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Resilience
A Conceptual Bridge Between Coping and Development
Bernhard Leipold and Werner Greve
Universität Hildesheim, Germany
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Abstract. Traditionally resilience is viewed as an important way of coping: Through resilience, an individual recovers from or avoids
negative outcomes from burdensome conditions. In this paper, we argue that individual stability under significant adverse conditions (i.e.,
resilience) results, to a large degree, from coping processes (e.g., assimilation and accommodation) influenced by personal and situational
conditions. Moreover, we propose that resilience, viewed as a stabilizing constellation, should be considered an important part of the
conceptual bridge between coping and development. Resilience, however, requires a definition of successful development. Here, we argue
that the potential and possibility for further development may be used as a common denominator of current proposals. The aim is to
outline an integrative model of coping, resilience, and development as a theoretical access to successful aging. Some empirical results
illustrate the developmental conditions for assimilative and accommodative processes.

Keywords: coping, resilience, lifespan development, accommodation

Introduction some notable exceptions (Skinner & Edge, 1998), these

As young children, we sometimes learn unusual concepts
in a revealing way. For one of us (WG), the concept of a
boomerang was perhaps most memorably defined as: “A
boomerang is, if you throw it away and it doesn’t return, it
is no boomerang.” Definitions of resilience, which typical-
ly refer to positive adaptation despite adversity (e.g., Gar-
mezy, 1991; Luthar, 2006; Masten, 2001; Rutter, 1987),
have a fatal inclination to become boomerangish that way,
as resilience is defined by its success: Resilience is, if you
don’t overcome adverse developmental conditions, it isn’t
resilience. Actually, several prominent psychological con-
cepts have been defined in this “effect”-way (e.g., the con-
cept of reinforcement), since this kind of explication illus-
trates rather well what is meant by the concept. However,
if we then use resilience as a concept with explanatory
power (“Why did he overcome this adverse situation?”
“Well, because of his resiliency”), a logical full circle is
drawn: The explanation then becomes tautological (it is the
“boomerangishness” of the boomerang that makes it come
back).
Thus, we are in need of a more substantial explanation
of what makes an individual’s reaction to adverse develop-
mental conditions appear (and feel) resilient. In fact, it
seems obvious that a variety of psychological processes
(e.g., certain kinds of information processing or emotional
regulation) and constellations (e.g., a particular social en-
vironment) explain why a person has shown resilience in a
given (adverse) developmental situation (Staudinger, Mar-
siske, & Baltes, 1995). Many, if not most, of these psycho-
logical processes refer to what are traditionally called cop-
ing reactions (Greve & Staudinger, 2006); however, despite
processes are seldom discussed from a developmental point
of view. In particular, although the development of coping
abilities has long been an issue in developmental research
(e.g., Skinner & Zimmer-Gembeck, 2007), the develop-
mental relevance of coping processes has remained some-
what outside the mainstream of the debate.
In the present paper, we attempt to elaborate on this re-
lationship between coping and development by proposing
that the concept of resilience can be considered an impor-
tant part of the conceptual bridge between coping and de-
velopment. To achieve this, we will present our argument
in three steps.
First, we will argue that resilience’s circularity problems
can be circumvented if the focus is moved on the processes
of recovery from or avoidance of developmental adversi-
ties. Contrary to many proposals, this entails viewing resil-
ience neither as a trait nor as a process explaining a phe-
nomenon, but rather as a phenomenon needing to be ex-
plained. It can be explained, we argue, by referring to
coping processes that resemble, in structural aspects, pro-
cesses of developmental regulation. Here, we refer in par-
ticular to the dual-process model of development proposed
by Brandtstädter and colleagues (Brandtstädter, 2007;
Brandtstädter & Greve, 1994; Brandtstädter & Rother-
mund, 2002). In the course of this argument, we also tackle
the thorny problem of defining developmental success
(Greve, 2001), that needs to be solved because resilience
is defined, as we mentioned, by successfully overcoming
adverse developmental conditions.
In sum, we propose that a fruitful research question lead-
ing to a closer connection between coping, resilience, and
development would ask which processes ensure the possi-

European Psychologist 2009; Vol. 14(1):40–50 © 2009 Hogrefe & Huber Publishers
DOI 10.1027/1016-9040.14.1.40
 B. Leipold & W. Greve: Resilience
bility of further development for a person confronted with
developmental challenges. This way of asking leaves open
whether these processes result in stability or growth,
whether they achieve this by optimization, compensation,
or selection, or by accommodative or assimilative process-
es. All of these, to be sure, represent possible forms of re-
silience.
Resilience as a Phenomenon:
Components of a Conceptual
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Clarification
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Traditionally, processes or competencies of resilience are
viewed as important means of coping with adversities. Ac-
cording to this view, it’s the individual’s resilience that
makes him or her recover from or entirely avoid negative
outcomes from unfavorable conditions that otherwise (i.e.,
without resilience) would inevitably lead to negative
(“maladaptive”) developmental pathways. In particular,
concepts of resiliency as a personality trait (Block & Block,
1980) or trait constellation (Asendorpf & van Aken, 1999)
tend to argue that resilience should be considered a stable
resource that allows a favorable performance under stress
(Weed, Keogh, & Borkowski, 2006). According to Block
and Block (1980), ego-resiliency refers to the tendency to
respond flexibly rather than rigidly to changing situational
demands, particularly in stressful situations.
