise REVERSED
and SET ASIDE.

The decision of the Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court), Branch 1, Balanga, Bataan, is
hereby ORDERED REINSTATED.

Costs against private respondents.

SO ORDERED.
272-A Phil. 344

FELICIANO, J.:
The late Judge Juan Taccad originally owned a parcel of land situated in Tumauini, Isabela
having an estimated area of twenty (20) hectares.  The western portion of this land bordering on
the Cagayan River has an elevation lower than that of the eastern portion which borders on the
national road.  Through the years, the western portion would periodically go under the waters of
the Cagayan River as those waters swelled with the coming of the rains.  The submerged portion,
however, would re-appear during the dry season from January to August.  It would remain
under water for the rest of the year, that is, from September to December during the rainy
season.

The ownership of the landholding eventually moved from one person to another.  On 9 May
1959, respondent Guillermo Manalo acquired 8.65 hectares thereof from Faustina Taccad,
daughter of Judge Juan Taccad.  The land sold was described in the Deed of Absolute Sale [1] as
follows:

"x x x a parcel of agricultural land in Balug, Tumauini, Isabela, containing

an area of 8.6500 hectares, more or less; bounded on the North by
Francisco Forto; on the East by National Road; on South by Julian
Tumolva; and on the West by Cagayan River; declared for taxation under
Tax Declaration No. 12681 in the name of Faustina Taccad, and assessed at
P750.00.  x x x"
Later in 1964, respondent Manalo purchased another 1.80 hectares from Gregorio Taguba who
had earlier acquired the same from Judge Juan Taccad.  The second purchase brought the total
acquisition of respondent Manalo to 10.45 hectares.  The second piece of property was more
particularly described as follows:

"x x x a piece of agricultural land consisting of tobacco land, and containing

an area of 18,000 square meters, more or less, bounded on the North by
Balug Creek; on the South, by Faustina Taccad (now Guillermo R. Manalo);
on the East, by a Provincial Road; and on the West, by Cagayan River
assessed at P440.00, as Tax Declaration No. 3152.  x x x"[2]
During the cadastral survey conducted at Balug, Tumauini, Isabela on 21 October 1969, the two
(2) parcels of land belonging to respondent Manalo were surveyed and consolidated into one lot,
designated as Lot No. 307, Pls-964.  Lot 307 which contains 4.6489 hectares includes:  (a) the
whole of the 1.80 hectares acquired from Gregorio Taguba; and (b) 2.8489 hectares out of the
8.65 hectares purchased from Faustina Taccad.  As the survey was conducted on a rainy month,
a portion of the land bought from Faustina Taccad then under water was left unsurveyed and
was not included in Lot 307.

The Sketch Plan[3] submitted during the trial of this case and which was identified by
respondent Manalo shows that the Cagayan River running from south to north, forks at a certain
point to form two (2) branches -- the western and the eastern branches -- and then unites at the
other end, further north, to form a narrow strip of land.  The eastern branch of the river cuts
through the land of respondent Manalo and is inundated with water only during the rainy
season.  The bed of the eastern branch is the submerged or the unsurveyed portion of the land
belonging to respondent Manalo.  For about eight (8) months of the year when the level of water
at the point where the Cagayan River forks is at its ordinary depth, river water does not flow into
the eastern branch.  While this condition persists, the eastern bed is dry and is susceptible to
cultivation.

Considering that water flowed through the eastern branch of the Cagayan River when the
cadastral survey was conducted, the elongated strip of land formed by the western and the
eastern branches of the Cagayan River looked very much like an island.  This strip of land was
surveyed on 12 December 1969.[4] It was found to have a total area of 22.7209 hectares and was
designated as Lot 821 and Lot 822.  The area of Lot 822 is 10.8122 hectares while Lot 821 has an
area of 11.9087 hectares.  Lot 821 is located directly opposite Lot 307 end is separated from the
latter only by the eastern branch of the Cagayan River during the rainy season and, during the
dry season, by the exposed, dry river bed, being a portion of the land bought from Faustina
Taccad.  Respondent Manalo claims that Lot 821 also belongs to him by way of accretion to the
submerged portion of the property to which it is adjacent.

Petitioners who are in possession of Lot 821, upon the other hand, insist that they own Lot 821. 
They occupy the outer edges of Lot 821 along the river banks, i.e., the fertile portions on which
they plant tobacco and other agricultural products.  They also cultivate the western strip of the
unsurveyed portion during summer.[5] This situation compelled respondent Manalo to file a case
for forcible entry against petitioners on 20 May 1969.  The case was dismissed by the Municipal
Court of Tumauini, Isabela for failure of both parties to appear.  On 15 December 1972,
respondent Manalo again filed a case for forcible entry against petitioners.  The latter case was
similarly dismissed for lack of jurisdiction by the Municipal Court of Tumauini, Isabela.

On 24 July 1974, respondent Manalo filed a complaint [6] before the then Court of First Instance
of Isabela, Branch 3 for quieting of title, possession and damages against petitioners.  He alleged
ownership of the two (2) parcels of land he bought separately from Faustina Taccad and
Gregorio Taguba for which reason he prayed that judgment be entered ordering petitioners to
vacate the western strip of the unsurveyed portion.  Respondent Manalo likewise prayed that
judgment be entered declaring him as owner of Lot 821 on which he had laid his claim during
the survey.

Petitioners filed their answer denying the material allegations of the complaint.  The case was
then set for trial for failure of the parties to reach an amicable agreement or to enter into a
stipulation of facts.[7] On 10 November 1982, the trial court rendered a decision with the
following dispositive portion:

"WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises, the Court renders

judgment against the defendants and in favor of the plaintiff and orders:

1.  That plaintiff, Guillermo Manalo, is declared the lawful owner of the land
in question, Lot No. 821, Pls-964 of Tumauini Cadastre, and which is more
particularly described in paragraph 2-b of the Complaint;
2. That the defendants are hereby ordered to vacate the premises of the
land in question, Lot No. 821, Pls-964 of Tumauini Cadastre, and which is
more particularly described in paragraph 2-b of the Complaint;

3. That the defendants are being restrained from entering the premises of
the land in question, Lot No. 821, Pls-964 of Tumauini Cadastre, and which
is more particularly described in paragraph 2-b of the Complaint; and

4. That there is no pronouncement as to attorney's fees and costs.

SO ORDERED.[8]"
Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals which, however, affirmed the decision of the trial
court.  They filed a motion for reconsideration, without success.

While petitioners insist that Lot 821 is part of an island surrounded by the two (2) branches of
the Cagayan River, the Court of Appeals found otherwise.  The Court of Appeals concurred with
the finding of the trial court that Lot 821 cannot be considered separate and distinct from Lot
307 since the eastern branch of the Cagayan River substantially dries up for the most part of the
year such that when this happens, Lot 821 becomes physically (i.e., by land) connected with the
dried up bed owned by respondent Manalo.  Both courts below in effect rejected the assertion of
petitioners that the depression on the earth's surface which separates Lot 307 and Lot 821 is,
during part of the year, the bed of the eastern branch of the Cagayan River.

It is a familiar rule that the findings of facts of the trial court are entitled to great respect, and
that they carry even more weight when affirmed by the Court of Appeals. [9] This is in recognition
of the peculiar advantage on the part of the trial court of being able to observe first-hand the
deportment of the witnesses while testifying.  Jurisprudence is likewise settled that the Court of
Appeals is the final arbiter of questions of fact. [10] But whether a conclusion drawn from such
findings of facts is correct, is a question of law cognizable by this Court. [11]

In the instant case, the conclusion reached by both courts below apparently collides with their
findings that periodically at the onset of and during the rainy season, river water flows through
the eastern bed of the Cagayan River.  The trial court held:

"The Court believes that the land in controversy is of the nature and
character of alluvion (Accretion), for it appears that during the dry season,
the body of water separating the same land in controversy (Lot No. 821,
Pls-964) and the two (2) parcels of land which the plaintiff purchased from
Gregorio Taguba and Justina Taccad Cayaba becomes a marshy land and is
only six (6) inches deep and twelve (12) meters in width at its widest in the
northern tip (Exhs. 'W', 'W-1', 'W-2', 'W-3' and 'W-4').  It has been held by
our Supreme Court that 'the owner of the riparian land which receives the
gradual deposits of alluvion, does not have to make an express act of
possession.  The law does not require it, and the deposit created by the
current of the water becomes manifest' (Roxas vs. Tuazon, 6 Phil. 408)." [12]
The Court of Appeals adhered substantially to the conclusion reached by the trial court, thus:

"As found by the trial court, the disputed property is not an island in the
strict sense of the word since the eastern portion of the said property
claimed by appellants to be part of the Cagayan River dries up during
summer.  Admittedly, it is the action of the heavy rains which comes during
rainy season especially from September to November which increases the
water level of the Cagayan river.  As the river becomes swollen due to heavy
rains, the lower portion of the said strip of land located at its southernmost
point would be inundated with water.  This is where the water of the
Cagayan river gains its entry.  Consequently, if the water level is high the
whole strip of land would be under water."

In Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Colegio de San Jose, it was held
that --

'According to the foregoing definition of the words "ordinary" and  "extra-

ordinary", the highest depth of the waters of Laguna de Bay during the dry
season is the ordinary one, and the highest depth they attain during the
extra-ordinary one (sic); inasmuch as the former is the one which is
regular, common, natural, which occurs always or most of the time during
the year, while the latter is uncommon, transcends the general rule, order
and measure, and goes beyond that which is the ordinary depth.  If
according to the definition given by Article 74 of the Law of Waters quoted
above, the natural bed or basin of the lakes is the ground covered by their
waters when at their highest ordinary depth, the natural bed or basin of
Laguna de Bay is the ground covered by its waters when at their highest
depth during the dry season, that is up to the northeastern boundary of the
two parcels of land in question.'
We find the foregoing ruling to be analogous to the case at bar.  The highest
ordinary level of the waters of the Cagayan River is that attained during the
dry season which is confined only on the west side of Lot [821] and
Lot [822].  This is the natural Cagayan river itself.  The small residual of
water between Lot [821] and 307 is part of the small stream already in
existence when the whole of the late Judge Juan Taccad's property was still
susceptible to cultivation and uneroded."[13]
The Court is unable to agree with the Court of Appeals that Government of the
Philippine Islands vs. Colegio de San Jose [14] is applicable to the present case.  That
case involved Laguna de Bay; since Laguna de Bay is a lake, the Court applied the legal
provisions governing the ownership and use of lakes and their beds and shores, in order to
determine the character and ownership of the disputed property.  Specifically, the Court applied
the definition of the natural bed or basin of lakes found in Article 74 of the Law of Waters of 3
August 1866.  Upon the other hand, what is involved in the instant case is the eastern bed of the
Cagayan River.

We believe and so hold that Article 70 of the Law of Waters of 3 August 1866 is the law
applicable to the case at bar:

"Art. 70. The natural bed or channel of a creek or river is the ground
covered by its waters during the highest floods".  (Underscoring supplied)
We note that Article 70 defines the natural bed or channel of a creek or river as the ground
covered by its waters during the highest floods.  The highest floods in the eastern branch of the
Cagayan River occur with the annual coming of the rains as the river waters in their onward
course cover the entire depressed portion.  Though the eastern bed substantially dries up for the
most part of the year (i.e., from January to August), we cannot ignore the periodical swelling of
the waters (i.e., from September to December) causing the eastern bed to be covered with
flowing river waters.

The conclusion of this Court that the depressed portion is a river bed rests upon evidence of
record.  Firstly, respondent Manalo admitted in open court that the entire area he bought from
Gregorio Taguba was included in Lot 307.[15] If the 1.80 hectares purchased from Gregorio
Taguba was included in Lot 307, then the Cagayan River referred to as the western boundary in
the Deed of Sale transferring the land from Gregorio Taguba to respondent Manalo as well as
the Deed of Sale signed by Faustina Taccad, must refer to the dried up bed (during the dry
months) or the eastern branch of the river (during the rainy months).  In the Sketch Plan
attached to the records of the case, Lot 307 is separated from the western branch of the Cagayan
River by a large tract of land which includes not only Lot 821 but also what this Court
characterizes as the eastern branch of the Cagayan River.

Secondly, the pictures identified by respondent Manalo during his direct examination depict the
depressed portion as a river bed.  The pictures, marked as Exhibits "W" to "W-4", were taken in
July 1973 or at a time when the eastern bed becomes visible.[16] Thus, Exhibit "W-2" which
according to respondent Manalo was taken facing the east and Exhibit "W-3" which was taken
facing the west both show that the visible, dried up portion has a markedly lower elevation than
Lot 307 and Lot 821.  It has dike-like slopes on both sides connecting it to Lot 307 and Lot 821
that are vertical upward and very prominent.  This topographic feature is compatible with the
fact that a huge volume of water passes through the eastern bed regularly during the rainy
season.  In addition, petitioner Ponciano Gannaban testified that one had to go down what he
called a "cliff" from the surveyed portion of the land of respondent Manalo to the depressed
portion.  The cliff, as related by petitioner by Gannaban, has a height of eight (8) meters. [17]

The records do not show when the Cagayan River began to carve its eastern channel on the
surface of the earth.  However, Exhibit "E"[18] for the prosecution which was the Declaration of
Real Property standing in the name of Faustina Taccad indicates that the eastern bed already
existed even before the sale to respondent Manalo.  The words "old bed" enclosed in parentheses
-- perhaps written to make legitimate the claim of private ownership over the submerged
portion -- is an implied admission of the existence of the river bed.  In the Declaration of Real
Property made by respondent Manalo, the depressed portion assumed the name Rio Muerte de
Cagayan.  Indeed, the steep dike-like slopes on either side of the eastern bed could have been
formed only after a prolonged period of time.

Now, then, pursuant to Article 420 of the Civil Code, respondent Manalo did not acquire private
ownership of the bed of the eastern branch of the river even if it was included in the deeds of
absolute sale executed by Gregorio Taguba and Faustina Taccad in his favor.  These vendors
could not have validly sold land that constituted property of public dominion.  Article 420 of the
Civil Code states:

"The following things are property of public dominion:

(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents,
ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and
others of similar character;

(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are
intended for some public service or for the development of the national
wealth." (Underscoring supplied)
Although Article 420 speaks only of rivers and banks, "rivers" is a composite term which
includes:  (1) the running waters, (2) the bed, and (3) the banks.[19] Manresa, in commenting
upon Article 339 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 from which Article 420 of the Philippine Civil
Code was taken, stressed the public ownership of river beds:

"La naturaleza especial de los rios, en punto a su disfrute general, hace que
sea necesario considerar en su relacion de dominio algo mas que sus aguas
corrientes.  En efecto, en todo rio es preciso distinguir:  1. esta agua
corriente; 2. el alveo o cauce, y 3. las riberas.  Ahora bien:  son estas dos
ultimas cosas siempre de dominio publico, como las aquas?

"Realmente, no puede imaginarse un rio sin alveo y sin ribera; de suerte

que al decir el Codigo civil que los rios son de dominio publico, parece que
debe ir implicito el dominio publico de aquellos tres elementos que 
integran el rio.  Por otra parte, en cuanto a los alveos o cauces tenemos la
declaracion del art. 407. num. 1. donde dice:  son de dominio publico ... los
rios y sus cauces naturals; declaracion que concuerda con lo que dispone
el art. 34 de la ley de [Aguas], segun el cual, son de dominio publico:  1. los
alveos o cauces  de los arroyos que no se hallen comprendidos en el art. 33,
y 2. los alveos o cauces naturales de los rios en la extension que cubran sus
aguas en las mayores crecidas ordinarias."[20] (Underscoring supplied)
The claim of ownership of respondent Manalo over the submerged portion is bereft of basis even
if it were alleged and proved that the Cagayan River first began to encroach on his property after
the purchase from Gregorio Taguba and Faustina Taccad.  Article 462 of the Civil Code would
then apply divesting, by operation of law, respondent Manalo of private ownership over the new
river bed.  The intrusion of the eastern branch of the Cagayan River into his landholding
obviously prejudiced respondent Manalo but this is a common occurrence since estates
bordering on rivers are exposed to floods and other evils produced by the destructive force of the
waters.  That loss is compensated by, inter alia, the right of accretion acknowledged by Article
457 of the Civil Code.[21] It so happened that instead of increasing the size of Lot 307, the eastern
branch of the Cagayan River had carved a channel on it.

We turn next to the issue of accretion.  After examining the records of the case, the Court
considers that there was no evidence to prove that Lot 821 is an increment to Lot 307 and the
bed of the eastern branch of the river.  Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under Article
457 of the Civil Code requires the concurrence of three (3) requisites:  (a) that the deposition of
soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the action of the waters
of the river (or sea); and (3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of
rivers (or the sea coast).[22] The Court notes that the parcels of land bought by respondent
Manalo border on the eastern branch of the Cagayan River.  Any accretion formed by this
eastern branch which respondent Manalo may claim must be deposited on or attached to Lot
307.  As it is, the claimed accretion (Lot 821) lies on the bank of the river not adjacent to
Lot 307 but directly opposite Lot  307 across the river.

Assuming (arguendo only), that the Cagayan River referred to in the Deeds of Sale
transferring ownership of the land to respondent Manalo is the western branch, the decision of
the Court of Appeals and of the trial court are bare of factual findings to the effect that the land
purchased by respondent Manalo received alluvium from the action of the river in a slow and
gradual manner.  On the contrary, the decision of the lower court made mention of several
floods that caused the land to reappear making it susceptible to cultivation.  A sudden and
forceful action like that of flooding is hardly the alluvial process contemplated under Article 457
of the Civil Code.  It is the slow and hardly perceptible accumulation of soil deposits that the law
grants to the riparian owner.

Besides, it is important to note that Lot 821 has an area of 11.91 hectares.  Lot 821 is the
northern portion of the strip of land having a total area of 22.72 hectares.  We find it difficult to
suppose that such a sizable area as Lot 821 resulted from slow accretion to another lot of almost
equal size.  The total landholding purchased by respondent Manalo is 10.45 hectares (8.65
hectares from Faustina Taccad and 1.80 hectares from Gregorio Taguba in 1959 and 1964,
respectively), in fact even smaller than Lot 821 which he claims by way of accretion.  The
cadastral survey showing that Lot 821 has an area of 11.91 hectares was conducted in 1969.  If
respondent Manalo's contention were accepted, it would mean that in a span of only ten (10)
years, he had more than doubled his landholding by what the Court of Appeals and the trial
court considered as accretion.  As already noted, there are steep vertical dike-like slopes
separating the depressed portion or river bed and Lot 821 and Lot 307.  This topography of the
land, among other things, precludes a reasonable conclusion that Lot 821 is an increment to the
depressed portion by reason of the slow and constant action of the waters of either the western
or the eastern branches of the Cagayan River.

We turn finally to the issue of ownership of Lot 821.  Respondent Manalo's claim over Lot 821
rests on accretion coupled with alleged prior possession.  He alleged that the parcels of land he
bought separately from Gregorio Taguba and Faustina Taccad were formerly owned by Judge
Juan Taccad who was in possession thereof through his (Judge Taccad's) tenants.  When
ownership was transferred to him, respondent Manalo took over the cultivation of the property
and had it declared for taxation purposes in his name.  When petitioners forcibly entered into
his property, he twice instituted the appropriate action before the Municipal Trial Court of
Tumauini, Isabela.  Against respondent Manalo's allegation of prior possession, petitioners
presented tax declarations standing in their respective names.  They claimed lawful, peaceful
and adverse possession of Lot 821 since 1955.

If respondent Manalo had proved prior possession, it was limited physically to Lot 307 and the
depressed portion or the eastern river bed.  The testimony of Dominga Malana who was a tenant
for Justina Taccad did not indicate that she was also cultivating Lot 821.  In fact, the complaints
for forcible entry lodged before the Municipal Trial Court of Tumauini, Isabela pertained only to
Lot 307 and the depressed portion or river bed and not to Lot 821.  In the same manner,
the tax declarations presented by petitioners conflict with those of respondent Manalo.  Under
Article 477 of the Civil Code, the plaintiff in an action for quieting of title must at least have
equitable title to or interest in the real property which is the subject matter of the action.  The
evidence of record on this point is less than satisfactory and the Court feels compelled to refrain
from determining the ownership and posssession of Lot 821, adjudging neither petitioners nor
respondent Manalo as owner(s) thereof.

WHEREFORE, the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 04892
are hereby SET ASIDE.  Respondent Manalo is hereby declared the owner of Lot 307.  The
regularly submerged portion or the eastern bed of the Cagayan River is hereby DECLARED to be
property of public dominion.  The ownership of Lot 821 shall be determined in an appropriate
action that may be instituted by the interested parties inter se.  No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-31408             April 22, 1991

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and BORROMEO BROS. ESTATE, INC., respondents.

Feliberto Leonardo and Benjamin S. Rallon for private respondent.

NARVASA, J.:

Whether the land in dispute was formed by the action of the sea or by deposits of soil and sedimentary matter carried by
river currents is the main issue in this case, which was elevated to the Court by petition for review of a decision of the Court
of Appeals. 1

In October 1956 the corporation R. Borromeo Bros. Estate, Inc. instituted in the Court of First Instance of Leyte original
proceedings  for confirmation and registration of title in its favor of a parcel of land fronting the sea in the coastal town of San
2

Isidro, Leyte with an area of 130,537 square meters. The application  alleged that the land was bounded on the North, East
3

and South by property of the applicant and on the West by San Isidro Bay; that it had been formed by accretion of sediments
carried from the highlands by the natural action of the Si-ong and Sinubdan Rivers when these overflowed their banks
during the rainy season;  that it had been publicly, openly, continuously and adversely possessed by the applicant for 20
4

years prior to the filing of the application; and that to the applicant's knowledge there existed no mortgage, lien or other
adverse claim on the land. 5

Two oppositions to the application were filed. One, filed by the Director of Lands, asserted that the land applied for was part
of the public domain, and that the applicant or its predecessors-in-interest had no sufficient title to the land, by way of either
composition of possessory information, or by virtue of open, public, adverse and continuous possession under claim of
ownership since July 26, 1894. 6

The other opposition, filed by the Municipality of San Isidro, echoed the contention of the Director of Lands that the land
formed part of the public domain, alleging that it was classified as Timber Block-J, Leyte Project No. 40; denied the
applicant's claim of open, adverse, continuous and exclusive possession and averred that the land was occupied by other
parties who had waived their claims in favor of said oppositor; and alleged, further, that it (oppositor) needed the land for
municipal expansion, having in fact adopted resolutions requesting the Government to reserve the land for that purpose, and
that the applicant had applied for, but had been denied, a lease of the land after it had been released for private occupation
by the Bureau of Forestry. 7

The case was then heard. It would appear that after the applicant had presented its evidence, it sought and was allowed to
amend its application, which originally alleged that the land applied for had been formed of alluvium deposited by the action
of the sea,  in order to allege, as said appellant's evidence had tended to establish, that said land had been formed instead
8

from accretions of soil and sediment carried from higher places by the currents of the Si-ong and Sinubdan Creeks.

Thereafter, evidence for the oppositors also having been presented, the Trial Court rendered judgment denying the
application and declaring the land applied for public land formed by the action of the sea and not of any river.  The applicant
9

then appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the decision of the Trial Court, sustained the applicant's contention
as to the origin of the land, on that basis declared the land to be private land of said applicant and decreed its registration in
the applicant's name. 10

The Appellate Court's judgment was in turn appealed to this Court by the Director of Lands who, in the main, argues that the
Appellate Court erred in concluding that the evidence showed the land to have been formed by the action of rivers and in not
holding the applicant bound by the averment in its original application that the land was formed by the natural action of the
sea.11

The first assignment of error may be disposed of by the simple expedient of pointing out that the assailed "conclusion" of the
Court of Appeals is one of fact, not of law, and is, therefore, beyond the province of this Court to review,  save in certain
12

exceptional circumstances. 13

To dispel any doubts, however, and not to rely solely on what might appear to some to be a fine distinction, particularly
considering that the finding of the Court of Appeals on the crucial factual question of how the land in dispute came into
existence conflicts with that of the Trial Court, this Court has reviewed the available record  and finds no sound basis for
14

ascribing any error to the Appellate Court in its appreciation of the evidence.

