US-China Relations: A Changing World Order

Owen Leroux

300021627

POL4378A

Professor Serge Banyonge

April 2021
 Leroux 1

This paper will be discussing the ongoing competition between China and the

United-States for global hegemony. Through an analysis of both countries foreign policy

strategies, it is clear that they have hegemonic ambitions, and directly compete with each

other over the domination of Asia and in terms of economic activity. It cannot be ignored

that the rise of China’s economy has transformed global politics, as well as the balance of

the US-led liberal international order. As China’s economic and military power increases

steadily, its geopolitical ambitions are also constantly growing, such as in Africa, South

China Sea, Taiwan and in Hong Kong. Some experts suggest the possibility of conflict

between China and the USA in the future, considering both countries have hegemonic

tendencies. There are many potential conflicted areas in East Asia where conflict could

erupt at any time in the future between the US and China. Many scholars and various

media outlets are projecting for China’s economy to surpass the United-States within the

next decade, in turn, raising many questions about the US position on the world stage.1

More specifically, this paper will be assessing the following question: With China

increasingly becoming a prominent superpower, and eventually becoming the world's

largest economy, how will this affect China’s foreign policy strategy and what will

happen to the current US-led liberal international order ? In response to this research

question, this paper will argue that, with China on track to become the new global

economic superpower, this will have the joint result of upsetting the liberal international

order and freeing China up to more freely and aggressively pursue its foreign policy

goals.

To begin, it is important to define what exactly is the US-led liberal international

order. Within the scope of international relations, the US-led liberal international order
1
“China Set to Surpass U.S. as World's Biggest Economy by 2028, Says Report.” CNBC, 26 Dec. 2020
 Leroux 2

encompasses a set of global rules which include structured relationships based on

political liberalism, economic liberalism and liberal internationalism. More specifically, it

entails international cooperation through multilateral institutions like the United Nations

and the World Trade Organization, and is constituted by the protections of human rights,

open markets, security cooperation, and promotion of liberal democracy. The US-led

liberal order was established in the aftermath of World War II, led in large part by the

United States, and then eventually took on its hegemonic characteristics after the collapse

of the Soviet-Union, marking the end of the Cold War.2

The liberal international order, taking prominence after the Cold War, started its

downfall by 2019. According to John Mearsheimer, the US-led liberal international order

was flawed from the start and thus destined to collapse with the rise of other global

superpowers. The spread of liberal democracy around the globe became under threat

because of the rise of ideologies such as nationalism and authoritarianism, which

emphasizes decisions being made outside of US supervision. Most importantly, the

liberal international order accelerated China's rise, which helped transform the system

from unipolar to multipolar, the issue for the US is that a liberal international order is

only possible in a unipolarity. The new multipolar world will feature three realist orders:

a non-dominated international order that facilitates cooperation between superpowers,

and two coexisting orders, with one dominated by China, the other by the United States,

creating tensions which will eventually induce a security competition between both

countries.3

2
Parmar, Inderjeet. “The US-Led Liberal Order: Imperialism by Another Name?” International affairs
(London) 94, no. 1 (2018): 151–172.
3
Mearsheimer, John J. “Bound to Fail: The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order.” International
security 43, no. 4 (2019): 7–50.
 Leroux 3

A fast rising China, both economically and with its strong global influence, has

been highly critical of the current US-led liberal international order. China has regarded

the order unfair and unreasonable, thus China’s foreign policy strategy has been making

advances in terms of becoming a global rule-maker. China’s foreign policy has been

expanding its influence in the international hierarchy, and seeks to change aspects of the

liberal order, which China believes is undermining its values and interests. China has

directly blamed the US promotion of liberal values, and claims its responsibility for

several global conflicts, effectively creating mass disruption and chaos worldwide. The

CCP considers the liberal international order to be biased, and favours the interests of

victorious white colonial powers that created this liberal order. Xi considers the world of

2020, with the COVID-19 pandemic, to be radically different from that of the post-war

era, therefore the CCP’s foreign policy decisions will reflect this new era accordingly.