The view that dispositions do account for variance in
coping responses has also been formulated by several other
concepts that sometimes resemble the basic idea of resil-
ience, though the term is not used explicitly. For instance,
Kobasa, Maddi, and Kahn (1982) proposed the construct
of “hardiness” to refer to a specific set of traits (including
three personality dispositions: commitment, control, and
challenge) that contribute to the stress-resistance of the per-
son. Likewise, Antonovsky’s (1987) “sense of coherence”
(a feeling of confidence that demands are comprehensible,
manageable, and meaningful) can be viewed as a global
personality disposition serving as a resource for a person
in resisting problems and burdens. Although these concepts
differ from “resiliency”, even in its personality-trait con-
ceptualization, they exemplify the guiding idea that it is the
individual’s personality (or parts of it) that enables him or
her to overcome adversities.
At first glance, this perspective seems convincing, since
it helps to explain why, under the very same conditions,
some persons are resistant and others are not. A closer look,
however, reveals that constructing resilience as represent-
ing a personal trait that allows some at-risk people to suc-
ceed in life can be misleading. First, a person-centered ap-
proach bears the risk of underestimating the role of external
factors (situation, context variables). Many of the ap-
proaches mentioned above do refer to external conditions,
to be sure, but a person-centered view is always in danger
© 2009 Hogrefe & Huber Publishers
41
of focusing on attributes of the individual as the decisive
aspect, and, hence, is highly in danger of neglecting the
fundamentally interactive nature of developmental (and
coping) processes. Second, and more fundamental, dispo-
sitional explanations, in general, do not offer an explana-
tion of what has happened, but rather a description of it
(Greve, 2005). The question of which processes facilitate
or create the ability to overcome difficulties remains unan-
swered.
In contrast, we argue that “resilience” simply denotes
the mere fact of an individual’s stability or quick recovery
(or even growth) under significant adverse conditions. This
phenomenon of resilience, in turn, needs to be explained
by coping processes, which lead to certain developmental
trajectories. More specifically, we claim that the difference
between coping and resilience is mainly a matter of con-
ceptual hierarchy, rather than an empirical issue (Greve &
Staudinger, 2006).
Successful Development: How to
Distinguish Coping, or Resilience, from
Failure
Since resilience as a phenomenon is defined by the success
(positive developmental outcomes) of the (coping) pro-
cesses involved (given the circumstances), these processes
can hardly be clarified without a satisfying idea of what
successful development is. However, humans differ in their
profile of demands: Congenital and acquired vulnerabili-
ties and deficits sometimes make special support necessary.
In every case, a minimum of fit between individuals and
their environment is the necessary prerequisite for devel-
opment to take place at all. Within this “space” human de-
velopment can unfold individually within a broad range.
Accordingly, a common denominator of what successful
development actually means is difficult to achieve because
a fundamental element of subjectivity seems unavoidable
here: What one person considers being a “successful” way
of dealing with a developmental constellation can be seen
as an escape or even as a failure by another. From a devel-
opmental point of view, the concepts of developmental
tasks or normative and nonnormative challenges (Baltes,
Lindenberger, & Staudinger, 2006) may be used as orga-
nizing principles to describe and explain changes in per-
sonal growth. These concepts consider to what extent chal-
lenges typically occur in concrete age periods. Following
growth models of personality development (see Baltes et
al., 2006, for a review), personality-based functioning is
subject to a systematic advance toward a higher level of
integration. For many people, life challenges and loss
threaten the order and predictability of one’s life. There is,
however, considerable evidence that benefits may result
from adversity (Aldwin, 1994; Davis & McKearney, 2003).
In developmental research on successful aging, the dif-
ferent approaches fall into three classes: Whereas some re-
European Psychologist 2009; Vol. 14(1):40–50
 42 B. Leipold & W. Greve: Resilience
fer to absolute standards, others use relative standards or
propose subjective standards (see Heckhausen, 1999, for a
further discussion). Absolute standards refer to optimal or,
at least, normal levels of functioning in a given domain
(e.g., nonpathological biomedical functioning). Relative
standards take into account the performance conditions for
a given individual in a given domain. Subjective standards,
in contrast, are entirely idiosyncratic to the individual and
diverge to the extent that different people evaluate the same
criteria in a different way. In short: The problem of legiti-
mate criteria remains unsolved even when the debate starts
from a point that seems to be highly in agreement.
One solution for this dilemma, of course, is to terminate
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the search for one final, decisive criterion of success. Baltes
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and Carstensen (2003), for instance, emphasized the limit-
ed value of normative, psychological outcomes, which are
primarily rooted in middle-class, white, male standards
and, therefore, ignore the potential of multiple personal
goals. They prefer a multicriteria approach with three di-
mensions and strive to identify the most important criteria.