The petitioner's case is anchored on evidence tending to establish that the Sinubdan and Si-ong Rivers whose currents,
according to the private respondent, formed the land in question from the sediments they carried were not natural streams,
but mere canals dug as part of an irrigation system; that they had no intrinsic water sources and in fact dried up during the
summer season; that a survey commissioned by the petitioner itself in 1949 did not indicate their existence on the plan; and
that part of the land is swampy with mangrove trees growing thereon. 15

More persuasive, however, is the countervailing evidence of the private respondent which consists, principally, of the
testimony of Felix Sablado, a bridge foreman of the Bureau of Public Highways, and Teofilo Pacana, overseer of the
petitioner's lands. According to the petitioner's uncontradicted summary of Sablado's testimony, said witness had
undertaken studies of the Sinubdan and Si-ong Rivers, measuring their depth and width, the volume of water that they
carried, and the size of the bridges spanning them. He had declared the Si-ong was more than seven meters deep, while the
Sinubdan had a depth of more than three meters, that the Filemon Bridge crossing the Si-ong was seven meters long and
four meters wide and the Sinubdan Bridge had the same dimensions. And under cross-examination, he had maintained that
there is a source of water under the Filemon Bridge.  Pacana, for his part, testified that there is a continuous flow of water in
16

both rivers throughout the year, and not merely during the rainy season, as claimed by one of the oppositors' witnesses, and
that while a few mangrove trees grow in the salvage zone which is far from the land, none are found within the boundaries of
the land itself.  This is at least partly confirmed by photographs received in evidence  showing rice, coconut trees and
17 18

bamboo groves growing on the land, and which apparently persuaded the Trial Court that at least a part of the land had
been . . . transformed (through cultivation by the private respondent) into a veritable first class rice land.
19

The petitioner's argument that accretion, by definition imperceptible, could hardly account for such an area of land (more
than thirteen hectares) being built up within a period of six years, hinges upon an unwarrantedly literal advertence to the
testimony of one of the private respondent's witnesses who declared that the process took place from 1930 to
1936.  Assuming that the witness attested to what he sincerely believed to be the truth, the possibility of his being mistaken
20

cannot be discounted because, the age of the rivers in question never having been established, the process of accretion
through the action of their currents could have started much earlier than 1930. It is also entirely possible –– and reasonably
presumable, lacking any proof to the contrary –– even granting that accretion started only in 1930, for the land to have
grown to thirteen hectares in the twenty years that followed until 1956 when the application for registration was filed.

The Court therefore finds no error in the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the land was formed by accretion through the
action of river currents and belonged to the private respondent as riparian owner pursuant to Art. 457 of the Civil Code. 1âwphi1

The Court of Appeals also correctly overruled the petitioner's contention that the averment in the original application for
registration attributing the origin of the land to the action of the sea, which averment, with leave of court, was later
superseded by an amendment to the effect that the land was formed by the action of rivers, was binding on the private
respondent as a judicial admission. Pleadings that have been amended disappear from the record, lose their status as
pleadings and cease to be judicial admissions. While they may nonetheless be utilized against the pleader as extra-judicial
admissions, they must, in order to have such effect, be formally offered in evidence.  It does not appear that the original
21

application for registration containing the averment in question, or that particular averment itself, was offered or received in
evidence for the petitioner in the Trial Court.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals subject of the petition for review is AFFIRMED, without pronouncement
as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 83804             July 18, 1991

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. REYNALDO M. ALON, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Silay City, Branch 40, EDUARDO L.
CLAPAROLS,  CELIA JALANDONI, CARMITA L. CLAPAROLS, ALBERTO BALCELLS, SAGRARIO MEDINA VDA. DE
1

CLAPAROLS, EULALIA L. CLAPAROLS and FRANCISCO ROSELLO, respondents.

Quisumbing, Torres & Evangelista for private respondents.

NARVASA, J.:

The refusal of the respondent Trial Judge to grant the petitioner Republic's motion for issuance of a writ of possession in
Civil Case No. 838 is what has given rise to the special civil action of certiorari at bar.

Civil Case No. 838 was instituted by the Republic in the Court of First Instance at Silay City for the purpose of nullifying and
cancelling resurvey/subdivision-consolidation plans, and certificates of title issued on the basis thereof to the private
respondents,  on the theory that they embraced increases in or expansions of the original areas obtained by said
2

respondents in violation of law, and said expanded areas form part of the unclassified public forest, not subject to private
appropriation. 3

As established by the evidence, and as summarized by the Trial Court,  the antecedents of the case are as follows:
4

1. The private respondents were indisputably the registered co-owners of two big tracts of land:

(a) Lot No. 10-B of the subdivision plan Psd-50714, being a portion of Lot No. 10 of the Cadastral Survey of
Talisay, Negros Occidental (LRC Record No. 97, measuring 650,124 square meters, more or less, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 38525 issued in their names on September 8, 1964; and

(b) Lot No. 2 of the Cadastral Survey of Negros Occidental, with an area of 667,634 square meters, more or less,
their ownership being evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 38516, also issued on September 8, 1964.

2. Both these lots were resurveyed, and the resurvey plans were approved by the Land Registration Commissioner. The
resurvey resulted in the expansion of the original areas of the lots.

(a) The area of Lot No. 10-B-increased by 100,367 square meters; i.e., from 650,124 square meters to 750,491
square meters; and

(b) That of Lot No. 2 increased by 182,656 square meters; i.e., from 667,634 square meters to 850,290 square
meters.

3. Thereafter, the owners caused the subdivision of these two (2) expanded lots into smaller lots, and then the consolidation-
subdivision of the latter (and one other property of the same respondents [Lot 9 of the Talisay Cadastre with an area of
12,537 sq.m. covered by TCT No. 88517]), all with the approval of the Land Registration Commissioner, and corresponding
transfer certificates of title were issued for the subdivided areas. All this activity resulted in the original property (Lots 10-B
and 2) being ultimately subdivided into ten (10) lots, covered by individual titles, as follows:

(a) Derived from Lot 10-B

 (1) Lot No. 1 10,000 sq. m. TCT No. 47459

(2) Lot No. 2 10,000 sq. m. TCT No. 51832

(3) Lot No. 3 10,000 sq. m. TCT No. 51833

(4) Lot No. 4 10,000 sq. m. TCT No. 51834

(5) Lot No. 5 386,670 sq. m. TCT No. 51835

(6) Lot No. 6 161,805 sq. m. TCT No. 51836

(b) Derived from Lot 2

(1) Lot No. 2-A 52,774 sq. m. TCT No. 42843

(2) Lot No. 2-B 36,105 sq. m. TCT No. 42843

(3) Lot No. 2-C 88,879 sq. m. TCT No. 42842

(4) Lot No. 2-D 672,532 sq. m TCT No. 42850

4. The private respondents' claim of title to the expanded areas was founded on the proposition that the same were alluvial
in character and therefore accrued to them as riparian owners in accordance with Article 457 of the Civil Code. 5

The Trial Court rendered judgment on February 6, 1987. It made reference to the evidence presented by private
respondents consisting of "the testimonies of Dr. Virendra Pal Singh, Mr. Bart Ali Choudray, Dr. Pedro Sangatanan, Dr.
Wilfredo Espada and Miss Eufemia Sionosa, all expert witnesses on soil except the last who is a chemist," who "all testified
that based on their examinations and laboratory tests of the soil taken from the expanded area, . . . the same is alluvial in
character and therefore the defendants owned it as riparian owner under Art. 457 of the Civil Code." The Court also
adverted in its judgment to the "similar case of Republic vs. Heirs of Abrille, 71 SCRA 57  (in which) the Supreme Court
6

affirmed the decision of the lower court cancelling the transfer certificates of title covering the lands with the increased areas
and directing the Register of Deeds of Davao to issue new certificates of title in lieu thereof after the increased portions shall
have been segregated;" and hewing to Abrille, and observing that the increases in area were to be found in only two (2) of
the subdivided lots, the judgment disposed of the case as follows:

ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered cancelling Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 51835 and 42850 and
directing the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental to issue new certificates of title in lieu thereof after the
portions consisting of 100,367 square meters and 182,656 square meters, respectively, shall have been
segregated therefrom in accordance with law.

The private respondents initially sought to appeal. They filed a notice of appeal. However, they later filed a motion to
withdraw their appeal, "electing (instead) to file a petition for original registration of the expanded area questioned by the
plaintiff . . . (since) a favorable action on said petition will . . . make (the case) moot and academic . . ."  In the same motion,
7

the respondent also prayed for cancellation of the notice of lis pendens "on their properties not included in the questioned
expanded area." By Order dated May 19, 1987, the Trial Court granted the motion, considering the appeal withdrawn, and
directing cancellation of the notice of lis pendens "on the titles subject of this case . . . ." The judgment of February 6, 1987
consequently became final.

The respondents did not file applications in May and June, 1987 with the Regional Trial Court at Silay City for registration of
their titles over the expanded areas thru Eduardo L. Claparols  and Javier M. Claparols,  uniformly docketed as Cad. Case
8 9

No. 10, GLRO Cad. Rec. No. 97, but covering different lots.  The applications stated that the applicants were claiming the
10

areas "as riparian owner . . . by virtue of Art. 457 of the Civil Code in relation to Art. 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters and/or
Section 48, CA 141 as amended by RA 42 and 6246 and by virtue of the open, public, uninterrupted possession of applicant
and his predecessors-in-interest for more than 30 years under claim of ownership." 11

Five months or so after the initiation of the registration proceedings involving the so-called "expanded areas," the Republic
filed in Civil Case No. 838 a "Motion for Writ of Possession,"  claiming that, as "the prevailing party," it was "entitled to
12

possession of . . . (said) portions," and their segregation from the respondents' titles, as decreed by the judgment of
February 6, 1987, "would be meaningless unless the same are placed in the (Republic's) possession and control . . ." It
theorized that although the judgment did not decree restoration of the segregated portions to the Republic, that judgment
nevertheless "necessarily carries with it the delivery of possession of said portions to the State, as successful party, and as
owner of all lands of the public domain," a judgment not being "confined to what appears upon the face of the decision but
also those necessarily included therein or necessary thereto," citing Section 45, Rule 39, Rules of Court, and Unson v.
Lacson, 2 SCRA 861, referring to Perez v. Evite, L-16003, March 29, 1961 as "controlling precedent." The motion closed
with the prayer, later amended,  reading as follows:
13 14

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that a writ of possession be issued placing plaintiff in possession of the
segregated portion covering an aggregate area of 283,023 square meters, and removing defendants and all those
claiming in their behalf from the premises.

After submission of extensive argument by the parties on the issue,  the Trial Court rendered an Order on May 12, 1988
15

denying the Republic's motion for a writ of possession, for lack of merit. In justification of its resolution, the Court made the
following observations:

The decision of this Court was founded only in the propriety of the remedy resorted to by private defendants in
securing title to the expanded areas. It was found that the titling of the expanded areas was not in accordance with
Act 496 and following the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Republic vs. Abrille, 71 SCRA 57, the titles
were ordered cancelled because the law requires that to make the alluvial deposits of land come under the Torrens
System, there must be a judicial application for registration.

The purpose of registration under the Land Registration and Cadastral Acts is merely to confirm the title of the
registrant and thereafter protect the title already possessed by the owner, making it imprescriptible by occupation
of third parties. Ownership of a piece of land is one thing and registration under the Torrens System of that
ownership is another. Ownership is governed by the Civil Code and registration under the Torrens System is not
one of the modes of acquiring ownership (Grande vs. Court of Appeals, 115 Phil. 521).

During the trial of this case, private defendants presented expert witnesses who testified and concluded that the
expanded areas are alluvial in character. And as registered owners of the land to which the alluvial deposits
adjoined, they are therefore the lawful owners of the said alluvial areas.

Art. 475 of the Civil Code provides:

To the owners of the land adjoining the bank of the river belong the accretion which they gradually received from
the effect of the current of the waters.

Accretion therefore which the banks of rivers may gradually receive from the effect of the current become the
property of the owners of the bank, such accretions being natural incidents to land bordering on running streams.
The provisions of the, Civil Code in that respect are not affected by the Land Registration Act. (C.N. Hodges vs.
Garcia, 109 Phil. 133).

Since the alluvial deposits of land adjoin the registered land of the private defendants and the expanded areas
have become part of their estate as a result of accretion, it follows therefore that the said expanded areas belong
to them.1âwphi1

On June 28, 1988 the Republic instituted in this Court the special civil action of certiorari at bar praying that the Order of May
12, 1988 be declared null and void, and pending adjudgment of the action, that a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
issue to place it in possession of the expanded areas. Here, the Republic insists on the correctness of the theory it
advocated before the Trial Court and contends that the latter, in not upholding that theory, acted beyond its jurisdiction and
gravely abused its discretion. It assails the Trial Court's findings respecting the private respondents' rights over the
expanded areas as "being totally without factual or legal mooring, apart from being wholly extraneous to the lis mota of
petitioner's main action which was for cancellation and reversion;"  invokes the presumption that all unregistered lands . . .,
16

unless the contrary is shown, are . . . "public lands;"  and refers to 14 evidences" in its possession (a) "that the areas aver
17

which private respondents lay claim as alluvial deposits are nothing but portions of a FORESHORE,"  (b) are "within the
18

unclassified public forest of Talisay . . . released to the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources for its administration,
management and disposition, pursuant to Section 13, PD No. 705, as implemented by Department Order No. 3, dated July
22, 1975, as shown in the Memorandum of the Secretary of Natural Resources, dated January 23, 1976,"  and (c) are now
19

in fact subject of a subsisting fishpond lease agreement in favor of a third person. 20

The signification and import of the Trial Court's challenged Order of May 12, 1988, as well as of its decision of February 6,
1987, seem to the Court to be sufficiently clear. Both the decision and the order declared  that at the very least the evidence
21

of the private respondents established prima facie that they are owners of the expanded areas in question –– pursuant to
Article 475 of the Civil Code and in virtue of open, continuous and exclusive possession of the land for more than 50 years in
concept of owners –– but that the procedure under Section 112 of the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496) by which they
succeeded in obtaining title over said areas was incorrect, and that title should issue in their favor only in virtue of regular,
original registration proceedings in accordance with the same law in the course of which, as pointed out in Republic v. Heirs
of Abrille, supra, "the following requisites should all be satisfied:

1. Survey of land by the Bureau of Lands or a duly licensed private surveyor;

2. Filing of application for registration by the applicant;

3. Setting of the date for the initial hearing of the application by the Court;

4. Transmittal of the application and the date of initial hearing together with all the documents or other evidences
attached thereto by the Clerk of Court to the Land Registration Commission;

5. Publication of a notice of the filing of the application and date and place of the hearing in the Official Gazette;

6. Service of notice upon contiguous owners, occupants and those known to have interests in the property by the
sheriff;

7. Filing of answer to the application by any person whether named in the notice or not;

8. Hearing of the case by the Court;

9. Promulgation of judgment by the Court;

10. Issuance of the decree by the Court declaring the decision final and instructing the Land Registration
Commission to issue a decree Entry of the decree of registration in the Land Registration Commission;

12. Sending of copy of the decree of registration to the corresponding Register of Deeds; and

13. Transcription of the decree of registration book and the issuance of the owner's duplicate original certificate of
title to the applicant by the Register of Deeds, upon payment of the prescribed fees.

This is indeed what the respondents have done. They have commenced original registration proceedings for the registration
of their title over the expanded areas. Their institution of said proceedings pursuant to the decision and order of the Trial
Court did not, of course, foreclose the right and option of the Republic to oppose their claim of ownership over those
expanded areas, and show the areas to be in truth unclassified forest. But these issues –– whether or not the land is alluvial
or not, or of public or private domain, and whether or not the private respondents are riparian owners thereof within the
contemplation of the Civil Code and have occupied the land as owners for fifty years, are issues proper for ventilation in the
registration case now pending before the Regional Trial Court at Silay City. As things stand now, the private respondents
have in their favor a judicial pronouncement that they have shown, prima facie at least, that the expanded areas are not of
public domain and they have acquired rights of ownership over them; in a word, they have acquired rights of ownership over
them, in a word, they have overcome the presumption that the land is within an unclassified public forest; on the other hand,
there is no categorical declaration in the judgment in Civil Case No. 838 that the expanded areas belong to the State, surely
a condition for its entitlement to a writ of possession thereof.  In any event, the issues are obviously not triable before this
22

Court, which must therefore reject the Republic's efforts to have said issues ventilated and resolved on the merits in the
action at bar. And since, as the record of Civil Case No. 838 of the Regional Trial Court now stands, no clear right to the
possession of the expanded areas is shown to exist in favor of the Republic, the Court must also reject the Republic's
submittal that the respondent Trial Court, in refusing to grant its motion for writ of possession, had acted beyond its
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DENIED, without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. Nos. L-66075-76 July 5, 1990

EULOGIO AGUSTIN, HEIRS OF BALDOMERO LANGCAY, ARTURO BALISI & JUAN LANGCAY, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, MARIA MELAD, TIMOTEO MELAD, PABLO BINAYUG & GERONIMA
UBINA, respondents.

Antonio N. Laggui for petitioners.

Pedro R. Perez, Jr. for private respondents.

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:

The Cagayan River separates the towns of Solana on the west and Tuguegarao on the east in the province of Cagayan. According to the
unrebutted testimony of Romeo Rigor, Geodetic Engineer of the Bureau of Lands, in 1919 the lands east of the river were covered by the
Tuguegarao Cadastre. In 1925, Original Certificate of Title No. 5472 was issued for land east of the Cagayan River owned by defendant-
petitioner Eulogio Agustin (Exh. 2-Agustin).

As the years went by, the Cagayan River moved gradually eastward, depositing silt on the western bank. The shifting of the
river and the siltation continued until 1968.

In 1950, all lands west of the river were included in the Solana Cadastre. Among these occupying lands covered by the
Solana Cadastre were plaintiffs-private respondents, namely, Pablo Binayug, who has been in possession of Lots 3349,
7876, 7877, 7878, 7879, 7875, 7881, 7882, 7883, 7884, 7885, 7891 and 7892, and Maria Melad, who owns Lot 3351 (Exh.
3-Binayug; Exh. B-Melad). Pablo Binayug began his possession in 1947. An area of eight (8) hectares was planted to
tobacco and corn while 12 hectares were overgrown with talahib (Exh. C-1 Binayug.) Binayug's Homestead Application No.
W-79055 over this land was approved in 1959 (Exh. B-Binayug). Binayug's possession was recognized in the decision in
Civil Case No. 101 (Exh. F-Binayug). On the other hand, as a result of Civil Case No. 343-T, Macario Melad, the
predecessor-in-interest of Maria Melad and Timoteo Melad, was issued Original Certificate of Title No. P-5026 for Lot 3351
of Cad. 293 on June 1, 1956.

Through the years, the Cagayan River eroded lands of the Tuguegarao Cadastre on its eastern bank among which was
defendant-petitioner Eulogio Agustin's Lot 8457 (Exh. E-Melad), depositing the alluvium as accretion on the land possessed
by Pablo Binayug on the western bank.

However, in 1968, after a big flood, the Cagayan River changed its course, returned to its 1919 bed, and, in the process, cut
across the lands of Maria Melad, Timoteo Melad, and the spouses Pablo Binayug and Geronima Ubina whose lands were
transferred on the eastern, or Tuguegarao, side of the river. To cultivate those lots they had to cross the river.

In April, 1969, while the private respondents and their tenants were planting corn on their lots located on the eastern side of
the Cagayan River, the petitioners, accompanied by the mayor and some policemen of Tuguegarao, claimed the same lands
as their own and drove away the private respondents from the premises.

On April 21, 1970, private respondents Maria Melad and Timoteo Melad filed a complaint (Civil Case No. 343-T) to recover
Lot No. 3351 with an area of 5 hectares and its 6.6-hectare accretion. On April 24, 1970, private respondent Pablo Binayug
filed a separate complaint (Civil Case No. 344-T) to recover his lots and their accretions.

On June 16, 1975, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby made:

 In Civil Case No. 343-T, commanding Eulogio Agustin, Gregorio Tuliao, Jacinto Buquel and Octavio
Bancud, or anybody acting as their representative[s] or agents to vacate Lot No. 3351 of Solana
Cadastre together with its accretion consisting of portions of Lots 9463, 9462 and 9461 of Tuguegarao
Cadastre and for these defendants to restore ownership in favor of Maria Melad and Timoteo Melad who
are the only interested heirs of Macario Melad.

In Civil Case No. 344-T, commanding defendants Justo Adduru, Andres Pastor, Teofilo Tagacay, Vicente
Camilan, Nicanor Mora, Baldomero Cagurangan, Domingo Quilang, Cesar Cabalza, Elias Macababbad,
Titong Macababbad, Arturo Balisi, Jose Allabun, Eulogio Agustin, Banong Aquino, Junior Cambri and
Juan Langoay, or any of their agents or representatives to vacate the Lots 3349, 7876, 7877, 7878, 7879,
7875, 7881, 7882, 7883, 7884, 7885, 7891 and 7892, together with its accretion and to restore
possession to plaintiffs Pablo Binayug and Geronima Ubina. Without pronouncement as to damages
which were not properly proven and to costs.

SO ORDERED. (As amended by the order dated August 15, 1975.) (pp. 24-25, Rollo.)

Only defendant-petitioner Eulogio Agustin appealed in Civil Case No. 343-T, while in Civil Case No. 344-T, only defendants-
petitioners Eulogio Agustin, Baldomero Cagurangan (substituted by his heir), Arturo Balisi and Juan Langcay appealed. But
upon motion of plaintiffs-private respondents, the trial court ordered the execution pending appeal of the judgment in Civil
Case No. 344-T against Cagurangan, Balisi and Langcay on the ground that their appeal was dilatory as they had not
presented evidence at the trial (Order dated August 15, 1975).

On November 29, 1983, the Intermediate Appellate Court rendered a decision affirming in toto the judgment of the trial court,
with costs against the defendants-appellants.

In their petition for review of that decision, the petitioners allege that the Court of Appeals erred:

1. in declaring that the land in question had become part of private respondents' estate as a result of
accretion;

2. in declaring that the accretion to private respondents' estate which used to pertain to petitioners' estate
cannot preclude the private respondents from being the owners thereof; and

3. in declaring that the ownership of private respondents over the accretion is not affected by the sudden
and abrupt change in the course of the Cagayan River when it reverted to its old bed

The petition is unmeritorious and must be denied.

The finding of the Court of Appeals that there had been accretions to the lots of the private respondents who did not lose the
ownership of such accretions even after they were separated from the principal lots by the sudden change of course of the
river, is a finding of fact which is conclusive on this Court. That finding is supported by Art. 457 of the New Civil Code which
provides:

Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually
receive from the effects of the current of the waters. (366)

Accretion benefits a riparian owner when the following requisites are present: (1) that the deposit be gradual and
imperceptible; (2) that it resulted from the effects of the current of the water; and (3) that the land where accretion takes
place is adjacent to the bank of a river (Republic vs. CA, 132 SCRA 514).

All these requisites of accretion are present in this case for, as the trial court found:

. . . Cagayan River did move year by year from 1919 to 1968 or for a period of 49 years. Within this
period, the alluvium (sic) deposited on the other side has become greater in area than the original lands
of the plaintiffs in both cases. Still the addition in every year is imperceptible in nature, one could not
discern it but can be measured after the lapse of a certain time. The testimonial evidence in these cases
that said Cagayan River moved eastward year by year is overwhelming as against the denial of
defendant Eulogio Agustin alone. Cesar Caronan, one time mayor of Solana, Cagayan, said so. Arturo
Taguian said so. Timoteo Melad said so. Francisco Ubina said so. Geodetic Engineer Rigor impliedly
said so when he testified that when Solana Cadastre was executed in 1950 it overlapped portions of
 Tuguegarao Cadastre executed in 1919. This could not have happened if that part of Tuguegarao
Cadastre was not eroded by the overflow of the Cagayan River. These testimonies cannot be destroyed
by the denials of Vicente Cauilan, Marcelo Agustin and Eulogio Agustin alone . . . . (p. 27, Rollo.)

