COLLECTIVE BARGAINING UNIT

1. Elizalde Co. vs. CAR, L-24200, Dec. 26, 1967

ELIZALDE & CO., INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS,
ASSOCIATED LABOR UNION and PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR
UNIONS, respondents.

Benedicto G. Arcinas and Benjamin Gascon for petitioner.

Cipriano Cid & Associates for respondent union.

SYLLABUS

1. APPEAL; FINAL ORDER, RULING OR DECISION OF THE COURT OF AGRARIAN

RELATIONS. — Under the Revised Rules of Court, any party may appeal from a
final order, ruling or decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations by filing with said
tribunal a notice of appeal and with this Court, the required number of copies of
the petition for review or certiorari, within 15 days (Secs. 1 and 4, Rule 43) from
receipt of the order, ruling or decision being contested.

2. ID.; PRESUMPTION THAT APPEAL HAS NOT BEEN PERFECTED. — The

presumption that the first two orders have become executory for lack of timely
appeal is rendered conclusive, not only by the holding of the certification
elections on November 16, 18, 23 and 24 and 25, 1964, but also by petitioner's
failure to state in the petition that the appeal from aforesaid orders is made
within the period. The appeal from the orders of August 20, 1964 and September
12, 1964, therefore, must be ruled out for being out of time.
3. ID.; FILED BEYOND THE 15 DAY REGLEMENTARY PERIOD; EFFECT. — Where
petitioner was notified of the January 11, 1965 order on February 4, 1965, and he
filed his petition in appeal with the Supreme Court on February 20, 1965, his
appeal was filed clearly beyond the 15-day reglementary period, and should,
therefore, be dismissed.

4. LABOR; CERTIFICATION ELECTION, HOLDING OF; PROPER BARGAINING UNIT;

WHO DETERMINES. — The determination of what constitutes a proper bargaining
unit, like any other phase of certification proceedings, lies primarily in the
discretion of the trial court, since no individual factor is given by law decisive
weight, and that there is nothing that indicates arbitrariness or abuse of
discretion by the Court below.

DECISION

REYES, J.B.L, J p:

Elizalde & Co., Inc., as owner and/or operator of the sugar cane plantations
known as Haciendas Esperanza, Najalin, Consuelo, Balbina and Caiñaman, filed
the present petition, praying for the review and reversal of the orders of the
Court of Agrarian Relations (in its Case No. L-216. Bacolod City), dated August 20,
1964, September 12, 1964 and January 11, 1965.

On April 20, 1964, the Associated Labor Union (ALU) petitioned the Court of
Agrarian Relations in Bacolod City (No. L-216) for the holding of a certification
election among all the agricultural workers in the five sugar cane plantations
owned and/or operated by Elizalde & Co., Inc., in the district of La Carlota,
Occidental Negros, to enable them to select their exclusive bargaining
representative. It proposed the selection of only one bargaining agent for all the
workers, permanent and seasonal alike, in the five haciendas (Esperanza, Najalin,
Consuelo, Balbina and Caiñaman) to which proposal the management did not
disagree.

The Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU) and the Commercial,
Agricultural and Industrial Labor Organization (CAILO), however, intervened,
praying that separate certification elections be conducted in each of the five sugar
cane plantations, and that one bargaining unit be designated for the permanent
workers and another for the seasonal workers or sacadas. After the hearing,
during which the parties entered into certain stipulations of fact, the court issued
an order, dated August 20, 1964, directing the conducting of separate certification
elections — one for permanent workers and one for seasonal workers — in each
of the five plantations, reasoning that the arrangement would promote the best
interests of the workers in each hacienda. The ruling was based on the court's
finding that although the haciendas are owned and/or operated by Elizalde & Co.,
Inc., they are administered separately by different individuals; that each of the
plantations is big enough to be considered an employer unit; and that, the
petitioner union (ALU) counts memberships among all the employees of the five
plantations; the intervenor PAFLU, among the permanent employees of three
plantations, while intervenor CAILO has members only among the permanent
workers of one plantation.

It does not appear when the management received notice of this order, which is
dated August 20, 1964, but the records show that Elizalde & Co., Inc., filed a
motion for its reconsideration dated September 1, 1964, 1 complaining that to
require it to deal with ten small units virtually amounts to harassment of the
management. This motion was denied on September 12, 1964. It also appears on
record that in compliance with the August 20, 1964 — order of the Court,
certification elections were conducted by the Department of Labor on November
16, 18, 23, 24 and 25, 1964. And, following the results of these elections, the
Agrarian Court, on January 11, 1965 issued an order 2 certifying PAFLU as the sole
and exclusive bargaining representative of the permanent workers in Haciendas
Esperanza, Najalin and Balbina, while the Associated Labor Union was certified as
the bargaining agent of the temporary or seasonal workers in the same haciendas
Esperanza, Najalin and Balbina, as well as of all the workers (permanent and
seasonal) in hacienda Consuelo. No representative was certified for the workers
in hacienda Caiñaman, who returned "no-union" votes. On February 20, 1965,
Elizalde & Co., Inc., filed the present petition in this Court for the purpose already
stated at the beginning of this opinion.

Herein petitioner is taking an appeal from the orders of the Agrarian Court of
August 20, 1964, holding that there should be separate bargaining units for
permanent workers and seasonal workers, in each of the five sugar cane
plantations; from the order of September 12, 1964, denying its motion for
reconsideration; and from the order of January 11, 1965, certifying the unions
voted for in the certification elections conducted by the Department of Labor.

Under the Revised Rules of Court, any party may appeal from a final order, ruling
or decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations by filing with said tribunal a notice
of appeal and with this Court, the required number of petition for review or
certiorari, within 15 days (Secs. 1 and 4, Rule 43) from receipt of the order, ruling
or decision being contested.

The presumption that the first two orders have become executory for lack of
timely appeal is rendered conclusive, not only by the holding of the certification
elections on November 16, 18, 23, 24 and 25, 1964, but also by petitioner's failure
to state in the petition that the appeal from the aforesaid orders is made within
the period. 3 The appeal from the orders of August 20, 1964 and September 12,
1964, therefore, must be ruled out for being out of time.

Similarly, the appeal from the order of January 11, 1965 must be dismissed.
Petitioner, having been notified of this order on February 4, 1965, the filing of the
petition in this Court on February 20, 1965, was clearly beyond the 15-day
reglementary period.
But even assuming that the correctness and legality of the orders of November
1964 and January 11, 1965 could still be properly entertained by this Court, there
is nothing in the allegations of the petition that would justify reversal. It is well to
reiterate, in this connection, that the determination of what constitutes a proper
bargaining unit, like any other phase of certification proceedings, lies primarily in
the discretion of the trial Court, since no individual factor is given by law decisive
weight, and we see nothing that indicates arbitrariness or abuse of discretion by
the Court below. 4 Further, that each Hacienda has its separate administrator
strongly supports the orders complained of, as labor conflicts due to management
practices in one plantation will not necessarily involve the others.

Petitioner's claim of nullity of the certificate-order of January 11, 1965 is further

weakened in that it is premised on its main proposition that the designation of
separate bargaining units for the workers in the five sugar cane plantations is not
supported by law and existing jurisprudence. As the issue of the constitution of
appropriate bargaining units for the workers can no longer be passed upon, the
same having been barred by prescriptive limitations, besides being conformable
to law and jurisprudence, the attack against the certification-order necessarily
must fail.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby dismissed, without costs. So ordered.

2. Mechanical Dept. Labor Union sa Phil. National Railways v. CIR, L-28223,

Aug. 30, 1968
MECHANICAL DEPARTMENT LABOR UNION SA PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS,
petitioner, vs. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, and SAMAHAN NG MGA
MANGGAGAWA SA CALOOCAN SHOPS, respondents.

Sisenando Villaluz for petitioner.

Gregorio E. Fajardo for respondent Samahan ng mga Mangagawa sa Caloocan
Shops.

SYLLABUS

1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; INDUSTRIAL PEACE ACT; LABOR UNION;

FORMATION AND SEPARATION OF BARGAINING UNIT; APPLICATION OF GLOBE
DOCTRINE IS PREMATURE. — Under the "Globe doctrine" (Globe Machine &
Stamping Co., 3 NLRB 294) applied in Democratic Labor Union vs. Cebu
Stevedoring Co., L-10321, 28 February 1958, bargaining units may be formed
through separation of new units from existing ones whenever plebiscites had
shown the workers' desire to have their own representatives. In the case at bar,
the appeal of the Mechanical Department Labor Union, questioning the
applicability under the circumstances of the Globe doctrine of considering the will
of the employees in determining what union should represent them, is
premature, since the result of the ordered plebiscite among the workers of the
Caloocan Shops (who desire to form a new bargaining unit) may be adverse to the
formation of a separate unit, in which event, all questions raised in this case
would be rendered moot and academic.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW AND SEPARATE BARGAINING UNIT IN
ONE DEPARTMENT OF THE SAME COMPANY. — Appellant contends that the
application of the "Globe doctrine" is not warranted because the workers of the
Caloocan Shops (one of the four main divisions or units of the Mechanical
Department of the PNR) do not require different skills from the rest of the
workers in the Mechanical Department of the Railway Company. This question is
primarily one of fact. The Industrial Court has found that there is a basic
difference, in that those in the Caloocan shops not only have a community of
interest and working conditions but perform major repairs of railway rolling stock,
using heavy equipment and machineries found in said ships, while the others only
perform minor repairs. It is easy to understand, therefore, that the workers in the
Caloocan shops require special skill in the use of heavy equipment and machinery
sufficient to set them apart from the rest of the workers. In addition, the record
shows that the collective bargaining agreements negotiated by the appellant
union have been in existence for more than two (2) years; hence, such
agreements can not constitute a bar to the determination, by proper elections, of
a new bargaining representative.

