Problems of Post-Communism

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China as an Oriental Despotism

George E. Taylor

To cite this article: George E. Taylor (1995) China as an Oriental Despotism, Problems of Post-
Communism, 42:1, 25-28, DOI: 10.1080/10758216.1995.11655581

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 China as an
Oriental Despotism
George E. Taylor

Mao turned China into a C hina is an Oriental despotism fIrst and a communist
country second. Far from changing traditional
modern ized version of the China, Mao· Zedong strengthened traditional Chinese
despotism by replacing the imperial dynasty with a
traditional Oriental political party and by intensifying the power of the
bureaucracy. This unique, self-regenerating society has
despotism, adding a political not been duplicated in the history of the West, nor does
not it behave like a Western country. Economic growth
party and a different ideology. is valued in China, but not at the expense of reduced
po~itical control. Change must originate with the Chi-
His rule was a bloody and nese Communist Party (CCP) and will be permitted only
in line with the party's interests. Outside interference
wasteful failure. Perhaps will not be allowed. The West tried to force China to its
China will be rescued by the way of doing business in the nineteenth century, and the
country ended up developing enclaves and treaty ports
real istic pol icies of Deng and losing control of Hong Kong to a colonial power.
Deng Xiaoping has initiated a period of economic
Xiaoping. growth. His successor must decide how that growth can
be continued without weakening the authority and char-
acter of the state.

GEORGE E. TAYLOR is professor emeritus and former director of the
Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington, and
president emeritus of the Washington Council on International Trade.
Oriental Despotism
Imperial China was not feudal in the European sense.
China does not fIt into any of the unilinear approaches
used to understand the historical development of West-
ern societies. It is different in kind, not merely degree,
from Western experience. Imperial China was charac-
terized by a powerful central government, a highly
trained and powerful bureaucracy, and a strong military.
Tolerating no political rivalry, the state exercised as
much power as possible. It controlled the major ele-
ments of the economy, such as the dikes along the
Yangzi and other rivers, the Grand Canal that brought
foodstuffs north to where the main army was staponed,
the irrigation systems, the distribution of salt and iron,
and the bimetallic currency. The state oversaw the Con-