What counts as “success” can be defined by different au-
thorities (individual, peer group, society), by different cri-
teria of assessment (subjective, objective), and by different
norms (functional, statistical, or ideal norm). Accepting
personal goals as the individual operationalization of suc-
cess directs attention to the strategies that people use to
master specific personal goals (e.g., through the processes
of selection, optimization, and compensation; Freund &
Baltes, 2002).
Some authors stress the importance of evolutionarily
given developmental goals: survival, competition, and hi-
erarchical positions in group-constellations (Sedikides,
Skowronski, & Dunbar, 2006). Others claim that subjective
criteria are problematic because they prevent and exclude
any consensus-based assessment of success, permit every
phenomenon to be interpreted a posteriori as success, and,
therefore, hinder scientific progress in the field of success-
ful aging (Heckhausen, 1999, p. 94). From the perspective
of actional self-development, the role that consensus
should play is far away from a consensus. Conceding that
success can also be acknowledged in areas that are not sim-
ilarly valued by all means, at least, that doubt exists as to
whether biological, fitness-related goal states of human de-
velopment are the only candidates worth mentioning.
At this point the question arises as to which philosophy
of life seems to fit the reality more adequately: Are the
biologically-based factors that facilitate survival the pre-
dominant ones, and more important than personal goals?
Empirical results can be discussed in favor of both posi-
tions. One solution might be to forego concrete, normative,
content-related standards, thereby taking interindividual
and intercultural variations seriously, but accept at a func-
tional (abstract) level the continued existence of the organ-
ism (and its future coping skills) as a necessary condition
for developmental and coping success (Greve, 2001).
From this point of view, perhaps the following consid-
erations could serve as an integrative compromise to re-
European Psychologist 2009; Vol. 14(1):40–50
solve the problem of successful development. Human de-
velopment is characterized by a remarkable plasticity in
cognitive functioning as well as in social integration and
personal self-regulation (Baltes et al., 2006). This plasticity
is not only critical for the dynamics of resilience and the
coping processes being discussed, it is also, in general, a
basic requirement for lifelong development. Development
consists primarily of the maintenance and implementation
of the individual’s abilities to use regulation processes (see
below) to adapt to a challenging situation. Successful de-
velopment, therefore, implies a progressive adaptation that
preferably preserves or increases this plasticity and adap-
tivity (Greve, 2001). Fundamentally, and to oversimplify
somewhat, development consists of successfully overcom-
ing life problems and successful coping can be recognized
exactly where overcoming future problems (i.e., develop-
ment) remains possible, if not easier.
Resilience as a Relational Construct:
Coping as a Constitutive Component
If the proposed approach of viewing resilience as the phe-
nomenon to be explained (rather than as the resource that
explains a positive developmental outcome) is acceptable,
the resulting scientific problem is to describe the underly-
ing mechanisms and processes more precisely. According
to Kaplan (1999), several obstacles hinder conceptual clar-
ity in this. The first problem has been discussed in the pre-
vious section: The necessity of distinguishing between re-
silience and outcome. This difficulty is circumvented (a)
when resilience is (boomerangishly) actually defined by its
(positive) outcome (and, hence, doesn’t explain positive
development but rather describes it), and (b) when resil-
ience is explained by a variety of processes. The second
problem of the great variation in outcomes between (or
even within) individuals can be circumvented by adopting
the proposed (admittedly abstract) idea of successful devel-
opment: Any reaction that maintains or enhances the pos-
sibility of further development. The problem to be solved,
however, is (third) the variation of processes that influence
developmental outcomes and (fourth) the variability of
problems, burdens, and so-called risk factors.
Accordingly, Greve and Staudinger (2006) proposed a
conceptualization of resilience as a constellation: the fit be-
tween individual resources (capacities, competencies, and
perhaps even attributes), social conditions (e.g., social sup-
port), and the developmental challenge or problem (e.g.,
obstacles, deficits, losses). This view implies a hierarchical
differentiation between resilience and coping, as it assumes
that coping is viewed as the individual processes that result,
in dynamical interaction with these components and under
certain conditions, in resilience.
Coping, in turn, is nowadays conceived of as a process
(as opposed to a trait or a competence) by which individ-
uals manage the challenging or threatening demands
© 2009 Hogrefe & Huber Publishers
 B. Leipold & W. Greve: Resilience
placed upon them (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). Originally,
coping research focused on individual coping reactions,
that is, the means a person uses to cope with an actual prob-
lem as well as the consequences thereof. Folkman and Laz-
arus (1980) made the famous distinction between problem-
and emotion-focused coping strategies. Emotion-focused
coping serves to regulate the burdensome emotions, where-
as problem-centered coping aims to change the relevant
conflict or problem. The two forms of coping are by no
means mutually exclusive. Just the opposite, a first reaction
that is emotion-centered (“Calm down first!”) often then
permits a problem-oriented clarification (e.g., of the con-
flict with the boss; see Folkman, 1984).
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It becomes clear that searching for a general reaction to
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certain types of problems should be rendered impossible.