3. ID.; ID.; COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS; COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

HAS DISCRETION IN MATTERS CONCERNING THE DETERMINATION OF
REPRESENTATION OF EMPLOYEE GROUPS; REASON THEREFOR. — Republic Act
No. 875 has primarily entrusted the prosecution of its policies to the Court of
Industrial Relations, and, in view of its intimate knowledge concerning the facts
and circumstances surrounding the cases brought before it, this Court has
repeatedly upheld the exercise of discretion of the Court of Industrial Relations in
matters concerning the representation of employee groups.

DECISION

REYES, J.B.L., J p:

Petition by the "Mechanical Department Labor Union sa PNR" for a review of an

order of the Court of Industrial Relations, in its Case No 1475-MC, directing the
holding of a plebiscite election to determine whether the employees at the
Caloocan Shops desire the respondent union, "Samahan ng Manggagawa sa
Caloocan Shops", to be separated from the Mechanical Department Labor Union,
with a view to the former being recognized as a separate bargaining unit.

The case began on 13 February 1965 by a petition of the respondent "Samahan ng

Manggagawa, etc." calling attention to the fact that there were three unions in
the Caloocan shops of the Philippine National Railways: the "Samahan", the
"Kapisanan ng Manggagawa sa Manila Railroad Company", and the Mechanical
Department Labor Union; that no certification election had been held in the last
12 months in the Caloocan shops; that both the "Samahan" and the Mechanical
Department Labor Union had submitted different labor demands upon the
management for which reason a certification election was needed to determine
the proper collective bargaining agency for the Caloocan shop workers.

The petition was opposed by the management as well as by the Mechanical

Department Labor Union, the latter averring that it had been previously certified
in two cases as sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the employees and laborers
of the PNR's mechanical department, and had negotiated two bargaining
agreements with management in 1961 and 1963; that before the expiration of the
latter, a renewal thereof had been negotiated and the contract remained to be
signed; that the "Samahan" had been organized only in 21 January 1965; that the
Caloocan shops unit was not established nor separated from the Mechanical
Department unit; that the "Samahan" is composed mainly of supervisors who had
filed a pending case to be declared non- supervisors; and that the purpose of the
petition was to disturb the present smooth working labor management relations.

By an order of 18 August 1967, Judge Arsenio Martinez, after receiving the

evidence, made the following findings:

"The Court, after a cursory examination of the evidence presented made the
following findings: That petitioner union is composed of workers exclusively at the
Caloocan shops of the Philippine National Railways charged with the maintenance
of rolling stocks for repairs; major repairs of locomotive, engines, etc. are done in
the Caloocan shops while minor ones in the Manila sheds; workers in the
Caloocan shops do not leave their station unlike Manila shop workers who go out
along the routes and lines for repairs; workers both in the Caloocan shops and
Manila sheds are exposed to hazards occasioned by the nature of their work; that
with respect to wages and salaries of employees, categories under the Job
Classification and Evaluation Plan of the company apply to all workers both in the
Caloocan shops and Manila sheds; administration over employees, members of
petitioner union as well as oppositor is under the Administrative Division of the
company; that from the very nature of their work, members of petitioner union
and other workers of the Mechanical Department have been under the coverage
of the current collective bargaining agreement which was a result of a
certification by this Court of the Mechanical Department Labor union, first in 1960
and later in 1963. Subsequently, when a latter contract expired, negotiations for
its renewal were had and at the time of the filing of this petition was already
consummated, the only act remaining to be done was to affix the signatures of
the parties thereto; that during the pendency of this petition, on June 14, 1965,
the aforesaid collective bargaining agreement was signed between the Philippine
National Railways and the Mechanical Department Labor Union sa Philippine
National Railways (Manila Railroad Company).

The main issue involved herein is: Whether or not a new unit should be
established, the Caloocan shops, separate and distinct from the rest of the
workers under the Mechanical Department now represented by the Mechanical
Department Labor Union.

The Caloocan Shops, all located at Caloocan City have 360 workers more or less. It
is part and parcel of the whole Mechanical Department of the Philippine National
Railways. The department is composed of four main divisions or units, namely:
Operations, Manila Area and Lines; Locomotive Crew; Motor Car Crew; and the
Shops Rolling Stocks Maintenance. (Exhibits "D" and "D-1").

The Locomotive Crew and Motor Car Crew, though part of the Mechanical
Department, is a separate unit, and is represented by the Union de Maquinistas,
Fogoneros Y Motormen. The workers under the other two main units of the
departments are represented by the Mechanical Department Labor Union. The
workers of the Shops Rolling Stocks Maintenance Division or the Caloocan Shops
now seek to be separated from the rest of the workers of the department and to
be represented by the "Samahan Ng Manggawa sa Caloocan Shops."
There is certainly a community of interest among the workers of the Caloocan
Shops. They are grouped in one place. They work under one or same working
condition, same working time or schedule and are exposed to same occupational
risk.

Though evidence on record shows that workers at the Caloocan Shops perform
the same nature of work as their counterparts in the Manila Shed, the difference
lies in the fact that workers at the Caloocan Shops perform major repairs of
locomotives, rolling stocks, engines, etc., while those in the Manila Shed, works
on minor repairs. Heavy equipment and machineries are found in the Caloocan
Shops."

The trial judge then reviewed the collective bargaining history of the Philippine
National Railways, as follows:

"On several similar instances, this Court allowed the establishment of new and
separate bargaining units in one company, even in one department of the same
company, despite the existence of the same facts and circumstances as obtaining
in the case at bar.

The history of the collective bargaining in the Manila Railroad Company, now the
Philippine National Railways shows that originally, there was only one bargaining
unit in the company, represented by the Kapisanan Ng Manggagawa sa MRR.
Under Case No. 237-MC, this Court ordered the establishment of two additional
units, the engine crew and the train crew to be represented by the Union de
Maquinistas, Fogoneros, Ayudante Y Motormen and Union de Empleados de
Trenes respectively. Then in 1961, under Cases Nos. 491-MC, 494-MC and 507-MC
three new separate units were established, namely, the yard crew unit, station
employees unit and engineering department employees unit, respectively, after
the employees concerned voted in a plebiscite conducted by the court for the
separation from existing bargaining units in the company. Then again, under Case
No. 763-MC, a new unit, composed of the Mechanical Department employees,
was established to be represented by the Mechanical Department Labor Union.
Incidentally, the first attempt of the employees of the Mechanical Department to
be separated as a unit was dismissed by this Court in Case No. 488-MC.

In the case of the yard crew, station employees and the Engineering Department
employees, the Supreme Court sustained the order of this Court in giving the
employees concerned the right to vote and decide whether or not they desire to
be separate units (See G.R. No. L-16292-94, L-16309 and L-16317-18, November,
1965)."

In view of its findings and the history of union representation in the railway
company, indicating that bargaining units had been formed through separation of
new units from existing ones whenever plebiscites had shown the workers' desire
to have their own representatives, and relying on the "Globe doctrine" (Globe
Machine & Stamping Co., 3 NLRB 294) applied in Democratic Labor Union vs. Cebu
Stevedoring Co., L-10321, 28 February 1958, Judge Martinez held that the
employees in the Caloocan Shops should be given a chance to vote on whether
their group should be separated from that represented by the Mechanical
Department Labor Union, and ordered a plebiscite held for the purpose. The
ruling was sustained by the Court en banc; wherefore, the Mechanical
Department Labor Union, appealed to this Court, questioning the applicability
under the circumstances of the "Globe doctrine" of considering the will of the
employees in determining what union should represent them.

Technically, this appeal is premature, since the result of the ordered plebiscite
among the workers of the Caloocan shops may be adverse to the formation of a
separate unit, in which event, as stated in the appealed order, all questions raised
in this case would be rendered moot and academic. Apparently, however, the
appellant Mechanical Department Labor Union takes it for granted that the
plebiscite would favor separation.
We find no grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of the ruling under appeal as
would justify our interfering with it. Republic Act No. 875 has primarily entrusted
the prosecution of its policies to the Court of Industrial Relations, and, in view of
its intimate knowledge concerning the facts and circumstances surrounding the
cases brought before it, this Court has repeatedly upheld the exercise of
discretion of the Court of Industrial Relations in matters concerning the
representation of employee groups (Manila Paper Mills Employees & Workers'
Association vs. C.I.R., 104 Phil. 10; Benguet Consolidated vs. Bobok Lumber Jack
Association, 103 Phil. 1150).

Appellant contends that the application of the "Globe doctrine" is not warranted
because the workers of the Caloocan shops do not require different skills from the
rest of the workers in the Mechanical Department of the Railway Company. This
question is primarily one of fact. The industrial Court has found that there is a
basic difference, in that those in the Caloocan shops not only have a community
of interest and working conditions but perform major repairs of railway rolling
stock, using heavy equipment and machineries found in said shops, while the
others only perform minor repairs. It is easy to understand, therefore, that the
workers in the Caloocan shops require special skill in the use of heavy equipment
and machinery sufficient to set them apart from the rest of the workers. In
addition, the record shows that the collective bargaining agreements negotiated
by the appellant union have been in existence for more than two (2) years; hence,
such agreements can not constitute a bar to the determination, by proper
elections, of a new bargaining representative (PLDT Employees' Union vs.
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co., 51 Off. Gaz., 4519).

