Calalang v.
Williams (REINE) FACTS:
December 2, 1940 | Laurel J| Social Justice
PETITIONER: Maximo Calalang
RESPONDENTS:A.D. Williams
1.SUMMARY: Calalang brought before the SC a writ of prohibition against
respondents due to the resolution of the National Traffic Commission which
recommended to he Director of Public Works and to the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from
passing along Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to
Dasmarinas Street, from 7:30 a. m. to 12:30 p. m. and from 1:30 p. m. to 5:30 p.
m.; and along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo
Street to’ Echague Street, from 7 a. m. to 11 p.m., for a period of one year from
the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic. The Secretary of Public
Works and Communications in his second indorsement approved the
recommendation that Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue be closed to traffic of
animal-drawn vehicles, between the points and during the hours as above
indicated, for a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante
Bridge to traffic. The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila
have enforced and caused to be enforced the rules and regulations thus adopted
and that as a consequence of such enforcement, all animal-drawn vehicles are
not now allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the places above-mentioned
to the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well.
Calalang contends that CA 548 is unconstitutional because it constitutes an
undue delegation of legislative power and that its provisions infringe on the
promotion of social justice to insure the well being & economic security of all
people.
The Court held that the authority therein conferred upon them and under which
they promulgated the rules and regulations now complained of is not to
determine what public policy demands but merely to carry out the legislative
policy laid down by the National Assembly in said Act, to wit, “to promote safe
transit upon and avoid obstructions.
As to social justice, social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the
people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure
economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the
maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of
the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of
measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of
rowers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored
principle of salus populi est suprema lex
DOCTRINE: Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of
interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should
be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic
life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the
health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about “the greatest good to the
greatest number.
1.) Maximo Calalang (Calalang) brought before the SC a writ of prohibition against
respondents (AD Williams-Chairman of the National Traffic Commission, Vicente
Fragrante- Director of Public Works, Sergio Bayan- Acting Secretary of Public
Works & Communications, Eulogio Rodriquez-Mayor of the City of Manila, & Juan
Dominguez- Acting Chief of Police of Manila)
2.) The National Traffic Commission (NTC), in its resolution of July 17, 1940,
resolved to recommend to the Director of Public Works and to the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from
passing along Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to
Dasmarinas Street, from 7:30 a. m. to 12:30 p. m. and from 1:30 p. m. to 5:30 p. m.;
and along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to’
Echague Street, from 7 a. m. to 11 p.m., for a period of one year from the date of the
opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic.
3.) The Chairman of the NTC recommended to the Director of Public Works the
adoption of the measure proposed in the resolution in pursuance of Commonwealth
Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director of Public Works, with the approval of
the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to promulgate rules and
regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads.
4.) The Secretary of Public Works and Communications in his second indorsement
approved the recommendation that Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue be closed to
traffic of animal-drawn vehicles, between the points and during the hours as above
indicated, for a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante
Bridge to traffic. The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila
have enforced and caused to be enforced the rules and regulations thus adopted and
that as a consequence of such enforcement, all animal-drawn vehicles are not now
allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the places above-mentioned to the
detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well.
5.) Calalang contends that Commonwealth Act. No 548 by  which the Director of
Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, is authorized to promulgate rules and regulations for the regulation
and control of the use of and traffic on national roads and streets is unconstitutional
because it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. 
ISSUE/s:
WoN Commonwealth Act No. 548 is unconstitutional because it constitutes an
undue delegation of legislative power?- NO
WoN the provision of CA No 548 infringes on the promotion of social justice to
insure the well being and economic security of all people?- NO
RULING: WHEREFORE, the writ of prohibition prayed for is hereby denied, with
costs against the petitioner. So ordered.
Ratio:
1.) As stated in Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro: “The true distinction therefore
is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a
discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its
execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be
done; to the latter no valid objection can be made.
2.) Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 548 states: To promote safe transit upon,
and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads by acts of
the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the Philippines, the
Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to regulate
and control the use of and traffic on such roads and streets. Such rules and
regulations, with the approval of the President, may contain provisions controlling
or regulating the construction of buildings or other structures within a reasonable
distance from along the national roads. Such roads may be temporarily closed to
any or all classes of traffic by the Director of Public Works and his duly authorized
representatives whenever the condition of the road or the traffic thereon makes such
action necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest, or for a
specified period, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications.