The appellate court confirmed that the accretion on the western bank of the Cagayan River had been going on from 1919 up
to 1968 or for a period of 49 years. It was gradual and imperceptible. Only when Lot No. 3351, with an original area of 5
hectares described in the free patent that was issued to Macario Melad in June 1956, was resurveyed in 1968 did it become
known that 6.6 hectares had been added to it. Lot No. 3351, covered by a homestead patent issued in June, 1950 to Pablo
Binayug, grew from its original area of 18 hectares, by an additional 50 hectares through alluvium as the Cagayan River
gradually moved to the east. These accretions belong to riparian owners upon whose lands the alluvial deposits were made
(Roxas vs. Tuason, 9 Phil. 408; Director of Lands vs. Rizal, 87 Phil. 806). The reason for this principle is because, if lands
bordering on streams are exposed to floods and other damage due to the destructive force of the waters, and if by virtue of
law they are subject to encumbrances and various kinds of easements, it is only just that such risks or dangers as may
prejudice the owners thereof should in some way be compensated by the right of accretion (Cortes vs. City of Manila, 10
Phil. 567).
i•t•c-aüsl

The private respondents' ownership of the accretion to their lands was not lost upon the sudden and abrupt change of the
course of the Cagayan River in 1968 or 1969 when it reverted to its old 1919 bed, and separated or transferred said
accretions to the other side (or eastern bank) of the river. Articles 459 and 463 of the New Civil Code apply to this situation.

Art. 459. Whenever the current of a river, creek or torrent segregates from an estate on its bank a known
portion of land and transfers it to another estate, the owner of the land to which the segregated portion
belonged retains the ownership of it, provided that he removes the same within two years.

Art. 463. Whenever the current of a river divides itself into branches, leaving a piece of land or part
thereof isolated, the owner of the land retains his ownership. He also retains it if a portion of land is
separated from the estate by the current. (Emphasis supplied).

In the case at bar, the sudden change of course of the Cagayan River as a result of a strong typhoon in 1968
caused a portion of the lands of the private respondents to be "separated from the estate by the current." The
private respondents have retained the ownership of the portion that was transferred by avulsion to the other side of
the river.

WHEREFORE, the petition is denied for lack of merit. The decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of
Appeals, is hereby affirmed. Costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 160453               November 12, 2012

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
ARCADIO IVAN A. SANTOS III, and ARCADIO C. SANTOS, JR., Respondents.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

By law, accretion - the gradual and imperceptible deposit made through the effects of the current of the water- belongs to the
owner of the land adjacent to the banks of rivers where it forms. The drying up of the river is not accretion. Hence, the dried-
up river bed belongs to the State as property of public dominion, not to the riparian owner, unless a law vests the ownership
in some other person.

Antecedents

Alleging continuous and adverse possession of more than ten years, respondent Arcadio Ivan A. Santos III (Arcadio Ivan)
applied on March 7, 1997 for the registration of Lot 4998-B (the property) in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Parafiaque
City. The property, which had an area of 1,045 square meters, more or less, was located in Barangay San Dionisio,
Parañaque City, and was bounded in the Northeast by Lot 4079 belonging to respondent Arcadio C. Santos, Jr. (Arcadio,
Jr.), in the Southeast by the Parañaque River, in the Southwest by an abandoned road, and in the Northwest by Lot 4998-A
also owned by Arcadio Ivan. 1

On May 21, 1998, Arcadio Ivan amended his application for land registration to include Arcadio, Jr. as his co-applicant
because of the latter’s co-ownership of the property. He alleged that the property had been formed through accretion and
had been in their joint open, notorious, public, continuous and adverse possession for more than 30 years. 2

The City of Parañaque (the City) opposed the application for land registration, stating that it needed the property for its flood
control program; that the property was within the legal easement of 20 meters from the river bank; and that assuming that
the property was not covered by the legal easement, title to the property could not be registered in favor of the applicants for
the reason that the property was an orchard that had dried up and had not resulted from accretion. 3

Ruling of the RTC

On May 10, 2000, the RTC granted the application for land registration, disposing:
4 

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares the applicants, ARCADIO IVAN A. SANTOS, III and ARCADIO C. SANTOS, JR.,
both Filipinos and of legal age, as the TRUE and ABSOLUTE OWNERS of the land being applied for which is situated in the
Barangay of San Dionisio, City of Parañaque with an area of one thousand forty five (1045) square meters more or less and
covered by Subdivision Plan Csd-00-000343, being a portion of Lot 4998, Cad. 299, Case 4, Parañaque Cadastre, LRC
Rec. No. and orders the registration of Lot 4998-B in their names with the following technical description, to wit:

xxxx

Once this Decision became (sic) final and executory, let the corresponding Order for the Issuance of the Decree be issued.

SO ORDERED.

The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed.
Ruling of the CA

In its appeal, the Republic ascribed the following errors to the RTC, to wit:
5 

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PROPERTY SOUGHT TO BE REGISTERED IS AN ACCRETION TO
THE ADJOINING PROPERTY OWNED BY APPELLEES DESPITE THE ADMISSION OF APPELLEE ARCADIO C.
SANTOS JR. THAT THE SAID PROPERTY WAS NOT FORMED AS A RESULT OF THE GRADUAL FILLING UP OF SOIL
THROUGH THE CURRENT OF THE RIVER.

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE APPLICATION FOR LAND REGISTRATION DESPITE APPELLEE’S
FAILURE TO FORMALLY OFFER IN EVIDENCE AN OFFICIAL CERTIFICATION THAT THE SUBJECT PARCEL OF
LAND IS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE.

III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT APPELLEES HAD SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED THEIR CONTINUOUS,
OPEN, PUBLIC AND ADVERSE OCCUPATION OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY FOR A PERIOD OF MORE THAN
THIRTY (30) YEARS.

On May 27, 2003, the CA affirmed the RTC. 6

The Republic filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion on October 20, 2003. 7

Issues

Hence, this appeal, in which the Republic urges that: 8

RESPONDENTS’ CLAIM THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS AN ACCRETION TO THEIR ADJOINING LAND THAT
WOULD ENTITLE THEM TO REGISTER IT UNDER ARTICLE 457 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE IS CONTRADICTED BY
THEIR OWN EVIDENCE.

II

ASSUMING THAT THE LAND SOUGHT TO BE REGISTERED WAS "PREVIOUSLY A PART OF THE PARAÑAQUE
RIVER WHICH BECAME AN ORCHARD AFTER IT DRIED UP," THE REGISTRATION OF SAID PROPERTY IN FAVOR
OF RESPONDENTS CANNOT BE ALTERNATIVELY JUSTIFIED UNDER ARTICLE 461 OF THE CIVIL CODE.

III

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT RULING THAT THE FAILURE OF
RESPONDENTS TO FORMALLY OFFER IN EVIDENCE AN OFFICIAL CERTIFICATION THAT THE SUBJECT
PROPERTY IS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE IS FATAL TO THEIR APPLICATION FOR LAND REGISTRATION.

IV

THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT RESPONDENTS HAVE CONTINUOUSLY, OPENLY, PUBLICLY AND
ADVERSELY OCCUPIED THE SUBJECT PROPERTY FOR MORE THAN THIRTY (30) YEARS IS NOT SUPPORTED BY
WELL-NIGH INCONTROVERTIBLE EVIDENCE.
To be resolved are whether or not Article 457 of the Civil Code was applicable herein; and whether or not respondents could
claim the property by virtue of acquisitive prescription pursuant to Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property
Registration Decree).

Ruling

The appeal is meritorious.

I.

The CA grossly erred in applying Article 457 of the Civil Code to respondents’ benefit

Article 457 of the Civil Code provides that "(t)o the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which
they gradually receive from the effects of the currents of the waters."

In ruling for respondents, the RTC pronounced as follows:

On the basis of the evidence presented by the applicants, the Court finds that Arcadio Ivan A. Santos III and Arcadio C.
Santos, Jr., are the owners of the land subject of this application which was previously a part of the Parañaque River which
became an orchard after it dried up and further considering that Lot 4 which adjoins the same property is owned by
applicant, Arcadio C. Santos, Jr., after it was obtained by him through inheritance from his mother, Concepcion Cruz, now
deceased. Conformably with Art. 457 of the New Civil Code, it is provided that:

"Article 457. To the owners of the lands adjoining the bank of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from
the effects of the current of the waters."
9

The CA upheld the RTC’s pronouncement, holding:

It could not be denied that "to the owners of the lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually
receive from the effects of the current of the waters" (Article 457 New Civil Code) as in this case, Arcadio Ivan Santos III and
Arcadio Santos, Jr., are the owners of the land which was previously part of the Parañaque River which became an orchard
after it dried up and considering that Lot 4 which adjoins the same property is owned by the applicant which was obtained by
the latter from his mother (Decision, p. 3; p. 38 Rollo).
10

The Republic submits, however, that the application by both lower courts of Article 457 of the Civil Code was erroneous in
the face of the fact that respondents’ evidence did not establish accretion, but instead the drying up of the Parañaque River.

The Republic’s submission is correct.

Respondents as the applicants for land registration carried the burden of proof to establish the merits of their application by
a preponderance of evidence, by which is meant such evidence that is of greater weight, or more convincing than that
offered in opposition to it. They would be held entitled to claim the property as their own and apply for its registration under
11 

the Torrens system only if they established that, indeed, the property was an accretion to their land.

Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited along the banks of rivers. The deposit of soil, to be considered
12 

accretion, must be: (a) gradual and imperceptible; (b) made through the effects of the current of the water; and (c) taking
place on land adjacent to the banks of rivers. 13

Accordingly, respondents should establish the concurrence of the elements of accretion to warrant the grant of their
application for land registration.

However, respondents did not discharge their burden of proof. They did not show that the gradual and imperceptible
deposition of soil through the effects of the current of the river had formed Lot 4998-B. Instead, their evidence revealed that
the property was the dried-up river bed of the Parañaque River, leading both the RTC and the CA to themselves hold that
Lot 4998-B was "the land which was previously part of the Parañaque River xxx (and) became an orchard after it dried up."

Still, respondents argue that considering that Lot 4998-B did not yet exist when the original title of Lot 4 was issued in their
mother’s name in 1920, and that Lot 4998-B came about only thereafter as the land formed between Lot 4 and the
Parañaque River, the unavoidable conclusion should then be that soil and sediments had meanwhile been deposited near
Lot 4 by the current of the Parañaque River, resulting in the formation of Lot 4998-B.

The argument is legally and factually groundless. For one, respondents thereby ignore that the effects of the current of the
river are not the only cause of the formation of land along a river bank. There are several other causes, including the drying
up of the river bed. The drying up of the river bed was, in fact, the uniform conclusion of both lower courts herein. In other
words, respondents did not establish at all that the increment of land had formed from the gradual and imperceptible deposit
of soil by the effects of the current. Also, it seems to be highly improbable that the large volume of soil that ultimately
comprised the dry land with an area of 1,045 square meters had been deposited in a gradual and imperceptible manner by
the current of the river in the span of about 20 to 30 years – the span of time intervening between 1920, when Lot 4 was
registered in the name of their deceased parent (at which time Lot 4998-B was not yet in existence) and the early 1950s
(which respondents’ witness Rufino Allanigue alleged to be the time when he knew them to have occupied Lot 4988-B). The
only plausible explanation for the substantial increment was that Lot 4988-B was the dried-up bed of the Parañaque River.
Confirming this explanation was Arcadio, Jr.’s own testimony to the effect that the property was previously a part of the
Parañaque River that had dried up and become an orchard.

We observe in this connection that even Arcadio, Jr.’s own Transfer Certificate of Title No. 44687 confirmed the uniform
conclusion of the RTC and the CA that Lot 4998-B had been formed by the drying up of the Parañaque River. Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 44687 recited that Lot 4 of the consolidated subdivision plan Pcs-13-002563, the lot therein described,
was bounded "on the SW along line 5-1 by Dried River Bed." 14

That boundary line of "SW along line 5-1" corresponded with the location of Lot 4998-B, which was described as "bounded
by Lot 4079 Cad. 299, (Lot 1, Psu-10676), in the name of respondent Arcadio Santos, Jr. (Now Lot 4, Psd-13-002563) in the
Northeast."15

The RTC and the CA grossly erred in treating the dried-up river bed as an accretion that became respondents’ property
pursuant to Article 457 of the Civil Code. That land was definitely not an accretion. The process of drying up of a river to
form dry land involved the recession of the water level from the river banks, and the dried-up land did not equate to
accretion, which was the gradual and imperceptible deposition of soil on the river banks through the effects of the current. In
accretion, the water level did not recede and was more or less maintained. Hence, respondents as the riparian owners had
no legal right to claim ownership of Lot 4998-B. Considering that the clear and categorical language of Article 457 of the Civil
Code has confined the provision only to accretion, we should apply the provision as its clear and categorical language tells
us to. Axiomatic it is, indeed, that where the language of the law is clear and categorical, there is no room for interpretation;
there is only room for application. The first and fundamental duty of courts is then to apply the law.
16  17

The State exclusively owned Lot 4998-B and may not be divested of its right of ownership. Article 502 of the Civil Code
expressly declares that rivers and their natural beds are public dominion of the State. It follows that the river beds that dry
18 

up, like Lot 4998-B, continue to belong to the

State as its property of public dominion, unless there is an express law that provides that the dried-up river beds should
belong to some other person. 19

II

Acquisitive prescription was

not applicable in favor of respondents

The RTC favored respondents’ application for land registration covering Lot 4998-B also because they had taken
possession of the property continuously, openly, publicly and adversely for more than 30 years based on their predecessor-
in-interest being the adjoining owner of the parcel of land along the river bank. It rendered the following ratiocination, viz:
20

In this regard, the Court found that from the time the applicants became the owners thereof, they took possession of the
same property continuously, openly, publicly and adversely for more than thirty (30) years because their predecessors-in-
interest are the adjoining owners of the subject parcel of land along the river bank. Furthermore, the fact that applicants paid
its realty taxes, had it surveyed per subdivision plan Csd-00-000343 (Exh. "L") which was duly approved by the Land
Management Services and the fact that Engr. Chito B. Cainglet, OIC–Chief, Surveys Division Land Registration Authority,
made a Report that the subject property is not a portion of the Parañaque River and that it does not fall nor overlap with Lot
5000, thus, the Court opts to grant the application.
Finally, in the light of the evidence adduced by the applicants in this case and in view of the foregoing reports of the
Department of Agrarian Reforms, Land Registration Authority and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources,
the Court finds and so holds that the applicants have satisfied all the requirements of law which are essential to a
government grant and is, therefore, entitled to the issuance of a certificate of title in their favor. So also, oppositor failed to
prove that the applicants are not entitled thereto, not having presented any witness.

In fine, the application is GRANTED.

As already mentioned, the CA affirmed the RTC.

Both lower courts erred.

The relevant legal provision is Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree), which
pertinently states:

Section 14. Who may apply. — The following persons may file in the proper [Regional Trial Court] an application for
registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

xxxx

Under Section 14(1), then, applicants for confirmation of imperfect title must prove the following, namely: (a) that the land
forms part of the disposable and alienable agricultural lands of the public domain; and (b) that they have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership either
since time immemorial or since June 12, 1945. 21

The Republic assails the findings by the lower courts that respondents "took possession of the same property continuously,
openly, publicly and adversely for more than thirty (30) years." 22

Although it is well settled that the findings of fact of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the CA, are accorded the
highest degree of respect, and generally will not be disturbed on appeal, with such findings being binding and conclusive on
the Court, the Court has consistently recognized exceptions to this rule, including the following, to wit: (a) when the findings
23 

are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (b) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd,
or impossible; (c) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (d) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(e) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (f) when in making its findings the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its
findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (g) when the findings are contrary to those of
the trial court; (h) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (i) when
the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by respondent; and (j)
when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record. 24

Here, the findings of the RTC were obviously grounded on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; and that the inference
made by the RTC and the CA was manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible. Hence, the Court should now review the
findings.

In finding that respondents had been in continuous, open, public and adverse possession of the land for more than 30 years,
the RTC declared:

In this regard, the Court found that from the time the applicant became the owners thereof, they took possession of the
same property continuously, openly, publicly and adversely for more than thirty years because their predecessor in interest
are the adjoining owners of the subject parcel of land along the river banks. Furthermore, the fact that the applicant paid its
realty taxes, had it surveyed per subdivision plan Csd-00-000343 (Exh. "L") which was duly approved by the Land
Management Services and the fact that Engr. Chito B. Cainglet, OIC – Chief, Surveys Division Land Registration Authority,
made a Report that the subject property is not a portion of the Parañaque River and that it does not fall nor overlap with Lot
5000, thus, the Court opts to grant the application.

The RTC apparently reckoned respondents’ period of supposed possession to be "more than thirty years" from the fact that
"their predecessors in interest are the adjoining owners of the subject parcel of land." Yet, its decision nowhere indicated
what acts respondents had performed showing their possession of the property "continuously, openly, publicly and
adversely" in that length of time. The decision mentioned only that they had paid realty taxes and had caused the survey of
the property to be made. That, to us, was not enough to justify the foregoing findings, because, firstly, the payment of realty
taxes did not conclusively prove the payor’s ownership of the land the taxes were paid for, the tax declarations and
25 

payments being mere indicia of a claim of ownership; and, secondly, the causing of surveys of the property involved was
26 

not itself an of continuous, open, public and adverse possession.

The principle that the riparian owner whose land receives the gradual deposits of soil does not need to make an express act
of possession, and that no acts of possession are necessary in that instance because it is the law itself that pronounces the
alluvium to belong to the riparian owner from the time that the deposit created by the current of the water becomes
manifest has no applicability herein. This is simply because Lot 4998-B was not formed through accretion. Hence, the
27 

ownership of the land adjacent to the river bank by respondents’ predecessor-in-interest did not translate to possession of
Lot 4998-B that would ripen to acquisitive prescription in relation to Lot 4998-B.

On the other hand, the claim of thirty years of continuous, open, public and adverse possession of Lot 4998-B was not even
validated or preponderantly established. The admission of respondents themselves that they declared the property for
taxation purposes only in 1997 and paid realty taxes only from 1999 signified that their alleged possession would at most be
28 

for only nine years as of the filing of their application for land registration on March 7, 1997.

Yet, even conceding, for the sake of argument, that respondents possessed Lot 4998-B for more than thirty years in the
character they claimed, they did not thereby acquire the land by prescription or by other means without any competent proof
that the land was already declared as alienable and disposable by the Government. Absent that declaration, the land still
belonged to the State as part of its public dominion.

Article 419 of the Civil Code distinguishes property as being either of public dominion or of private ownership. Article 420 of
the Civil Code lists the properties considered as part of public dominion, namely: (a) those intended for public use, such as
roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar
character; and (b) those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or
for the development of the national wealth. As earlier mentioned, Article 502 of the Civil Code declares that rivers and their
natural beds are of public dominion.

Whether the dried-up river bed may be susceptible to acquisitive prescription or not was a question that the Court resolved
in favor of the State in Celestial v. Cachopero, a case involving the registration of land found to be part of a dried-up portion
29 

of the natural bed of a creek. There the Court held:

As for petitioner’s claim of ownership over the subject land, admittedly a dried-up bed of the Salunayan Creek, based on (1)
her alleged long term adverse possession and that of her predecessor-in-interest, Marcelina Basadre, even prior to October
22, 1966, when she purchased the adjoining property from the latter, and (2) the right of accession under Art. 370 of the
Spanish Civil Code of 1889 and/or Article 461 of the Civil Code, the same must fail.

Since property of public dominion is outside the commerce of man and not susceptible to private appropriation and
acquisitive prescription, the adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of title in the confirmation of an imperfect
title refers only to alienable or disposable portions of the public domain. It is only after the Government has declared the land
to be alienable and disposable agricultural land that the year of entry, cultivation and exclusive and adverse possession can
be counted for purposes of an imperfect title.

A creek, like the Salunayan Creek, is a recess or arm extending from a river and participating in the ebb and flow of the sea.
As such, under Articles 420(1) and 502(1) of the Civil Code, the Salunayan Creek, including its natural bed, is property of
the public domain which is not susceptible to private appropriation and acquisitive prescription. And, absent any declaration
by the government, that a portion of the creek has dried-up does not, by itself, alter its inalienable character.

xxxx

Had the disputed portion of the Salunayan Creek dried up after the present Civil Code took effect, the subject land would
clearly not belong to petitioner or her predecessor-in-interest since under the aforementioned provision of Article 461, "river
beds which are abandoned through the natural change in the course of the waters ipso facto belong to the owners of the
land occupied by the new course," and the owners of the adjoining lots have the right to acquire them only after paying their
value.

And both Article 370 of the Old Code and Article 461 of the present Civil Code are applicable only when "river beds are
abandoned through the natural change in the course of the waters." It is uncontroverted, however, that, as found by both the
Bureau of Lands and the DENR Regional Executive Director, the subject land became dry as a result of the construction an
irrigation canal by the National Irrigation Administration. Thus, in Ronquillo v. Court of Appeals, this Court held:

The law is clear and unambiguous. It leaves no room for interpretation. Article 370 applies only if there is a natural change in
the course of the waters. The rules on alluvion do not apply to man-made or artificial accretions nor to accretions to lands
that adjoin canals or esteros or artificial drainage systems. Considering our earlier finding that the dried-up portion of Estero
Calubcub was actually caused by the active intervention of man, it follows that Article 370 does not apply to the case at bar
and, hence, the Del Rosarios cannot be entitled thereto supposedly as riparian owners.

The dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub should thus be considered as forming part of the land of the public domain which
cannot be subject to acquisition by private ownership. xxx (Emphasis supplied)

Furthermore, both provisions pertain to situations where there has been a change in the course of a river, not where the
river simply dries up. In the instant Petition, it is not even alleged that the Salunayan Creek changed its course. In such a
situation, commentators are of the opinion that the dry river bed remains property of public dominion. (Bold emphases
supplied)

Indeed, under the Regalian doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed
to belong to the State. No public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the
30 

Government. It is indispensable, therefore, that there is a showing of a title from the State. Occupation of public land in the
31 

concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title. 32

Subject to the exceptions defined in Article 461 of the Civil Code (which declares river beds that are abandoned through the
natural change in the course of the waters as ipso facto belonging to the owners of the land occupied by the new course,
and which gives to the owners of the adjoining lots the right to acquire only the abandoned river beds not ipso facto
belonging to the owners of the land affected by the natural change of course of the waters only after paying their value), all
river beds remain property of public dominion and cannot be acquired by acquisitive prescription unless previously declared
by the Government to be alienable and disposable. Considering that Lot 4998-B was not shown to be already declared to be
alienable and disposable, respondents could not be deemed to have acquired the property through prescription.

Nonetheless, respondents insist that the property was already classified as alienable and disposable by the Government.
They cite as proof of the classification as alienable and disposable the following notation found on the survey plan, to wit: 33

NOTE

ALL CORNERS NOT OTHERWISE DESCRIBED ARE OLD BL CYL. CONC. MONS 15 X 60CM

All corners marked PS are cyl. conc. mons 15 x 60 cm

Surveyed in accordance with Survey Authority NO. 007604-48 of the Regional Executive Director issued by the CENR-
OFFICER dated Dec. 2, 1996.

This survey is inside L.C. Map No. 2623, Proj. No. 25 classified as alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest Dev’t. on
Jan. 3, 1968.

Lot 4998-A = Lot 5883} Cad 299

Lot 4998-B = Lot 5884} Paranaque Cadastre.

Was the notation on the survey plan to the effect that Lot 4998-B was "inside" the map "classified as alienable/disposable by
the Bureau of Forest Development on 03 Jan. 1968" sufficient proof of the property’s nature as alienable and disposable
public land?

To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must conclusively establish the
existence of a positive act of the Government, such as a presidential proclamation, executive order, administrative action,
investigation reports of the Bureau of Lands investigator, or a legislative act or statute. Until then, the rules on confirmation
of imperfect title do not apply.
As to the proofs that are admissible to establish the alienability and disposability of public land, we said in Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources v. Yap that: 34 

The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person
applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or
disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the
application (or claim) is alienable or disposable.There must still be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as
alienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant must
establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an
administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The applicant
may also secure a certification from the government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the required number
of years is alienable and disposable.

