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PROJECT REPORT
TOPIC: IRAQ & USA WAR

SUBMITTED TO:
MAM. NAJAF ZAHRA
GROUP MEMBERS:
1. ZEESHAN TARIQ M1F17BBAM0033
2. MANAHIL BADAR M1F17BBAM0020
3. AZEEM M1F17BBAM0023
4. ALI HAMZA M1F17BBAM0025
5. UMAIR M1F17BBAM0052
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Contents
Introduction to Iraq:...............................................................................................................................4
Location of Iraq:....................................................................................................................................4
Introduction to United States of America:.............................................................................................5
Location of USA:..................................................................................................................................6
U.S invasion of Iraq in 2003..................................................................................................................6
Introduction...........................................................................................................................................6
Background...........................................................................................................................................7
History of War:......................................................................................................................................8
Invasion Planning and International and Domestic Politics (2001–2003)..............................................9
Violence, Surge, and Awakening (2005–2007)...................................................................................11
Timeline 2002-2011: Notable events in Iraq.......................................................................................13
In 2002................................................................................................................................................13
In 2003................................................................................................................................................13
In 2004................................................................................................................................................14
In 2005................................................................................................................................................14
In 2006................................................................................................................................................15
In 2007................................................................................................................................................15
In 2008................................................................................................................................................16
In 2009................................................................................................................................................16
In 2010................................................................................................................................................17
In 2011................................................................................................................................................17
The False Arguments for War:............................................................................................................18
The War and the Coalition:..................................................................................................................18
Destruction of the Iraqi State and the Breakdown of Public Order:.....................................................19
The Strange Post-War Role of the Security Council and the UN:.......................................................20
Coalition-Sponsored Militias, Commandoes, and Death Squads:........................................................21
A Free and Sovereign Iraq:..................................................................................................................22
Massive Destruction:...........................................................................................................................23
"Joint" Military Operations and Criticism by Iraqi Authorities:..........................................................24
US Rule in Iraq:...................................................................................................................................24
Attacks on Cities:................................................................................................................................25
Sealed-off Cities and Heavy Curfews..................................................................................................26
Forced Evacuation and Those Who Remain:.......................................................................................26
Cutting Off Water, Food and Electricity:.............................................................................................27
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Confinement of Journalists and Blockage of Media Coverage:...........................................................27

Massive Bombardment:.......................................................................................................................28
Urban Assault, Snipers and Violent Searches:.....................................................................................29
Attacks on Medical Facilities and Prevention of Humanitarian Assistance:........................................29
Casualties in war.................................................................................................................................30
Estimated casualties of civilians:.........................................................................................................30
Why did Bush go to war in Iraq?.........................................................................................................31
Reason behind the US invasion of Iraq:...............................................................................................33
1: Weapons of Mass Destruction.........................................................................................................34
2: A Visible Enemy.............................................................................................................................35
3: The Domino Effect..........................................................................................................................36
Causes of US Invasion in Iraq:............................................................................................................36
1: Remove Saddam’s Dictatorship.......................................................................................................36
2: Self Defense....................................................................................................................................37
3: Weapons of Mass Destruction.........................................................................................................37
4: War on Terrorism............................................................................................................................37
5: Economic Benefit............................................................................................................................38
Current status of Iraq & US relation:...................................................................................................38
New low in US-Iraq relations: What’s next for 2020?.........................................................................39
The U.S. Role in the Future of Iraq.....................................................................................................41
Will the Iraq-U.S. relationship survive the Trump era?.......................................................................43
Conclusions About Iraq War...............................................................................................................43
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Introduction to Iraq:
Modern-day Iraq is located on the ancient land of Mesopotamia, or "the land between the
rivers." The first human civilization is thought to have flourished here, on the fertile plain
between the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. By the year 4000 BC, the Sumerians had established
the earliest-known cities and government institutions. Writing, mathematics, and science also
began in Sumer.

Eventually, a series of peoples invaded and conquered the region. These groups included the
Babylonians, Assyrians, Chaldeans, Persians, Greeks, and Romans. During the Golden Age
of Iraq (AD 750–1258), under the Abbasids, Baghdad became the capital and the center of
political power and culture in the Middle East. Iraq was part of the Ottoman Empire from the
sixteenth century until World War I (1914–18), when Britain invaded and conquered it in
1917–18. In 1920 an Iraqi Arab state under British mandate was created. Twelve years later,
in October 1932, Iraq was recognized as an independent monarchy.
From 1980 until 1988, Iraq fought a severe and costly war with its neighbor, Iran. More than
500,000 Iraqis and Iranians died, and neither side was really able to claim victory. The war
ended in the summer of 1988, with Iran and Iraq signing a cease-fire agreement arranged by
the United Nations.
Internally, Iraq suffers from serious conflicts between the government and the Kurdish
minority living in the mountains of the northeast, and between the ruling Sunni Muslim
minority and the Shi’a Muslim majority. On August 2, 1990, Iraq's leader, Saddam Hussein,
led an invasion of the neighboring country of Kuwait. Other nations, including the United
States, came to Kuwait's defense, sparking the Persian Gulf War. Iraq withdrew on February
26, 1991, and the war ended.
Location of Iraq:
Iraq is located in southwestern Asia, in the heart of the Middle East. The total land area is
about 170,000 square miles (400,300 square kilometers), a little larger than the state of
California. Iraq has four distinct regions. The Delta region of the southeast is a broad alluvial
(sand and clay) plain. West of the Delta are the Steppe-Desert Plains, part of the dry Syrian
Desert, made up of sand and stony plains. The northern foothills between the Tigris and
Euphrates rivers is a fertile area of grassy flatlands and rolling hills. In the Kurdish Country
of the northeast, the land rises steeply into the Zagros Mountains.
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The population of Iraq is about 20 million people. Baghdad, the capital and largest city, has a
population of about 4 million people.

Introduction to United States of America:

United States, officially United States of America, abbreviated U.S. or U.S.A.,
byname America, country in North America, a federal republic of 50 states. Besides the 48
conterminous states that occupy the middle latitudes of the continent, the United
States includes the state of Alaska, at the northwestern extreme of North America, and the
island state of Hawaii, in the mid-Pacific Ocean. The conterminous states are bounded on the
north by Canada, on the east by the Atlantic Ocean, on the south by the Gulf of
Mexico and Mexico, and on the west by the Pacific Ocean. The United States is the fourth
largest country in the world in area (after Russia, Canada, and China). The national capital
is Washington, which is coextensive with the District of Columbia, the federal capital region
created in 1790. The major characteristic of the United States is probably its great variety. Its
physical environment ranges from the Arctic to the subtropical, from the moist rain forest to
the arid desert, from the rugged mountain peak to the flat prairie. Although the total
population of the United States is large by world standards, its overall population density is
relatively low. The country embraces some of the world’s largest urban concentrations as
well as some of the most extensive areas that are almost devoid of habitation.
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Location of USA:
The land area of the entire United States is approximately 3,800,000 square miles
(9,841,955 km2), with the contiguous United States making up 2,959,064 square miles
(7,663,940.6 km2) of that. Alaska, separated from the contiguous United States by Canada, is
the largest state at 663,268 square miles (1,717,856.2 km2). Hawaii, occupying an
archipelago in the central Pacific, southwest of North America, is 10,931 square miles
(28,311 km2) in area. The populated territories of Puerto Rico, American
Samoa, Guam, Northern Mariana Islands, and U.S. Virgin Islands together cover 9,185
square miles (23,789 km2). Measured by only land area, the United States is third in size
behind Russia and China, just ahead of Canada.

U.S invasion of Iraq in 2003

Introduction
On March 20, 2003, the United States, the United Kingdom and a Coalition of allies invaded
Iraq and overthrew the government of Saddam Hussein. They claimed to bring peace,
prosperity and democracy. But ever since, violence, civil strife and economic hardship have
wracked the land. Thousands of innocent people are now dead and wounded, millions are
displaced, several of Iraq 's cities lie in ruins, and enormous resources have been squandered.
Much has been written about the war and occupation, but there is little available that presents
a comprehensive picture and an assessment of the responsibility of the Coalition. Most public
discussion of Iraq today – especially in the United States – focuses on inter-ethnic conflict
among Iraqis, the "civil war," ethnic cleansing, terror bombings and the like. Commentators
often blame these tragedies on flawed concepts such as Iraqis' age-old ethnic hatreds, the
extremism of Islam, or the meddlesome impulses of neighboring countries. Anything but the
occupation itself.
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Although the occupation is the central political reality in Iraq, Coalition influence and
Coalition violence too often fade into the background of Western political discourse. When
Interior Ministry forces commit yet another atrocity, for instance, few mentions that a
hundred US advisors work in the ministry and heavily influence its every move.  Amazingly,
some commentators and political leaders have re-branded Coalition forces as humanitarian
agents who must be allowed to continue their work to promote peace and stability in the
unruly country. The Iraq Study Group presented such a perspective, as do the major media
and many leading political figures.
This report assesses the war and occupation after the passage of four years. It considers the
evidence from the vantage point of international law. It draws extensively on information in
the public domain – reports by governments, the United Nations, human rights organizations,
and other NGOs, as well as journalists' accounts. The report considers the role of the United
Nations, the legality of the occupation in action, and the human consequences of the conflict.
The information assembled presents an argument for a swift end to the occupation and
groundwork for a peaceful post-occupation Iraq.
This report considers above all the actions and the responsibility of the United States and the
United Kingdom. The US and the UK are powerful nations that claim to defend and promote
the global rule of law. As permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, they
present themselves as the guardians of order and justice in the world, insisting on the "rule of
law," and chastising others for violations of law and breaches of the peace. They should be
held to the highest standards, since they constantly and vigorously apply such standards to
others.
Certainly, there are various kinds of responsibility for the Iraq tragedy. Saddam Hussein was
a tyrant who left behind a fractured and badly weakened society. The terrible long-lasting war
with Iran (1980-88) and the punishing thirteen years of UN sanctions unquestionably took
their toll. Yet the US and UK governments supported Saddam for many years with arms and
aid, even while he was carrying out his worst excesses. And they authored the thirteen years
of comprehensive UN economic sanctions, which harmed the Iraqi people and left Saddam in
power. While the overwhelming majority of Iraqis are innocent victims of the bloodshed and
violence, some Iraqis share responsibility for recent events. Some have participated in
reprehensible acts – by setting off bombs in crowded city streets, attacking religious shrines,
killing innocent civilians, and operating gangs for robbery, kidnapping, extortion and murder.
Iraqis in and out of the government have been implicated in sectarian strife, militias,
assassinations, bombings, and death squads, as well as massive corruption.
But none of these acts by Iraqis can justify the wrongdoing of the Coalition. Those who
started the war and occupation, particularly the US and the UK, must take responsibility for
the death and destruction they have wrought, as well as the breakdown of public order, the
rise of sectarianism and the economic chaos that their rule has provoked. They destroyed the
Iraqi state and now are reaping the consequences. They must also take responsibility for the
erosion of international law and the undermining of international cooperation that the war and
occupation has created.
Background
Strong international opposition to the Saddam Hussein regime began after Iraq's invasion of
Kuwait in 1990. The international community condemned the invasion, and in 1991 a
military coalition led by the United States launched the Gulf War to expel Iraq from Kuwait.
Following the Gulf War, the US and its allies tried to keep Saddam Hussein in check with a
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policy of containment. This policy involved numerous economic sanctions by the UN

Security Council; the enforcement of Iraqi no-fly zones declared by the US and the UK to
protect the Kurds in Iraqi Kurdistan and Shias in the south from aerial attacks by the Iraqi
government; and ongoing inspections to ensure Iraq's compliance with United Nations
resolutions concerning Iraqi weapons of mass destruction.

The inspections were carried out by the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM).

UNSCOM, in cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, worked to ensure
that Iraq destroyed its chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons and facilities. ] In the decade
following the Gulf War, the United Nations passed 16 Security Council resolutions calling
for the complete elimination of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. Member states
communicated their frustration over the years that Iraq was impeding the work of the special
commission and failing to take seriously its disarmament obligations. Iraqi officials harassed
the inspectors and obstructed their work, and in August 1998 the Iraqi government suspended
cooperation with the inspectors completely, alleging that the inspectors were spying for the
US. The spying allegations were later substantiated.
In October 1998, removing the Iraqi government became official U.S. foreign policy with
enactment of the Iraq Liberation Act. The act provided $97 million for Iraqi "democratic
opposition organizations" to "establish a program to support a transition to democracy in
Iraq." This legislation contrasted with the terms set out in United Nations Security Council
Resolution 687, which focused on weapons and weapons programs and made no mention of
regime change. One month after the passage of the Iraq Liberation Act, the US and UK
launched a bombardment campaign of Iraq called Operation Desert Fox. The campaign's
express rationale was to hamper Saddam Hussein's government's ability to produce chemical,
biological, and nuclear weapons, but U.S. intelligence personnel also hoped it would help
weaken Saddam's grip on power.
Following the election of George W. Bush as president in 2000, the US moved towards a
more aggressive Iraq policy. The Republican Party's campaign platform in the 2000 election
called for "full implementation" of the Iraq Liberation Act as "a starting point" in a plan to
"remove" Saddam. However, little formal movement towards an invasion occurred until
the 11 September attacks.