3.) The above provisions of Commonwealth Act No 548 do not confer legislative
power upon the Director of Public Works and the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications. The authority therein conferred upon them and under which they
promulgated the rules and regulations now complained of is not to determine what
public policy demands but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the
National Assembly in said Act, to wit, “to promote safe transit upon and avoid
obstructions…”
4.) The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not the determination of what the law
shall be, but merely the ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon which the
application of said law is to be predicated. To promulgate rules and regulations on
the use of national roads and to determine when and how long a national road should
be closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the traffic thereon and the
requirements of public convenience and interest, is an administrative function which
cannot be directly discharged by the National Assembly.
5.) It must depend on the discretion of some other government official to whom is
confided the duty of determining whether the proper occasion exists for executing
the law. But it cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion is the making of the
law.
6.) The growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of
governmental regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, the
rigidity of the theory of separation of governmental powers has, to a large extent,
been relaxed by permitting the delegation of greater powers by the legislative and
vesting a larger amount of discretion in administrative and executive officials, not
only in the execution of the laws, but also in the promulgation of certain rules and
regulations calculated to promote public interest.
Unlawful interference with legitimate business or trade and abridge the right to
personal liberty and freedom of locomotion
7.) Said Act, by virtue of which the rules and regulations complained of were
promulgated, aims to promote safe ‘transit upon and avoid obstructions on national
roads, in the interest and convenience of the public. In enacting said law, therefore,
the National Assembly was prompted by considerations of public convenience and
welfare.
8.) It was inspired by a desire to relieve congestion of traffic. which is, to say the
least, a menace to public safety. Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the
enactment of said law, and the state in order to promote the general welfare may
interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations.
9.) The scope of police power keeps expanding as civilization advances. The
development of civilization, the rapidly increasing population, the growth of public
opinion, with an increasing desire on the part of the masses and of the government to
look after and care for the interests of the individuals of the state, have brought
within the police power many questions for regulation which formerly were not so
considered.
Infringement on promotion of social justice to insure the well being and
economic security of all the people
10.) Social justice is “neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor
anarchy,” but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and
economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively
secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the
promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of
measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements
of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social
equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community,
constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-
constitutionally, through the exercise of rowers underlying the existence of all
governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex.
11.) Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity
of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the
protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a
combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental
and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort, and
quiet of all persons, and of bringing about “the greatest good to the greatest
number.
ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDHOLDERS OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
 SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM (JOSEF)
July, 14, 1989 | Cruz, J. | History of Agrarian Reform in the Philippines
PETITIONERS:
GR 78742: Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, et al.
GR 79310: Arsenio Al. Acuna, et al.
GR 79744: Inocentes Pabico
GR 79777: Nicolas S. Manaay and Agustin Hermano Jr.
RESPONDENTS: (Same order)
Honorable Secretary of Agrarian Reform
Joker Arroyo, et al.
Hon. Philip E. Juico, et al.
Hon. Philip E. Juico as Secretary of Agrarian Reform and Land Bank of the
Philippines
SUMMARY: This is a consolidation of 4 petitions involving the same legal queries
about the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (R.A. 6657) and several
presidential issuances with regard to it (Proc. No. 131, P.D. No. 27, E.O. Nos. 228
and 229). Petitioners in these cases raise several constitutional infirmities that makes
CARP invalid, namely: violation of Due Process, Equal protection clause, taking
without just compensation, fails to provide for retention limits, violation of
separation of powers, determination of just compensation must be lodged with the
judiciary, separation of powers, no valid appropriation, and others. The SC was able
to answer all these questions but it particular focused on the issue of just
compensation. Under this problem, there were still three sub-problems: (1) WoN the
determination of just compensation must be done by the judiciary only (2) WoN just
compensation must be fully paid before the title is passed (3) WoN just
compensation should be paid only with money and not with other forms. For the first
issue, there is nothing in the law the removes such power from the judiciary. The
proposal of just compensation by the DAR is only initial or preliminary and therefore
subject to review by the court. For the second issue, the law itself provides that the
title of the owners shall only be transferred upon full payment. With regard the third
issue, jurisprudence says that compensation must be paid with money and not any
other things with value. However, the court said that this is a revolutionary kind of
expropriation as it involves lands all over the country intended to be distributed for
the welfare of the society. This project involves a lot of money. Given this, the court
decided that they accept the theory that compensation must not be paid with just full
money. It is not oppressive since the owners still receive things of value.