In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report, statute, or certification was
presented to the Court. The records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by
private claimants were subject of a government proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable. Absent such well-
nigh incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot accept the submission that lands occupied by private claimants were
already open to disposition before 2006. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for
proof." (Emphasis supplied)

In Menguito v. Republic, which we reiterated in Republic v. Sarmiento, we specifically resolved the issue of whether the
35  36 

notation on the survey plan was sufficient evidence to establish the alienability and disposability of public land, to wit:

To prove that the land in question formed part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, petitioners relied
on the printed words which read: "This survey plan is inside Alienable and Disposable Land Area, Project No. 27-B as per
L.C. Map No. 2623, certified by the Bureau of Forestry on January 3, 1968," appearing on Exhibit "E" (Survey Plan No. Swo-
13-000227).

This proof is not sufficient. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, provides: "All lands of the public domain, waters,
minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and
fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. x x x."

For the original registration of title, the applicant (petitioners in this case) must overcome the presumption that the land
sought to be registered forms part of the public domain. Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to
a private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain. Indeed, "occupation thereof in the concept of
owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title." To overcome such presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the applicant. Absent such evidence, the land sought to be registered remains
inalienable.

In the present case, petitioners cite a surveyor-geodetic engineer’s notation in Exhibit "E" indicating that the survey was
inside alienable and disposable land. Such notation does not constitute a positive government act validly changing the
classification of the land in question. Verily, a mere surveyor has no authority to reclassify lands of the public domain. By
relying solely on the said surveyor’s assertion, petitioners have not sufficiently proven that the land in question has been
declared alienable. (Emphasis supplied)

In Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., we dealt with the sufficiency of the certification by the Provincial Environmental Officer
37 

(PENRO) or Community Environmental Officer (CENRO) to the effect that a piece of public land was alienable and
disposable in the following manner, viz:

x x x it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The applicant for land
registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the public
domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved
area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration must present a
copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the
official records. These facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable. Respondent failed to do
so because the certifications presented by respondent do not, by themselves, prove that the land is alienable and
disposable.

Only Torres, respondent’s Operations Manager, identified the certifications submitted by respondent.  The government
1âwphi1

officials who issued the certifications were not presented before the trial court to testify on their contents. The trial court
should not have accepted the contents of the certifications as proof of the facts stated therein. Even if the certifications are
presumed duly issued and admissible in evidence, they have no probative value in establishing that the land is alienable and
disposable.

xxxx

The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do not prove that Lot 10705-B falls within the
alienable and disposable land as proclaimed by the DENR Secretary. Such government certifications do not, by their mere
issuance, prove the facts stated therein. Such government certifications may fall under the class of documents contemplated
in the second sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132. As such, the certifications are prima facie evidence of their due execution
and date of issuance but they do not constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. (Emphasis supplied)

These rulings of the Court indicate that the notation on the survey plan of Lot 4998-B, Cad-00-000343 to the effect that the
"survey is inside a map classified as alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest Dev’t" did not prove that Lot 4998-B was
already classified as alienable and disposable. Accordingly, respondents could not validly assert acquisitive prescription of
Lot 4988-B.

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on May 27, 2003;
DISMISSES the application for registration of Arcadio C. Santos, Jr. and Arcadio Ivan S. Santos III respecting Lot 4998-B
with a total area of 1,045 square meters, more or less, situated in Barangay San Dionisio, Parañaque City, Metro Manila;
and DECLARES Lot 4998-B as exclusively belonging to the State for being part of the dried--up bed of the Parat1aque
River.

Respondents shall pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
 SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 116290. December 8, 2000.]

DIONISIA P. BAGAIPO, Petitioner, v. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and LEONOR

LOZANO, Respondents.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition assails the decision dated June 30, 1994 of the Court of Appeals affirming the dismissal by the
Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 8, in Civil Case No. 555-89, of petitioner’s complaint for recovery
of possession with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction and damages.

The undisputed facts of the case are as follows: chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Petitioner Dionisia P. Bagaipo is the registered owner of Lot No. 415, a 146,900 square meter agricultural
land situated in Ma-a, Davao City under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-15757 particularly described as
follows:
chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

. . . Bounded on the NE,., by Lots Nos. 419 and 416; on the SE by the Davao River; on the SE.,(sic) by Lots
Nos. 1092 and 1091; and on the NW., by Lots Nos. 413 and 418 . . . 1

Respondent Leonor Lozano is the owner of a registered parcel of land located across and opposite the
southeast portion of petitioner’s lot facing the Davao River. Lozano acquired and occupied her property in
1962 when his wife inherited the land from her father who died that year.

On May 26, 1989, Bagaipo filed a complaint 2 for Recovery of Possession with Mandatory Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and Damages against Lozano for: (1) the surrender of possession by Lozano of a certain portion
of land measuring 29,162 square meters which is supposedly included in the area belonging to Bagaipo
under TCT No. T-15757; and (2) the recovery of a land area measuring 37,901 square meters which
Bagaipo allegedly lost when the Davao River traversed her property. Bagaipo contended that as a result of a
change in course of the said river, her property became divided into three lots, namely: Lots 415-A, 415-B
and 415-C.

In January 1988, Bagaipo commissioned a resurvey of Lot 415 and presented before the trial court a survey
plan 3 prepared by Geodetic Engineer Gersacio A. Magno. The survey plan allegedly showed that: a) the
area presently occupied by Bagaipo, identified as Lot 415-A, now had an area of only 79,843 square meters;
b) Lot 415-B, with an area measuring 37,901 square meters, which cut across Bagaipo’s land was taken up
by the new course of the Davao River; and c) an area of 29,162 square meters designated as Lot 415-C was
illegally occupied by respondent Lozano. The combined area of the lots described by Engineer Magno in the
survey plan tallied with the technical description of Bagaipo’s land under TCT No. T-15757. Magno concluded
that the land presently located across the river and parallel to Bagaipo’s property still belonged to the latter
and not to Lozano, who planted some 350 fruit-bearing trees on Lot 415-C and the old abandoned river bed.

Bagaipo also presented Godofredo Corias, a former barangay captain and long-time resident of Ma-a to
prove her claim that the Davao River had indeed changed its course. Corias testified that the occurrence was
caused by a big flood in 1968 and a bamboo grove which used to indicate the position of the river was
washed away. The river which flowed previously in front of a chapel located 15 meters away from the
riverbank within Bagaipo’s property now flowed behind it. Corias was also present when Magno conducted
the relocation survey in 1988.
For his part, Lozano insisted that the land claimed by Bagaipo is actually an accretion to their titled property.
He asserted that the Davao River did not change its course and that the reduction in Bagaipo’s domain was
caused by gradual erosion due to the current of the Davao River. Lozano added that it is also because of the
river’s natural action that silt slowly deposited and added to his land over a long period of time. He further
averred that this accretion continues up to the present and that registration proceedings instituted by him
over the alluvial formation could not be concluded precisely because it continued to increase in size.

Lozano presented three witnesses: Atty. Pedro Castillo, his brother-in-law; Cabitunga Pasanday, a tenant of
Atty. Castillo; and Alamin Catucag, a tenant of the Lozanos.

Atty. Castillo testified that the land occupied by the Lozanos was transferred to his sister, Ramona when
they extra-judicially partitioned their parents’ property upon his father’s death. On September 9, 1973, Atty.
Castillo filed a land registration case involving the accretion which formed on the property and submitted for
this purpose, a survey plan 4 approved by the Bureau of Lands as well as tax declarations 5 covering the
said accretion. An Order of General Default 6 was already issued in the land registration case on November
5, 1975, but the case itself remained pending since the petition had to be amended to include the continuing
addition to the land area.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Mr. Cabitunga Pasanday testified that he has continuously worked on the land as tenant of the Castillos
since 1925, tilling an area of about 3 hectares. However, the land he tilled located opposite the land of the
Lozanos and adjacent to the Davao River has decreased over the years to its present size of about 1
hectare. He said the soil on the bank of the river, as well as coconut trees he planted would be carried away
each time there was a flood. This similar erosion occurs on the properties of Bagaipo and a certain Dr.
Rodriguez, since the elevation of the riverbank on their properties is higher than the elevation on Lozano’s
side.

Alamin Catucag testified that he has been a tenant of the Castillos since 1939 and that the portion he
occupies was given to Ramona, Lozano’s wife. It was only 1 hectare in 1939 but has increased to 3 hectares
due to soil deposits from the mountains and river. Catucag said that Bagaipo’s property was reduced to half
since it is in the curve of the river and its soil erodes and gets carried away by river water.

On April 5, 1991, the trial court conducted an ocular inspection. It concluded that the applicable law is
Article 457 7 the New Civil Code and not Art. 461. 8 The reduction in the land area of plaintiff was caused by
erosion and not by a change in course of the Davao River. Conformably then, the trial court dismissed the
complaint.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court and decreed as follows: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the plaintiff-appellant. 9

Hence, this appeal.

Petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeals erred in: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

. . . NOT GIVING PROBATIVE VALUE TO THE RELOCATION SURVEY (EXHIBIT "B") PREPARED BY LICENSED
GEODETIC ENGINEER GERSACIO MAGNO. THE CASE OF "DIRECTOR OF LANDS VS. HEIRS OF JUANA
CAROLINA" 140 SCRA 396 CITED BY THE RESPONDENT COURT IN DISREGARDING EXHIBIT "B" IS NOT
APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.

. . . NOT FINDING THAT ASSUMING WITHOUT ADMITTING THAT THE QUESTIONED LOT 415-C (EXHIBIT "B-
1") OCCUPIED BY RESPONDENT LEONOR LOZANO WAS THE RESULT OF AN ACCRETION, THE PRINCIPLE OF
ACCRETION CANNOT AND DOES NOT APPLY IN THE INSTANT CASE TO FAVOR SAID RESPONDENT BECAUSE
SAID LOT 415-C IS WITHIN AND FORM PART OF PETITIONER’S LAND DESCRIBED IN TCT NO. 15757
(EXHIBIT "A")

. . . FINDING PETITIONER GUILTY OF LACHES WHEN SHE INSTITUTED THE SUIT.

. . . NOT ORDERING RESPONDENT LEONOR LOZANO TO VACATE AND SURRENDER LOT 415-C IN FAVOR OF
PETITIONER AND FOR HIM TO PAY PETITIONER DAMAGES FOR ITS UNLAWFUL OCCUPATION THEREOF.

. . . NOT HOLDING PETITIONER ENTITLED TO THE ABANDONED RIVER BED. 10

For this Court’s resolution are the following issues: Did the trial court err in holding that there was no
change in course of the Davao River such that petitioner owns the abandoned river bed pursuant to Article
461 of the Civil Code? Did private respondent own Lot 415-C in accordance with the principle of accretion
under Article 457? Should the relocation survey prepared by a licensed geodetic engineer be disregarded
since it was not approved by the Director of Lands? Is petitioner’s claim barred by laches?

On the first issue. The trial court and the appellate court both found that the decrease in land area was
brought about by erosion and not a change in the river’s course. This conclusion was reached after the trial
judge observed during ocular inspection that the banks located on petitioner’s land are sharp, craggy and
very much higher than the land on the other side of the river. Additionally, the riverbank on respondent’s
side is lower and gently sloping. The lower land therefore naturally received the alluvial soil carried by the
river current. 11 These findings are factual, thus conclusive on this Court, unless there are strong and
exceptional reasons, or they are unsupported by the evidence on record, or the judgment itself is based on a
misapprehension of facts. 12 These factual findings are based on an ocular inspection of the judge and
convincing testimonies, and we find no convincing reason to disregard or disbelieve them.

The decrease in petitioner’s land area and the corresponding expansion of respondent’s property were the
combined effect of erosion and accretion respectively. Art. 461 of the Civil Code is inapplicable. Petitioner
cannot claim ownership over the old abandoned riverbed because the same is inexistent. The riverbed’s
former location cannot even be pinpointed with particularity since the movement of the Davao River took
place gradually over an unspecified period of time, up to the present. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

The rule is well-settled that accretion benefits a riparian owner when the following requisites are present: 1)
That the deposit be gradual and imperceptible; 2) That it resulted from the effects of the current of the
water; and 3) That the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of the river. 13 These
requisites were sufficiently proven in favor of respondents. In the absence of evidence that the change in
the course of the river was sudden or that it occurred through avulsion, the presumption is that the change
was gradual and was caused by alluvium and erosion. 14

As to Lot 415-C, which petitioner insists forms part of her property under TCT No. T-15757, it is well to
recall our holding in C.N. Hodges v. Garcia, 109 Phil. 133, 135: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

. . . The fact that the accretion to his land used to pertain to plaintiff’s estate, which is covered by a Torrens
certificate of title, cannot preclude him (defendant) from being the owner thereof. Registration does not
protect the riparian owner against the diminution of the area of his land through gradual changes in the
course of the adjoining stream. Accretions which the banks of rivers may gradually receive from the effect of
the current become the property of the owners of the banks (Art. 366 of the old Civil Code; Art. 457 of the
new). Such accretions are natural incidents to land bordering on running streams and the provisions of the
Civil Code in that respect are not affected by the Land Registration Act. 15

Petitioner did not demonstrate that Lot 415-C allegedly comprising 29,162 square meters was within the
boundaries of her titled property. The survey plan commissioned by petitioner which was not approved by
the Director of Lands was properly discounted by the appellate court. In Titong v. Court of Appeals 16 we
affirmed the trial court’s refusal to give probative value to a private survey plan and held thus: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

. . . the plan was not verified and approved by the Bureau of Lands in accordance with Sec. 28, paragraph 5
of Act No. 2259, the Cadastral Act, as amended by Sec. 1862 of Act No. 2711. Said law ordains that private
surveyors send their original field notes, computations, reports, surveys, maps and plots regarding a piece
of property to the Bureau of Lands for verification and approval. A survey plan not verified and approved by
said Bureau is nothing more than a private writing, the due execution and authenticity of which must be
proven in accordance with Sec. 20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. The circumstance that the plan was
admitted in evidence without any objection as to its due execution and authenticity does not signify that the
courts shall give probative value therefor. To admit evidence and not to believe it subsequently are not
contradictory to each other . . .

In view of the foregoing, it is no longer necessary now to discuss the defense of laches. It is mooted by the
disquisition on the foregoing issues.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated June 30, 1994, of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G. R. CV No. 37615,
sustaining the judgment of the court a quo, is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-28021 December 15, 1977

JULIAN SANTULAN substituted by his children named PATROCINIO, ADORACION, ARTURO, CONSTANCIA,
and PEPITA, all surnamed SANTULAN and minor grandchildren, JOCELYN, ROSAURO and ROBERTO, all
surnamed SANTULAN assisted by their guardian ad litem, PATROCINIO SANTULAN Petitioners-Appellants, v.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, and ANTONIO LUSIN, substituted by his Heirs named TEODOSIA BALANZA (widow)
and Children LEOPOLDO, ARMANDO. ALFONSO, EMILIANO, MAGDALENA, ERLINDA and ESTRELLA (ESTER),
all surnamed LUSIN, and Heirs of CAROLINA LUSIN-LUCERO named MANOLITO LUCERO and MARIO
LUCERO, Respondents-Appellees.

Isidoro Crisostomo for appellants Heirs of Julian Santulan.chanrobles virtual law library

Romulo C. Felizmeña for appellees Heirs of Antonio Lusin.chanrobles virtual law library

Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz Assistant Solicitor General Esmeraldo Umali and Solicitor Conrado T.
Limcaoco for The Executive Secretary, etc.

AQUINO, J.

This case is about the lease of a parcel of foreshore land of the public domain with an area of about four and
one-half hectares located at Barrio Kaingin, Kawit, Cavite abutting on Bacoor Bay and the Ankaw
Creek.chanrobles virtual law library

It is protracted controversy that has been pending for more than thirty years between the rival claimants
Julian Santulan plan and Antonio Lusin, who have been succeeded by their heirs.chanrobles virtual law
library

Santulan claimed that foreshore land was an extension of his land, Lot No. 986 of the Kawit cadastre, with
an area of 17,301 square meters, registered in his name in 1937 under Original Certificate of Title No. 6
which was issued by virtue of a free patent. The northern boundary of Lot No. 986 is Bacoor (Manila) Bay
(Exh. A). The said foreshore land was allegedly formed by soil deposits accumulated by the alluvial action of
the sea.chanrobles virtual law library

On December 5, 1942 Santulan caused the said land to be surveyed. The survey plan was approved by the
Director of Lands in 1944 (Exh. B). On December 29, 1942 Santulan, pursuant to Lands Administrative
Order No. 7-1, filed an application, F.L.A. No. V 562, to lease for five years for agricultural purposes an area
of 36,120 square meters of the said foreshore land (Exh. F).chanrobles virtual law library

On that same date, December 29, 1942, Santulan, pursuant to Act No. 3077 and Lands Administrative Order
No. 8-3, filed with the Bureau of Lands an application for a revocable permit to occupy the said land. He
indicated therein that he would use the land for 11 capiz beds and oyster beds, the planting of bakawan and
pagatpat and later to be developed into a fishpond" (Exh. G).chanrobles virtual law library

Seven years later, or on December 22, 1949, Santulan filed with the Bureau of Fisheries an application for
an ordinary fishpond permit or lease of the said foreshore land (Special Use Permit, pp. A. No. 5114, Exh.
H).chanrobles virtual law library

At the instance of the Director of Fisheries, the Director of Forestry investigated the condition of the said
foreshore land. The latter in his first indorsement dated June 19, 1950 found that it was swampy "and not
an improved fishpond as alleged by Antonio Lusin" and that it is within the disposable areas for agricultural
purposes under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands (Exh. L-1).chanrobles virtual law library

The chief of the division of commercial fisheries sent a letter to Lusin dated April 28, 1950 apprising him that
he was reported to have illegally entered the area covered by Santulan's fishpond permit application and
directing him to refrain from introducing improvements, with the warning that court proceedings would be
taken against him (Exh. J).chanrobles virtual law library

On January 12, 1951 an attorney, acting for the Director of Lands wrote the following letter to Lusin advising
him to vacate the disputed land and maintain the status quo:
Mr. Antonio Lusin
Caiñgin, Kawit, Cavite

S i r:

We have been informed that the area which is presently controverted by and between you and Julian
Santulan, under the applications noted above, was recently entered by you and some companion and that
you are destroying the dikes and other improvements previously constructed thereon by said Julian
Santulan.chanrobles virtual law library

If this information is true, and inasmuch as you are aware that the controversy is still pending final
adjudgment in this Office, is desired that you take proper advice and leave the area and its existing
improvements in status quo in order to avoid possible confusion of rights which ma delay the final
disposition of the area in question.chanrobles virtual law library

You are advised further that the acts imputed to you may make you liable to prosecution and punishment
under the law; and that whatever improvements you may make for yourself in the premises will not legally
accrue to your benefit, nor will they serve as basis for a claim to preferential rights. (Paragraphing supplied,
Exh, J-1).

Santulan declared the said foreshore land in his name for tax purposes. Tax Declaration No. 2923, which
took effect in 1948 and which cancelled Tax Declaration No. 13816 also in Santulan's name, shows that the
land was assessed at P460. He paid the realty taxes due on the said land for the years 1945-46, 1948-55
and 195760 (Exh. C, D and E, el seq.).chanrobles virtual law library

On the other hand, Antonio Lusin in 1942 and 1945 (he died in 1962) filed with the Bureau of Lands
applications for a revocable-permit and lease of a foreshore land, respectively, for the purpose of producing
salt on the said land. He claimed that he had been in the continuous and exclusive possession of the land
since 1920, when it was still under water, and that he had used it as a site of his fish corrals.chanrobles
virtual law library

He allegedly converted two hectares of the said land into a fishpond. The entire area was enclosed with mud
dikes and provided with a concrete sluice gate and another sluice gate made of wood On the northern part
of the land bordering the bay were bamboo stakes placed at close intervals to serve as water breakers to
protect the mud dikes from being washed away by the action of the sea. Lusin introduced the alleged
improvements from 1951 to 1953.chanrobles virtual law library

The 1942 foreshore lease applications of Santulan and Lusin gave rise to Bureau of Lands Conflict No. 8 (N).
The Director of Lands in his decision in that case dated February 1, 1951 found that the disputed land is
foreshore land covered and uncovered by the flow and ebb of the ordinary tides that it is an extension of
Santulan's Lot No. 986 and it was formerly a part of the sea; that Santulan was the first to enter the land
and to make dikes thereon, and that Lusin entered the land later and made dikes also (Exh. K made a part
hereof for reference as Annex A).chanrobles virtual law library

The Director ruled that the disputed foreshore land was subject "to reparian rights which may he invoked by
Santulan as owner of the upland in accordance with section 32 of Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1" (Exh.
K). Hence the Director rejected Lusin's application for a foreshore lease and for a revocable permit and gave
due course to Santulan's foreshore lease application.chanrobles virtual law library

Lusin filed a motion for reconsideration. The Director in his order of October 19, 1951 denied that motion. lie
found that Lusin was a possessor in bad faith: that it is not true that Lusin had improved and possessed the
said foreshore land for twenty years, that the disputed area is covered by water, two to three feet deep
during ordinary tides and is exposed land after the ebb of the tides, and that Lusin's alleged possession and
improvements could not nullify Santulan's preferential right to lease the land by reason of his riparian rights.
The Director ordered Lusin to vacate the land within sixty days from notice (Exh. L made a part hereof for
reference as Annex B).chanrobles virtual law library

Lusin appealed to the Acting Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources who in his decision of October
13, 1952 dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Director's 1951 decision (Exh. M made a part hereof for
reference as Annex C). Lusin's motion for reconsideration was denied in the Secretary's order of February
28, 1953 (Exh. N made a part hereof for reference as Annex D).chanrobles virtual law library

Lusin asked for a reinvestigation of the case. His request was granted. The Department ordered a
reinvestigation on May 12, 1953.chanrobles virtual law library

After receipt of the report of reinvestigation, the Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, by
authority of the Secretary, in his order of December 14, 1954, reaffirmed the rejection of Lusin's revocable
permit and foreshore lease applications but ordered Santulan to reimburse to Lusin the appraised value of
his improvements (Exh. O made a part hereof for reference as Annex E).chanrobles virtual law library

Lusin appealed to the President of the Philippines after his motion for reconsideration was denied in the
Undersecretary's order of May 19, 1955 (Exh. OO made a part hereof for reference as Annex F).chanrobles
virtual law library

Executive Secretary Juan C. Pajo, by authority of the President, held in his decision of April 10, 1958 that
section 32 of Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1 (promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources on April 30, 1936 pursuant to Acts Nos. 2874 and 3038) was "rendered obsolete" by section 67 of
the Public Land Law which took effect on December 1, 1936 (Exh. P made a part hereof for reference as
Annex G).chanrobles virtual law library

On the basis of the foregoing ruling and since the record is silent as to whether or not the land in question
has been declared by the President as not necessary for the public service and as open to disposition (Sec.
61, Public Land Law), the Executive Secretary sustained Lusin's appeal and reversed the orders of the
Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources in favor of Santulan. Secretary
Pajo decided the case in the alternative as follows:

On the assumption that the land in question has been declared open for disposition and is not necessary for
the public service, this Office directs that an oral bidding for the leasing thereof to interested parties
pursuant to the provisions of Section 67 of Commonwealth Act .No. 141 be conducted and the contract of
lease awarded to the highest bidder whoever shall be the highest bidder, if other than the appellant, shall be
required to pay to the appellant the appraised value of the improvements introduced by him on the land to
be determined by that Department.chanrobles virtual law library

If the land in question has not been so declared, this Office directs that a revocable permit under Section 68
of Commonwealth Act No. 141 be Id to the appellant requiring him to pay permit fees since the year
1951.chanrobles virtual law library

Accordingly, the orders and decisions of that Department and the Bureau of Lands are hereby revoked.