It all depends, as it were, on the particular constellation.
Considerable evidence (starting with the classical study by
Brickman, Coates, & Janoff-Bulman, 1978) demonstrates
in a particularly vivid way that coping depends not on the
objective events themselves but rather on their interpreta-
tion and processing.
However, a sequential model of coping reactions, such
as Lazarus’ (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984), is missing a more
exact explanation of the particular coping reaction that is
chosen: When does the person show which reaction for
what purpose? As a first approximation, it seems plausible
to suppose that efforts toward problem-oriented solutions
will be maintained as long as personal self-efficacy beliefs
(Bandura, 1997) allow reaching the goal or regaining the
status quo to appear promising. Evidently, it is objectively
and subjectively important for humans to control their re-
lationship to their surroundings (Heckhausen & Schulz,
1999), as even the perceived loss of control may constitute
a strain or threat.
When, however, the individual’s active problem-solving
efforts appear fruitless, then adaptations on the part of the
individual become necessary, since otherwise the threat
would become a permanent source of stress. Following
Rothbaum, Weisz, and Snyder (1982); Heckhausen (1999)
proposed a lifespan theory of primary and secondary con-
trol that developed these thoughts systematically; this the-
oretical framework, however, depicts the goals of second-
ary processes as ultimately serving to re-establish primary
control. Without claiming primacy of the primary control
(e.g., Heckhausen, 2002, p. 259) even the denomination
“primary” control would be rendered pointless. Actually,
striving to influence one’s environment in favor of one’s
interests and necessities seems plausible from an evolution-
ary point of view (Heckhausen & Schulz, 1999). Adapting
one’s own evaluatory criteria and level of expectation (sec-
ondary control) can indeed lead to regaining a feeling of
being in control and, therefore, also being able to reach
these revised goals. However, two problems with this se-
quential model need to be resolved. First, processes of sec-
ondary control do not underlie personal control in the same
way active and strategic reactions to a problem do (Brandt-
städter, 2006); as a rule, they cannot be reconstructed in an
© 2009 Hogrefe & Huber Publishers
43
“intentional jargon” (thus, even their denomination as sec-
ondary “control” becomes questionable). Second, and
more fundamental, the primacy of primary control process-
es for all circumstances – and for all persons – is not evi-
dent, let alone empirically corroborated (Greve & Wentura,
2007; Brandtstädter, 2006, 2007). Even from an evolution-
ary point of view, several organisms have chosen other so-
lutions (e.g., symbiosis). This is another advantage of con-
ceiving resilience as a relational constellation: It does not
entail any primacy of certain (coping) responses to (devel-
opmental) burdens or threats.
At the core of this (resilient) constellation, however, the
individual’s coping reaction remains the critical component
of the model. Given a certain problem (challenge, task,
threat, etc.) in a particular social situation, it is the individ-
ual’s response that makes the decisive difference for the
developmental outcome. Thus, the question of how indi-
vidual selection of a specific reaction comes about (under
a given constellation of preconditions) takes center stage.
This question, in turn, can be answered only from a devel-
opmental point of view.
Resilience as a Constellation –
Toward an Integrative Model of
Development, Coping, and Resilience
The problem in evaluating coping reactions as “function-
al,” “successful,” or even “healthy” admittedly has not
been avoided, even through the cautious definition suggest-
ed above. The impression remains that varying coping re-
actions – even conceding that individual life plans vary and
with them the criteria of success – seem to appear function-
al (adaptive) for successful development in different ways.
As a result, the functionality of a coping reaction cannot,
in any case, be ascertained per se (empirically or theoreti-
cally) but rather can only be classified relative to the re-
spective developmental situation of the person. This leads
to the consideration that coping reactions and developmen-
tal processes, differ in their time frame: Short-term state
changes in reaction to challenging constellations that can-
not be resolved with the available means and resources
would accordingly be described as coping; longer term
changes in the person in reaction to challenges that cannot
be dealt with by the previously developed cognitive, emo-
tional, and behavioral repertoire would then be described
as development.
Resilience: The Relation to Adaptation,
Stability, and Maintenance
This can be well-integrated into a general understanding in
which coping and development differ fundamentally in
European Psychologist 2009; Vol. 14(1):40–50
 44 B. Leipold & W. Greve: Resilience
time frame, and hence, on a conceptual level. Stabilizing
coping processes can be recognized in this framework fair-
ly well. This, in turn, supports our view that resilience is
neither an individual characteristic nor a specific process.
Rather, it describes the phenomena of a “normal” (or stable,
or successful) developmental course under potentially en-
dangering circumstances and, thus, is the expression of a
complex resilience constellation (Greve & Staudinger,
2006). At first glance, little seems to have, thus, been
gained theoretically in the current discussion about “adap-
tive” coping processes. At most, through the term “constel-
lation” the developmental circumstances have now also
been integrated conceptually. In the sense of the argumen-
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tation central to the relationship between development and
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coping, the term constellation is, in fact, applicable, but it
underestimates the heuristic fruitfulness of the resilience
term in another respect. In fact, the resilience phenomenon
draws attention to the point that development can also exist
when outwardly little or nothing changes (Greve, 2005).