As to the charge that some of the members of the appellee, "Samahan Ng

Manggagawa", are actually supervisors, it appears that the question of the status
of such members is still pending final decision; hence, it would not constitute a
legal obstacle to the holding of the plebiscite. At any rate, the appellant may later
question whether the votes of those ultimately declared to be supervisors should
be counted.
Whether or not the agreement negotiated by the appellant union with the
employer, during the pendency of the original petition in the Court of Industrial
Relations, should be considered valid and binding on the workers of the Caloocan
shops is a question that should be first passed upon by the Industrial Court.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the order appealed from is affirmed, with costs
against appellant Mechanical Department Labor Union sa Philippine National
Railways.

3. Philippine Land-Air Sea Labor Union v. CIR, et. al. G.R. No. L-14656, Nov.
29, 1960

PHILIPPINE LAND-AIR-SEA LABOR UNION (PLASLU), petitioner, vs. COURT

OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, ET AL., respondents.

Emilio Lumontad for petitioner.

Simeon S. Andres for respondent CIR.

Severino, Ferrer, Revira & Benigno for respondent AWA.

Hilado & Hilado for respondent San Carlos Milling Co.

SYLLABUS

LABOR LAWS; BARGAINING AGREEMENT; BASIC TEST OF A BARGAINING

UNIT'S ACCEPTABILITY. — The most efficacious bargaining unit is one which
is compromised of constituents enjoying a community or mutuality of
interest. This is so because the basic test of bargaining unit's acceptability is
whether it will be best secure to all employees the exercise of their
collective bargaining rights. Hence, piece workers employed on casual or
day to day basis who do not have reasonable basis for continued or
renewed employment for any appreciable time, cannot be considered to
have such mutuality of interest as to justify their inclusion in a bargaining
unit composed of permanent or regular employees.

DECISION

GUTIERREZ DAVID, J p:

This is a petition to review on certiorari an order of the Court of Industrial

Relations in Case No. 38 MC-Cebu certifying the Allied Workers' Association
of the Philippines, San Carlos Chapter, as the sole collective bargaining
representative of the employees of the San Carlos Milling Co., Inc.

The record shows that in Case No. 38 MC-Cebu the Industrial Court on May
25, 1956 ordered the holding of certification election to determine which of
the two contending labor unions therein, herein petitioner Philippine Land-
Air-Sea Labor Union (PLASLU) or respondent Allied Workers' Association of
the Philippines (AWA), shall be the sole collective bargaining agent of the
employees of the San Carlos Milling Co. The pertinent portions of the
court's order read as follows:

"Considering the history of bargaining relations in this case where there has
only been one bargaining unit, and for purposes of effectuating the policies
of the Act, the same should be maintained. In other words, the appropriate
bargaining unit is the Employer unit composed of 602 employees including
some 200 piece work (pakiao) workers and stevedores appearing in the
Employer's payrolls during the milling and off season minus the alleged
laborers and operators of farm tractors who are hired and paid by the sugar
cane planters. (Italics supplied.)

"All the foregoing considered, the Court hereby directs the Department of
Labor to conduct a certification election in the premises of the San Carlos
Milling Company, Ltd. at San Carlos Negros Occidental for the purpose of
determining, under existing rules and regulations on the matter, which of
the two (2) contending labor unions herein, the PLASLU or the AWA shall be
the sole collective bargaining agent in accordance with the provisions of the
Act. The Employer is hereby ordered to submit a list of employees
appearing in its payroll during the milling season for the year 1955 to the
Department of Labor which, together with the 'Exhibit X-Court' now part of
the records of this case shall be used as the list of eligible voters minus
employees who are performing functions of supervisors and security guards
who are excluded from participating in said election. (Italics supplied.)

"SO ORDERED."

Prior to the holding of the election, respondent AWA filed an urgent motion
to exclude 144 employees from participating in the election. The motion,
however, was denied, the Industrial Court holding that the workers sought
to be excluded were eligible to vote since they were actual employees of
good standing of the respondent company during the milling season of
1955 and were included in the company's payroll as of that date.

On September 21, 1956, the certification election was held in the premises
of the San Carlos Milling Co., PLASLU receiving 88 votes while AWA
garnered 149, with 390 ballots recorded as challenged, 242 of them by the
petitioner PLASLU and 142 by the respondent AWA. Within 72 hours after
the closing of the election, as required by the Rules for Certification
Election, AWA filed with the Industrial Court a petition contesting the
election on the ground of the ineligibility of the voters who cast the 148
ballots it challenged. Said respondent AWA also alleged that the 242 ballots
challenged by PLASLU were cast by legitimate employees of the company,
as they were the votes of "piece work (pakiao) workers and stevedores
appearing in the employer's payroll during the milling and off-season" of
1955. PLASLU, on the other hand, in an urgent motion filed on October 4,
1956, questioned the validity of the 242 ballots cast by the stevedores and
piece workers. The motion was opposed by AWA on the ground that as a
protest of the election it was filed late. The Industrial Court, however,
considered the same as an answer to AWA's petition, and on September 4,
1957, after hearing the arguments of the parties, ordered that all the 390
challenged ballots be opened and canvassed and the corresponding votes
added to those already credited to the contending labor unions. PLASLU
moved for reconsideration of the order but the motion was denied and
pursuant to said order the challenged ballots were opened. After the
canvass, 148 votes challenged by AWA were counted in favor of PLASLU. Of
the 242 votes challenged by PLASLU, 3 were counted in its favor, 228
credited in favor of AWA, and 11 declared either for no union or spoiled
ballots. Adding the votes to the results of the certification election, the final
count showed that the respondent AWA garnered a total of 377 votes on
against 239 for PLASLU. Accordingly, said respondent was certified by the
Industrial Court in its order dated March 12, 1958 as the sole collective
bargaining agent of the employees of the San Carlos Milling Co. As its
motion for reconsideration of the order was denied by the court en banc —
with Judge Feliciano Tabigne dissenting — the petitioner PLASLU filed the
present petition for review, contending that the Industrial Court erred in
not excluding the 242 votes challenged by it from the total number of votes
credited to respondent AWA.

We find petitioner's contention to be meritorious.

In the order of May 25, 1956 authorizing the certification election, the trial
judge of the Industrial Court directed that the "list of employees appearing
in its payroll during milling season for the year 1955 . . . together with the
Exhibit 'X-Court' now part of the records of this case shall be used as the list
of eligible voters minus employees who are performing functions of
supervisors and security guards who are excluded from participating in said
election." It being disputed that the challenged votes were cast by casual
employees consisting of stevedores and piece workers who — as stated by
Judge Tabigne in his dissent — "were not included in the list of employees
appearing in the payroll of the company during the milling season for the
year 1955 nor did they appear in the Exhibit 'X-Court' which formed portion
of the list of personnel allowed to vote in said certification election", the
said challenged votes should have been excluded. Citing the declaration of
the Industrial Court that the appropriate bargaining unit is the employer's
unit composed of 602 employees, including the piece workers and
stevedores whose votes were challenged by PLASLU, the respondent AWA
argues that the challenged votes were cast by employees eligible to vote. It
will be noted, however, that these employees whose votes were challenged
were hired on temporary or casual basis and had work of a different nature
from those of the laborers permitted to vote in the certification election. In
the case of Democratic Labor Union vs. Cebu Stevedoring Co., Inc., et al.
(G.R. No. L-10321, February 28, 1958) this Court had occasion to rule that in
the determination of the proper constituency of a collective bargaining
unit, certain factors must be considered, among them, the employment
status of the employees to be affected, that is to say, the positions and
categories of work to which they belong, and the unity of employees'
interest such as substantial similarity of work and duties. The most
efficacious bargaining unit is one which is comprised of constituents
enjoying a community or mutuality of interest. And this is so because the
basic test of a bargaining unit's acceptability is whether it will be best
assure to all employees the exercise of their collective bargaining rights.
(See also Alhambra Cigar & Cigarette Manufacturing Co. vs. Alhambra
Employees' Association, 107 Phil., 23.) It appearing that the 242 stevedores
and piece workers, whose votes have been challenged, were employed on
a casual or day to day basis and have no reasonable basis for continued or
renewed employment for any appreciable substantial time — not to
mention the nature of work they perform — they cannot be considered to
have such mutuality of interest as to justify their inclusion in a bargaining
unit composed of permanent or regular employees.

There is nothing to the contention that the order complained of is merely

complementary to the order of the Industrial Court dated September 4,
1957, which has become final and executory the same not having been
appealed. It will be observed that the said order of September 4, 1957
merely ordered the opening and canvassing of the challenged ballots. Any
appeal taken from said order would therefore have been premature.

Disregarding the votes cast by the stevedores and piece workers which
were counted in favor of the respondent AWA, the final results of the
 certification election show that the petitioner PLASLU garnered a majority
of the votes cast by eligible voters. Consequently, said petitioner should be
certified as the sole collective bargaining representative of the employees
of the San Carlos Milling Co.

Wherefore, the order complained of is reversed and the petitioner PLASLU

is hereby certified as the collective bargaining agent of the employees of
the San Carlos Milling Company. Without costs.

4. San Miguel Corporation Supervisors v. Laguesma, G.R. No. 110399, Aug.

15, 1997

SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION SUPERVISORS AND EXEMPT UNION AND

ERNESTO L. PONCE, President, petitioners,vs.HONORABLE BIENVENIDO E.
LAGUESMA IN HIS CAPACITY AS UNDERSECRETARY OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT, HONORABLE DANILO L. REYNANTE IN HIS CAPACITY AS
MED-ARBITER AND SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION, respondents.

Benigno I. Vivar, Jr.for petitioners.

Siguion Reyna Montecillo & Ongsiako for private respondent.