DOCTRINE: In the pursuit of agrarian reform, we do not tread on familiar ground
but grope on terrain fraught with pitfalls and expected difficulties. This is inevitable.
The CARP Law is not a tried and tested project. On the contrary, to use Justice
Holmes's words, "it is an experiment, as all life is an experiment," and so we learn as
we venture forward, and, if necessary, by our own mistakes. We cannot expect
perfection although we should strive for it by all means. Meantime, we struggle as
best we can in freeing the farmer from the iron shackles that have unconscionably,
and for so long, fettered his soul to the soil.
FACTS:
1. This involves a consolidation of 4 cases involving the same legal queries
including serious challenges to the constitutionality of various laws and its
provisions:
a. R.A. No. 3844, otherwise known as the Agricultural Land Reform
Code
b. P.D. No. 27, which was enacted to provide for the compulsory
acquisition of private lands for distribution among tenant-farmers
and to specify maximum retention limits for landowners
c. E.O. No. 228, declaring full land ownership in favor of the
beneficiaries of P.D. No. 27 and providing for the valuation of still
unvalued lands covered by the decree as well as the manner of
 their payment
d. Presidential Proclamation No. 131, instituting a comprehensive
agrarian reform program (CARP), and E.O. No. 229, providing the
mechanics for its implementation
e. R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law of 1988
G.R. No. 79310
G.R. No. 79777
2. The subjects of this petition are a 9-hectare riceland worked by four tenants
and owned by petitioner Nicolas Manaay and his wife and a 5-hectare
riceland worked by four tenants and owned by petitioner Augustin
Hermano, Jr. The tenants were declared full owners of these lands by E.O.
No. 228 as qualified farmers under P.D. No. 27.
3. CONTENTIONS OF THE PETITIONERS:
a. P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are unconstitutional on grounds
inter alia of separation of powers, due process, equal protection and the
constitutional limitation that no private property shall be taken for
public use without just compensation.
b. President Aquino usurped legislative power when she promulgated
E.O. No. 228.
c. In connection with the determination of just compensation, the
petitioners argue that the same may be made only by a court of justice
and not by the President of the Philippines. Moreover, the just
compensation contemplated by the Bill of Rights is payable in money
or in cash and not in the form of bonds or other things of value.
d. In considering the rentals as advance payment on the land, the
executive order also deprives the petitioners of their property rights as
protected by due process.
e. The equal protection clause is also violated because the order places the
burden of solving the agrarian problems on the owners only of
agricultural lands. No similar obligation is imposed on the owners of
other properties.
4. COMMENT OF THE OSG:
a. The Solicitor General stresses that P.D. No. 27 has already been upheld
by earlier jurisprudence.
b. The determination of just compensation by the executive authorities
conformably to the formula prescribed under the questioned order is at
best initial or preliminary only. It does not foreclose judicial
intervention whenever sought or warranted. At any rate, the challenge
to the order is premature because no valuation of their property has as
yet been made by the Department of Agrarian Reform.
c. The petitioners are also not proper parties because the lands owned by
them do not exceed the maximum retention limit of 7 hectares.
5. The petitioners herein are landowners and sugar planters in the Victorias
Mill District, Victorias, Negros Occidental. Co-petitioner Planters'
Committee, Inc. is an organization composed of 1,400 planter-members.
This petition seeks to prohibit the implementation of Proc. No. 131 and
E.O. No. 229.
