MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, petitioner, 
vs. CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, during the pendency of an appeal.—Section 4, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that,
Ombudsman; GUALBERTO J. DE LA LLANA, Special Prosecutor; SANDIGANBAYAN
and REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, respondents.
Criminal Procedure; Complaint and Information; Jurisdiction; Where the accused
voluntarily submitted himself to the court or was duly arrested, the court thereby acquires
jurisdiction over the person of the accused.— It has been held that where after the filing of the
complaint or information a warrant for the arrest of the accused is issued by the trial court
and the accused either voluntarily submitted himself to the court or was duly arrested, the
court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused. The voluntary appearance
of the accused, whereby the court acquires jurisdiction over his person, is accomplished either
by his pleading to the merits (such as by filing a motion to quash or other pleadings requiring
the exercise of the court’s jurisdiction thereover, appearing for arraignment, entering trial) or
by filing bail. On the matter of bail, since the same is intended to obtain the provisional liberty
of the accused, as a rule the same cannot be posted before custody of the accused has been
acquired by the judicial authorities either by his arrest or voluntary surrender.
Same; Same; Posting of bail bond tantamounts to submission to the jurisdiction of the
court.—We find and so hold that petitioner is deemed to have voluntarily submitted herself to
the jurisdiction of respondent court upon the filing of her aforequoted “Urgent Ex-parte Motion
for Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond for and in behalf of Dr. Miriam Defensor-Santiago” wherein
she expressly sought leave “that she be considered as having placed herself under the
jurisdiction of (the Sandiganbayan) for purposes of the required trial and other proceedings,”
and categorically prayed “that the bail bond she is posting in the amount of P15,000.00 be
duly accepted” and that by said motion “she be considered as having placed herself under the
custody” of said court. Petitioner cannot now be heard to claim otherwise for, by her own
representations, she is effectively estopped from asserting the contrary after she had earlier
recognized the jurisdiction of the court and caused it to exercise that jurisdiction over the
aforestated plead-ings she filed therein.
Same; Same; Same; In her motion for the acceptance of the cash bond, she requested
respondent court to dispense with her personal appearance, hence, she can not claim later,
she did not personally appear and thereby render the court jurisdiction over her person
ineffectual.—Petitioner would also like to make capital of the fact that she did not personally
appear before respondent court to file her cash bond, thereby rendering the same ineffectual.
Suffice it to say that in this case, it was petitioner herself, in her motion for the acceptance of
the cash bond, who requested respondent court to dispense with her personal appearance
until she shall have recovered sufficiently from her vehicular accident. It is distressing that
petitioner should now turn around and fault respondent court for taking a compassionate
stand on the matter and accommodating her own request for acceptance of the cash bond
posted in her absence.
Remedial Law; Injunction; Appeal; The execution of a judgment decreeing the
dissolution of a writ of preliminary injunction shall not be stayed before an appeal is taken or
unless otherwise ordered by the court, a judgment in an action for injunction shall not be
stayed after its rendition and before an appeal is taken or during the pendency of an appeal.
And, the rule is that the execution of a judgment decreeing the dissolution of a writ of
preliminary injunction shall not be stayed before an appeal is taken or during the pendency of
an appeal, and we see no reason why the foregoing considerations should not apply to a
temporary restraining order. The rationale therefore is that even in cases where an appeal is
taken from a judgment dismissing an action on the merits, the appeal does not suspend the
judgment, hence the general rule applies that a temporary injunction terminates automatically
on the dismissal of the action.
Same; Same; Same; An order of dissolution of an injunction may be immediately
effective, even though it is not final.— It has similarly been held that an order of dissolution of
an injunction may be immediately effective, even though it is not final. A dismissal,
discontinuance, or non-suit of an action in which a restraining order or temporary injunction
has been granted operates as a dissolution of the restraining order or temporary injunction
and no formal order of dissolution is necessary to effect such dissolution. Consequently, a
special order of the court is necessary for the reinstatement of an injunction. There must be a
new exercise of judicial power.
Same; Same; The mere pendency of a special civil action for certiorari, commenced in
relation to a case pending before the lower court, does not even interrupt the course of the
latter when there is no writ of injunction restraining it.— The original and special civil action
filed with this Court is, for all intents and purposes, an invocation for the exercise of its
supervisory powers over the lower courts. It does not have the effect of divesting the inferior
courts of jurisdiction validly acquired over the case pending before them. It is elementary that
the mere pendency of a special civil action for certiorari, commenced, in relation to a case
pending before a lower court, does not even interrupt the course of the latter when there is
no writ of injunction restraining it. The inevitable conclusion is that for as long as no writ of
injunction or restraining order is issued in the special civil action for certiorari, no impediment
exists and there is nothing to prevent the lower court from exercising its jurisdiction and
proceeding with the case pending before it. And, even if such injunctive writ or order is issued,
the lower court nevertheless continues to retain its jurisdiction over the principal action.
Same; Same; Courts; Jurisdiction; Inherent powers of the courts.—Courts possess
certain inherent powers which may be said to be implied from a general grant of jurisdiction,
in addition to those expressly conferred on them. These inherent powers are such powers as
are necessary for the ordinary and efficient exercise of jurisdiction; or essential to the
existence, dignity and functions of the courts, as well as to the due administration of justice;
or are directly appropriate, convenient and suitable to the execution of their granted powers;
and include the power to maintain the court’s jurisdiction and render it effective in behalf of
the litigants. Therefore, while a court may be expressly granted the incidental powers
necessary to effectuate its jurisdiction, a grant of jurisdiction, in the absence of prohibitive
legislation, implies the necessary and usual incidental powers essential to effectuate it, and,
subject to existing laws and constitutional provisions, every regularly constituted court has the
power to do all things that are reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within
the scope of its jurisdiction. Hence, demands, matters, or questions ancillary or incidental to,
or growing out of, the main action, and coming within the above principles, may be taken
cognizance of by the court and determined, since such jurisdiction is in aid of its authority over
the principal matter, even though the court may thus be called on to consider and decide
matters which, as original causes of action, would not be within its cognizance.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Inherent power of the court to make interlocutory orders
necessary to protect its jurisdiction. ___Furthermore, a court has the inherent power to make
interlocutory orders necessary to protect its jurisdiction. Such being the case, with more
reason may a party litigant be subject to proper coercive measures where he disobeys a
proper order, or commits a fraud on the court or the opposing party, the result of which is
that the jurisdiction of the court would be ineffectual. What ought to be done depends upon
the particular circumstances.
Constitutional Law; The right to travel.—Turning now to the case at bar, petitioner does
not deny and, as a matter of fact, even made a public statement that she had every intention
of leaving the country allegedly to pursue higher studies abroad. We uphold the course of
action adopted by the Sandiganbayan in taking judicial notice of such fact of petitioner’s plan
to go abroad and in thereafter issuing sua sponte the hold departure order, in justified
consonance with our preceding disquisition. To reiterate, the hold departure order is but an
exercise of respondent court’s inherent power to preserve and to maintain the effectiveness of
its jurisdiction over the case and the person of the accused. Second, petitioner asseverates
that considering that she is leaving for abroad to pursue further studies, there is no sufficient
justification for the impairment of her constitutional right to travel; and that under Section 6,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution, the right to travel may be impaired only when so required
in the interest of national security, public safety or public health, as may be provided by law.
Same; Bail Bond; Posting of bail bond, she holds herself amenable at all times to the orders
and processes of the court.— It will be recalled that petitioner has posted bail which we have
declared legally valid and complete despite the absence of petitioner at the time of filing
thereof, by reason of the peculiar circumstances and grounds hereinbefore enunciated and
which warrant a relaxation of the afore-cited doctrine in Feliciano. Perforce, since under the
obligations assumed by petitioner in her bail bond she holds herself amenable at all times to
the orders and processes of the court, she may legally be prohibited from leaving the country
during the pendency of the case.
Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the
redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate court.— One final observation. We
discern in the proceedings in this case a propensity on the part of petitioner, and, for that
matter, the same may be said of a number of litigants who initiate recourses before us, to
disregard the hierarchy of courts in our judicial system by seeking relief directly from this
Court despite the fact that the same is available in the lower courts in the exercise of their
original or concurrent jurisdiction, or is even mandated by law to be sought therein. This
practice must be stopped, not only because of the imposition upon the precious time of this
Court but also because of the inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the
adjudication of the case which often has to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the
proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues since
this Court is not a trier of facts. We, therefore, reiterate the judicial policy that this Court will
not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the
appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a
remedy within and calling for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction.
Same; Same; Same; Right to travel; Parties with pending cases should apply for permission
to leave the country from the same courts.— For the guidance of the bench and the bar, we
elucidate that such policy includes the matter of petitions or motions involving hold departure
orders of the trial or lower courts. Parties with pending cases therein should apply for
permission to leave the country from the very same courts which, in the first instance, are in
the best position to pass upon such applications and to impose the appropriate conditions
therefor since they are conversant with the facts of the cases and the ramifications or
implications thereof. Where, as in the present case, a hold departure order has been issued  ex
parte or motu proprio by said court, the party concerned must first exhaust the appropriate
remedies therein, through a motion for reconsideration or other proper submissions, or by the
filing of the requisite application for travel abroad. Only where all the conditions and
requirements for the issuance of the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus
indubitably obtain against a disposition of the lower courts may our power of supervision over
said tribunals be invoked through the appropriate petition assailng on jurisdictional or clearly
valid grounds their actuations therein.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION to review the resolution of the Sandi-ganbayan.
     The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
     Marciano P. Defensor for petitioner.
     Nestor P. Ifurong for Maria S. Tatoy.
     Danilo C. Cunanan for respondents.
RESOLUTION
REGALADO, J.:
Filed directly with the Court, ostensibly as an incident in the present special civil action, is
petitioner’s so-called “Motion to Restrain the Sandiganbayan from Enforcing its Hold Departure
Order with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary
Injunction, with Motion to Set Pending Incident for Hearing.” Despite the impropriety of the
mode adopted in elevating the issue to us, as will hereinafter be discussed, we will disregard
the procedural gaffe in the interest of an early resolution hereof.
The chronology of events preceding the instant motion is best summarized to readily
provide a clear understanding and perspective of our disposition of this matter, thus:
 . 1.On May 13, 1991, an information dated May 9, 1991 and docketed as Criminal
Case No. 16698 was filed against petitioner with the Sandiganbayan for alleged
violation of Section 3(e), Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act.
. 2.On May 14, 1991, an order of arrest was issued in said case against herein
petitioner by Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena of the Sandiganbayan, with
bail for the release of the accused fixed at P15,000.00.1
. 3.On even date, petitioner filed an “Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of Cash
Bail Bond for and in Behalf of Dr. Miriam Defensor-Santiago,”2 which pertinently
states in part:
xxx
. “3. As a result of the vehicular collision, she suffered extensive physical injuries
which required surgical intervention. As of this time, her injuries, specifically in the
jaw or gum area of the mouth, prevents her to speak (sic) because of extreme pain.
Further, she cannot for an extended period be on her feet because she is still in
physical pain.xxx.
. “4.On the other hand, the accused Miriam Defensor Santiago seeks leave of this
Honorable Court that she be considered as having placed herself under the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, for purposes of the required trial and other
proceedings and further seeks leave of this Honorable Court that the recommended
bail bond of P15,000.00 that she is posting in cash be accepted.
xxx
“WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that the bail bond she is
posting in the amount of P15,000.00 be duly accepted, and that by this motion, she be
considered as having placed herself under the custody of this Honorable Court and dispensing
of her personal appearance for now until such time she will (sic) have recovered sufficiently
from her recent near fatal accident. “Further, on the above basis, it is also respectfully prayed
that the warrant for her arrest be immediately recalled.”
xxx
. 4.Also on the same day, the Sandiganbayan issued a reso-lution3 authorizing
petitioner to post a cash bond for her provisional liberty without need for her
physical appearance until June 5, 1991 at the latest, unless by that time her
condition does not yet permit her physical appearance before said court. On May 15,
1991, petitioner filed a cash bond in the amount of P15,000.00, aside from the other
legal fees.4
. 5.On May 21, 1991, respondent Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez filed with the
Sandiganbayan a manifestation “that accused Miriam Defensor-Santiago appeared in
his office in the second floor of the Old NAWASA Building located in Arroceros Street,
Ermita, Manila at around 3:30 o’clock in the afternoon of May 20, 1991. She was
accompanied by a brother who represented himself to be Atty. Arthur Defensor and
a lady who is said to be a physician. She came and left unaided, after staying for
about fifteen minutes.”5
. 6.Acting on said manifestation, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution also on May
21, 1991, setting the arraignment of the accused for May 27, 1991, and setting
aside the court’s resolution of May 14, 1991 which ordered her appearance before
the deputy clerk of the First Division of said court on or before June 5, 1991.6
. 7.In a motion dated May 22, 1991, petitioner asked that her cash bond be cancelled
and that she be allowed provisional liberty upon a recognizance. She contended that
for her to continue remaining under bail bond may imply to other people that she
has intentions of fleeing, an intention she would like to prove as baseless.7
. 8.Likewise on May 24, 1991, petitioner filed with this Court a petition for certiorari
and prohibition with preliminary injunction, and a subsequent addendum thereto,
seeking to enjoin the Sandiganbayan and the Regional Trial Court of Manila
. 8.Likewise on May 24, 1991, petitioner filed with this Court a petition for certiorari
and prohibition with preliminary injunction, and a subsequent addendum thereto,
seeking to enjoin the Sandiganbayan and the Regional Trial Court of Manila from
proceeding with Criminal Cases Nos. 12298 (for violation of Section 3[e] of Republic
Act No. 3019), 91-94555 (violation of Presidential Decree No. 46), and 91-94897 (for
libel), respectively. Consequently, a temporary restraining order was issued by this
Court on May 24, 1991, enjoining the Sandiganbayan and the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 3, from proceeding with the criminal cases pending before them. This
Court, in issuing said order, took into consideration the fact that according to
petitioner, her arraignment, originally set for June 5, 1991, was inexplicably
advanced to May 27, 1991, hence the advisability of conserving and affording her
the opportunity to avail herself of any remedial right to meet said contingency.
. 9. On May 27, 1991, the Sandiganbayan issued an order deferring: (a) the
arraignment of petitioner until further advice from the Supreme Court; and (b) the
consideration of herein petitioner’s motion to cancel her cash bond until further
initiative from her through counsel.8
. 10.On January 18, 1992, this Court rendered a decision dismissing the petition for
certiorari and lifting and setting aside the temporary restraining order previously
issued.9 The motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was eventually denied
with finality in this Court’s resolution dated September 10, 1992.
. 11.Meanwhile, in a resolution adopted on July 6, 1992, the Sandiganbayan issued a
hold departure order against petitioner which reads as follows:
“Considering the information in media to the effect that accused Santiago intends to leave the
country soon for an extended stay abroad for study purposes, considering the recent decision
of the Supreme Court dismissing her petition promulgated on January 13, 1992, although the
same is still subject of a Motion for Reconsideration from the accused, considering that the
accused has not yet been arraigned, nor that she has not (sic) even posted bail the same
having been by reason of her earlier claim of being seriously indisposed, all of which were
overtaken by a restraining order issued by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 99289 and No.
99290 dated May 24, 1991, the accused is ordered not to leave the country and the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation is ordered not to allow the departure of the
accused unless authorized from (sic) this Court.”10
The hold departure order was issued by reason of the announcement made by petitioner,
which was widely publicized in both print and broadcast media, that she would be leaving for
the United States to accept a fellowship supposedly offered by the John F. Kennedy School of
Government at Harvard University. Petitioner likewise disclosed that she would be addressing
Filipino communities in the United States in line with her crusade against election fraud and
other aspects of graft and corruption.
In the instant motion submitted for our resolution, petitioner argues that:
 . 1.The Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse
of discretion in issuing the hold departure order considering that it had not acquired
jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.
. 2.The Sandiganbayan blatantly disregarded basic principles of judicial comity and
due deference owing to a superior tribunal when it issued the hold departure order
despite the pendency of petitioner’s motion for reconsideration with this Honorable
Court.
. 3.The right to due process of law, the right to travel and the right to freedom of
speech are preferred, pre-eminent rights enshrined not only in the Constitution but
also in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which can be validly impaired only
under stringent criteria which do not obtain in the instant case.
. 4.The hold departure order in the instant case was issued under disturbing
circumstances which suggest political harassment and persecution.
. 5.On the basis of petitioner’s creditable career in the bench and bar and her
characteristic transparency and candor, there is no
. reasonable ground to fear that petitioner will surreptitiously flee the country to evade
judicial processes.11
I. Petitioner initially postulates that respondent court never acquired jurisdiction over her
person considering that she has neither been arrested nor has she voluntarily surrendered,
aside from the fact that she has not validly posted bail since she never personally appeared
before said court. We reject her thesis for being factually and legally untenable.
It has been held that where after the filing of the complaint or information a warrant for
the arrest of the accused is issued by the trial court and the accused either voluntarily
submitted himself to the court or was duly arrested, the court thereby acquires jurisdiction
over the person of the accused.12 The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the
court acquires jurisdiction over his person, is accomplished either by his pleading to the merits
(such as by filing a motion to quash or other pleadings requiring the exercise of the court’s
jurisdiction thereover, appearing for arraignment, entering trial) or by filing bail. On the matter
of bail, since the same is intended to obtain the provisional liberty of the accused, as a rule
the same cannot be posted before custody of the accused has been acquired by the judicial
authorities either by his arrest or voluntary surrender.13
In the case at bar, it becomes essential, therefore, to determine whether respondent court
acquired jurisdiction over the person of herein petitioner and, correlatively, whether there was
a valid posting of bail bond.
We find and so hold that petitioner is deemed to have voluntarily submitted herself to the
jurisdiction of respondent court upon the filing of her aforequoted “Urgent Ex-parte Motion for
Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond for and in behalf of Dr. Miriam Defensor-Santiago” wherein she
expressly sought leave “that she be considered as having placed herself under the jurisdiction
of (the Sandiganbayan) for purposes of the required trial and other proceedings,” and
categorically prayed “that the bail bond she is posting in the amount of P15,000.00 be duly ac-
cepted” and that by said motion “she be considered as having placed herself under the
custody” of said court. Petitioner cannot now be heard to claim otherwise for, by her own
representations, she is effectively estopped from asserting the contrary after she had earlier
recognized the jurisdiction of the court and caused it to exercise that jurisdiction over the
aforestated plead-ings she filed therein.
It cannot be denied that petitioner has posted a cash bail bond of P15,000.00 for her
provisional release as evidenced by Official Receipt No. 4292925 dated May 15, 1991 and
which is even attached as Annex C-2 to her own motion now under consideration. This is
further buttressed by the fact that petitioner thereafter also filed a motion for the cancellation
of said cash bond and for the court to allow her provisional liberty upon the security of a
recognizance. With the filing of the foregoing motions, petitioner should accordingly and
necessarily admit her acquiescence to and acknowledgment of the propriety of the cash bond
she posted, instead of adopting a stance which ignores the injunction for candor and sincerity
in dealing with the courts of justice.
Petitioner would also like to make capital of the fact that she did not personally appear
before respondent court to file her cash bond, thereby rendering the same ineffectual. Suffice
it to say that in this case, it was petitioner herself, in her motion for the acceptance of the
cash bond, who requested respondent court to dispense with her personal appearance until
she shall have recovered sufficiently from her vehicular accident. It is distressing that
petitioner should now turn around and fault respondent court for taking a compassionate
stand on the matter and accommodating her own request for acceptance of the cash bond
posted in her absence.
II. Petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan disregarded the rule of judicial comity when it
issued the hold departure order despite the pendency of her motion for reconsideration of the
decision of this Court which dismissed her petition. She claims that if the principle of judicial
comity applies to prevent a court from interfering with the proceedings undertaken by a
coordinate court, with more reason should it operate to prevent an inferior court, such as the
Sandiganbayan, from interfering with the instant case where a motion for reconsideration was
still pending before this Court. She contends further that the hold departure order contravenes
the temporary restraining order previously issued by this Court enjoining the Sandigan-bayan
from proceeding with the criminal case pending before it.
It will be remembered that the Court rendered a decision in the present case on January
18, 1992 dismissing the petition for certiorari filed in this case and lifting and setting aside the
temporary restraining order it previously issued. It is peti-tioner’s submission that the filing of
her motion for reconsideration stayed the lifting of the temporary restraining order, hence
respondent court continued to be enjoined from acting on and proceeding with the case
during the pendency of the motion for reconsideration. We likewise reject this contention
which is bereft of merit.
Section 4, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that, unless otherwise ordered by the
court, a judgment in an action for injunction shall not be stayed after its rendition and before
an appeal is taken or during the pendency of an appeal. And, the rule is that the execution of
a judgment decreeing the dissolution of a writ of preliminary injunction shall not be stayed
before an appeal is taken or during the pendency of an appeal,14 and we see no reason why
the foregoing considerations should not apply to a temporary restraining order. The rationale
there-for is that even in cases where an appeal is taken from a judgment dismissing an action
on the merits, the appeal does not suspend the judgment, hence the general rule applies that
a temporary injunction terminates automatically on the dismissal of the action.15
 It has similarly been held that an order of dissolution of an injunction may be immediately
effective, even though it is not final.16 A dismissal, discontinuance, or non-suit of an action in
which a restraining order or temporary injunction has been granted operates as a dissolution
of the restraining order or temporary injunction17 and no formal order of dissolution is
necessary to effect such dissolution.18 Consequently, a special order of the court is necessary
for the reinstatement of an injunction.19 There must be a new exercise of judicial power.20
The reason advanced in support of the general rule has long since been duly explained, to
wit:
“x x x The court of this State, relying upon the last of the two clauses quoted, held that an
appeal from an order dissolving an injunction continued the injunction in force. The evils
which would result from such a holding are forcibly pointed out by Judge Mitchell in a
dissenting opinion. He said: ‘Although a plaintiff’s papers are so insufficient on their face or so
false in their allegations that if he should apply on notice for an injunction, any court would,
on a hear-ing, promptly refuse to grant one, yet, if he can find anywhere in the State a judge
or court commissioner who will improvidently grant one ex parte, which the court on the first
and only hearing ever had dissolves, he can, by appealing and filing a bond, make the  ex
parte injunction impervious to all judicial interference until the appeal is determined in this
court.’ * * * Such a result is so unjust and so utterly inconsistent with all known rules of
equity practice that no court should adopt such a construction unless absolutely shut up to it
by the clear and unequivocal language of the statute. x x x.”21
This ruling has remained undisturbed over the decades and was reiterated in a case squarely
in point and of more recent vintage:
“The SEC’s orders dated June 27, 1989 and July 21, 1989 (directing the secretary of UDMC to
call a stockholders’ meeting, etc.) are not premature, despite the petitioner’s then pending
motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals. The lifting by the Court of
Appeals of its writ of preliminary injunction in C.A-G.R. SP No. 17435 cleared the way for the
implementation by the SEC’s en banc resolution in SEC EB Case No. 191. The SEC need not
wait for the Court of Appeals to resolve the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration for a
judgment decreeing the dissolution of a preliminary injunction is immediately executory. It
shall not be stayed after its rendition and before an appeal is taken or during the pendency of
an appeal. x x x.”22
On the bases of the foregoing pronouncements, there is no question that with the dismissal of
the petition for certiorari and the lifting of the restraining order, nothing stood to hinder the
Sandiganbayan from acting on and proceeding with the criminal cases filed against herein
petitioner. At any rate, as we have earlier mentioned, the motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioner was denied with finality in our resolution dated September 10, 1992.
Petitioner further posits, however, that the filing of the instant special civil action for
certiorari divested the Sandigan-bayan of its jurisdiction over the case therein. Whether
generated by misconception or design, we shall address this proposition which, in the first
place, had no reason for being and should not hereafter be advanced under like or similar
procedural scenarios.
The original and special civil action filed with this Court is, for all intents and purposes, an
invocation for the exercise of its supervisory powers over the lower courts. It does not have
the effect of divesting the inferior courts of jurisdiction validly acquired over the case pending
before them. It is elementary that the mere pendency of a special civil action for certiorari,
commenced in relation to a case pending before a lower court, does not even interrupt the
course of the latter when there is no writ of injunction restraining it. 23 The inevitable
conclusion is that for as long as no writ of injunction or restraining order is issued in the
special civil action for certiorari, no impediment exists and there is nothing to prevent the
lower court from exercising its jurisdiction and proceeding with the case pending before it.
And, even if such injunctive writ or order is issued, the lower court nevertheless continues to
retain its jurisdiction over the principal action.
III. It is further submitted by petitioner that the hold departure order violates her right to
due process, right to travel and freedom of speech.
First, it is averred that the hold departure order was issued without notice and hearing.
Much is made by petitioner of the fact that there was no showing that a motion to issue a hold
departure order was filed by the prosecution and, instead, the same was issued  ex mero
motu by the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner is in error.
Courts possess certain inherent powers which may be said to be implied from a general
grant of jurisdiction, in addition to those expressly conferred on them.24 These inherent
powers are such powers as are necessary for the ordinary and efficient exercise of
jurisdiction;25 or essential to the existence, dignity and functions of the courts,26 as well as to
the due administration of justice;27 or are directly appropriate, convenient and suitable to the
execution of their granted powers;28 and include the power to maintain the court’s jurisdiction
and render it effective in behalf of the litigants.29
Therefore, while a court may be expressly granted the incidental powers necessary to
effectuate its jurisdiction, a grant of jurisdiction, in the absence of prohibitive legislation,
implies the necessary and usual incidental powers essential to effectu-ate it, and, subject to
existing laws and constitutional provisions, every regularly constituted court has the power to
do all things that are reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within the scope of
its jurisdiction. Hence, demands, matters, or questions ancillary or incidental to, or growing
out of, the main action, and coming within the above principles, may be taken cognizance of
by the court and determined, since such jurisdiction is in aid of its authority over the principal
matter, even though the court may thus be called on to consider and decide matters which, as
original causes of action, would not be within its cognizance.
Furthermore, a court has the inherent power to make inter-locutory orders necessary to
protect its jurisdiction.30 Such being the case, with more reason may a party litigant be
subjected to proper coercive measures where he disobeys a proper order, or commits a fraud
on the court or the opposing party, the result of which is that the jurisdiction of the court
would be ineffectual. What ought to be done depends upon the particular circum-stances.31
Turning now to the case at bar, petitioner does not deny and, as a matter of fact, even
made a public statement that she had every intention of leaving the country allegedly to
pursue higher studies abroad. We uphold the course of action adopted by the Sandiganbayan
in taking judicial notice of such fact of peti-tioner’s plan to go abroad and in thereafter
issuing sua sponte the hold departure order, in justified consonance with our preceding
disquisition. To reiterate, the hold departure order is but an exercise of respondent court’s
inherent power to preserve and to maintain the effectiveness of its jurisdiction over the case
and the person of the accused.
 Second, petitioner asseverates that considering that she is leaving for abroad to pursue
further studies, there is no sufficient justification for the impairment of her constitutional right
to travel; and that under Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, the right to travel may
be impaired only when so required in the interest of national security, public safety or public
health, as may be provided by law.
It will be recalled that petitioner has posted bail which we have declared legally valid and
complete despite the absence of petitioner at the time of filing thereof, by reason of the
peculiar circumstances and grounds hereinbefore enunciated and which warrant a relaxation
of the aforecited doctrine in Feliciano. Perforce, since under the obligations assumed by
petitioner in her bail bond she holds herself amenable at all times to the orders and processes
of the court, she may legally be prohibited from leaving the country during the pendency of
the case. This was the ruling we handed down in Manotoc, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, et
al.,32 to the effect that:
“A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This
is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. “Rule 114, Section 1 of
the Rules of Court defines bail as the security required and given for the release of a person
who is in the custody of the law, that he will appear before any court in which his appearance
may be required as stipulated in the bail bond or recogni-zance.
“Its object is to relieve the accused of imprisonment and the state of the burden of
keeping him, pending the trial, and at the same time, to put the accused as much under the
power of the court as if he were in custody of the proper officer, and to secure the
appearance of the accused so as to answer the call of the court and do what the law may
require of him.
“The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever
the court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel. As we have
held in People vs. Uy Tuising, 61 Phil. 404 (1935):
‘x x x the result of the obligation assumed by appellee (surety) to hold the accused amenable
at all times to the orders and processes of the lower court, was to prohibit said accused from
leaving the jurisdiction of the Philippines, because, otherwise, said orders and processes will
be nugatory, and inasmuch as the jurisdiction of the courts from which they issued does not
extend beyond that of the Philippines they would have no binding force outside of said
jurisdiction.’
“Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason, he
may be placed beyond the reach of the courts.”
This was reiterated in a more recent case where we held:
“Petitioner thus theorizes that under the 1987 Constitution, Courts can impair the right to
travel only on the grounds of ‘national security, public safety, or public health.’
“The submission is not well taken.
“Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should be interpreted to mean that while
the liberty of travel may be impaired even without Court Order, the appropriate executive
officers or administrative authorities are not armed with arbitrary discretion to impose
limitations. They can impose limits only on the basis of ‘national security, public safety, or
public health’ and ‘as may be provided by law,’ a limitive phrase which did not appear in the
1973 text (The Constitution, Bernas, Joaquin, G., S.J., Vol. I, First Edition, 1987, p. 263).
Apparently, the phraseology in the 1987 Constitution was a reaction to the ban on
international travel imposed under the previous regime when there was a Travel Processing
Center, which issued certificates of eligibility to travel upon application of an interested party
(See Salonga v. Hermoso & Travel Processing Center, No. 53622, 25 April 1980, 97 SCRA
121).
“Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should by no means be construed as
delimiting the inherent power of the Courts to use all means necessary to carry their orders
into effect in criminal cases pending before them. When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a
Court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it
into effect may be employed by such Court or officer (Rule 135, Section 6, Rules of Court).
xxx
“x x x Holding an accused in a criminal case within the reach of the Courts by preventing
his departure from the Philippines must be considered as a valid restriction on his right to
travel so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law. The offended party in any criminal
proceeding is the People of the Philippines. It is to their best interest that criminal
prosecutions should run their course and proceed to finality without undue delay, with an
accused holding himself amenable at all times to Court Orders and processes.”33
One final observation. We discern in the proceedings in this case a propensity on the part of
petitioner, and, for that matter, the same may be said of a number of litigants who initiate
recourses before us, to disregard the hierarchy of courts in our judicial system by seeking
relief directly from this Court despite the fact that the same is available in the lower courts in
the exercise of their original or concurrent jurisdiction, or is even mandated by law to be
sought therein. This practice must be stopped, not only because of the imposition upon the
precious time of this Court but also because of the inevitable and resultant delay, intended or
otherwise, in the adjudication of the case which often has to be remanded or referred to the
lower court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve
the issues since this Court is not a trier of facts. We, therefore, reiterate the judicial policy that
this Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in
the appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify avail-ment of
a remedy within and calling for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction.
For the guidance of the bench and the bar, we elucidate that such policy includes the
matter of petitions or motions involving hold departure orders of the trial or lower courts.
Parties with pending cases therein should apply for permission to leave the country from the
very same courts which, in the first instance, are in the best position to pass upon such
applications and to impose the appropriate conditions therefor since they are conversant with
the facts of the cases and the ramifications or implications thereof. Where, as in the present
case, a hold departure order has been issued ex parte or motu proprio by said court, the party
concerned must first exhaust the appropriate remedies therein, through a motion for
reconsideration or other proper submissions, or by the filing of the requisite application for
travel abroad. Only where all the conditions and requirements for the issuance of the
extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus indubitably obtain against a
disposition of the lower courts may our power of supervision over said tribunals be invoked
through the appropriate petition assailing on jurisdictional or clearly valid grounds their actua-
tions therein.
 WHEREFORE, with respect to and acting on the motion now before us for resolution, the
same is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