China has been proactive regarding the ongoing changes to the liberal international order,

foreign policy such as supporting international institutions like the World Bank,

effectively serving China’s interests, utilizes UN Peacekeeping to its own purposes, and

directly challenges, through diplomatic means, human rights regimes that might pose a

challenge to China’s values. But the Chinese leadership has become increasingly active in

shaping the rules and norms forming the basis for the world order and created

international institutions to better align with its values and interests. China’s proposition

of a new international order is in fact enshrined by the UN, this view promotes the idea

that all political systems should be respected as equally valid, meaning democracies

should not be considered as superior to authoritarianism. All systems should peacefully

coexist, not attempting to transform the others to democratic systems. Claiming to

 Leroux 4

promote a prosperous future for mankind, China’s attempt to shape the world order,

however, is inherently meant to advance Chinese interests. According to Xi, the CCP’s

foreign policy strategy is to position China in the commanding heights of the

international competition, especially against the United-States. With China having several

leadership positions within international institutions, such as the UN security council, this

has allowed China to advance both their economic and political interests.4

Now having considered that China has indeed drastically affected the US-led

liberal international order, this paper will present three possible scenarios that could

happen to US-China relations. From the academic article, “US-China Relations and the

Liberal World Order: Contending Elites, Colliding Visions?”, it theorizes three potential

scenarios regarding the changing liberal international order, the first of which, is of

inevitable conflict between the United-States and China. Using a realist model, and in

terms of the balance of power, China's emergence as a global superpower is directly

threatening America's position as the single most powerful hegemony. While some

realists view the US decline as inevitable and advocate cooperation during China's rise to

power, most argue that the United States should and will resist this challenge by pursuing

an aggressive foreign policy strategy, leading to a new Cold War or even an all out war,

with open military conflict. In the second scenario, that of co-optation under the liberal

order, China will let itself be incorporated into the US-led international order. China

might take this course of action as it would be considering its own self-interests, and

effectively deepen interdependence between the world's two largest economies,

benefiting both countries as opposed to US economic hegemony. This would also imply a

4
Zhao, Suisheng. “Rhetoric and Reality of China’s Global Leadership in the Context of COVID-19:
Implications for the US-Led World Order and Liberal Globalization.” The Journal of contemporary China
30, no. 128 (2021): 233–248.
 Leroux 5

gradual abandoning of the state controlled capitalist model of economic and political

governance. This scenario could even unfold in the case of America's relative hegemonic

decline, considering how the liberal order is an attractive model of governance. The

liberal order has significant low costs of entry, while simultaneously bringing great

benefits in terms of prosperity and legitimacy, which is useful for China’s economic

growth. The third scenario is that of coexistence, in which the United-States and China

would each maintain their own distinct political and economic system. This scenario

would entail a peaceful compatibility of both systems, with a capitalist and globally

interlinked world economy. This scenario would allow China to retain a relatively

autonomous political system, while adapting to the rules of the liberal order, but at the

same time holding on to distinctive aspects of its communist state model and foreign

policy goals. This type of scenario would be beneficial for China as it aligns with its

existing agenda, that of China needing to take a more proactive and leading role in global

politics.5 However, the United States would have to adapt its foreign policy strategy for

this scenario to work, but the question remains: Is the United-States, in its current state of

hegemonic power, willing to make drastic changes to its foreign policy strategy in order

to coexist peacefully with China?