6. CONTENTIONS OF THE PETITIONERS:
a. The petitioners claim that the power to provide for a Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program as decreed by the Constitution belongs to
Congress and not the President.
b. They also argued against Sec. 2 of Proc. No. 131 which provides for
the Agrarian Reform Fund (50 Billion) which covers the cost of the
CARP from 1987 - 1992 which shall be financed by what can be taken
from the confiscation of ill gotten wealth by the PCGG. The argument
was that there would be the use of government money without proper
appropriation.
c. Furthermore, they contend that taking must be simultaneous with
payment of just compensation as it is traditionally understood, i.e., with
money and in full, but no such payment is contemplated in Section 5 of
the E.O. No. 229. No full payment because they alleged that it can be
part cash and part bond.
d. The petitioners also argue that in the issuance of the two measures, no
effort was made to make a careful study of the sugar planters' situation.
There is no tenancy problem in the sugar areas that can justify the
application of the CARP to them.
7. COMMENT OF THE OSG:
a. The Solicitor General first invokes the presumption of constitutionality
in favor of Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229.
b. He also justifies the necessity for the expropriation as explained in the
"whereas" clauses of the Proclamation and submits that, contrary to the
petitioner's contention, a pilot project to determine the feasibility of
CARP and a general survey on the people's opinion thereon are not
indispensable prerequisites to its promulgation.
c. On the alleged violation of the equal protection clause, the sugar
 planters have failed to show that they belong to a different class and
should be differently treated.
d. The public respondent also points out that the constitutional prohibition
is against the payment of public money without the corresponding
appropriation. There is no rule that only money already in existence can
be the subject of an appropriation law.
G.R. No. 79744
8. CONTENTIONS OF THE PETITIONERS (others mere reiterations of
previous contentions):
a. The petitioner alleges that the then Secretary of Department of
Agrarian Reform, in violation of due process and the requirement for
just compensation, placed his landholding erroneously under the
coverage of Operation Land Transfer. His petition for recall and
cancellation of the transfer became moot due to the issuance of E.O.
Nos. 228 and 229.
G.R. No. 78742
9. CONTENTIONS OF THE PETITIONERS:
a. The petitioners in this case invoke the right of retention granted by P.D.
No. 27 to owners of rice and corn lands not exceeding seven hectares as
long as they are cultivating or intend to cultivate the same. Their
respective lands do not exceed the statutory limit but are occupied by
tenants who are actually cultivating such lands.
The petitioners claim they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to
enjoy their right of retention because the Department of Agrarian Reform
has so far not issued the implementing rules required under the above-
quoted decree. They therefore ask the Court for a writ of mandamus to
compel the respondent to issue the said rules.
10. COMMENT OF THE OSG:
a. The OSG argues that the regulations implementing P.D. No. 27 have
already been issued (too many Memos and AOs were already issued
and mentioned in this case by the OSG). For failure to file the
corresponding applications for retention under these measures, the
petitioners are now barred from invoking this right.
ISSUE/s:
1. WoN the pertinent laws and provisions that were assailed by the petitioners
are constitutional – Yes, kindly see ratio part
RULING: WHEREFORE, the Court holds as follows:
1. R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are
SUSTAINED against all the constitutional objections raised in the herein petitions.
2. Title to all expropriated properties shall be transferred to the State only upon full
payment of compensation to their respective owners.
3. All rights previously acquired by the tenant-farmers under P.D. No. 27 are
retained and recognized.
4. Landowners who were unable to exercise their rights of retention under P.D. No.
27 shall enjoy the retention rights granted by R.A. No. 6657 under the conditions
therein prescribed.
5. Subject to the above-mentioned rulings all the petitions are DISMISSED, without
pronouncement as to costs.
RATIO: (there were explanations regarding constitutional concepts like what are
the requisites of the inherent powers of the state, but I did not include it here since
puro reiterations lang sya of what we’ve learned from our consti class so nilagay ko
nalang yung relate sa present case since I think mas important sya for easy
reference but please see orig for reference lang dun sa concepts)
POLICE POWER OR EMINENT DOMAIN
1. The cases before us present no knotty complication insofar as the question
of compensable taking is concerned. To the extent that the measures under
challenge merely prescribe retention limits for landowners, there is an
exercise of the police power for the regulation of private property in
accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry out such
 regulation, it becomes necessary to deprive such owners of whatever
lands they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is
definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for which
payment of just compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated is
not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the
surrender of the title to and the physical possession of the said excess and
all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer-
beneficiary. This is definitely an exercise not of the police power but of
the power of eminent domain.