History of War:
In March 2003 US and coalition forces invaded Iraq. US forces withdrew in December 2008.
Approximately 4,400 US troops were killed and 31,900 wounded during the initial invasion
and the subsequent war. Estimates of Iraqi casualties vary widely, ranging from roughly
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100,000 to more than half a million. The invasion was launched as part of the US strategic
response to the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, and ended the rule of Iraqi President
Saddam Hussein. After the collapse of the regime, Iraq experienced significant violence as
former regime loyalists launched insurgent attacks against US forces, and al-Qaeda in Iraq
(AQI), a group linked to al-Qaeda, also attacked US forces and sought to precipitate sectarian
civil war. Simultaneously with the increasing violence, Iraq held a series of elections that
resulted in a new Constitution and an elected parliament and government. In 2007, the United
States deployed more troops to Iraq to quell the insurgency and sectarian strife. The
temporary increase in troops was known as “the Surge.” In November 2008, the US and Iraqi
governments agreed that all US troops would withdraw from Iraq by December 2011. In
2014, AQI, now calling itself the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), attacked and
captured large swaths of Iraq, including several large cities. That year, the United States and
allied states launched new military operations in Iraq called Operation Inherent Resolve. The
government of Iraq declared victory over ISIL in 2017.

Invasion Planning and International and Domestic Politics (2001–2003)

Policy planning for a war, and the updating of existing war plans, began in earnest in the
United States in 2002. Throughout the year, US officials worked to build a coalition of states
to support and participate in potential military action against Iraq. In July 2002, UK officials
reported that their conversations with US officials indicated war with Iraq was “inevitable.”
There is little evidence, however, that President Bush had made a decision to invade Iraq at
this point. A September 2002 meeting of senior administration officials at Camp David seems
to have been an important turning point in the move toward war, although the United States
was careful not to make an explicit commitment to war. The Bush administration took
various other steps, including purposefully not establishing an office for managing post-war
reconstruction in Iraq, so as not to signal inevitability of war and foreclose diplomatic
options.
Both Bush’s main international ally, British Prime Minister Tony Blair, and Bush’s Secretary
of State Colin Powell encouraged the President to use the United Nations to confront Iraq. In
September 2002, after the Camp David meeting, President Bush spoke at the United Nations
and effectively issued an ultimatum to Saddam Hussein, saying: “If the Iraqi regime wishes
peace, it will immediately and unconditionally forswear, disclose, and remove or destroy all
weapons of mass destruction, long-range missiles, and all related material.” In the months
after Bush’s speech, the United Nations Security Council resolved, as per UNSCR 1441, to
afford Iraq “a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations.” In response,
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Iraq submitted a 12,000-page document, but the records were incomplete and out of date and
seemed to confirm that Iraq would not respond to UN requests.
In addition, after the Camp David meeting, in fall 2002, officials including Vice President
Richard B. Cheney and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice led a sustained public
relations campaign highlighting Saddam’s history of weapons of mass destruction programs
and usage, and support of terrorism. Cheney suggested a link between one of the 9/11
hijackers and the Iraqi intelligence service, although this connection was dubious and the
Central Intelligence Agency was skeptical of any connection. Rice, in emphasizing the
potential effects of an Iraqi weapons of mass destruction program, warned: “We don’t want
the smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud.”
In October 2002, the CIA issued a top-secret National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq,
and also made available an unclassified summary of the NIE to the public. The key
judgments from the NIE, titled “Iraq’s Continuing Program for Weapons of Mass
Destruction,” included that Iraq had chemical and biological weapons and would “probably
have a nuclear weapon during this decade.” On February 3, 2003, the British government
released a dossier of intelligence claiming an Iraqi weapons of mass destruction capability.
Both the US NIE and UK dossier were analytically flawed documents. The US NIE
suggested far more certainty about the existence and capability of Iraq’s WMD programs
than was supportable by evidence. In the United Kingdom, the Iraq Inquiry that investigated
the decision to go to war found that British intelligence reporting was similarly wanting.
At 9:30 pm Eastern Time on March 19, 2003, US missiles struck Iraq in an attempted
decapitation strike against Saddam Hussein. Forty-five minutes later, Bush addressed the
nation from the Oval Office and explained that the United States was at war with Iraq. By this
date, there were over 340,000 US military personnel ashore or afloat in the Persian Gulf
region, another 47,000 from the United Kingdom, and 2,000 from Australia. Unlike
Operation Desert Storm, the 2003 invasion of Iraq, codenamed Operation Iraqi Freedom, did
not begin with an isolated air bombardment but with a combined air and ground assault. The
ground force, launched from Kuwait, consisted of fewer than 150,000 US troops and
approximately 20,000 coalition forces (mostly British). This relatively lean fighting force,
designed to be agile and quick, sped toward Baghdad, frequently skirting other urban centers
in a dash to the capital. The invasion was spectacularly successful and gained control of all
major cities in Iraq within twenty-five days. On May 1, 2013, President Bush flew to the
USS Abraham Lincoln wearing a flight suit and sitting in the co-pilot seat of a US Navy S-3B
Viking. In a speech aboard ship, Bush declared “victory” and announced that “major combat
operations in Iraq have ended.” The Abraham Lincoln, which was returning from supporting
the invasion, bore a large banner that read “Mission Accomplished.” The phrase became
closely associated with the President’s speech.
During the initial phase of combat operations and after, US forces searched for leading
members of Saddam Hussein’s regime, and Saddam himself. Troops were issued a fifty-two-
card deck of playing cards, called the “Personality Identification Playing Cards,” that featured
the faces and information regarding the “most wanted” members of the former
administration. Saddam’s sons, Uday and Qusay Hussein, the Ace of Hearts and the Ace of
Clubs, respectively, were killed in June 2003. The Ace of Spades, Saddam Hussein, was
captured in December 2002 and later executed in December 2006.
In addition to the search for key figures of the former regime, American forces searched Iraq
for the weapons of mass destruction described in the 2002 NIE. US troops did find a small
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number of chemical weapons left over from the 1980–1988 Iran–Iraq War. The Iraq Survey
Group, a multinational group of civilian and military experts who scoured Iraq for WMD,
found no evidence that Saddam had sought to reactivate his nuclear weapons program after
1991 and concluded that he had disposed of his chemical weapons stockpile in the years after
Desert Storm. Iraq’s biological weapons program had been abandoned in 1995. While
Saddam desired to recreate a nuclear program, sanctions prevented him from doing so in the
1990s. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence later determined that although the US
intelligence community had assessed that Iraq had reconstituted its nuclear weapons program
and had biological and chemical weapons, “not one bit of it could be confirmed when the war
was over.”

Violence, Surge, and Awakening (2005–2007)

In November 2005, President Bush authorized the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq
(NSVI), a document meant to reaffirm existing US strategy in the war. US strategy as
described in the NSVI was premised on the notion that political progress would lead to
stability in Iraq. The elections in 2005 offered partial support for this strategy, but increasing
violence in 2005 and especially in 2006 caused reconsideration in Washington and ultimately
the development of a new strategy for 2007. On February 22, 2006, the Askariya Shrine in
Samarra, a holy site for Shia, was destroyed by explosives. The destruction of the shrine did
not mark the start of increasing violence, but did serve as a symbol of increased sectarian
violence in Iraq as per Zarqawi’s plan. In April 2006, Iraqis elected a national government
under Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, and that same month, US forces killed Zarqawi. The
increase in violence, combined with the election of a government and the death of the AQI
leader, generated confusing signals as to whether the US strategy was working.
Throughout the spring and summer of 2006, various groups of officials in the National
Security Council, State Department, Office of the Vice President, and at the direction of the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff re-evaluated US policy in light of ever-increasing
violence. After the 2006 midterm elections, in which the Republican Party suffered dramatic
losses, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld resigned and the President created a formal
interagency body to study strategy in Iraq. The culmination of the informal evaluations earlier
in 2006 and the formal group appointed in the fall was a Presidential decision to change
strategy in Iraq to emphasize population security. In late 2006, President Bush and National
Security Advisor Stephen Hadley worked to bring skeptics of this new approach, including
now-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on board. Bush also
planned to appoint a new ground commander and ambassador in Iraq to support the new plan,
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dubbed “the Surge.” In January 2007, President Bush again spoke to the nation to announce
what would be the deployment of approximately 30,000 more troops to Iraq.
In 2007, the number of Army brigades and Marine regiments in Iraq increased. As expected,
and forewarned by the President in his speech announcing the Surge, violence initially
increased in Iraq as more US troops arrived. The new commander in Iraq, General David
Petraeus, who had participated in the development of a new counter-insurgency manual,
deployed troops into urban centers to quell sectarian violence. Special operations force also
pursued enemy leaders at a higher tempo, killing and capturing key figures including
bombmakers. Petraeus also increased US support to Sunni militia groups that confronted
AQI. This policy was made possible by an indigenous effort by some Sunni groups who
rejected AQI’s brutal treatment of Iraqis. The movement, which had its origins before the
Surge, was known as “Awakening,” or the “Anbar Awakening” for the Iraqi province of
Anbar.
In October 2002, the CIA issued a top-secret National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq,
and also made available an unclassified summary of the NIE to the public. The key
judgments from the NIE, titled “Iraq’s Continuing Program for Weapons of Mass
Destruction,” included that Iraq had chemical and biological weapons and would “probably
have a nuclear weapon during this decade.” On February 3, 2003, the British government
released a dossier of intelligence claiming an Iraqi weapons of mass destruction capability.
Both the US NIE and UK dossier were analytically flawed documents. The US NIE
suggested far more certainty about the existence and capability of Iraq’s WMD programs
than was supportable by evidence. In the United Kingdom, the Iraq Inquiry that investigated
the decision to go to war found that British intelligence reporting was similarly wanting.
In early 2003, Tony Blair pushed Bush to seek a new resolution that would alleviate any
confusion as to whether the United Nations had authorized the use of military force against
Iraq. US officials believed that sufficient authority existed in UNSCR 1441, passed in
November 2002. Nonetheless, President Bush agreed to seek a second resolution, although
US officials had determined they had the legal authority to act under already existing
resolutions. Secretary of State Colin Powell briefed the United Nations Security Council on
the evidence the United States had demonstrating that Saddam Hussein was continuing to
develop weapons of mass destruction. Several members of the Security Council, including
China, France, Germany, and Russia, resisted efforts by the United States to gain a second
resolution. The result was no resolution, strained relations between the United States and its
NATO allies, France and Germany, and an outpouring of public protest. On February 15,
coordinated protests occurred in hundreds of cities around the world and in the United States,
with some marches in major cities drawing hundreds of thousands of anti-war protesters. To
protest lack of French support, the cafeteria in the United States Capitol building renamed
French Fries and French Toast to Freedom Fries and Freedom Toast, respectively.
Senior administration officials raised the idea of taking action against Iraq as a response to
the 9/11 attacks as early as the afternoon of September 11, 2001. In the aftermath of the
attacks on the United States, the United States invaded Afghanistan in search of Osama bin
Laden and the leadership of al-Qaeda. The attack on Afghanistan, however, was considered
by the administration as only one part of the US response to 9/11. The US strategic concept
that emerged after 9/11 called for efforts to prevent any future terror attack on the United
States. The strategy, championed especially by officials from the civilian leadership of the
Department of Defense, called for action against any terrorist group or state sponsor of
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terrorism that may attack the United States, whether or not there was a direct connection
between that group or state and the 9/11 attacks.
Iraq, both as a state that had developed and used weapons of mass destruction and one that
supported terrorist groups (though not al-Qaeda), was frequently identified by officials as a
target in the “war on terror.” Iraq also had more readily identifiable targets for military
action, as opposed to Afghanistan, and an attack on Iraq would offer the US an opportunity to
impress on other states that the development of weapons of mass destruction and the
sponsorship of terrorist groups was unacceptable to the United States.