Not only does an apparent stability at closer view often
have a highly dynamic (microprocessual, i.e., lower level)
regulation at the basis, but also these stabilizing regulation
processes are based on development over the lifespan. In
other words, the resilience that appears outwardly as the
expression of stability and unchangeability in the person is
the result of regulation and coping processes that are not
only highly dynamic and complexly interacting at every
point in development, but also are themselves constantly
changing throughout the lifespan.
With this, the relationship between coping and develop-
ment not only becomes even closer (and more plausible), but
also gains a partly new, extended understanding of develop-
ment. Development is no longer bound only to externally
visible (dramatic) changes; the maintenance of a dynamic
balance is also conceptualized as the expression and result of
developmental processes. In fact, in this understanding of
development, the coping processes addressed in this contri-
bution shift conceptually closer to a classical developmental
concept from, at first glance, a completely different origin:
Piaget’s theory of cognitive development (Flavell, 1963). The
function of the interplay between assimilative and accommo-
dative adaptive processes is, here again, maintaining or re-
gaining a balance between internal structures and perceptions
of reality (principle of equilibration).
Resilience and Development: Toward an
Integrative Model of Coping and Resilience
Apparently individuals differ greatly in their reactions to
seemingly comparable stresses and challenges. At the same
time, a single individual can show very different coping
reactions in various situations. The availability of the vari-
ety of coping reactions is, then, noticeably tied to the re-
spective, antecedent development of personal structures,
skills, or resources. Likewise, the assessment of the situa-
European Psychologist 2009; Vol. 14(1):40–50
tion and the resources available depends on the person’s
cognitive structures for perception, comprehension, inter-
pretation, and evaluation, which in turn are products of dif-
ferences in individual development.
First of all, it is clear that problem-oriented reactions
(primary control) are only possible if appropriate problem-
solving competence is available. I can only pass my driving
test (subjectively threatening but seen as necessary and de-
sired) when I possess the necessary cognitive and motoric
abilities (eye-hand coordination, anticipatory driving style,
assessment of dangers, situation-appropriate understanding
of the traffic regulations, etc.). It is clear that such complex
information-processing is only possible at more differenti-
ated stages of (in particular, mental) development. Of
course, this concerns not only such developmental tasks but
also social problems and challenges: A confrontation with
authority (boss, teacher, etc.) that has become inevitable
will only succeed when one has the social and communi-
cation skills plus a sufficient emotion regulation compe-
tence (to avoid uncontrolled outbursts of anger) and cogni-
tive abilities (to hold one’s own in an argument but also to
cleverly plan the discussion strategically). In a similar man-
ner, cognitive-emotional adaptation processes (emotion-
centered, secondary control) demand the availability of al-
ternate evaluation and interpretation structures as well as
the cognitive flexibility to revise initially preferred inter-
pretations and assessments and, if necessary, even drop
them in favor of others (Brandtstädter, 2006).
These considerations suggest a strong mutual interrela-
tion between developmental trajectories and (the availabil-
ity of) coping reactions. Instead of collecting (and listing)
them, however, an integrative framework should be more
appropriate to conceptualize this relationship. Threats and
challenges, whether as acute problems or serious develop-
mental crises, can be reconstructed as discrepancies be-
tween a current, actual (perceived) state or condition (“Is-
state”) and an intended or desirable alternative state or con-
dition (target or “Should be-state”). The reactions to such
challenges can generally be placed in one of two catego-
ries: Individuals either actively try to solve the problem or
reactively try to reduce the stress they feel by avoiding or
modifying how they view the problem. Not only can sev-
eral theories of developmental regulation, at least in prin-
ciple, be integrated into this abstract system, but also al-
most all coping theories (Greve, 1997). Moreover, despite
notable differences in their details, various research ap-
proaches to developmental regulation that include coping
with developmental problems and tasks (Baltes & Baltes,
1990; Brandtstädter, 2007; Heckhausen & Schulz, 1999)
can all be described by this common fundamental concept
(see also Boerner & Jopp, 2007; Greve & Wentura, 2007):
Either the threatening or stressful problem itself is solved
or the problematic aspects of the situation are alleviated or
avoided. Although a broad dichotomous model based upon
commonalities of different theories entails the danger of
underestimating differences in the scope of application and
conceptual details (Riediger & Ebner, 2007), this general
© 2009 Hogrefe & Huber Publishers
 B. Leipold & W. Greve: Resilience
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This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
Figure 1. An integrative model of coping, resilience, and development.
framework opens a developmental psychological perspec-
tive on coping processes.
We attempt to summarize our considerations with the
following diagram (Figure 1). A critical life event or a de-
velopmental stressor provokes the personal constellation
that, by means of regulative processes, determines whether
or not the stressor will even be recognized as such, and not
be masked by defense mechanisms. If it is perceived as
stressful, assimilative and accommodative processes (see
below) are activated, which, in turn, (given the circum-
stances) influence the extent to which the crisis unfavor-
ably affects further dimensions (e.g., subjective well-being,
health). Assimilative processes also include the activation
of social resources. When there are then no (further) serious
deficits to be found on the criteria side (e.g., subjective
well-being), then one can speak of resilience.