Santulan's case was distinguished from that of Gonzalo Monzon whose Lot No. 987 adjoins Santulan's Lot
No. 986. Executive Secretary Fred Ruiz Castro (now Chief Justice) in his decision of May 10, 1954 upheld the
preferential right of Monzon to lease the foreshore land north of his lot, which foreshore land is adjacent to
the foreshore land now in dispute in this case (Exh. Q made a part hereof for reference as Annex
H).chanrobles virtual law library

Santulan's motion for reconsideration was denied in the letter of the Acting Executive Secretary dated
August 20, 1959 (Exh. W).chanrobles virtual law library

On October 22, 1959 Santulan filed in the Court of First Instance of Cavite a petition for certiorari wherein
he alleged that the Executive Secretary committed a grave abuse of discretion in misinterpreting certain
provisions of Act No. 2874, Commonwealth Act No. 141, and Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1.chanrobles
virtual law library

In the lower court the parties agreed that the case Involves only a question of law. On August 18. 1961 the
lower court dismissed the petition and affirmed the Executive Secretary's decision. Santulan appealed to the
Court of Appeals which in its resolution of July 21, 1967 elevated the record to this Court on the ground that
Santulan in his brief raised only the legal questions of whether the Public Land Law repealed section 32 of
Lands Administrative Order No. 7 1 and whether the Executive Secretary's decision is "legally sound and
correct" (CA-G. R. No. 30708-R).chanrobles virtual law library
It should be emphasized that. as found by tile investigators of the Bureau of Lands, Santulan was the prior
possessor of the foreshore land in question. lie had it surveyed in 1942. The survey plan Psu-115357) was
approved by the Director of Lands in 1944. Santulan paid the realty taxes on that land .chanrobles virtual
law library

It should further be underscored that the regulations pie him a preferential right to lease the land as a
riparian owner. Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1 dated April 30. 1936. which was issued by the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources upon the recommendation of the Director of Lands for the disposition
of alienable lands of the public domain, provides:

32. Preference of the Reparian Owner - The owner of the property adjoining foreshore lands, marshy lands
or lands covered with water bordering upon shores or banks of navigable lakes or rivers, shall be given
preference to apply for such lands adjoining his property as may not be needed for the public service,
subject to the laws and regulations governing lands of this nature, provided that he applies therefor within
sixty (60) days from the date he receives a communication from the Director of Lands advising him of his
preferential right.

Paragraph 32 quoted above is a substantial copy of paragraph 4 of Lands Administrative Order No. 8-3
dated April 20, 1936, which was promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources upon
the recommendation of the Director of Lands for issuance of temporary permits of occupation and use of
agricultural lands of the public domain.chanrobles virtual law library

The word "riparian" in paragraphs 32 and 4 of the departmental regulations is used in a broad sense as
referring to any property having a water frontage (Shepard's Point Land Co. vs. Atlantic Hotel, 44 S. E. 39,
45, 132 N. C. 517, 65 C. J. S. 143, note 84). Strictly speaking, "riparian" refers to rivers. A riparian owner is
a person who owns land situated on the bank of a river.chanrobles virtual law library

But in paragraphs 32 and 4, the term "riparian owner" embraces not only the owners of lands on the banks
of rivers but also the littoral owners, meaning the owners of lands bordering the shore of the sea or lake or
other tidal waters. The littoral is the coastal region including both the land along the coast and the water
near the coast or the shore zone between the high and low watermarks.chanrobles virtual law library

Therefore, on the basis of paragraphs 32 and 4 of the said administrative regulations, Santulan or his heirs
Should be allowed to leased or occupy the said foreshore land.chanrobles virtual law library

But the Executive Secretary ruled that paragraph 32 was rendered obsolete by Commonwealth Act No. 141
or, as held by the trial court, Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1 was repealed by the Public Land Law. Is
that conclusion correct? We hold that it is wrong.chanrobles virtual law library

It is true that Lands Administrative Orders Nos. 7-1 and 8-3 were issued when the 1919 Public Land Act was
in force or before the present Public Land Law took effect on December 1, 1936. But that circumstance
would not necessarily mean that the said departmental regulations are not good under the 1936 Public Land
Law.chanrobles virtual law library

In rationalizing the alleged repeal of paragraph 32, the Executive Secretary cited the following provisions of
Act No. 2874, the 1919 Public Land Act (15 Public Land laws 24):

SEC. 64. The lease or sale shall be adjudicated to the highest bidder; and if there is no bidder besides the
applicant, it shall be adjudicated to him. The provisions of section twenty-seven of this Act shall be applied
wherever applicable. If all or part of the lots remain unleased or unsold the Director of Lands Shall from time
to time announce in the Offcial Gazette or otherwise the lease or sale of those lots if necessary . (Section 27
refers to sealed bidding).

The Executive Secretary held that the above-quoted section 64 was by the for provisions of on wealth Act
No. 141 which took effect on December 1, 1936:

SEC. 67. The lease or sale shall be made through oral bidding-, and ajudication shall be made to the highest
bidder. However, where m applicant has made improvements on the land by virtue of a permit issued to him
by competent authority, the sale or lease shall be made by sealed bidding as prescribed in section twenty-
six of this Act, the provisions of which shall be applied wherever applicable. If all or Dart of the lots remain
unleased or unsold. the Director of Lands shall from time to time announce in the Official Gazzate, or in any
other newspapers of general circulation, the lease or sale of those lots, if necessary. (Section 26, like section
27 of Act No. 2874, refers to sealed bidding).

The Executive Secretary noted that under section 64 of Act No. 2874 sealed bidding was the general rule of
procedure in an award of a lease of foreshore land and that the t is entitled to equal the bid of the highest
bidder. On the other hand, under 67, oral bidding is the general rule.chanrobles virtual law library

Hence, the Executive Secretary assumed that, while under section 64 of the 1919 old Public Land Act, the
fact that the applicant has a preferential right to lease foreshore land was a crucial factor it is thus under
section 67 of the 1936 Public Land Law because in oral bidding the appellant is not entitled to equal the bid
of the highest bidder.chanrobles virtual law library

The Executive Secretary concluded that, because the preferential right of the applicant to lease foreshore
land was immaterial under 67 of the present Public Land Law, paragraph 32 of Lands Administrative Order
No. 7-1, which gives such preference. had become "idle and useless".chanrobles virtual law library

That conclusion is wrong because it is based on the erroneous hypothesis that section 64 of the 1919 Public
Land Act is different from section 67 of the 1936 Public Land Law. They are not different. The truth is that
section 64 was amended by Act No. 3517 which took effect on February 4, 1919 (24 Public Laws 416).
Section 64, as thus amended, is substantially the same as section 67 of the 1936 Public Land Law.

That fact was overlooked by the Executive Secretary. Hence, his conclusion, that paragraph 32 of Lands
Administrative Order No. 71 was repealed or rendered obsolete by section 67 of the present Public Land
Law, is wrong because its premise is wrong.chanrobles virtual law library

In other words, paragraph 32 of Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1, issued on April 30, 1936, was
promulgated under section 64 of the old Public Land Law, as amended. And since the amended section 64
was substantially reproduced in section 67 of the 1936 Public Land Law, it is glaringly incorrect to say that
section 67 rendered obsolete the said paragraph 32. Paragraph 32 is still in force and is good under the
existing Public Land Law.chanrobles virtual law library

The foregoing discussion reveals that the Executive Summary's rationalization of the alleged repeal of
paragraph 32 of Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1 (identical to paragraph 4 of Lands Administrative Order
No. 8-3) is not only deficient in clarity and cogency but is predicated on the false assumption that section 64
of the 1919 Public Land Act is different from section 67 of the present Public Land Law. Consequently, the
aforementioned decision of Executive Secretary Juan C. Pajo under review bas to be set aside.chanrobles
virtual law library

This case is governed by the precedent established in the case of Gonzalo Monzon, which, as already noted,
is similar to this cm since the foreshore land involved in the Monzon case is adjacent to the foreshore land
involved in this case.chanrobles virtual law library

In the Monzon case, the Office of the President, applying the oft-cited paragraph 32 of Lands Administrative
Order No. 7-1 held that Monzon, the littoral owner of the registered land abutting upon the foreshore land,
has the preferential right to lease the foreshore land,

The location of the lots of Santulan and Monzon and the foreshore lands abutting thereon is shown in the
following sketch bawd on the plan, Psu-115357 (Exh. B):

Manila Bay or Bacoor Bay

Disputed Area

Psu-1 15357

Psu- 1 15358

Foreshore land

Forshore land
claimed by

leased to

Julian Santulan

Gonzalo Monzon

and

Antonio Lusin

Lot No. 986

Lot no. 987

Belonging to

Belonging to

Julian Santulan

Gonzalo Monzon

Considering that the foreshore land abutting upon Santolan's lot is in the same situation as the foreshore
land abutting upon Monzon's lot, there is no reason why Santulan should not enjoy, with respect to the
disputed foreshore land, the rights given to Monzon over the foreshore land adjacent to his lot.chanrobles
virtual law library

Now, then, is there any justification for giving to the littoral owner the preferential right to lease the
foreshore land abutting on his land?

That rule in paragraph 32 is in consonance with article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 which
provides that, while lands added to the shores by accretions and alluvial deposits caused by the action of the
sea form part of the public domain, such lands, "when they are no longer washed by the waters of the sea
and are not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of special industries, or for the
coast guard service", shall be declared by the Government "to be the property of the owner of the estates
adjacent thereto and as increment thereof" (cited in Ignacio vs. Director of Lands, 108 Phil. 335,
338).chanrobles virtual law library

In other words, article 4 recognizes the preferential right of the littoral owner (riparian according to
paragraph 32) to the foreshore land formed by accretions or alluvial deposits due to the action of the sea
(Ker & Co. vs. Cauden 6 Phil. 732, 736, 223 U.S. 268, 56 L. Ed. 432, 435; Jover vs. Insular Government, 10
Phil. 522, 40 Phil. 1094, 1100, 221 U.S. 623, 55 L. Ed. 884).chanrobles virtual law library

The reason for that preferential right is the same as the justification for giving accretions to the riparian
owner, which is that accretion compensates the riparian owner for the diminutions which his land suffers by
reason of the destructive force of the waters (Cortes vs. City of Manila, 10 Phil. 567). So, in the case of
littoral lands, he who loses by the encroachments of the sea should gain by its recession (Banks vs. Ogden 2
Wall. 57, 67, 17 L. Ed. 818, 821).chanrobles virtual law library

That preferential right is recognized in American jurisprudence where the rule is that the owner of the land
adjacent to navigable waters has certain riparian or littoral rights of a proprietary nature not possessed by
the general public which rights are incident to the ownership of the banks or the uplands: riparian as
respects the waters of a river and littoral as to sea waters or the waters of a lake (65 C.J. S. 143-
145).chanrobles virtual law library
It may be mentioned that the Director of Lands stated in his manifestation of October 26, 1977 that Lands
Administrative Orders Nos. 7-1 and 8-3 are still in force and have not been superseded by any later
regulations and that the directive of the President of the Philippines to the Director of Lands dated May 24,
1966, stopping the grant of foreshore leases all along Manila Bay, towards Cavite and Bataan, has not
rendered the instant case moot and academic "because the foreshore lease application involved is pending
award."

In view of the foregoing considerations, the trial court's decision and the decision of the Executive Secretary
dated April 10, 1958 are reversed and set aside and the order of the Undersecretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources dated December 14, 1954 and the orders of the Director of Lands dated February I and
October 19, 1951 are affirmed.chanrobles virtual law library

The lease application of Julian Santulan mentioned in the order of February 1, 1951 should be recorded in
the names of his heirs and the obligation to make reimbursement mentioned in the dispositive part of the
Undersecretary's order should now devolve upon the heirs of Santolan. The reimbursement should be made
to the heirs of the late Antonio Lusin The obligation to vacate the disputed land, as required in the Director's
order of October 19, 1951 devolves upon the heirs of Lusin Costs in both instances against respondent heirs
of Lusin (As amended by Resolution of February 17, 1977.chanrobles virtual law library

SO ORDERED.

Barredo (Actg. Chairman), Antonio, Concepcion Jr. and Guerrero, JJ., concur.chanrobles virtual law library

Guerrero, J., was designated to sit in the Second Division.chanrobles virtual law library

Fernando and Santos, JJ., are on leave.

Annexes to Opinion in L-28021, Julian Santolan

vs. Executive , et al.

F. L. A. No. V-562, R. P. A. (New). Julian Santolan, Applicant & Contestant vs. F. L. A. (New), R. P. A.
(New), B. L. Conflict No. 8 (N) Psu- 1 15357, Kawit, Cavite.

Julian Santolan, Applicant-Appellant vs. Antonio Lusin, Applicant-Appellant, D.A.N.R. Case No. 625, Psu- 1
15357, Kawit, Cavite.

Annex A - Order of Director of Lands dated February 1, 1951.chanrobles virtual law library

Annex B - Order of Director of Lands dated October 19, 1951.chanrobles virtual law library

Annex C - Decision of Acting Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources dated October 13,
1952.chanrobles virtual law library

Annex D - Order of Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources dated February 28,1953.chanrobles
virtual law library

Annex E - Order of Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resource dated December 14,
1954.chanrobles virtual law library

Annex F - Order of Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources dated May 19, 1955.chanrobles
virtual law library

Annex G - Decision of Executive Secretary Juan C. Pajo dated April 10, 1958.chanrobles virtual law library

Annex H - Decision of Executive Secretary Fred Ruiz Castro dated -May 10, 1954 in Emiliano del Rosario vs.
Gonzalo Monzon.

ANNEX A

ORDER
Julian Santolan, who owns Lot No. 986 of the Kawit Cadastre, under a free patent grant with Original
Certificate of Title No. 6 issued to him on June 9, 1937, claims preferential rights to all the areas extending
seaward from the said lot. He caused the said areas to be surveyed for him in 1942, and the survey plan
thereof was approved in 1944, as may be seen in the Survey Plan Psu-115357 of this Office which is
reproduced in the sketch drawn. on the back of the last page hereof. Except the portion marked "A" in the
sketch, he made a foreshore lease application and a revocable permit application for these areas in 1942 to
devote the areas applied for to fishpond purposes. Presently, he now includes the portion "A" in his
applications herein mentioned to be devoted to the same purposes - in fact, he now intends to utilize the
entire area comprised in his Survey Psu-115357 for fishery purposes and has filed therefor with the Bureau
of Fisheries fishpond permit application No. 5114. Upon this claim he contests the revocable permit (new)
application and the foreshore lease (new) application for the portion O these mm marked "X" in the sketch
which were filed by Antonio Lusin in 1942 and 1945, respectively, for salt-producing purposes.chanrobles
virtual law library

Lot No. 986 of the Kawit Cadastre, mentioned above as owned by Julian Santolan, a to be bounded on the
north by the Bacoor Bay. It is evident therefore that the areas now in Santolan's Survey Psu-115357, were
formerly parts of the bay, and that presently they exist as a result of the of the waters of the sea.
Investigation disclosed that these areas are now foreshore lands, - covered and uncovered by the flow and
ebb of the tides. Santolan was found to have entered the areas first and made dikes Lusin was found to
have entered lately and made does also. None of them, however, has obtained from this Office any permit
of occupancy and use, and their applications are not yet approved.chanrobles virtual law library

On the basis alone of actual occupancy or introduction of improvements neither of the parties here may
claim preferential rights, for under the law and regulations, it is only such occupancy and introduction of
improvements as are made upon the authority of an official permit issued by this Office which could serve as
a reason for holding a sealed bidding in a public auction of the right to low at which the permittee is given
the preferred right to equal the highest bid that might be put by any other party. This is the rule prescribed
by Section 67 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (the Public land Act)' It appears, however, that the areas -
portions "A", "X" and the parts extending up to the Bar Bay now, as may be seen in the sketch, - which are
comprised by Santolan's Survey Plan -Psu-115357, are immediately adjoining Lot No. 986, which is his
private property, and are extensions of the said lot to the sea. The areas, being foreshore lands, are
therefore subject to riparian fights which may be invoked by Santolan as owner of the upland in accordance
With Section 32 of lands Administrative Order No. 7-1 which provides the following:

Sec. 32. The owner of the property adjoining foreshore lands, marshy lands, or lands covered with water
bordering upon the shores or banks of navigable lakes or rivers, shall be given preference to apply for such
lands adjoining his property as may not be needed for the public service, subject to the laws and regulations
governing lands of this nature, provided that he applies therefor within 60 days from the date he receives a
communication from the Director of Lands advising him of his preferential right

As Julian Santolan is interested in utilizing the entire area covered by his Survey Psu- 1 15357 over which
he is fully entitled to exercise his riparian rights, the above-noted foreshore lease (new) application and
revocable (new) application of Antonio Lusin, both covering the portion marked "X" in the sketch, are hereby
rejected. The lease application of Santolan, shall be recorded as Foreshore Urn Application No. 562 and
given due course for the whole area (including portion "A) shown in the said sketch.chanrobles virtual law
library

SO ORDERED.chanrobles virtual law library

Manila, Philippines, February 1, 1951.

JOSE P. DANS
Director of Lands

ANNEX B

ORDER

Counsel for respondent Antonio Lusin has filed in due time a motion for the reconsideration of our Order of
February 1, 1951, which resolved this case in favor of contestant Julian Santolan, praying that the said order
be set aside and the case, reopened for purposes of a formal hearing for the submission of evidence.
Substantially stated, respondent Lusin claims that he is entitled to preference because he has been in
possession of the premises for a period of over twenty years, placing stakes and planting aquatic trees for
the raising and cultivation of shell fish and sea shells, besides constructing dikes for pending fish and
making salt beds, - all these works undertaken by him being the cause for the gradual filling of the area and
its conversion into a productive state. He contends that the areas under question had been formed thru
"artificial accretion" caused by his own labor and, consequently, he has the right of pre-emption.chanrobles
virtual law library

There is no question, however, that the areas under question are parts of the foreshore. Under Section 61 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Public Land Act), they are disposable to private parties by k only and not
otherwise; and under Section 67 of the same Act, the lease shall be made thru oral bidding, the adjudication
to be made to the highest bidder.chanrobles virtual law library

There is no question also that the areas under question extend to the sea from lot No. 986 of the Kawit
Cadastre, which is actually owned by respondent Santolan under Original Certificate of Title No. 6 of the land
records of Cavite. Undoubtedly, respondent has riparian rights to the foreshore in question which he can
invoke against contestant Lusin under the provisions of Section 32 of Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1,
quoted in toto in the order sought to be reconsidered.chanrobles virtual law library

Records show that the areas under question are also involved in the Fishpond Application No. 5114 of Julian
Santolan with the Bureau of Fisheries which is also contested by Antonio. lt appears that upon request of the
Director of Fisheries to the Bureau of Forestry for certification as to the availability of the areas for fishery
purposes, the latter made investigation, inquiring at the same time into the claim of Antonio Lusin, made
formally in writing, that he has improved the areas into a fishpond and has been in occupation thereof for
more than 20 years. The Bureau of Forestry made the findings that those areas are within the disposable
areas for agricultural purposes under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands; and that they are swampy
lands, formerly under sea water of the Bacoor Bay, "and not an improved fishpond as alleged by Antonio
Lusin". These findings were transmitted to the Director of Fisheries under first indorsement dated June 19,
1950.chanrobles virtual law library

Our own investigating officer, reporting on this case on January 25, 1951, stated the following: "On
December 15, 1950, when I conducted the first ocular inspection of the premises in the presence of both
parties, the only visible improvements found thereon are the newly-constructed dikes made thereon by
Julian Santolan, a few bacauan and ape-ape trees of about two to three years old, bamboo stakes placed
thereon at intervals, and a small old hut located at almost the middle of the land in question. All these
improvements were claimed to have been introduced by Julian Santolan. Antonio Lusin, however, claimed
that those bamboo stakes found therein were his."

It is evident from the findings of both the inspecting officer of the Bureau of Forestry and our own
investigating officer that the areas under question are foreshore lands, and that they have not been really
improved and possessed by respondent Lusin for over twenty years as he alleged. The improvements found
therein have been recently made, and they are not of such nature and extent as would have changed the
character of the areas as foreshore. In fact, according to the investigating officer, the areas have been seen
by him on different occasions, and he found that the same, as well as the neighboring areas in the same
belt, were covered by tidal waters of from 2 to 3 feet deep during ordinary rise of the tides, and uncovered
by the tides at ebb.chanrobles virtual law library

There is, therefore, no reason for changing our disposition in our order of February 1, 1951. It is not
necessary to re-open the case to receive evidence on respondent's allegation that he has been in possession
of the premises for over 20 years and has gradually improved them because, aside from the fact that the
allegation is belied by the physical condition of the premises, whatever evidence may be gathered on that
allegation could not change the nature of the areas as foreshore, nor would it avoid the rights of contestant
as riparian owner. The presence of the respondent in the premises has not been authorize by competent
authorities, and his introduction of improvements thereon was not done with proper permit of temporary
occupancy and -use such as is prescribed in our administrative practice. The circumstances under which he
made improvements cannot justify his claim for a preferred right under Section 67 of the Public Land Act; on
the contrary, he stands to forfeit the improvements to the Government for, as reported by our investigating
officer, he entered the Premises and commenced making the improvements after contestant Santolan
himself has already made improvements, and after he has been warned on December 15, 1950 by the
investigating officer not to continue working, which warning was confirmed by us in our letter to him of
January 12, 1951. His bad faith is quite evident, and he cannot avail of his presence in the premises now to
demand the issuance to him of a provisional or revocable permit of temporary occupancy and use under our
rules and regulations in order to legal his entry and give validity to his improvements. The right to demand
issuance of such a permit is concomittant to the right of contestant Santolan to be a preferred applicant by
virtue of his riparian right recognized in Section 32 of Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1 cited
hereinabove.chanrobles virtual law library

IN VIEW HEREOF, the instant motion for reconsideration and reinvestigation of respondent Antonio Lusin is
hereby denied, and he shall vacate the premises within 60 days from receipt of notice hereof.chanrobles
virtual law library

SO ORDERED.chanrobles virtual law library

Manila, Philippines, October 19, 1951.

JOSE P. DANS
Director of Lands

ANNEX C

DECISION

The order of the Director of Lands dated February 1, 1951, rejected Foreshore Lease Application (New) and
Revocable Permit Application (New) of Antonio Lusin and gave due course to the Foreshore Lease Application
No. 562 of Julian Santolan. Antonio Lusin claims that the order is against the fact and the law. He presented
three (3) motions for reconsideration: one on October 19, 1951; the other on December 12, 1951; and the
last on April 9, 1952. Said motions were all denied. Hence, the present appeal. The subject of contention is
the strip of land having an area of 41/2 hectares from Lot No. 986 of the Kawit Cadastre No. 203 to the
waters of Bacoor Bay. Lot No. 986 is covered by I Certificate of Title No. 6 issued to Julian Santolan on June
9, 1937. Santolan's titled property is bounded on the north by Bacoor Bay.chanrobles virtual law library

On December 5, 1942, Santolan filed his foreclosure km application for the entire tract entervening between
his property and Bacoor Bay. So he caused Psu- 115357 to be executed and same was approved in 1944 by
the Director of Lands.chanrobles virtual law library

On November 26, 1945, Antonio Lusin applied for permit for an area of 4.5 for salt bed purposes. The area
for which permit was asked is by his F.L.A. (New) filed on November 17, 1945, the boundaries of which are
as follows:

NE - V. del Rosario and E. del Rosario

SE - Julian Santolan

SW - Ankaw River

NW - Bacoor Bay

The two applications of Santolan and Lusin cover the same area. Julian Santolan duly protested in 1946
against Lusin's application. The question to be decided in this appeal is: Which of the two applicants, Julian
Santolan or Antonio Lusin, has right of preference to the land in controversy?

By virtue of the fact that he is a riparian owner, Julian Santolan has the right of preference pursuant to the
provisions of Section 32 Of Administrative Order No. 7-1, which reads as follows:

Sec. 32. The owner of the property adjoining foreshore lands, marshy lands, or hinds covered with water
bordering upon the shores or banks of navigable lakes or rivers, shall be given preference to apply for such
lands adjoining his property as may not be needed for the public service, subject in the laws and regulations
governing lands of this nature, provided that he applies therefor within sixty (60) days from the date he
receives communication from the Director of Lands advising him of his preferential right.

It is true that appellant Lusin introduced improvements on the in question, but that fact does not give him
preferential right , not only because he had not acquired any permit from the Bureau of Lands before doing
so, but also because his entry on the was duly protested by Santolan.chanrobles virtual law library
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, and finding that the order of the Director of lands on Feb. 1, 1951, is in
accordance with the facts of record and the provisions of the law on the matter, the herein appeal from said
order should be, as hereby it is, dismissed.chanrobles virtual law library

SO ORDERED.chanrobles virtual law library

Manila, Philippines, October 13, 1952.