5.
ISSUE OF VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION
2. Issue of Due process: One of the basic principles of the democratic system
is that where the rights of the individual are concerned, the end does not
justify the means. It is not enough that there is a valid objective; it is also
necessary that the means employed to pursue it be in keeping with the
Constitution. In the case at hand, what is affected is the constitutional
right to property which is afforded ample protection in Sec. 9, which
reaffirms the familiar rule that private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation.
6.
3. Issue of Equal protection: Equal protection simply means that all persons or
things similarly situated must be treated alike both as to the rights conferred
and the liabilities imposed. The petitioners have not shown that they belong
to a different class and entitled to a different treatment. The argument that
not only landowners but also owners of other properties must be made
to share the burden of implementing land reform must be rejected.
There is a substantial distinction between these two classes of owners
that is clearly visible except to those who will not see. There is no need to
elaborate on this matter (I wish I could say this during recit lol). In any
event, the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid
classification. Its decision is accorded recognition and respect by the courts
of justice except only where its discretion is abused to the detriment of the
Bill of Rights.
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN
4. (Issue here is that petitioners alleged that only Public Lands are the lands
that must be distributed) Let us dispose first of the argument raised by the
petitioners in G.R. No. 79310 that the State should first distribute public
agricultural lands in the pursuit of agrarian reform instead of immediately
disturbing property rights by forcibly acquiring private agricultural lands.
Parenthetically, it is not correct to say that only public agricultural
lands may be covered by the CARP as the Constitution calls for "the
just distribution of all agricultural lands." In any event, the decision to
redistribute private agricultural lands in the manner prescribed by the CARP
was made by the legislative and executive departments in the exercise of
their discretion (political question). We are not justified in reviewing that
discretion in the absence of a clear showing that it has been abused.
Requisite of Public Use: As earlier observed, the requirement for public
use has already been settled for us by the Constitution itself No less than
the 1987 Charter calls for agrarian reform, which is the reason why
private agricultural lands are to be taken from their owners, subject to
the prescribed maximum retention limits. The purposes specified in P.D.
No. 27, Proc. No. 131 and R.A. No. 6657 are only an elaboration of the
constitutional injunction that the State adopt the necessary measures "to
encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands to
enable farmers who are landless to own directly or collectively the lands
they till." That public use, as pronounced by the fundamental law itself,
must be binding on us.
Requisite of Just Compensation:
a. It bears repeating that the measures challenged in these petitions
contemplate more than a mere regulation of the use of private
lands under the police power. We deal here with an actual taking
of private agricultural lands that has dispossessed the owners
of their property and deprived them of all its beneficial use and
enjoyment, to entitle them to the just compensation mandated
by the Constitution.
b. (Issue here is that petitioners assail the validity of the
determination of the value of just compensation) To be sure, the
determination of just compensation is a function addressed to the
courts of justice and may not be usurped by any other branch or
official of the government. A reading of the aforecited Section
16(d) will readily show that it does not suffer from the arbitrariness
that rendered the challenged decrees constitutionally objectionable.
Although the proceedings are described as summary, the
landowner and other interested parties are nevertheless
allowed an opportunity to submit evidence on the real value of
the property. But more importantly, the determination of the
just compensation by the DAR is not by any means final and
 conclusive upon the landowner or any other interested party,
for Section 16(f) clearly provides:
Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to
the court of proper jurisdiction for final determination of just
compensation.
The determination made by the DAR is only preliminary unless
accepted by all parties concerned. Otherwise, the courts of
justice will still have the right to review with finality the said
determination in the exercise of what is admittedly a judicial
function.
c. (Issue here is the propriety of the payment of just compensation –
whether it must be for full payment only of money or can be paid
by money and other forms) It cannot be denied from these cases
that the traditional medium for the payment of just compensation is
money and no other. And so, conformably, has just compensation
been paid in the past solely in that medium. However, we do not
deal here with the traditional excercise of the power of eminent
domain. This is not an ordinary expropriation where only a
specific property of relatively limited area is sought to be taken
by the State from its owner for a specific and perhaps local
purpose. What we deal with here is a revolutionary kind of
expropriation.