     Narvasa (C.J.), Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Davide,
Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Campos, Jr., JJ., concur.

Motion denied.
 G.R. No. 115407. August 28, 1995.*
MIGUEL P. PADERANGA, petitioner, vs.  COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Criminal Procedure; Bail; Words and Phrases; Bail, Defined; As bail is intended to obtain
or secure one’s provisional liberty, the same cannot be posted before custody over him has
been acquired by the judicial authorities, either by his lawful arrest or voluntary surrender .—
Section 1 of Rule 114, as amended, defines bail as the security given for the release of a
person in custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, conditioned upon his
appearing before any court as required under the conditions specified in said Rule. Its main
purpose, then, is to relieve an accused from the rigors of imprisonment until his conviction and
yet secure his appearance at the trial. As bail is intended to obtain or secure one’s provisional
liberty, the same cannot be posted before custody over him has been acquired by the judicial
authorities, either by his lawful arrest or voluntary surrender. As this Court has put it in a case,
“it would be incongruous to grant bail to one who is free.”
Same; Same; The rationale for the rule is that it discourages and prevents resort to the
former pernicious practice whereby an accused could just send another in his stead to post his
bail, without recognizing the jurisdiction of the court by his personal appearance therein and
compliance with the requirements therefor.—The rationale behind the rule is that it
discourages and prevents resort to the former pernicious practice whereby an accused could
just send another in his stead to post his bail, without recognizing the jurisdiction of the court
by his personal appearance therein and compliance with the requirements therefor. Thus, in
Feliciano vs. Pasicolan, etc., et al., where the petitioner who had been charged with
kidnapping with murder went into hiding without surrendering himself, and shortly thereafter
filed a motion asking the court to fix the amount of the bail bond for his release pending trial,
the Supreme Court categorically pronounced that said petitioner was not eligible for admission
to bail.
Same; Same; Instances where a person is considered to be in custody of the law .—On
the other hand, a person is considered to be in the custody of the law (a) when he is arrested
either by virtue of a warrant of arrest issued pursuant to Section 6, Rule 112, or by
warrantless arrest under Section 5, Rule 113 in relation to Section 7, Rule 112 of the revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure, or (b) when he has voluntarily submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court by surrendering to the proper authorities.
Same; Same; In the instant case, even as petitioner filed his motion for admission to
bail before he was actually and physically placed under arrest, he may, however, under the
peculiar circumstances which attended the filing of the bail application, namely, that he was
then confined in the hospital, for purposes of the hearing thereof, he should be deemed to
have voluntarily submitted his person to the custody of the law and, necessarily, the
jurisdiction of the trial court .—In the case of herein petitioner, it may be conceded that he had
indeed filed his motion for admission to bail before he was actually and physically placed
under arrest. He may, however, at that point and in the factual ambience thereof, be
considered as being constructively and legally under custody. Thus, in the likewise peculiar
circumstances which attended the filing of his bail application with the trial court, for purposes
of the hearing thereof he should be deemed to have voluntarily submitted his person to the
custody of the law and, necessarily, to the jurisdiction of the trial court which thereafter
granted bail as prayed for. In fact, an arrest is made either by an actual restraint of the
arrestee or merely by his submission to the custody of the person making the arrest. The
latter mode may be exemplified by the so-called “house arrest” or, in the case of military
offenders, by being “confined to quarters” or restricted to the military camp area. It should be
stressed herein that petitioner, through his counsel, emphatically made it known to the
prosecution and to the trial court during the hearing for bail that he could not personally
appear as he was then confined at the nearby Cagayan Capitol College General Hospital for
acute costochondritis, and could not then obtain medical clearance to leave the hospital. The
prosecution and the trial court, notwithstanding their explicit knowledge of the specific
whereabouts of petitioner, never lifted a finger to have the arrest warrant duly served upon
him.
Same; Same; Presumption of Innocence; The right to bail, which may be waived
considering its personal nature, springs from the presumption of innocence accorded every
accused.—Section 13, Article III of the Constitution lays down the rule that before conviction,
all indictees shall be allowed bail, except only those charged with offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua when the evidence of guilt is strong. In pursuance thereof, Section 4 of
Rule 114, as amended, now provides that all persons in custody shall, before conviction by a
regional trial court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, be admitted to bail as a matter of right. The right to bail, which may be waived
considering its personal nature and which, to repeat, arises from the time one is placed in the
custody of the law, springs from the presumption of innocence accorded every accused upon
whom should not be inflicted incarceration at the outset since after trial he would be entitled
to acquittal, unless his guilt be established beyond reasonable doubt.
Same; Same; Where bail is a matter of right, upon proper application for admission to
bail, the court having custody of the accused should, as a matter of course, grant the same
after a hearing conducted to specifically determine the conditions of the bail .—Thus, the
general rule is that prior to conviction by the regional trial court of a criminal offense, an
accused is entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right, the present exceptions thereto
being the instances where the accused is charged with capital offense or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment and the evidence of guilt is strong.
Under said general rule, upon proper application for admission to bail, the court having
custody of the accused should, as a matter of course, grant the same after a hearing
conducted to specifically determine the conditions of the bail in accordance with Section 6
(now, Section 2) of Rule 114.
Same; Same; Where the grant of bail becomes a matter of judicial discretion, a hearing,
mandatory in nature and which should be summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court,
is required with the participation of both the defense and a duly notified representative of the
prosecution, to ascertain whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong for the provisional
liberty of the applicant.—On the other hand, as the grant of bail becomes a matter of judicial
discretion on the part of the court under the exceptions to the rule, a hearing, mandatory in
nature and which should be summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court, is required
with the participation of both the defense and a duly notified representative of the
prosecution, this time to ascertain whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong for the
provisional liberty of the applicant. Of course, the burden of proof is on the prosecution to
show that the evidence meets the required quantum.
Same; Same; Due Process; Procedure to be followed when the grant of bail is a matter
of judicial discretion.—Where such a hearing is set upon proper motion or petition, the
prosecution must be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the
evidence that it may want to introduce before the court may resolve the application, since it is
equally entitled as the accused to due process. If the prosecution is denied this opportunity,
there would be a denial of procedural due process, as a consequence of which the court’s
order in respect of the motion or petition is void. At the hearing, the petitioner can rightfully
cross-examine the witnesses presented by the prosecution and introduce his own evidence in
rebuttal. When, eventually, the court issues an order either granting or refusing bail, the same
should contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution, followed by its conclusion as to
whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong. The court, though, cannot rely on mere
affidavits or recitals of their contents, if timely objected to, for these represent only hearsay
evidence, and thus are insufficient to establish the quantum of evidence that the law requires.
Same; Same; Same; There is no irregularity that could be attributed to the trial court in
regard to the grant of bail to petitioner where it exhausted all means to convince itself of the
propriety of the waiver of evidence on the part of the prosecution and the omnibus order
contained the requisite summary of the evidence of both the prosecution and the defense,
and only after sifting through them did the court conclude that petitioner could be
provisionally released on bail.—No irregularity, in the context of procedural due process, could
therefore be attributed to the trial court here as regards its order granting bail to petitioner. A
review of the transcript of the stenographic notes pertinent to its resolution of November 5,
1992 and the omnibus order of March 29, 1993 abundantly reveals scrupulous adherence to
procedural rules. As summarized in its aforementioned order, the lower court exhausted all
means to convince itself of the propriety of the waiver of evidence on the part of the
prosecution. Moreover, the omnibus order contained the requisite summary of the evidence of
both the prosecution and the defense, and only after sifting through them did the court
conclude that petitioner could be provisionally released on bail. Parenthetically, there is no
showing that, since then and up to the present, petitioner has ever committed any violation of
the conditions of his bail.
Same; Same; Actions; Certiorari; The indubitably unreasonable period of time that
elapsed, one hundred eighty-four (184) days to be exact, before the prosecution questioned
through the special civil action of certiorari the resolution and the omnibus order militates
against the cause of the prosecution .—What finally militates against the cause of the
prosecution is the indubitably unreasonable period of time that elapsed before it questioned
before the respondent court the resolution and the omnibus order of the trial court through a
special civil action for certiorari. The Solicitor General submits that the delay of more than six
(6) months, or one hundred eighty-four (184) days to be exact, was reasonable due to the
attendant difficulties which characterized the prosecution of the criminal case against
petitioner. But then, the certiorari proceeding was initiated before the respondent court long
after trial on the merits of the case had ensued in the court below with the active participation
of prosecution lawyers, including Prosecutor Gingoyon.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The definitive rule now is that the special civil action for
certiorari should not be instituted beyond a period of three months .—At any rate, the
definitive rule now is that the special civil action for certiorari should not be instituted beyond
a period of three months, the same to be reckoned by taking into account the duration of time
that had expired from the commission of the acts complained of up to the institution of the
proceeding to annul the same.
PETITION for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Concordio C. Diel,Guerrero A. Adaza, Juanito Dela Riarte, Gael Paderanga and Alfredo
J. Lagamon for petitioner.
REGALADO, J.:
The adverse decision in this case promulgated by respondent Court of Appeals in  CA-G.R. SP
No. 32233 on November 24, 1993, as well as its resolution of April 26, 1994 denying the
motion for reconsideration thereof, are challenged by petitioner Miguel P. Paderanga in this
appeal by certiorari through a petition which raises issues centering mainly on said petitioner’s
right to be admitted to bail.
On January 28, 1990, petitioner was belatedly charged in an amended information as a co-
conspirator in the crime of multiple murder in Criminal Case No. 86-39 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 18, of Cagayan de Oro City for the killing of members of the Bucag family
sometime in 1984 in Gingoog City of which petitioner was the mayor at the time. The original
information, filed on October 6, 1986 with the Regional Trial Court of Gingoog City,1 had
initially indicted for multiple murder eight accused suspects, namely, Felipe Galarion, Manuel
Sabit, Cesar Sabit, Julito Ampo, Eddie Torion, John Doe, Peter Doe and Richard Doe, as the
alleged conspirators in the indiscriminate slaying of the spouses Romeo and Juliet Bucag and
their son, Romeo, Jr. However, only one of the accused, Felipe Galarion, was apprehended,
tried and eventually convicted. Galarion later escaped from prison. The others have remained
at large up to the present.2
In a bizarre twist of events, one Felizardo (“Ely”) Roxas was implicated in the crime. In an
amended information dated October 6, 1988, he was charged as a co-accused therein. As
herein petitioner was his former employer and thus knew him well, Roxas engaged the
former’s services as counsel in said case. Ironically, in the course of the preliminary
investigation therein, said accused, in a signed affidavit dated March 30, 1989 but which he
later retracted on June 20, 1990, implicated petitioner as the supposed mastermind behind the
massacre of the Bucag family.3
Then, upon the inhibition of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City from the case per
his resolution of July 7, 1989, the Department of Justice, at the instance of said prosecutor,
designated a replacement, State Prosecutor Henrick F. Gingoyon, for purposes of both the
preliminary investigation and prosecution of Criminal Case No. 86-39. Pursuant to a resolution
of the new prosecutor dated September 6, 1989, petitioner was finally charged as a co-
conspirator in said criminal case in a second amended information dated October 6, 1992.
Petitioner assailed his inclusion therein as a co-accused all the way to this Court in G.R. No.
96080, entitled “Atty. Miguel P. Paderanga vs. Hon. Franklin M. Drilon, Hon. Silvestre H. Bello
III, Atty. Henrick F. Gingoyon, Helen B. Canoy and Rebecca B. Tan.” In an en banc decision
promulgated on April 19, 1991, the Court sustained the filing of the second amended
information against him.4
Under this backdrop, the trial of the case was all set to start with the issuance of an arrest
warrant for petitioner’s apprehension but, before it could be served on him, petitioner,
through counsel, filed on October 28, 1992 a motion for admission to bail with the trial court
which set the same for hearing on November 5, 1992. Petitioner duly furnished copies of the
motion to State Prosecutor Henrick F. Gingoyon, the Regional State Prosecutor’s Office, and
the private prosecutor, Atty. Benjamin Guimong. On November 5, 1992, the trial court
proceeded to hear the application for bail. Four of petitioner’s counsel appeared in court but
only Assistant Prosecutor Erlindo Abejo of the Regional State Prosecutor’s Office appeared for
the prosecution.5
 As petitioner was then confined at the Cagayan Capitol College General Hospital due to
“acute costochondritis,” his counsel manifested that they were submitting custody over the
person of their client to the local chapter president of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
that, for purposes of said hearing on his bail application, he be considered as being in the
custody of the law. Prosecutor Abejo, on the other hand, informed the trial court that in
accordance with the directive of the chief of their office, Regional State Prosecutor Jesus
Zozobrado, the prosecution was neither supporting nor opposing the application for bail and
that they were submitting the same to the sound discretion of the trial judge.6
Upon further inquiries from the trial court, Prosecutor Abejo announced that he was
waiving any further presentation of evidence. On that note and in a resolution dated
November 5, 1992, the trial court admitted petitioner to bail in the amount of P200,000.00.
The following day, November 6, 1992, petitioner, apparently still weak but well enough to
travel by then, managed to personally appear before the clerk of court of the trial court and
posted bail in the amount thus fixed. He was thereafter arraigned and, in the trial that ensued,
he also personally appeared and attended all the scheduled court hearings of the case.7
The subsequent motion for reconsideration of said resolution filed twenty (20) days later
on November 26, 1992 by Prosecutor Gingoyon, who allegedly received his copy of the
petition for admission to bail on the day after the hearing, was denied by the trial court in its
omnibus order dated March 29, 1993. On October 1, 1993, or more than six (6) months later,
Prosecutor Gingoyon elevated the matter to respondent Court of Appeals through a special
civil action for certiorari. Thus were the resolution and the order of the trial court granting bail
to petitioner annulled on November 24, 1993, in the decision now under review, on the
ground that they were tainted with grave abuse of discretion.8
Respondent court observed in its decision that at the time of petitioner’s application for
bail, he was not yet “in the custody of the law,” apparently because he filed his motion for
admission to bail before he was actually arrested or had voluntarily surrendered. It further
noted that apart from the circumstance that petitioner was charged with a crime punishable
by reclusion perpetua, the evidence of guilt was strong as borne out by the fact that no bail
was recommended by the prosecution, for which reasons it held that the grant of bail was
doubly improvident. Lastly, the prosecution, according to respondent court, was not afforded
an opportunity to oppose petitioner’s application for bail contrary to the requirements of due
process. Hence, this appeal.
Petitioner argues that in accordance with the ruling of this Court in Santiago vs. Vasquez,
etc., et al.,9 his filing of the aforesaid application for bail with the trial court effectively
conferred on the latter jurisdiction over his person. In short, for all intents and purposes, he
was in the custody of the law. In petitioner’s words, the “invocation by the accused of the
court’s jurisdiction by filing a pleading in court is sufficient to vest the court with jurisdiction
over the person of the accused and bring him within the custody of the law.”
Petitioner goes on to contend that the evidence on record negates the existence of such
strong evidence as would bar his provisional release on bail. Furthermore, the prosecution, by
reason of the waiver by Prosecutor Abejo of any further presentation of evidence to oppose
the application for bail and whose representation in court in behalf of the prosecution bound
the latter, cannot legally assert any claim to a denial of procedural due process. Finally,
petitioner points out that the special civil action for certiorari was filed in respondent court
after an unjustifiable delay over an unreasonable length of time. On the undisputed facts, the
legal principles applicable and the equities involved in this case, the Court finds for petitioner.
1. Section 1 of Rule 114, as amended, defines bail as the security given for the release of
a person in custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, conditioned upon his
appearing before any court as required under the conditions specified in said Rule. Its main
purpose, then, is to relieve an accused from the rigors of imprisonment until his conviction and
yet secure his appearance at the trial.10 As bail is intended to obtain or secure one’s
provisional liberty, the same cannot be posted before custody over him has been acquired by
the judicial authorities, either by his lawful arrest or voluntary surrender.11 As this Court has
put it in a case, “it would be incongruous to grant bail to one who is free.”12
The rationale behind the rule is that it discourages and prevents resort to the former
pernicious practice whereby an accused could just send another in his stead to post his bail,
without recognizing the jurisdiction of the court by his personal appearance therein and
compliance with the requirements therefor.13
Thus, in Feliciano vs. Pasicolan, etc., et al., 14 where the petitioner who had been charged
with kidnapping with murder went into hiding without surrendering himself, and shortly
thereafter filed a motion asking the court to fix the amount of the bail bond for his release
pending trial, the Supreme Court categorically pronounced that said petitioner was not eligible
for admission to bail.
As a paramount requisite then, only those persons who have either been arrested,
detained, or otherwise deprived of their freedom will ever have occasion to seek the protective
mantle extended by the right to bail. The person seeking his provisional release under the
auspices of bail need not even wait for a formal complaint or information to be filed against
him as it is available to “all persons”15 where the offense is bailable. This rule is, of course,
subject to the condition or limitation that the applicant is in the custody of the law.16
On the other hand, a person is considered to be in the custody of the law (a) when he is
arrested either by virtue of a warrant of arrest issued pursuant to Section 6, Rule 112, or by
warrantless arrest under Section 5, Rule 113 in relation to Section 7, Rule 112 of the revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure, or (b) when he has voluntarily submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court by surrendering to the proper authorities.17 In this light, the
ruling vis-a-vis  the facts in Santiago vs. Vasquez, etc., et al.,18 should be explained.
In said case, the petitioner, who was charged before the Sandiganbayan for violation of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, filed through counsel what purported to be an
“Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond.” Said petitioner was at the time
confined in a hospital recuperating from serious physical injuries which she sustained in a
major vehicular mishap. Consequently, she expressly sought leave “that she be considered as
having placed herself under the jurisdiction of (the Sandiganbayan) for purposes of the
required trial and other proceedings.” On the basis of said ex parte  motion and the peculiar
circumstances obtained in that incident, the Sandiganbayan authorized petitioner to post a
cash bail bond for her provisional liberty without need of her personal appearance in view of
her physical incapacity and as a matter of humane consideration.