Timeline 2002-2011: Notable events in Iraq

Following the September 11, 2001, attacks, the US invaded Afghanistan with the goal of
dismantling the al-Qaeda network and seizing its leader, Osama bin Laden.
Heightened security concerns in the US, and allegations that Iraq possessed weapons of mass
destruction, prompted an invasion by US and other Western forces which led to the toppling
of Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein, although no WMD's were ever found.
American troops have been a constant presence across Iraq’s landscape since then. Some
45,000 were still on the ground earlier this year, but under the terms of a security pact,
they will fully withdraw by the end of 2011.
In 2002

US President George W Bush warns that the world needs to act against the increasing
dangers posed by Saddam Hussein's pariah regime in Iraq.
At the same time, UK Prime Minister Tony Blair publishes a dossier on Iraq’s military
capabilities, later seen to be suspect.
A UN resolution threatens serious consequences for Iraq if it breaches the terms of a
disarmament accord.
UN weapons inspectors return to Iraq to investigate the validity of claims that the
country possesses WMD's.
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In 2003

Hans Blix, the chief weapons inspector for the UN, says inspectors need more time to verify
Iraq’s compliance with the UN resolution.
The UK’s ambassador to the UN says the diplomatic process on Iraq has ended as arms
inspectors leave the country.
A US-led invasion of the country begins on March 20, 2003 with a force of 150,000
American troops and 23,000 soldiers from other countries.
The capital, Baghdad, falls 20 days later, toppling Saddam’s government.
A power struggle emerges among Iraq's Shia communities with some calling for co-
operation, and others for resistance.
In December, Saddam is captured after being found hiding underground at a farm in Tikrit.

In 2004

Loyalists of Moqtada al-Sadr, the Shia cleric, take on Western coalition forces based in the
country. Religious leaders warn top US civilian administrator Paul Bremer
against blocking Islamic law.
Hundreds are reported killed in fighting during a US military siege of Falluja.
The US hands sovereignty to an interim government headed by Iyad Allawi, as the
debate continues about whether Iraq ever had WMD's.
Photographs are unearthed of US troops abusing and humiliating Iraqi prisoners at Abu
Ghraib prison, sparking international outcry and a US senate probe of alleged abuses.
Meanwhile, images of gruesome violence in Iraq become well-known across the world via
internet videos, as the US claims that Jordanian-born Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's group of
fighters has attracted a growing number of supporters.
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In July, Saddam appears in court for the first time, facing charges including war crimes and
genocide.
In the aftermath of the US invasion, the Iraqi unemployment rate reaches 70 per cent in
August.
In 2005

The first multi-party elections in 50 years are held amid stringent security measures on
January 30.
Jalal Talabani, a Kurdish politician, is sworn in as president.
Masoud Barzani becomes the regional president for semi-autonomous Iraqi Kurdistan.
Voters accept a new constitution with aims to create an Islamic federal democracy. Iraqis
vote for a government and parliament.
The Arab League chief visits Iraq to prepare for a reconciliation conference, and the US
military begins paying Iraqi contractors in dinars rather than in dollars.
In 2006

The United Iraqi Alliance - a Shia-led party - wins the 2005 election. President Talabani tasks
new prime minister Nouri al-Maliki with forming a new government as Ibrahim al-Jafari is
forced out.
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, al-Qaeda's leader in Iraq, is killed in an air strike. In December,
Saddam is executed for crimes against humanity as the Baath party names a new leader.
The number of foreign troops in the country drops to just under 127,000 US soldiers and
20,000 from the other coalition countries. One of the country's most powerful Shia leaders
calls for stronger action against Sunni-led fighters.
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In 2007

President Bush announces a new Iraq strategy, including a surge of over 21,000 more troops
to be deployed for security in the country, following an escalation in insurgent activity
and sectarian strife.
The Iraqi Accordance Front, the main Sunni political bloc, withdraws from cabinet following
a dispute. Britain hands over security of Basra to Iraqi forces, as the country pushes towards
reducing the number of its troops in Iraq.
In 2008

Parliament passes a law allowing former officials of Saddam’s government to return to public
life. Violence continues to escalate despite a troop surge and US support for the Awakening
Council.
In April the British defense secretary says the final withdrawal of troops has been postponed
after clashes between Shia fighters and Iraqi security forces. In November, parliament
approves a security pact with the US which says that all US troops will leave the country by
the end of 2011.
In 2009
17 | P a g e

The new US embassy in Baghdad opens officially, as private security contractor Blackwater
is banned from the country. A Baghdadi criminal court sentences the journalist who threw a
shoe at the US president is sentenced to three years. Iraq takes more and more control of key
areas, including Baghdad’s Green Zone. President Maliki’s party scores big gains in
provincial elections.
US President Barack Obama announces the withdrawal of most US troops from Iraq by
August 2010. Troops withdraw from towns and cities; but some will stay on to advise the
Iraqi security forces until final withdrawal in 2011.Britain officially ends combat operations
in southern Iraq. They hand control of their Basra base over to US forces.
An independent inquiry into the Iraq war begins in London. Barzani is re-elected in a
presidential election, and the governing alliance retains its position despite new opposition
parties gaining added support.
Prime Minister Maliki also announces the State of Law, a grouping of 40 political parties,
after a split in the United Iraqi Alliance. Britain’s Shell and Malaysian firm
Petronas are awarded a joint contract to exploit Iraq's giant Majnoon oil field, potentially
worth $12bn.
In 2010

‘Chemical’ Ali Hassan al-Majid, who was a key figure in Saddam’s government, is executed.
Parliamentary elections are held in March and no coalition wins enough votes for a majority
as Iraq's neighbors anxiously eye the voting. AL-Qaeda in Iraq leaders are hunted down
and killed by an Iraqi intelligence team.
Iraq’s leading army official criticizes the planned withdrawal of US troops, saying that Iraq
may not be ready for the move. The last US combat brigade leaves Iraq in August, but 50,000
troops remain for training and advisory purposes. WikiLeaks publishes thousands of
classified US military logs on the war in Iraq. The two main political blocs end talks on
forming an alliance government.
In November, Jalal Talabani is appointed as president and Nouri al-Maliki as prime minister.
Parliament approves a new government that includes the major factions. Amid
worsening violence, an Iraqi church attack in Baghdad that kills 58 people is claimed by al-
Qaeda
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In 2011

Moqtada al-Sadr returns to Iraq after years of self-imposed exile in Iran. Thousands gather in
Baghdad and northern Iraq demanding improved services and an end to corruption,
apparently inspired by the Arab Spring protests that have spread across the region.
The Iraqi government plans a summit to decide whether US troops are needed in the country
past the 2011 withdrawal deadline, as US officials continue to advocate for a future presence.
Al-Sadr says his fighters will suspend military attacks on the US, which will resume only if
the US fails to pull out in time. In October, US officials announce they have abandoned plans
to keep troops in Iraq and will leave by the end-of-year withdrawal deadline.
As the drawdown looms, Iraq's prime minister visits the US to chart future relations.

The False Arguments for War:

Prior to the invasion, the US and the UK pressed the UN Security Council to authorize the
"use of force" against Iraq. They argued that force was necessary to prevent the Iraqi
government from developing or using weapons of mass destruction that could be targeted
against other nations. They declared that Iraq was in "material breach" of Security Council
resolutions and they presented evidence to the Council, notably in the famous meeting of
February 5, 2003. Secretary of State Colin Powell said then: "What we're giving you are facts
and conclusions based on solid intelligence." But most Council members were skeptical and
in the end the Council did not authorize military action. We now know that Iraq did not
possess weapons of this type and had destroyed virtually all of them in 1991, twelve years
before the invasion. 
The governments of the United States and the United Kingdom, with their renowned
intelligence services, were almost certainly aware before the war that the evidence for mass
destruction weapons in Iraq was weak or even non-existent. Memoirs and other accounts
suggest that Bush administration officials were discussing a war against Iraq in early 2001
without reference to WMDs and that President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Tony
Blair talked about an attack on Iraq at the White House on September 20, 2001. As UK
intelligence chief Sir Richard Dearlove commented in a meeting with Prime Minister Blair in
June 2002: "the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy" by leaders in
Washington. London was soon at work on a parallel campaign of exaggerated and false
claims, including two notorious "dossiers" released by Downing Street. US Secretary of State
Colin Powell later described his speech to the Security Council as a "blot" on his record. 
The two countries also claimed that they acted in legitimate "self-defense" under article 51 of
the UN Charter. Yet we now know that Iraq posed no clear and immediate threat of offensive
19 | P a g e

military action and the policymakers knew that.  Carne Ross, the senior Iraq expert at the UK
mission to the UN, later testified that he saw US and UK intelligence traffic on Iraq every
working day for four and a half years, and not a single report suggested that Saddam had
significant WMD capability or posed a threat to the UK or any other country. 
Washington also claimed that Saddam Hussein was giving support to al-Qaeda and
promoting international terrorism that threatened the United States. This too was false and
those propagating the accusation knew it was not true. A thorough investigation by the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the US Senate later showed that these claims were irresponsible
and had no basis in fact.  Finally, the US and the UK put forward humanitarian arguments,
such as liberating the Iraqi people from Saddam Hussein's dictatorship and his frightful
human rights abuses.  The war, they contended, would bring freedom and democracy to Iraq.
But if Washington and London were so concerned about this issue, why had they earlier
cooperated with Saddam, given him arms, aid and military assistance, and even shielded him
from censure by UN human rights bodies? 
The War and the Coalition:
As the timing of the conflict approached, Washington assembled a "coalition of the willing"
to give its military action greater legitimacy and to lend it the appearance of a multilateral
effort, with wide support. Washington announced that its "Coalition" had attracted 49
countries.  But some of the members contributed no military contingents, while many others
participated only in a symbolic way. Kazakhstan 's contingent in 2003 numbered 29,
Moldova 's 24 and Iceland 's just two.  The military force that invaded Iraq was almost
entirely composed of US and UK combat units. The total force numbered just over 300,000
ground troops, as well as large naval and air assets. 
Massive aerial bombardment, to "shock and awe," preceded the ground campaign. The US
made use of reprehensible weapons such as napalm, depleted uranium munitions and cluster
bombs, an early sign that the Coalition would exercise little moral or legal restraint.  Saddam
Hussein's troops were no match for the enormous military might brought into the field by the
United States. In just under three weeks, on April 8, Coalition forces entered Baghdad.
Though many Iraqis welcomed the fall of the dictator, they did not throw flowers or cheer the
arrival of the Coalition troops, as some Washington pundits had predicted. Soon after, on
May 2, President Bush gave his "mission accomplished" speech aboard the aircraft carrier
Abraham Lincoln.
Destruction of the Iraqi State and the Breakdown of Public Order:

In the first days of the occupation, the Coalition demobilized the Iraqi police force and army,
laying open Iraqi cities to looting and arson while the Coalition military stood by. Seventeen
government ministries were gutted, including the Ministries of Education, Health, Culture
20 | P a g e

and Trade, while Coalition forces protected only the Oil Ministry. Fires destroyed most Iraqi
government records, while thieves made off with furniture, computers, and everything else,
even ripping copper wires out of the walls to sell for scrap. Looters simultaneously attacked
banks, businesses and even major hospitals. Iraq 's leading cultural institutions were sacked,
including the National Museum and National Library and many were badly damaged by fire.
Concerned Iraqis, international scholars and humanitarian leaders pleaded with Coalition
officials and military commanders to protect Iraq 's institutions and cultural treasures, but to
no avail. 
In the absence of any civil authority, there began robberies, kidnappings, murders and the
settling of scores from the old regime. Chaos ruled the neighborhoods and many people
sought arms to defend themselves. A strange nonchalance seemed to grip the Coalition
leadership. "Stuff happens," said US Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, shrugging off the looting
of the National Museum in a news conference on April 11. 
In May, the Coalition took a final step to disband the army and cancel all military pensions,
stripping 400,000 families of their main livelihood.  A radical "de-Baathification" was also
set in motion, which purged more than 30,000 members of the old ruling party from all
official posts, with virtually no effort to exempt those who were innocent of the crimes of the
old regime.  This removed many of the most qualified people from state service, dealing a
devastating blow to what was left of the old state apparatus.