REVOLUTIONARY KIND OF EXPROPRIATION
7. The expropriation before us affects all private agricultural lands whenever
found and of whatever kind as long as they are in excess of the maximum
retention limits allowed their owners. This kind of expropriation is
intended for the benefit not only of a particular community or of a
small segment of the population but of the entire Filipino nation, from
all levels of our society, from the impoverished farmer to the land-
glutted owner. Its purpose does not cover only the whole territory of
this country but goes beyond in time to the foreseeable future, which it
hopes to secure and edify with the vision and the sacrifice of the present
generation of Filipinos. Generations yet to come are as involved in this
program as we are today, although hopefully only as beneficiaries of a
richer and more fulfilling life we will guarantee to them tomorrow through
our thoughtfulness today. And, finally, let it not be forgotten that it is no
less than the Constitution itself that has ordained this revolution in the
farms, calling for "a just distribution" among the farmers of lands that
have heretofore been the prison of their dreams but can now become
the key at least to their deliverance.
8. Such a program will involve not mere millions of pesos. The cost will be
tremendous. Considering the vast areas of land subject to expropriation
under the laws before us, we estimate that hundreds of billions of pesos will
be needed, far more indeed than the amount of P50 billion initially
appropriated, which is already staggering as it is by our present standards.
Such amount is in fact not even fully available at this time.
9. We assume that the framers of the Constitution were aware of this difficulty
when they called for agrarian reform as a top priority project of the
government. It is a part of this assumption that when they envisioned the
expropriation that would be needed, they also intended that the just
compensation would have to be paid not in the orthodox way but a less
conventional if more practical method. There can be no doubt that they
were aware of the financial limitations of the government and had no
illusions that there would be enough money to pay in cash and in full
for the lands they wanted to be distributed among the farmers. We may
therefore assume that their intention was to allow such manner of
payment as is now provided for by the CARP Law, particularly the
payment of the balance (if the owner cannot be paid fully with money),
or indeed of the entire amount of the just compensation, with other
things of value. We may also suppose that what they had in mind was a
similar scheme of payment as that prescribed in P.D. No. 27, which was the
law in force at the time they deliberated on the new Charter and with which
they presumably agreed in principle.
10. The Court has not found in the records of the Constitutional
Commission any categorical agreement among the members regarding
the meaning to be given the concept of just compensation as applied to
the comprehensive agrarian reform program being contemplated.
There was the suggestion to "fine tune" the requirement to suit the demands
of the project even as it was also felt that they should "leave it to Congress"
to determine how payment should be made to the landowner and
reimbursement required from the farmer-beneficiaries. Such innovations as
"progressive compensation" and "State-subsidized compensation" were also
proposed. In the end, however, no special definition of the just
compensation for the lands to be expropriated was reached by the
Commission.
ARGUMENT: THE LANDOWNER IS DIVESTED OF HIS PROPERTY
EVEN BEFORE ACTUAL PAYMENT TO HIM IN FULL OF JUST
COMPENSATION WHICH VIOLATES THE PRINCIPLE OF EMINENT
DOMAIN

11. The recognized rule, indeed, is that title to the property expropriated shall
pass from the owner to the expropriator only upon full payment of the just
compensation.
12. It is true that P.D. No. 27 expressly ordered the emancipation of tenant-
farmer as October 21, 1972 and declared that he shall "be deemed the
owner" of a portion of land consisting of a family-sized farm except that
"no title to the land owned by him was to be actually issued to him unless
and until he had become a full-fledged member of a duly recognized
farmers' cooperative." It was understood, however, that full payment of
the just compensation also had to be made first, conformably to the
constitutional requirement.
13. The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and
ownership of the land to the government on receipt by the landowner of
the corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of the
compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then,
title also remains with the landowner. 57 No outright change of ownership
is contemplated either. Hence, the argument that the assailed measures
violate due process by arbitrarily transferring title before the land is fully
paid for must also be rejected.