When the Sandiganbayan later issued a hold departure order against her, she questioned
the jurisdiction of that court over her person in a recourse before this Court, on the ground
that “she has neither been arrested nor has she voluntarily surrendered, aside from the fact
that she has not validly posted bail since she never personally appeared before said court.” In
rejecting her arguments, the Court held that she was clearly estopped from assailing the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan for by her own representations in the urgent ex parte
motion for bail, she had earlier recognized such jurisdiction. Furthermore, by actually posting a
cash bail bond which was accepted by the court, she had effectively submitted to its
jurisdiction over her person. Nonetheless, on the matter of bail, the Court took pains to
reiterate that the basic rule is that the same cannot be posted before custody of the accused
has been acquired by the judicial authorities either by his arrest or voluntary surrender.
In the case of herein petitioner, it may be conceded that he had indeed filed his motion for
admission to bail before he was actually and physically placed under arrest. He may, however,
at that point and in the factual ambience thereof, be considered as being constructively and
legally under custody. Thus, in the likewise peculiar circumstances which attended the filing of
his bail application with the trial court, for purposes of the hearing thereof he should be
deemed to have voluntarily submitted his person to the custody of the law and, necessarily, to
the jurisdiction of the trial court which thereafter granted bail as prayed for. In fact, an arrest
is made either by an actual restraint of the arrestee or merely by his submission to the
custody  of the person making the arrest.19 The latter mode may be exemplified by the so-
called “house arrest” or, in the case of military offenders, by being “confined to quarters” or
restricted to the military camp area.
It should be stressed herein that petitioner, through his counsel, emphatically made it
known to the prosecution and to the trial court during the hearing for bail that he could not
personally appear as he was then confined at the nearby Cagayan Capitol College General
Hospital for acute costochondritis, and could not then obtain medical clearance to leave the
hospital. The prosecution and the trial court, notwithstanding their explicit knowledge of the
specific whereabouts of petitioner, never lifted a finger to have the arrest warrant duly served
upon him. Certainly, it would have taken but the slightest effort to place petitioner in the
physical custody of the authorities, since he was then incapacitated and under medication in a
hospital bed just over a kilometer away, by simply ordering his confinement or placing him
under guard.
The undeniable fact is that petitioner was by then in the constructive custody of the law.
Apparently, both the trial court and the prosecutors agreed on that point since they never
attempted to have him physically restrained. Through his lawyers, he expressly submitted to
physical and legal control over his person, firstly, by filing the application for bail with the trial
court; secondly, by furnishing true information of his actual whereabouts; and, more
importantly, by unequivocally recognizing the jurisdiction of the said court. Moreover, when it
came to his knowledge that a warrant for his arrest had been issued, petitioner never made
any attempt or evinced any intent to evade the clutches of the law or concealed his
whereabouts from the authorities since the day he was charged in court, up to the submission
of his application for bail, and until the day of the hearing thereof.
At the hearing, his counsel offered proof of his actual confinement at the hospital on
account of an acute ailment, which facts were not at all contested as they were easily
verifiable. And, as a manifestation of his good faith and of his actual recognition of then
authority of the trial court, petitioner’s counsel readily informed the court that they were
surrendering custody of petitioner to the president of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
Misamis Oriental Chapter.20 In other words, the motion for admission to bail was filed not for
the purpose or in the manner of the former practice which the law proscribes for being
derogatory of the authority and jurisdiction of the courts, as what had happened in  Feliciano.
There was here no intent or strategy employed to obtain bail in absentia and thereby be able
to avoid arrest should the application therefor be denied.
2. Section 13, Article III of the Constitution lays down the rule that before conviction, all
indictees shall be allowed bail, except only those charged with offenses punishable
by reclusion perpetua  when the evidence of guilt is strong. In pursuance thereof, Section 4 of
Rule 114, as amended, now provides that all persons in custody shall, before conviction by a
regional trial court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua  or life
imprisonment, be admitted to bail as a matter of right. The right to bail, which may be waived
considering its personal nature21 and which, to repeat, arises from the time one is placed in
the custody of the law, springs from the presumption of innocence accorded every accused
upon whom should not be inflicted incarceration at the outset since after trial he would be
entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be established beyond reasonable doubt.22
Thus, the general rule is that prior to conviction by the regional trial court of a criminal
offense, an accused is entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right, the present
exceptions thereto being the instances where the accused is charged with a capital offense or
an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua  or life imprisonment23 and the evidence of guilt
is strong. Under said general rule, upon proper application for admission to bail the court
having custody of the accused should, as a matter of course, grant the same after a hearing
conducted to specifically determine the conditions of the bail in accordance with Section 6
(now, Section 2) of Rule 114. On the other hand, as the grant of bail becomes a matter of
judicial discretion on the part of the court under the exceptions to the rule, a hearing,
mandatory in nature and which should be summary or otherwise in the discretion of the
court,24 is required with the participation of both the defense and a duly notified
representative of the prosecution, this time to ascertain whether or not the evidence of guilt is
strong for the provisional liberty of the applicant.25 Of course, the burden of proof is on the
prosecution to show that the evidence meets the required quantum.26
Where such a hearing is set upon proper motion or petition, the prosecution must be given
an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may want to
introduce before the court may resolve the application, since it is equally entitled as the
accused to due process.27 If the prosecution is denied this opportunity, there would be a
denial of procedural due process, as a consequence of which the court’s order in respect of
the motion or petition is void.28 At the hearing, the petitioner can rightfully cross-examine the
witnesses presented by the prosecution and introduce his own evidence in rebuttal. 29 When,
eventually, the court issues an order either granting or refusing bail, the same should contain
a summary of not the evidence of guilt is strong.30 The court, though, cannot rely on mere
affidavits or recitals of their contents, if timely objected to, for these represent only hearsay
evidence, and thus are insufficient to establish the quantum of evidence that the law
requires.31
In this appeal, the prosecution assails what it considers to be a violation of procedural due
process when the court below allowed Assistant Prosecutor Erlindo Abejo of the Regional State
Prosecutor’s Office to appear in behalf of the prosecution, instead of State Prosecutor Henrick
F. Gingoyon who is claimed to be the sole government prosecutor expressly authorized to
handle the case and who received his copy of the motion only on the day after the hearing
had been conducted. Accordingly, the prosecution now insists that Prosecutor Abejo had no
authority at all to waive the presentation of any further evidence in opposition to the
application for bail and to submit the matter to the sound discretion of the trial court. In
addition, they argue that the prosecution was not afforded “reasonable time” to oppose that PROSECUTOR ABEJO:
application for bail.

We disagree. Firstly, it is undisputed that the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor acted   I am not aware of that, Your Honor. I was only informed just
as the collaborating counsel, with State Prosecutor Henrick Gingoyon, in Criminal Case No. 86-
now. The one assigned here is State Prosecutor Perseverando
39 on the basis of an authority from then Chief State Prosecutor Fernando de Leon which was
sent through radio message on July 10, 1992 and duly received by the Office of the Regional Arana, Jr. who unfortunately is in the hospital attending to his
State Prosecutor on the same date. This authorization, which was to be continuing until and sick son. I do not know about this but before I came I received
unless it was expressly withdrawn, was later confirmed and then withdrawn only on July 12, an instruction from our Chief to relay to this court the stand of
1993 by then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon. This was done after one Rebecca Bucag- the office regarding the motion to admit bail. That office is
Tan questioned the authority of Regional State Prosecutor Jesus Zozobrado and State
neither supporting nor opposing it and we are submitting to the
Prosecutor II Erlindo Abejo to enter their appearance as collaborating government prosecutors
in said criminal case.32 It was in fact by virtue of this arrangement that the same Prosecutor sound discretion of the Honorable Court.
Zozobrado and Prosecutor Perseverando Arana entered their appearance as collaborating
prosecutors in the previous hearings in said case.33 Hence, on the strength of said authority
and of its receipt of the notice of the hearing for bail, the Regional State Prosecutor’s Office,
through Prosecutor Abejo, could validly represent the prosecution in the hearing held on COURT:
November 5, 1992.

Secondly, although it is now claimed that Prosecutor Abejo was allegedly not familiar with   Place that manifestation on record. For the record, Fiscal
the case, he nonetheless was explicitly instructed about the position of the Regional State
Prosecutor’s Office on the matter. Prosecutor Zozobrado, whose office received its copy of the
motion on the very day when it was sent, that is, October 28, 1992, duly instructed Prosecutor
Abejo to manifest to the court that the prosecution was neither supporting nor opposing the       Abejo, would you like to formally enter your appearance in this
application for bail and that they were submitting the matter to its sound discretion.
matter?
Obviously, what this meant was that the prosecution, at that particular posture of the case,
was waiving the presentation of any countervailing evidence. When the court a quo  sought to
ascertain whether or not that was the real import of the submission by Prosecutor Abejo, the
latter readily answered in the affirmative.
PROSECUTOR ABEJO:

The following exchanges bear this out:

  Yes, Your Honor. For the government, the Regional State

Prosecutor’s Office represented by State Prosecutor Erlindo
“PROSECUTOR ERLINDO ABEJO:
Abejo.

      I was informed to appear in this case just now, Your Honor.
COURT:

COURT:
  By that manifestation do you want the Court to understand that
in effect, at least, the prosecution is dispensing with the
presentation of evidence to show that the guilt of the accused
  Where is your Chief of Office? Your Office received a copy of is strong, the denial . . .
the motion as early as October 28. There is an element of
urgency here.

PROSECUTOR ABEJO:
  I am amenable to that manifestation, Your Honor.
COURT:
  Final inquiry. Is the prosecution willing to submit the incident
covered by this particular motion for resolution by this court?
PROSECUTOR ABEJO:
  Yes, Your Honor.
COURT:
  Without presenting any further evidence?
PROSECUTOR ABEJO:
  Yes, Your Honor.”34
It is further evident from the foregoing that the prosecution, on the instructions of Regional
State Prosecutor Zozobrado, had no intention at all to oppose the motion for bail and this
should be so notwithstanding the statement that they were “neither supporting nor opposing”
the motion. What is of significance is the manifestation that the prosecution was “submitting
(the motion) to the sound discretion of the Honorable Court.” By that, it could not be any
clearer. The prosecution was dispensing with the introduction of evidence en contra and this it
did at the proper forum and stage of the proceedings, that is, during the mandatory hearing
for bail and after the trial court had fully satisfied itself that such was the position of the
prosecution.
3. In Herras Teehankee vs. Director of Prisons ,35 it was stressed that where the trial court
has reasons to believe that the justified, as when he is evidently committing a gross error or a
dereliction of duty, the court, in the interest of justice, must inquire from the prosecutor
concerned as to the nature of his evidence to determine whether or not it is strong. And, in
the very recent administrative matter Re: First Indorsement Dated July 21, 1992 of Hon.
Fernando de Leon, Chief State Prosecutor, Department of Justice; Alicia A. Baylon, City
Prosecutor of Dagupan City vs. Judge Deodoro Sison ,36 the Court, citing Tucay vs. Domagas,
etc.,37 held that where the prosecutor interposes no objection to the motion of the accused,
the trial court should nevertheless set the application for hearing and from there diligently
ascertain from the prosecution whether the latter is really not contesting the bail application.
No irregularity, in the context of procedural due process, could therefore be attributed to
the trial court here as regards its order granting bail to petitioner. A review of the transcript of
the stenographic notes pertinent to its resolution of November 5, 1992 and the omnibus order
of March 29, 1993 abundantly reveals scrupulous adherence to procedural rules. As
summarized in its aforementioned order, the lower court exhausted all means to convince
itself of the propriety of the waiver of evidence on the part of the prosecution. Moreover, the
omnibus order contained the requisite summary of the evidence of both the prosecution and
the defense, and only after sifting through them did the court conclude that petitioner could
be provisionally released on bail. Parenthetically, there is no showing that, since then and up
to the present, petitioner has ever committed any violation of the conditions of his bail.
As to the contention that the prosecution was not given the opportunity to present its
evidence within a reasonable period of time, we hold otherwise. The records indicate that the
Regional State Prosecutor’s Office duly received its copy of the application for bail on the very
same day that it was filed with the trial court on October 28, 1992. Counted from said date up
to the day of the hearing on November 5, 1992, the prosecution had more than one (1) week
to muster such evidence as it would have wanted to adduce in that hearing in opposition to
the motion. Certainly, under the circumstances, that period was more than reasonable. The
fact that Prosecutor Gingoyon received his copy of the application only on November 6, 1992
is beside the point for, as already established, the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor was
authorized to appear for the People.
4. What finally militates against the cause of the prosecution is the indubitably
unreasonable period of time that elapsed before it questioned before the respondent court the
resolution and the omnibus order of the trial court through a special civil action for certiorari.
The Solicitor General submits that the delay of more than six (6)months, or one hundred
eighty-four (184) days to be exact, was reasonable due to the attendant difficulties which
characterized the prosecution of the criminal case against petitioner. But then, the certiorari
proceeding was initiated before the respondent court long after trial on the merits of the case
had ensued in the court below with the active participation of prosecution lawyers, including
Prosecutor Gingoyon. At any rate, the definitive rule now is that the special civil action for
certiorari should not be instituted beyond a period of three months,38 the same to be
reckoned by taking into account the duration of time that had expired from the commission of
the acts complained of up to the institution of the proceeding to annul the same.39
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 32233,
promulgated on November 24, 1993, annulling the resolution dated November 5, 1992 and
the omnibus order dated March 29, 1993 of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City,
as well as said respondent court’s resolution of April 26, 1994 denying the motion for
reconsideration of said judgment, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The aforesaid
resolution and omnibus order of the Regional Trial Court granting bail to petitioner Miguel P.
Paderanga are hereby REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

     Narvasa (C.J., Chairman), Puno, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ.,  concur.

Judgment reversed and set aside, resolution and omnibus order of the court a quo
reinstated.
 G.R. No. 93177. August 2, 1991.*
BGEN. JOSE COMENDADOR, BGEN. MARIELO BLANDO, CAPT. DANILO PIZARRO,
CAPT. MANUEL ISON, COL. LUISITO SANCHEZ, LTC. ROMELINO GOJO, LTC.
ARSENIO TECSON, LTC. RAFAEL GALVEZ, LTC. TIBURCIO FUSILLERO, LTC.
ERICSON AURELIO, LTC. JACINTO LIGOT, LTC. FRANKLIN BRAWNER, MAJ.
ALFREDO OLIVEROS, MAJ. CESAR DE LA PEÑA, MAJ. LEUVINO VALENCIA, CAPT.
FLORENCIO FLORES, CAPT. JAIME JUNIO, CAPT. DANILO LIM, CAPT. ELMER AMON,
CAPT. VERGEL NACINO, and LT. JOEY SARROZA, petitioners, vs. GEN. RENATO S.
DE VILLA, CHIEF OF STAFF, AFP, THE PTI INVESTIGATING PANEL COMPOSED OF:
COL. MANUEL S. MENDIOLA, COL. VIRTUD NORBERTO L. DAGZA, MAJ. FELIX V.
BALDONADO and MAJ. ESTELITO L. PORNEA, and GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL NO.
14 COMPOSED OF: BGEN. DEMETRIO CAMUA, COL. HERMINIO A. MENDOZA, COL.
ERNESTO B. YU, COL. ROMEO ODI, COL. WILLY
FLORENDO, COL. DIONY A. VENTURA and CAPT. FRANCISCO T. MALLILLIN, respondents.
G.R. No. 95020. August 2, 1991.*
BGEN. DEMETRIO CAMUA, COL. HERMINIO A. MENDOZA, COL. ERNESTO B. YU, COL. ROMEO
ODI, COL. WILLY FLORENDO, COL. DIONY A. VENTURA, and CAPT. FRANCISCO T.
MALLILLIN, petitioners, vs. HON. MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION, Presiding Judge, Branch 104,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Q.C., LTC. JACINTO LIGOT, PA., respondents.
G.R. No. 96948. August 2, 1991.*
BGEN. JOSE COMENDADOR, BGEN. MARCELO BLANDO, CAPT. DANILO PIZARRO PN, CAPT.
MANUEL ISON PN, LTC. ROMELINO GOJO PN (M), LTC. ARSENIO TECSON PA, LTC. RAFAEL
GALVEZ PA, LTC. TIBURCIO FUSILLERO PA, LTC. ERICSON AURELIO PA, LTC. JACINTO
LIGOT, PA, LTC. FRANKLIN BRAWNER PA, MAJ. ALFREDO OLIVEROS PA, MAJ. CESAR DE LA
PENA PN (M): MAJ. LEUVINO VALENCIA PA, CAPT. FLORENCIO FLORES PA, CAPT. JAIME
JUNIO PA, CAPT. DANILO LIM PA, CAPT. ELMER AMON PAF, CAPT. VERGEL NACINO, and LT.
JOEY SARROZA, petitioners, vs. BGEN. DEMETRIO CAMUA, COL. HERMINIO A. MENDOZA,
COL. ERNESTO B. YU, COL. ROMEO ODI, COL. WILLY FLORENDO, COL. DIONY A. VENTURA,
and CAPT. FRANCISCO T. MALLILLIN, PRESIDENT AND MEMBERS OF GENERAL COURT-
MARTIAL NO. 14, respondents.
G.R. No. 97454. August 2, 1991.*
AFP CHIEF OF STAFF LT. GEN RODOLFO BIAZON, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF MAJOR GEN.
ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, PNP DIRECTOR GENERAL MAJOR GEN. CESAR NAZARENO and LT.
COL. ALBERTO OLARIO, Commanding Officer of the PNP/INP Detention Center/Jail,
petitioners, vs. HON. ANTONIO P. SOLANO, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Quezon
City, Branch 86, CAPTAIN
REYNALDO S. RAFAEL, 1LT. SERVANDO A. BAOANAN PN(M), 1LT. WILFREDO JIMENEZ PAF,
1LT. ATANACIO T. MACALAN, JR PM(M), 2LT. ELISEO T. RASCO PC, 2LT. JONAS CALLEJA PC,
2LT. JAIRUS JS. GELVEZON III PM(M), 2LT. JOSELITO CABREROS PM(M), 2LT. MEMEL ROJAS
PN(M) and 2LT. HERMINIO L. CANTACO PC, respondents.
Constitution; Bail; Constitution grants the right to bail to all persons with the defined
exception is applicable and covers all military men facing court-martial proceedings.— On
August 22, 1990, the trial court rendered judgment inter alia: (a) Declaring, that Section 13,
Article III of the Constitution granting the right to bail to all persons with the defined
exception is applicable and covers all military men facing court-martial proceedings.
Accordingly, the assailed orders of General Court-Martial No. 14 denying bail to petitioner and
intervenors on the mistaken assumption that bail does not apply to military men facing court-
martial proceedings on the ground that there is no precedent, are hereby set aside and
declared null and void. Respondent General Court-Martial No. 14 is hereby directed to conduct
proceedings on the applications of bail of the petitioner, interve-nors and which may as well
include other persons facing charges before General Court-Martial No. 14.
Same; Bill of Rights; Due Process; Due process is satisfied as long as the party is
accorded an opportunity to be heard. If it is not availed of, it is deemed waived or forfeited
without violation of the Bill of Rights.— Due process is satisfied as long as the party is accorded
an opportunity to be heard. If it is not availed of, it is deemed waived or forfeited without
violation of the Bill of Rights.
Criminal Procedure; Pre-trial; Jurisdiction; Pre-trial investigation is directory, not
mandatory, and in no way affects the jurisdiction of a court martial.— There was in our view
substantial compliance with Article of War 71 by the PTI Panel. Moreover, it is now settled that
“even a failure to conduct, a pre-trial investigation does not deprive a general court-martial of
jurisdiction.” x x x But even a failure to conduct a pre-trial investigation does not deprive a
general court-martial of jurisdiction. The better accepted concept of pre-trial investigation is
that it is directory, not mandatory, and in no way affects the jurisdiction of a court-martial.
Statutory Construction; It is a basic canon of statutory construction that when the
reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases; Cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex.— It is a
basic canon of statutory construction that when the reason of the law ceases, the law itself
ceases. Cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex.  This principle is also expressed in the
maxim ratio legis est anima: the reason of law is its soul.
Jurisdiction; Certiorari; Habeas Corpus, Quo warranto; Regional Trial Court has
concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court over petitions for
certiorari, prohibition or mandamus against inferior court and other bodies and on petition for
habeas corpus and quo warranto.— The Regional Trial Court has concurrent jurisdiction with
the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court over petitions for certiorari, prohibition
or mandamus against inferior courts and other bodies and on petitions for habeas
corpus and quo warranto. In the absence of a law providing that the decisions, orders and
ruling of a court-martial or the Office of the Chief of Staff can be questioned only before the
Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, we hold that the Regional Trial Court can exercise
similar jurisdiction.
Constitution; Bill of Rights; Bail; Equal Protection; That denial from the military of the
right to bail would violate the equal protection clause is not acceptable.— The argument that
denial from the military of the right to bail would violate the equal protection clause is not
acceptable. This guaranty requires equal treatment only of persons or things similarly situated
and does not apply where the subject of the treatment is substantially different from others.
The accused officers can complain if they are denied bail and other members of the military
are not. But they cannot say they have been discriminated against because they are not      Mariano R. Santiago for Alfredo Oliveros.
allowed the same right that is extended to civilians.
     Ricardo J.M. Rivera for Manuel Ison.
Remedial Law; Certiorari; Jurisdiction; Appeal; A petition for certiorari in order to
prosper, must be based on jurisdictional grounds because, as long as respondent acted with
jurisdiction, any error committed by him or in the exercise thereof will amount to nothing      Castillo, Laman, Tan and Pantaleon for Danilo Pizarro.
more than an error of judgment which may be reviewed or corrected only by appeal.—
Regarding the propriety of the petitions at bar, it is well to reiterate the following observations      Alfredo Lazaro for Romelino Gojo.
of the Court in Arula: The referral of charges to a court-martial involves the exercise of
judgment and discretion (AW 71). A petition for certiorari, in order to prosper, must be based
     Manuel A. Barcelona, Jr. for Jose Comendador.
on jurisdictional grounds because, as long as the respondent acted with jurisdiction, any error
committed by him or it in the exercise thereof will amount to nothing more than an error of
judgment which may be reviewed or corrected only by appeal. Even an abuse of discretion is      Jonathan B.S. Rebong and Efren C. Carag for Marcelo Blando.
not sufficient by itself to justify the issuance of a writ of certiorari.
     Pablito V. Sanidad for Franklin Brawner and Ericson Aurelio.
G.R. No. 93177:
     Efren C. Moncupa for A.L. Tecson.
PETITION for certiorari prohibition and mandamus to review the decision of the General Court
Martial No. 14.
     M.M. Lazaro & Associates for respondents Ligot and Ison.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Baldomero S.P. Gatbonton, Jr. for Jacinto Ligot.
G.R. No. 96948:
     Salvador B. Britanico  for Cesar de la Peña.
PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the General Court Martial No. 14.
     Gilbert R.T. Reyes for Danilo Pizarro.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Ponce Enrile, Cayetano, Reyes & Manalastas for petitioners in G.R. No. 93177.
G.R. No. 95020:
     The Solicitor General for respondents.
PETITION for certiorari to review the order of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Br. 104.
Asuncion, J.
CRUZ, J.:

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

These four cases have been consolidated because they involve practically the same parties
and related issues arising from the same incident.
G.R. No. 97454:
The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 and the private respondents in G.R. Nos.
PETITION for certiorari to review the order of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Br. 86.
95020 and 97454 are officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines facing prosecution for
Solano, J.
their alleged participation in the failed coup d’etat that took place on December 1 to 9, 1989.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