As was previously discussed in the preceding paragraphs, China’s rise to the

position of economic superpower is not only a very likely event within the next decade,

but it will also almost certainly upset the US-led liberal international order that was

imposed on the world following the end of the Cold War. This means that established

economic trade networks will be subject to upheaval, the international market’s

5
de Graaff, Naná, and Bastiaan van Apeldoorn. “US-China Relations and the Liberal World Order:
Contending Elites, Colliding Visions?” International affairs (London) 94, no. 1 (2018): 113–131.
 Leroux 6

dependency on the US dollar will be negated, and liberal-democrat systems of

government, especially in countries with close ties to China, might be replaced by a

system closer to China’s authoritarian and communist model. A more intentional

consequence, and one that may have broad negative consequences for regional and world

stability, is the fact that China, if in a position of dominance over the USA and the West,

would have a free hand to ramp up several foreign policy initiatives, some of them being

aggressive measures. This paper will now take a brief look at China’s current foreign

policy initiatives and the effect these have on their relationship with the USA and the

world at large, before attempting to extrapolate what other goals China might pursue if it

suddenly found itself in a position of a world superpower.

China’s foreign policy has dramatically varied over the course of the 20th century

and early 21st century, owing to the many natural and political crises it had to deal with,

as well as the many changes of government that it endured, going from an empire to a

(Semi) Democratic republic to one of the ideal models of Communism. Being such a

large and powerful nation, Chinese foreign policy has always had great impact on its

immediate and more distant neighbours. In the early days of Communist domination,

Chinese policy was mostly internal, concerning itself with the modernization of the

country and the rapid development of industry. Millions died in this “Great Leap

Forward”, but it is impossible to deny that China was a far stronger and more modernized

nation afterwards. It was in 1976 that China truly began to trade and engage in diplomatic

relations with the rest of the world, under Paramount Leader Deng Xiaoping. From the

start, certain goals in Chinese foreign policy became quite evident, and sometimes put

them at odds with the rest of the world.6

6
Zhiyue Bo,. The History of Modern China. New York: Mason Crest Publishing. 2016. 135.
 Leroux 7

For starters, China, as a communist nation and an ally of the Soviet Union, had as

one of its primary foreign policy goals the spreading of Communism to as many nations

as possible, this led to their direct armed intervention in the Korean War and their support

for North Vietnam and communist factions in India.7 Following the Xiaoping thaw, China

instead tried to solidify its presence in the region instead of spreading socialism like a

wave, and this is in many ways still one of their chief foreign policy goals today.8 They

engaged in an undeclared border war with India to bring certain disputed territories in the

Himalayas under their control, as well as an armed conflict with North Vietnam when the

latter country had a confrontation with China’s ally, the Cambodian Khmer regime.

Although perhaps no move by China in that early period was as obvious a power, grab as

their invasion of Tibet, undertaken in the 1950s under Mao Zedong, China invaded and

occupied the country under a pretext of protecting Chinese minorities there and fostering

socialism. Tibet has been under occupation ever since and acquiring international

recognition of the annexation has been and remains a critical Chinese foreign policy goal

ever since. As shown above, throughout history, China has shown an aggressive-realist

type of foreign policy.

Current Chinese foreign policy has shown, ever since the accession to power of

General Secretary Xi Jinping in 2012, an increasing willingness by the country to assert

itself on the international stage and increase its prominence in the affairs of the world.9

Some commentators have stated that this shows a particular wish of Xi’s to ensure China

replaces the US-aligned west as a so-called “World Leader”. A main area of focus for his

7
Zhiyue Bo,. The History of Modern China. New York: Mason Crest Publishing. 2016. 135.
8
David Batashvilli, “What happens when China becomes the Next global superpower?” The National
Interest. April 10, 2019.
9
Avery Goldstein, “China’s grand strategy under Xi Jinping: Reassurance, Reform, and Resistance”.
International Security (Summer 2020) vol 45, issue 1. P 164.
 Leroux 8

government, and area of concern for the US and its allies in the region, has been China’s

attempts to assert its full sovereignty over the South China sea. Citing security reasons,

the Chinese military, as well as Chinese economic interests have been especially active in

the area, engaging in activities that some western commentators and strategic analysts

have described as potentially provocative, causing a risk of escalation. Chinese naval

units often patrol far out of Chinese national waters, claiming that the so-called