The Strange Post-War Role of the Security Council and the UN:

Having refused to authorize the use of force, the Security Council sharply reversed course
after the invasion. Keen to avoid further tension with Washington and persuaded that no
alternative options were available, Council members agreed to several resolutions that
conceded legality to the occupation and provided it with financing from Iraq 's oil revenue.
Resolution 1483 of May 22, 2003 recognized the US and the UK as "occupying authorities,"
an effort to ensure compliance with international humanitarian law. At the same time, the
resolution also gave the Coalition the right to sell Iraqi oil, to take billions of dollars from the
UN's Oil for Food accounts and to spend as they saw fit for "purposes benefiting the Iraqi
people."  The Council's anti-war majority was hopeful that, as the resolution insisted, the UN
would play a "vital role" in Iraq, eventually taking over real responsibility. But this was self-
deception. The US had no intention of ceding authority to the United Nations and left only
the most marginal role to it.
Sergio Vieira de Mello, the UN's Special Representative in Baghdad, tried to stake out an
independent function for the UN, but the US-led administration in Iraq gave him little room
for maneuver, rejecting his proposals for broad consultation with Iraqis of all political
21 | P a g e

persuasions. The "vital role" foreseen by the Security Council never materialized. On August
19, 2003, a truck bomb destroyed UN headquarters in Baghdad, killing Vieira de Mello and
thirteen members of his staff. Thereafter, the organization drastically reduced its presence in
the country and moved its Iraq operations to Amman, Jordan.
Yet in October 2003, the Security Council took another fateful step with Resolution 1511. In
exchange for US-UK promises that a political process would soon lead to elections and a
turnover of authority to Iraqis, the Council gave an official UN mandate to the occupation,
making the Coalition a "multinational force" (MNF). The US and the UK afterwards stepped
up their claims that they were acting on behalf of the UN and that the UN has provided legal
authorization for what they do.
Since that time, despite the many violations of international law by the Coalition, the Council
has twice renewed the mandate.  But it has never exercised any meaningful oversight of the
MNF nor has it had a frank and full discussion of the Iraq matter. A few ambassadors, like
Juan Gabriel Valdes of Chile and Adolfo Aguilar Zinser of Mexico, tried to press the issue
early on, but Washington forced their governments to recall them, making it very clear that
no dissent would be tolerated.  As other ambassadors have reported ruefully since then,
Washington does not even accept questions when it presents periodic reports to the Council
in the name of the MNF. 

Coalition-Sponsored Militias, Commandoes, and Death Squads:

The Coalition created or expanded Iraqi irregular forces. Before the invasion, the US and the
UK had given covert support to Kurdish peshmergas -- party/tribal militias in Iraqi
Kurdistan.  In 2003, they numbered tens of thousands of fighters. Coalition commanders
announced that the peshmergas could keep their weapons and maintain their units, since they
were considered as operating "under Coalition supervision."  Peshmergas enforced Kurdish
rule over non-Kurdish minorities in the North. And the Coalition command used peshmergas
to attack insurgent targets in the North and Center. This policy promoted Kurdish separatism
and greatly increased Sunni and Shia resentment against the Kurds.
The US had also armed, trained and funded a sizeable militia of the Iraq National Congress
under the leadership of Ahmad Chalabi, an Iraqi exile who was a Pentagon favorite and
tipped as a future prime minister. This militia, called the "Free Iraq Forces," was set up in
2002 and enjoyed multi-million-dollar funding by the Pentagon.  Very shortly after the
invasion, the US air force flew Chalabi and 600 of his militia into Nasiriya in the South.  A
multi-million-dollar CPA contract (nominally to guard oil installations), later reportedly
bankrolled the militia, as did a stipend to the INC/Chalabi from the Pentagon of $342,000 a
22 | P a g e

month.  Chalabi's forces fought pitched battles with rivals in Baghdad. Many accused them of
car theft, fraud, illegal seizure of assets of former Baathists, and outright murder.
The Scorpions were yet another irregular Iraqi force, built by the CIA and operating from the
beginning very clandestinely.  This force came to light most prominently in the brutal beating
(and eventual death) of an Iraqi detainee in US custody in November 2003. 
By the fall of 2003, Washington had clearly opted for a dirty war. A war-funding bill,
proposed by the Pentagon and passed by Congress in November included $3 billion in
monies for Iraqi militias.  After mid-2004, the Coalition made increasing use of Iraqi
irregular forces as well as special units set up under the nominal control of the Iraqi Ministry
of the Interior.
Pentagon sources and news reporters spoke of this policy as "the Salvador option," referring
to US counter-insurgency tactics in Central America in the 1980s. James Steele, a special
advisor in the US embassy who had played a key role in the dirty wars of Central America ,
was assigned to advise many of these units.  New irregular units, set up in the summer and
fall of 2004, included the Hilla SWAT Team, the Iraqi Freedom Guard, the Amarah Brigade,
and the Special Police Commandos, sometimes referred to as the Wolf Brigade.  Many were
trained and armed by the Coalition. Some functioned as death squads, carrying out targeted
assassinations. Many of the Iraqi commanders were former officers of Saddam's secret police
and special army units, restored again to favor after the wholesale de-Baathification
purges.  Some of these groups were extremely violent and undisciplined and they sometimes
ran amok, looting, burning, torturing and executing.
Violence multiplied. Ethnic and religious groups as well as political parties set up militias for
their own defense (or for aggressive political ends). SCIRI, the leading Shia political party,
expanded its Badr Brigades, while cleric Moktada al-Sadr strengthened his Mahdi
Army.  Neighborhoods and political leaders hired armed guards. Government figures used
official police and army units as semi-independent militias. Armed gangs came into being to
carry out lucrative kidnappings in cities as well as armed robbery and the seizure of goods on
highways. The Coalition, by playing the militia card, had redoubled the violence in the
country and further undermined the state.

A Free and Sovereign Iraq:

From the beginning, the United States and its partners insisted that they were establishing a
democratic Iraq that would soon be a model for the entire region. But in practice, they ruled
with minimal consultation and little understanding of the country and its people. For a year,
the Coalition Provisional Authority ruled Iraq from its confines in the Green Zone,
promulgating orders, decrees, memoranda and public notices.  Most of the CPA staff worked
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on six-month assignments and had little opportunity to learn about the country before heading
home. 
Bremer and the CPA set up a "Governing Council" made up of US-handpicked Iraqis,
friendly to the occupation. Many had spent decades in exile and they had few roots in
contemporary Iraq. Some, like Iyad Allawi and Ahmad Chalabi, had worked for years
directly on Washington 's payroll.  By naming the Governing Council on the basis of
sectarian affiliation and "balance," the CPA gave prominence to the sectarian dimension of
Iraqi politics and deepened sectarian rivalries.  "Divide-and-rule" tactics seemed to be at
work.
At the end of June 2004, the CPA turned over "sovereignty" to Iraqis and dissolved itself.
The Coalition announced that a "sovereign" Iraqi Interim Government was now in charge and
in New York the Security Council welcomed the transition.  The new Interim Government
had been handpicked by Bremer, with the assistance of UN special envoy, Lakhdar Brahimi.
Though supposedly composed of technocrats, it contained familiar personalities, chosen and
presented (again) according to sectarian identity.  CIA-linked Allawi was the new Prime
Minister. Bremer finally departed with most of his staff, but an enormous US presence
remained.
The trappings of sovereignty had been put in place. Iraq again had ministries, civil servants, a
nascent police force and army, as well as prisons, a Ministry of Finance, even an intelligence
service. And, of course, there were elections -- touted by the Coalition as proof of success
and the ultimate benchmark of democracy. But the reality was quite different. Ambassador
John Negroponte, who followed Bremer, continued to exercise overwhelming influence in
the country, at the head of the world's largest US embassy. Each ministry had dozens of US
"advisors" guiding policy.  The army was entirely under US command and the intelligence
service took its orders (and payroll) from the CIA. 
The initial elections for the 275-member Iraqi National Assembly took place on January 30,
2005. Because of dangerous security conditions, international election experts supervised the
elections from outside the country, relying on information from mostly partisan Iraqi
monitors. The International Mission for Iraqi Elections declared that the elections "generally
met recognized standards."  Critics, though, complained that the elections were organized on
a flawed basis with a single national constituency and unified lists of candidates, that no
meaningful campaigning had been possible, and that the elections had taken place under
conditions that violate international human rights standards.  Another cloud over the election
was the extremely low Sunni turn out.

Massive Destruction:
24 | P a g e

Heavy bombardment has caused great destruction in the cities under attack, including
historical and religious sites, as well as water, electricity and sewage systems. US-led forces
have bombed and even bulldozed numerous buildings, either as part of offensives or as
retaliation against civilians who do not give information about insurgents. 
In Falluja, Operation Phantom Fury left the city in ruins, as a "ghost town." The Study Center
for Human Rights and Democracy, a Falluja-based non-governmental organization, reports
that the offensive destroyed an estimated 70 percent of the buildings, homes and
shops.  Speaking in a press conference about the scale of destruction in Najaf, Minister of
State Qassim Daoud said: "It is horrible and it is difficult to know where to start." Officials in
Najaf told IRIN, that "a total of 72 shops, 50 hotels, 90 homes, three schools and dozens of
cars were destroyed in the fighting."  They said "there has also been massive destruction of
the historic old part of the city, some of it impossible to repair." 
In the Ramadi operation of 2006, "instead of continuing to fight for the downtown, or rebuild
it," the New York Times reported, Coalition forces "are going to get rid of it, or at least a very
large part of it."  US Department of Defense newspaper Stars and Stripes  reports that at least
eight blocks of buildings were razed. "We're used to taking down walls, doors and windows,
but eight city blocks are something new to us,” admitted Marine 1st Lieutenant Ben Klay
who took part in the demolition work in Ramadi.
With power, water and sewage systems dysfunctional and most buildings in ruins, many of
these cities will remain only marginally habitable for a long time to come, in spite of
announced (but largely un-implemented) reconstruction programs.

"Joint" Military Operations and Criticism by Iraqi Authorities:

Increasingly, US commanders have portrayed military operations against Iraqi cities as joint
operations between US and Iraqi forces. This appears to be an effort to make the sieges more
palatable to Iraqi and international opinion. Officially, US troops only "back-up" Iraqi forces
or the two are said to carry out operations jointly. Observers say, though, that the US always
takes the lead.
In fact, Iraqi government authorities have often been critical of the operations and condemned
the conduct of US forces. After a week of heavy fighting in August 2004, Iraq 's Interim
Deputy President Ibrahim Al-Jaafari "call[ed] for multinational forces to leave Najaf and for
only Iraqi forces to remain there. “Deputy Governor of Najaf, Jawdat Kadhim Najam al-
Quraishi, followed by 16 of the 30 members of the Najaf Provincial Council, resigned in
protest against the assault.
In the case of Falluja, feelings in Iraq ran high and several members of the Iraq Governing
Council criticized the attacks and threatened to resign if the US commanders did not halt the
operation. Adnan Pachachi, a leading member of the IGC qualified the operation "as illegal
and totally unacceptable."  And Ghazi Yawar, another prominent member said: "How can a
superpower like the United States put itself in a state of war with a small city like Falluja?" 
In a statement on government television in August 2006, Iraq 's Prime Minister Nouri al-
Maliki sharply criticized US-Iraqi raids on Baghdad 's Sadr City, saying that such operations
"violate the rights of citizens." "This operation used weapons that are unreasonable to detain
someone – like using planes," he said, before apologizing to the Iraqi people. He promised
"this won't happen again." 
These public statements signal serious differences between even hand-picked Iraqi politicians
and US military commanders and they show how little control the sovereign and elected Iraqi
25 | P a g e

government has over these offensives. Iraqi official statements have not stopped the US
military from continuing these campaigns, even in Baghdad itself.

US Rule in Iraq:

In place of the Iraqi state, the US established the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), a
governing body without Iraqi participation, headed by Paul Bremer, a Pentagon
appointee.  Bremer set up his offices in Saddam's former Republican Palace and ruled the
country by decree, with almost unlimited powers. To protect the unpopular CPA from a
growing Iraqi resistance movement, Bremer organized a tightly-controlled, four square mile
security area in the middle of Baghdad known as the "Green Zone," where the CPA and the
military high command could live and work in relative safety. With virtually no Arabic
speakers and only the most minimal knowledge of the country, Bremer and his team of
youthful Republican enthusiasts from Washington set out to rebuild Iraq according to neo-
conservative principles.
Bremer radically restructured Iraq 's public institutions and the Iraqi economy. He issued over
a hundred sweeping decrees. In one of the first such "Orders," he suspended all tariffs,
customs duties and import fees, opening Iraq 's economy to the effects of free trade after
years of protectionism. Meanwhile, the CPA was freely spending Iraq 's oil revenues and the
billions taken over from the UN Oil-for-Food account. CPA staff and military officers handed
out millions in cash, in hopes of winning Iraqi friends and "jump starting" the Iraqi economy.
A spirit of corruption, beginning in the CPA itself, quickly took root. Halliburton, Parsons,
Fluor and other huge construction companies, took billions in "reconstruction"
contracts.  Behind the scenes, planning was under way for the privatization of Iraq 's fabulous
oil resources, from which US and UK companies like Exxon, Shell and British Petroleum
expected an enormous profit. While Bremer gave wide publicity to a newly-created Iraq stock
exchange, Iraq 's banking system was dysfunctional, its industry collapsing, and even its vital
oil sector sinking. Unemployment and poverty rose steadily.
The process of drafting and approving a new Constitution was also problematic, leading to
further sectarian rancor. The referendum ground-rules, stipulated in the interim constitution,
were changed at the last minute before the vote of October 15, 2005 and voting irregularities
cast a shadow over the results.  Instead of the widely-expected rejection, the constitution was
declared adopted. Parliamentary elections followed on December 15 with an outcome that
gave power to sectarian blocs of Kurdish and Shia parties. The political process had become
increasingly sectarian and rising violence made issue-based campaigning virtually
impossible. When finally, a new constitutional parliament took office in early 2006, the
fleeting hopes generated by the elections had already begun to fade among the Iraqi public.
Months of maneuvering were required to form a government. The political leadership under
26 | P a g e

Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki proved weak, sectarian and incapable of uniting the country.
Symbolically sited in the fortified Green Zone along with the huge US embassy, the
parliament and the government leaders had little room for political maneuver. Corruption
flourished in the ministries. Militias multiplied. The government's authority scarcely had any
meaning, inside or outside the Green Zone.