     Armando M. Marcelo and Rainier L. Madrid for petitioners Luisito Sanchez, Tiburcio
Fusillero, Ericson Aurelio, Levino Valencia, Danilo Amon, Vergel Nacino, Florencio Flores,
Benigno Junio and Joey Sarroza.
     Manuel Q. Malvar for Rafael Galvez and Danny Lim.
     Manuel E. Valenzuela for Arsenio Tecson.
The charges against them are violation of Articles of War (AW) 67 (Mutiny), AW 96
(Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman) and AW 94 (Various Crimes) in relation to
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (Murder).
In G.R. No. 93177, which is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, they are
questioning the conduct of the Pre-Trial Investigation (PTI) Panel constituted to investigate
the charges against them and the creation of the General Court Martial (GCM) convened to try
them.
 In G.R. No. 96948, the petitioners, besides challenging the legality of GCM No. 14,
seek certiorari against its ruling denying them the right to peremptory challenge as granted by
Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408.
In G.R. No. 95020, the orders of the respondent judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City are assailed on certiorari on the ground that he has no jurisdiction over GCM No.
14 and no authority either to set aside its ruling denying bail to the private respondents.
In G.R. No. 97454, certiorari is also sought against the decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City in a petition for habeas corpus directing the release of the private respondents.
Jurisdictional objections are likewise raised as in G.R. No. 95020.
I They also allege that the initial hearing of the charges consisted merely of a roll call and that
Before the charges were referred to GCM No. 14, a Pre-Trial Investigation (PTI) Panel had
been constituted pursuant to Office Order No. 16 dated January 14, 1990, to investigate the
petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948.
The PTI Panel issued a uniform subpoena dated January 30, 1990, individually addressed
to the petitioners, to wit:
You are hereby directed to appear in person before the undersigned Pre-Trial Investigating
Officers on 12 Feb 90 9:00 a.m. at Kiangan Hall, Camp Crame  Quezon City, then and there to
submit your counter-affidavit and the affidavits of your witnesses, if any, in the pre-trial
investigation of the charge/charges against you for viol of AWs _______________. DO NOT
SUBMIT A MOTION TO DISMISS.
Failure to submit the aforementioned counter-affidavits on the date above specified shall
be deemed a waiver of your right to submit controverting evidence.
On the same date, the petitioners acknowledged receipt of a copy of the charge sheet, sworn
statements of witnesses, and death and medical certificates of victims of the rebellion.
At the first scheduled hearing, the petitioners challenged the proceedings on various
grounds, prompting the PTI Panel to grant them 10 days within which to file their objections
in writing. This was done through a Motion for Summary Dismissal dated February 21, 1990.
In a resolution dated February 27, 1990, the PTI Panel denied the motion and gave the
petitioners 5 days from notice to submit their respective counter-affidavits and the affidavits of
their witnesses.
On March 7, 1990, the petitioners verbally moved for reconsideration of the foregoing
denial and the PTI Panel gave them 7 days within which to reduce their motion to writing. This
was done on March 14, 1990.
The petitioners now claim that there was no pre-trial investigation of the charges as
mandated by Article of War 71, which provides:
Art. 71. Charges; Action upon.—Charges and specifications must be signed by a person
subject to military law, and under the oath either that he has personal knowledge of, or has
investigated, the matters set forth therein and that the same are true in fact, to the best of his
knowledge and belief.
No charge will be referred to a general court-martial for trial until after a thorough and
impartial investigation thereof shall have been made. This investigation will include inquiries
as to the truth of the matter set forth in said charges, form of charges, and what disposition
of the case should be made in the interest of justice and discipline. At such investigation full
opportunity shall be given to the accused to cross-examine witnesses against him if they are
available and to present anything he may desire in his own behalf, either in defense or
mitigation, and the investigating officer shall examine available witnesses requested by the
accused. If the charges are forwarded after such investigation, they shall be accompanied by
a statement of the substance of the testimony taken on both sides.  (Italics supplied.)
no prosecution witnesses were presented to reaffirm their affidavits. While the motion for
summary dismissal was denied, the motion for reconsideration remains unresolved to date and
they have not been able to submit their counter-affidavits.
At the hearing of May 15, 1990, the petitioners in G.R. No. 96948 manifested that they
were exercising their right to raise peremptory challenges against the president and members
of GCM No. 14. They invoked Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408 for this purpose. GCM No. 14
ruled, however, that peremptory challenges had been discontinued under P.D. No. 39.
In G.R. No. 95020, Ltc. Jacinto Ligot applied for bail on June 5, 1990, but the application
was denied by GCM No. 14. He thereupon filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a
petition for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for provisional liberty and a writ of
preliminary injunction. After considering the petition and the answer thereto filed by the
president and members of GCM No. 14, Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion issued an order
granting provisional liberty to Ligot.
On July 28, 1990, Ligot filed an urgent omnibus motion to enforce the order for his release
and to declare in contempt the commanding officer of the PC/INP Jail for disobeying the said
order. He later also complained that Generals De Villa and Aguirre had refused to release him
“pending final resolution of the appeal to be taken” to this Court.
After hearing, the trial court reiterated its order for the provisional liberty of Ligot, as well
as of intervenors Ltc. Franklin Brawner, Lt/Col. Arsenio Tecson and Maj. Alfredo Oliveros, and
later of additional intervenors Ltc. Romelino Gojo and Capt. Manuel Ison.
On August 22, 1990, the trial court rendered judgment inter alia:
(a) Declaring, that Section 13, Article III of the Constitution granting the right to bail to all
persons with the defined exception is applicable and covers all military men facing court-
martial proceedings. Accordingly, the assailed orders of General Court-Martial No. 14 denying
bail to petitioner and intervenors on the mistaken assumption that bail does not apply to
military men facing court-martial proceedings on the ground that there is no precedent, are
hereby set aside and declared null and void. Respondent General Court-Martial No. 14 is
hereby directed to conduct proceedings on the applications of bail of the petitioner,
intervenors and which may as well include other persons facing charges before General Court-
Martial No. 14.
Pending the proceedings on the applications for bail before General Court-Martial No. 14,
this Court reiterates its orders of release on the provisional liberty of petitioner Jacinto Ligot as
well as intervenors Franklin Brawner and Arsenio Tecson.
On February 18, 1991, the private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 filed with this Court a
petition for habeas corpus on the ground that they were being detained in Camp Crame
without charges. The petition was referred to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, where it
was raffled to respondent Judge Antonio P. Solano. Finding after hearing that no formal
charges had been filed against the petitioners after more than a year after their arrest, the
trial court ordered their release.
II
The Court has examined the records of this case and rules as follows.
It appears that the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 were given several
opportunities to present their side at the pre-trial investigation, first at the scheduled hearing
of February 12, 1990, and then again after the denial of their motion of February 21, 1990,
when they were given until March 7, 1990, to submit their counter-affidavits. On that date,
they filed instead a verbal motion for reconsideration which they were again asked to submit
in writing. This they did on March 13, 1990. The motion was in effect denied when the PTI
Panel resolved to recommend that the charges be referred to the General Court Martial for
trial.
The said petitioners cannot now claim they have been denied due process because the
investigation was resolved against them owing to their own failure to submit their counter-
affidavits. They had been expressly warned in the subpoena sent them that “failure to submit
the aforementioned counter-affidavits on the date above specified shall be deemed a waiver of
(their) right to submit controverting evidence.” They chose not to heed the warning. As their
motions appeared to be dilatory, the PTI Panel was justified in referring the charges to GCM
No. 14 without waiting for the petitioners to submit their defense. Due process is satisfied as
long as the party is accorded an opportunity to be heard. If it is not availed of, it is deemed
waived or forfeited without violation of the Bill of Rights.
There was in our view substantial compliance with Article of War 71 by the PTI Panel.
Moreover, it is now settled that “even a failure to conduct a pre-trial investigation does not
deprive a general court-martial of jurisdiction.” We so held in Arula v. Espino,1 thus:
xxx
But even a failure to conduct a pre-trial investigation does not deprive a general court-
martial of jurisdiction.
The better accepted concept of pre-trial investigation is that it is directory, not mandatory,
and in no way affects the jurisdiction of a court-martial. In Humphrey v. Smith, 336 U.S. 695,
93 L ed 986 (1949), the Court said:
“We do not think that the pre-trial investigation procedure by Article 70 (The Philippine
counter-part is article of war 71, Commonwealth Act 408) can properly be construed as an
indispensable pre-requisite to the exercise of Army general court-martial jurisdiction. The
Article does serve important functions in the administration of court-martial procedures and
does provide safeguards to an accused. Its language is clearly such that a defendant could
object to trial in the absence of the required investigation. In that event the court-martial
could itself postpone trial pending the investigation. And the military reviewing authorities
could consider the same contention, reversing a court-martial conviction where failure to
comply with Article 70 has substantially injured an accused. But we are not persuaded that
Congress intended to make otherwise valid court-martial judgments wholly void because pre-
trial investigations fall short of the standards prescribed by Article 70. That Congress has not
required analogous pre-trial procedure for Navy court-martial is an indication that the
investigatory plan was not intended to be exalted to the jurisdictional level.
xxx
Shortly after enactment of Article 70 in 1920 the Judge Advocate General of the Army did
hold that where there had been no pre-trial investigation, court-martial proceedings were
void ab initio. But this holding has been expressly repudiated in later holdings of the Judge
Advocate General. This later interpretation has been that the pre-trial requirements of Article
70 are directory, not mandatory, and in no way effect the jurisdiction of a court-martial. The
War Department’s interpretation was pointedly called to the attention of Congress in 1947
after which Congress amended Article 70 but left unchanged the language here under
consideration.”
A trial before a general court-martial convened without any pretrial investigation under
article of war 71 would of course be altogether irregular; but the court-martial might
nevertheless have jurisdiction. Significantly, this rule is similar to the one obtaining in criminal
procedure in the civil courts to the effect that absence of preliminary investigation does not go
into the jurisdiction of the court but merely to the regularity of the proceedings.
As to what law should govern the conduct of the preliminary investigation, that issue was
resolved more than two years ago in Kapunan v. De Villa,2 where we declared:
The Court finds that, contrary to the contention of petitioners, there was substantial
compliance with the requirements of law as provided in the Articles of War and P.D. No. 77, as
amended by P.D. No. 911. The amended charge sheets, charging petitioners and their co-
respondents with mutiny and conduct unbecoming an officer, were signed by Maj. Antonio
Ruiz, a person subject to military law, after he had investigated the matter through an
evaluation of the pertinent records, including the reports of respondent AFP Board of Officers,
and was convinced of the truth of the testimonies on record. The charge sheets were sworn to
by Maj. Ruiz, the “accuser,” in accordance with and in the manner provided under Art. 71 of
the Articles of War. Considering that P.D. No. 77, as amended by P.D. No. 911, is only of
suppletory application, the fact that the charge sheets were not certified in the manner
provided under said decrees, i.e., that the officer administering the oath has personally
examined the affiant and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood his
affidavit, does not invalidate said charge sheets. Thereafter, a “pretrial investigation” was
conducted by respondent Maj. Baldonado, wherein, pursuant to P.D. No. 77, as amended by
P.D. No. 911, petitioners were subpoenaed and required to file their counter-affidavit.
However, instead of doing so, they filed an untitled pleading seeking the dismissal of the
charges against them. That petitioners were not able to confront the witnesses against them
was their own doing, for they never even asked Maj. Baldonado to subpoena said witnesses so
that they may be made to answer clarificatory questions in accordance with P.D. No. 77, as
amended by P.D. No. 911.
The petitioners also allege that GCM No. 14 has not been constitute in accordance with Article
8 of the Articles of War because General Order No. M-6, which supposedly convened the body,
was not signed by Gen. Renato de Villa as Chief of Staff.
Article of War No. 8 reads:
Art. 8. General Courts-Martial.—The President of the Philippines, the Chief of Staff of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Chief of Constabulary and, when empowered by the
President, the commanding officer of a major command or task force, the commanding officer
of a division, the commanding officer of a military area, the superintendent of the Military
Academy, the commanding officer of a separate brigade or body of troops may appoint
general courts-martial; but when any such commander is the accuser or the prosecutor of the
person or persons to be tried, the court shall be appointed by superior competent authority. x
xx
While it is true that General Order No. M-6 was not signed by Gen. De Villa, there is no doubt
that he authorized it because the order itself said it was issued “By Command of General De
Villa” and it has not been shown to be spurious. As observed by the Solicitor General, the
Summary Disposition Form showed that Gen. De Villa, as Chief of Staff, AFP, actually
constituted GCM No. 14 and appointed its president and members. It is significant that
General De Villa has not disauthorized or revoked or in any way disowned the said order, as
he would certainly have done if his authority had been improperly invoked. On the contrary, as
the principal respondent in G.R. No. 93177, he sustained General Order No. M-6 in the
Comment filed for him and the other respondents by the Solicitor General. Coming now to the
right to peremptory challenge, we note that this was originally provided for under Article 18 of
Com. Act No. 408 (Articles of War), as amended by Rep. Act No. 242, on June 12, 1948, to
wit:
Art. 18. Challenges.—Members of general or special courts-martial may be challenged by the
accused or the trial judge advocate for cause stated to the court. The court shall determine
the relevancy and validity thereof, and shall not receive a challenge to more than one member
at a time. Challenges by the trial judge advocate shall ordinarily be presented and decided
before those by the accused are offered. Each side shall be entitled to the peremptory
challenge, but the law member of the court shall not be challenged except for cause.
The history of peremptory challenge was traced in Martelino v. Alejandro,3 thus:
In the early formative years of the infant Philippine Army, after the passage in 1935 of
Commonwealth Act No. 1 (otherwise known as the National Defense Act), except for a handful
of Philippine Scout officers and graduates of the United States military and naval acade-mies
who were on duty with the Philippine Army, there was a complete dearth of officers learned in
military law, this aside from the fact that the officer corps of the developing army was
numerically inadequate for the demands of the strictly military aspects of the national defense
program. Because of these considerations it was then felt that peremptory challenges should
not in the meanwhile be permitted and that only challenges for cause, in any number, would
be allowed. Thus Article 18 of the Articles of War (Commonwealth Act No. 408), as worded on
September 14, 1938, the date of the approval of the Act, made no mention or reference to
any peremptory challenge by either the trial judge advocate of a court-martial or by the
accused. After December 17, 1958, when the Manual for Courts-Martial of the Philippine Army
became effective, the Judge Advocate General’s Service of the Philippine Army conducted a
continuing and intensive program of training and education in military law, encompassing the
length and breadth of the Philippines. This program was pursued until the outbreak of World
War II in the Pacific on December 7, 1941. After the formal surrender of Japan to the allies in
1945, the officer corps of the Armed Forces of the Philippines had expanded to a very large
number, and a great many of the officers had been indoctrinated in military law. It was in
these environmental circumstances that Article of War 18 was amended on June 12, 1948 to
entitle “each side” to one peremptory challenge, with the sole proviso that “the law member of
court shall not be challenged except for cause.”
On September 27, 1972, President Marcos issued General Order No. 8, empowering the Chief
of Staff of the Armed Forces to create military tribunals “to try and decide cases of military
personnel and such other cases as may be referred to them.”
On November 7, 1972, he promulgated P.D. No. 39 (Governing the Creation, Composition,
Jurisdiction, Procedure, and other matters relevant to Military Tribunals). This decree
disallowed the peremptory challenge, thus:
No peremptory challenge shall be allowed. Challenges for cause may be entertained to insure
impartiality and good faith. Challenges shall immediately be heard and determined by a
majority of the members excluding the challenged member. A tie vote does not disqualify the
challenged member. A successfully challenged member shall be immediately replaced.
On June 11, 1978, President Marcos promulgated P.D. No. 1498, or the National Security
Code, which was a compilation and codification of decrees, general orders, LOI and policies
intended “to meet the continuing threats to the existence, security and stability of the State.”
The modified rule on challenges under P.D. No. 39 was embodied in this decree.
On January 17, 1981, President Marcos issued Proc. No. 2045 proclaiming the termination
of the state of martial law throughout the Philippines. The proclamation revoked General
Order No. 8 and declared the dissolution of the military tribunals created pursuant thereto
upon final determination of the cases pending therein.
P.D. No. 39 was issued to implement General Order No. 8 and the other general orders
mentioned therein. With the termination of martial law and the dissolution of the military
tribunals created thereunder, the reason for the existence of P.D. No. 39 ceased automatically.
It is a basic canon of statutory construction that when the reason of the law ceases, the
law itself ceases. Cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex.  This principle is also expressed in the
maxim ratio legis est anima: the reason of law is its soul.
Applying these rules, we hold that the withdrawal of the right to peremptory challenge in
P.D. No. 39 became ineffective when the apparatus of martial law was dismantled with the
issuance of Proclamation No. 2045. As a result, the old rule embodied in Article 18 of Com. Act
No. 408 was automatically revived and now again allows the right to peremptory challenge.
We do not agree with the respondents in G.R. No. 96948 that the right to peremptory
challenge remains withdrawn under P.D. No. 39. To repeat for emphasis, this decree was itself
withdrawn when martial law was lifted on January 17, 1981. Indeed, even if not so withdrawn,
it could still be considered no longer operative, having been cast out under the new
dispensation as, in the words of the Freedom Constitution, one of the “iniquitous vestiges of
the previous regime.”
The military tribunal was one of the most oppressive instruments of martial law. It is
curious that the present government should invoke the rules of that discredited body to justify
its action against the accused officers.
The Court realizes that the recognition of the right to peremptory challenge may be
exploited by a respondent in a court-martial trial to delay the proceedings and defer his
deserved punishment. It is hoped that the accused officers in the cases at bar will not be so
motivated. At any rate, the wisdom of Com. Act No. 408, in the light of present circumstances,
is a matter addressed to the law-makers and not to this Court. The judiciary can only interpret
and apply the laws without regard to its own misgivings on their adverse effects. This is a
problem only the political departments can resolve.
The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454 question the propriety of the petition
for certiorari and mandamus and the petition for habeas corpus filed by the private
respondents with the Regional Trial Courts of Quezon City. It is argued that since the private
respondents are officers of the Armed Forces accused of violations of the Articles of War, the
respondent courts have no authority to order their release and otherwise interfere with the
court-martial proceedings.
The petitioners further contend that under Sec. 9(3) of BP 129, the Court of Appeals is
vested with “exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions,
orders, or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities,
boards or commissions.” Rather irrelevantly, the petitioners also cite the case of Yang v. Court
of Appeals,4 where this Court held that “appeals from the Professional Regulation Commission
are now exclusively cognizable by the Court of Appeals.”
It should be noted that the aforecited provision and the case cited refer to ordinary
appeals and not to the remedies employed by the accused officers before the respondent
courts.
In Martelino, we observed as follows:
It is true that civil courts as a rule exercise no supervision or correcting power over the
proceedings of courts-martial, and that mere errors in their proceedings are not open to
consideration. The single inquiry, the test, is jurisdiction. But it is equally true that in the
exercise of their undoubted discretion, courts-martial may commit such an abuse of discretion
—what in the language of Rule 65 is referred to as “grave abuse of discretion”—as to give rise
to a defect in their jurisdiction. This is precisely the point at issue in this action suggested by
its nature as one for certiorari and prohibition x x x.
The Regional Trial Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court over petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus against inferior courts
and other bodies and on petitions for habeas corpus and quo warranto.5 In the absence of a
law providing that the decisions, orders and ruling of a court-martial or the Office of the Chief
of Staff can be questioned only before the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, we hold
that the Regional Trial Court can exercise similar jurisdiction.
We find that the right to bail invoked by the private respondents in G.R. Nos. 95020 has
traditionally not been recognized and is not available in the military, as an exception to the
general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. This much was suggested in Arula, where we
observed that “the right to a speedy trial is given more emphasis in the military where the
right to bail does not exist.”
The justification for this exception was well explained by the Solicitor General as follows:
The unique structure of the military should be enough reason to exempt military men from the
constitutional coverage on the right to bail.
Aside from structural peculiarity, it is vital to note that mutinous soldiers operate within the
framework of democratic system, are allowed the fiduciary use of firearms by the government
for the discharge of their duties and responsibilities and are paid out of revenues collected
from the people. All other insurgent elements carry out their activities outside of and against
the existing political system.
xxx
National security considerations should also impress upon this Honorable Court that
release on bail of respondents constitutes a damaging precedent. Imagine a scenario of say
1,000 putschists roaming the streets of the Metropolis on bail, or if the assailed July 25, 1990
Order were sustained, on “provisional” bail. The sheer number alone is already discomforting.
But, the truly disquieting thought is that they could freely resume their heinous activity which
could very well result in the overthrow of duly constituted authorities, including this Honorable
Court, and replace the same with a system consonant with their own concept of government
and justice.
The argument that denial from the military of the right to bail would violate the equal
protection clause is not acceptable. This guaranty requires equal treatment only of persons or
things similarly situated and does not apply where the subject of the treatment is substantially
different from others. The accused officers can complain if they are denied bail and other
members of the military are not. But they cannot say they have been discriminated against
because they are not allowed the same right that is extended to civilians.
On the contention of the private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 that they had not been
charged after more than one year from their arrest, our finding is that there was substantial
compliance with the requirements of due process and the right to a speedy trial.
The petition for habeas corpus was directly filed with this Court on February 18, 1991, and
was referred to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for raffle, hearing and decision. It was
heard on February 26, 1991, by the respondent court, where the petitioners submitted the
charge memorandum and specifications against the private respondents dated January 30,
1991. On February 12, 1991, pursuant to Office Order No. 31-91, the PTI panel was created
and initial investigation was scheduled on March 12, 1991 at 2:00 p.m. On March 20, 1991,
the private respondents received the copies of the charges, charge sheets and specifications
and were required to submit their counter-affidavits on or before April 11, 1991. There was
indeed a delay of more than one year in the investigation and preparation of the charges
against the private respondents. However, this was explained by the Solicitor General thus:
x x x The AFP Special Investigating Committee was able to complete its pre-charge
investigation only after one (1) year because hundreds of officers and thousands of enlisted
men were involved in the failed coup. All of them, as well as other witnesses, had to be
interviewed or investigated, and these inevitably took months to finish. The pre-charge
investigation was rendered doubly difficult by the fact that those involved were dispersed and
scattered throughout the Philippines. In some cases, command units, such as the Scout
Rangers, have already been disbanded. After the charges were completed, the same still had
to pass review and approval by the AFP Chief of Staff.
While accepting this explanation, the Court nevertheless must reiterate the following
admonition:
This Court as protector of the rights of the people, must stress the point that if the
participation of petitioner in several coup attempts for which he is confined on orders of
Adjutant General Jorge Agcaoili cannot be established and no charges can be filed against him
or the existence of a prima facie case warranting trial before a military commission is wanting,
it behooves respondent then Major General Rodolfo Biazon (now General) to release
petitioner. Respondents must also be reminded that even if a military officer is arrested
pursuant to Article 70 of then Articles of War, indefinite confinement is not sanctioned, as
Article 71 thereof mandates that immediate steps must be taken to try the person accused or
to dismiss the charge and release him. Any officer who is responsible for unnecessary delay in
investigating or carrying the case to a final conclusion may even be punished as a court
martial may direct.6
It should be noted, finally, that after the decision was rendered by Judge Solano on February
26, 1991, the government filed a notice of appeal ad cautelam and a motion for
reconsideration, the latter was ultimately denied, after hearing, on March 4, 1991. The 48-
hour period for appeal under Rule 41, Section 18, of the Rules of Court did not run until after
notice of such denial was received by the petitioners on March 12, 1991. Contrary to the
private respondents’ contention, therefore, the decision had not yet become final and
executory when the special civil action in G.R. No. 97454 was filed with this Court on March
12, 1991.
III
Regarding the propriety of the petitions at bar, it is well to reiterate the following observations
of the Court in Arula:
The referral of charges to a court-martial involves the exercise of judgment and discretion
(AW 71). A petition for certiorari, in order to prosper, must be based on jurisdictional grounds
because, as long as the respondent acted with jurisdiction, any error committed by him or it in
the exercise thereof will amount to nothing more than an error of judgment which may be
reviewed or corrected only by appeal. Even an abuse of discretion is not sufficient by itself to
justify the issuance of a writ of certiorari.
As in that case, we find that the respondents in G.R. No. 93177 have not acted with grave
abuse of discretion or without or in excess of jurisdiction to justify the intervention of the
Court and the reversal of the acts complained of by the petitioners. Such action is indicated,
however, in G.R. No. 96948, where we find that the right to peremptory challenge should not
have been denied, and in G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, where the private respondents should
not have been ordered released.
ACCORDINGLY, in G.R. No. 93177, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. In G.R. No.
96948, the petition is GRANTED, and the respondents are DIRECTED to allow the petitioners
to exercise the right of peremptory challenge under Article 18 of the Articles of War. In G.R.
Nos. 95020 and 97454, the petitions are also GRANTED, and the orders of the respondent
courts for the release of the private respondents are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
     Fernan (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez,
Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Me-dialdea, Regalado and David
e, Jr., JJ., concur.
     Sarmiento, J., See Concurring and Dissenting Opinion.
SARMIENTO, J.: Concurring and Dissenting Opinion.
I concur with the ponencia of my esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Cruz, but I dissent
insofar as he would deny bail to accused military personnel.
The Constitution explicitly grants the right to bail to “all persons” before conviction, with
the only exception of “those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong.”1 The Charter also states that “[T]he right to bail shall not be
impaired even if the writ of habeas corpus is suspended.”2 To deny the military officers here
concerned of the right to bail is to circumscribe the inclusive meaning of “all persons”—the
coverage of the right.
I believe that military officers fall within “persons”.
The picture conjured up by the Solicitor General of “a scenario of say 1,000 putschists
roaming the streets of the Metropolis on bail, or if the assailed July 25, 1990 Order were
sustained, on ‘provisional’ bail... [t]he sheer number alone is already discomforting . . . [b]ut,
the truly disquieting thought is that they could freely resume their heinous activity which could
very well result in the overthrow of duly constituted authorities, including this Honorable
Court, and replace the same with a system consonant with their own concept of government
and justice.”3 But would a scenario of 1,000 murderers or drug pushers roaming the streets of
the metropolis justify a denial of the right to bail? Would not that dark picture painted by the
Solicitor General be reproduced by 1,000 “equally dangerous” elements of society?
 We gave bail Senator Enrile and General Brawner. I find no reason why the petitioners
should not be granted the same right.

The majority would point to tradition, supposed to be firmly settled, as an argument to

deny bail. I submit, however, that tradition is no argument. First, the Constitution does not
say it. Second, we are a government of laws, not tradition.

If there are precedents that attest to the contrary, I submit that a reexamination is in
order.