“Nine-Dash-Line”(A line just Northwest of the Philippines) represents the outer limits of

their territory, but this has been contested by the US Government as well as the United

Nations, who issued a ruling that such territorial claims were illegal and in breach of

international law. China has mostly ignored these protests and the UN ruling, continuing

to claim territories such as the Spratly and Paracel islands. Furthermore, China has been

constructing what US defense experts have described as “the great wall of sand” in the

Southern China sea, a land reclamation project that has created several artificial islands in

the area.10

Another area of Chinese foreign policy that remains a paramount goal for them,

and also at odds with the US and most of the West, concerns Taiwan or, as they are

officially known, the Republic of China. (As compared to the People’s Republic of

China). An island nation off China’s coast, Taiwan represents the last holdout of the

Chinese nationalists that were opposed to Mao’s Communists. Unable to attack the island

because of US support for Taiwan and, at the time, unstable conditions domestically,

China has refused to extend diplomatic recognition to Taiwan and has more or less

refused to acknowledge its existence as an independent state, claiming full sovereignty

10
“China building ‘Great Wall of Sand’ in South China Sea”. BBC.com. April 1st, 2015.
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-32126840
 Leroux 9

over the island.11 While economic cooperation does occur between the two countries as a

matter of necessity, political tensions between the two remain high, especially in light of

the previously-mentioned efforts by China to expand its sovereignty in and around the

South China sea. It is also very possible that if a direct military conflict were to occur

between the US and China, it would be over Taiwan’s sovereignty:

James Fanell, former intelligence chief of the USA Pacific fleet challenges
the conventional wisdom that the USA military is unsurpassed by any force
on this planet. He thinks that there is a high possibility that the USA and
China will go to war in the next 30 years. China is waiting for a right
moment in order to regain control over Taiwan. James Fannel thinks that by
2035 China is very likely to attack Taiwan. Chinese military was ordered by Xi
Jinping to have the capability to take Taiwan by military force. China is building
up its military capability in order to be able to confront the USA and regain
Taiwan before 2049.12

One last piece of Chinese foreign policy that will be examined by this paper

before extrapolating what might happen if China surpasses the United-States, concerns

what the Chinese government calls the Belt and Road initiative. This is, in effect, a large

system of interconnected roads, railways, and other transport infrastructure that China

proposes to build throughout Eurasia, with some referring to it as the “New Silk Road''13,

in reference to the ancient trade routes that first brought European explorers to China.

This project would in effect result in the creation of what the US has described as a

“Sino-centric international trade network”, and involves the participation of over 70

countries that would receive investments from the Chinese government. It is of such

importance to China that it was actually set down in their constitution in 2017, 4 years

11
Marc Lanteigne, Chinese Foreign Policy: an Introduction. London: Routledge Press, 2019. 65.
12
Modebadze, Valeri. “US-CHINA RIVALRY FOR GLOBAL HEGEMONY.” Journal of Liberty and
International Affairs (Bitola) 2, no. 2 (2020): 167–173.
13
Niko Kommenda and Lily Kuo. “What is China’s ‘Belt and Road’ Initiative?”. The Guardian, September
5,2018.
 Leroux 10

after Xi Jingping officially announced the launch of the project.14 Its main goals are to

open up new land and maritime trade routes going from the Chinese interior through

Central Asia towards the oil and resource-rich areas of the Middle East. Critical partners

in this scheme involve Russia, Mongolia, and Pakistan, which has caused some fears

amongst the West that China is trying to create a solidified bloc of alliances to counter the

US and its partners.15

After taking a look at current Chinese foreign policy initiatives, this paper will

now, using some speculation as well as some opinion and political pieces published

recently, attempt to extrapolate what China taking a global lead over the United-States

might mean for its foreign policy. When a country achieves the level of superpower,

especially if it is a sole superpower as the US has been since the end of the Cold War, it

finds itself facing drastically less restrictions on the pursuit of its policy, and usually a

large number of countries end up allied with it or in its sphere of influence.