In addition, such a model takes into consideration that,
as previously mentioned,
1) Conditions (personal constellation, personality, context
factors) for all three paths are possible (e.g., the avail-
ability of relieving cognitions for defensiveness, objec-
tive paths of action, subjective control beliefs for assim-
ilation, and alternative interpretation options for accom-
modation, etc.),
and
© 2009 Hogrefe & Huber Publishers
45
2) there is negative interdependence between all three (the
consequent pursuit of a solution strategy inhibits or
makes each of the others unnecessary because a problem
that has been solved needs neither to be denied nor re-
solved).
Processes of primary control, or selective optimization can
be described in this conceptual frame as assimilative reac-
tions, whereas secondary control processes or emotion-
centered coping refer in part to what is meant by accom-
modative reactions in the dual-process model (see below).
This again demonstrates that many of the theories ad-
dressed here noticeably overlap (Boerner & Jopp, 2007),
despite notable differences in meaning or relevance of the
single components (Riediger & Ebner, 2007).
A Developmental Theoretical Framework for
Coping Processes: The Dual-Process Model
of Developmental Regulation
Hence, we focus on the two-process model of developmen-
tal regulation (Brandtstädter, 2006; Brandtstädter & Roth-
ermund 2002), which fits best to the conceptual frame work
sketched above. The starting point is the consideration that
stressful events, threats to identity, and developmental loss-
es can be understood as problem situations with an under-
European Psychologist 2009; Vol. 14(1):40–50
 46 B. Leipold & W. Greve: Resilience
lying discrepancy between an is and a should be perspec-
tive of personal development. However, in this approach,
the differentiation between fundamental reaction modes is
drawn along the boundaries of personal (i.e., behavior that
is consciously and intentionally planned and governed by
the person as the acting unit) and subpersonal (i.e., intrain-
dividual processes such as information processing or emo-
tional regulation, which cannot be controlled or even initi-
ated, and are often not even consciously recognized by the
person) perspectives against the background of an action-
theoretical perspective of human development. The model
basically differentiates between two modes of coping with
problems, designated as assimilative and accommodative
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
processes (Brandtstädter & Rothermund, 2002); these can
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
be supported by a third mode of dealing with threats: de-
fensive processes (Brandtstädter & Greve, 1994).
Assimilative Strategies: Intentional
Self-Development
In the assimilative reaction mode, individuals try to change
their life situation or their own behavior toward a better align-
ment between their normative expectations and goals in rela-
tion to themselves (Brandtstädter, 2006). Characteristic of
this mode is that personal standards and goals underlying the
situational or developmental appraisal are maintained. As
previously mentioned, coping attempts in this mode are usu-
ally carried out intentionally, consciously, and are controlled,
and can, thus, appropriately be called coping strategies.
Accommodative Processes: Development as
Adaptation
The attempt to remove or prevent developmental losses by
means of active problem-solving can fail or be bound to
difficulties and costs that are too high. Often in life – and
in old age increasingly so – fundamental revisions in life-
and developmental blueprints become necessary beyond
simply compensatory measures. Serious threats occur that
cannot be actively removed and need to be resolved
through reactive preference readjustments. In response to
these burdens, the alternative option consists of revising
standards and goals to the given action possibilities: This
is the accommodative mode. According to Brandtstädter’s
view, neither of the modes has primacy. For a given situa-
tion, it is not only open which of the modes is appropriate
or even successful; it is also an empirical question as to
which mode the person will initially react with in a stress
situation. From a dynamic perspective it might often be that
only the combination of both forms is effective.
1 In several presentations of the dual-process model, this third mode is referred to as immunization (e.g., Brandtstädter & Greve, 1994).
However, in the work of one of the authors (WG) immunization is also used to denote a particular way of self-stabilization (by adapting
one’s self-definition according to certain changes in one’s profile of competencies or attributes; Greve & Wentura, 2003) Thus, in order to
prevent confusion, we prefer the broader term “defense” in our present discussion.
European Psychologist 2009; Vol. 14(1):40–50
Defensively Dealing with Problems: Escape or
Detour?
From a coping point of view, however, it seems to make
sense to add a third reaction mode to the developmental
model that several of the above-mentioned models includ-
ed: Individuals can apparently also completely ignore a
problem, denying its meaning or even its existence.1 In this
case they change neither the problem nor themselves: Nei-
ther personal goals, preferences, standards, nor aspects of
the self-image get adjusted nor does the problem get solved
actively. This defensive mode operates, as it were, entirely
in the background, as the mechanisms as well as the effects
of these processes principally remain hidden from the in-
dividual.