G.R. No. 93177, petition dismissed; G.R. No. 96948, petition granted; G.R. Nos. 95020 and
97454, petitions granted, orders reversed and set aside.
 G.R. No. 129670. February 1, 2000.*
MANOLET O. LAVIDES, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS; HON.
ROSALINA L. LUNA PISON, Judge Presiding over Branch 107, RTC, Quezon City;
and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Criminal Procedure; Bail; In cases where it is authorized, bail should be granted before
arraignment, otherwise the accused may be precluded from filing a motion to quash. —In the
first place, as the trial court itself acknowledged, in cases where it is authorized, bail should be
granted before arraignment, otherwise the accused may be precluded from filing a motion to
quash. For if the information is quashed and the case is dismissed, there would then be no
need for the arraignment of the accused. In the second place, the trial court could ensure the
presence of petitioner at the arraignment precisely by granting bail and ordering his presence
at any stage of the proceedings, such as arraignment. Under Rule 114, §2(b) of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure, one of the conditions of bail is that “the accused shall appear before the
proper court whenever so required by the court or these Rules,” while under Rule 116, §1(b)
the presence of the accused at the arraignment is required.
Same; Same; To condition the grant of bail to an accused on his arraignment would be
to place him in a position where he has to choose between (1) filing a motion to quash and
thus delay his release on bail because until his motion to quash can be resolved, his
arraignment cannot be held, and (2) foregoing the filing of a motion to quash so that he can
he arraigned at once and thereafter he released on bail .—To condition the grant of bail to an
accused on his arraignment would be to place him in a position where he has to choose
between (1) filing a motion to quash and thus delay his release on bail because until his
motion to quash can be resolved, his arraignment cannot be held, and (2) foregoing the filing
of a motion to quash so that he can be arraigned at once and thereafter be released on bail.
These scenarios certainly undermine the accused’s constitutional right not to be put on trial
except upon valid complaint or information sufficient to charge him with a crime and his right
to bail.
Same; Same; It is the condition in the trial court’s order that “approval of the bail bonds
shall be made only after arraignment,” which the Court of Appeals should have declared void,
instead of the condition that the accused cannot waive his appearance at the trial but that he
must be present at the hearings of the case. —It is the condition in the May 16, 1997 order of
the trial court that “approval of the bail bonds shall be made only after arraignment,” which
the Court of Appeals should instead have declared void. The condition imposed in the trial
court’s order of May 16, 1997 that the accused cannot waive his appearance at the trial but
that he must be present at the hearings of the case is valid and is in accordance with Rule
114. For another condition of bail under Rule 114, §2(c) is that “The failure of the accused to
appear at the trial without justification despite due notice to him or his bondsman shall be
deemed an express waiver of his right to be present on the date specified in the notice. In
such case, trial shall proceed in absentia.”
Same; Same; Trials in Absentia; Stages of Trial Where Presence of Accused Required. —
Art. III, §14(2) of the Constitution authorizing trials in absentia allows the accused to be
absent at the trial but not at certain stages of the proceedings, to wit: (a) at arraignment and
plea, whether of innocence or of guilt, (b) during trial whenever necessary for identification
purposes, and (c) at the promulgation of sentence, unless it is for a light offense, in which
case the accused may appear by counsel or representative. At such stages of the proceedings,
his presence is required and cannot be waived. As pointed out in Borja v. Mendoza, in an
opinion by Justice, later Chief Justice, Enrique Fernando, there can be no trial  in
absentia unless the accused has been arraigned.
Same; Same; Although a condition for the grant of bail to an accused is invalid, it does
not follow that his arraignment and the subsequent proceedings against him are invalid. —
Although this condition is invalid, it does not follow that the arraignment of petitioner on May
23, 1997 was also invalid. Contrary to petitioner’s contention, the arraignment did not
emanate from the invalid condition that “approval of the bail bonds shall be made only after
the arraignment.” Even without such a condition, the arraignment of petitioner could not be
omitted. In sum, although the condition for the grant of bail to petitioner is invalid, his
arraignment and the subsequent proceedings against him are valid.
Criminal Law; Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse;  Pleadings and
Practice; Certiorari; While certiorari will not lie from a denial of a motion to quash, there may
be cases where there are special circumstances clearly demonstrating the inadequacy of an
appeal, and the accused may resort to the appellate court to raise the issue decided against
him; Whether an accused is liable for just one crime regardless of the number of sexual acts
allegedly committed by him and the number of children with whom he had sexual intercourse,
or whether each act of intercourse constitutes one crime is a question that bears on the
presentation of evidence by either party. —In Tano v. Salvador, the Court, while holding that,
certiorari will not lie from a denial of a motion to quash, nevertheless recognized that there
may be cases where there are special circumstances clearly demonstrating the inadequacy of
an appeal. In such cases, the accused may resort to the appellate court to raise the issue
decided against him. This is such a case. Whether petitioner is liable for just one crime
regardless of the number of sexual acts allegedly committed by him and the number of
children with whom he had sexual intercourse, or whether each act of intercourse constitutes
one crime is a question that bears on the presentation of evidence by either party. It is
important to petitioner as well as to the prosecution how many crimes there are. For instance,
if there is only one offense of sexual abuse regardless of the number of children involved, it
will not matter much to the prosecution whether it is able to present only one of the
complainants. On the other hand, if each act of sexual intercourse with a child constitutes a
separate offense, it will matter whether the other children are presented during the trial.
Same; Same; Elements.—The elements of the offense are as follows: (1) the accused
commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; (2) that said act is performed with
a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and (3) the child, whether
male or female, is or is deemed under 18 years of age. Exploitation in prostitution or other
sexual abuse occurs when the child indulges in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct (a) for
money, profit, or any other consideration; or (b) under the coercion or influence of any adult,
syndicate, or group.
Same; Same; Same; Each incident of sexual intercourse and lascivious act with a child
under the circumstances mentioned in Article III, §5 of Republic Act No. 7160 is a separate
and distinct offense.—Each incident of sexual intercourse and lascivious act with a child under
the circumstances mentioned in Art. III, §5 of R.A. No. 7160 is thus a separate and distinct
offense. The offense is similar to rape or act of lasciviousness under the Revised Penal Code in
which each act of rape or lascivious conduct should be the subject of a separate information.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
      Wilfred M. Guerrero, Liberato G. Yambao, George Coronacion, Ben I. Ibuyan and
Benito P. Fabie for petitioner.
     The Solicitor General for respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
Petitioner Manolet Lavides was arrested on April 3, 1997 for child abuse under R.A. No. 7610
(AN ACT PROVIDING FOR STRONGER DETERRENCE AND SPECIAL PROTECTION AGAINST
CHILD ABUSE, EXPLOITATION AND DISCRIMINATION, PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR ITS
VIOLATION, AND OTHER PURPOSES). His arrest was made without a warrant as a result of an
entrapment conducted by the police. It appears that on April 3, 1997, the parents of
complainant Lorelie San Miguel reported to the police that their daughter, then 16 years old,
had been contacted by petitioner for an assignation that night at petitioner’s room at the
Metropolitan Hotel in Diliman, Quezon City. Apparently, this was not the first time the police
received reports of petitioner’s activities. An entrapment operation was therefore set in
motion. At around 8:20 in the evening of April 3, 1997, the police knocked at the door of
Room 308 of the Metropolitan Hotel where petitioner was staying. When petitioner opened the
door, the police saw him with Lorelie, who was wearing only a t-shirt and an underwear,
whereupon they arrested him. Based on the sworn statement of complainant and the
affidavits of the arresting officers, which were submitted at the inquest, an information for
violation of Art. III, §5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 was filed on April 7, 1997 against petitioner in the
Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, where it was docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-97-70550.
On April 10, 1997, petitioner filed an “Omnibus Motion (1) For Judicial Determination of
Probable Cause; (2) For the Immediate Release of the Accused Unlawfully Detained on an
Unlawful Warrantless Arrest; and (3) In the Event of Adverse Resolution of the Above
Incident, Herein Accused be Allowed to Bail as a Matter of Right under the Law on Which He is
Charged.”1
On April 29, 1997, nine more informations for child abuse were filed against petitioner by
the same complainant, Lorelie San Miguel, and by three other minor children, Mary Ann
Tardesilla, Jennifer Catarman, and Annalyn Talingting. The cases were docketed as Criminal
Case Nos. Q-97-70866 to Q-97-70874. In all the cases, it was alleged that, on various dates
mentioned in the informations, petitioner had sexual intercourse with complainants who had
been “exploited in prostitution and . . . given money [by petitioner] as payment for the said
[acts of] sexual intercourse.”
No bail was recommended. Nonetheless, petitioner filed separate applications for bail in
the nine cases.
On May 16, 1997, the trial court issued an order resolving petitioner’s Omnibus Motion, as
follows:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Court finds that:
. 1.In Crim. Case No. Q-97-70550, there is probable cause to hold the accused under
detention, his arrest having been made in accordance with the Rules. He must
therefore remain under detention until further order of this Court;
. 2.The accused is entitled to bail in all the above-entitled case. He is hereby granted
the right to post bail in the amount of P80,000.00 for each case or a total of
P800,000.00 for all the cases under the following conditions:
. a)The accused shall not be entitled to a waiver of appearance during the trial of
these cases. He shall and must always be present at the hearings of these cases;
. b)In the event that he shall not be able to do so, his bail bonds shall be
automatically cancelled and forfeited, warrants for his arrest shall be immediately
issued and the cases shall proceed to trial in absentia;
. c)The hold-departure Order of this Court dated April 10, 1997 stands; and
. d)Approval of the bail bonds shall be made only after the arraignment to enable this
Court to immediately acquire jurisdiction over the accused.
. 3.Let these cases be set for arraignment on May 23, 1997 at 8:30 o’clock in the
morning.2
On May 20, 1997, petitioner filed a motion to quash the informations against him, except
those filed in Criminal Case No. Q-97-70550 or Q-97-70866. Pending resolution of his motion,
he asked the trial court to suspend the arraignment scheduled on May 23, 1997.3 Then on
May 22, 1997, he filed a motion in which he prayed that the amounts of bail bonds be reduced
to P40,000.00 for each case and that the same be done prior to his arraignment.4
On May 23, 1997, the trial court, in separate orders, denied petitioner’s motions to reduce
bail bonds, to quash the informations, and to suspend arraignment. Accordingly, petitioner
was arraigned during which he pleaded not guilty to the charges against him and then ordered
him released upon posting bail bonds in the total amount of P800,000.00, subject to the
conditions in the May 16, 1997 order and the “hold-departure” order of April 10, 1997. The
pre-trial conference was set on June 7, 1997.
On June 2, 1997, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 44316) in the
Court of Appeals, assailing the trial court’s order, dated May 16, 1997, and its two orders,
dated May 23, 1997, denying his motion to quash and maintaining the conditions set forth in
its order of May 16, 1997, respectively.
While the case was pending in the Court of Appeals, two more informations were filed
against petitioner, bringing the total number of cases against him to 12, which were all
consolidated.
On June 30, 1997, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, considering that the conditions imposed under Nos. 2-a) and 2-b),5 of the May
23 (should be May 16), 1997 Order, are separable, and would not affect the cash bond which
petitioner posted for his provisional liberty, with the sole modification that those aforesaid
conditions are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE, the May 16, and May 23, 1997 Orders are
MAINTAINED in all other respects.6
The appellate court invalidated the first two conditions imposed in the May 16, 1997 order for
the grant of bail to petitioner but ruled that the issue concerning the validity of the condition
making arraignment a prerequisite for the approval of petitioner’s bail bonds to be moot and
academic. It noted “that petitioner has posted the cash bonds; that when arraigned,
represented by lawyers, he pleaded not guilty to each offense; and that he has already been
released from detention.” The Court of Appeals thought that the aforesaid conditions in the
May 16, 1997 order were contrary to Art. III, §14(2) of the Constitution which provides that
“[a]fter arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided
that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.”
With respect to the denial of petitioner’s motion to quash the informations against him, the
appellate court held that petitioner could not question the same in a petition for certiorari
before it, but what he must do was to go to trial and to reiterate the grounds of his motion to
quash on appeal should the decision be adverse to him.
Hence this petition. Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred7—
. 1.In ruling that the condition imposed by respondent Judge that the approval of
petitioner’s bail bonds “shall be made only after his arraignment” is of no moment
and has been rendered moot and academic by the fact that he had already posted
the bail bonds and had pleaded not guilty to all the offenses;
. 2.In not resolving the submission that the arraignment was void not only because it
was made under compelling circumstance which left petitioner no option to question
the respondent Judge’s arbitrary action but also because it emanated from a void
Order;
. 3.In ruling that the denial of petitioner’s motion to quash may not be impugned in a
petition for certiorari; and
. 4.In not resolving the legal issue of whether or not petitioner may be validly charged
for violation of Section 5(b) of RA No. 7610 under several informations
corresponding to the number of alleged acts of child abuse allegedly committed
against each private complainant by the petitioner.
We will deal with each of these contentions although not in the order in which they are stated
by petitioner.
First. As already stated, the trial court’s order, dated May 16, 1997, imposed four
conditions for the grant of bail to petitioner:
. a)The accused shall not be entitled to a waiver of appearance during the trial of
these cases. He shall and must always be present at the hearings of these cases;
. b)In the event that he shall not be able to do so, his bail bonds shall be
automatically cancelled and forfeited, warrants for his arrest shall be immediately
issued and the cases shall proceed to trial in absentia;
. c)The hold-departure Order of this Court dated April 10, 1997 stands; and
. d)Approval of the bail bonds shall be made only after the arraignment to enable this
Court to immediately acquire jurisdiction over the accused.
The Court of Appeals declared conditions (a) and (b) invalid but declined to pass upon the
validity of condition (d) on the ground that the issue had become moot and academic.
Petitioner takes issue with the Court of Appeals with respect to its treatment of condition (d)
of the May 16, 1997 order of the trial court which makes petitioner’s arraignment a
prerequisite to the approval of his bail bonds. His contention is that this condition is void and
that his arraignment was also invalid because it was held pursuant to such invalid condition.
We agree with petitioner that the appellate court should have determined the validity of
the conditions imposed in the trial court’s order of May 16, 1997 for the grant of bail because
petitioner’s contention is that his arraignment was held in pursuance of these conditions for
bail.
In requiring that petitioner be first arraigned before he could be granted bail, the trial
court apprehended that if petitioner were released on bail he could, by being absent, prevent
his early arraignment and thereby delay his trial until the complainants got tired and lost
interest in their cases. Hence, to ensure his presence at the arraignment, approval of
petitioner’s bail bonds should be deferred until he could be arraigned. After that, even if
petitioner does not appear, trial can proceed as long as he is notified of the date of hearing
and his failure to appear is unjustified, since under Art. III, §14(2) of the Constitution, trial  in
absentia is authorized. This seems to be the theory of the trial court in its May 16, 1997 order
conditioning the grant of bail to petitioner on his arraignment.
This theory is mistaken. In the first place, as the trial court itself acknowledged, in cases
where it is authorized, bail should be granted before arraignment, otherwise the accused may
be precluded from filing a motion to quash. For if the information is quashed and the case is
dismissed, there would then be no need for the arraignment of the accused. In the second
place, the trial court could ensure the presence of petitioner at the arraignment precisely by
granting bail and ordering his presence at any stage of the proceedings, such as arraignment.
Under Rule 114, §2(b) of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, one of the conditions of bail is that
“the accused shall appear before the proper court whenever so required by the court or these
Rules,” while under Rule 116, §1(b) the presence of the accused at the arraignment is
required.
On the other hand, to condition the grant of bail to an accused on his arraignment would
be to place him in a position where he has to choose between (1) filing a motion to quash and
thus delay his release on bail because until his motion to quash can be resolved, his
arraignment cannot be held, and (2) foregoing the filing of a motion to quash so that he can
be arraigned at once and thereafter be released on bail. These scenarios certainly undermine
the accused’s constitutional right not to be put on trial except upon valid complaint or
information sufficient to charge him with a crime and his right to bail.8
It is the condition in the May 16, 1997 order of the trial court that “approval of the bail
bonds shall be made only after arraignment,” which the Court of Appeals should instead have
declared void. The condition imposed in the trial court’s order of May 16, 1997 that the
accused cannot waive his appearance at the trial but that he must be present at the hearings
of the case is valid and is in accordance with Rule 114. For another condition of bail under
Rule 114, §2(c) is that “The failure of the accused to appear at the trial without justification
despite due notice to him or his bondsman shall be deemed an express waiver of his right to
be present on the date specified in the notice. In such case, trial shall proceed in absentia”
Art. III, §14(2) of the Constitution authorizing trials in absentia allows the accused to be
absent at the trial but not at certain stages of the proceedings, to wit: (a) at arraignment and
plea, whether of innocence or of guilt,9 (b) during trial whenever necessary for identification
purposes,10 and (c) at the promulgation of sentence, unless it is for a light offense, in which
case the accused may appear by counsel or representative.11 At such stages of the
proceedings, his presence is required and cannot be waived. As pointed out in Borja v.
Mendoza,12 in an opinion by Justice, later Chief Justice, Enrique Fernando, there can be no
trial in absentia unless the accused has been arraigned.
 Undoubtedly, the trial court knew this. Petitioner could delay the proceedings by absenting
himself from the arraignment. But once he is arraigned, trial could proceed even in his
absence. So it thought that to ensure petitioner’s presence at the arraignment, petitioner
should be denied bail in the meantime. The fly in the ointment, however, is that such court
strategy violates petitioner’s constitutional rights.
Second. Although this condition is invalid, it does not follow that the arraignment of
petitioner on May 23, 1997 was also invalid. Contrary to petitioner’s contention, the
arraignment did not emanate from the invalid condition that “approval of the bail bonds shall
be made only after the arraignment.”
Even without such a condition, the arraignment of petitioner could not be omitted. In sum,
although the condition for the grant of bail to petitioner is invalid, his arraignment and the
subsequent proceedings against him are valid.
Third. Petitioner concedes that the rule is that the remedy of an accused whose motion to
quash is denied is not to file a petition for certiorari but to proceed to trial without prejudice to
his right to reiterate the grounds invoked in his motion to quash during trial on the merits or
on appeal if an adverse judgment is rendered against him. However, he argues that this case
should be treated as an exception. He contends that the Court of Appeals should not have
evaded the issue of whether he should be charged under several informations corresponding
to the number of acts of child abuse allegedly committed by him against each of the
complainants.
In Tano v. Salvador,13 the Court, while holding that certiorari will not lie from a denial of a
motion to quash, nevertheless recognized that there may be cases where there are special
circumstances clearly demonstrating the inadequacy of an appeal. In such cases, the accused
may resort to the appellate court to raise the issue decided against him. This is such a case.
Whether petitioner is liable for just one crime regardless of the number of sexual acts
allegedly committed by him and the number of children with whom he had sexual intercourse,
or whether each act of intercourse constitutes one crime is a question that bears on the
presentation of evidence by either party. It is important to petitioner as well as to the
prosecution how many crimes there are. For instance, if there is only one offense of sexual
abuse regardless of the number of children involved, it will not matter much to the
prosecution whether it is able to present only one of the complainants. On the other hand, if
each act of sexual intercourse with a child constitutes a separate offense, it will matter
whether the other children are presented during the trial.
The issue then should have been decided by the Court of Appeals. However, instead of
remanding this case to the appellate court for a determination of this issue, we will decide the
issue now so that the trial in the court below can proceed without further delay.
Petitioner’s coatention is that the 12 informations filed against him allege only one offense
of child abuse, regardless of the number of alleged victims (four) and the number of acts of
sexual intercourse committed with them (twelve). He argues that the act of sexual intercourse
is only a means of committing the offense so that the acts of sexual intercourse/lasciviousness
with minors attributed to him should not be subject of separate informations. He cites the
affidavits of the alleged victims which show that their involvement with him constitutes an
“unbroken chain of events,” i.e., the first victim was the one who introduced the second to
petitioner and so on. Petitioner says that child abuse is similar to the crime of large-scale
illegal recruitment where there is only a single offense regardless of the number of workers
illegally recruited on different occasions. In the alternative, he contends that, at the most, only
four informations, corresponding to the number of alleged child victims, can be filed against
him.
Art. III, §5 of R.A. No. 7160 under which petitioner is being prosecuted, provides:
Sec. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse.— Children, whether male or female, who for
money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult,
syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be
children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed upon the following:
....
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child
exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse.
The elements of the offense are as follows: (1) the accused commits the act of sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct; (2) that said act is performed with a child exploited in
prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and (3) the child,14 whether male or female,
is or is deemed under 18 years of age. Exploitation in prostitution or other sexual abuse occurs
when the child indulges in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct (a) for money, profit, or
any other consideration; or (b) under the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate, or
group.
Each incident of sexual intercourse and lascivious act with a child under the circumstances
mentioned in Art. III, §5 of R.A. No. 7160 is thus a separate and distinct offense. The offense
is similar to rape or act of lasciviousness under the Revised Penal Code in which each act of
rape or lascivious conduct should be the subject of a separate information. This conclusion is
confirmed by Art. III, §5(b) of R.A. No. 7160, which provides:
[t]hat when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted
under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the
Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be: Provided, That the
penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall
be reclusion temporal in its medium period.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE and another one is
RENDERED declaring the orders dated May 16, 1997 and May 23, 1997 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 107, Quezon City to be valid, with the exception of condition (d) in the second
paragraph of the order of May 16, 1997 (making arraignment a prerequisite to the grant of
bail to petitioner), which is hereby declared void.
SO ORDERED.
      Bellosillo (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Judgment set aside, orders of the trial court rendered valid.

 G.R. No. 131909. February 18, 1999.* be governed by rule, not by rumour; it must not be arbitrary, vague and fanciful; but legal and
regular.’ ”
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. ALFREDO CABRAL, Presiding
Judge, RTC, Branch 30, Camarines Sur and RODERICK ODIAMAR, respondents.
Same; Same; “No bail” recommendation constitutes clear and strong evidence of guilt of
the accused.—Lending credence to petitioner’s case is the fact that after the conduct of two
(2) preliminary investigations, “no bail” was recommended in the information. According
Criminal Procedure; Bail; The grant or denial of an application for bail is dependent on to Baylon v. Sison, such recommendation constitutes clear and strong evidence of guilt of the
whether the evidence of guilt is strong which the lower court should determine in a hearing accused.
called for the purpose.—In this case, accused-respondent was being charged with rape
qualified by the use of a deadly weapon punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. As such,
bail is discretionary and not a matter of right. The grant or denial of an application for bail is,
therefore, dependent on whether the evidence of guilt is strong which the lower court should
Same; Same; Jurisprudential guidelines in the exercise of discretion.— Aside from the
determine in a hearing called for the purpose. The determination of whether the evidence of
apparent abuse of discretion in determining which circumstances and pieces of evidence are to
guilt is strong, in this regard, is a matter of judicial discretion. While the lower court would
be considered, the lower court also did not strictly comply with jurisprudential guidelines in the
never be deprived of its mandated prerogative to exercise judicial discretion, this Court would
exercise of discretion. As reiterated in Carpio v. Maglalang, discretion is guided by: first, the
unhesitatingly reverse the trial court’s findings if found to be laced with grave abuse of
applicable provisions of the Constitution and the statutes; second, by the rules which this
discretion.
Court may promulgate; and third, by those principles of equity and justice that are deemed to
be part of the laws of the land.

Same; Same; Even though there is a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of accused, if on

an examination of the entire record the presumption is great that accused is guilty of a capital
Same; Same; Duties of a judge in case an application for bail is filed.— Recently, this
offense, bail should be refused.— By judicial discretion, the law mandates the determination of
Court laid down the following rules in Basco v. Judge Rapatalo which outlined the duties of a
whether proof is evident or the presumption of guilt is strong. “ Proof evident” or “Evident
judge in case an application for bail is filed: “(1) Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the
proof” in this connection has been held to mean clear, strong evidence which leads a well-
application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation; (2) Conduct a hearing of the
guarded dispassionate judgment to the conclusion that the offense has been committed as
application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to
charged, that accused is the guilty agent, and that he will probably be punished capitally if the
show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise
law is administered. “Presumption great”  exists when the circumstances testified to are such
its discretion; (3) Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong based on the
that the inference of guilt naturally to be drawn therefrom is strong, clear, and convincing to
summary of evidence of the prosecution ; (Italics supplied) (4) If the guilt of the accused is not
an unbiased judgment and excludes all reasonable probability of any other conclusion . Even
strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bailbond. Otherwise, petition should
though there is a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of accused, if on an examination of the
be denied.”
entire record the presumption is great that accused is guilty of a capital offense, bail should be
refused.