Attacks on Cities:
The Coalition has used overwhelming military force to attack several Iraqi cities, on grounds
that they were "insurgent strongholds." These offensives, using heavy air and land
bombardment, culminate in massive armored assaults. They have displaced hundreds of
thousands of people, caused large civilian casualties and destroyed much of the urban areas.
The offensives against Falluja in April and November 2004 caused a great outcry. The
Coalition has also assaulted Najaf (April and August 2004), Tal Afar (September 2004 and
September 2005), Samarra (October 2004, September 2005 and March 2006), al-Qaim (May
and November 2005), Haditha (October 2005), Ramadi (October 2005 and June-July 2006)
and Baqubah (January 2007). These military operations have harmed more than two million
people and deepened Iraqi rage at the occupation.  Such attacks continue, especially in Anbar
and Diyala provinces, even though they repeatedly violate the Geneva Conventions.

Sealed-off Cities and Heavy Curfews

As prelude to the attacks, Coalition forces often surround the targeted area with sandbags,
concrete slabs, earthen barricades, and razor wire, turning cities into prison camps. These
preliminary operations deploy thousands of troops, with helicopters and armored construction
vehicles. They close highways and streets, set up roadblocks and checkpoints. In Tal Afar,
attacking forces built an 8-foot high, 12-mile long dirt wall that ringed the entire city. 
Coalition troops seize control of all movement into and out of the cities, including goods and
supplies, water, food, medicines and emergency assistance of all kinds. This "sealing off"
strategy seeks to isolate insurgents and show ordinary civilians the heavy cost of not
cooperating. Lieutenant Colonel Nathan Sossaman described the approach quite bluntly in the
early months of the occupation: "With a heavy dose of fear and violence, and a lot of money
for projects, I think we can convince these people that we are here to help them." 
Coalition forces subject residents to intensive screening at check points, where they are
required to present special identification cards.  At the checkpoints, troops arrest and detain
some Iraqis (often arbitrarily), while routinely denying access to others on grounds that their
documents are not in order. "We are like birds in a cage," said a resident of Abu Hishma to
the New York Times, complaining of the humiliation endured. 
In Falluja, beginning immediately before the November 2004 siege, US forces imposed a
harsh curfew, including restriction of movement within the city of all men under 45 years of
age.  Similar curfews were imposed on Ramadi, Tal Afar and other cities. The UN reported
that road closings and curfews in Ramadi raised prices and created a shortage of basic
supplies in early July 2006, before attacks on the city began.  At Abu Hishma , US forces
locked down the village for 15 hours a day, preventing residents from going to the mosque
for prayers and badly disrupting many families' livelihoods.  Coalition forces have routinely
opened fire on any person or vehicle not in conformity with curfew orders.
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Forced Evacuation and Those Who Remain:

In preparation for the offensives, the US and its allies issue warnings to city residents, urging
them to leave their homes and abandon the urban area. Most of the people then flee. The
Coalition argues that displacement lessens civilian casualties during the heavy bombardment
and fighting, but displacement also creates an excuse for unrestrained military operations –
on grounds that all those remaining are enemy fighters or supporters. Free-fire zones within
the target area are thought to be justified. 
In Tal-Afar, US forces played messages over loudspeakers warning residents to evacuate,
while starting a demonstration bombing of the Sarai neighborhood. Most of the population
(80 percent according to Jon Brain, the BBC 's correspondent in Baghdad eventually fled to
escape the impending fighting. The Coalition has also used air-dropped leaflets to warn city
residents of impending attacks. 
Among those who flee, the most fortunate are able to seek refuge with out-of-town relatives,
but many flee into the countryside where they face extremely difficult conditions, including
shortages of food and water. Eventually the Red Crescent, the UN or relief organizations set
up camps. In Falluja, a city of about 300,000, over 216,000 displaced persons had to seek
shelter in overcrowded camps during the winter months, inadequately supplied with food,
water, and medical care.  An estimated 100,000 fled al-Qaim, a city of 150,000, according to
the Iraqi Red Crescent Society (IRCS). In Ramadi, about 70 percent of the city's 400,000
people left in advance of the US onslaught.  These moments mark the beginning of Iraq 's
massive displacement crisis.
While many leave the cities at the time of warnings, significant numbers remain – an
estimated 50,000 in Falluja and more than 100,000 in Ramadi.  Coalition forces assume that
they are insurgents or sympathizers. But those staying behind have included large numbers of
non-combatant civilians – unable or unwilling to abandon their homes, including children, the
sick, the elderly, and those fearful of a worse fate that might await them beyond the familiar
protection of their city.

Cutting Off Water, Food and Electricity:

The Coalition has repeatedly denied water to residents of cities under siege, including Falluja,
Tal Afar and Samarra , affecting up to 750,000 civilians.  Many families have only limited
emergency water storage and cannot survive long once the central supply has been cut. Along
with water, the Coalition has cut off electricity (which may power pumps and local wells).
They also have cut off food and medical supplies, creating a "state of siege" and imposing a
humanitarian crisis on the entire remaining urban population.
In September 2004, the US "turned off" water supplies to Tal Afar "for at least three days,"
according to the Washington Post.  In October 2004, the Independent  reported that "US-led
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forces cut off power and water" in Samarra .  And in November 2004, the UN reported a
similar cut-off of vital necessities in Falluja, "directly affecting civilians (approximately
50,000 people then remaining inside [the city]) for whom water is a basic need and a
fundamental human right."  Supplies of necessities were unavailable within Falluja for many
days and were withheld by the Coalition even from the displaced citizens in camps outside,
again according to the UN.  The UN reported that in early July 2006, US forces imposed a
"total blockade" of Rutba "for approximately four days" followed by subsequent blockades
"intermittently." 
These siege tactics seek to punish the inhabitants for their presumed sympathy with the
insurgents, force those remaining to leave the city, and press them to turn over insurgent
fighters.  In some cases, the Coalition has used the siege openly as a bargaining tool. In
Ramadi, US and Iraqi forces reportedly told residents that they would not get water,
electricity, telephones and other services back unless they would hand over "the
terrorists."  According to Lieutenant Colonel Hassan al-Medan, the Iraqi spokesperson for the
operation in Najaf, "if we allow the entrance of food and medicines to the city, we are just
feeding the insurgents this in spite of thousands of civilians still within the area.

Confinement of Journalists and Blockage of Media Coverage:

Prior to the major assaults, Coalition commanders have prevented journalists from entering
the targeted cities. All media workers not "embedded" with US forces have been banned for
the duration of the battle and usually a long time afterwards. Sometimes, even embedded
media have been refused access. This gives the Coalition almost complete control over
international public perceptions of what is happening on the battlefield.
Preceding US military operations in Najaf in August 2004, Iraqi police encircled a hotel
where journalists were staying, ordering them to leave the city and threatening to arrest all
those who did not comply with the order.  While claiming that the ban was based on concerns
for the safety of the journalists, police officers said they would confiscate all cell phones and
cameras.  In Falluja, the US military banned all non-embedded journalists from the city.
Reports have mentioned that journalists and camera crews were arrested and their equipment
confiscated, without explanation, before being released later without charges. 
Reporters Without Borders, referring to Najaf, condemned "the totally unacceptable
imposition of an information blackout" and insisted that "the presence of journalists on the
spot is indispensable, as the worst atrocities are always committed in the absence of
witnesses.
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Massive Bombardment:

Coalition forces have inflicted prolonged and intense air and ground bombardment on these
cities, destroying thousands of homes, shops, mosques, clinics and schools, and – inevitably –
killing and injuring many civilians.  The strategy of indiscriminate and massive
bombardment, in advance of ground offensives, has reduced the number of Coalition
casualties, at a heavy cost in life and injury to the remaining Iraqi city residents.
The Washington Post reported that in Falluja, an "official, who spoke on condition of
anonymity, described 12 hours of overnight strikes by American helicopters, fighter-
bombers, field artillery and tanks as ‘shaping operations.' Military commanders use the
term as shorthand for battlefield preparation, combat operations specifically intended to
remove enemy strong points in advance of an assault."  In the second assault on Falluja, the
air strikes began on October 15, the first day of the Muslim holy month of Ramadan, and
continued for three weeks prior to the assault of November 7. In Najaf, US Marines
bombarded the cemetery near the famous Imam Ali Shrine as well as much of the city center,
in a massive attack backed by aircraft and tanks. In Ramadi, US forces carried out intensive
bombardment, targeting the city's power stations, water treatment facilities, and water pipes,
leaving many destroyed houses and no civilian services functioning. 
US military bombardment has destroyed large areas of the cities. Reports have confirmed that
whole neighborhoods have been leveled and elsewhere just hulks of buildings stand. "Those
who have witnessed US aircraft firing missiles into packed tenements in Sadr City, and have
seen the resulting carnage, treat claims of ‘precision strikes' … with deep skepticism"
commented the London-based Independent newspaper. 
Air strikes and artillery bombardment are typically indiscriminate. According to an Iraq Body
Count study on different types of weapons, aircraft attacks have been responsible for the
largest proportion of children killed.  In addition to massive bombardment with high
explosives, there is clear evidence of the use of indiscriminate and especially injurious
weapons, particularly incendiaries, in these ferociously violent campaigns. 

Urban Assault, Snipers and Violent Searches:

After extensive bombardment, Coalition armed forces storm into the cities with columns of
tanks and other armored vehicles. Heavy tank fire blasts into many structures, widening the
urban desolation.
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Troops seize remaining buildings and carry out house searches in those structures still
standing. The soldiers often use violent methods to enter houses, such as setting off
explosives or knocking down part of the front wall with a military vehicle. 
The US military has increasingly relied on snipers to back-up infantry patrols. Commanders
portray snipers as a precision method to avoid civilian casualties, but in fact sniper teams
often fire at anyone moving in the streets, in gardens or even inside of buildings. Everyone is
treated in the besieged cities as an enemy.
Using night goggles and special high-power scopes, snipers shoot at any moving object,
which might be a civilian going out in desperate search for food or water, seeking medical
care, escaping a collapsing building, or trying to leave the city. During the siege of Falluja in
April 2004, the Guardian  reported that US snipers shot an ambulance, an elderly woman
carrying a white flag, and an aid worker delivering medical supplies on foot.  The UN
reported that, in August 2006, snipers in Ramadi shot thirteen civilians who had breached the
curfew, killing six and injuring seven in just one district of the city.