JOSE S. CAMUS
Acting Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources

ANNEX D

ORDER

This is a motion filed by Antonio Lusin, thru counsel, for the reconsideration of the decision of this Office
dated October 13, 1952, dismissing his appeal from the decision of the Director of Lands under date of
February 1, 1951.chanrobles virtual law library

In support of the said motion for reconsideration, Lusin substantially alleges that he has been improving the
land in question since 1920, spending for such improvements no more than P20,000.00, and for that
reason, he should be given the preferential right to acquire the said land. To reinforce his allegation, movant
cites the case of Rosalia Vida Vda. de Tirona vs. Magdaleno Tragico, CA G.R. No. 9050, decided by the Court
of Appeals on June 30, 1943, wherein it was held that because Tragico has constructed fishpond on a
portion of the land in question by means of the improvements he has introduced thereon and has possessed
the land for sufficient time to acquire the land by right of prescription, he was awarded the land in
dispute.chanrobles virtual law library

We have found this allegation of movant to be far from the truth. lt is the finding of the investigating officer
who made an investigation of this case that it is Julian Santolan and not movant Lusin who has been actually
occupying the land in question and introducing improvements thereon. The pertinent portion of his M reads
as follows:

On December 16, 1950,, when I conducted the first ocular inspection of the premises in the presence of
both parties, the only visible improvements found thereon were the newly constructed dikes made thereon
by Julius Santolan, a few bacauan and ape-ape trees of about two to three years old, bamboo stakes placed
thereon at intervals and a small old hut located at almost the middle of the land in question. All these
improvements were claimed to have been introduced thereon by Julian Santolan. Antonio Lusin, however,
claimed that the bamboo stakes found thereon were his.

Moreover, according to the further finding of the said investigating officer, the WW in question fails under
the category of foreshore land. That portion of his report referring to this finding is hereby quoted as
follows:

It may not be amiss to state in this connection that I have. or different occassions, the opportunity to
inspect the land subject hereof on both high and low tides. During ordinary low tide, the whole area. and
further seaward, is entirely ex to the surface while during ordinary high tide, it is wholly covered with tidal
water with an approximate depth of two to three feet. The land in question in its entirety is marshy covered
and uncovered by the ebb and flow of tidal water.

As the land is a foreshore land, the same is susceptible to the riparian right of the owner of the adjoining
land. According to Section 32 of Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1, the owner of the property adjoining
foreshore land, shall be given preference to apply for such land adjoining his property as may not be needed
for the public service. Inasmuch as the land in question adjoins Lot No. 980, Kawit Cadastre, which is a
private property of Julian Santolan, said Julian Santolan shall have the preference right to apply therefor
over and above any other applicant. It may be mentioned, in this connection, that the said case of Rosalia
Vida Vda. de Tirona vs. Magdaleno Tragico who had and improved the land claimed by him, it is Santolan
and riot movant Lusin who has been actually occupying and improving the land subject of the present
controversy.chanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, the instant motion for reconsideration filed by Antonio Lusin, as well as his request for
reinvestigation of this case, should be, as hereby it is, denied.chanrobles virtual law library

SO ORDERED.chanrobles virtual law library

Manila, Philippines, February 28,1953.

FERNANDO LOPEZ
Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources

ANNEX E

ORDER

On October 13, 1952, the Office a in connection with the above-case can, the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows:

In view of all the foregoing and that the order of the Director of Lands on February 1, 1961, is in with the
facts of record and the provisions of law on the matter the herein appeal from the said order should be, as
hereby it is dismissed.

From the said decision Antonio Lusin filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied as per order of this
Office dated February 28, 1953. Still not satisfied with the aforementioned order, Lusin again filed a second
notion for reconsideration predicating his motion on the following grounds:

1. That he (Lusin) is in actual ion of the land in question since 1920;

2. That said area is an agricultural land actually devoted to fishpond and, therefore, is not a foreshore land;

3. That even granting without admitting that Santolan is a riparian owner, Santolan had lost his riparian
right thereto in view of the continuous ion by Lusin of the area since 1920; and

4. That in the investigation relied upon by the Director of Lands in his decision and confirmed by this Office,
the movant herein was not given opportunity to be heard because the said investigation was never
completed, and as a result, the conclusions of the investigator thereat were one sided

Adhering to its Policy of giving party litigants the outmost opportunity to present their respective sides of
the case, this Office ordered a reinvestigation of the case to determine whether or not the allegations of
Antonio Lusin are true.chanrobles virtual law library

From the said reinvestigation, the facts of this case may be stated as follows:

The disputed area is a strip of land containing an approximate area of 4-1/2 hectares located at the Barrio of
Kaingin, Municipality of Kawit, Province of Cavite- lt is bounded on the North by Bacoor Bay, on the East by
the property occupied by Vicente del Rosario and E. del Rosario, on the South by Lot No. 896 of Kawit
Cadastre No. 203; and on the West by Ankaw River. Lot 986, mentioned above as the boundary of the area
in question on the South, is owned and possessed by Julian Santolan, his ownership thereof being evidenced
by a free patent grant with Original Certificate of Title No. 6 issued on June 9, 1937. The only issue to be
resolved in this case is whether or not Julian Santolan, as riparian owner, is entitled to the preference
provided for in Section 32, Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1, which reads as follows:

32. Preference of Riparian Owner.- The owner of the property adjoining foreshore lands, marshy lands, or
lands covered with water bordering upon the shores or banks of navigable lakes or rivers, shall be given
preference to apply or such lands adjoining his property as may not be needed for the public service, subject
to the laws and regulations governing Ian of this nature, provided that he applies therefor within sixty (60)
days from the date he receives a communication from the Director of Lands advising him of his preferential
right.

During the reinvestigation of this case by a representative of this Office, it was disclosed that Antonio Lusin
is the actual occupant of the area in question - his present possession thereof dating back as of 1951.
During his occupation, Lusin has introduced considerable improvements in the area investing his fife sa
therein. Today, a portion of approximately two hectares of the said area is a complete fishpond surrounded
with dikes. A concrete gate was constructed on the western side of the fishpond in 1951. Water breakers
were constructed around the dikes to protect them from the action of the waves. The remaining portion of
the area in question is fenced with bamboo stakes.chanrobles virtual law library

On the other hand, it is apparent that the area in question is an extension of Lot 986 to the sea and that its
present existence is the result of the continuous recession of the water of the sea. There is no doubt that the
area in question is a foreshore, it being situated along the shore lying between medium high and low water
marks and is covered and uncovered by the flow and ebb of ordinary tide.chanrobles virtual law library

Both Parties claim prior ion of the disputed area, Santolan's claim dating way back in 1907, the year he
claims said area was donated to him by his father-in-law while Lusin alleges that he was already in
possession of the same since 1920. The evidence presented by both parties during the reinvestigation were
so diametrically opposed with each other that they only create doubts as to the veracity of the respective
claims of said parties. From the testimonies of witnesses for both sides, there could be gathered sufficient
grounds to believe that prior to 1942, neither Party Possessed the area to the exclusion of the other. Rather,
there are good reasons to believe that both parties fished in the premises jointly and/or simultaneously
without claiming the property exclusively for themselves because then the area was covered with water
which at that time was still deep. It was only in 1942 that Julian Santolan took positive step to claim the
property by filing a foreshore lease and a revocable permit application for said area with the intention of
converting the same into a fishpond. Santolan caused said area to be surveyed in 1942, the survey plan was
approved in 1944 as may be seen in survey Plan Psu- 115357 of the Bureau of Lands. Since 1942, Santolan
exercised dominion over the property although Lusin occasionally entered the premises with a similar
intention of claiming the area for himself. In January of 1951 Lusin entered the area in question and wrested
the n thereof from Santolan. Since then up to the present, Lusin is in continuous possession of the same
notwithstanding the vigorous opposition of Santolan.chanrobles virtual law library

Lusin alleges that the area in question does not fall within the purview of the above quoted Section 32 of
Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1 on the theory that the lands enumerated in said provision, whether
foreshore lands, marshy lands, or lands covered with water, must be bordering upon the shores or banks of
navigable lakes or rivers. And it is argued that the area in question is bordering the shores of Manila Bay,
which is neither a lake nor a river, the owner of the adjoining property is not en to the preferential right
accorded by said Lands Administrative Order.chanrobles virtual law library

We cannot agree with this contention. This Office is of the opinion and so holds that the said provision of
Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1, Section 32 speaks of the following kinds of lands, distinct and separate
from one another:

(1) Foreshore lands

(2) Marshy lands, or

(3) Land covered with water bordering upon the shores of navigable lakes or rivers.chanrobles virtual law
library

The phrase "bordering upon the shores of navigable lakes or river" in said provision modifies only the third
classification, that is, "lands covered with water", for if the law that said phrase should modify the three
types of land enumerated are then the punctuation mark, comma, should not have been placed before the
alternative "or" but instead between the words "water" and "bordering" making said provision to appear as
follows:

The owner of the property adjoining foreshore ands marshy lands or lands covered with water, bordering
upon the shores or banks of navigable lakes or rivers ... .

The use of the alternative "or" instead of the conjunction "and" shows the intention of the law in segregating
foreshore lands from marshy lands and those two from lands covered with water bordering upon shores of
navigable lakes or rivers.chanrobles virtual law library

It is also alleged that even granting that Santolan was the preferential rights accorded to a riparian owner,
said right has prescribed on the ground that Lusin has been in continuous ion of the said area since 1920.
This allegation was not duly proven during the reinvestigation. While Lusin claims ion of the disputed area
since 1920, on the other hand. Santolan claims that he possessed the same since 1907 when it was donated
to him by his father-in-law. As we have- already stated, it is the - finding of this Office that prior to 1942,
neither party the premises exclusively. It was only in 1942 when Santolan took positive steps to claim the
area for himself. There are even evidence on record that Santolan paid the land taxes for the area in 1936.
In 1951, Lusin effected his entry to the area up to the present. It may be recalled, however, that these
actuations of Lusin had been the subject of a criminal complaint filed by Santolan before the Justice of the
Peace Court of Kawit, Cavite, wherein Lusin was acquitted on the ground that his guilt was not proven
beyond reasonable doubt.chanrobles virtual law library

Needless to say, proof beyond reasonable doubt is absolutely necessary before conviction in criminal cases
could be had. On the other hand, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to prove a matter of fact in civil
and/or administrative cases. The preponderance of evidence adduced at the reinvestigation of this case
conducted by a representative of this Office, shows that the present occupation of Lusin of the area in
question was effected by force, although there are good reasons to believe that such force was employed by
Lusin to assert what he believed was his right over the property in question.chanrobles virtual law library

From the foregoing facts and circumstances, it is therefore, apparent that the area in question is a foreshore
land, and Santolan, being the riparian owner, is entitled to the preferential rights accorded by the provision
of Section 32 of Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1. Considering, however, the fact that during the
reinvestigation of this case, it was disclosed that Antonio Lusin had introduced considerable improvements in
the premises and had invested his life savings therefor, and considering further that if Santolan were the
one who converted the area into a fishpond, as he intends to do, he would have incurred the same expenses
as was incurred by Lusin in the premises in question, it is the belief of this Office that justice would be fully
served if Santolan be required to reimburse Lusin of the value of the improvements now existing in the area
as may be appraised by the Committee on Appraisal of the Bureau of Lands.chanrobles virtual law library

WHEREFORE, the above-noted foreshore lease (New) application and revocable permit (New) application of
Antonio Lusin should remain, as hereby it is, REJECTED; and Foreshore Lease Application No. V-65 of Julian
Santolan given due course, PROVIDED, he reimburses Antonio Lusin of the appraised value of the
improvements now existing in the area within sixty (60) days after notification of said appraisal.chanrobles
virtual law library

The Director of Lands is hereby directed to instruct the Committee on Appraisal concerned to make the
necessary appraisal of the value of the improvements now existing in the area in question within thirty (30)
days from receipt of this order and to notify Julian Santolan of the result of said appraisal.chanrobles virtual
law library

In the event that Julian Santolan fails to reimburse Antonio Lusin of the appraisal value of the said
improvements within the period specified in this order, he shall lose his preferential rights over the area and
Antonio Lusin will be allowed to file an appropriate public land application therefor.chanrobles virtual law
library

SO ORDERED.chanrobles virtual law library

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 168386               March 29, 2010

LUCITA A. CANTOJA, Petitioner,
vs.
HARRY S. LIM, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

CARPIO, Acting C.J.:

The Case

This is a petition for review1 of the Decision2 dated 24 January 2005 and the Resolution dated 12 May 2005 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76661.

The Facts

Petitioner in this case is the widow of the late Roberto Cantoja, Sr. (Cantoja), whom the DENR awarded a Foreshore Lease
Agreement over the foreshore area situated in Makar, General Santos City. Under the Lease Contract3 executed on 23
November 1990, the foreshore lease would expire on 21 October 2015.

The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:

On 16 November 1989, the late Roberto Cantoja Sr. filed with the Office of the DENR, General Santos City, an application
for a Foreshore Lease Contract over an area situated in Makar, General Santos City, per Survey Plan No. (XI-5B) 000002-
D. Cantoja was awarded the Foreshore Lease Agreement (FLA) on 23 November 1990.

On 4 March 1994, herein petitioner [Harry S. Lim] filed his protest docketed as DENR Case No. 5231, questioning the grant
of the FLA to Cantoja. The protest was based on petitioner’s allegation that Cantoja committed fraud and misrepresentation
in declaring in his application that the subject foreshore area adjoined his (Cantoja’s) property. To prove this allegation,
petitioner presented his Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 8423, over Lot 2-B, (LRC) Psd-210799, which adjoins the
foreshore area subject of the lease.

On 23 May 1995, Regional Executive Director Augustus L. Momongan of DENR XI, Davao City, issued
"Memorandum/Order assigning the above entitled case to Special Investigator Romulo Marohomsalic of the DENR Office
No. XI-5D, General Santos City, for further investigation and appropriate action" Upon ocular inspection, during which
petitioner failed to appear despite notice, Special Investigator Marohomsalic found that Cantoja was in actual possession of
the foreshore area which was utilized as "dock-board of the Cantoja’s Fishing Business. It was further ascertained, that no
portion thereof, has been occupied or possessed by any other person or persons, nor was there any adverse claimant
thereof."

On 12 December 1995, Geodetic Engineer Bernardo L. Soria, in compliance with the 27 October 1995 Order of the City
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) XI-5B, submitted his report stating, inter alia, that "there was no
overlapping of xxx Lot 2-B, (LRC) Psd-210799; and Fli-XI-5b-000002-D xxx all shown in the prepared sketch xxx of (the)
report."

On 1 February 1996, Director Momongan issued [an] Order dismissing petitioner’s protest on the ground that "(i)n view of all
the xxx circumstances and facts gathered during the investigative proceedings, this Office finds that the foreshore area
under survey plan Fli-XI-5B-000002-D, covered by FLA No. (XI-5B) 000002 is separate and distinct from that parcel of land,
identified as Lot 2-B, Psd-210799, registered in the name of Claimant-Protestant Harry G. Lim." The petitioner, concluded
the Director, "has no legal personality to question the veracity of the possession and occupation of herein Applicant-
Respondent over the foreshore area in question, as the same has been legally and regularly acquired by Applicant-
Respondent Roberto Cantoja, through public bidding and Applicant-Respondent’s occupation and possession thereof is by
virtue of a valid award granted by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)."

On 5 May 1997, petitioner filed Motion for Reconsideration of the said Order.

Meanwhile, on 6 October 1997, the DENR through the Office of the Solicitor General instituted Civil Case No. 6438 for
annulment/cancellation of Patent No. 188030 and OCT No. P-14720 both issued in the name of Jacinto Acharon, as well as
petitioner’s TCT No. 8423. The suit was anchored on the findings and recommendations of Special Investigator Romulo J.
Marohomsalic that "the area in question is xxx partly foreshore and partly river bed of the Makar and therefore inalienable."

On 2 May 2000, then DENR Secretary Antonio H. Cerilles, rendered a Decision reconsidering the 1 February 1996 Order
issued by Executive Director Momongan, and thereby cancelled the FLA previously granted to Cantoja. Secretary Cerilles
ratiocinated that:

Clearly, the foreshore area leased to Cantoja is bounded on the West by Lot 2, Psu-164268, of which Lot 2-B (LRC) Psd-
210799 of herein protestant is a portion. In other words, the said Lot 2-B immediately adjoins the foreshore area leased to
Cantoja, contrary to Roberto Cantoja’s statement and declaration in his Application for Foreshore Lease that his properties
adjoin the foreshore area leased to him. Obviously, Mr. Cantoja could not be expected to state otherwise for this will result in
his outright disqualification as Cantoja could not have legal access to said foreshore area without passing thru Lot-2-B of
herein protestant.

(Rollo, p. 79)

A motion for reconsideration with supplemental grounds was subsequently filed by Cantoja. Petitioner in turn filed his
opposition.

On 16 August 2000, Secretary Cerilles issued Special Order No. 2000-820 for the "Creation of a Team to Conduct
Investigation and Ocular Inspection of the Land Located in General Santos City subject of DENR Case No. 5231." Said
order was issued "(i)n view of the request of the Office of the Solicitor General for comment on the proposal of Mr. Harry Lim
for amicable settlement of the case xxx."

Without waiting, however, for the result of the investigation of said team, Secretary Cerilles, in an Order dated 17 October
2000, set aside its 2 May 2000 Order and reinstated the FLA in favor of Cantoja. The DENR Secretary also denied
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

On appeal, the Office of the President rendered the herein assailed Decision affirming the 17 October 2000 Order of the
DENR Secretary. Like the DENR Secretary, the Office of the President also relied on the findings of Special Investigator
Marohomsalic that the petitioner’s titled land is an inalienable foreshore area which could not be subject of a valid patent or
title.4

Aggrieved, respondent Harry Lim (respondent) appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 24 January 2005, the Court of Appeals
rendered a decision, setting aside the 27 March 2003 decision of the Office of the President and reinstating the 2 May 2000
decision of the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). 1avvphi1

Hence, this petition for review.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals reinstated the 2 May 2000 decision of the DENR Secretary, which cancelled and rescinded the
Foreshore Lease Contract covering the foreshore area under survey plan Fli-XI-5B- 000002-D in favor of Cantoja.

The Court of Appeals held that Cantoja committed misrepresentation amounting to fraud in his application for lease when he
declared in his application that his lot adjoins that of the foreshore area sought to be leased.

The Issue

The primary issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals erred in cancelling the Foreshore Lease Contract granted to
Cantoja covering the foreshore area under survey plan Fli-XI-5B-000002-D.
 The Ruling of the Court

The petition has no merit.

It is undisputed that respondent is the registered owner of the land adjacent to the foreshore area leased to Cantoja, which
is covered by TCT No. 84235 issued on 20 January 1975. Respondent’s predecessor-in-interest, Jacinto Acharon, was
issued OCT No. P-14720 on 17 August 1961 by virtue of a free patent grant. Thus, prior to Cantoja’s foreshore lease
application on 16 November 1989 and the grant of the foreshore lease contract on 23 November 1990, respondent already
owned the land adjacent to the foreshore land. The sketch plan6 dated 12 December 1995 submitted by the Geodetic
Engineer clearly shows that respondent’s property is in between the foreshore land and Cantoja’s property. As stated by the
DENR Secretary in his Decision7 dated 2 May 2000:

Clearly, the foreshore area leased to Cantoja is bounded on the West by Lot 2, Psu-164268, of which Lot 2-B (LRC) Psd-
210799 of herein protestant is a portion. In other words, the said Lot 2-B immediately adjoins the foreshore area leased to
Cantoja, contrary to Roberto Cantoja’s statement and declaration in his Application for Foreclosure Lease that his properties
adjoin the foreshore area leased to him. Obviously, Mr. Cantoja could not be expected to state otherwise for this will result in
his outright disqualification as Cantoja would not have legal access to said foreshore area without passing thru Lot 2-B of
herein protestant.8

Being the owner of the land adjoining the foreshore area, respondent is the riparian or littoral owner9 who has preferential
right to lease the foreshore area10 as provided under paragraph 32 of the Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1, dated 30 April
1936, which reads:

32. Preference of Riparian Owner. – The owner of the property adjoining foreshore lands, marshy lands or lands covered
with water bordering upon shores or banks of navigable lakes or rivers, shall be given preference to apply for such lands
adjoining his property as may not be needed for the public service, subject to the laws and regulations governing lands of
this nature, provided that he applies therefor within sixty (60) days from the date he receives a communication from the
Director of Lands advising him of his preferential right.

The Court explained in Santulan v. The Executive Secretary11 the reason for such grant of preferential right to the riparian or
littoral owner, thus:

Now, then, is there any justification for giving to the littoral owner the preferential right to lease the foreshore land abutting on
his land?

That rule in paragraph 32 is in consonance with Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 which provides that, while
lands added to the shore by accretions and alluvial deposits caused by the action of the sea form part of the public domain,
such lands, "when they are no longer washed by the waters of the sea and are not necessary for purposes of public utility, or
for the established [sic] of special industries, or for the coast guard service," shall be declared by the Government "to be the
property of the owners of the estates adjacent thereto and as increment thereof."

In other words, article 4 recognizes the preferential right of the littoral owner (riparian according to paragraph 32) to the
foreshore land formed by accretions or alluvial deposits due to the action of the sea.

The reason for that preferential right is the same as the justification for giving accretions to the riparian owner, which is that
accretion compensates the riparian owner for the diminutions which his land suffers by reason of the destructive force of the
waters. So, in the case of littoral lands, he who loses by the encroachments of the sea should gain by its
recession.12 (Citations omitted)

In this case, Cantoja committed fraud when he misrepresented himself as the riparian or littoral owner in his application for
the foreshore lease. Under stipulation no. 15 of the Foreshore Lease Agreement, any fraud or misrepresentation committed
by the applicant is a ground for cancellation or rescission of the Foreshore Lease Agreement.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 24 January 2005 and the Resolution dated 12 May
2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76661.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 182908               August 6, 2014

HEIRS OF FRANCISCO I. NARVASA, SR., and HEIRS OF PETRA IMBORNAL and PEDRO FERRER, represented by
their Attorney-in-Fact, MRS. REMEDIOS B. NARVASA-REGACHO, Petitioners,
vs.
EMILIANA, VICTORIANO, FELIPE, MA TEO, RAYMUNDO, MARIA, and EDUARDO, all surnamed
IMBORNAL, Respondents.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari  are the Decision  dated November 28, 2006 and the Resolution  dated May 7,
1 2 3

2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 57618 which reversed and set aside the Decision  dated August 20,
4

1996 of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch 44 (RTC) in Civil Case No. D-6978, declared (a) the descendants
of Ciriaco Abrio  as the exclusive owners of the Motherland covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 1462,  (b) the
5 6

descendants of respondent Victoriano Imbornal (respondent Victoriano) as the exclusive owners of the first accretion (First
Accretion) covered by OCT No. P-318,  and (c) the descendants of Pablo Imbornal (Pablo) as the exclusive owners of the
7

second accretion (Second Accretion) covered by OCT No. 21481,  and dismissed the complaint and counterclaim in all other
8

respects for lack of merit.

The Facts

Basilia Imbornal+ (Basilia) had four (4) children, namely, Alejandra, Balbina, Catalina, and Pablo.Francisco I. Narvasa,
Sr.  (Francisco) and Pedro Ferrer (Pedro) were the children  of Alejandra, while petitioner Petra Imbornal (Petra) was the
9 10

daughter of Balbina.  Petitionersare the heirs and successors-in-interest of Francisco, Pedro, and Petra (Francisco, et al.).
11

On the other hand, respondentsEmiliana, Victoriano, Felipe, Mateo, Raymundo, Maria, and Eduardo, all surnamed Imbornal,
are the descendants of Pablo. 12

During her lifetime, Basilia owned a parcel of land situated at Sabangan, Barangay Nibaliw West, San Fabian, Pangasinan
with an area of 4,144 square meters (sq. m.), more or less (Sabangan property), which she conveyed to her three (3)
daughters Balbina, Alejandra, and Catalina (Imbornal sisters) sometime in 1920. 13

Meanwhile, Catalina’s husband, Ciriaco Abrio (Ciriaco), applied for and was granted a homestead patent over a 31,367-sq.
m. riparian land (Motherland) adjacent to the Cayanga River in San Fabian, Pangasinan.  He was eventually awarded
14

Homestead Patent No. 24991  therefor, and, on December 5, 1933, OCT No. 1462 was issued in his name. Later, or on
15

May 10, 1973, OCT No. 1462 was cancelled, and Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 101495  was issued in the name of
16

Ciriaco’s heirs, namely: Margarita Mejia; Rodrigo Abrio, marriedto Rosita Corpuz; Antonio Abrio, married to Crisenta Corpuz;
Remedios Abrio, married to Leopoldo Corpuz; Pepito Abrio; Dominador Abrio; Francisca Abrio; Violeta Abrio; and Perla
Abrio (Heirs of Ciriaco).