VITUG, J., Dissenting Opinion:

Same; Same; It must be remembered that the discretion to be exercised in granting or
denying bail, according to Basco v. Rapatalo is not absolute nor beyond control.— It is thus
indicative from the above observations that the lower court abused its discretion and showed
Criminal Procedure; Bail; When the judge views the evidence of guilt in such a capital
manifest bias in favor of accused-respondent in determining which circumstances are to be
offense not to be strong, the grant of bail becomes a matter of sound discretion on his part.—
considered in supporting its decision as to the guilt of accused-respondent. In this regard, it
In an indictment for a capital offense, the accused is not entitled to bail when the evidence of
must be remembered that the discretion to be exercised in granting or denying bail, according
guilt is strong, and it is the duty of the judge to hear the parties and to make an intelligent
to Basco v. Rapatalo “is not absolute nor beyond control. It must be sound, and exercised
assessment of the evidence presented. When the judge views the evidence of guilt in such a
within reasonable bounds. Judicial discretion, by its very nature, involves the exercise of the
capital offense not to be strong, the grant of bail becomes a matter of sound discretion on his
judge’s individual opinion. It is because of its very nature that the law has wisely provided that
part.
its exercise be guided by well-known rules which, while allowing the judge rational latitude for
the operation of his own individual views, prevent them from getting out of control. An
uncontrolled or uncontrollable discretion on the part of a judge is a misnomer. It is a fallacy.
Lord Mansfield, speaking of the discretion to be exercised in granting or denying bail said: ‘But
discretion when applied to a court of justice, means sound discretion guided by law. It must Remedial Law; Certiorari; The extraordinary remedies under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court are not open when the question is whether the trial judge has erred in the exercise of
sound discretion.— The extraordinary remedies under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court are not
open when the question is whether the trial judge has erred in the exercise of sound
discretion. These special reliefs are available only when the judge has committed “grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction” in his decision or order such as by
arbitrarily ignoring the evidence or completely acting on bias and whim. Even assuming that
the judge has erred in his judgment, so long as grave abuse of discretion is not evident in his
action, the aforesaid exceptional remedies are not warranted.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
     Amador L. Simando for private respondent.
ROMERO, J.:
Assailed before this Court is the August 1, 1997 decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R.
No. 42318 which affirmed the March 24, 1995 and June 14, 1996 orders2 of the lower court
granting accused-respondent’s Motion for Bail and denying petitioner People’s Motions “to
Recall and Invalidate Order of March 24, 1995” and “to Recall and/or Reconsider the Order of
May 5, 1995” confirming the hospitalization of accused-respondent.
Accused-respondent Roderick Odiamar was charged with rape upon the complaint of
Cecille Buenafe. In a bid to secure temporary liberty, accused-respondent filed a motion
praying that he be released on bail which petitioner opposed by presenting real, documentary
and testimonial evidence. The lower court, however, granted the motion for bail in an order,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, the evidence not being strong at the (sic) stage of the trial, this court is
constrained to grant bail for the provisional liberty of the accused Roderick Odiamar in the
amount of P30,000.00.” (Italics supplied)
Believing that accused-respondent was not entitled to bail as the evidence against him was
strong, the prosecution filed the two abovementioned motions which the lower court disposed
of, thus:
“WHEREFORE, the motions dated 10 May 1995 and 15 May 1995 both filed by Atty. Romulo
Tolentino, State Prosecutor, are hereby denied, for lack of merit.”
The above-cited orders prompted petitioner to file a petition before the Court of Appeals with
prayer for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. The Court of Appeals denied
the petition reasoning thus:
“We have examined in close and painstaking detail the records of this case, and find that the
claim of the People that the respondent judge had over-stepped the exercise of his jurisdiction
in issuing the questioned orders, is unimpressed with merit. We are not inclined to declare
that there was grave abuse in respondent court’s exercise of its discretion in allowing accused
to obtain bail. There is grave abuse of discretion where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility amounting to an
evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law. We do not find this to be so in this case. Our ruling is based not only on
the respect to be accorded the findings of facts of the trial court, which had the advantage
(not available to Us) of having observed first-hand the quality of the autoptic proference and
the documentary exhibits of the parties, as well as the demeanor of the witnesses on the
stand, but is grounded on the liberal slant given by the law in favor of the accused. Differently
stated, in the absence of clear, potent and compelling reasons, We are not prepared to
supplant the exercise of the respondent court’s discretion with that of Our own.”
Still convinced by the merit of its case, petitioner filed the instant petition submitting the
following sole issue:
“WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE ASSAILED DECISION
AND RESOLUTION DESPITE A SHOWING BY THE PROSECUTION THAT THERE IS STRONG
EVIDENCE PROVING RESPONDENT’S GUILT FOR THE CRIME CHARGED.”
The above-submitted issue pertains to the orders of the lower court granting accused-
respondent’s application for bail which it justified through its summary of the evidence
presented during the hearing. Said order states, thus:
“Now going over the evidence adduced in conjunction with the petition for bail filed by the
accused through counsel, the court believes that the evidence so far presented by the
prosecution is not strong. This is so because the crime of rape is not to be presumed; consent
and not physical force is the common origin of acts between man and woman. Strong
evidence and indication of great weight alone support such presumption. It is the teaching of
applicable doctrines that form the defense in rape prosecution. In the final analysis, it is
entitled to prevail, not necessarily because the untarnished truth is on its side but merely
because it can raise reasonable, not fanciful doubts. It has the right to require the
complainant (sic) strong evidence and an indication of great weight (People v. Godoy, G.R.
No. L-31177, July 15, 1976), and in the instant case, the reasonable doubt is on the evidence
of the prosecution, more so, because the intrinsic nature of the crime, the conviction or the
acquittal of the accused depends almost entirely on the credibility of the complainant (People
v. Oliquino, G.R. No. 94703, May 31, 1993). Rightly so, because in the commission of the
offense of rape the facts and circumstances occurring either prior, during and subsequent
thereto may provide conclusion whether they may negate the commission thereof by the
accused (People v. Flores, L-6065, October 26, 1986). If they negate, they do presuppose that
the evidence for the prosecution is not strong. More so, because in the instant case, the facts
and circumstances showing that they do seem to negate the commission thereof were mostly
brought out during the cross-examination. As such, they deserve full faith and credence
because the purpose thereof is to test accuracy and truthfulness and freedom from interest
and bias or the reverse (Rule 132, Sec. 6, Revised Rules of Evidence). The facts and
circumstances brought up are as follow, to wit:
. a)That, when the offended party Cecille Buenafe rode in the jeepney then driven by
the accused Roderick Odiamar in that evening of July 20, 1994 at about 8:00 o’clock
from the Poblacion, Lagonoy, Camarines Sur the former knew that it was for a joy
ride. In fact, she did not even offer any protest when the said jeepney proceeded to
 the Pilapil Beach resort at Telegrafo, San Jose, Camarines Sur instead of Sabang,
same municipality, where she and Stephen Florece intended to go. And when the
said jeepney was already inside that resort, Cecille even followed the accused in
going down from the jeepney also without protest on her part, a fact which shows
voluntariness on the part of the offended party and, therefore, to the mind of the
court her claim of rape should not be received with precipitate credulity. On the
contrary, an insight into the human nature is necessary (People v. Barbo, 56 SCRA
495). And it is only when the testimony is impeccable and rings true throughout
where it shall be believed (People v. Tapao, G.R. No. L-41704, October 23, 1981).
Rightly so, because the aphorism that evidence to be believed must not only
proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but it must be credible in itself in
conformity with the common experience and observation of mankind is nowhere of
moral relevance than in cases involving prosecution of rape (People v.
Macatangay, 107 Phil. 188);
. b)That, in that resort, when the accused Roderick Odiamar and companions
allegedly forced the offended party Cecille Buenafe to drink gin, the latter, at first,
refused and even did not swallow it but later on voluntarily took four (4) shots there
shows that there (was) no force. And as regards the claim that the accused Roderick
Odiamar and companions allegedly forced the said offended party to inhale smoke,
out of a small cigarette, presumably a marijuana, it becomes doubtful because the
prosecution, however, failed to present any portion of that so-called small cigarette
much less did it present an expert witness to show that inhaling of smoke from the
said cigarette would cause dizziness. Rightly so, because administration of narcotics
is covered by Art. 335, par. 2, Revised Penal Code (People v. Giduces  C.A. 38 O.C.
1434 cited in the Revised Penal Code, Aquino, Vol. III, p. 392). As such, the burden
of proof rests with the prosecution but it failed to do so;
. c)That, in that cottage where the accused, Roderick Odiamar allegedly brought the
offended party, Cecille Buenafe, the former was able to consummate the alleged
offense of rape by removing the two (2) hands of the offended party, placed them
on her knee, separating them thereby freeing the said hand and consequently
pushed the head of the accused but the latter was able to insert his penis when the
said offended party was no longer moving and the latter became tired. Neither
evidence has been presented to show that the offended party suffered an injury
much less any part of her pants or blouse was torn nor evidence to show that there
was an overpowering and overbearing moral influence of the accused towards the
offended party (People v. Mabunga, G.R. No. 96441, November 13, 1992) more so,
because force and violence in the offense of rape are relative terms, depending on
the age, size and strength of the parties and their relation to each other (People v.
Erogo, G.R. No. 102077, January 4, 1994);
. d)That, after the alleged commission of rape at about 3:00 o’clock in the early
morning of July 21, 1994, the offended party, Cecille, Stephen Florece and the
latter’s companions all boarded the same jeepney going back to the Poblacion of
Lagonoy, without the said offended party, protesting, crying or in any way showing
sign of grief regarding the alleged commission of the offense of rape until the
jeepney reached the house of Roderick Odiamar where the latter parked it. As in
other cases, the testimony of the offended party shall not be accepted unless her
sincerity and candor are free from suspicion, because the nature of the offense of
rape is an accusation easy to be made, hard to be proved but harder to be defended
by the party accused though innocent (People v. Francisco, G.R. No. L-43789, July
15, 1981). It becomes necessary, therefore, for the courts to exercise the most
painstaking care in scrutinizing the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution
(People v. Dayag, G.R. No. L-30619, March 29, 1974);
. e)That the offended party, Cecille Buenafe had herself physically examined by Dr.
Josephine Decena for medical certificate dated July 27, 1994 and it states, among
others, that there was a healed laceration on the hymen, her laceration might have
been sustained by the said offended party, a month, six (6) months, and even a
year, prior to the said examination and that the said laceration might have been
caused by repeated penetration of a male sex organ probably showing that the
offended party might have experienced sexual intercourse. This piece of testimony
coming from an expert, such finding is binding to court (Rules of Court, Moran, op.
cit., vol. 5, 1963 ed., p. 413);
. f)That the offended party, Cecille Buenafe accompanied by the Station Commander
of Lagonoy, Camarines Sur, proceeded to Naga City and upon the suggestion of
Gov. Bulaong, the said offended party submitted for medical treatment before the
same physician per medical certificate dated August 1, 1994 but according to the
said physician the lesions near the umbilicus were due to skin diseases but the said
offended party claim they were made by the accused after the sexual acts. As such,
there were contradictions on material points, it becomes of doubtful veracity (People
v. Palicte, 85 Phil. 711) and it also destroys the testimony (People v. Garcia, G.R. No.
13086, March 27, 1961). As to the fact that the said lesion was made by the accused
subsequent to the commission of the act, it is immaterial. As such, it has no
probative value.”
The lower court concluded that the evidence of guilt was not strong.
The Office of the Solicitor General disagreed with the lower court. It opined that aside
from failing to include some pieces of evidence in the summary, the trial court also misapplied
some well-established doctrines of criminal law. The Office of the Solicitor General pointed out
the following circumstances duly presented in the hearing for bail:
“First. There was no ill motive on the part of Cecille to impute the heinous crime of rape
against respondent (People v. Paragsa, 83 SCRA 105 [1978]; People v. Delovino, 247 SCRA
637 [1995]).
Second. Dr. Belmonte, the psychiatrist who attended to Cecille testified that based on her
psychiatric examination of the latter, Cecille manifested psychotic signs and symptoms such as
unusual fear, sleeplessness, suicidal thoughts, psychomotor retardation, poverty of thought
content as well as depressive signs and symptoms. These abnormal psychological
manifestations, according to Dr. Belmonte, are traceable to the rape incident (Pages 5-7, TSN,
November 22, 1994).
Third. The unrebutted offer of compromise by respondent is an implied admission of guilt
(People v. Flores, 239 SCRA 83 [1994]).
Fourth. Cecille was threatened by a deadly weapon and rendered unconscious by
intoxication and inhalation of marijuana smoke.
Fifth. The fact that after the conduct of two (2) preliminary investigations, ‘no bail was
recommended in the information’ constitutes ‘clear and strong evidence of the guilt of (all) the
accused’ (Baylon v. Sison, 243 SCRA 284 [1995]).
 Sixth. Cecille categorically testified on re-cross examination (Pages 5-7, Order) that
respondent succeeded in forcibly deflowering her because she was already weak and dizzy
due to the effect of the smoke and the gin. Her declarations remain unrebutted.
Seventh. Cecille categorically testified that she performed acts manifesting her lament,
torment and suffering due to the rape. She went to Stephen Florece, cried and complained
about the incident. Instead of helping her, Florece threatened to harm her and her family.
(Pages 9-13, November 17, 1994). The statements of Cecille are positive statements which,
under existing jurisprudence, are stronger than the denials put forth by respondent (Batiquin
v. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 334 [1996]).
Eight. The reliance by trial court on the testimony of Dr. Decena to the effect that the
lacerations suffered by Cecille ‘might have been sustained by the latter a month, six (6)
months or even a year prior to the examination’ (Page 12 [e], Order, March 24, 1995) thus
implying that respondent could not have committed the crime is highly misplaced.
Dr. Decena herself testified that she cannot tell ‘how old is an old hymenal laceration’
because she cannot indicate when an old laceration was inflicted and that from the size of the
vagina she ‘could not point the exact cause’ (Pages 7-10, TSN, December 9, 1994).
Nevertheless, proof of hymenal laceration is not indispensable in indictments for rape as a
broken hymen is not an essential ele-ment of the crime (People v. Echegaray, 257 SCRA
561 [1996]). Further, in crimes against chastity, the medical examination of the victim’s
genitalia is not an indispensable element for the successful prosecution of the crime. The
examination is merely corroborative in nature. (People v. Arce, 227 SCRA 406 [1993]).
Ninth. With respect to the cigarette wounds, Dr. Decena positively testified that the
wounds could have been ‘caused by cigarette butts as alleged by the victim’ (Page 6, TSN,
December 9, 1994) which confirms Cecille’s testimony (quoted in the Order at page 9) that
respondent burned her ‘right side of the stomach’ thrice.”
The above points are well taken and have impressed upon this Court the merits of the instant
petition.
The 1987 Constitution in Article III, Section 13 of the Bill of Rights provides:
“All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired
even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be
required.” (Italics supplied)
In view of the above exception to the constitutional guarantee on bail and in accordance with
its rule-making powers,3 the Supreme Court, in promulgating the Rules of Court, adopted the
following provision:
“Sec. 7. No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail
regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.”4 (Italics supplied)
In this case, accused-respondent was being charged with rape qualified by the use of a deadly
weapon punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.5 As such, bail is discretionary and not a
matter of right. The grant or denial of an application for bail is, therefore, dependent on
whether the evidence of guilt
is strong which the lower court should determine in a hearing called for the purpose. The
determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong, in this regard, is a matter of judicial
discretion. While the lower court would never be deprived of its mandated prerogative to
exercise judicial discretion, this Court would unhesitatingly reverse the trial court’s findings if
found to be laced with grave abuse of discretion.
By judicial discretion, the law mandates the determination of whether proof is evident or
the presumption of guilt is strong.6 “Proof evident” or “Evident proof” in this connection has
been held to mean clear, strong evidence which leads a well-guarded dispassionate judgment
to the conclusion that the offense has been committed as charged, that accused is the guilty
agent, and that he will probably be punished capitally if the law is
administered.7 “Presumption great” exists when the circumstances testified to are such
that the inference of guilt naturally to be drawn therefrom is strong, clear, and convincing to
an unbiased judgment and excludes all reasonable probability of any other conclusion .8 Even
though there is a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of accused, if on an examination of the
entire record the presumption is great that accused is guilty of a capital offense, bail should be
refused.9 (Emphasis and Italics supplied)
In other words, the test is not whether the evidence establishes guilt beyond reasonable
doubt but rather whether it shows evident guilt or a great presumption of guilt. As such, the
court is ministerially bound to decide which circumstances and factors are present which
would show evident guilt or presumption of guilt as defined above.10
This Court has observed that the lower court’s order failed to mention and include some
significant factors and circumstances which, to the mind of this Court are strong, clear and
convincing. First, it excluded the testimony of Dr. Belmonte about her psychiatric examination
of the victim as well as her findings that the latter manifested “psychotic signs and symptoms
such as unusual fear, sleeplessness, suicidal thoughts, psychomotor retardation, poverty of
thought content as well as depressive signs and symptom.”11 This particular testimony should
have been considered and included in the summary as it was given by an expert witness.
Second, the unrebutted offer of compromise by accused-respondent is an implied admission of
guilt which should have been noted as an offer of a compromise is generally considered as
admissible evidence against the party making it.12
Aside from failing to mention those important pieces of evidence and testimonies, this
Court has likewise observed that the lower court misapplied some doctrines in criminal law.
First, the lower court, in its order, intoned the following doctrine that “evidence to be believed
must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but it must be credible in itself in
conformity with common experience and observation of mankind.”
According to the lower court, the credibility of the complainant is suspect because she
willingly went with accused-respondent to the resort where she was allegedly raped. In the
scene of the crime, complainant allegedly voluntarily drank four shots of gin. The complainant,
likewise, never protested nor cried while they were on their way to accused-respondent’s
house. Because of those findings, the lower court doubted the credibility of complainant and
stated that the crime of rape is not to be presumed and that sexual acts between a man and a
woman are presumed to be consensual. In overcoming such presumption, much depends on
the credibility of the complainant.
 This Court cannot agree. First, there was no finding of any ill-motive on the part of
complainant in filing the rape charge against accused-respondent. This should have been
taken into consideration. The following rebuttal of petitioner to the findings of the lower court
is more credible:
“It must also be stressed that Cecille testified that she was forced by respondent to drink gin
with the help of his friends by holding her hair and putting the glass on her mouth (Pages 5-7,
TSN, November 17, 1994). More, respondent and his friends blew smoke into her face forcing
her to inhale the intoxicating smoke. Whenever she attempted to leave the place, she was
forced to sit down by Odiamar and his friends (Pages 6-7, TSN, November 17, 1994).
Similarly, Cecille categorically declared that she was threatened by Florece with a gun
(Page 17, TSN, November 17, 1994).
The requirement of force and intimidation in the crime of rape are relative and must be
viewed in light of the victim’s perspective and the offender’s physical condition (People v.
Plaza, 242 SCRA 724 [1995]). Further, physical resistance need not be established in rape
when intimidation is exercised upon the victim and the latter submits herself against her will
because of fear for life and personal safety. (People v. Ramos, 245 SCRA 405 [1995])
In this case, Cecille was only fifteen (15) years old at the time of the incident in question.
At her age, it is reasonable to assume that a shot of gin rendered her tipsy. Thus, four (4)
shots of gin must have rendered her dizzy, intoxicated and deprived of will or reason. The
resulting weakness and dizziness which deprived Cecille of reason, will and freedom must be
viewed in light of her perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the crime,
and not by any hard and fast rule because in “rape cases, submission does not necessarily
imply volition.” (Querido, 229 SCRA 745 [1994])”
It must likewise be taken into consideration that when Cecille went with the group of accused-
respondent, she was of the impression that it was just for a joy ride. The conclusion made by
the trial court that Cecille must have consented to the sexual act because she acquiesced to
go with them in the first place is, therefore, bereft of any legal or factual support, if not non
sequitur. That she agreed to accompany them for a joy ride does not mean that she also
agreed to the bestial acts later committed against her person.
Second, the lower court stated that “force and violence inthe offense of rape are relative
terms, depending on the age, size and strength of the parties and their relation to each
other.” The lower court enunciated this doctrine in finding that the alleged rape was actually a
consensual act since the prosecution was unable to show that complainant suffered any injury
nor show any evidence that her pants or blouse was torn. Neither was there any evidence that
accused-respondent exerted overpowering and overbearing moral influence over the offended
party.
This Court is of the impression that when the lower court invoked the above doctrine, it
readily concluded that complainant agreed to the sexual act disregarding testimonies lending
credence to complainant’s allegation that she was threatened and intimidated as well as
rendered weak and dizzy, not only by the smoke of the marijuana cigarette but also by
intoxication, thereby facilitating the commission of the crime. It was not imperative for the
prosecution, in order to prove the elements of force or intimidation to show that Cecille had
broken limbs or that her blouse or pants were torn. Her testimony to that effect would have
sufficed. Nevertheless, the prosecution still exerted efforts to corroborate Cecille’s claim by
presenting the examining physician who testified that Cecille suffered hymenal lacerations and
lesions near the umbilicus area. Unfortunately, however, the lower court chose to ignore these
telling pieces of evidence.
This Court views this apparent lapse on the part of the lower court with concern and
agrees with petitioner, in accordance with well established jurisprudence, that proof of
hymenal laceration is not indispensable in indictments for rape as a broken hymen is not an
essential element of the crime. Further, in crimes against chastity, the medical examination of
the victim’s genitalia is not an indispensable element for the successful prosecution of the
crime. The examination is merely corroborative in nature.13 And contrary to the theory
espoused by the lower court, a hymenal laceration is not conclusive proof that one is
experienced in sexual intercourse.
Second, the lower court highlighted the testimony of Dr. Decena to the effect that the
cigarette burns indicated that the lesions near complainant’s umbilicus were due to skin
diseases. Notably, however, the lower court again failed to mention that Dr. Decena likewise
positively testified that the wounds could have been “caused by cigarette butts as alleged by
the victim” which corroborates Cecille’s testimony that respondent burned her “right side of
the stomach” thrice.
It is thus indicative from the above observations that the lower court abused its discretion
and showed manifest bias in favor of accused-respondent in determining which circumstances
are to be considered in supporting its decision as to the guilt of accused-respondent. In this
regard, it must be remembered that the discretion to be exercised in granting or denying bail,
according to Basco v. Rapatalo14 “is not absolute nor beyond control. It must be sound, and
exercised within reasonable bounds. Judicial discretion, by its very nature, involves the
exercise of the judge’s individual opinion. It is because of its very nature that the law has
wisely provided that its exercise be guided by well-known rules which, while allowing the
judge rational latitude for the operation of his own individual views, prevent them from getting
out of control. An uncontrolled or uncontrollable discretion on the part of a judge is a
misnomer. It is a fallacy. Lord Mansfield, speaking of the discretion to be exercised in granting
or denying bail said: ‘But discretion when applied to a court of justice, means sound discretion
guided by law. It must be governed by rule, not by rumour; it must not be arbitrary, vague
and fanciful; but legal and regular.’ ”
The fact that vital prosecution evidence and testimonies have been irregularly disregarded
indicate that they have not been considered at all in arriving at the decision to grant bail. This
irregularity is even more pronounced with the misapplication of the two criminal law doctrines
cited to support the grant of the bail application. This Court cannot help but observe that the
lower court exerted painstaking efforts to show that the evidence of guilt of accused-
respondent is not strong by its non sequitur justifications, misleading or unsupported
conclusions, irregular disregard of vital prosecution evidence and strained interpretation, if not
misinterpretation, of criminal law doctrines.
It is the view of this Court that: (1) the testimony of Dr. Decena confirming complainant’s
allegation that accused-respondent burned the right side of her stomach with cigarette butts,
(2) the testimony of Dr. Belmonte stating that complainant exhibited psychological
manifestations which are “traceable to the rape incident,” and (3) the unrebutted offer of
compromise, are indications of the strength of the evidence of guilt of accused-respondent.
 Lending credence to petitioner’s case is the fact that after the conduct of two (2)
preliminary investigations, “no bail” was recommended in the information. According to Baylon
v. Sison,15 such recommendation constitutes clear and strong evidence of guilt of the
accused.
Aside from the apparent abuse of discretion in determining which circumstances and
pieces of evidence are to be considered, the lower court also did not strictly comply with
jurisprudential guidelines in the exercise of discretion. As reiterated in Carpio v.
Maglalang,16 discretion is guided by: first, the applicable provisions of the Constitution and
the statutes; second, by the rules which this Court may promulgate; and third, by those
principles of equity and justice that are deemed to be part of the laws of the land.
The present Constitution, as previously adverted to, provides that in crimes punishable by
reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, bail is not a matter of right. This Court
has reiterated this mandate in Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. Recently, this Court
laid down the following rules in Basco v. Judge Rapatalo17 which outlined the duties of a
judge in case an application for bail is filed:
. “(1)Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to
submit his recommendation;
. (2)Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the
prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is
strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its discretion;
. (3)Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong based on the
summary of evidence of the prosecution ; (Italics supplied)
. (4)If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval
of the bailbond. Otherwise, petition should be denied.”
Based on the above-cited procedure and requirements, after the hearing, the court’s order
granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution.18 A
summary is defined as “a comprehensive and usually brief abstract or digest of a text or
statement.”19
There are two corollary reasons for the summary. First, the summary of the evidence in
the order is an extension of the hearing proper, thus, a part of procedural due process
wherein the evidence presented during the prior hearing is formally recognized as having been
presented and most importantly, considered. The failure to include every piece of evidence in
the summary presented by the prosecution in their favor during the prior hearing would be
tantamount to not giving them the opportunity to be heard in said hearing, for the inference
would be that they were not considered at all in weighing the evidence of guilt. Such would be
a denial of due process, for due process means not only giving every contending party the
opportunity to be heard but also for the Court to consider every piece of evidence presented
in their favor.20 Second, the summary of the evidence in the order is the basis for the judge’s
exercising his judicial discretion. Only after weighing the pieces of evidence as contained in
the summary will the judge formulate his own conclusion as to whether the evidence of guilt
against the accused is strong based on his discretion.21 (Emphasis supplied)
Based on the above-stated reasons, the summary should necessarily be a complete
compilation or restatement of all the pieces of evidence presented during the hearing proper.
The lower court cannot exercise judicial discretion as to what pieces of evidence should be
included in the summary. While conceding that some prosecution evidence were enumerated,
said enumeration was incomplete. An incomplete enumeration or selective inclusion of pieces
of evidence for the prosecution in the order cannot be considered a summary, for a summary
is necessarily a reasonable recital of any evidence presented by the prosecution. A “summary”
that is incomplete is not a summary at all. According to Borinaga v. Tamin,22 the absence of a
summary in the order would make said order defective in form and substance. Corollarily, an
order containing an incomplete “summary” would likewise be defective in form and substance
which cannot be sustained or be given a semblance of validity. In Carpio v. Maglalang,23 said
order was considered defective and voidable. As such, the order granting or denying the
application for bail may be invalidated.24
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision dated August 1, 1997 and the
resolution dated December 22, 1997 in CA G.R. No. 42318 are REVERSED and the order dated
March 24, 1995 in Criminal Case No. T-1417 is declared void for having been issued in grave
abuse of discretion. The court a quo shall immediately issue a warrant for the rearrest of
Roderick Odiamar if his bail bond has been approved and thereafter, proceed with dispatch in
the disposition of said case. This resolution is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
     Panganiban, Purisima and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
     Vitug, J., Please see dissenting opinion.
DISSENTING OPINION
VITUG, J.:
With all due respect, I beg to disagree with the majority although it is not my wish to debate
with it in its evaluation of the evidence presented before the court below. Rather, what I find
to be difficult is whether this Court would be correct in substituting its own judgment over that
of the trial court at this stage of the proceedings. In an indictment for a capital offense, the
accused is not entitled to bail when the evidence of guilt is strong,1 and it is the duty of the
judge to hear the parties and to make an intelligent assessment of the evidence
presented.2 When the judge views the evidence of guilt in such a capital offense not to be
strong, the grant of bail becomes a matter of sound discretion on his part.3 The extraordinary
remedies under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court are not open when the question is whether the
trial judge has erred in the exercise of sound discretion. These special reliefs are available only
when the judge has committed “grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction” in his decision or order such as by arbitrarily ignoring the evidence or completely
acting on bias and whim.4 Even assuming that the judge has erred in his judgment, so long as
grave abuse of discretion is not evident in his action, the aforesaid exceptional remedies are
not warranted. Abuse of discretion must be such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty, or a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as
where the power is exercised in a despotic manner by reason, for instance, of passion and
hostility.5
 The Court a quo, I believe, did not commit grave abuse of discretion as that term is so
understood.

