1. Details note on Literal rule of Interpretation.

The Literal Rule of Interpretation is the oldest rule and is followed to date by the Judges
across the globe. The rationale behind the Literal Rule is that it prevents courts from making
biased decisions when the issues are relating to political matters. This rule also restricts the
Courts from creating new laws through the interpretation of the existing ones. This rule
follows the words of the Legislature and the implication of this rule brings certainty in
interpretation as the law would be interpreted exactly as it is provided by the Legislature.

As every coin has two sides, there are some disadvantages of applying the Literal Rule of
Interpretation. This at times results in the provisions being vague and absurd and inconsistent
with the intention if the framers of the Statute. There cannot be a fixed rule for Interpretation
and similarly, a statute cannot be drafted without having multiple interpretations. As Justice
Donaldson contended, the interpretation of statutes is a craft as much as a science and the
judges, as craftsmen, select and apply the appropriate rules as the tools of their trade.

According to Black's Law Dictionary, A Statute is a formal written enactment of a legislative

authority that governs a country, state, city, or county. Typically, statutes command or
prohibit something, or declare policy. The word is often used to distinguish law made by
legislative bodies from the judicial decisions of the common law and the regulations issued
by Government agencies.

In general sense, the law formed and passed by the Legislature in form of an Act or any
provision of law which prohibits or permits anything. There are different kinds of Statutes
depending upon their purpose, duration, nature, etc. For example, statutes made for a
particular time frame are known as temporary statutes and on the other hand statues without
an expiry are known as Perpetual Statutes. Depending upon the object of statutes, there are
Permissive Statutes, Enabling Statutes, Prohibitory Statutes, etc.

Understanding the Literal Rule

The Literal Rule means that the words need to be interpreted in the strict ordinary meaning
and the scope of words should not be considered more than its ordinary meaning. The words
are to be understood in their ordinary and natural meaning unless the object of the statute
suggests otherwise. This is the first rule to be applied by the Judges while interpreting the
statute. Brett, MR called it a cardinal rule that Whenever you have to understand or interpret
a statute or document you do not interpret it according to the mere ordinary general meaning
of the words, but according to the ordinary meaning of the words as applied to the subject
matter with regard to which they are used. The basic meaning of the word in question is to be
understood in the first place and that meaning is to be implemented while interpreting.

If and only if the meaning so derived is contrary to the object of the statute or is inconsistent
with the statute, other rules of interpretation are to be adopted. Generally, the important terms
of a Statute are explained in the definitions clause of the statute. In case, these definitions are
not explained or anyone is left out, then there comes the need for interpretation of such terms.
The exact meaning of a provision is always preferred over loose meaning of the same
provision. In a case, it was held that there is a presumption that the words are used in an Act
of Parliament correctly and exactly and not loosely and inexactly. This means that the
framers of the Act have used the word reasonably after understanding the meaning of the
word and not with an absurdity.

Under Literal Rule, the popular meaning of the word must also be considered. For example,
the word marriage in ‘cruelty during the time of marriage' meant only marriage till the
emergence of the concept of live-in-relationships. So now, Court has to interpret the term
marriage in such a manner that the popular concept is also covered under its purview. In one
of the most recent judgments, the counsel on behalf of the respondent submitted that it is a
settled principle of law that a criminal statute has to be construed strictly. In cases where two
interpretations are possible, the Courts must lean towards the construction which exempts the
subject from penalty rather than the one which imposes the same.

In the case of R vs. Harris, the defendant bit off the victim's nose. According to the statute, it
is an offence 'to stab cut or wound'. The court interpreted the Statute in such a manner that it
gave a pre-requisite for the act of the defendant to be an offence and that is the usage of an
instrument. Therefore, the defendant was held not liable for biting.

Article 233(2) of the Constitution of India provides for the qualification of an Advocate as
the District Judge. The Statute reads as: a person shall only be eligible to be appointed as a
District Judge if he has been, for not less than seven years, an advocate or pleader, and is
recommended by the High Court for appointment.

Applying Literal Interpretation, the Supreme Court of India held that: it is clear from the
expression has been that the present perfect continuous tense is used for a position which
began sometime in the past and is still continuing, and that therefore such person must, with
the requisite period, still be continuing as an advocate on the date of his application.

Advantages of Literal Rule.

Literal rule was defined by Lord Tindal as, the words themselves alone do…best declare the
intention of the lawgiver. The rationale behind this was to maintain the faith of the general
public on the Legislative bodies and not giving the power to make laws in the hands of the
Judges the way of Interpreting Statutes. The Literal Rule follows the words of the
Legislature. According to Lord Diplock, it is not for the Judge to invent fancied ambiguities.