SYNOPSIS

This is a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for the issuance of preliminary
injunction filed by petitioner San Miguel Corporation Supervisors and
Exempt Union seeking to reverse and set aside the Order of public
respondent Undersecretary of the Department of Labor and Employment
Bienvenido Laguesma excluding the employees under supervisory levels 3
and 4 and the so-called exempt employees from the proposed bargaining
unit and ruled out their participation in the certification election. The
questioned order declared that Supervisory 3 and 4 and the so-called
exempt employees are confidential employees and therefore they are not
allowed to form, join or assist a labor union for purposes of collective
bargaining. Consequently, they are not allowed to participate in the
certification election. In the instant case, petitioners posed the issue of
whether or not supervisory employees 3 and 4 and the exempt employees
fall under the category of "confidential employees" and if not, do the
employees of the three plants constitute one single bargaining unit.

The Supreme Court ruled that petitioner employees do not fall within the
term confidential employees who may be prohibited from joining the
union. In the case at bar, supervisors 3 and above may not be considered
confidential employees merely because they handle confidential data. They
must first be strictly classified as pertaining to labor relations for them to
fall under said restrictions. Clearly, the informations they handle are
properly classifiable as technical and internal business operation data which
has no relevance to negotiations and settlement of grievances wherein the
interests of a union and the management are invariably adversarial.
Furthermore, even assuming that they are confidential employees,
jurisprudence has established that there is no legal prohibition against
confidential employees who are not performing managerial function to
form and join a union. Anent the issue of employees of the three plants
constitute one single bargaining unit, the Court has held that petitioner's
contention is meritorious. It is readily seen that the employees in the
instant case have community or mutuality of interest, which is the standard
in determining the proper constituency of a collective bargaining
agreement. The fact that three plants are located in different places is
immaterial. Geographical location can be completely disregarded if the
communal or mutual interests of the employees are not sacrificed.
Accordingly, the Court set aside the assailed order and the order of the
Med-Arbiter is reinstated.

SYLLABUS

1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; LABOR CODE; LABOR RELATIONS;

CONFIDENTIAL EMPLOYEES, DEFINED. — Confidential employees are those
who (1) assist or act in a confidential capacity, (2) to persons who
formulate, determine, and effectuate management policies in the field of
labor relations. The two criteria are cumulative, and both must be met if an
employee is to be considered a confidential employee — that is, the
confidential relationship must exist between the employee and his
supervisor, and the supervisor must handle the prescribed responsibilities
relating to labor relations. SDTaHc

2. ID.;ID.;ID.;"CONFIDENTIAL EMPLOYEE RULE";CONSTRUED. — The

exclusion from bargaining units of employees who, in the normal course of
their duties, become aware of management policies relating to labor
relations is a principal objective sought to be accomplished by the
"confidential employee rule." The broad rationale behind this rule is that
employees should not be placed in a position involving a potential conflict
of interests."Management should not be required to handle labor relations
matters through employees who are represented by the union with which
the company is required to deal and who in the normal performance of
their duties may obtain advance information of the company's position
with regard to contract negotiations, the disposition of grievances, or other
labor relations matters." An important element of the "confidential
employee rule" is the employee's need to use labor relations information.
Thus, in determining the confidentiality of certain employees, a key
question frequently considered is the employees' necessary access to
confidential labor relations information. "Access to information which is
regarded by the employer to be confidential from the business standpoint,
such as financial information or technical trade secrets, will not render an
employee a confidential employee." As held in Westinghouse Electric
Corporation v. National Labor Relations Board, [(CA6) 398 P2d 669 (1968)]
"an employee may not be excluded from appropriate bargaining unit
merely because he has access to confidential information concerning
employer's internal business operations and which is not related to the
field of labor relations." It must be borne in mind that Section 3 of Article
XIII of the 1987 Constitution mandates the State to guarantee to "all"
workers the right to self-organization. Hence, confidential employees who
may be excluded from bargaining unit must be strictly defined so as not to
needlessly deprive many employees of their right to bargain collectively
through representatives of their choosing.
3. ID.;ID.;ID.;LABOR ORGANIZATION; INELIGIBILITY OF MANAGERIAL
EMPLOYEES TO JOIN THEREOF; NOT APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR. — There
is no question that the employees of San Miguel Corporation Magnolia
Poultry Products Plants of Cabuyao, San Fernando and Otis, supervisors and
exempt employees, are not vested with the powers and prerogatives to lay
down and execute management policies and/or to hire, transfer, suspend,
layoff, recall, discharge or dismiss employees. They are, therefore, not
qualified to be classified as managerial employees who, under Article 245
of the Labor Code, are not eligible to join, assist or form any labor
organization. In the very same provision, they are not allowed membership
in a labor organization of the rank-and-file employees but may join, assist
or form separate labor organizations of their own.

4. ID.;ID.;ID.;APPROPRIATE BARGAINING UNIT; DEFINED. — An appropriate

bargaining unit may be defined as "a group of employees of a given
employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of employees,
which the collective interest of all the employees, consistent with equity to
the employer, indicate to be best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and
duties of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the law."

5. ID.;ID.;ID.;ID.;STANDARD IN DETERMINING PROPER CONSTITUENCY

THEREOF; PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. — A unit to be appropriate must effect
a grouping of employees who have substantial, mutual interests in wages,
hours, working conditions and other subjects of collective bargaining. It is
readily seen that the employees in the instant case have "community or
mutuality of interests," which is the standard in determining the proper
constituency of a collective bargaining unit. It is undisputed that they all
belong to the Magnolia Poultry Division of San Miguel Corporation. This
means that, although they belong to three different plants, they perform
work of the same nature, receive the same wages and compensation, and
most importantly, share a common stake in concerted activities. The fact
that the three plants are located in three different places, namely, in
Cabuyao, Laguna, in Otis, Pandacan, Metro Manila, and in San Fernando,
Pampanga is immaterial. Geographical location can be completely
disregarded if the communal or mutual interests of the employees are not
sacrificed. The distance among the three plants is not productive of
insurmountable difficulties in the administration of union affairs. Neither
are there regional differences that are likely to impede the operations of a
single bargaining representative.

DECISION

ROMERO, J p:

This is a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for the Issuance of Preliminary
Injunction seeking to reverse and set aside the Order of public respondent,
Undersecretary of the Department of Labor and Employment, Bienvenido
E. Laguesma, dated March 11, 1993, in Case No. OS MA A-2-70-91 1
entitled "In Re: Petition for Certification Election Among the Supervisory
and Exempt Employees of the San Miguel Corporation Magnolia Poultry
Products Plants of Cabuyao, San Fernando and Otis, San Miguel Corporation
Supervisors and Exempt Union, Petitioner." The Order excluded the
employees under supervisory levels 3 and 4 and the so-called exempt
employees from the proposed bargaining unit and ruled out their
participation in the certification election. LexLib

The antecedent facts are undisputed:

On October 5, 1990, petitioner union filed before the Department of Labor

and Employment (DOLE) a Petition for Direct Certification or Certification
Election among the supervisors and exempt employees of the SMC
Magnolia Poultry Products Plants of Cabuyao, San Fernando and Otis.

On December 19, 1990, Med-Arbiter Danilo L. Reynante issued an Order

ordering the conduct of certification election among the supervisors and
exempt employees of the SMC Magnolia Poultry Products Plants of
Cabuyao, San Fernando and Otis as one bargaining unit.
On January 18, 1991, respondent San Miguel Corporation filed a Notice of
Appeal with Memorandum on Appeal, pointing out, among others, the
Med-Arbiter's error in grouping together all three (3) separate plants, Otis,
Cabuyao and San Fernando, into one bargaining unit, and in including
supervisory levels 3 and above whose positions are confidential in nature.

On July 23, 1991, the public respondent, Undersecretary Laguesma,

granted respondent company's Appeal and ordered the remand of the case
to the Med-Arbiter of origin for determination of the true classification of
each of the employees sought to be included in the appropriate bargaining
unit.

Upon petitioner-union's motion dated August 7, 1991, Undersecretary

Laguesma granted the reconsideration prayed for on September 3, 1991
and directed the conduct of separate certification elections among the
supervisors ranked as supervisory levels 1 to 4 (S1 to S4) and the exempt
employees in each of the three plants at Cabuyao, San Fernando and Otis.

On September 21, 1991, respondent company, San Miguel Corporation

filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to suspend proceedings.

On March 11, 1993, an Order was issued by the public respondent granting
the Motion, citing the doctrine enunciated in Philips Industrial
Development, Inc. v. NLRC 2 case. Said Order reads in part:

"...Confidential employees, like managerial employees, are not allowed to

form, join or assist a labor union for purposes of collective bargaining.

In this case, S3 and S4 Supervisors and the so-called exempt employees are
admittedly confidential employees and therefore, they are not allowed to
form, join or assist a labor union for purposes of collective bargaining
following the above court's ruling. Consequently, they are not allowed to
participate in the certification election.
WHEREFORE, the Motion is hereby granted and the Decision of this Office
dated 03 September 1991 is hereby modified to the extent that employees
under supervisory levels 3 and 4 (S3 and S4) and the so-called exempt
employees are not allowed to join the proposed bargaining unit and are
therefore excluded from those who could participate in the certification
election." 3

Hence this petition.

For resolution in this case are the following issues:

1. Whether Supervisory employees 3 and 4 and the exempt employees of

the company are considered confidential employees, hence ineligible from
joining a union.

2. If they are not confidential employees, do the employees of the three

plants constitute an appropriate single bargaining unit.

On the first issue, this Court rules that said employees do not fall within the
term "confidential employees" who may be prohibited from joining a
union.