Developmental Preconditions of
Coping with Adversities: An Empirical
Illustration
In the previous section we discussed stabilizing processes
of the developing person (i.e., the self; Brandtstädter,
2007). One would assume that to the extent to which the
developmental balance of an individual shifts with increas-
ing age in a negative direction, adaptive and compensatory
regulatory processes of the aging self would gain in impor-
tance. Throughout middle adulthood the high stability of
the self is maintained, to a large degree, through assimila-
tive processes, mostly without high costs from adaptation
or defensiveness. In old and very old age it becomes in-
creasingly necessary to secure the aspects of the self that
constitute identity through adaptation and reorganization,
not only in peripheral but also in structural and evaluative
characteristics of the self (Brandtstädter, 2007). Stabilizing
the individual self-esteem and identity, and, thereby, well-
being and mental health, through adaptive regulation of the
aging self, thus, becomes a central prerequisite for success-
ful aging.
Following our argument sketched thus far, however, the
predicted increase of developmental significance of ac-
commodative processes is dependent on certain precondi-
tions. In short: Accommodation is both producer of and
produced by developmental processes. One important pre-
condition of these processes of reframing and reorientation
should be a certain mental complexity (Brandtstädter &
Rothermund, 2002) that has to be developed in advance.
We investigated these assumptions using a questionnaire
and a sentence-completion test. The sample consisted of
148 middle-aged and older adults (mean age = 61 years;
© 2009 Hogrefe & Huber Publishers
 B. Leipold & W. Greve: Resilience
SD = 10.55; range = 33–85 years; male = 25%). The ques-
tionnaire comprised the scales Tenacious Goal Pursuit
(TGP) and Flexible Goal Adjustment (FGA) as indicators
of assimilative and accommodative processes (Brandt-
städter & Renner, 1990), the CES-D (Radloff, 1977) as an
indicator of depression, and four items from Ryff’s Envi-
ronmental Mastery Scale (1989) that represent an indicator
of self-efficacy (e.g., “Has a sense of mastery in managing
everyday affairs.”). Cognitive complexity was measured
by the short form of Loevinger’s Sentence Completion Test
(Hy & Loevinger, 1996). This test consists of 18 sentence
stems such as “My mother and I . . .” or “When I am criti-
cized . . .” At higher levels, responses are characterized by
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acceptance of contradictions, the distinction of different de-
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
pendencies, and a cherishing of individuality.
The data replicate the well-known stability (“nonin-
crease”) of depression throughout the lifespan (rage = .05,
ns), that has sometimes been labeled a “paradox” (Staudin-
ger, 2000). As discussed above, age-related differences in
coping processes are possibly involved and may provide an
explanation for this fact. Actually, TGP shows an age-re-
lated decrease (r = –.18,p = .03), whereas FGA increases
over the age range (r = .24, p < .01). Both scales show, at
least as a trend, negative relations to depression (rs = –.15,
p = .06 and –.16, p = .05). This pattern, again, replicates
earlier studies (e.g., Brandtstädter & Greve, 1994).
According to the dual-process model, action resources
such as self-efficacy beliefs and self-perceptions of control
are considered to be facilitating conditions for assimilative
activities. The correlation between TGP and self-efficacy
beliefs confirmed this expectation (r = .31, p < .01). In so
far as assimilative processes are predominant in younger
adulthood, one could expect that self-efficacy is more
strongly negatively related to depression in this age cohort.
To test this assumption, the moderation effect was assessed
through a hierarchical regression analysis involving CES-
D as the outcome variable and self-efficacy, age, and the
cross-product Age × Self-efficacy as predictors. The inter-
action was significantly associated with depression (β =
.16, p < .03). Especially for younger adults, high self-effi-
cacy predicts low depression. Furthermore, the data sug-
gest that, in the high self-efficacy condition, TGP is more
strongly negatively related to depression (β = –.17, p =
.03).
On the other hand, one could expect that one structural
characteristic of the self-concept, self-complexity, consti-
tutes a favorable condition for the accommodative process-
es that become increasingly important in old age. One
could argue that a complex and rich self-structure may en-
hance the accessibility of reappraisal cognitions, which are
a central means of accommodative coping. According to
Linville (1987), negative events become less harmful with-
in a complex self-structure. Having a complex self-struc-
ture could buffer negative age effects on depression, be-
cause alternative goals are available or, which is more like-
ly for the Loevinger measure, because mutual
dependencies, as well as a concept of persons having and
© 2009 Hogrefe & Huber Publishers
47
being in different roles, are an element of more complex
answers. In the following analysis, the interactive effect of
Age × Self-complexity was tested within a regression
equation. Age and self-complexity had no significant main
effect on depression; however, the interaction term was sig-
nificant (β = –.19, p = .02). For older adults, self-complex-
ity is negatively correlated with depression, whereas for
younger adults the opposite pattern emerges. Finally we
examined whether self-complexity possibly moderated the
connection between FGA and depression. Here the analy-
ses showed a trend that did not reach the 5% significance
level. One of the two subfacets of the FGA Scale (accom-
modation through reappraisal; Wentura, 1995) was related
more favorably to depression when self-complexity was
highly pronounced (β = –.14, p = .09). There is, however,
no indication of a direct relationship between self-com-
plexity and accommodative coping tendencies. Here we
presumably would have needed experimentally controlled
conditions to take the process nature of coping modalities
more appropriately into account. To summarize, there are
indices for an age-related stability in well-being that, at
least in part, can be explained by interactions between the
content and structural characteristics of the self-concept, as
well as by self-regulatory processes (assimilation, accom-
modation).