Ciriaco and his heirs had since occupied the northern portionof the Motherland, while respondents occupied the southern
portion.
17

Sometime in 1949, the First Accretion, approximately 59,772 sq. m. in area, adjoined the southern portion of the Motherland.
On August 15, 1952, OCT No. P-318 was issued in thename of respondent Victoriano, married to Esperanza Narvarte,
covering the First Accretion.  Decades later, or in 1971, the Second Accretion, which had an area of 32,307 sq. m., more or
18

less, abutted the First Accretion on its southern portion.  On November 10, 1978, OCT No. 21481 was issued in the names
19

of all the respondents covering the Second Accretion.

Claiming rights over the entire Motherland, Francisco, et al., as the children of Alejandra and Balbina, filed on February
27,1984 an Amended Complaint  for reconveyance, partition,and/or damages against respondents, docketed as Civil Case
20

No. D-6978. They anchored their claim on the allegation that Ciriaco, with the help of his wifeCatalina, urged Balbina and
Alejandra to sell the Sabangan property, and that Ciriaco used the proceeds therefrom to fund his then-pending homestead
patent application over the Motherland. In return, Ciriaco agreed that once his homestead patent is approved, he will be
deemed to be holding the Motherland – which now included both accretions – in trust for the Imbornal sisters. 21

Likewise, Francisco, et al.alleged that through deceit, fraud, falsehood, and misrepresentation, respondent Victoriano, with
respect to the First Accretion, and the respondents collectively, with regard to the Second Accretion, had illegally registered
the said accretions in their names, notwithstanding the fact that they werenot the riparian owners (as they did not own the
Motherland to which the accretions merely formed adjacent to). In this relation, Francisco, et al. explained that they did not
assert their inheritance claims over the Motherland and the two (2) accretions because they respected respondents’ rights,
until they discovered in 1983 that respondents have repudiated their (Francisco, et al.’s) shares thereon.  Thus, bewailing
22

that respondents have refused them their rights not only with respect to the Motherland, but also to the subsequent
accretions, Francisco, et al. prayed for the reconveyance ofsaid properties, or, in the alternative, the payment of their value,
as well as the award of moral damages in the amount of ₱100,000.00, actual damages in the amount of ₱150,000.00,
including attorney’s fees and other costs.23

In their Amended Answer dated March 5, 1984,  respondents contended that: (a) the Amended Complaint statedno cause of
24

action against them, having failed to clearly and precisely describe the disputed properties and specify the transgressions
they have allegedly committed; (b) the action was barred by prescription; and (c) that the properties sought to be
reconveyed and partitioned are not the properties of their predecessors-ininterest but, instead, are covered by Torrens
certificates of titles, free from any encumbrance, and declared for taxation purposes in their names. In this regard,
respondents prayed that the Amended Complaint be dismissed and that Francisco, et al.be held liable for the payment of
moral damages, attorney’s fees, and costs of suit in their favor.

During trial, it was established from the testimonies of the parties that the Motherland was eventually sold bythe Heirs of
Ciriaco to a certain Gregorio de Vera (de Vera), and thatsaid heirs and deVera were not impleaded as parties in this case. 25

The RTC Ruling

On August 20, 1996, the RTC rendered a Decision  in favor of Francisco, et al. and thereby directed respondents to: (a)
26

reconvey to Francisco, et al. their respective portions in the Motherland and in the accretions thereon, or their pecuniary
equivalent; and (b) pay actual damages in the amount of ₱100,000.00, moral damages in the amount of ₱100,000.00, and
attorney’s fees in the sum of ₱10,000.00, as well as costs of suit.

The RTC found that the factual circumstances surrounding the present case showed that an implied trust existed between
Ciriaco and the Imbornal sisters with respect to the Motherland.  It gave probative weight to Francisco, et al.’s allegation that
27

the Sabangan property, inherited by the Imbornal sisters from their mother, Basilia, was sold in order to help Ciriaco raise
funds for his then-pending homesteadpatent application. In exchange therefor, Ciriaco agreed that he shall hold the
Motherland in trust for them once his homestead patent application had been approved. As Ciriaco was only able to acquire
the Motherland subject of the homestead patent through the proceeds realized from the sale of the Sabangan property, the
Imbornal sisters and, consequently, Francisco, et al. (as the children of Alejandra and Balbina) are entitled to their
proportionate shares over the Motherland, notwithstanding the undisputed possession of respondents over its southern
portion since 1926.28

With respect to the accretions thatformed adjacent to the Motherland, the RTC ruled that the owner of the Motherland is
likewise the owner of the said accretions. Considering that the Imbornal sisters have become proportionate owners of the
Motherland by virtue of the implied trust created between them and Ciriaco, they (Imbornal sisters) and their heirs are also
entitled to the ownership of said accretions despite the fact that respondents were able to register them in their names.

Dissatisfied with the RTC’s ruling, respondents elevated the matter on appeal to the CA.

The CA Ruling

On November 28, 2006, the CA rendered a Decision  reversing and setting aside the RTC Decision and entering a new one
29

declaring: (a) the descendants of Ciriaco as the exclusive owners of the Motherland; (b) the descendants of respondent
Victoriano asthe exclusive owners of the First Accretion; and (c) the descendants of Pablo (i.e., respondents collectively) as
the exclusive owners of the Second Accretion.

With respect to the Motherland, the CA found that Ciriaco alone was awarded a homestead patent, which later became the
basis for the issuance of a Torrens certificate of title in his name; as such, saidcertificate of title cannot be attacked
collaterally through an action for reconveyance filed by his wife’s (Catalina’s) relatives (i.e., Francisco, et al.being the
children of Alejandra and Balbina, who, in turn, are the sisters of Catalina). The CA further observed that the homestead
patent was not aninheritance of Catalina; instead, it was awarded by the government to Ciriaco after having fully satisfied
the stringent requirements set forth under Commonwealth Act No. 141,  as amended,  and his title thereto had already
30 31

become indefeasible.  Consequently, since the entire Motherland was titled in Ciriaco’s name, his descendants should be
32

regarded as the absolute owners thereof.

On the other hand, with regard to the disputed accretions, the CA ruled that respondents – i.e., respondent Victoriano with
respect to the First Accretion, and all the respondents withrespect to the Second Accretion – need not be the owners of the
Motherland in order to acquire them by acquisitive prescription. Considering that accretions are not automatically registered
in the name of the riparianowner and are, therefore, subject to acquisitive prescription by third persons, any occupant may
apply for their registration. In this case, the CA found that respondents have acquired title to the subject accretions by
prescription,  considering that they have been in continuous possession and enjoyment of the First Accretion in the concept
33

of an owner since 1949 (when the First Accretion was formed), which resulted in the issuance of a certificate of title in the
name of respondent Victoriano covering the same. Accordingly, they have also become the riparian owners of the Second
Accretion, and given thatthey have caused the issuance of OCT No. 21481 in their names over the said Accretion, they have
also become the absolute ownersthereof. Since Francisco, et al. took no action to protect their purported interests over the
disputed accretions, the respondents’ titles over the same had already become indefeasible, to the exclusion of Francisco,
et al.
34

At odds with the CA’s disposition, Francisco et al. filed a motion for reconsideration which was, however,denied by the CA in
a Resolution  dated May 7, 2008, hence, this petition taken by the latter’s heirs as their successors-in-interest.
35

The Issue Before the Court

The issue to be resolved by the Court is whether or not the CA erred in declaring that: (a) the descendants of Ciriaco are the
exclusive owners of the Motherland; (b) the descendants of respondent Victoriano are the exclusive owners of the First
Accretion; and (c) the descendants of Pablo (respondents collectively) are the exclusive owners of the Second Accretion on
the basis of the following grounds: (a) prescription of the reconveyance action, which was duly raised as anaffirmative
defense in the Amended Answer, and (b) the existence of an implied trust between the Imbornal sisters and Ciriaco.

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is bereft of merit.

A. Procedural Matter: Issue of Prescription.

At the outset, the Court finds that the causes of action pertaining to the Motherland and the First Accretion are barred by
prescription.

An action for reconveyance is one that seeks to transfer property, wrongfully registered by another, to its rightful and legal
owner.  Thus, reconveyance is a remedy granted only tothe owner of the property alleged to be erroneously titled in
36

another’s name. 37

As the records would show, the Amended Complaint filed by petitioners’ predecessors-in-interest, Francisco, et al. is for the
reconveyance of their purported shares or portions in the following properties: (a) the Motherland, originally covered by OCT
No. 1462 in the name of Ciriaco; (b) the First Accretion, originally covered by OCT No. P-318 in the name of respondent
Victoriano; and (c) the Second Accretion, covered by OCT No. 21481 in the name of all respondents. To recount, Francisco,
et al. asserted co-ownership over the Motherland, alleging that Ciriaco agreed to hold the same in trustfor their
predecessors-in-interest Alejandra and Balbina upon issuance of the title in his name. Likewise, they alleged that
respondents acquired the First and Second Accretions by means of fraudand deceit.

When property is registered in another’s name, an implied or constructive trust is created by law in favor of the true
owner.  Article 1456 of the Civil Code provides that a person acquiring property through fraud becomes, by operation of law,
38

a trustee ofan implied trust for the benefit of the real owner of the property. An action for reconveyance based on an implied
trust prescribes in ten (10) years, reckoned from the date of registration of the deed or the date ofissuance of the certificate
of title over the property,  if the plaintiff is not in possession. However, if the plaintiff is in possession of the property, the
39

action is imprescriptible. As held in the case of Lasquite v. Victory Hills, Inc.:

40

An action for reconveyance based on an implied trust prescribes in 10 years. The reference point of the 10-yearprescriptive
period is the date of registration of the deed or the issuance of the title. The prescriptive period applies only if there is an
actual need to reconvey the property as when the plaintiff is not in possession of the property. However, if the plaintiff, as the
realowner of the property also remains in possession of the property, the prescriptive period to recover title and possession
of the property does not run against him. In such a case, an action for reconveyance, if nonetheless filed, would be in the
nature of a suit for quieting of title, an action that is imprescriptible.  (Emphases supplied)
41

Based on the foregoing, Francisco, et al. had then a period of ten (10) years from the registration of the respective titles
covering the disputed properties within which to file their action for reconveyance, taking into account the fact that they were
never in possessionof the said properties. Hence, with respect tothe Motherland covered by OCT No. 1462 issued on
December 5, 1933 in the name of Ciriaco, an action for reconveyance therefor should have been filed until December 5,
1943; with respect to the First Accretion covered by OCT No. P-318 issued on August 15, 1952in the name of respondent
Victoriano, an action of the same nature should have been filed untilAugust 15, 1962; and, finally, with respect to the Second
Accretion covered by OCT No. 21481 issued on November 10, 1978in the name of the respondents, a suit for reconveyance
therefor should have been filed until November 10, 1988.

A judicious perusal of the records, however, will show that the Amended Complaint  covering all three (3) disputed
42

properties was filed only on February 27, 1984. As such, it was filed way beyond the 10-year reglementary period within
which to seek the reconveyance of two (2) of these properties, namely, the Motherland and the First Accretion, with only the
reconveyance action with respect to the Second Accretion having been seasonably filed. Thus, considering thatrespondents
raised prescription as a defense in their Amended Answer,  the Amended Complaint with respect to the Motherland and the
43

First Accretion ought to have beendismissed based on the said ground, with only the cause of action pertaining to the
Second Accretion surviving. As will be, however, discussed below, the entirety of the Amended Complaint, including the
aforesaid surviving cause of action, would falter on its substantive merits since the existence of the implied trust asserted in
this case had not been established. In effect, the said complaint is completely dismissible.

B. Substantive Matter: Existence of an Implied Trust.

The main thrust of Francisco, et al.’s Amended Complaint is that an implied trust had arisen between the Imbornal sisters,
on the one hand, and Ciriaco, on the other, with respect to the Motherland. This implied trust is anchored on their allegation
that the proceeds from the sale of the Sabangan property – an inheritance of their predecessors, the Imbornal sisters – were
used for the then-pending homestead application filed by Ciriaco over the Motherland. As such, Francisco, et al. claim that
they are, effectively, coowners of the Motherland together with Ciriaco’s heirs.

An implied trust arises, not from any presumed intention of the parties, but by operation of law in order to satisfy the
demands of justice and equity and to protect against unfair dealing or downright fraud.  To reiterate, Article 1456 of the Civil
44

Code states that "[i]f property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a
trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes."

The burden of proving the existence ofa trust is on the party asserting its existence, and such proof must be clear and
satisfactorily show the existence of the trust and its elements.  While implied trusts may be proven by oral evidence, the
45

evidence must be trustworthy and received by the courts with extreme caution, and should not be made to rest on loose,
equivocal or indefinite declarations. Trustworthy evidence is required because oral evidence can easily be fabricated. 46

In this case, it cannot be said, merely on the basis of the oral evidence offered by Francisco, et al., that the Motherland had
been either mistakenly or fraudulently registered in favor of Ciriaco. Accordingly, it cannot be said either that he was merely
a trustee of an implied trust holding the Motherland for the benefit of the Imbornal sisters or their heirs.

As the CA had aptly pointed out,  a homestead patent award requires proof that the applicant meets the stringent
47

conditions  set forth under Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, which includes actual possession, cultivation, and
48

improvement of the homestead. It must be presumed, therefore, that Ciriaco underwent the rigid process and duly satisfied
the strict conditions necessary for the grant of his homestead patent application. As such, it is highly implausible thatthe
Motherland had been acquired and registered by mistake or through fraudas would create an implied trust between the
Imbornal sisters and Ciriaco, especially considering the dearth of evidence showing that the Imbornal sisters entered into the
possession of the Motherland, or a portion thereof, orasserted any right over the same at any point during their lifetime.
Hence, when OCT No. 1462 covering the Motherland was issued in his name pursuant to Homestead Patent No. 24991 on
December 15, 1933, Ciriaco’s titleto the Motherland had become indefeasible. It bears to stress that the proceedings for
land registration that led to the issuance of Homestead Patent No. 24991 and eventually, OCT No. 1462 in Ciriaco’s name
are presumptively regular and proper,  which presumption has not been overcome by the evidence presented by Francisco,
49

et al.

In this light, the Court cannot fully accept and accord evidentiary value to the oral testimony offered by Francisco, et al. on
the alleged verbal agreement between their predecessors, the Imbornal sisters, and Ciriaco with respect to the Motherland.
Weighed against the presumed regularity of the award of the homestead patent to Ciriaco and the lack of evidence showing
that the same was acquired and registered by mistake or through fraud, the oral evidence of Francisco, et al.would not
effectively establish their claims of ownership. It has been held that oral testimony as to a certain fact, depending as it does
exclusively on human memory, is not as reliable as written or documentary evidence,  especially since the purported
50

agreement transpired decades ago, or in the 1920s. Hence, with respect to the Motherland, the CA did not err in holding that
Ciriaco and his heirs are the owners thereof, without prejudice to the rights of any subsequent purchasers for value of the
said property.

Consequently, as Francisco, et al.failed to prove their ownership rights over the Motherland, their cause of action with
respect to the First Accretion and, necessarily, the Second Accretion, must likewise fail. A further exposition is apropos.

Article 457 of the Civil Code states the rule on accretion as follows: "[t]o the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers
belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters." Relative thereto, in Cantoja
v. Lim,  the Court, citing paragraph 32 of the Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1 dated April 30, 1936, in relation to Article 4
51

of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, as well as related jurisprudence on the matter, elucidated on the preferential right of
the riparian owner over the land formed by accretions, viz.:

Being the owner of the land adjoining the foreshore area, respondent is the riparian or littoralowner who has preferential
right to lease the foreshore area as provided under paragraph 32 of the Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1, dated 30 April
1936, which reads:

32. Preference of Riparian Owner. – The owner of the property adjoining foreshore lands, marshylands or lands covered
with water bordering upon shores or banks of navigable lakes or rivers, shall be given preference to apply for such lands
adjoining his property as may not be needed for the public service, subject to the laws and regulations governing lands of
this nature, provided that he applies therefor within sixty (60) days from the date he receives a communication from the
Director of Lands advising him of his preferential right.

The Court explained in Santulan v. The Executive Secretary[170 Phil. 567; 80 SCRA 548 (1977)] the reason for such grant
of preferential right to the riparian or littoral owner, thus:

Now, then, is there any justification for giving to the littoral owner the preferential right to lease the foreshore land abutting on
his land?

That rule in paragraph 32 is in consonance with Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 which provides that, while
lands added to the shore by accretions and alluvial deposits caused by the action of the sea form part of the public domain,
such lands, "when they are no longer washed by the waters of the sea and are not necessary for purposes of public utility, or
for the established [sic] of special industries, or for the coast guard service, "shall be declared by the Government "to be the
property of the owners of the estates adjacent thereto and as increment thereof."

In other words, article 4 recognizes the preferential right of the littoral owner (riparian according to paragraph 32) to the
foreshore land formed by accretionsor alluvial deposits due to the action of the sea. 1âwphi1

The reason for that preferential right is the same as the justification for giving accretions to the riparianowner, which is that
accretion compensates the riparian owner for the diminutions which his land suffers by reason of the destructive force of the
waters. So, in the case of littoral lands, he who loses by the encroachments of the sea should gain by its recession. 52

Accordingly, therefore, alluvial deposits along the banks of a creek or a river do not form part of the public domain as the
alluvial property automatically belongs to the owner of the estate to which it may have been added. The only restriction
provided for by law is that the owner of the adjoining property must register the same under the Torrens system; otherwise,
the alluvial property may be subject to acquisition through prescription by third persons. 53

In this case, Francisco, et al. and, now, their heirs, i.e., herein petitioners,. are not the riparian owners of the Motherland to
which the First Accretion had .attached, hence, they cannot assert ownership over the First Accretion. Consequently, as the
Second Accretion had merely attached to the First Accretion, they also have no right over the Second Accretion. Neither
were they able to show that they acquired these properties through prescription as it was ·not established that they were in
possession of any of them. Therefore, whether through accretion or, independently, through prescription, the discernible
conclusion is that Francisco et al. and/or petitioners' claim of title over the First and Second Accretions had not been
substantiated, and, as a result, said properties cannot be reconveyed in their favor. This is especially so since on the other
end of the fray lie respondents armed with a certificate of title in their names covering the First and Second Accretions
coupled with their possession thereof, both of which give rise to the superior credibility of their own claim. Hence, petitioners'
action for reconveyan.ce with respect to both accretions must altogether fail.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated November 28, 2006 and the Resolution dated May 7, 2008 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 57618 are hereby AFFIRMED, and a new judgment is entered DISMISSING the
Amended Complaint dated February 27, 1984 filed in said case.

SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 142595. October 15, 2003.]

RACHEL C. CELESTIAL, Petitioner, v. JESSE CACHOPERO, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

In the instant appeal by petition for review on certiorari, 1 petitioner Rachel Cachopero Celestial assails the
February 15, 1999 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 45927, "Jesse C. Cachopero v.
Regional Executive Director of DENR, Region XII and Rachel C. Celestial," which reversed and set aside the
Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Midsayap, Cotabato, Branch 18 dismissing respondent’s petition
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, and mandated the Regional Executive Director of the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Region XII to process the Miscellaneous Sales Application
(MSA) of respondent Jesse Cachopero in DENR Claim No. XII-050-90 to which petitioner filed a protest. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Respondent, brother of petitioner, filed an MSA (Plan No. (XII-6)-1669) with the Bureau of Lands covering a
415 square meter parcel of land located at Barrio 8, Midsayap, Cotabato and formerly part of the Salunayan
Creek in Katingawan, Midsayap.

In his MSA, respondent alleged that he had, since 1968, been occupying the land whereon he built a
residential house and introduced other improvements.

Petitioner filed a protest against respondent’s MSA, claiming preferential right over the land subject thereof
since it is adjacent to, and is the only outlet from, her residential house situated at Lot No. 2586-G-28 (LRC)
Psd-105462, Poblacion 8, Midsayap.

Following an ocular inspection, the Bureau of Lands, finding the land subject of respondent’s MSA to be
outside the commerce of man, dismissed petitioner’s protest and denied respondent’s MSA, to wit: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

In the ocular inspection, it was verified that the land in dispute with an area of 415 square meters was
formerly a part of the Salunayan Creek that became dry as a result of the construction of an irrigation canal
by the National Irrigation Administration. However, it was certified by Project Engineer Reynaldo Abeto of
the said office in his certification dated May 19, 1982, that only a portion of the same containing an area of
59.40 square meters more or less was taken as part of the National Irrigation Administration service road. It
was also ascertained that the P20,000.00 residential house wherein Jesse Cachopero and his family are
living is not within the 69-meters width of the national highway. However, per the certification of the local
office of the District Engineer for Public Works and Highways, the government may need the area where the
house stands for expansion in the future. Moreover, it was also certified by the Office of Municipal Mayor
that the whole area covered by the miscellaneous sales application of Jesse Cachopero is needed by the
municipal government for future public improvements.

From the foregoing facts, it is clear that the subject land is outside the commerce of man and therefore, not
susceptible of private acquisition under the provision of the Public Land Act. However, in keeping with the
policy of our compassionate society in tilting the balance of social forces by favoring the disadvantaged in
life, we may allow Jesse Cachopero to temporarily occupy the land in dispute, after excluding therefrom the
portion needed for the existing right of way being claimed by Rachel Celestial to be [the] only adequate
outlet to the public highway until such time that the land is needed by the government for expansion of the
road.

WHEREFORE, it is ordered that this case, be, as hereby it is, dismissed and this case (sic), dropped from the
records. The Miscellaneous Sales Application (New) of Jesse Cachopero is hereby rejected and in lieu
thereof, he shall file a revocable permit application for the land in question after excluding from the southern
part of the land the area of five (5) meters for right of way purposes as shown in the sketch drawn at the
back of this order. The segregation survey of the area shall be at the pro-rata expense of the parties.

SO ORDERED. 2 (Emphasis and Italics supplied)

Petitioner thereafter instituted an action for ejectment against respondent and his wife before the Municipal
Trial Court of Midsayap, Cotabato, docketed as Civil Case No. 711. A judgment based on a compromise was
rendered in said case under the following terms and conditions: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

That Spouses Jesse Cachopero and Bema Cachopero, defendants in this case, are going to vacate the
premises in question and transfer the old house subject of this ejectment case at the back of Lot No. 2586-
G-28 (LRC) Psd-105462, located at 8, Midsayap, Cotabato, within eight (8) months from today, but not later
than April 30, 1990;

x           x           x

That plaintiff is willing to give a two (2)-meter wide exit alley on the eastern portion of said lot as road-
right-of-way up to the point of the NIA road on the west of Lot No. 2586-G-28, (LRC) Psd-105462;

That defendants hereby promise to remove all their improvements introduced fronting the residence of the
plaintiff before August 31, 1989; and the plaintiff shall likewise remove all her existing improvements on the
same area;

x       x       x 3 (Emphasis supplied)

Subsequently or on May 21, 1991, respondent filed another MSA with the DENR Regional Office of Cotabato
involving a portion of the same lot subject of his first MSA, covering an area of 334 square meters, more or
less (the subject land), and docketed as DENR-XII-Claim No. 050-90. This time, the MSA was supported by
a certification 4 dated January 9, 1989 issued by the Office of the Mayor of Midsayap and an Indorsement 5
dated January 16, 1989 by the District Engineer of the Department of Public Works and Highways stating
that the subject land is suitable for residential purposes and no longer needed by the municipal government.