Attacks on Medical Facilities and Prevention of Humanitarian Assistance:

Coalition troops have targeted medical facilities during urban offensives, and repeatedly
destroyed and confiscated ambulances, making emergency care nearly impossible. In Falluja,
US troops "destroyed a civilian hospital in a massive air raid, captured the main hospital and
prohibited the use of ambulances. "Medical personnel were arrested and the patients
removed.  Similarly, as the US prepared to launch a major assault on Najaf, Al-Hakeem
Hospital was "taken over as a coalition military base, off limits to civilians." 
In the summer of 2006, during an offensive against Ramadi, Coalition forces captured the
city's General Hospital, endangering the sick and rendering health care impossible. According
to the UN, troops seized the city's Specialized Hospital on July 5 and held it more than a
week until July 13, after which time they withdrew but set up a patrol outside.  Further UN
reports have spoken of Coalition snipers stationed on the roof of the Ramadi General
Hospital, troops quartered in the hospital garden, and fearful residents avoiding the hospital
altogether.  In Tal Afar, the UN reported that the city hospital had been "occupied" by
Coalition forces for six months.
Coalition forces have blocked access to humanitarian and medical relief convoys trying to
enter cities, obstructing the work of humanitarian agencies trying to assess needs, deliver
relief supplies and bring urgent assistance to the population.  In Samarra, in March 2006, US
troops turned back the Iraqi Red Crescent Committee's aid convoys, leaving hundreds of
families, including children, without medical assistance and basic necessities. 
Najaf's top health official Falah Al-Mahtani reported that the attack was causing "a real
catastrophe" for local health services. "Ambulances are prevented from reaching the injured
people," he said. "Our staff is not able to reach the hospitals. We are paralyzed."  As a result,
a far higher proportion of injured civilians have died or suffered serious bodily damage than
if medical care had been available, contributing to the soaring Iraq mortality rate.
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Casualties in war

US-led military operations in populated areas have caused scores of civilian deaths and
injuries. People have been killed by ordnance explosions, collapsed buildings, fires, sniper
shots and many other violent causes. While Coalition forces claim that most of those killed in
attacks are men of military-age, reliable reports suggest that many, if not most, of the victims
in these operations have been non-combatants. A 2005 report by UNAMI concluded: "The
United Nations has been unable to obtain accurate figures concerning civilian losses
following such operations but reports received from civil society organizations, medical
sources and other monitors indicate that they are significant and include women and children.
During the first week of the assault on Falluja in April 2004, the city General Hospital 's
Director Rafie al-Issawi reported that over 600 people had died, most of them women,
children and the elderly.  In Najaf too, "the total number killed was 570 with 785 injured.
These statistics were taken from local hospitals and didn't include bodies buried in homes or
elsewhere during the fighting."  Using accounts from tribal leaders, medical personnel and
local witnesses, the Washington Post calculated that "Operation Steel Curtain," a US
offensive in November 2005, included bombings that killed 97 civilians in Husaybah, 80 to
90 in al-Qaim, 18 children in Ramadi, and many other civilians in additional cities and
villages. Amnesty International and other human rights organizations have expressed concern
at the growing number of civilian casualties due to extremely violent US counter-insurgency
operations. The rising use of air strikes, which grew five-fold in 2005, has greatly increased
the likelihood of civilian deaths in the battles over urban areas. 

Estimated casualties of civilians:

One of the highest estimates was published in the UK medical journal The Lancet, which said
that over 600,000 violent deaths occurred between the invasion and June 2006.
Most other estimates of civilian deaths are much lower, with the Iraq Index published by the
Brookings Institution in Washington DC reporting nearly 115,000 civilian deaths from March
2003 to April 2011.
The Iraq Index also says that nearly 4,500 US troops have been killed in Iraq since the start of
hostilities.
Between 800 and 900 US troops died each year from 2004 to 2007.
But casualties have fallen since then with just 60 deaths last year and 24 so far in 2011.
The highest number of US soldiers to be killed in Iraq was just over 900, in 2007, the same
year that then-president George W Bush announced that a surge of 21,000 extra troops would
enter the country.
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For Iraqi military members and police, the bloodiest year on record was 2005, when just over
2,500 were killed.
The 2003 US invasion of Iraq was sold to the American public as a war to defend the nation
and free the Iraqi people.
But the costs have steadily risen, in financial terms and in lives - both military and civilian.
The number of civilian casualties during the eight-year occupation of Iraq has been less easy
to pin down.

Why did Bush go to war in Iraq?

Sixteen years after the United States invaded Iraq and left a trail of destruction and chaos in
the country and the region, one aspect of the war remains criminally underexamined: why
was it fought in the first place? What did the Bush administration hope to get out of the war?
The official, and widely-accepted, story remains that Washington was motivated by Saddam
Hussein's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programmed. His nuclear capabilities,
especially, were deemed sufficiently alarming to incite the war. As then US Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice said, "We do not want the smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud."
Despite Saddam not having an active WMD programmed, this explanation has
found support among some International Relations scholars, who say that while the Bush
administration was wrong about Saddam's WMD capabilities, it was sincerely wrong.
Intelligence is a complicated, murky enterprise, the argument goes, and given the foreboding
shadow of the 9/11 attacks, the US government reasonably, if tragically, misread the evidence
on the dangers Saddam posed.
There is a major problem with this thesis: there is no evidence for it, beyond the words of the
Bush officials themselves. And since we know the administration was engaged in a
widespread campaign of deception and propaganda in the run-up to the Iraq war, there is little
reason to believe them.
My investigation into the causes of the war finds that it had little to do with fear of WMDs -
or other purported goals, such as a desire to "spread democracy" or satisfy the oil or Israel
lobbies. Rather, the Bush administration invaded Iraq for its demonstration effect.
A quick and decisive victory in the heart of the Arab world would send a message to all
countries, especially to recalcitrant regimes such as Syria, Libya, Iran, or North Korea, that
American hegemony was here to stay. Put simply, the Iraq war was motivated by a desire to
(re)establish American standing as the world's leading power.
Indeed, even before 9/11, then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld saw Iraq through the
prism of status and reputation, variously arguing in February and July 2001 that ousting
Saddam would "enhance US credibility and influence throughout the region" and
"demonstrate what US policy is all about".
These hypotheticals were catalyzed into reality by September 11, when symbols of American
military and economic dominance were destroyed. Driven by humiliation, the Bush
administration felt that the US needed to reassert its position as an unchallengeable hegemon.
The only way to send a message so menacing was a swashbuckling victory in war. Crucially,
however, Afghanistan was not enough: it was simply too weak a state. As prison bullies
know, a fearsome reputation is not acquired by beating up the weakest in the yard. Or as
Rumsfeld put it on the evening of 9/11, "We need to bomb something else to prove that we're,
you know, big and strong and not going to be pushed around by these kinds of attacks."
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Moreover, Afghanistan was a "fair" war, a tit-for-tat response to the Taliban's provision of
sanctuary to al-Qaeda's leadership. Rumsfeld, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz,
and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith considered restricting retaliation to
Afghanistan dangerously "limited", "meager", and "narrow". Doing so, they alleged, "may be
perceived as a sign of weakness rather than strength" and prove to "embolden rather than
discourage regimes" opposed to the US. They knew that sending a message of unbridled
hegemony entailed a disproportionate response to 9/11, one that had to extend beyond
Afghanistan.
Iraq fit the bill both because it was more powerful than Afghanistan and because it had been
in neoconservative crosshairs since George HW Bush declined to press on to Baghdad in
1991. A regime remaining defiant despite a military defeat was barely tolerable before 9/11.
Afterwards, however, it became untenable.
That Iraq was attacked for its demonstration effect is attested to by several sources, not least
the principals themselves - in private. A senior administration official told a reporter, off the
record, that "Iraq is not just about Iraq", rather "it was of a type", including Iran, Syria, and
North Korea.
In a memo issued on September 30, 2001, Rumsfeld advised Bush that "the USG [US
government] should envision a goal along these lines: New regimes in Afghanistan and
another key State [or two] that supports terrorism [to strengthen political and military efforts
to change policies elsewhere]".
Feith wrote to Rumsfeld in October 2001 that action against Iraq would make it easier to
"confront - politically, militarily, or otherwise" Libya and Syria. As for then-Vice President
Dick Cheney, one close adviser revealed that his thinking behind the war was to show: "We
are able and willing to strike at someone. That sends a very powerful message."
In a 2002 column, Jonah Goldberg coined the "Ledeen Doctrine", named after
neoconservative historian Michael Ledeen. The "doctrine" states: "Every ten years or so, the
United States needs to pick up some small crappy little country and throw it against the wall,
just to show the world we mean business."
It may be discomfiting to Americans to say nothing of millions of Iraqis that the Bush
administration spent their blood and treasure for a war inspired by the Ledeen Doctrine. Did
the US really start a war - one that cost trillions of dollars, killed hundreds of thousands of
Iraqis, destabilized the region, and helped create the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
(ISIL) - just to prove a point?
More uncomfortable still is that the Bush administration used WMDs as a cover, with equal
parts fearmongering and strategic misrepresentation - lying - to exact the desired political
effect. Indeed, some US economists consider the notion that the Bush administration
deliberately misled the country and the globe into war in Iraq to be a "conspiracy theory", on
par with beliefs that President Barack Obama was born outside the US or that the Holocaust
did not occur.
But this, sadly, is no conspiracy theory. Even Bush officials have sometimes dropped their
guard. Feith confessed in 2006 that "the rationale for the war didn't hinge on the details of
this intelligence even though the details of the intelligence at times became elements of the
public presentation".
That the administration used the fear of WMDs and terrorism to fight a war for hegemony
should be acknowledged by an American political establishment eager to rehabilitate George
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W Bush amid the rule of Donald Trump, not least because John Bolton, Trump's national
security adviser, seems eager to employ similar methods to similar ends in Iran.

Reason behind the US invasion of Iraq:

The immediate considerations behind the invasion of Iraq were characterized by concerns
brought to the forefront by the events of September 11 th 2001, namely global terrorism, and
more importantly, the weapons at its disposal in a new era of transnational asymmetrical war
waged by non-state actors. As President George W. Bush made it clear in his State of the
Union on January 29th 2002, in meeting this challenge, the US would not differentiate
between terrorist groups and nations which harbor or arm them (Bush, 2002). This policy led
to the invasion of Afghanistan, motivated by the need to remove al-Qaeda’s safe haven and
training ground.
Iraq did not specifically harbor al-Qaeda, but it had provided training camps and other
support to terrorist groups fighting the government of Turkey and Iran, as well as hard-liner
Palestinian groups. In fact, “the question of Iraq’s link to terrorism grew more urgent with
Saddam’s suspected determination to develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD), which
Bush administration officials feared he might share with terrorists who could launch
devastating attacks against the United States” (Council on Foreign Relations, 2005).
Nonetheless, the official reason that the US cited for launching the invasion was exemplified
by Colin Powell’s statement to the United Nations on February 5 th 2003 (Washington Post,
2005).
However, the unofficial reasons why the US led the Invasion of Iraq in 2003 are equally
important. The main unofficial consideration was that removing Saddam Hussein would be a
demonstration of US military might against a visible enemy, a demonstration which hawkish
elements within the Bush administration and the military establishment considered necessary
to deter others and to dispel any appearance of weakness following 9/11 (Karon, 2011). This
consideration is motivated by Realism, and, according to Daniel Lieber Feld’s explanatory
perspectives on the Iraq Invasion, was meant to “maintain unipolarity, maintain hegemony
and avoid post-9/11 decline by demonstrating U.S. willingness to use force” (Lieber Feld,
2005).
Saddam Hussein’s Iraq was considered the perfect country to be made an example of as
animosity between the US and Saddam Hussein went back many decades, and removing him
was considered unfinished business by many senior Neo-conservatives in the Bush
administration such as Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Vice President Dick Cheney
(Manne, 2004). Thus, this essay aims to examine both the immediate and official reasons
why the US led the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the unofficial goals of this campaign, as well as
other contributing considerations which had been present long before 9/11.
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1: Weapons of Mass Destruction

The attacks of 9/11 demonstrated that the US was vulnerable and that a large-scale attack by
a non-state terrorist organization was possible. It also demonstrated that these organizations
had the will to cause as much death and destruction as possible and did not have any scruples
about inflicting casualties on civilians or were prepared to follow rules of war accepted by
most nation states to some degree or other. It, therefore, followed that groups such as these
would try to acquire weapons as destructive as possible, which in the modern world was no
longer as difficult or unthinkable as it once was. During the Cold War era, only nation states
possessed the capability to inflict large scale damage, but in the post-Cold War world, with
the democratization of technology, small groups of people not bound to any specific state
could inflict catastrophic damage (Tschirgi, 2007). The emphasis, therefore, was no longer on
these groups alone, but also on their possible sponsors. At the top of this list were countries
which had grievances with the United States, had links to terrorist organizations, were located
in the Muslim Middle East, had WMD or the ability to manufacture them, and had used them
in the past. The one country which stood out more than most was Iraq.
“Iraq’s history with chemical, biological and nuclear weapons is a long and winding path that
eventually ended in the American invasion of the country” (Wright and Hopper, 2005). On
June 7th 1981, Israeli warplanes launched a surprise attack on the French built Osirak nuclear
reactor near Baghdad by claiming that Iraq was building a nuclear weapon which it could use
against Israel (Wright and Hopper, 2005). Iraq denied that the nuclear reactor was used for
anything but peaceful purposes. In 1983, Iraq used chemical weapons in its war with Iran,
which lasted from 1980 to 1988. Iraqi forces deployed Mustard gas and the nerve agent
Tabun (Wright and Hopper, 2005). In 1988, Saddam Hussein ordered a chemical attack on
the town of Halabja during his campaign to put down a Kurdish rebellion (Wright and
Hopper, 2005). On April 3rd 1991, after Iraqi forces were expelled from Kuwait following the
first gulf war, “the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed its first resolution
addressing Weapons of Mass Destruction in Iraq. Resolution 687 stated that Iraq must
destroy its presumed stockpile of WMD, and the means to produce them” (Wright and
Hopper, 2005). Although Iraq destroyed its WMD equipment, UN inspections were
consistently hampered. On October 11th 1991, the UNSC passed resolution 715 stating that
Iraq must “accept unconditionally the inspectors and all other personnel designated by the
Special Commission” (Wright and Hopper, 2005).
Another possible consideration was now that the US had proved that it had the will to go to
war by invading Afghanistan, Iraq, and other countries that were a part of the “Axis of Evil,”
they would normally not associate with as an insurance policy in case the US invaded
(Soderblom, 2004). This meant that the US would need to strike soon, before hostile regimes
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had time and opportunity to make such arrangements or instigate programmed to manufacture
these weapons.
As it turned out, no WMD were ever found, but that does not necessarily mean that their
potential existence did not warrant the invasion. Bush administration officials argued a
“better safe than sorry” policy and pointed to Saddam’s continued non-cooperation with the
UN inspection teams as well as the nebulous nature of Iraq’s WMD programmed as
legitimizing US military action. Detractors of this stance argue that even if the Bush
administration did not outright lie about Iraq’s WMD programmed, it at the very least
massively inflated its dimensions, sophistication, and threat level in order to justify the war.
The most outspoken critics of the Bush administration claimed that the Iraq War was about
oil, citing administration officials’ statements to that effect (Wright, 2003). According to
Noam Chomsky, the deals taking shape between Iraq’s Oil Ministry and Western oil
companies also.