As the Act is framed by the Legislature, the Literal Rule basically forces the Judges to follow
the same. The Literal rule of interpretation is most preferable when there are issues related to
politics as the Judge cannot make any decision according to his discretion and needs to be
stick to the provisions framed. This also helps to restrict the Judiciary from creating laws
contrary to the provisions of the Statute.

This also makes the Act and its provisions easy to understand for the general public. Because
of interpreting only the ordinary meaning of the words, the process of interpretation becomes
more certain and brings consistency in interpreting the Statute.

Criticism

Literal Rule rests on the assumption that there is only one meaning for a particular word. This
restricts the scope of deriving meaning from the context of the Statute and depending solely
upon the plain wordings. As stated by Krishna Iyer J to be literal in meaning is to see the skin
and miss the soul. This is the reason the Judges prefer to apply the golden rule instead of the
Literal rule so as to consider the intent of the Statute and not the plain words.

According to Salmond: The essence of law lies in the spirit, not in its letter, for the letter is
significant only as being the external manifestation of the intention that underlies it.

The implication of Literal Rule creates absurdity which means that it makes the provision
vague and inconsistent with the whole Statute, departing the meaning from the intention of
framing the particular Statute. Lord Reid in DPP v Ottewell affirmed that the imprecision of
the English language… is such that it is extremely difficult to draft any provision which is not
ambiguous in that sense.
Conclusion
There cannot be a fixed rule for the purpose of Interpretation when dealing with cases that are
all unique in some sense or the other. In a similar way, there cannot be a statute which is
made leaving no scope of Interpretation. According to Justice Donaldson, the interpretation
of statutes is a craft as much as a science and the judges, as craftsmen, select and apply the
appropriate rules as the tools of their trade. This is the oldest rule and is still in use by Judges
as they don't want to legislate. Even if a slight interpretation changes the meaning, it is
equivalent to making of a new law and therefore, Judges prefer the literal meaning of words
in the provisions of the Statute.

2. Mischief Rule of Interpretation

The Mischief Rule is a certain rule that judges can apply in statutory interpretation in order to
discover Parliament’s intention. The application of this rule gives the judge more discretion
than the literal and the golden rule as it allows him to effectively decide on Parliament’s
intent. It can be argued that this undermines Parliament’s supremacy and is undemocratic as
it takes law-making decisions away from the legislature. Legislative intent is determined by
examining secondary sources, such as committee reports, treatises, law review articles and
corresponding statutes. This rule has often been used to resolve ambiguities in cases in which
the literal rule cannot be applied but associated problem is that the fact that this rule helps
achieve that the use of this rule is limited due to Parliamentary intent. So according to the
author, this modern use of the mischief rule ought to be understood as one of the components
of what is characterized as the “modern” method of statutory construction, rather than a
stand-alone rule serving (as it formerly had), as an alternative to the methods of construction
proposed by the plain meaning rule and the golden rule.

When we read an Act of Parliament the first and fundamental point of note is that it is not
like reading a book or a newspaper. Legislative text must be read according to the principles
and rules as decided upon by the judges and the statute itself. A special skill is required to
understand the meaning. This project will deal briefly with the subject, but it is hoped it will
provide a better understanding of how a Judge approaches the problems.

DAVID HUME once asked,’ referring to Pope’s Essay on Man, whether there is any essential
difference between one form of government and another; and whether every form is not to be
regarded as good or bad, according to whether it is well or ill-administered. Similar questions
are likely to occur to anyone who begins to examine the theory and practice governing the
interpretation of statutes. Does the interpretation of statutes really depend on the rules which
are? Supposed to regulate it? Does not a judge, according to his outlook and capacity, simply
use these so-called rules to justify a decision which he has already reached on other grounds?
And should the Law Commissions, before embarking on an inquiry into the interpretation of
Statutes, have asked themselves whether their journey was really necessary? To these
questions Hume’s reply to Pope suggests one answer. He would be sorry, he said, “to think
that human affairs admit of no greater stability than what they receive from the humours and
characters of particular men”. But as applied to the interpretation of statutes today, this
answer is unsatisfying. It is true that a judge may express or reveal certain distaste for the
policy of a statute and some reluctance to accept that it is intended to override not only his
personal predilections (which of course he would not dispute) but also a long-established
principle of the common law. That this reluctance can still be of the greatest practical
importance may be seen in the decision of the Court of Appeal in Allen v. Thorn Electrical
Industries.
Winn L.J., for example, in that case described the role of the judge as, in effect, the guardian
of the common law against the inroads of statute in the following very strong terms:

“I must reject as quite untenable any submission that, if in any case one finds
(a) that a statute is worded ambiguously in any particular respect, and
(b) finds also clear indications aliunde (from another place)that Parliament intended they
should have the strictest and most stringent meaning possible, the court is therefore
compelled to construe the section in the sense in which Parliament would desire it to take
effect, bygiving the words their most stringent possible meaning.
On the contrary I think the right view is, and I understand always has been, that in such a case
of ambiguity, it is resolved in such a way as to make the statute less onerous for the general
public and so as to cause less interference, than the more stringent sense would, with such
rights and liberties as existing contractual obligations.”

Nevertheless I do not maintain that we could justify an enquiry into the interpretation of
statutes solely on the ground that the judiciary approach statutes with some regard to what
they conceive to be the generally accepted values of the society in which they live, or because
they read statutes to some extent in the context of those values. On the other hand I am far
from suggesting that the present system of interpretation gives all the assistance which it
might to the judge in determining in the first place whether the words of a statute really are
ambiguous.

Much more significant is the link which Lord Simonds’ statement provides between the
concept of a so-called plain meaning, free from ambiguity, and the concept of the mischief of
a statute emphasised by Heydon’s Case. Here again I would say in parenthesis that we need
not spend many words on the golden rule, for on closer examination when a court decides
that particular words of a statute read in the context of ordinary usage, are absurd, it implies,
although often tacitly, that the construction is absurd because it is irreconcilable with the
court’s conception of the general policy of the statute; in other words, the golden rule turns
out to be a disguised version of the mischief rule of uncertain and imprecise application.
As regards the mischief rule proper, you will have observed that Lord Simonds concedes that
the mischief is part of the context and that he says that other sections of the statute, the
preamble, the existing state of the law and other statutes in pari materia may be used to throw
light on that mischief. But you will have also noted that he refers to “other legitimate” but
unspecified means to ascertain the mischief. This seems to us the central problem connected
with the rule in Heydon’s Case, which in many respects has much to recommend it. The
attempt which has been made in a number of Commonwealth countries to give the rule
in Heydon’s Case statutory effect and to make it the central principle of statutory
interpretation has produced disappointing results because little guidance has been given as to
how the mischief is to be ascertained.

The mischief rule of statutory interpretation is the oldest of the rules. The mischief rule was

established in Heydon’s Case. In Re Sussex Peerage, it was held that the mischief
rule should only be applied where there is ambiguity in the statute. Under the mischief
rule the court’s role is to suppress the mischief the Act is aimed at and advance the remedy.
Mischief Rule

This is a very important rule as far as the Interpretation of Statute is concerned. It is often
referred to as the “rule in Heydon’s Case“[i]. This very important case reported by Lord
Coke and decided by the Barons of the Exchequer in the 16th century laid down the
following rules:
That for the sure and true interpretation of all statutes in general, be they penal or beneficial,
restrictive or enlarging of the common law; four things are to be considered –

1)      What was the common law before the passing of the Act?

2)      What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide?

3)      What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the “disease of the
Commonwealth”.

4)      The true reasons for the remedy.

And then the office of all the Judges is always to make such construction as shall suppress the
mischief and advance the remedy. Before proceeding any further, a word of warning is
appropriate. Uses the exact words – “disease of the Commonwealth” – used byLord Coke in
his report and it is important to bear in mind that words had different meanings. It is
necessary to discover their meaning at the time of writing. From the 14th century to the end
of the 17th, the meaning of disease was lack of ease, disquiet or distress and Commonwealth,
of course, meant the Country.

According to an early case, The Longford(1889) 14 P.D. 34 an Act must be construed as if