© 1995 by .tM. E. Sharpe, Inc. Taylor Oriental Despotism 25


fucian education of the bureaucracy, but it permitted
Buddhism most of the time, as well as Taoism and a few
other religious peliefs. .
The Chinese bureaucracy went beyond anything
known in Europe. Bureaucrats dominated every other
class or group and brooked no competition, especially
from wealthy merchants. As the de facto ruling class,
the bureaucracy managed the agrarian economy, admin-
istered justice, and routinely performed public Confu-
cian ceremonies. The bureaucracy dominated the landed
gentry and the military. Such a society does not move
easily into contemporary democratic capitalism, but it
is not afraid of commercial expansion.
The Nationalist Option
In 1928, Chinese Nationalists, led by Chiang Kai-shek,
defeated warlord resistance to the republic and at-
tempted to implement a modem government. During
their years in power, the Nationalists began to build the
institutions of a modem state, but the task was compli-
cated by regular Japanese military intervention and ha-
rassment from Chinese communist armies. They
succeeded in establishing a national currency, a national
banking system, a modem educational system, and a
trained bureaucratic corps. There was a lively exchange
of students with other countries and few barriers to
trade. The strong possibility existed of developing the
basis for a constitutional government. Judging from the
accomplishments of Taiwan since Chiang's govern-
ment moved there in 1949, the Nationalists might have
been successful if not for the Communists and the
Japanese. The Communists did little fighting against
Japan during the war, but they built up a: much larger
army than they had before the full-scale Japanese inva-
sion in 1937 and, in effect, acted like ,allies of the invader
against the Nationalists.
What Did Mao Want?
Mao called himself a socialist, but it is doubtful whether
he understood or cared about the socialist movement as
it developed in Europe. He made a great fuss about the
role of the peasantry, but events have shown that his love
affair with the peasants was a strategic device to employ
until he had the power to create an industrialized society
and thus produce the proletariat, which, in theory, was
to be the leading class in the revolution. Many foreign
observers accepted Mao as an agrarian reformer, but he
was no fighter for the interests of the peasants, whom
26 Problems of Post-Communism January/February 1995
he held in utter contempt-one of the few opinions he
shared with Soviet Communists. Mao's real interest was
in the way in which the Bolsheviks established the
USSR because their power strategies could be adapted
to different conditions in China.
The fierce discussion on the nature of Chinese society
that took place in the ranks of the Communist Interna-
tional (Comintern) and the communist parties of the
USSR and China centered on the issue of whether China
was feudal or whether it already had a proletariat and a
bourgeoisie. That answer would determine whether the
CCP should concentrate its energies on the countryside
with the peasantry or on the towns. Under orders from
the Comintern, the Chinese Communists cooperated
with the "bourgeois" Nationalists until 1927, when they
went their own way and ultimately adapted the strategy
ofus~g the peasantry to seize power.
By 1949, when the Chinese Communist Party de-
feated the Nationalists, it was completely dominated by
Mao Zedong. Mao's ultimate goal was to change human
nature in order to produce a classless society. The pro-
grams he initiated to reach this objective were costly
failures. He thought that the Paris Commune was an
example of people's power and social equality, in other
words, true communism. He seems to have been serious
enough about equality to harass intellectuals in many
different ways, including sending them to live with
peasants for extended periods. An elitist of the worst
sort, Mao believed that only he knew what was best for
all Chinese, and he had the will and power to impose it on
them. Mao made no important contribution to Marxism-
Leninism but he was a talented ideological strategist.
Emperor Mao
After the communist victory in 1949, Mao adopted the
imperial system in almost every important aspect. Mao
did not assume the mantle of emperor, but he,put himself
in the same omnipotent position, reinforced by a new
political party. Like the emperors of old, he controlled
ideology and relied on the same system of rewards and
punishments for his subjects. Mao, however, went much
further than the emperor in extending his domination
over the people, to the point of trying to organi2;e the
very lives and thoughts of individual peasants. Under
Mao, first land ownership was redistributed, then the
peasants were organized into varying forms of cooper-
atives and collective farming; the government took a
J
large share of agricultural production as tribute. The
CCP led campaigns, such as the Cultural Revolution and
 Great Leap Forward, against various ideological targets,
terrified and paralyzed potential opposition forces, and
trained aspiring party workers. Imposing totalitarian
control cost the Chinese people dearly. New evidence
from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences suggests
that the violent campaigns such as the Great Leap For-
ward and the Cultural Revolution may have been re-
sponsible for up to 80 million deaths. The mass
starvation caused by the campaigns drove people to eat
their own children and even to sell their bodies as
"pork." In the drive to enforce his policies Mao know-
ingly allowed millions of people to die.
Mao turned party apparatchiks into his own bureau-
cratic class. Replacing the imperial system of written
examination were many tests of the candidate's loyalty
to the party, understanding of policy, and grasp of "Mao
Zedong Thought." He had the advantage over the em-
perors of better means of communication, a political
party, and new techniques of thought control.
Deng's main achievement was
to turn the party around and put
economic reform at the top of its agenda.
Mao co-opted the value system of Confucianism. The
hierarchical system of loyalties and authority was the es-
sence of the imperial system of social control. The
emperor held a mandate from heaven to rule the empire.
Imperial China actively supported the authority of the
father over the family, whose behavior was also his
responsibility. The Chinese value system was loaded
very heavily in favor, first, of lineal obedience, then of
collateral bonding and loyalty to the clan or other orga-
nizations. Individualism was neither ,encouraged nor
cultivated. Mao did not challenge this value system. In
fact, his communist party was based on collateral loyal-
ties and lineal authority.
Against the background of this barbaric system, the
rise ofDeng Xiaoping is as amazing as his achievements
since he came to power. Almost two decades ago, Deng
and his whole family hid themselves away from the
murderous arm of ChaLrman Mao for six years, a fan-
tastic achievement. When it was safe to return to Bei-
,. jing, Deng was restored to his previous positions and
initiated great changes in the economy. A pragmatic
communist, Deng did not return the land to the peasants, '
but rather assured them of family tenure of thirty or more
years. Then he allowed the peasants to sell any produce
in excess of state needs. These measures increased
agricultural output enormously and enriched some of
the peasants. In industry he allowed factory managers
wider powers in matters of staffing; procurement, and
marketing. He restricted mandatory state planning and
gave more power to the provinces, but, as shown by
events at Tiananmen Square in 1989, is willing to use
force to crush any pot~ntial challenge to state authority.
Deng was also aware that the party and the army were
interfering too much in the role of the government as
such and took steps to mend matters, probably to no
avail. His main achievement was to tum the party
around and put economic reform at the top of its agenda.
Deng took the leadership, after the Maoist ideology hit
a dead-end, and cultivated party support for the propo-
sition that successful economic policies could be the
basis for legitimacy.
When Deng shifted the ideological ground, he met
with a strong hostile reaction from some of the party
faithful. The issue was economic planning versus a
market economy. Deng countered with the argument
that the capitalist countries had some elements of plan-
ning and socialist countries had their versions of mar-
kets. The formula established a new economic
legitimacy. The words were critical. Five years earlier
the formula was to build a socialist planned economy;
now it was to build a socialist market system. So China
today, due mainly to Deng, is on the path of economic
development, with a foothold in the mainstream of
international trade.
Who Succeeds to the Dragon Throne?
One advantage of a monarchical system is continuity;
some Chinese dynastic hO\lses lasted for centuries. Sta-
bility allows the monarchy to eliminate the question of
succession. The communist system under Mao provided
for succession by a process marked by rivalry, assassi-
nation, conspiracy, betrayal, and treachery. Mao actu-
ally chose his heirs, but his own system disposed of three
of his choicet'>o An imp.ortant difference between Com-
munist China and imperial China is the former's lack of
an orderly succession process and respect for the rule of
law.
Deng Xiaoping' s'failing health has initiated an early
struggle to succeed him. Just as military support was
vital for imperial rulers, so too will the Chinese army
play Ii'decidittg role in determining Deng's successor.
At Mao's death, the People's Liberation Army I
(PLA)
was a v~ry lean machine. Today it is very large and very
corrupt. The PLA today is so wealthy that it can exercise
economic as well as military power. Greatly benefiting
Taylor otiental Despotism 27