2: A Visible Enemy
Another reason why the US led the invasion of Iraq in 2003 was that it presented a visible
enemy. The US invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001 had led to the rapid collapse of the
Taliban regime and the remainder of its fighters along with al-Qaeda had retreated into the
tribal areas bordering Pakistan. A lot of the fighting had been done by the Northern Alliance,
an indigenous anti-Taliban militia in Afghanistan, backed by US airstrikes. US Special
Forces and then US ground forces did enter Afghanistan and fought the Taliban and al-
Qaeda, notably during Operation Anaconda in March 2002 (Naylor, 2006), but it was not the
awe-inspiring hammer blow which the US wanted to demonstrate its power. “Instead,
Pentagon planners began shifting military and intelligence resources away from Afghanistan
in the direction of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, which was increasingly mentioned as a chief U.S.
threat in the war on terror” (Council on Foreign Relations, 2002). Iraq presented a much
better arena to show the world the extent of the US’ military supremacy.
For the US, the defeat of the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan showed it would live up to
its policy brought into being by President Bush’s State of the Union, but it was not an ample
example of the punishment that rogue states which were a part of the Axis of Evil could
expect to receive. Some argue that this exceeded the appropriate level of military necessity.
According to Henry Michaels, “purely military considerations cannot explain such savagery.
Bush’s war plans are driven by political aims—to terrorize and demoralize the Iraqi people
and the Arab masses and send a message of violence and intimidation to the entire world”
(Michaels, 2003). In general, however, it is accepted that the US army has largely kept to the
principles of distinction and proportionality in Iraq (Powers, date unknown), with some
notable exceptions such as the Abu Ghraib incident and the Haditha killings.
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3: The Domino Effect

The invasion of Iraq and its intended effects cannot be simply seen by themselves, but must
be understood in the greater context. The US intended the invasion to not only topple Saddam
Hussein and remove the threat of WMD production and diffusion, but also to bring
democracy to a country in the center of a region almost completely devoid of it. In his State
of the Union, President Bush made it clear that he intended to bring democracy to the Middle
East. His doctrine at its core was that people who are free and prosperous do not fly airplanes
into skyscrapers. In his speech, he made his point that “all fathers and mothers, in all
societies, want their children to be educated and live free from poverty and violence. No
people on earth yearn to be oppressed, or aspire to servitude, or eagerly await the midnight
knock of the secret police” (Bush, 2002).
Once Iraq was a flourishing democracy prosperous from massive oil revenues which would
pay for reconstruction, it would become an example which other states, or at least their
populations, would emulate. Hostile regimes in the region would find it harder and harder to
paint the US in a negative light and to control and oppress their citizens. One regime after
another would be toppled, supplanted by friendly governments representing grateful
populations which would end in a stable, peaceful, and secure Middle East, constituting
victory in the war on terror, safeguarding the United States, improving Israel’s security, and
ensuring uninterrupted global access to oil reserves.

Causes of US Invasion in Iraq:

1: Remove Saddam’s Dictatorship

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Indeed, the western world headed by US participated in the coalition against Iraq under not
grounds; of course, there had been more than one reason but other than those reasons which
were announced to the entire globe. It was true to know the fact that more than 150 Members
of Parliament have signed a Commons motion tabled by the Labor backbencher, condemning
any attack that didn’t have the backing of the United Nations.
Then; whey European countries and United States legalized for invasion of Iraq. In other
words, Saddam really was a very bad man indeed and should not be trusted an inch. (Nick
Assinder,2002). With these words, United Kingdom may have participated in the war against
Iraq out of special impressions against Saddam’s regime, regardless of any facts he might be
faced with which did not support his case.
2: Self Defense
The United Stated invaded and interfered Iraq with self-defense claims. The United States did
not have clear right to self-defense. Although, the administration confirmed that it was
entitled to defend itself against any potential attack may take place in the future. President
Bush displayed Saddam Hussein’s regime, in his speech to the United Nations on September
12, 2002, as “a grave and gathering danger,”. Explaining that persistent Saddam’s regime had
mass destruction weapons, and named it “outlaw regime”. He provided such weapons sent to
terrorists (Adam P. Tait. 2005).
Furthermore, the US administration also said that the United States had a right to self-defense
on the grounds because the Iraqi regime was a link and relation to Al Qaeda. US
administration confirmed that the organization was responsible for the attacks on the United
States in September 11, 2001. Secretary of State Colin Powell told the United Nations
Security Council in February 2003that Iraq protected a terrorist cell headed by Abu Musab
Zarqawi. Powell also added that Iraq and Al Qaeda leaders had met about eight times at the
least since the early 1990s along with had a link to Ansar al-Islam, an Islamist militia group
was based in a lawless part of northeast Iraq.
3: Weapons of Mass Destruction
Second false allegation was that Iraq has chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs
as well as its development of long-range missile. It was also alleged that Iraq supported
terrorism, were the justifications put forward for forcibly disarming Iraq. However, weapons
of mass destruction were not used by Iraqi forces, on the first hand and UN inspectors did not
discover any weapons of mass destructions before the war or even US forces while the war.
U.S. intelligence suggested that such chemical and biological weapons were dispersed and
armed with established command and control. Observers saw that U.S. forces toppled
military structure of Iraq and the authorization to use such weapons. Others saw that Iraq had
little incentives to use such weapons, for several reasons: they had limited military utility
against U.S. forces, which moved fast; Iraq had rare delivery options given to U.S. and allied
forces; as well as use of such weapons would convert world’s opinion against Iraq. While
many observers saw that the threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction would increase the
closer U.S. forces got to Baghdad, and then decrease once they were in the city (Raymond W.
Copson,2003)
4: War on Terrorism
Although the Bush administration has justified its invasion against Iraq as part of the war on
terrorism. It claimed that Saddam Hussein supported terrorist groups in the Middle East.
Although, they did not focus their attacks on U.S. targets instead of being part of the war on
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the terrorist network. This allegation was not considered justified strongly and attacking of
the United States still an unprovoked invasion of Iraq. It detracted from US administration
and actually cause more retaliatory terrorism against U.S. targets. Furthermore, invading Iraq
would increase radical Islamists around the world, acting as a virtual recruiting poster for al-
Qaeda and destabilizing friendly regimes in the Middle East. Bush administration wanted to
put all its resources and efforts for fighting the foe enemy at the gates “al-Qaeda.”. In fact,
Iraq invasions had had the very predictable effect of enhancing the position of Al Qaeda and
other Islamist groups throughout the Arab and Muslim worlds. None of such causes were
credible for invading Iraq at that time and even now (Brand Howard, 2004).
An international law permitted nations to use military force to prevent genocide or other
humanitarian catastrophes. However, when Saddam Hussein has committed horrific acts
against his own people in the past, the U.S. has not argued that intervention is necessary to
address continuous crimes against humanity (Michael, C. Dorf, 2003).
5: Economic Benefit
On the other side, main cause to invade Iraq was economic benefit throughout oil resources.
United State of America intended to invade Iraq in spite of opposition from world community
because there were not motivations or main causes to do so. According to Duffield said that
“effect such a move might have on Iraqi oil production and exports.” Iraq had about potential
to produce big volumes of oil than it was producing prior to the invasion. The low production
was due to a set of historic circumstances and conditions that decreased production of Iraqi
oil including the devastation caused by the Iran-Iraq war, the first Gulf War, and the UN
sanctions that followed that war. Saddam also decreased oil exports at various times as a way
to attempt to gain leverage over American and Israeli foreign policy.

Current status of Iraq & US relation:

Because of the primary roles taken by the United States and Britain in deposing Saddam
Hussein and establishing interim governments to replace his regime, Iraq's relationships with
those countries, particularly the United States, are expected to remain important for the
foreseeable future.
The Iraqi insurgency, later referred to as the Iraq Crisis, escalated after the withdrawal of
U.S. troops in 2011, resulting in violent conflict with the central government, as well as
sectarian violence among Iraq's religious groups. This escalated into a civil war with the
conquest of Fallujah and Mosul and major areas in northern Iraq by the Islamic State of Iraq
and the Levant (ISIL, also known as ISIS). This has resulted in airstrikes by Iran, Syria, and
other countries – including the United States.
In January 2017, US President Donald Trump issued an executive order banning the entry of
all Iraqi citizens, as well as citizens of six other countries. After sharp criticism and public
protests as well as lawsuits against the executive order, Trump relaxed the travel restrictions
somewhat and dropped Iraq from the list of non-entry countries in March 2017.
As of October 2019, United States continued to use Iraqi bases for conducting operations
such as the Barisha raid.
After a 2020 attack near Baghdad International airport, outgoing Prime Minister Adil Abdul-
Mahdi condemned America's assassination and stated that the strike was an act of aggression
and a breach of Iraqi sovereignty which would lead to war in Iraq. He said the strike violated
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the agreement on the presence of U.S. forces in Iraq and that safeguards for Iraq's security
and sovereignty should be met with legislation. The media office of the Iraqi military's joint
operations forces posted a photo of a destroyed vehicle on fire after the attack. The speaker of
Iraq's parliament Mohammed al Halbousi vowed to "put an end to the U.S. presence" in
Iraq. Iraq's military condemned the American attack, stating "we affirm that what happened is
a flagrant violation of Iraqi sovereignty and a clear breach by the American forces of their
mandate which is exclusively to fight Islamic State and provide advice and assistance to Iraqi
security forces. On January 5, the Iraqi parliament approved a resolution to expel US troops
from the country. In response, Donald Trump threatened to impose sanctions on Iraq “like
they’ve never seen before.

New low in US-Iraq relations: What’s next for 2020?

In early 2019, I predicted that US forces would remain in Iraq this past year despite calls in
parliament to pass a law mandating their withdrawal. My prediction was right. My prediction
for 2020 is that no US forces will remain in Iraq by the end of the year. As someone who
firmly believes in the importance of robust US-Iraq ties and works hard to help both sides
improve and strengthen the relationship, I am saddened at this recent deterioration and am
concerned about the future.
How did we get to this new low and potentially game-changing turning point in US-Iraq
relations and what does it mean?