one were interpreting it on the day it was passed. Thus, we ask ourselves what the word
meant on the day it was uttered if by analogy we argue that the same can be said of a
judgment. The importance of the mischief rule in criminal law can best be shown by
considering examples. An Act of Parliament will state the purpose for which it was enacted.
If we take the case of Parkin v. Norman[1982] 2 All E.R. 583, (reserved judgment), it can
be seen that the court decided that the Public Order Act 1936 was never designed to deal
with homosexual behavior in public toilets. The long title to the Act reads:
“An Act to prohibit the wearing of uniforms in connexion with political objects and the
maintenance by private persons of associations of military or similar characters; and to make
further provision for the preservation of public order on the occasion of public processions
and meetings and in public places.”
The purposes of the Act and the mischief rule are, therefore, closely connected, and it is very
genuine to look at the long title. Another example of the application of the mischief rule is
found in Ohison v. Hylton[1975] 2 All E.R. 490. The facts, briefly, were a carpenter was on
his way home from work. He boarded a train which was crowded. Another passenger
objected and subsequently both finished up on the platform. The defendant, the carpenter,
took one of his tools of his trade, a hammer, from his briefcase and struck the other man with
it. He was charged under the Prevention of Crime Act 1953. Lord Widgery, CJ, said, inter
alia:

“This is a case in which the mischief at which the statute is aimed appears to me to be very
clear. Immediately prior to the passing of the 1953 Act the criminal law was adequate to deal
with the actual use of weapons in the course of a criminal assault. Where it was lacking,
however, was that the mere carrying of offensive weapons was not an offence. The long title
of the Act reads as follows:
 ‘An Act to prohibit the carrying of offensive weapons in public places without lawful
authority or reasonable excuse’. Parliament is there recognizing the need for preventive
justice where, by preventing the carriage of offensive weapons in a public place, it reduced
the opportunity for the use of such weapons. If, however, the prosecutor is right, the scope
goes far beyond the mischief aimed at, and in every case where an assault is committed with
a weapon and in a public place an offence under the 1953 Act can be charged in addition to
the charge of assault. Whilst on the subject of offensive weapons, mention must be made of
the Divisional Court’s decision in Gibson v. Wales(1983) 147 J. P. 143, which decided that a
“flick knife” is an offensive weapon per se.’”

Case Laws

Smith v. Hughes [ii] 
The brief facts were that the defendant was a common prostitute who lived at No. 39 Curzon
Street, London and used the premises for the purposes of prostitution. On November 4, 1959,
between 8.50 p.m. and 9.05 p.m. the defendant solicited men passing in the street, for the
purposes of prostitution, from a first-floor balcony of No. 39 Curzon Street (the balcony
being some 8–10 feet above street level). The defendant’s method of soliciting the men was
(i)  to attract their attention to her by tapping on the balcony railing with some metal object
and by hissing at them as they passed in the street beneath her and

(ii) having so attracted their attention, to talk with them and invite them to come inside the
premises with such words as ‘Would you like to come up here a little while?’ at the same
time as she indicated the correct door of the premises.

It was contended on behalf of the defendant, inter alia, that the balcony was not ‘in a Street’
within the meaning of section 1(1) of the Street Offences Act, 1959, and that accordingly no
offence had been committed. “The sole question here is whether in those circumstances the
appellant was soliciting in a street or public place. The words of s. 1(1) of the Act are in this
form: ‘It shall be an offence for a common prostitute to loiter or solicit in a street or public
place for the purpose of prostitution’.

Lord Parker CJ said Case that she ‘being a common prostitute, did solicit in a street for the
purpose of prostitution, contrary to section 1(1) of the Street Offences Act, 1959.’ It was
found that the defendant was a common prostitute, that she had solicited and that the
solicitation was in a street. The defendants in this case were not themselves physically in the
street but were in a house adjoining the street, on a balcony and she attracted the attention of
men in the street by tapping and calling down to them. At other part the defendants were in
ground-floor windows, either closed or half open. The sole question here is whether in those
circumstances each defendant was soliciting in a street or public place. The words of section
1(1) of the Act of 1959 are in this form: ‘It shall be an offence for a common prostitute to
loiter or solicit in a street or public place for the purpose of prostitution.’

Observe that it does not say there specifically that the person who is doing the soliciting must
be in the street. Equally, it does not say that it is enough if the person who receives the
solicitation or to whom it is addressed is in the street. For my part, I approach the matter by
considering what the mischief is aimed at by this Act. Everybody knows that this was an Act
intended to clean up the streets, to enable people to walk along the streets without being
molested or solicited by common prostitutes. Viewed in that way, it can matter little whether
the prostitute is soliciting while in the street or is standing in a doorway or on a balcony, or at
a window, or whether the window is shut or open or half open; in each case her solicitation is
projected to and addressed to somebody walking in the street. For my part, I am content to
base my decision on that ground and that ground alone.