Petitioner likewise filed a protest against her brother-respondent’s second MSA, alleging a preferential right
over the subject land, she being the adjacent and riparian owner, and maintaining that it is her only access
to the national highway. She thus reiterated her demand for a five (5)-meter road right of way through the
land.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

After another investigation of the subject land, DENR Regional Executive Director Macorro Macumbal issued
an Order dated February 17, 1994 stating that it was suitable for residential purposes but that, in light of
the conflicting interest of the parties, it be sold at public auction. Respondent’s second MSA was accordingly
dismissed, viz: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

In the ocular investigation of the premises, it was established that the said property is a dried bed of
Salunayan Creek resulting from the construction of the irrigation canal by the National Irrigation
Administration; that it is suitable for residential purpose . . .

x           x           x

It is evident that under the law, property of the public domain situated within the first (1st) to fourth class
municipalities are disposable by sales only. Since municipality of Midsayap, Cotabato is classified as third
(3rd) class municipality and the property in dispute, Lot no. (MSA-XII-6)-1669, is situated in the poblacion
of Midsayap, Cotabato, and considering the conflicting interest of the herein parties, it is therefore equitable
to dispose the same by sale at a public auction pursuant to Section 67, C.A. No. 141, as amended, pertinent
clause of which provides: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

. . . sale shall be made through oral bidding; and adjudication shall be made to the highest bidder, . . .

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, it is ordered as hereby is ordered that the instant protest is
dismissed and dropped from the records, and the Miscellaneous Sales Application (New) of Jesse C.
Cachopero is rejected and returned unrecorded. Accordingly, the CENR Officer of CENRO XII-4B shall cause
the segregation survey of a portion of five (5) meters in width running parallel to line point C-1 of the
approved survey plan (MSA-XII-6)-1669, sketch is shown at the dorsal side hereof, as a permanent
easement and access road for the occupants of Lot No. 2386-G-28, (LRC) Psd-105462 to the national
highway. Thereafter, and pursuant to paragraph G.2.3 of Department Administrative Order No. 38, Series of
1990, the CENRO XII 4B shall dispose the remaining area of the lot in question through oral bidding.

SO ORDERED." 6 (Emphasis and Italics supplied)

Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the above-said order of the DENR Regional Executive
Director, but it was denied by Order of February 27, 1995 by the OIC Regional Executive Director of Region
XII, Cotabato City in this wise:
chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

A meticulous scrutiny of the records disclosed that Civil Case No. 711 for ejectment, decided on the basis of
compromise agreement of the parties dated August 10, 1989, involved "transfer of the house from Lot No.
MSA XII-6-1669 to the litigant’s parents’ property situated at the back of protestant property, Lot No. 2586-
G-28 (LRC), Psd-105462." Whereas the issue in DENR XII Claim No. 050-90 involved the disposition of lot
no. (MSA II-6)-1669 a residential public land being exclusively vested with the Director of Lands (Sec. 4,
C.A. 141).

The two (2) meters wide exit alley provided in the compromise agreement was established by the protestant
from her private property (Lot No. 2586-G-28 (LRC), Psd-105462) for the benefit of her brother, herein
respondent, upon his transfer to their parents property at the back of Lot No. 2586-G-28 (LRC), Psd-
105462. Whereas the five (5) meters wide easement imposed on Lot No. (MSA-XII-6)-1669, a public land,
provided in the decision in DENR Claim No. 050-90 is in accordance with Article 670 of the New Civil Code . .
.

x           x           x

With all the above foregoing, we find no reversible error to reconsider our Order of February 17, 1994.

WHEREFORE, the instant motion for reconsideration is DENIED. 7

Respondent thereupon filed on April 3, 1995 with the RTC of Midsayap, Cotabato a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with preliminary mandatory injunction and temporary restraining order assailing
the Orders dated February 17, 1994 and February 27, 1995 of the DENR Regional Executive Director and
OIC Regional Executive Director of Region XII, Cotabato, attributing grave abuse of discretion in the
issuance thereof.

Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the petition, alleging lack of jurisdiction and non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies.

By Order of March 26, 1997, the RTC denied respondent’s petition for certiorari for lack of merit and non-
exhaustion of administrative remedies, as it did deny his motion for reconsideration.

The Court of Appeals, before which respondent assailed the RTC orders by petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus, granted said petition, and accordingly reversed and set aside the assailed orders of the RTC
and ordered the DENR to process the MSA of Respondent. 8

Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration 9 of the appellate court’s decision having been denied by Resolution
of March 2, 2000, 10 she lodged the present petition, alleging that the Court of Appeals acted contrary to
law and jurisprudence 1) in holding that the RTC of Midsayap had jurisdiction over respondent’s petition, the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not applicable to the instant case, and the contested
land is public land; and 2) in ordering the processing of respondent’s MSA pursuant to R.A. 730. 11

Petitioner contends that the RTC of Midsayap had no jurisdiction over respondent’s petition for certiorari as
(a) it "is in the nature of an appeal" 12 falling within the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals under Section
9(3) 13 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (B.P. 129), as amended; and (b) respondent failed to exhaust
administrative remedies when he failed to appeal the questioned Orders to the Secretary of Environment
and Natural Resources. 14
Petitioner’s petition fails. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Petitioner has apparently confused the separate and distinct remedies of an appeal (i.e. through a petition
for review of a decision of a quasi judicial agency under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court) and a special civil
action for certiorari (i.e. through a petition for review under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court). In Silverio v.
Court of Appeals, 15 this Court, speaking through then Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee, distinguished
between these two modes of judicial review as follows: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

The provisions of the Rules of Court permit an aggrieved party, in the general types of cases, to take a
cause and apply for relief to the appellate courts by way of either of two distinctly different and dissimilar
modes — through the broad process of appeal or the limited special civil action of certiorari. An appeal
brings up for review errors of judgment committed by a court with jurisdiction over the subject of the suit
and the persons of the parties or any such error committed by the court in the exercise of its jurisdiction
amounting to nothing more than an error of judgment. On the other hand, the writ of certiorari issues for
the correction of errors of jurisdiction only or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. The writ of certiorari "cannot legally be used for any other purpose." In terms of its function, the
writ of certiorari serves "to keep an inferior court within the bounds of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from
committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction" or to relieve parties from
arbitrary acts of courts — acts which courts have no power or authority in law to perform. 16 (Italics,
emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Concomitantly, appellate jurisdiction is separate and distinct from the jurisdiction to issue the prerogative
writ of certiorari. An appellate jurisdiction refers to a process which is a continuation of the original suit and
not a commencement of a new action. In contrast, to invoke a court’s jurisdiction to issue the writ
of certiorari requires the commencement of a new and original action therefor, independent of the
proceedings which gave rise to the questioned decision or order. 17 As correctly held by the Court of
Appeals, 18 the RTCs have concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court over
original petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus 19 under Section 21 20 of B.P. 129.

A perusal of respondent’s Petition dated April 3, 1995 filed before the RTC clearly shows that it alleged that
the DENR Regional Executive Director and OIC Regional Executive Director acted with "grave abuse of
discretion and without or in excess of jurisdiction amounting to lack of jurisdiction" when they issued the
questioned Orders dated February 17, 1994 and February 27, 1995. Evidently, respondent sought a judicial
review of the questioned Orders through a special civil action for certiorari which, as aforementioned, was
within the jurisdiction of the RTC of Midsayap, Cotabato. 21

Additionally, this Court finds no reason to disturb the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the instant case falls
under the recognized exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies, to wit: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

The rule of exhaustion of administrative remedies is inapplicable if it should appear that an irreparable injury
or damage will be suffered by a party if he should await, before taking court action, the final action of the
administrative official concerned on the matter as a result of a patently illegal order (Vivo v. Cloribel, 18
SCRA 713; De Lara v. Cloribel, 14 SCRA 269); or where appeal would not prove to be speedy and adequate
remedy. 22

True, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies calls for resort first to the appropriate
administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under their jurisdiction before the same
may be elevated to the courts of justice for review, and non-observance thereof is a ground for the dismissal
of the complaint, 23 the rationale being: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

The thrust of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is that the courts must allow the
administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized
areas of their respective competence. It is presumed that an administrative agency, if afforded an
opportunity to pass upon a matter, will decide the same correctly, or correct any previous error committed
in its forum. Furthermore, reasons of law, comity and convenience prevent the courts from entertaining
cases proper for determination by administrative agencies. Hence, premature resort to the courts
necessarily becomes fatal to the cause of action of the petitioner. 24

However, this requirement of prior exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute, there being
instances when it may be dispensed with and judicial action may be validly resorted to immediately, among
which are: 1) when the question raised is purely legal; 2) when the administrative body is in estoppel; 3)
when the act complained of is patently illegal; 4) when there is urgent need for judicial intervention; 5)
when the claim involved is small; 6) when irreparable damage will be suffered; 7) when there is no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy; 8) when strong public interest is involved; and 9) in quo warranto
proceedings.25 cralaw:red

Hence, where the act complained of is patently illegal since the administrative body acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with such grave abuse of discretion as to be tantamount to lack of jurisdiction, as
was alleged in respondent’s petition before the RTC, prior exhaustion of administrative remedies is not
required and resort to the courts through a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is permitted: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

We hold that it was an error for the court a quo to rule that the petitioners should have exhausted its
remedy of appeal from the orders denying their application for waiver/suspension to the Board of Trustees
and thereafter to the Court of Appeals pursuant to the Rules. Certiorari is an appropriate remedy to question
the validity of the challenged issuances of the HDMF which are alleged to have been issued with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

Moreover, among the accepted exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies are: (1)
where the question in dispute is purely a legal one; and (2) where the controverted act is patently illegal or
was performed without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction. Moreover, while certiorari as a remedy may
not be used as a substitute for an appeal, especially for a lost appeal, this rule should not be strictly
enforced if the petition is genuinely meritorious. It has been said that where the rigid application of the rules
would frustrate substantial justice, or bar the vindication of a legitimate grievance, the courts are justified in
exempting a particular case from the operation of the rules. 26 (Emphasis supplied)

To justify the issuance of the writ of certiorari, however, it must be clearly shown that there is a patent and
grave abuse of discretion amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. 27

The crux of the case at bar is, therefore, whether the DENR Regional Executive Director and OIC Regional
Director acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the
questioned Orders dated February 17, 1994 and February 27, 1995, respectively. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

In resolving respondent’s second MSA and petitioner’s protest thereto, the DENR Regional Executive
Director, after considering the conflicting interest of the parties, found it equitable to resolve the same by
directing the sale of the subject land at public auction pursuant to Section 67, C.A. No. 141, as amended.

Section 67 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as "The Public Land Act," provides the
procedure for the disposition of lands of the public domain which are open to disposition or concession and
intended to be used for residential, commercial, industrial or other productive purposes other than
agricultural, to wit: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

SEC. 67. The lease or sale shall be made through oral bidding; and adjudication shall be made to the highest
bidder. However, where an applicant has made improvements on the land by virtue of a permit issued to
him by competent authority, the sale or lease shall be made by sealed bidding as prescribed in Section
twenty-six of this Act, the provisions of which shall be applied wherever applicable. If all or part of the lots
remain unleased or unsold, the Director of Lands shall from time to time announce in the Official Gazette or
in any other newspapers of general circulation, the lease or sale of those lots, if necessary. (Emphasis
supplied)

With the enactment of Republic Act No. 730 28 on June 18, 1952, however, an exception to the foregoing
procedure was created by authorizing disposition of lands of the public domain by private sale, instead of
bidding, provided that: (1) the applicant has in his favor the conditions specified therein and (2) the area
applied for is not more than 1,000 square meters. 29 The pertinent provision of R.A. 730 thus provides: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

SEC. 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of Sections 61 and 67 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended
by Republic Act No. 293, any Filipino citizen of legal age who is not the owner of a home lot in the
municipality or city in which he resides and who has in good faith established his residence on a parcel of
the public land of the Republic of the Philippines which is not needed for the public service, shall be given
preference to purchase at a private sale of which reasonable notice shall be given to him not more than one
thousand square meters at a price to be fixed by the Director of Lands with the approval of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources. It shall be an essential condition of this sale that the occupant has
constructed his house on the land and actually resided therein. Ten percent of the purchase price shall be
paid upon the approval of the sale and the balance may be paid in full, or in ten equal annual installments.

SEC. 2. Land acquired under the provisions of this Act shall not be subject to any restrictions against
encumbrance or alienation before and after the issuance of the patents thereon. 30

SEC. 3. The provisions of the Public Land Act with respect to the sale of lands for residential purposes which
are not inconsistent herewith shall be applicable.

SEC. 4. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Approved, June 18, 1952. (Emphasis supplied)

Given the foregoing provisions of R.A. 730 which took effect on June 18, 1952, and the DENR Regional
Executive Director’s February 17, 1994 finding that the subject land was "suitable for residential purposes,"
it was incumbent upon him to determine whether the provisions of R.A. 730 were applicable to respondent’s
MSA. As held by the Court of Appeals: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Finally, petitioner contends that the DENR Regional Executive Director and OIC Regional Executive Director
gravely erred in ordering the sale of the subject lot through oral bidding applying Section 67,
Commonwealth Act No. 141 and not Republic Act 730 authorizing the sale of public land without bidding.

We agree with the petitioner.

x           x           x

Apropos is the case of Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 125 SCRA 785, ruling that: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"When public land lots of not more than 1,000 sq. ms. are used, or to be used as a residence . . . they can
be sold on private sales under the provisions of Republic Act No. 730." cralaw virtua1aw library

In Agura v. Serfino, Sr., (204 SCRA 569), the Supreme Court held that: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"R.A. 730 authorizes a sale by private sale, as an exception to the general rule that it should be by bidding,
if the area applied for does not exceed 1,000 square meters, . . ." cralaw virtua1aw library

We see no reason why these ruling should not be applied in this case which involves 415 [should have been
334] square meters only. 31

The Regional Director, however, summarily chose to apply Section 67 of the Public Land Act upon a finding
that it was more "equitable" in light of the "conflicting interest" of the parties. In his "Answer" to
respondent’s petition before the RTC, the Director justified his non-application of R.A. 730 in this wise: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

. . . Republic Act No. 730 is not applicable to the case at bar, the land being disputed, Republic Act No. 730
requisite (sic) vas not meet (sic) that for this law to apply to a particular case, the land must be in the first
place not a land in conflict. There being a pending protest for final adjudication, the said conflict continues to
exist thus an impediment to the application of Republic Act 730 32 (Emphasis supplied)

which justification he reiterated in his Opposition 33 to respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration of the RTC
decision.

The Director’s reliance on equity as basis for his action was misplaced, however. It is well-settled that
"equity follows the law." 34 Described as "justice outside legality," it is applied only in the absence of, and
never against, statutory law or legal pronouncements. 35 Where pertinent positive rules are present, they
should pre-empt and prevail over all abstract arguments based only on equity. 36

A reading of R.A. 730 (or of the Public Land Act for that matter) shows nothing therein to support the
Director’s contention that the pendency of a protest is a bar to the application of R.A. 730 to an MSA.
Indeed, that Section 1 of R.A. 730 gives a qualified applicant preference to purchase alienable public land
suitable for residential purposes implies that there may be more than one party interested in purchasing it.
virtua1 1aw library
chanrob1es
What is more, under Section 91 of the Public Land Act, it is the duty of the Director of the Lands
Management Bureau (formerly the Director of Lands) to determine whether the material facts set forth in an
MSA are true: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

SEC. 91. The statements made in the application shall be considered as essential conditions and parts of any
concession, title, or permit issued on the basis of such application, and any false statement therein or
omission of facts altering, changing, or modifying the consideration of the facts set forth in such statements,
and any subsequent modification, alteration, or change of the material facts set forth in the application shall
ipso facto produce the cancellation of the concession, title, or permit granted. It shall be the duty of the
Director of Lands, from time to time and whenever he may deem it advisable, to make the necessary
investigations for the purpose of ascertaining whether the material facts set out in the application are true,
or whether they continue to exist and are maintained and preserved in good faith, and for the purposes of
such investigation, the Director of Lands is hereby empowered to issue subpoenas and subpoenas duces
tecum and, if necessary, to obtain compulsory process from the courts. In every investigation made in
accordance with this section, the existence of bad faith, fraud, concealment, or fraudulent and illegal
modification of essential facts shall be presumed if the grantee or possessor of the land shall refuse or fail to
obey a subpoena or subpoena duces tecum lawfully issued by the Director of Lands or his authorized
delegates or agents, or shall refuse or fail to give direct and specific answers to pertinent questions, and on
the basis of such presumption, an order of cancellation may issue without further proceedings. (Emphasis
supplied)

Likewise, under Section 102 of the same Public Land Act, it is the duty of the Director of the Lands
Management Bureau to, after due hearing, verify whether the grounds of a protest or objection to an MSA
are well founded, and, if so, to cancel the MSA: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

SEC. 102. Any person, corporation, or association may file an objection under oath to any application or
concession under this Act, grounded on any reason sufficient under this Act for the denial or cancellation of
the application or the denial of the patent or grant. If, after the applicant or grantee has been given suitable
opportunity to be duly heard, the objection is found to be well founded, the Director of Lands shall deny or
cancel the application or deny patent or grant, and the person objecting shall, if qualified, be granted a prior
right of entry for a term of sixty days from the date of the notice. (Emphasis supplied)

There was thus clearly a positive duty on the part of the DENR Director to process respondent’s MSA, and to
ascertain, particularly in light of petitioner’s protest, whether respondent was qualified to purchase the
subject land at a private sale pursuant to R.A. 730. This, he did not do.

In fine, by abdicating his duty to process respondent’s MSA and summarily ordering, without factual or legal
basis, that the subject land be disposed of via oral bidding pursuant to Section 67 of the Public Land Act, the
Director acted with patent grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. As the Court
of Appeals held: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Considering that the assailed Orders of public respondent DENR Regional Executive Director applying Section
67 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 and ordering the sale of the subject lot by oral bidding are patently
erroneous, the authority of the court to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is warranted. 37

The Director’s commission of grave abuse of discretion does not, however, mean that respondent
automatically has the better right to the subject land. As mandated by law, the Director must process
respondent’s MSA, conduct an investigation, and determine whether the material facts set forth therein are
true to bring it within the coverage of R.A. 730.

A thorough investigation is all the more imperative considering that petitioner’s protest raises serious factual
issues regarding respondent’s qualification to purchase the subject land — in particular, whether he already
owns a home lot in Midsayap and whether he has, in good faith, constructed his house on the subject land
and actually resided therein. These factual issues are properly within the authority of the DENR and the Land
Management Bureau, which are tasked with carrying out the provisions of the Public Land Act and R.A. 730,
38 do determine, after both parties have been given an opportunity to fully present their evidence.

As for petitioner’s claim of ownership over the subject land, admittedly a dried-up bed of the Salunayan
Creek, based on (1) her alleged long term adverse possession and that of her predecessor-in-interest,
Marcelina Basadre, even prior to October 22, 1966, when she purchased the adjoining property from the
latter, and (2) the right of accession under Art. 370 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 and/or Article 461 of
the Civil Code, the same must fail.
Since property of public dominion is outside the commerce of man 39 and not susceptible to private
appropriation and acquisitive prescription, 40 the adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of
title in the confirmation of an imperfect title refers only to alienable or disposable portions of the public
domain. 41 It is only after the Government has declared the land to be alienable and disposable agricultural
land that the year of entry, cultivation and exclusive and adverse possession can be counted for purposes of
an imperfect title. 42

A creek, like the Salunayan Creek, is a recess or arm extending from a river and participating in the ebb and
flow of the sea. 43 As such, under Articles 420(1) 44 and 502(1) 45 of the Civil Code, the Salunayan Creek,
including its natural bed, is property of the public domain which is not susceptible to private appropriation
and acquisitive prescription. 46 And, absent any declaration by the government, that a portion of the creek
has dried-up does not, by itself, alter its inalienable character. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

This, in fact, was the very reason behind the denial of respondent’s first MSA, the District Engineer having
certified that the government may need the subject land for future expansion, and the office of the Municipal
Mayor having certified that it was needed by t he municipal government for future public improvements. 47
Consequently, it was only after the same offices subsequently certified 48 that the subject land was suitable
for residential purposes and no longer needed by the municipal government that it became alienable and
disposable. Confronted with similar factual circumstances, this Court in Bracewell v. Court of Appeals 49
held:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Clear from the above is the requirement that the applicant must prove that the land is alienable public land.
On this score, we agree with respondents that petitioner failed to show that the parcels of land subject of his
application are alienable or disposable. On the contrary, it was conclusively shown by the government that
the same were only classified as alienable or disposable on March 27, 1972. Thus, even granting that
petitioner and his predecessors-in-interest had occupied the same since 1908, he still cannot claim title
thereto by virtue of such possession since the subject parcels of land were not yet alienable land at that
time nor capable of private appropriation. The adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of title
or confirmation of an imperfect title refers only to alienable or disposable portions of the public domain. 50
(Emphasis supplied)

With respect to petitioner’s invocation of the principle of accession under either Article 370 of the Spanish
Civil Code of 1889 or Article 461 of the Civil Code, the same does not apply to vest her with ownership over
subject land.

Under Article 370 51 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 which took effect in the Philippines on December 7,
1889, 52 the beds of rivers which remain abandoned because the course of the water has naturally changed
belong to the owners of the riparian lands throughout their respective lengths. If the abandoned bed divided
estates belonging to different owners, the new dividing line shall run at equal distance therefrom. 53

When the present Civil Code took effect on August 30, 1950, 54 the foregoing rule was abandoned in favor
of the present Article 461, which provides: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

ART. 461. River beds which are abandoned through the natural change in the course of the waters ipso facto
belong to the owners whose lands are occupied by the new course in proportion to the area lost. However,
the owners of the lands adjoining the old bed shall have the right to acquire the same by paying the value
thereof, which value shall not exceed the value of the area occupied by the new bed. (Emphasis supplied)

Article 461 provides for compensation for the loss of the land occupied by the new bed since it is believed
more equitable to compensate the actual losers than to add land to those who have lost nothing. 55 Thus,
the abandoned river bed is given to the owner(s) of the land(s) onto which the river changed its course
instead of the riparian owner(s). 56

Petitioner claims that on October 22, 1966, when she purchased the property adjoining the subject land
from Marcelina Basadre, the said subject land was already a dried-up river bed such that "almost one-half
portion of the residential house . . . was so already built and is still now situated at the said dried-up portion
of the Salunayan Creek bed . . ." 57 She failed to allege, however, when the subject portion of the
Salunayan Creek dried up, a fact essential to determining whether the applicable law is Article 370 of the
Spanish Civil Code of 1889 or Article 461 of the Civil Code. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Had the disputed portion of the Salunayan Creek dried up after the present Civil Code took effect, the
subject land would clearly not belong to petitioner or her predecessor-in-interest since under the
aforementioned provision of Article 461, "river beds which are abandoned through the natural change in the
course of the waters ipso facto belong to the owners of the land occupied by the new course," and the
owners of the adjoining lots have the right to acquire them only after paying their value. 58

And both Article 370 of the Old Code and Article 461 of the present Civil Code are applicable only when"
[r]iver beds are abandoned through the natural change in the course of the waters." It is uncontroverted,
however, that, as found by both the Bureau of Lands and the DENR Regional Executive Director, the subject
land became dry as a result of the construction of an irrigation canal by the National Irrigation
Administration. Thus, in Ronquillo v. Court of Appeals, 59 this Court held:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

The law is clear and unambiguous. It leaves no room for interpretation. Article 370 applies only if there is a
natural change in the course of the waters. The rules on alluvion do not apply to man-made or artificial
accretions nor to accretions to lands that adjoin canals or esteros or artificial drainage systems. Considering
our earlier finding that the dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub was actually caused by the active
intervention of man, it follows that Article 370 does not apply to the case at bar and, hence, the Del
Rosarios cannot be entitled thereto supposedly as riparian owners.

The dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub should thus be considered as forming part of the land of the public
domain which cannot be subject to acquisition by private ownership. . . 60 (Emphasis supplied)

Furthermore, both provisions pertain to situations where there has been a change in the course of a river,
not where the river simply dries up. In the instant Petition, it is not even alleged that the Salunayan Creek
changed its course. In such a situation, commentators are of the opinion that the dry river bed remains
property of public dominion. 61

Finally, while this Court notes that petitioner offered to purchase the subject land from the government, 62
she did so through an informal letter dated August 9, 1989 63 instead of the prescribed form. By such
move, she is deemed to have acknowledged that the subject land is public land, for it would be absurd for
her to have applied for its purchase if she believed it was hers. She is thus stopped from claiming otherwise.
64

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED. cha