There is no question that the said employees, supervisors and the exempt
employees, are not vested with the powers and prerogatives to lay down
and execute management policies and/or to hire, transfer, suspend, layoff,
recall, discharge or dismiss employees. They are, therefore, not qualified to
be classified as managerial employees who, under Article 245 4 of the Labor
Code, are not eligible to join, assist or form any labor organization. In the
very same provision, they are not allowed membership in a labor
organization of the rank-and-file employees but may join, assist or form
separate labor organizations of their own. The only question that need be
addressed is whether these employees are properly classified as
confidential employees or not.
Confidential employees are those who (1) assist or act in a confidential
capacity, (2) to persons who formulate, determine, and effectuate
management policies in the field of labor relations. 5 The two criteria are
cumulative, and both must be met if an employee is to be considered a
confidential employee — that is, the confidential relationship must exist
between the employee and his supervisor, and the supervisor must handle
the prescribed responsibilities relating to labor relations. 6

The exclusion from bargaining units of employees who, in the normal

course of their duties, become aware of management policies relating to
labor relations is a principal objective sought to be accomplished by the
"confidential employee rule." The broad rationale behind this rule is that
employees should not be placed in a position involving a potential conflict
of interests. 7 "Management should not be required to handle labor
relations matters through employees who are represented by the union
with which the company is required to deal and who in the normal
performance of their duties may obtain advance information of the
company's position with regard to contract negotiations, the disposition of
grievances, or other labor relations matters." 8

There have been ample precedents in this regard, thus in Bulletin

Publishing Company v. Hon. Augusto Sanchez, 9 the Court held that "if
these managerial employees would belong to or be affiliated with a Union,
the latter might not be assured of their loyalty to the Union in view of
evident conflict of interest. The Union can also become company-
dominated with the presence of managerial employees in Union
membership." The same rationale was applied to confidential employees in
"Golden Farms, Inc. v. Ferrer-Calleja" 10 and in the more recent case of
"Philips Industrial Development, Inc. v. NLRC " 11 which held that
confidential employees, by the very nature of their functions, assist and act
in a confidential capacity to, or have access to confidential matters of,
person who exercise managerial functions in the field of labor relations.
Therefore, the rationale behind the ineligibility of managerial employees to
form, assist or join a labor union was held equally applicable to them. 12
An important element of the "confidential employee rule" is the
employee's need to use labor relations information. Thus, in determining
the confidentiality of certain employees, a key question frequently
considered is the employees' necessary access to confidential labor
relations information. 13

It is the contention of respondent corporation that Supervisory employees

3 and 4 and the exempt employees come within the meaning of the term
"confidential employees" primarily because they answered in the
affirmative when asked "Do you handle confidential data or documents?" in
the Position Questionnaires submitted by the Union. 14 In the same
questionnaire, however, it was also stated that the confidential information
handled by questioned employees relate to product formulation, product
standards and product specification which by no means relate to "labor
relations." 15

Granting arguendo that an employee has access to confidential labor

relations information but such is merely incidental to his duties and
knowledge thereof is not necessary in the performance of such duties, said
access does not render the employee a confidential employee. 16 "If access
to confidential labor relations information is to be a factor in the
determination of an employee's confidential status, such information must
relate to the employer's labor relations policies. Thus, an employee of a
labor union, or of a management association, must have access to
confidential labor relations information with respect to his employer, the
union, or the association, to be regarded a confidential employee, and
knowledge of labor relations information pertaining to the companies with
which the union deals, or which the association represents, will not cause
an employee to be excluded from the bargaining unit representing
employees of the union or association." 17 "Access to information which is
regarded by the employer to be confidential from the business standpoint,
such as financial information 18 or technical trade secrets, will not render
an employee a confidential employee." 19

Herein listed are the functions of supervisors 3 and higher:

1. To undertake decisions to discontinue/temporarily stop shift operations
when situations require.

2. To effectively oversee the quality control function at the processing lines

in the storage of chicken and other products.

3. To administer efficient system of evaluation of products in the outlets.

4. To be directly responsible for the recall, holding and rejection of direct

manufacturing materials.

5. To recommend and initiate actions in the maintenance of sanitation and

hygiene throughout the plant. 20

It is evident that whatever confidential data the questioned employees may

handle will have to relate to their functions. From the foregoing functions,
it can be gleaned that the confidential information said employees have
access to concern the employer's internal business operations. As held in
Westinghouse Electric Corporation v. National Labor Relations Board, 21
"an employee may not be excluded from appropriate bargaining unit
merely because he has access to confidential information concerning
employer's internal business operations and which is not related to the
field of labor relations." cdrep

It must be borne in mind that Section 3 of Article XIII of the 1987

Constitution mandates the State to guarantee to "all" workers the right to
self-organization. Hence, confidential employees who may be excluded
from bargaining unit must be strictly defined so as not to needlessly
deprive many employees of their right to bargain collectively through
representatives of their choosing. 22

In the case at bar, supervisors 3 and above may not be considered

confidential employees merely because they handle "confidential data" as
such must first be strictly classified as pertaining to labor relations for them
to fall under said restrictions. The information they handle are properly
classifiable as technical and internal business operations data which, to our
mind, has no relevance to negotiations and settlement of grievances
wherein the interests of a union and the management are invariably
adversarial. Since the employees are not classifiable under the confidential
type, this Court rules that they may appropriately form a bargaining unit for
purposes of collective bargaining. Furthermore, even assuming that they
are confidential employees, jurisprudence has established that there is no
legal prohibition against confidential employees who are not performing
managerial functions to form and join a union. 23

In this connection, the issue of whether the employees of San Miguel

Corporation Magnolia Poultry Products Plants of Cabuyao, San Fernando,
and Otis constitute a single bargaining unit needs to be threshed out.

It is the contention of the petitioner union that the creation of three (3)
separate bargaining units, one each for Cabuyao, Otis and San Fernando as
ruled by the respondent Undersecretary, is contrary to the one-company,
one-union policy. It adds that Supervisors level 1 to 4 and exempt
employees of the three plants have a similarity or a community of interests.

This Court finds the contention of the petitioner meritorious.

An appropriate bargaining unit may be defined as "a group of employees of

a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of
employees, which the collective interest of all the employees, consistent
with equity to the employer, indicate to be best suited to serve the
reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining
provisions of the law." 24

A unit to be appropriate must effect a grouping of employees who have

substantial, mutual interests in wages, hours, working conditions and other
subjects of collective bargaining. 25
It is readily seen that the employees in the instant case have "community or
mutuality of interests," which is the standard in determining the proper
constituency of a collective bargaining unit. 26 It is undisputed that they all
belong to the Magnolia Poultry Division of San Miguel Corporation. This
means that, although they belong to three different plants, they perform
work of the same nature, receive the same wages and compensation, and
most importantly, share a common stake in concerted activities.

In light of these considerations, the Solicitor General has opined that

separate bargaining units in the three different plants of the division will
fragmentize the employees of the said division, thus greatly diminishing
their bargaining leverage. Any concerted activity held against the private
respondent for a labor grievance in one bargaining unit will, in all
probability, not create much impact on the operations of the private
respondent. The two other plants still in operation can well step up their
production and make up for the slack caused by the bargaining unit
engaged in the concerted activity. This situation will clearly frustrate the
provisions of the Labor Code and the mandate of the Constitution. 27

The fact that the three plants are located in three different places, namely,
in Cabuyao, Laguna, in Otis, Pandacan, Metro Manila, and in San Fernando,
Pampanga is immaterial. Geographical location can be completely
disregarded if the communal or mutual interests of the employees are not
sacrificed as demonstrated in UP v. Calleja-Ferrer where all non-academic
rank and file employees of the University of the Philippines in Diliman,
Quezon City, Padre Faura, Manila, Los Baños, Laguna and the Visayas were
allowed to participate in a certification election. We rule that the distance
among the three plants is not productive of insurmountable difficulties in
the administration of union affairs. Neither are there regional differences
that are likely to impede the operations of a single bargaining
representative.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Order of March 11, 1993 is hereby SET ASIDE and
the Order of the Med-Arbiter on December 19, 1990 is REINSTATED under
which a certification election among the supervisors (level 1 to 4) and
 exempt employees of the San Miguel Corporation Magnolia Poultry
Products Plants of Cabuyao, San Fernando, and Otis as one bargaining unit
is ordered conducted. cdphil

SO ORDERED.

5. UP v. Calleja-Ferrer

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. PURA FERRER-

CALLEJA, Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations, Department of Labor
and Employment, and THE ALL U.P. WORKERS' UNION, represented by its
President, Rosario del Rosario, respondents.

U .P . Office of Legal Services for petitioner.

Ruben C . Carranza, Jr . for private respondent All-U.P. Workers Union.

SYLLABUS

1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; LABOR LAWS; EXECUTIVE ORDER NO.

180; "HIGH-LEVEL EMPLOYEES," DEFINED; PROFESSORS, ASSOCIATE
PROFESSORS, ASSISTANT PROFESSORS, NOT INCLUDED. — In light of
Executive Order No. 180 and its implementing rules, as well as the
University's charter and relevant regulations, the professors, associate
professors and assistant professors (hereafter simply referred to as
professors) cannot be considered as exercising such managerial or highly
confidential functions as would justify their being categorized as "high-level
employees" of the institution.