from Deng's economic policies, the army runs large
businesses and does not pay taxes. Deng' s credentials
with the army were sound enough for him to control
it, but China is running out of party members with the
same record of military service. The military may be
out of control. All this makes even more important the
sloppy and bloody system, or lack of system, of suc-
cession.
The Search for legitimacy
The succession question is bound up with the matter of
legitimacy. The nearest thing that the communists have
to a genuine constitution is the legacy of Marx and
Lenin, but that has long been devalued and overshad-
owed by the so-called Mao Zedong Thought, and this
vacuous exercise gives no guidance. The communist
version of Chinese nationalism is evident: in this view,
advocacy of an independent Taiwan is unthinkable, as
is challenging the conquest of Tibet or expansion in the
south seas, and the role of army is inviolable.
It is not out of the question that the army, heavily
involved as it is in the new economic growth, may be
willing to make a deal with the new middle class and
retire the party members who cling too stubbornly to the
past. That is the only way in which serious adjustment
can be made to the problem of absorbing the new
economic forces. - many foreign observers, he would see the strength of
The commitment to a market economy is not irrevers-
ible, but it is worthwhile so long as the party seeks to
regain China's former domination of East Asia. On the
other hand, economic growth poses serious problems. If
China's economy falls into a recession, Deng' s enemies
will have ammunition for their opposition to the present
economic course, and he might no longer be there to
defend it. Neutral observers are concerned about the
decrease in arable land, the heavy reliance on coal for
energy, the inadequacy of the .infrastructure to carry the
load, and the environmental devastation that is as dan-
gerous for the rest of the world as it is for China itself.
Deng's policies may well do more to erode the power
of the party than to strengthen its legitimacy with the
people. It depends on who gets the credit for economic
success, if the success continues. The party must enlist
new members and bureaucrats who understand the ways
of international finance, trade, and politics well enough
to enable the party to understand and control the econ-
To order reprints call1-800-352-221O; outside the U.S. call 717-632-3535.
28 Problems of Post-Communism January/February 1995
omy. This may call for concessions that might be diffi-
cult to make. Deng' s impressive political achievements
may well unintentionally pave the way for the further
decline of the party. A weak party could live on, perhaps,
as the handmaiden of the army, each surviving on the
other's corruption.
.The ironyis that some partyme(J]bers in .
Beijing are asking: HdW.did Taiwan do it?
The moral of the story is that the new Oriental des-
potism is having to adjust its party bureaucratic control
over national growth to the forces generated by a market
economy_ The irony is that some party members in
Beijing are asking: How did Taiwan do it? A Manchu
emperor would recognize his former empire quite
readily and would be impressed with how far despotism
can be extended when the tools are available. He would
find the same dominant bureaucracy, the same some-
what battered despotic rule from Beijing, the same
impoverishment among riches. The army is still influ-
ential politically and much more involved in the econ-
omy. There is little in the way of rule of law or respect
for Confucianism, and there is more thought control
than was possible under the empire. He would be baffled
by the role of the Communist Party. But, better than
this unique society and its resistance to basic change.
The challenge of the market economy is serious but
probably not to the point of undermining the party-bu-
reaucratic state. The truth is that the communists
strengthened the institutions of Oriental despotism and
made it harder for domestic forces in favor of change to
achieve their objectives. .
It is essential that U.S. policymakers do not assume
that the glow of Chinese commercial expansion indi-
cates an acceptance of democratic-capitalist values and
institutions. The reality is an imperialist power intent on
supremacy in East Asia, heavily armed with nuclear
weapohs, proud of i~s veto in the United Nations Secu-
rity Council, active in the politics of the Arab world and
Southeast Asia, engaged in Imperial-size public works
such as the Yangzi River Dam project, and as xenophobic
as ever. A long time will pass before democracy becomes
a way of life' in China. It is as a political peril that China
looms large in the world, not as an economic challenge.