WHEREFORE, I vote to DISMISS the petition.

Judgment and resolution reversed, order declared void.

 G.R. No. 153675. April 19, 2007.*
GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, represented
by the Philippine Department of Justice, petitioner, vs. HON. FELIXBERTO T.
OLALIA, JR. and JUAN ANTONIO MUÑOZ, respondents.
International Law; Extradition; Jurisprudence on extradition is but in its infancy in this
jurisdiction.—Jurisprudence on extradition is but in its infancy in this jurisdiction. Nonetheless,
this is not the first time that this Court has an occasion to resolve the question of whether a
prospective extraditee may be granted bail.
Same; Same; Bail; Human Rights; The modern trend in public international law is the
primacy placed on the worth of the individual person and the sanctity of human rights. —At
first glance, the above ruling applies squarely to private respondent’s case. However, this
Court cannot ignore the following trends in international law: (1) the growing importance of
the individual person in public international law who, in the 20th century, has gradually
attained global recognition; (2) the higher value now being given to human rights in the
international sphere; (3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal
human rights in fulfilling their treaty obligations; and (4) the duty of this Court to balance the
rights of the individual under our fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on extradition,
on the other. The modern trend in public international law is the primacy placed on
the worth of the individual person and the sanctity of human rights. Slowly, the
recognition that the individual person may properly be a subject of international law is now
taking root. The vulnerable doctrine that the subjects of international law are limited only to
states was dramatically eroded towards the second half of the past century. For one, the
Nuremberg and Tokyo trials after World War II resulted in the unprecedented spectacle of
individual defendants for acts characterized as violations of the laws of war, crimes against
peace, and crimes against humanity. Recently, under the Nuremberg principle, Serbian leaders
have been persecuted for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in the former
Yugoslavia. These significant events show that the individual person is now a valid subject of
international law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Due Process; Universal Declaration of Human
Rights; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; While on a treaty, the principles
contained in the said Universal Declaration of Human Rights are now recognized as
customarily binding upon the members of the international community; Fundamental among
the rights enshrined in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights are the rights of
every person to life, liberty, and due process. —On a more positive note, also after World War
II, both international organizations and states gave recognition and importance to human
rights. Thus, on December 10, 1948, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights in which the right to life, liberty and all the other
fundamental rights of every person were proclaimed. While not a treaty, the principles
contained in the said Declaration are now recognized as customarily binding upon
the members of the international community. Thus, in Mejoff v. Director of Prisons , 90
Phil. 70 (1951), this Court, in granting bail to a prospective deportee, held that under
the Constitution, the principles set forth in that Declaration are part of the law of
the land. In 1966, the UN General Assembly also adopted the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights which the Philippines signed and ratified. Fundamental among the rights
enshrined therein are the rights of every person to life, liberty, and due process.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; While this Court in Government of the United States
of America v. Purganan, 389 SCRA 623 (2002), limited the exercise of the right to bail to
criminal proceedings, however, in light of the various international treaties giving recognition
and protection to human rights, particularly the right to life and liberty, a reexamination of this
Court’s ruling in Purganan is in order. —The Philippines, along with the other members of the
family of nations, committed to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the
worth and dignity of every person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our
Constitution which provides: “The State values the dignity of every human person and
guarantees full respect for human rights.” The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of
protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process, ensuring that
those detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to
decide without delay on the legality of the detention and order their release if justified. In
other words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available to every person
under detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These
remedies include the right to be admitted to bail. While this Court in Purganan limited the
exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings, however, in light of the various
international treaties giving recognition and protection to human rights, particularly the right
to life and liberty, a reexamination of this Court’s ruling in Purganan is in order.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; If bail can be granted in deportation cases, the
Court sees no justification why it should not also be allowed in extradition cases—clearly, the
right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail must be viewed in the light of the various
treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection of
human rights.—In Mejoff v. Director of Prisons , 90 Phil. 70 (1951) and Chirskoff v.
Commission of Immigration , 90 Phil. 256 A(1951), this Court ruled that foreign nationals
against whom no formal criminal charges have been filed may be released on bail pending the
finality of an order of deportation. As previously stated, the Court in  Mejoff relied upon the
Universal declaration of Human Rights in sustaining the detainee’s right to bail. If bail can be
granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it should not also be allowed in
extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
applies to deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in
extradition cases. After all, both are administrative proceedings where the innocence or
guilt of the person detained is not in issue. Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to
apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the various treaty obligations of
the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human rights. Under
these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty. Thus, the Philippines should see
to it that the right to liberty of every individual is not impaired.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Extradition has thus been characterized as the right of a
foreign power, created by treaty, to demand the surrender of one accused or convicted of a
crime within its territorial jurisdiction, and the correlative duty of the other state to surrender
him to the demanding state. —Section 2(a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1069 (The
Philippine Extradition Law) defines “extradition” as “the removal of an accused from the
Philippines with the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the
requesting state or government to hold him in connection with any criminal investigation
directed against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or criminal
law of the requesting state or government.” Extradition has thus been characterized as the
right of a foreign power, created by treaty, to demand the surrender of one accused or
convicted of a crime within its territorial jurisdiction, and the correlative duty of the other state
to surrender him to the demanding state. It is not a criminal proceeding. Even if the potential
extraditee is a criminal, an extradition proceeding is not by its nature criminal, for it is not
punishment for a crime, even though such punishment may follow extradition. It is sui
generis, tracing its existence wholly to treaty obligations between different nations. It is not a
trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the potential extraditee. Nor is it a full-
blown civil action, but one that is merely administrative in character. Its object is to
prevent the escape of a person accused or convicted of a crime and to secure his return to the
state from which he fled, for the purpose of trial or punishment.
Same; Same; Same; Same; While extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is
characterized by the following: (a) it entails a deprivation of liberty on the part of the potential
extraditee and (b) the means employed to attain the purpose of extradition is also “the
machinery of criminal law”—obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly
administrative, bears all earmarks of a criminal process. —But while extradition is not a criminal
proceeding, it is characterized by the following: (a) it entails a deprivation of liberty on the
part of the potential extraditee and (b) the means employed to attain the purpose of
extradition is also “the machinery of criminal law.” This is shown by Section 6 of P.D.
No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) which mandates the “immediate arrest and
temporary detention of the accused” if such “will best serve the interest of justice.” We
further note that Section 20 allows the requesting state “in case of urgency” to ask for
the “provisional arrest of the accused, pending receipt of the request for
extradition”; and that release from provisional arrest “shall not prejudice re-arrest and
extradition of the accused if a request for extradition is received subsequently.” Obviously, an
extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears all earmarks of a criminal
process. A potential extraditee may be subjected to arrest, to a prolonged restraint
of liberty, and forced to transfer to the demanding state following the
proceedings. “Temporary detention” may be a necessary step in the process of extradition,
but the length of time of the detention should be reasonable.
Same; Same; Same; Same; By any standard, detention for an extended period of more
than two (2) years is a serious deprivation of a potential extraditee’s fundamental right to
liberty; While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee,
however, there is no provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right to
due process under the Constitution. —Records show that private respondent was arrested on
September 23, 1999, and remained incarcerated until December 20, 2001, when the trial court
ordered his admission to bail. In other words, he had been detained for over two (2)
years without having been convicted of any crime. By any standard, such an extended
period of detention is a serious deprivation of his fundamental right to liberty. In fact, it was
this prolonged deprivation of liberty which prompted the extradition court to grant him bail.
While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee, however,
there is no provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right to due process
under the Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Burden of Proof; The applicable standard of due process,
however, should not be the same as that in criminal proceedings—in the latter, the standard
of due process is premised on the presumption of innocence of the accused, in the former,
the assumption is that such extraditee is a fugitive from justice; The prospective extraditee
thus bears the onus probandi of showing that he or she is not a flight risk and should be
granted bail.—The applicable standard of due process, however, should not be the same as
that in criminal proceedings. In the latter, the standard of due process is premised on the
presumption of innocence of the accused. As Purganan correctly points out, it is from this
major premise that the ancillary presumption in favor of admitting to bail arises. Bearing in
mind the purpose of extradition proceedings, the premise behind the issuance of the arrest
warrant and the “temporary detention” is the possibility of flight of the potential extraditee.
This is based on the assumption that such extraditee is a fugitive from justice. Given the
foregoing, the prospective extraditee thus bears the onus probandi of showing that he or she
is not a flight risk and should be granted bail.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Pacta Sunt Servanda; While the time-honored principle of
pacta sunt servanda demands that the Philippines honor its obligations under the Extradition
Treaty, it does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations, the Philippines
should diminish a potential extraditee’s rights to life, liberty, and due process; An extraditee
should not be deprived of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain standard for the
grant is satisfactorily met.—The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that
the Philippines honor its obligations under the Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region. Failure to comply with these obligations is a setback in
our foreign relations and defeats the purpose of extradition. However, it does not necessarily
mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential
extraditee’s rights to life, liberty, and due process. More so, where these rights are
guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also by international conventions, to which the
Philippines is a party. We should not, therefore, deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for
bail, provided that a certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily met.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Standard of Proof; An extradition proceeding being sui
generis, the standard of proof required in granting or denying bail can neither be the proof
beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of preponderance of
evidence in civil cases—the potential extraditee must prove by “clear and convincing proof”
that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition
court.—An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in granting
or denying bail can neither be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the
standard of proof of preponderance of evidence in civil cases. While administrative in
character, the standard of substantial evidence used in administrative cases cannot likewise
apply given the object of extradition law which is to prevent the prospective extraditee from
fleeing our jurisdiction. In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now Chief
Justice Reynato S. Puno, proposed that a new standard which he termed “clear and
convincing evidence” should be used in granting bail in extradition cases. According
to him, this standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than
preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee must prove by “clear and convincing
evidence” that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the
extradition court. In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence
to show that he is not a flight risk. Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial
court to determine whether private respondent may be granted bail on the basis of “clear and
convincing evidence.”
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     The Hon. Secretary and the State Prosecutor for petitioner.
     Agabin, Versola, Hermoso, Layaoen and De Castro Law Office  for private respondent
Juan Antonio Muñoz.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For our resolution is the instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, seeking to nullify the two Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 8, Manila (presided by respondent Judge Felixberto T. Olalia, Jr.) issued in Civil Case
No. 99–95773. These are: (1) the Order dated December 20, 2001 allowing Juan Antonio
Muñoz, private respondent, to post bail; and (2) the Order dated April 10, 2002 denying the
motion to vacate the said Order of December 20, 2001 filed by the Government of Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region, represented by the Philippine Department of Justice (DOJ),
petitioner. The petition alleges that both Orders were issued by respondent judge with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as there is no provision in the
Constitution granting bail to a potential extraditee.
The facts are:
On January 30, 1995, the Republic of the Philippines and the then British Crown Colony of
Hong Kong signed an “Agreement for the Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons.” It
took effect on June 20, 1997.
On July 1, 1997, Hong Kong reverted back to the People’s Republic of China and became
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
Private respondent Muñoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with three (3) counts
of the offense of “accepting an advantage as agent,” in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the
Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong Kong. He also faces seven (7) counts of
the offense of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common law of Hong Kong. On August
23, 1997 and October 25, 1999, warrants of arrest were issued against him. If convicted, he
faces a jail term of seven (7) to fourteen (14) years for each charge.
On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department of Justice a
request for the provisional arrest of private respondent. The DOJ then forwarded the request
to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which, in turn, filed with the RTC of Manila,
Branch 19 an application for the provisional arrest of private respondent.
On September 23, 1999, the RTC, Branch 19, Manila issued an Order of Arrest against
private respondent. That same day, the NBI agents arrested and detained him.
On October 14, 1999, private respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application for preliminary mandatory injunction
and/or writ of habeas corpus questioning the validity of the Order of Arrest.
On November 9, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision declaring the Order of
Arrest void.
On November 12, 1999, the DOJ filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari,
docketed as G.R. No. 140520, praying that the Decision of the Court of Appeals be reversed.
On December 18, 2000, this Court rendered a Decision granting the petition of the DOJ
and sustaining the validity of the Order of Arrest against private respondent. The Decision
became final and executory on April 10, 2001.
Meanwhile, as early as November 22, 1999, petitioner Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for the extradition of private respondent,
docketed as Civil Case No. 99–95733, raffled off to Branch 10, presided by Judge Ricardo
Bernardo, Jr. For his part, private respondent filed in the same case a petition for
bail which was opposed by petitioner.
After hearing, or on October 8, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order denying the
petition for bail, holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and
that private respondent is a high “flight risk.”
On October 22, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself from further hearing Civil Case
No. 99–95733. It was then raffled off to Branch 8 presided by respondent judge.
On October 30, 2001, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order
denying his application for bail. This was granted by respondent judge in an Order dated
December 20, 2001 allowing private respondent to post bail, thus:
“In conclusion, this Court will not contribute to accused’s further erosion of civil liberties. The
petition for bail is granted subject to the following conditions:
1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that accused hereby undertakes
that he will appear and answer the issues raised in these proceedings and will at all times hold
himself amenable to orders and processes of this Court, will further appear for judgment. If
accused fails in this undertaking, the cash bond will be forfeited in favor of the government;
 2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court;
3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and discretion of filing its own
motion for hold departure order before this Court even in extradition proceeding; and
4. Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors handling this case or if
they so desire to the nearest office, at any time and day of the week; and if they further
desire, manifest before this Court to require that all the assets of accused, real and personal,
be filed with this Court soonest, with the condition that if the accused flees from his
undertaking, said assets be forfeited in favor of the government and that the corresponding
lien/annotation be noted therein accordingly.
SO ORDERED.”
On December 21, 2001, petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the above Order, but it
was denied by respondent judge in his Order dated April 10, 2002.
Hence, the instant petition. Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail;
that there is nothing in the Constitution or statutory law providing that a potential extraditee
has a right to bail, the right being limited solely to criminal proceedings.
In his comment on the petition, private respondent maintained that the right to bail
guaranteed under the Bill of Rights extends to a prospective extraditee; and that extradition is
a harsh process resulting in a prolonged deprivation of one’s liberty.
Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides that the right to bail shall not be
impaired, thus:
“Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient
sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not
be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail
shall not be required.
Jurisprudence on extradition is but in its infancy in this jurisdiction. Nonetheless, this is not
the first time that this Court has an occasion to resolve the question of whether a prospective
extraditee may be granted bail.
In Government of United States of America v. Hon. Guillermo G. Purganan , Presiding
Judge, RTC of Manila, Branch 42, and Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario Batacan Crespo ,1 this
Court, speaking through then Associate Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, later Chief Justice,
held that the constitutional provision on bail does not apply to extradition proceedings. It is
“available only in criminal proceedings,” thus:
“x x x. As suggested by the use of the word “conviction,” the constitutional provision on bail
quoted above, as well as Section 4, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a
person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not
apply to extradition proceedings because extradition courts do not render judgments of
conviction or acquittal.
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail “flows from the presumption of innocence in favor
of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would
be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt” ( De la Camara v.
Enage, 41 SCRA 1, 6, September 17, 1971, per Fernando, J., later CJ). It follows that the
constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption
of innocence is not at issue.
The provision in the Constitution stating that the “right to bail shall not be impaired even
when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended” does not detract from the rule
that the constitutional right to bail is available only in criminal proceedings. It must be noted
that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus finds application “only to
persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with
invasion” (Sec. 18, Art. VIII, Constitution). Hence, the second sentence in the constitutional
provision on bail merely emphasizes the right to bail in criminal proceedings for the
aforementioned offenses. It cannot be taken to mean that the right is available even in
extradition proceedings that are not criminal in nature.”
At first glance, the above ruling applies squarely to private respondent’s case. However, this
Court cannot ignore the following trends in international law: (1) the growing importance of
the individual person in public international law who, in the 20th century, has gradually
attained global recognition; (2) the higher value now being given to human rights in the
international sphere; (3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal
human rights in fulfilling their treaty obligations; and (4) the duty of this Court to balance the
rights of the individual under our fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on extradition,
on the other.
The modern trend in public international law is the primacy placed on the worth
of the individual person and the sanctity of human rights. Slowly, the recognition that
the individual person may properly be a subject of international law is now taking root. The
vulnerable doctrine that the subjects of international law are limited only to states was
dramatically eroded towards the second half of the past century. For one, the Nuremberg and
Tokyo trials after World War II resulted in the unprecedented spectacle of individual
defendants for acts characterized as violations of the laws of war, crimes against peace, and
crimes against humanity. Recently, under the Nuremberg principle, Serbian leaders have been
persecuted for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in the former Yugoslavia.
These significant events show that the individual person is now a valid subject of international
law.
On a more positive note, also after World War II, both international organizations and
states gave recognition and importance to human rights. Thus, on December 10, 1948, the
United Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in which
the right to life, liberty and all the other fundamental rights of every person were proclaimed.
While not a treaty, the principles contained in the said Declaration are now
recognized as customarily binding upon the members of the international
community. Thus, in Mejoff v. Director of Prisons ,2 this Court, in granting bail to a
prospective deportee, held that under the Constitution,3 the principles set forth in
that Declaration are part of the law of the land. In 1966, the UN General Assembly also
adopted the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which the Philippines signed
and ratified. Fundamental among the rights enshrined therein are the rights of every person to
life, liberty, and due process.
The Philippines, along with the other members of the family of nations, committed to
uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person.
This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which provides: “The
State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights.”
The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every
person to liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in
the proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without delay on the legality of the
detention and order their release if justified. In other words, the Philippine authorities are
under obligation to make available to every person under detention such remedies which
safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the right to be admitted
to bail. While this Court in Purganan limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal
proceedings, however, in light of the various international treaties giving recognition and
protection to human rights, particularly the right to life and liberty, a reexamination of this
Court’s ruling in Purganan is in order.
First, we note that the exercise of the State’s power to deprive an individual of his liberty is
not necessarily limited to criminal proceedings. Respondents in administrative
proceedings, such as deportation and quarantine,4 have likewise been detained.
Second, to limit bail to criminal proceedings would be to close our eyes to our
jurisprudential history. Philippine jurisprudence has not limited the exercise of the right to bail
to criminal proceedings only. This Court has admitted to bail persons who are not involved in
criminal proceedings. In fact, bail has been allowed in this jurisdiction to persons in
detention during the pendency of administrative proceedings, taking into
cognizance the obligation of the Philippines under international conventions to
uphold human rights.
The 1909 case of US v. Go-Sioco5 is illustrative. In this case, a Chinese facing
deportation for failure to secure the necessary certificate of registration was granted bail
pending his appeal. After noting that the prospective deportee had committed no crime, the
Court opined that “To refuse him bail is to treat him as a person who has committed the most
serious crime known to law”; and that while deportation is not a criminal proceeding, some of
the machinery used “is the machinery of criminal law.” Thus, the provisions relating to bail
was applied to deportation proceedings.
In Mejoff v. Director of Prisons 6 and Chirskoff v. Commission of Immigration ,7 this Court
ruled that foreign nationals against whom no formal criminal charges have been filed may be
released on bail pending the finality of an order of deportation. As previously stated, the Court
in Mejoff relied upon the Universal declaration of Human Rights in sustaining the detainee’s
right to bail.
If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it should not also
be allowed in extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights applies to deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be
invoked in extradition cases.
After all, both are administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the person
detained is not in issue. Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this
jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines
concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human rights. Under these treaties,
the presumption lies in favor of human liberty. Thus, the Philippines should see to it that the
right to liberty of every individual is not impaired.
Section 2(a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law)
defines “extradition” as “the removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object of
placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or government
to hold him in connection with any criminal investigation directed against him or the execution
of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or
government.”
Extradition has thus been characterized as the right of a foreign power, created by treaty,
to demand the surrender of one accused or convicted of a crime within its territorial
jurisdiction, and the correlative duty of the other state to surrender him to the demanding
state.8 It is not a criminal proceeding.9 Even if the potential extraditee is a criminal, an
extradition proceeding is not by its nature criminal, for it is not punishment for a crime, even
though such punishment may follow extradition.10 It is sui generis, tracing its existence
wholly to treaty obligations between different nations.11 It is not a trial to determine the
guilt or innocence of the potential extraditee.12 Nor is it a full-blown civil action,
but one that is merely administrative in character.13 Its object is to prevent the escape
of a person accused or convicted of a crime and to secure his return to the state from which
he fled, for the purpose of trial or punishment.14
But while extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is characterized by the following: (a) it
entails a deprivation of liberty on the part of the potential extraditee and (b)  the means
employed to attain the purpose of extradition is also “the machinery of criminal
law.” This is shown by Section 6 of P.D. No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) which
mandates the “immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused” if such “will
best serve the interest of justice.” We further note that Section 20 allows the requesting state
“in case of urgency” to ask for the “provisional arrest of the accused, pending receipt
of the request for extradition”; and that release from provisional arrest “shall not
prejudice re-arrest and extradition of the accused if a request for extradition is received
subsequently.”
Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears all earmarks of
a criminal process. A potential extraditee may be subjected to arrest, to a prolonged
restraint of liberty, and forced to transfer to the demanding state following the
proceedings. “Temporary detention” may be a necessary step in the process of extradition,
but the length of time of the detention should be reasonable.
 Records show that private respondent was arrested on September 23, 1999, and remained
incarcerated until December 20, 2001, when the trial court ordered his admission to bail.  In
other words, he had been detained for over two (2) years without having been
convicted of any crime. By any standard, such an extended period of detention is a serious
deprivation of his fundamental right to liberty. In fact, it was this prolonged deprivation of
liberty which prompted the extradition court to grant him bail.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. This case is REMANDED to the trial court to
determine whether private respondent is entitled to bail on the basis of “clear and convincing
evidence.” If not, the trial court should order the cancellation of his bail bond and his
immediate detention; and thereafter, conduct the extradition proceedings with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.

While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee, however,
there is no provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right to due process
under the Constitution.

The applicable standard of due process, however, should not be the same as that in
criminal proceedings. In the latter, the standard of due process is premised on the
presumption of innocence of the accused. As Purganan correctly points out, it is from this
major premise that the ancillary presumption in favor of admitting to bail arises. Bearing in
mind the purpose of extradition proceedings, the premise behind the issuance of the arrest
warrant and the “temporary detention” is the possibility of flight of the potential extraditee.
This is based on the assumption that such extraditee is a fugitive from justice. 15 Given the
foregoing, the prospective extraditee thus bears the onus probandi of showing that he or she
is not a flight risk and should be granted bail.

The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the Philippines honor its
obligations under the Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region. Failure to comply with these obligations is a setback in our foreign
relations and defeats the purpose of extradition. However, it does not necessarily mean that in
keeping with its treaty obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential extraditee’s
rights to life, liberty, and due process. More so, where these rights are guaranteed, not only
by our Constitution, but also by international conventions, to which the Philippines is a party.
We should not, therefore, deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided that a
certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily met.

An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in granting or

denying bail can neither be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the
standard of proof of preponderance of evidence in civil cases. While administrative in
character, the standard of substantial evidence used in administrative cases cannot likewise
apply given the object of extradition law which is to prevent the prospective extraditee from
fleeing our jurisdiction. In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now Chief
Justice Reynato S. Puno, proposed that a new standard which he termed “clear and
convincing evidence” should be used in granting bail in extradition cases. According
to him, this standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than
preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee must prove by “clear and convincing
evidence” that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the
extradition court.

In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show that
he is not a flight risk. Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial court to
determine whether private respondent may be granted bail on the basis of “clear and
convincing evidence.”