Royal College of Nursing v DHSS [iii] 

The Royal College of Nursing brought an action challenging the legality of the involvement
of nurses in carrying out abortions. The Offences against the Person Act 1861 makes it an
offence for any person to carry out an abortion. The Abortion Act 1967 provided that it
would be an absolute defence for a medically registered practitioner (i.e. a doctor) to carry
out abortions provided certain conditions were satisfied. Advances in medical science meant
surgical abortions were largely replaced with hormonal abortions and it was common for
these to be administered by nurses it was Held: It was legal for nurses to carry out such
abortions. The Act was aimed at doing away with back street abortions where no medical
care was available. The actions of the nurses were therefore outside the mischief of the Act of
1861 and within the contemplate defence in the 1967 Act.

Elliot v Grey[iv]

The defendant’s car was parked on the road. It was jacked up and had its battery removed. He
was charged with an offence under the Road Traffic Act 1930 of using an uninsured vehicle
on the road. The defendant argued he was not ‘using’ the car on the road as clearly it was not
driveable. It was held: The court applied the mischief rule and held that the car was being
used on the road as it represented a hazard and therefore insurance would be required in the
event of an incident. The statute was aimed at ensuring people were compensated when
injured due to the hazards created by others.

Corkery v Carpenter[v] 
The defendant was riding his bicycle whilst under the influence of alcohol. S.12 of
the Licensing Act 1872 made it an offence to be drunk in charge of a ‘carriage’ on the
highway. It was held:
The court applied the mischief rule holding that a riding a bicycle was within the mischief of
the Act as the defendant represented a danger to himself and other road users.  According
to S.12 of the Licensing Act 1872, a person found drunk in charge of a carriage on the
highway can be arrested without a warrant. A man was arrested drunk in charge of a bicycle.
According to the plain meaning rule a bike is not a carriage. Under the Mischief rule the
bicycle could constitute a carriage. The mischief the act was attempting to remedy was that of
people being on the road on transport while drunk. Therefore a bicycle could be classified as
a carriage.

DPP v Bull[vi]
A man was charged with an offense under s.1(1) of the Street Offences Act 1959 which
makes it an offense for a ‘common prostitute to loiter or solicit in a public street or public
place for the purposes of prostitution’. The magistrates found him not guilty on the grounds
that ‘common prostitute’ only related to females and not males. The prosecution appealed by
way of case stated.
The court held that the Act did only apply to females. The word prostitute was ambiguous
and they applied the mischief rule. The Street Offences Act was introduced as a result of the
work of the Wolfenden Report into homosexuality and prostitution. The Report only
referred to female prostitution and did not mention male prostitutes. The QBD, therefore,
held the mischief the Act was aimed at was controlling the behavior of only female
prostitutes.

Brown v. Brown [vii]
In Brown v Brown, Sir Jocelyn Simon P said that the disadvantage of the old law on
condonation of adultery was that, though a resumption of cohabitation might actually
promote a reconciliation which had yet taken place, a wronged spouse might be reluctant to
resume cohabitation in case it did not succeed and he or she would then have lost the right to
complain of the matrimonial offense. The provision in s 2(1) of the Matrimonial Causes Act
1963 (now contained in s 42 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1965) that adultery shall not be
deemed to be condoned by reason of a continuation or resumption of cohabitation between
the parties for a period of up to three months was, therefore, limited to cases within this
‘mischief’- where the cohabitation was with a view to effecting a reconciliation, and did not
extend to cases where it was in consequence of re3conciliation.

Sodra Devi v. Commr. Of Income Tax [viii]

By s 16(3) of the Indian Income Tax Act 1922, ‘In computing the total income of any
individual for the purpose of assessment, there shall be included so much of the income of a
wife or minor child of such individual as arises indirectly or directly’ In CIT v Sodra
Devi the court observed that the legislature was guilty of using an ambiguous term. There is
no knowing with certainly as to whether the legislature meant to enact these provisions with
reference only to a male of the species using the words ‘any individual’ or ‘such individual’
in the narrower sense of the term indicated above or intended to include within the
connotation of the words ‘any individual’ or ‘such individual’ also a female of the species.
Holding the words ‘any individual’ and ‘such individual’ as restricted in their connotation to
mean only the male of the species, the court observed that the evil which was sought to be
remedied was the only resulting from the widespread practice of husbands entering into
nominal partnerships with their wives, and fathers admitting their minor children to the
benefits of the partnerships of which they were members. This evil was sought to be
remedied by the Income-tax Act. The only intention of the legislature in doing so was to
include the income derived by the wife or a minor child, in the computation of the total
income of the male assessee, the husband or the father as the case may be for the purpose of
the assessment.