Conclusion
Although from the previous discussion it may seem plau-
sible that no matter how development is conceptually dif-
ferentiated from shorter-term changes and adaptive reac-
tions, it can only be successful if an adequate repertoire of
coping reactions is available. However, this claim does not
make the relationship between coping and development
any clearer. It is worthwhile here to differentiate between
two perspectives. On the one hand, previous developmen-
tal processes appear to be the requisite condition in enabl-
ing coping reactions to be built up and differentiated. In a
word, competence in coping has to develop (one needs abil-
ities to master challenges and one must learn how to deal
with stress). On the other hand, however, the potential for
successful further development is itself dependent on ef-
fectively managing current stresses and challenges, espe-
cially serious life crises. Thus, coping makes development
possible and the ability to cope, thereby, develops itself
(this ability can also influence how later stressors are dealt
with). Successful development, put simply, always presup-
poses competence in coping, as, at the same time, coping
is made possible through (successful) development.
Resilience may be viewed as a bridging concept be-
tween coping and development, not because it represents a
missing link in any moderating or causal sense. Rather, it
signifies a bewildering phenomenon that cannot be ex-
plained except by referring to and integrating seemingly
highly heterogeneous concepts and models, both from a
European Psychologist 2009; Vol. 14(1):40–50
 48 B. Leipold & W. Greve: Resilience
developmental and a coping theory realm. The phenome-
non, of course, is the “phenotypical” developmental stabil-
ity of an individual living under adverse developmental
conditions. (In order to identify resilience constellations,
several theoretical problems need to be solved, among
these the question of what makes a developmental pathway
“successful.”) We have argued that two major challenges
result from the mere existence of this phenomenon of re-
silience. First, the developmental stability or recovery has
to be explained by referring to a variety of possible coping
reactions. Obviously, it is not a certain collection of reac-
tions that produce or result in resilience, but rather any pos-
sible combination of individual responses, given a certain
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
situational and social constellation, that eventually result in
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
the overcoming of the developmental adversity. The selec-
tion of a particular response by the individual results from
the previous developmental pathway that has produced
both, the individuals’ options (possibilities, competencies)
and his or her inclinations (tendencies).
From this perspective, there is no fundamental differ-
ence between coping processes and developmental regu-
lation. Hence, the commonalities of these approaches
(i.e., the “Is”/“Should be” model) are able to integrate
these fields. This may also contribute to an extension and
enhancement of the very concept of development as it
stresses that development includes phenomena of stabil-
ity and also consists of a sequence of many problems
solved. In fact, all problems to be coped with are devel-
opmental problems, and the solving of any coping prob-
lem will shape not only any further problem solving, but
the individuals’ further development, in general. Thus,
we agree with Karl Poppers’ famous claim that “all life
is problem solving” (1999).
The most obvious theoretical implication for future re-
search is to emphasize that stability, and not only change,
is a topic for developmental psychology. In particular, in-
creasing stability (during middle and late adulthood) needs
to be explained by examining developmental processes
(Greve, 2005). Second, in explaining the phenomenon of
resilience, not only do risk markers and personality and
situational aspects (the resilience constellation, as it were)
need to be included, but also the microprocesses involved
in adjustment (e.g., coping), that is, the diachronical (de-
velopmental) perspective on resilience.
From a practical point of view, a closer look at possible
options that facilitate or enhance resilience could be worth-
while (see Greve, Leipold, & Meyer, 2008). For instance,
if children were to be trained in their divergent and creative
thinking in early years, this could contribute to promoting
accommodative competencies in early adulthood. Like-
wise, a stimulation of complex thinking might, in turn,
stimulate the propensity (or even ability) to create accom-
modative advice to given life problems. If life is problem
solving, and if the problems are mostly unpredictable, then
we must develop our adaptive flexibility. This, after all, is
what our hominid ancestors did on the evolutionary path to
our present state.
European Psychologist 2009; Vol. 14(1):40–50
Acknowledgments
Many thanks go to Amy Michéle for helping this manu-
script take wing.
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 50 B. Leipold & W. Greve: Resilience

About the authors Bernhard Leipold

Dr. Bernhard Leipold is research scientist at the University of Hil- Universität Hildesheim
desheim, Germany. His research interests lie in the areas of life- Institut für Psychologie
span development, coping, self-concept, and cognitive complex- Marienburger Platz 22
ity. D-31141 Hildesheim
Germany
Dr. Werner Greve is Professor for Developmental and Educational Tel. +49 5121 883482
Psychology at the University of Hildesheim, Germany. His main Fax +49 5121 883479
interests focus on lifespan developmental psychology, law psy- E-mail leipold@uni-hildesheim.de
chology, and evolutionary psychology.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

European Psychologist 2009; Vol. 14(1):40–50 © 2009 Hogrefe & Huber Publishers