The first and perhaps most obvious way China would be able to more effectively

pursue its foreign policy if it becomes the prominent political and economic power in the

world concerns its foreign trade policy. With its economy rapidly on the rise as opposed

to the debt-ridden US economy, Chinese currency has started to be considered to replace

the US dollar as a staple in certain markets, such as with certain Middle-Eastern countries

like Saudi Arabia and Iran, who have entered into lucrative oil deals with China1617. It

stands to reason that, as more and more countries fall under China’s economic orbit, that

14
Avery Goldstein, “China’s grand strategy under Xi Jinping: Reassurance, Reform, and Resistance”.
International Security (Summer 2020) vol 45, issue 1. P 185.
15
Niko Kommenda and Lily Kuo. “What is China’s ‘Belt and Road’ Initiative?”. The Guardian, September
5,2018.
16
Chen, Mo. “Reflections on New Trends in the Oil Market and China-Saudi Arabia Energy Cooperation.”
Asian journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic studies 14, no. 4 (2020): 505–515.
17
Yeung,Karen US sanctions, closer Middle East ties could advance China's petroyuan dream. (2021, April
02).
 Leroux 11

they will be able to use dependence on their currency, as well as leveraging economic aid,

in order to further their trade policies for an immense profit. The belt and road initiative

would potentially receive a huge surge in funding and be brought to completion faster

than planned, and in the context of countries already dependent on Chinese currency,

would result in the reinforcing of alliances and the forming of a true China-centered bloc

of aligned countries, much like the Eastern Bloc of the Cold War.18

Furthermore, if China achieves a superior position to that of the United States, its

ambitions in the South China Sea will see their main counterbalance being removed. US

presence in the region and the maintaining of a few close allies like the Philippines and

Japan have limited Chinese moves into the region to a certain degree. If the US’s

economic situation becomes inferior to that of China, it will eventually lose the economic

ability to project force in that area or provide adequate support to its allies. If that

becomes the case, then China will find itself with no military or economic opponent

strong enough to oppose it, therefore giving it an almost free hand to expand its economic

sphere of influence and perhaps, if they actually achieve the status of superpower,

directly annex territories.19 Western commentators have been remarking on the likelihood

of that situation occurring ever since the Jinping government made its intentions for that

area clear, and experts do see that as a potential strategic threat to the US, its navy, and

strategic interests in the area.

Situations that are already a sticking point between China and the West also run

the serious risk of being exacerbated if China achieves a position of global

socio-economic domination. The previously mentioned annexation of Tibet being one

18
Avery Goldstein, “China’s grand strategy under Xi Jinping: Reassurance, Reform, and Resistance”.
International Security (Summer 2020) vol 45, issue 1. P 174.
19
Angang Hu, China in 2020 : a New type of Superpower. Washington, D.C: Brookings Press, 2011. 123.
 Leroux 12

such case, as of right now, many governments, international organizations, and NGOs

actively denounce Chinese policy in Tibet and refuse to give the Chinese occupation a

legal standing, leaving the door open for a potential mediated solution. If China replaces

the United-States as the foremost nation in terms of economy and power projection, such

entities may not be able or willing to maintain their anti-China attitude, for fear of

alienating a potential ally, trading partner, or even political overlord. This would leave the

people of Tibet with basically no international resources to plead their case and ensure

that the annexation stays a permanent state of affairs for the foreseeable future.20 Taiwan

is another such case, its government is supported by the United States as a buffer against

Chinese expansion in the region and as part of a commitment to help democracy against

authoritarian communism. If China acquires the economic status and power projection

abilities of a superpower, it may turn out that American support to Taiwan will have to be

withdrawn as a concession to China or simply because they would lose the capacity to

maintain it, or as previously mentioned an all out war with the US. This may have dire

political consequences for Taiwan down the road, although direct annexation remains a

remote, but possible, outcome, Taiwan may find itself isolated on the world stage and

dependent on China for support and economic assistance, something which would almost

certainly undermine its political position.21

Less specific and more global changes and strides forward in Chinese foreign

policy would also almost certainly result from China acquiring superpower status.