A.M. No. RTJ-99-1518. August 14, 2000.*
(Formerly OCA IPI No. 99-712-RTJ)
LUZVIMINDA C. COMIA, complainant, vs. JUDGE CONRADO R. ANTONA,
respondent.
Judges; Bail; Where the rules and principles relating to bail transgressed by a judge are
basic, unfamiliarity therewith entails a finding of administrative liability and necessitates the
imposition of the proper penalty .—The rules and principles relating to bail transgressed by
respondent judge are—to say the least—basic that unfamiliarity therewith entails a finding of
administrative liability and necessitates the imposition of the proper penalty.
Same; Same; Since bail is intended to obtain the provisional liberty of the accused, the
same cannot be authorized or posted before custody of the said accused has been acquired
by the judicial authorities by his arrest or voluntary surrender—the right to bail can only be
availed of by a person who is in custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his liberty and it
would be premature, not to say incongruous, to file a petition for bail for someone whose
freedom has yet to be curtailed .—Jurisprudence on the matter is crystalline. Bereft of any
ambiguity of language, this Court, as early as Feliciano vs. Pasicolan, articulated the principle
in this jurisdiction that since bail is intended to obtain the provisional liberty of the accused,
the same cannot be authorized or posted before custody of said accused has been acquired by
the judicial authorities by his arrest or voluntary surrender. It is self evident that a court
cannot authorize provisional liberty to one who is then actually in the enjoyment of his liberty,
or as the Court quoted in Feliciano, “it would be incongruous to grant bail to one who is free.”
Stated differently, the right to bail can only be availed of by a person who is in custody of the
law or otherwise deprived of his liberty and it would be premature, not to say incongruous,
to file a petition for bail for someone whose freedom has yet to be curtailed.
Same; Same; A judge violated settled jurisprudential doctrines regarding the purpose of
bail—to secure the temporary liberty of persons under the custody of the law, or otherwise
deprived of freedom—where, despite being wholly cognizant that the accused has remained
“at large,” he still entertained an application for bail by setting a date of hearing therefor,
albeit tentatively, and conditioned upon the voluntary surrender of the accused .—Under the
present circumstances, respondent Judge Antona—fully cognizant that the court had not yet
acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the accused considering that the latter were “at
large”—still entertained the application for bail by setting a date of hearing therefor, albeit
tentatively, and conditioned upon the voluntary surrender of the accused. In doing so,
respondent judge indubitably violated settled jurisprudential doctrines regarding the purpose
of bail which is to secure the temporary liberty of persons under the custody of the law, or
otherwise deprived of freedom. It is of no moment that the accused eventually surrendered to
the police authorities on the same date “tentatively” scheduled for the hearing of the
application for bail. To our mind, such supervening event is of no bearing and immaterial; it
does not absolve respondent judge from administrative liability considering that he should not
have accorded recognition to the application for bail filed on behalf of persons, who at that
point, were devoid of personality to ask such specific affirmative relief from the court.
Same; A judge is also guilty of a procedural lapse if he hears a petition for bail where
the order and the manner of presentation of evidence in the bail hearings were flawed and
highly irregular—the Rules unequivocally provide that in bail petitions, the burden of proving
that the evidence of guilt is strong lies within the fence of the prosecution .—Respondent judge
is guilty of a procedural lapse in the hearing of the petition for bail inasmuch as the order and
manner of presentation of evidence in the bail hearings were flawed and highly irregular. In
the case before us, the defense adduced and presented its evidence even ahead of the
prosecution despite the unequivocal provision of the Rules to the effect that in bail petitions,
the burden of proving that the evidence of guilt is strong lies within the fence of the
prosecution. The clear import of the foregoing pronouncements is that the prosecution should
be accorded all the opportunity to adduce, submit and present proof to bolster its stand that
the evidence of guilt is indeed strong so as to warrant the denial of the petition for bail
addressed to the court. Moreover, as gleaned from the order dated 04 January 1999, only the
defense witnesses were issued subpoenas Ad Testificandum to the exclusion of prosecution
witnesses.
Same; Due Process; The court’s order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary
of the evidence for the prosecution, otherwise the order may be invalidated because the
summary of the evidence for the prosecution, which contains the judge’s evaluation of the
evidence, may be considered as an aspect of procedural due process for both prosecution and
the defense.—Respondent judge transgressed the Rules in view of the fact that his order
dated 15 February 1999, granting the petition for bail in favor of the accused Dante Fajardo,
Sr. and Filipina Fajardo-Arce, and reducing the bail in favor of Pio Arce, Jr., failed to recite a
summary of the evidence for the prosecution. The records show that said order merely made
mention and invoked as its basis the evidence presented by the defense. Notably, respondent
judge’s actuation is dissident to settled doctrine on this matter that the court’s order granting
or refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution , otherwise the
order may be invalidated because the summary of the evidence for the prosecution, which
contains the judge’s evaluation of the evidence, may be considered as an aspect of procedural
due process for both prosecution and the defense.
Same; Same; The concept of fairness must not be strained till it is narrowed to a
filament.—To appreciate the strength or weakness of the evidence of guilt, the prosecution
must be consulted or heard. It is equally entitled, as the accused, to due process. The concept
of fairness must not be strained till it is narrowed to a filament. We are to keep the balance
true. This norm is of the very essence of due process, as the embodiment of justice requires
that the prosecution be given the opportunity to prove that there is strong evidence of guilt.
Same; Same; In this jurisdiction, whether bail is a matter of right or discretion,
reasonable notice of hearing is required to be given to the prosecutor or fiscal, or at least, he
must be asked for his recommendation .—Worth stressing too, is that no reasonable notice
was given to the prosecution regarding the hearing of the petition for bail. As shown by the
records, the order setting the 06 January 1999 bail hearing was received by the City
Prosecutor and private prosecutor on 04 January 1999 and 05 January 1999, respectively. In
this jurisdiction, whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, reasonable notice of hearing is
required to be given to the prosecutor or fiscal, or at least, he must be asked for his
recommendation.
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Gross Ignorance of the Law.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Walter T. Young for complainant.
BUENA, J.:
The administrative matter at bar stems from a sworn affidavit-complaint dated 22 March 1999,
filed by herein complainant Luzviminda C. Comia, imputing to respondent Judge Conrado R.
Antona of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Batangas City, Branch 4, a plethora of charges
involving “gross ignorance of the law, by deliberately committing a mockery of judicial
proceedings, (for) knowingly rendering an unjust judgment in favor of the accused, (for)
capriciously allowing the accused in the custody of their counsel, (for) treating the private
prosecutor in a despotic, tyrannical, oppressive and dictatorial manner during the January 6,
1999 hearing, (for) allowing accused to post bail despite the fact that the crime committed is
a capital offense and a heinous crime, at that; (of) depriving the prosecution the procedural
requirement of due process, (for) acting most prejudicial to the best interest, image, trust,
confidence and integrity of the court, and (for) deliberately violating the existing doctrines and
jurisprudence laid down by the Honorable Supreme Court.”
In a Memorandum dated 12 April 2000, Court of Appeals Justice Buenaventura J.
Guerrero, who was tasked by this Court to conduct an investigation, and submit a report and
recommendation on
the instant administrative matter, classified the charges against respondent judge into three:1
. A)Ignorance of the law;
. B)Conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the Court; and
. C)Deliberately violating existing doctrines and jurisprudence laid down by the
Supreme Court.
As borne by the records, this administrative matter arose as a result of respondent judge’s
handling of Criminal Case No. 9309 for Murder, particularly the hearing and resolution of the
petition for bail therein.
Based on the Memorandum submitted by Investigating Justice Buenaventura J. Guerrero,
the material antecedents and proceedings in the instant administrative case are as follows:
“On 19 January 1998, an information for murder for the death of complainant’s husband,
Numeriano Comia, was filed with the Regional Trial Court, Fourth judicial Region, and raffled
to Branch 4, Batangas City, presided by respondent Judge. Docketed as Criminal Case No.
9309 and entitled ‘People of the Philippines vs. Fajardo, et al.,’ accused were Dante Fajardo,
Sr. and Filipina Fajardo-Arce, as principals, the latter’s husband Pio Arce as accomplice.
“On 29 January 1998, counsels for accused Fajardo, Sr., Filipina Arce and Pio Arce, filed an
‘Urgent Motion to Defer Issuance of the Warrants of Arrest with Supplemental Petition to
Quash, Lift and or Dissolve Warrant of Arrest if Already Issued.’ Private Prosecutor Atty.
Isabelita Bathan Manigbas with the conformity of 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Leonardo Suyo
of Batangas City submitted a comment/opposition. Taking cognizance that a petition for
review against the resolution of the City Prosecutor had been filed by the accused with the
Department of Justice, respondent judge held that ‘such fact does not in any way preclude the
court from acting on the information already filed with the Court’ hence denied the urgent
motion for lack of merit. Counsel for the accused filed a motion for reconsideration. On 10
March 1998, respondent Judge granted the motion decreeing ‘that the efficacy of the said
warrants of arrest against all the herein accused dated January 27, 1998 are hereby
suspended until further order of the court.’
“A motion for reconsideration was filed by the Private Prosecutor with the conformity of the
2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Leonardo Suyo. On 31 March 1998, respondent Judge denied
the motion ruling, inter alia, that:
‘x x x In any case, a reading of the subsequent orders of the Secretary of Justice merely gave
the justification for the prosecutors to file informations with the Court even if there were
appeals and/or petitions for review of their resolutions seasonably filed. There is, however,
nothing in these orders and/or circulars which in any way affects the discretion of the Court on
whether or not warrants of arrest should be issued and although already issued, the Court
may order its recall and as what had been made in this case, suspend the effectivity of said
warrants of arrest.
‘Moreover, the right of an accused to appeal and/or petition for review resolutions of
Prosecutors to the Secretary of Justice had not been removed but only qualified. It is
unfortunate that what impressed the Private prosecutor was the apparently no longer effective
Circular No. 17 of the Department of Justice. But as can be gleaned from the order of March
10, 1998, the suspension of the efficacy of warrants of arrest was primarily premised on the
sense of fair play of the Court to give full meaning to the due process that should be accorded
every person accused of a criminal offense and in the interest of substantial justice in the face
of the existence of warrants of arrest which undoubtedly would affect the rights of the
accused to ventillate (sic) their arguments and evidence before the Secretary of Justice.’
“On 04 November 1998, defense’s appeal to the Department of Justice was dismissed.
“On 04 December 1998, respondent Judge issued the second warrants of arrest against
accused Fajardo, Sr., Filipina and Pio. While still at large, Atty. Reynaldo P. Dimayacyac, Sr.
filed an Urgent Petition for the Grant of Bail to Accused Dante Fajardo, Sr. and Filipina Arce
with Supplemental Motion for Reduction of Bail Recommended for Accused Pio Arce, Jr. dated
14 December 1998.
On 16 December 1998, respondent Judge merely directed that the urgent petition be filed
with the records it appearing the court has not yet acquired jurisdiction over the persons of all
accused who are still at large.
“On 04 January 1999, acting on the manifestation/motion of counsel for the accused,
respondent Judge issued an order setting tentatively the hearing of the petition for bail of
Fajardo, Sr. and Filipina Arce and reduction of bail of Pio Arce, Jr. on 06 January 1999 at 9:30
a.m. In the same order, respondent judge directed that a copy thereof be furnished the City
Prosecutor, and upon request of the defense counsel, subpoena ad testificandum be issued to
three witnesses named in the request.
“On 06 January 1999, the scheduled hearing of the petition for bail was held. First to
speak was the private prosecutor who manifested they only learned ‘today’ of the return of
the warrant dated January 6, 1999 showing that the warrant was served by the PNP Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group, Camp Crame, Quezon City in the evening on January 5,
1999. Inasmuch as the accused were present, she continued that a commitment order be
issued for their confinement at the City Jail of Batangas, adding that a representative of the
PNP Batangas is present for the purpose.
“Defense’s counsel retorted the proceedings was for petition for bail and since the court
had ruled that the petition could not be heard without the accused-movants submitting
themselves to the jurisdiction of the court, they surrendered themselves to the Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group of the PNP, Camp Crame and were pressing (sic) for a
speedy trial.
“Respondent Judge then remarked that the matter to be heard as shown in the order
setting the hearing, was subject to the condition  that the accused voluntarily surrender
themselves which they did. Regarding the plea of the private counsel that a commitment order
for the confinement of the accused in Batangas City Jail be issued, he said it ‘will be resolved
later on but first things first.’ Continuing, he observed that ‘the motion here set for hearing is
the one for the movants to show their cause why this motion should be granted and in the
matter of granting bail and with respect to the other accused in the matter of reduction of
bail, so first things first.’
“Private prosecutor then asserted that under the Rules of Criminal Procedure, in
application for bail particularly for capital offense (the burden of) ‘showing (that the evidence
of) the guilt of the accused is strong, lies in the prosecution. It is the prosecution who should
present evidence to prove (that the evidence of) the guilt of accused is strong.’ Citing Section
8 of Rule 114, she argues that ‘all of the evidence presented by the prosecution shall [be]
automatically form part (of) the trial on the merits of the case. So, it would be unprocedural
(sic) Your Honor, with due respect to the Honorable Court and to defense counsel that this
application for bail be conducted without first submitting the accused to the proper agency;
that they be properly arraigned and the Prosecution then will be given the proper Opportunity
to file an opposition to the petition for bail and to give proper opportunity for the prosecution
to present its evidence to prove that the evidence of guilt is strong; the accused here has not
yet been arraigned; they had not been committed to the proper agency where they should
had been properly detained, Your Honor.’ ” (Emphasis Ours)
During the course of the bail hearing, the defense further moved—to the objection of the
prosecution—that the accused be held in custody at the Criminal Investigation and Detection
Group, Camp Crame, claiming that accused, Fajardo, Sr., was then scheduled for medical
operation “as early as December 14th.”2 Respondent judge granted the motion of defense
counsel.
On 12 January 1999, the prosecution filed an “Omnibus Motion to (a) reconsider the order
of custody of the accused; (b) declare the proceedings on the bail null and void; (c) inhibit;
and, (d) defer further proceedings.”
On 28 January 1999, the prosecution likewise filed a “Supplement to the Omnibus Motion
dated December 14, 1998 with Additional Arguments to Support its Motion for Reconsideration
Anent the order of January 6, 1999.”
In an order3 dated 01 February 1999, respondent judge denied the Omnibus Motion to
which the prosecution moved to reconsider said order. On 03 February 1999, respondent
judge denied the Motion for Reconsideration of the prosecution and declared the bail hearings
terminated.
Upon arraignment, accused Fajardo, Sr. and Filipina FajardoArce pleaded not guilty to the
charge against them.
In an order dated 15 February 1999,4 respondent judge granted the petition for bail and
fixed the amount thereof at P200,000.00 each for accused Fajardo, Sr. and Filipina Fajardo-
Arce, and reduced the amount of bail to P100,000.00 for accused Pio Arce, Jr.
On 25 February 1999, respondent judge inhibited himself from the hearing and trial of
Criminal Case No. 9309.5
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE
Acting on the sworn affidavit-complaint filed by herein complainant Luzviminda Comia and
considering the gravity of the charges imputed therein, the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) recommended to the High Court that the instant administrative matter be referred to
the Court of Appeals for immediate raffle, investigation, report and recommendation.
In a Resolution dated 06 December 1999, this Court referred the case to the Court of
Appeals and, upon subsequent raffle, was assigned to Justice Buenaventura J. Guerrero for
investigation, report and recommendation.
On 23 February 2000, herein complainant, through counsel, filed a memorandum. 6 For his
part, respondent judge submitted a Manifestation7 on 06 March 2000, and a
Memorandum8 on 17 March 2000, to which complainant filed a Compliance with Reply-
Memorandum9 dated 28 March 2000.
In a Memorandum dated 12 April 2000, Investigating Justice Buenaventura J. Guerrero
submitted to the High Court his findings and recommendations on the administrative matter,
to wit:
. “1.Ignorance of the law: On the basis of the foregoing, respondent Judge may be
held administratively liable and ordered to pay a fine of P20,000.00;
 . “2.Conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the Court: No Fraud, dishonesty or
corruption has been charged much less proven against respondent Judge. Hence, he
may be exonerated; and,
. “3.Deliberately violating existing doctrines and jurisprudence laid down by the
Supreme Court: There is no evidence that respondent Judge was aware of herein
aforecited jurisprudential doctrines on application for admission to bail in a capital
offense. Not one of these cases—or any case for that matter involving petition for
bail in a charge for a capital offense—was brought to the attention of respondent
Judge by the prosecution to show that his order was in violation of existing
jurisprudence. Hence, respondent Judge may be exonerated.” (Emphasis Ours)
THE COURT’S RULING
The findings and recommendations of the investigating justice are well-taken. A thorough
perusal of the records and evidence adduced by the complainant lend credible substantiation
to the charge of gross ignorance of the law on the part of respondent judge. Verily, the
actuation of respondent judge specifically in the handling, hearing and resolution of the
petition for bail constitutes not only ignorance of fundamental rules relating to bail
applications, but demands stern rebuke from this Court as well.
Without doubt, the rules and principles relating to bail transgressed by respondent judge
are—to say the least—basic that unfamiliarity therewith entails a finding of administrative
liability and necessitates the imposition of the proper penalty.
Section 8 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court is explicit:
“Sec. 8. Burden of Proof in Bail Application. —At the hearing of an application for admission to
bail filed by any person who is in custody for the commission of an offense punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the prosecution has the burden of showing
that evidence of guilt is strong. The evidence presented during the bail hearings shall be
considered automatically reproduced at the trial, but upon motion of either party, the court
may recall any witness for additional examination unless the witness is dead, outside of the
Philippines or otherwise unable to testify.” (Emphasis Ours)
Likewise, jurisprudence on the matter is crystalline. Bereft of any ambiguity of language, this
Court, as early as Feliciano vs. Pasicolan, 10 articulated the principle in this jurisdiction that
since bail is intended to obtain the provisional liberty of the accused, the same cannot be
authorized or posted before custody of said accused has been acquired by the judicial
authorities by his arrest or voluntary surrender.
It is self-evident that a court cannot authorize provisional liberty to one who is then actually in
the enjoyment of his liberty, or as the Court quoted in Feliciano, “it would be incongruous to
grant bail to one who is free.”11 Stated differently, the right to bail can only be availed of by a
person who is in custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his liberty and it would be
premature, not to say incongruous, to file a petition for bail for someone whose freedom has
yet to be curtailed.12
Thus in Borinaga vs. Tamin,13 the High Court in categorical terms enunciated:
“x x x Where admission to bail is a matter of discretion, the prosecution has the burden of
showing that evidence of guilt is strong.  x x x Admission to bail as a matter of discretion
presupposes the exercise thereof in accordance with law and guided by the applicable legal
principles. The prosecution must first be accorded an opportunity to present evidence because
by the very nature of deciding applications for bail, it is on the basis of such evidence that
judicial discretion is weighed against in determining whether the guilt of the accused is
strong. In other words, discretion must be exercised regularly, legally and within the confines
of procedural due process, that is, after evaluation of the evidence submitted by the
prosecution,  x x x
“x x x
“In the first place respondent judge did not have the authority to set the petition for bail
for hearing in view of the fact that he had not even acquired jurisdiction over the criminal case
x x x.” (Emphasis ours)
Under the present circumstances, respondent Judge Antona—fully cognizant that the court
had not yet acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the accused considering that the latter
were “at large”—still entertained the application for bail by setting a date of hearing therefor,
albeit tentatively, and conditioned upon the voluntary surrender of the accused. In doing so,
respondent judge indubitably violated settled jurisprudential doctrines regarding the purpose
of bail which is to secure the temporary liberty of persons under the custody of the law, or
otherwise deprived of freedom.
It is of no moment that the accused eventually surrendered to the police authorities on the
same date “tentatively” scheduled for the hearing of the application for bail. To our mind, such
supervening event is of no bearing and immaterial; it does not absolve respondent judge from
administrative liability considering that he should not have accorded recognition to the
application for bail filed on behalf of persons, who at that point, were devoid of personality to
ask such specific affirmative relief from the court.
The records reveal that at the time the application for bail was filed, the accused were, in
fact, in the enjoyment of their liberty, having evaded the long arm of the law despite the
existence of standing warrants for their arrest issued by no less than respondent Judge
Antona himself.
Similarly, respondent judge is guilty of a procedural lapse in the hearing of the petition for
bail inasmuch as the order and manner of presentation of evidence in the bail hearings were
flawed and highly irregular. In the case before us, the defense adduced and presented its
evidence even ahead of the prosecution despite the unequivocal provision of the Rules to the
effect that in bail petitions, the burden of proving that the evidence of guilt is strong lies
within the fence of the prosecution. The clear import of the foregoing pronouncements is that
the prosecution should be accorded all the opportunity to adduce, submit and present proof to
bolster its stand that the evidence of guilt is indeed strong so as to warrant the denial of the
petition for bail addressed to the court. Moreover, as gleaned from the order14 dated 04
January 1999, only the defense witnesses were issued subpoenas Ad Testificandum to the
exclusion of prosecution witnesses.
Likewise, respondent judge transgressed the Rules in view of the fact that his order dated
15 February 1999, granting the petition for bail in favor of the accused Dante Fajardo, Sr. and
Filipina Fajardo-Arce, and reducing the bail in favor of Pio Arce, Jr., failed to recite a summary
of the evidence for the prosecution. The records show that said order merely made mention
and invoked as its basis the evidence presented by the defense. Notably, respondent judge’s
actuation is dissident to settled doctrine on this matter that the court’s order granting or
refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution,  otherwise the order
may be invalidated because the summary of the evidence for the prosecution, which contains
the judge’s evaluation of the evidence, may be considered as an aspect of procedural due
process for both prosecution and the defense.15
To appreciate the strength or weakness of the evidence of guilt, the prosecution must be
consulted or heard. It is equally entitled, as the accused, to due process. 16 The concept of
fairness must not be strained till it is narrowed to a filament. We are to keep the balance true.
This norm is of the very essence of due process, as the embodiment of justice requires that
the prosecution be given the opportunity to prove that there is strong evidence of guilt.17
In the instant administrative matter, proof is extant that in the bail hearings the
prosecution was not afforded adequate opportunity within a reasonable time to present
evidence within its grasp to substantiate the degree and gravity of guilt of the accused, for
purposes of resolving the bail petition. As gleaned from the order dated 15 February 1999,
respondent judge relied solely on, and made strict mention of the evidence adduced by the
defense without incorporating in said order a recital of the evidence for the prosecution.
Respondent judge ruled and concluded, albeit erroneously, that the prosecution waived its
right to adduce evidence; in effect, the prosecution was denied the opportunity to submit all
the evidence it desired to present.
Evidently, respondent judge was remiss in performing the specific duty of reciting—in the
subject order—the summary of evidence for the prosecution. For where the grant of bail is
discretionary, as in the instant case, the issue of whether or not an accused should be
admitted to bail lies on the strength of the prosecution’s evidence as to their guilt,18 without
prejudice, however, to the right of the defense to cross-examine witnesses and introduce
evidence in its own rebuttal.19
Worth stressing too, is that no reasonable notice  was given to the prosecution regarding
the hearing of the petition for bail. As shown by the records, the order setting the 06 January
1999 bail hearing was received by the City Prosecutor and private prosecutor on 04 January
1999 and 05 January 1999, respectively. In this jurisdiction, whether bail is a matter of right
or discretion, reasonable notice of hearing is required to be given to the prosecutor or fiscal,
or at least, he must be asked for his recommendation.20
Thus, in Depamaylo vs. Brotarlo,21 the disregard by respondent judge of the mandatory
three-day notice rule under Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court was deemed by the High
Court to constitute “undue haste”:
“The undue haste with which respondent judge granted bail also accounts for her disregard of
the mandatory requirement in Rule 15, Section 4 that notice of a motion must be served on all
parties at least three days in advance of the hearing.”
In the same vein, despite lack of proper substantiation and presentation of documentary
evidence by the defense and over the vigorous objection of the prosecution, respondent judge
allowed that custody of the accused be transferred from the Batangas City Jail to the Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group, specifically under Senior Inspector Eduardo S. Villena,
Chief of Prosecution Department, on the ground of “health and security reasons.”
As to the charge, however, of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the court, we
adopt the findings of the Investigating Justice that no fraud, dishonesty or corruption was
imputed, nor proved by complainant; hence, respondent judge is not liable therefor.
On the same score, this Court finds no compelling evidence on record to substantiate the
charge that respondent judge deliberately violated existing doctrines and jurisprudence
enunciated by the High Court. To our mind, the procedural lapses and irregularities in the bail
hearings were not consciously, purposely, and intentionally perpetrated by respondent judge
so as to render him liable for said charge. At the most respondent judge’s actuation were
borne by an ignorance of the pertinent rules and applicable jurisprudence and were not, in our
considered view, products of a grand design to deliberately perpetrate injustice.
All told, this Court once again seizes the moment to remind judges to keep abreast of the
rules and recent pronouncements of this Court, so they may evolve into more effective
dispensers of justice—magistrates of the law in the truest sense of the word.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing disquisitions, the Court finds respondent Judge
Conrado R. Antona liable for gross ignorance of the law.  ACCORDINGLY, the Court hereby
resolves to impose upon him a fine of P20,000.000 and sternly warns respondent judge that a
repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
     Mendoza (Actg. Chairman), Quisumbing and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
     Bellosillo (Chairman), J., On official leave.
Respondent Judge Conrado R. Antona meted a P20,000.00 fine for gross ignorance of the
law, with stern warning against repetition of similar acts.