For starters, if Iran was behind the attack on the Iraqi base near Kirkuk on December 27 that
killed an American civilian contractor and wounded Americans and Iraqi servicemen and
they were hoping to get the United States to strike inside Iraq, Tehran got exactly what it
wanted. Iraqi political blocs of all strips condemned the US reprisal that hit Popular
Mobilization Force (PMF) targets in Syria and Iraq and killed over twenty-five people.
Moreover, some Iraqi political leaders are now calling on the government to ask for the
withdrawal of US troops.
The protesters who have been camped out in Tahrir Square for months will now also likely
add the removal of US forces to their growing list of demands for the next prime minister,
who has still not been appointed after weeks of uncertainty following Prime Minister Adil
Abdul-Mahdi’s resignation. While Abdul-Mahdi managed to prevent a parliamentary vote to
demand the US troop withdrawal last year when his government was firmly situated, the
situation now is quite different. Now Abdul-Mahdi has no legs to stand on in terms of
negotiating power, and the next prime minister will not be in a stronger position.
For all these reasons, the days of the United States’ sizable diplomatic, military, and business
presence in Iraq are numbered. It is likely that several Iraqi armed groups allied with Iran will
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revert to their pre-2012 mode if they do not get their way via political means, as cleric
Moqtada al-Sadr has written. Moreover, the attack on the US Embassy demonstrated that the
Iraqi government and its security forces are unable to reign in all the armed non-state actors
when these groups are determined to take matters into their own hands.
One of the most important consequences of this crisis is that any pro-US prime minister
candidate will have next to zero chance of confirmation by Iraq’s parliament in the coming
weeks. Another critical consequence, and one that will be exploited by many, is that the
attention on Iraq will shift away from the protesters and the reforms they are calling for to the
“more newsworthy” events in the Green Zone and the aftermath of the attack on the US
Embassy. This is a regrettable turn of events for all parties, and it is likely to get worse before
it gets better.
The demonstrators who camped outside the US Embassy have agreed to dismantle their tents
and clear the area at the request of the Iraqi government and the orders of their respective
leaders. They said that their message was received and they scored a victory for the time
being. Their next step is to take the fight to parliament to expel the US troops. This step has
been the goal of many Iraqi leaders since the victory over ISIS was announced.
Back in February 2019 when US President Donald J. Trump stated that US troops were
stationed in Iraq to monitor Iran, many Iraqi leaders called for their expulsion, but the US
administration managed to walk back the US president’s statement and assured the Iraqis that
the US-Iraqi agreement and the Iraqi constitution that prohibits the use of foreign forces for
such a purpose would be fully respected. The issue came up again when Israel bombed PMF
bases inside Iraq in August 2019, but the United States avoided a crisis by denying any prior
knowledge of the bombing or coordination with the Israelis. Now that the United States has
struck the PMF inside Iraq, the pressure on the Iraqi government and parliament for the
passage of the law that would remove US troops will be overwhelming. The law’s passage is
only a matter of time. The only question is whether it will be a complete withdrawal, as the
hawkish proponents call for, or whether there will be a compromise to mandate a significant
troop reduction and leave a very small number of trainers.
The same goes for the outlandish demands to close the US Embassy in Baghdad. The United
States will most likely be able to maintain a significant diplomatic presence in Iraq, but it will
not be as large as it has been in the past. If the US-PMF relations remains as hostile as they
have been, it will be very hard to maintain a strong US presence outside the fortified
Embassy compound in the Green Zone. This is particularly important for the US companies
that must have high confidence of security to operate if they receive major contracts in Iraq’s
vital sectors. With the Iraqi government in a weak position to control the use of violence, the
PMF will not go away. The only way to solve this problem is for the international community
to allow a truly independent government to exist in Iraq. Otherwise, external powers such as
Iran will continue to meddle in Iraq’s affairs and derail the progress it has made in the post-
2003 era.
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The U.S. Role in the Future of Iraq

The United States of America has invested significant time and effort in Iraq over the last
fifteen years, yet the Iraqi political process continues to falter. The damage of the country’s
limited adoption of democratic values is continually demonstrated in each election cycle.
This is especially complicated by the outsized role of Iraq’s Islamist political parties
connected to Iran.
Since these parties believe in the primacy of the Quran in governance and Ayatollah
Khomeini’s doctrine of Velayat-e Faiqh, their goals are driven by regional concerns for the
primacy of Iran rather than domestic stability and democracy—even treating democratic
principles with a large degree of suspicion. Values of democratic equality such as those
connected to women, child protection, human rights, and citizenship are often viewed with
suspicion. These connections are complicated; Quds Force head Major General Qassem
Soleimani has control over sizable Iraqi militias, and his dictates further contribute to the
submission of these political parties to Iranian dictates.
In contrast with Iran’s clear and continued engagement in Iraqi politics, U.S. interests in the
future of Iraq remain opaque for many domestic observers. Though the United States has
stated that the regional influence of Iran is one of its primary foreign policy concerns, these
efforts are complicated by the history of U.S. foreign policy in Iraq. With the Obama
administration’s nuclear agreement with Iran and the withdrawal of American military forces
from Iraq, many anti-Iranian groups inside Iraq have interpreted the United States as
acquiescing for Iraq to be subject to Iran’s expansionist whims. The inclusion of the Fatah
Alliance in the dominant political coalition demonstrates the result of the Obama
administration’s previous silence on Soleimani’s actions in the country, and the continued
mixed messaging from the current administration.
It is not unreasonable to trace many of Iraq’s ills to a failed American policy in Iraq: political
and economic crises in the face of disappearing Iraqi sovereignty and a real absence of the
principle of the separation of powers, with rampant financial and administrative corruption.
Iran has exploited the indecision of U.S. foreign policy to expand its influence in Iraq as a
means of developing stronger influence across the whole region, and Iranian-backed parties
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have shown little interest in stemming Iraq’s major crises. Rather, Iranian actions actively
threaten Iraqi democracy; political parties affiliated with Iran have worked in a concerted
manner to forge election results in both Shi’a and Sunni provinces—the latter of which
contain Sunnis suffering from corruption who are linked through mutual connections with
Soleimani and his followers.
The currently forming Iraqi government seems to be particularly vulnerable to Iranian
machinations. Soleimani himself met with Iraqi politicians—including a number of
politicians notorious for corruption—in order to form a bloc of over a hundred members that
stands as a clear challenge to politicians looking to reduce Iranian influence in Iraq.
In the past months since the Iraqi elections, Soleimani has also sent a clear message to Iraqi
and U.S. officials alike through the development of an oppositionist bloc of 145 members of
parliament under Badr’s Hadi al-Ameri and former Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki that Iran
will have significant control of minister positions and voting blocs.
Soleimani’s clear success in controlling a sizable source of power in the new Iraqi
government demonstrates the impact of a persistent and clear stance in Iraqi politics, both to
the Iranian government and Iraqis themselves. Moreover, Soleimani’s activist stances
continue to contrast with State Department officials’ mixed messaging throughout the lengthy
process of Iraqi government formation, including its apparent acceptance of Iraqi elections
results despite evidence of corruption.
Without a clear vision from U.S. officials in Iraq, the country lacks serious prospects of a
moderate Iraqi government liberated from Iranian influence ever forming. Many Iraqis who
relied on the U.S. vision of moderation and democracy as a model for their country have lost
trust in American policy. Soleimani's efficacy in promoting his goals is appealing in
comparison, and his allure may serve as a fatal blow to independents, moderates, democrats,
and to future American interests in Iraq.
The solution is clear: The United States and its representatives in Iraq must have clear stances
on Iraqi politics and demonstrate that working with the United States has clear benefits for
Iraq. The American administration should not allow its staff to recycle the same policies
adopted by Obama’s administration in Iraq, especially since they no longer reflect the United
States’ overall renewed focus on Iran.
Perhaps the most effective and quickest way to restore benign American influence is the
implementation of existing Iraqi-American agreements. America could also contribute to
bringing about reconciliation between Iraq’s different sects in order to re-engage Sunni Iraqis
in the political process by giving them the sense of playing a part in Iraq’s future. Perhaps the
United States can allocate further resources to support the country’s process of
decentralization in the country and supporting efforts to bring Sunni Arabs into the country’s
armed forces. Finally, the United States should work to support Iraqi media that can counter
sectarian Iranian propaganda that seeks to spread division among the people of Iraq.
However, this does not mean that the United States is unilaterally responsible for the U.S.-
Iraqi relationship. Iraq, for its part, must retain its ability to act independently in oil markets,
whatever the situation with market indicators and regional struggles may be. Strengthening
the Iraqi-American partnership will not come about only through American investment in
Iraq, but rather through cooperation, which will ultimately bring about economic and
strategic benefits to both countries.
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Will the Iraq-U.S. relationship survive the Trump era?

Iraq is at an important crossroads in the fight against the Islamic State. With aggressive
posturing between the incoming Trump Administration and Iran, pressure will increase on
Iraqi Prime Minister al-Abadi. Is the future of the Iraq-U.S. relationship now at risk?  
Iraq’s Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi has been under a state of political siege for the last few
years. The country has been held together begrudgingly by a shared determination to confront
and defeat extremism but political divisions among Iraq’s ruling Shia Muslims are now
especially heightened following the Trump Administrations’ executive order to ban Iraqi
citizens (among a list of six other countries) from entering the U.S. for 90 days.
Though this ban has since been overturned by a Federal judge, the move has laid bare the
dangers that the embattled PM faces from the followers of the popular Shia cleric Moqtada
al-Sadr, who has consistently urged the Iraqi government to expel U.S. diplomatic and
military personnel from the country. Al-Sadr met with the Prime Minister in late December to
discuss reforms and the ongoing security situation.
On the other side, Abadi has to be mindful of the pro-Iranian members of his own Islamic
Dawa Party. Chief among those is the former Prime Minister and Dawa Party leader, Nouri
al-Maliki, who has been touring southern Iraq to shore up support among his fellow Shia
Arab constituents. In the southern city of Basra, anti-Maliki protesters stormed a meeting hall
where Maliki was due to speak. Widespread speculation indicated that the anti-Maliki
protests were organized by al-Sadr. In an appeal to Arab nationalism, Maliki recently called
for Kurdish Peshmerga to withdraw from areas liberated from the so-called Islamic State
group (IS).
Amidst this inter-Shia struggle comes the arrival of the Trump Administration with stinging
comments about Iraq’s oil resources, rising anti-American sentiment within Iraqi society, and
the enticement of other regional powers. Iraq’s provincial elections, originally scheduled for
April 2017, have been pushed back to 2018, the same time as the federal elections. The
U.S. relationship with Iraq, which includes diplomatic, economic, military and intelligence
cooperation at all levels, looks to be on the path towards certain doom.

Conclusions About Iraq War

On a military level the Iraq War was a clear demonstration of what happens when a force
uses advanced technology coupled with 21st century tactics against a poorly trained
opponent. Ultimately, Iraq stood little chance against professional Coalition forces which
were steeped both physically and intellectually in the art of war. Casualties on the part of the
Coalition were relatively light, while the Iraqis suffered the destruction of huge formations.
Of course, morale played a part as well. Regular army units were not enthusiastic supporters
of Saddam's regime, causing them to melt back into the population at the first opportunity.
However, the Fedayeen and Baath party members were fanatical supporters, but spent
themselves in suicidal attacks.
While the Coalition victory was impressive, the aftermath proved to be a longer struggle. It
moved into a political phase, in the United States, in Iraq, and around the world. The goal of
the U.S. was to bring stability and democracy to the region in the face of opposition by
fanatics still infiltrating the country from outside (the Iraq Insurgency). The battle though was
not just on the ground in Iraq; it was also fought out in the halls of the Congress of the United
States and in the media. The question would be how much was the United States willing to
pay in the lives of soldiers and the treasure of the nation in order to accomplish its goals?
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There is little question that if the U.S. does not establish peace in the region that the results
will be disastrous for both the Iraqi people and U.S. prestige. Ultimately, the United States
and its allies would be faced with terrorism on the home front.
Weapons of mass destruction were not found in Iraq after the Iraq War (though they were
found after the Gulf War). Their probable existence was probably the chief justification for
coalition actions - besides the humanitarian aspect presented by the benefits of destroying a
murderous regime. However, at the time of the beginning of the Iraq war, all intelligence
analysts believed that the Iraqis had nuclear weapons in development. The fact is that
Saddam Hussein had a history of developing weapons of mass destruction. There is little
doubt that he would indeed have put back in place the program which had been dismantled by
the allies in 1992-93 once he got out from under the U.N.'s prying eyes, which looked likely
with the support of both France and Russia.
In the final analysis the war could be justified on humanitarian, political, and military
grounds. The deaths of hundreds of thousands of Iraqis were due to Saddam's brutality. He
supported terrorists, going so far as to fund their recruiting efforts by paying the families of
martyrs. Bringing democratic governance to the region could bring both stability and peace.
Saddam was at war for most of his nearly thirty years in power. He was a destabilizing power
in the region, spending the nation's vast oil wealth to fund military adventurism. Saddam was
captured, hiding in a hole in the ground, in December of 2003. He was brought before a court
in his own country in a trial that was fairer than any, he allowed his political opposition. He
was hanged for his terrible crimes.
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References:
1. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraq_War
2. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rationale_for_the_Iraq_War
3. https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/war-in-iraq-begins
4. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/03/world/middleeast/us-iraq.html
5. https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/jan/08/iran-us-iraq-war-2003-bush-
trump-media