Western journalists and commentators have remarked that it will lower democracy’s

credibility as a model of political leadership, and that China may seek to convert other

20
Marc Lanteigne, Chinese Foreign Policy: an Introduction. London: Routledge Press, 2019. 115.
21
Avery Goldstein, “China’s grand strategy under Xi Jinping: Reassurance, Reform, and Resistance”.
International Security (Summer 2020) vol 45, issue 1. P 187
 Leroux 13

countries to the particular brand of semi authoritarianism that the Jinping regime has

gradually been re-introducing. Its support for blatantly totalitarian or rogue states (As

defined by the US), such as Iran or North Korea may increase, whereas it was kept in

check before by US and NATO-allied influence. Closer ties with Russia could also be

anticipated, as that country has been steadily distancing itself from European politics and

becoming relatively opposed to US policy on the world stage, particularly since the 2014

annexation of Crimea. This would probably lead to an overall diminishing of democracy

in a potential Russo-Chinese sphere of influence.22 From a strategic point of view, this

also means that China would now be free to work towards many long-term military

objectives, such as the establishment of a true capable navy able to challenge the US, the

unopposed placement of bases through the Pacific rim area, as well as modernizing its air

force and strategic nuclear arsenal.23 US and EU influence have limited, but not restricted

Chinese military development in the aim of preserving stability, but a superpower-level

China would be able to freely establish itself as a strategic threat to the US and their

allies, drastically shifting the global balance of power.

After reading through the few paragraphs above, it becomes clear that China’s

foreign policies have always been at least somewhat if not completely at odds with those

of the US and their Western allies, owing to the vast differences in political systems,

varying historical circumstances, and their nature as competing emerging superpowers.

Whether annexing foreign territory, imposing economic restrictions and boycotts on

Taiwan, or seeking to massively widen its socio-economic sphere of influence, China has

22
Peter Baker. “As Russia draws closer to China, U.S faces a new challenge.” The New York Times.
November 8, 2014.
23
Avery Goldstein, “China’s grand strategy under Xi Jinping: Reassurance, Reform, and Resistance”.
International Security (Summer 2020) vol 45, issue 1. P 171
 Leroux 14

been on the fast-track to be not only a superpower but a rival to the United States, and it

was also shown that if they indeed surpass the US in rankings over the next decade, their

capacities to expand economically and in terms of territory will be almost unchecked, and

the capacities of other nations to respond accordingly will be limited if not crippled.

There will most certainly be drastic changes to the US-led liberal international

order in the coming decade, and as mentioned in the paper, there are three potential

scenarios that are likely to play out regarding US-China relations, however, with the

increasingly aggressive form of foreign policy coming from China, the potential for

armed conflict in the coming decade with the US seems more plausible.
 Leroux 15

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Parmar, Inderjeet. “The US-Led Liberal Order: Imperialism by Another Name?”

International affairs (London) 94, no. 1 (2018): 151–172.

Mearsheimer, John J. “Bound to Fail: The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International
Order.” International security 43, no. 4 (2019): 7–50.

Zhao, Suisheng. “Rhetoric and Reality of China’s Global Leadership in the Context of
COVID-19: Implications for the US-Led World Order and Liberal Globalization.” The
Journal of contemporary China 30, no. 128 (2021): 233–248.

de Graaff, Naná, and Bastiaan van Apeldoorn. “US-China Relations and the Liberal
World Order: Contending Elites, Colliding Visions?” International affairs (London) 94,
no. 1 (2018): 113–131.

Chen, Mo. “Reflections on New Trends in the Oil Market and China-Saudi Arabia
Energy Cooperation.” Asian journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic studies 14, no. 4
(2020): 505–515.

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 Leroux 16

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