2. ID.; ID.; EMPLOYMENT; SUPERVISOR OR MANAGERIAL EMPLOYEE;

POWER TO RECOMMEND MUST NOT ONLY BE EFFECTIVE BUT ALSO
REQUIRE THE EXERCISE OF INDEPENDENT JUDGMENT. — In Franklin Baker
Company of the Philippines vs. Trajano, this Court reiterated the principle
laid down in National Merchandising Corp. vs. Court of Industrial Relations,
that the power to recommend, in order to qualify an employee as a
supervisor or managerial employee "must not only be effective but the
exercise of such authority should not be merely of a routinary or clerical
nature but should require the use of independent judgment." Where such
recommendatory powers, as in the case at bar, are subject to evaluation,
review and final action by the department heads and other higher
executives of the company, the same, although present, are not effective
and not an exercise of independent judgment as required by law.

3. ID.; ID.; EXECUTIVE ORDER 180; "POLICY DETERMINING," TEST IN

SEGREGATING RANK AND FILE EMPLOYEES FROM MANAGEMENT. —
Executive Order No. 180 is a law concerning public sector unionism. It must
therefore be construed within that context. Within that context, the
University of the Philippines represents the government as an employer.
'Policy-determining' refers to policy-determination in university matters
that affect those same matters that may be the subject of negotiation
between public sector management and labor. The reason why 'policy-
determining' has been laid down as a test in segregating rank-and-file from
management is to ensure that those who lay down policies in areas that are
still negotiable in public sector collective bargaining do not themselves
become part of those employees who seek to change these policies for
their collective welfare.

4. ID.; ID.; LABOR RELATIONS; BARGAINING UNIT; CONSTRUED. — A

"bargaining unit" has been defined as a group of employees of a given
employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of employees,
which the collective interest of all the employees, consistent with equity to
the employer, indicate to be the best suited to serve the reciprocal rights
and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the
law.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; COLLECTIVE BARGAINING UNIT; NO SPECIFIC GUIDELINE FOR

DETERMINATION THEREOF. — Our labor laws do not however provide the
criteria for determining the proper collective bargaining unit. Apart from
the single descriptive word "appropriate," in Section 12 of the Industrial
Peace Act which was subsequently incorporated into the Labor Code with
minor changes, no specific guide for determining the proper collective
bargaining unit can be found in the statutes. Case law fortunately furnishes
some guidelines.

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; MUTUALITY OF INTEREST TEST; BASIC TEST IN THE

DETERMINATION OF THE APPROPRIATE BARGAINING UNIT. — The basic
test in determining the appropriate bargaining unit is that a unit, to be
appropriate, must affect a grouping of employees who have substantial,
mutual interests in wages, hours, working conditions and other subjects of
collective bargaining (citing Smith on Labor Laws, 316-317; Francisco, Labor
Laws, 162). . . . The Court further explained that "(t)he test of the grouping
is community or mutuality of interests. And this is so because the basic test
of an asserted bargaining unit's acceptability is whether or not it is
fundamentally the combination which will best assure to all employees the
exercise of their collective bargaining rights' (Rothenberg on Labor
Relations, 490)."

7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ABSENCE OF MUTUALITY OF INTERESTS NEGATES

FORMATION OF A SINGLE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING UNIT; CASE AT BAR. —
In the case at bar, the University employees may quite easily be categorized
into two general classes: one, the group composed of employees whose
functions are non-academic, i.e., janitors, messengers, typists, clerks,
receptionists, carpenters, electricians, ground-keepers, chauffeurs,
mechanics, plumbers; and two, the group made up of those performing
academic functions, i.e., full professors, associate professors, assistant
professors, instructors — who may be judges or government executives —
and research, extension and professional staff. Not much reflection is
needed to perceive that the community or mutuality of interests which
justifies the formation of a single collective bargaining unit is wanting
between the academic and non-academic personnel of the university. It
would seem obvious that teachers would find very little in common with
the University clerks and other non-academic employees as regards
responsibilities and functions, working conditions, compensation rates,
social life and interests, skills and intellectual pursuits, cultural activities,
etc. On the contrary, the dichotomy of interests, the dissimilarity in the
nature of the work and duties as well as in the compensation and working
conditions of the academic and non-academic personnel dictate the
separation of these two categories of employees for purposes of collective
bargaining. The formation of two separate bargaining units, the first
consisting of the rank-and-file non-academic personnel, and the second, of
the rank-and-file academic employees, is the set-up that will best assure to
all the employees the exercise of their collective bargaining rights. These
special circumstances, i.e., the dichotomy of interests and concerns as well
as the dissimilarity in the nature and conditions of work, wages and
compensation between the academic and non-academic personnel, bring
the case at bar within the exception contemplated in Section 9 of Executive
Order No. 180.

DECISION

NARVASA, C. J p:

In this special civil action of certiorari the University of the Philippines seeks
the nullification of the Order dated October 30, 1990 of Director Pura
Ferrer-Calleja of the Bureau of Labor Relations holding that "professors,
associate professors and assistant professors (of the University of the
Philippines) are . . . rank-and-file employees . . . ;" consequently, they
should, together with the so-called non-academic, non-teaching, and all
other employees of the University, be represented by only one labor
organization. 1 The University is joined in this undertaking by the Solicitor
General who "has taken a position not contrary to that of petitioner and, in
fact, has manifested . . . that he is not opposing the petition . . . ." 2

The case 3 was initiated in the Bureau of Labor Relations by a petition filed
on March 2, 1990 by a registered labor union, the "Organization of Non-
Academic Personnel of UP" (ONAPUP). 4 Claiming to have a membership of
3,236 members — comprising more than 33% of the 9,617 persons
constituting the non-academic personnel of UP-Diliman, Los Baños, Manila,
and Visayas, it sought the holding of a certification election among all said
non-academic employees of the University of the Philippines. At a
conference thereafter held on March 22, 1990 in the Bureau, the University
stated that it had no objection to the election.

On April 18, 1990, another registered labor union, the "All UP Workers'
Union," 5 filed a comment, as intervenor in the certification election
proceeding. Alleging that its membership covers both academic and non-
academic personnel, and that it aims to unite all UP rank-and-file
employees in one union, it declared its assent to the holding of the election
provided the appropriate organizational unit was first clearly defined. It
observed in this connection that the Research, Extension and Professorial
Staff (REPS), who are academic non-teaching personnel, should not be
deemed part of the organization unit. llcd

For its part, the University, through its General Counsel, 6 made of record
its view that there should be two (2) unions: one for academic, the other
for non-academic or administrative, personnel considering the dichotomy
of interests, conditions and rules governing these employee groups.

Director Calleja ruled on the matter on August 7, 1990. 7 She declared that
"the appropriate organization unit . . . should embrace all that regular rank-
and-file employees, teaching and non-teaching, of the University of the
Philippines, including all its branches" and that there was no sufficient
evidence "to justify the grouping of the non-academic or administrative
personnel into an organization unit apart and distinct from that of the
academic or teaching personnel." Director Calleja adverted to Section 9 of
Executive Order No. 180, viz.:

"SEC. 9. The appropriate organizational unit shall be the employer unit

consisting of rank-and-file employees, unless circumstances otherwise
require."

and Section 1, Rule IV of the Rules Implementing said EO 180 (as amended
by Sec. 2, Resolution of Public Sector Labor Management Council dated
May 14, 1989), viz.:
xxx xxx xxx

"For purposes of registration, an appropriate organizational unit may refer

to:

xxx xxx xxx

d. State universities or colleges, government-owned or controlled

corporations with original charters."

She went on to say that the general intent of EO 180 was "not to
fragmentize the employer unit, as "can be gleaned from the definition of
the term "accredited employees' organization," which refers to:

". . . a registered organization of the rank-and-file employees as defined in

these rules recognized to negotiate for the employees in an organizational
unit headed by an officer with sufficient authority to bind the agency, such
as . . . states colleges and universities."

The Director thus commanded that a certification election be "conducted

among rank-and-file employees, teaching and non-teaching" in all four
autonomous campuses of the UP, and that management appear and bring
copies of the corresponding payrolls for January, June, and July, 1990 at the
"usual pre-election conference . . . ." LibLex

At the pre-election conference held on March 22, 1990 at the Labor

Organizations Division of the DOLE, 8 the University sought further
clarification of the coverage of the term, "rank-and-file" personnel,
asserting that not every employee could properly be embraced within both
teaching and non-teaching categories since there are those whose positions
are in truth managerial and policy-determining, and hence, excluded by
law.
At a subsequent hearing (on October 4, 1990), the University filed a
Manifestation seeking the exclusion from the organizational unit of those
employees holding supervisory positions among non-academic personnel,
and those in teaching staff with the rank of Assistant Professor or higher,
submitting the following as grounds therefor:

1) Certain "high-level employees" with policy-making, managerial, or

confidential functions, are ineligible to join rank-and-file employee
organizations under Section 3, EO 180:

"SEC. 3. High-level employees whose functions are normally considered as

policy-making or managerial or whose duties are of a highly confidential
nature shall not be eligible to join the organization of rank-and file
government employees;

2) In the University hierarchy, not all teaching and non-teaching personnel

belong to the rank-and-file: just as there are those occupying managerial
positions within the non-teaching roster, there is also a dichotomy between
various levels of the teaching or academic staff;

3) Among the non-teaching employees composed of Administrative Staff

and Research personnel, only those holding positions below Grade 18
should be regarded as rank-and-file, considering that those holding higher
grade positions, like Chiefs of Sections, perform supervisory functions
including that of effectively recommending termination of appointments or
initiating appointments and promotions; and

4) Not all teaching personnel may be deemed included in the term, "rank-
and-file;" only those holding appointments at the instructor level may be so
considered, because those holding appointments from Assistant Professor
to Associate Professor to full Professor take part, as members of University
Council, a policy-making body, in the initiation of policies and rules with
respect to faculty tenure and promotion. 9
The ONAPUP quite categorically made of record its position: that it was not
opposing the University's proffered classification of rank-and file
employees. On the other hand, the "All UP Workers' Union" opposed the
Universitys' view, in a Position Paper presented by it under date of October
18, 1990.

Director Calleja subsequently promulgated an Order dated October 30,

1990, resolving the "sole issue" of "whether or not professors, associate
professors and assistant professors are included in the definition of high-
level employee(s)" in light of Rule I, Section (1) of the Implementing
Guidelines of Executive Order No. 180, defining "high level employee" as
follows:

"1. High Level Employee — is one whose functions are normally considered
policy determining, managerial or one whose duties are highly confidential
in nature. A managerial function refers to the exercise of powers such as:

1. To effectively recommend such managerial actions; llcd

2. To formulate or execute management policies and decisions; or

3. To hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, dismiss, assign or discipline

employees."

The Director adjudged that said teachers are rank-and-file employees

"qualified to join unions and vote in certification elections." According to
her —

"A careful perusal of the University Code . . . shows that the policy-making
powers of the Council are limited to academic matters, namely, prescribing
courses of study and rules of discipline, fixing student admission and
graduation requirements, recommending to the Board of Regents the
conferment of degrees, and disciplinary power over students. The policy-
determining functions contemplated in the definition of a high-level
employee pertain to managerial, executive, or organization policies, such as
hiring, firing, and disciplining of employees, salaries, teaching/working
hours, other monetary and non-monetary benefits, and other terms and
conditions of employment. They are the usual issues in collective
bargaining negotiations so that whoever wields these powers would be
placed in a situation of conflicting interests if he were allowed to join the
union of rank-and-file employees.

The University seasonably moved for reconsideration, seeking to make the

following points, to wit:

1) UP professors do "wield the most potent managerial powers: the power

to rule on tenure, on the creation of new programs and new jobs, and
conversely, the abolition of old programs and the attendant re-assignment
of employees."

2) To say that the Council is "limited to (acting on) academic matters" is

error, since academic decisions "are the most important decisions made in
a University . . . (being, as it were) the heart, the core of the University as a
workplace.

3) Considering the law regards as a "high level employee, one who

performs either policy-determining, managerial, or confidential functions,
the Director erred in applying only the "managerial functions" test, ignoring
the policy-determining-functions" test.

4) The Director's interpretation of the law would lead to absurd results,

e.g.: "an administrative officer of the College of Law is a high level
employee, while a full Professor who has published several treatises and
who has distinguished himself in argument before the Supreme Court is a
mere rank-and-file employee. A dormitory manager is classified as a high
level employee, while a full Professor of Political Science with a Ph. D. and
several Honorary doctorates is classified as rank-and-file." 10

The motion for reconsideration was denied by Director Calleja, by Order

dated November 20, 1990.
The University would now have this Court declare void the Director's Order
of October 30, 1990 as well as that of November 20, 1990. 11 A temporary
restraining order was issued by the Court, by Resolution dated December 5,
1990 conformably to the University's application therefor.

Two issues arise from these undisputed facts. One is whether or not
professors, associate professors and assistant professors are "high-level
employees" "whose functions are normally considered policy determining,
managerial or . . . highly confidential in nature." The other is whether or
not, they, and other employees performing academic functions, 12 should
comprise a collective bargaining unit distinct and different from that
consisting of the non-academic employees of the University, 13 considering
the dichotomy of interests, conditions and rules existing between them.

As regards the first issue, the Court is satisfied that it has been correctly
resolved by the respondent Director of Bureau Relations. In light Executive
Order No. 180 and its implementing rules, as well as the University's
charter and relevant regulations, the professors, associate professors and
assistant professors (hereafter simply referred to as professors) cannot be
considered as exercising such managerial or highly confidential functions as
would justify their being categorized as "high-level employees" of the
institution. Cdpr

The Academic Personnel Committees, through which the professors

supposedly exercise managerial functions, were constituted "in order to
foster greater involvement of the faculty and other academic personnel in
appointments, promotions, and other personnel matters that directly affect
them." 14 Academic Personnel Committees at the departmental and
college levels were organized "consistent with, and demonstrative of the
very idea of consulting the faculty and other academic personnel on
matters directly affecting them" and to allow "flexibility in the
determination of guidelines peculiar to a particular department or college."
15
Personnel actions affecting the faculty and other academic personnel
should, however, "be considered under uniform guidelines and consistent
with the Resolution of the Board (of Regents) adopted during its 789th
Meeting (11-26-69) creating the University Academic Personnel Board." 16
Thus, the Departmental Academic Personnel Committee is given the
function of "assist(ing) in the review of the recommendations initiated by
the Department Chairman with regard to recruitment, selection,
performance evaluation, tenure and staff development, in accordance with
the general guidelines formulated by the University Academic Personnel
Board and the implementing details laid down by the College Academic
Personnel Committee;" 17 while the College Academic Personnel
Committee is entrusted with the following functions: 18

1. Assist the Dean in setting up the details for the implementation of

policies, rules, standards or general guidelines as formulated by the
University Academic Personnel Board;

2. Review the recommendations submitted by the DAPCs with regard to

recruitment, selection, performance evaluation, tenure, staff development,
and promotion of the faculty and other academic personnel of the College;

3. Establish departmental priorities in the allocation of available funds for

promotion;

4. Act on cases or disagreement between the Chairman and the members

of the DAPC particularly on personnel matters covered by this Order;

5. Act on complaints and/or protests against personnel actions made by the

Department Chairman and/or the DAPC.

The University Academic Personnel Board, on the other hand, performs the
following functions: 19

1. Assist the Chancellor in the review of the recommendations of the

CAPC'S.
2. Act on cases of disagreement between the Dean and the CAPC.

3. Formulate policies, rules, and standards with respect to the selection,

compensation, and promotion of members of the academic staff.

4. Assist the Chancellor in the review of recommendations on academic

promotions and on other matters affecting faculty status and welfare.

From the foregoing, it is evident that it is the University Academic

Personnel Committee, composed of deans, the assistant for academic
affairs and the chief of personnel, which formulates the policies, rules and
standards respecting selection, compensation and promotion of members
of the academic staff. The departmental and college academic personnel
committees' functions are purely recommendatory in nature, subject to
review and evaluation by the University Academic Personnel Board. In
Franklin Baker Company of the Philippines vs. Trajano, 20 this Court
reiterated the principle laid down in National Merchandising Corp. vs. Court
of Industrial Relations, 21 that the power to recommend, in order to qualify
an employee as a supervisor or managerial employee "must not only be
effective but the exercise of such authority should not be merely of a
routinary or clerical nature but should require the use of independent
judgment." Where such recommendatory powers, as in the case at bar, are
subject to evaluation, review and final action by the department heads and
other higher executives of the company, the same, although present, are
not effective and not an exercise of independent judgment as required by
law.

Significantly, the personnel actions that may be recommended by the

departmental and college academic personnel committees must conform
with the general guidelines drawn up by the university personnel academic
committee. This being the case, the members of the departmental and
college academic personnel committees are not unlike the chiefs of
divisions and sections of the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority
whom this Court considered as rank-and-file employees in National
Waterworks & Sewerage Authority vs. NWSA Consolidated Unions, 22
because "given ready policies to execute and standard practices to observe
for their execution, . . . they have little freedom of action, as their main
function is merely to carry out the company's orders, plans and policies."

The power or prerogative pertaining to a high-level employee "to

effectively recommend such managerial actions, to formulate or execute
management policies or decisions and/or to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off,
recall, dismiss, assign or discipline employees" 23 is exercised to a certain
degree by the university academic personnel board/committees and
ultimately by the Board of Regents in accordance with Section 6 of the
University Charter, 24 thus:

(e) To appoint, on the recommendation of the President of the University,

professors, instructors, lecturers and other employees of the University; to
fix their compensation, hours of service, and such other duties and
conditions as it may deem proper; to grant them in its discretion leave of
absence under such regulations as it may promulgate, any other provision
of law to the contrary notwithstanding, and to remove them for cause after
investigation and hearing shall have been had. LLpr

Another factor that militates against petitioner's espousal of managerial

employment status for all its professors through membership in the
departmental and college academic personnel committees is that not all
professors are members thereof. Membership and the number of members
in the committees are provided as follows: 25

Section 2. Membership in Committees. — Membership in committees may

be made either through appointment, election, or by some other means as
may be determined by the faculty and other academic personnel of a
particular department or college.

Section 3. Number of Members. — In addition to the Chairman, in the case

of a department, and the Dean in the case of a college, there shall be such
number of members representing the faculty and academic personnel as
will afford a fairly representative, deliberative and manageable group that
can handle evaluation of personnel actions.

Neither can membership in the University Council elevate the professors to

the status of high-level employees. Sections 6 (f) and 9 of the UP Charter
respectively provide: 26

Sec. 6. The Board of Regents shall have the following powers and
duties . . . .:

xxx xxx xxx

(f) To approve the courses of study and rules of discipline drawn up by the
University Council as hereinafter provided:

Sec. 9. There shall be a University Council consisting of the President of the

University and of all instructors in the university holding the rank of
professor, associate professor, or assistant professor. The Council shall
have the power to prescribe the courses of study and rules of discipline,
subject to the approval of the Board of Regents. It shall fix the
requirements for admission to any college of the university, as well as for
graduation and the receiving of a degree. The Council alone shall have the
power to recommend students or others to be recipients of degrees.
Through its president or committees, it shall have disciplinary power over
the students within the limits prescribed by the rules of discipline approved
by the Board of Regents. The powers and duties of the President of the
University, in addition to those specifically provided in this Act shall be
those usually pertaining to the office of president of a university.

It is readily apparent that the policy-determining functions of the University

Council are subject to review, evaluation and final approval by the Board of
Regents. The Council's power of discipline is likewise circumscribed by the
limits imposed by the Board of Regents. What has been said about the
recommendatory powers of the departmental and college academic
personnel committees applies with equal force to the alleged policy-
determining functions of the University Council.

Even assuming arguendo that UP professors discharge policy-determining

function through the University Council, still such exercise would not
qualify them as high-level employees within the context of E.O. 180. As
correctly observed by private respondent, "Executive Order No. 180 is a law
concerning public sector unionism. It must therefore be construed within
that context. Within that context, the University of the Philippines
represents the government as an employer. `Policy-determining' refers to
policy-determination in university matters that affect those same matters
that may be the subject of negotiation between public sector management
and labor. The reason why `policy-determining' has been laid down as a
test in segregating rank-and-file from management is to ensure that those
who lay down policies in areas that are still negotiable in public sector
collective bargaining do not themselves become part of those employees
who seek to change these policies for their collective welfare." 27

The policy-determining functions of the University Council refer to

academic matters, i.e. those governing the relationship between the
University and its students, and not the University as an employer and the
professors as employees. It is thus evident that no conflict of interest
results in the professors being members of the University Council and being
classified as rank-and-file employees.

Be that as it may, does it follow, as public respondent would propose, that

all rank-and-file employees of the university are to be organized into a
single collective bargaining unit?

A "bargaining unit" has been defined as a group of employees of a given

employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of employees,
which the collective interest of all the employees, consistent with equity to
the employer, indicate to be the best suited to serve the reciprocal rights
and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the
law. 28
Our labor laws do not however provide the criteria for determining the
proper collective bargaining unit. Section 12 of the old law, Republic Act
No. 875 otherwise known as the Industrial Peace Act, simply reads as
follows: 29

Section 12. Exclusive Collective Bargaining Representation for Labor

Organizations. — The labor organization designated or selected for the
purpose of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in an
appropriate collective bargaining unit shall be the exclusive representative
of all the employees in such unit for the purpose of collective bargaining in
respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of
employment; Provided, That any individual employee or group of
employees shall have the right at any time to present grievances to their
employer.

Although said Section 12 of the Industrial Peace Act was subsequently

incorporated into the Labor Code with minor changes, no guidelines were
included in said Code for determination of an appropriate bargaining unit in
a given case. 30 Thus, apart from the single descriptive word "appropriate,"
no specific guide for determining the proper collective bargaining unit can
be found in the statutes.

Even Executive Order No. 180 already adverted to is not much help. All it
says, in its Section 9, is that "(t)he appropriate organizational unit shall be
the employer unit consisting of rank-and-file employees, unless
circumstances otherwise require" Case law fortunately furnishes some
guidelines.

When first confronted with the task of determining the proper collective
bargaining unit in a particular controversy, the Court had perforce to rely
on American jurisprudence. In Democratic Labor Association vs. Cebu
Stevedoring Company, Inc., decided on February 28, 1958, 31 the Court
observed that "the issue of how to determine the proper collective
bargaining unit and what unit would be appropriate to be the collective
bargaining agency" . . . "is novel in this jurisdiction; however, American
precedents on the matter abound . . . (to which resort may be had)
considering that our present Magna Carta has been patterned after the
American law on the subject." Said the Court: LLjur

". . . Under these precedents, there are various factors which must be
satisfied and considered in determining the proper constituency of a
bargaining unit. No one particular factor is itself decisive of the
determination. The weight accorded to any particular factor varies in
accordance with the particular question or questions that may arise in a
given case. What are these factors? Rothenberg mentions a good number,
but the most pertinent to our case are: (1) will of the employees (Globe
Doctrine); (2) affinity and unit of employees' interest, such as substantial
similarity of work and duties, or similarity or compensation and working
conditions; (3) prior collective bargaining history; and (4) employment
status, such as temporary, seasonal and probationary employees. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

"An enlightening appraisal of the problem of defining an appropriate

bargaining unit is given in the 10th Annual Report of the National Labor
Relations Board wherein it is emphasized that the factors which said board
may consider and weigh in fixing appropriate units are: the history, extent
and type of organization of employees; the history of their collective
bargaining; the history, extent and type organization of employees in other
plants of the same employer, or other employers in the same industry; the
skill, wages, work, and working conditions of the employees; the desires of
the employees; the eligibility of the employees for membership in the
union or unions involved; and the relationship between the unit or units
proposed and the employer's organization, management, and
operation. . . .
". . . In said report, it is likewise emphasized that the basic test in
determining the appropriate bargaining unit is that a unit, to be
appropriate, must affect a grouping of employees who have substantial,
mutual interests in wages, hours, working conditions and other subjects of
collective bargaining (citing Smith on Labor Laws, 316-317; Francisco, Labor
Laws, 162). . . ."

The Court further explained that "(t)he test of the grouping is community or
mutuality of interests. And this is so because `the basic test of an asserted
bargaining unit's acceptability is whether or not it is fundamentally the
combination which will best assure to all employees the exercise of their
collective bargaining rights' (Rothenberg on Labor Relations, 490)." Hence,
in that case, the Court upheld the trial court's conclusion that two separate
bargaining units should be formed, one consisting of regular and
permanent employees and another consisting of casual laborers and
stevedores.

Since then, the "community or mutuality of interests" test has provided the
standard in determining the proper constituency of a collective bargaining
unit. In Alhambra Cigar & Cigarette Manufacturing Company, et al. vs.
Alhambra Employees' Association (PAFLU), 107 Phil. 23. The Court, noting
that the employees in the administrative, sales and dispensary departments
of a cigar and cigarette manufacturing firm perform work which have
nothing to do with production and maintenance, unlike those in the raw
lead (malalasi), cigar, cigarette, packing (precintera) and engineering and
garage departments, authorized the formation of the former set of
employees into a separate collective bargaining unit. The ruling in the
Democratic labor Association case, supra, was reiterated in Philippine Land-
Air-Sea Labor Union vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 110 Phil. 176, where
casual employees were barred from joining the union of the permanent
and regular employees.

Applying the same "community or mutuality of interests" test, but resulting

in the formation of only one collective bargaining unit is the case of
National Association of Free Trade Unions vs. Mainit Lumber Development
Company Workers Union-United Lumber and General Workers of the Phils.,
G.R. No. 79526, December 21, 1990, 192 SCRA 598. In said case, the Court
ordered the formation of a single bargaining unit consisting of the Sawmill
Division in Butuan City and the Logging Division in Zapanta Valley,
Kitcharao, Agusan Norte of the Mainit Lumber Development Company. The
Court reasoned:

"Certainly, there is a mutuality of interest among the employees of the

Sawmill Division and the Logging Division. Their functions mesh with one
another. One group needs the other in the same way that the company
needs them both. There may be difference as to the nature of their
individual assignments but the distinctions are not enough to warrant the
formation of a separate bargaining unit."

In the case at bar, the University employees may, as already suggested,

quite easily be categorized into two general classes: one, the group
composed of employees whose functions are non-academic, i.e., janitors,
messengers, typists, clerks, receptionists, carpenters, electricians, grounds-
keepers, chauffeurs, mechanics, plumbers; 32 and two, the group made up
of those performing academic functions, i.e., full professors, associate
professors, assistant professors, instructors — who may be judges or
government executives — and research, extension and professorial staff. 33
Not much reflection is needed to perceive that the community or mutuality
of interests which justifies the formation of a single collective bargaining
unit is wanting between the academic and non-academic personnel of the
university. It would seem obvious that teachers would find very little in
common with the University clerks and other non-academic employees as
regards responsibilities and functions, working conditions, compensation
rates, social life and interests, skills and intellectual pursuits, cultural
activities, etc. On the contrary, the dichotomy of interests, the dissimilarity
in the nature of the work and duties as well as in the compensation and
working conditions of the academic and non-academic personnel dictate
the separation of these two categories of employees for purposes of
collective bargaining. The formation of two separate bargaining units, the
first consisting of the rank-and-file non-academic personnel, and the
 second, of the rank-and-file academic employees, is the set-up that will
best assure to all the employees the exercise of their collective bargaining
rights. These special circumstances, i.e., the dichotomy of interests and
concerns as well as the dissimilarity in the nature and conditions of work,
wages and compensation between the academic and non-academic
personnel, bring the case at bar within the exception contemplated in
Section 9 of Executive Order No. 180. It was grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the Labor Relations Director to have ruled otherwise, ignoring
plain and patent realities.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Order of October 30, 1990 is hereby AFFIRMED in

so far as it declares the professors, associate professors and assistant
professors of the University of the Philippines as rank-and-file employees of
the University of the Philippines shall constitute a bargaining unit to the
exclusion of the academic employees. The Order of August 7, 1990 is
MODIFIED in the sense that the non-academic rank-and-file employees of
the institution - i.e., full professors, associate professors, assistant
professors, instructors, and the research, extension and professorial staff,
who may, if so minded, organize themselves into a separate collective
bargaining unit; and that, therefore, only said non-academic rank-and-file
personnel of the University of the Philippines in Diliman, Manila, Los Baños
and the Visayas are to participate in the certification election.

SO ORDERED.

6. Laguna College v. CIR

LAGUNA COLLEGE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS,
LAGUNA COLLEGE TEACHERS ASSOCIATION (LACTA) CCLU, and THE
DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS, respondents.

De Lara, Puno and Pampolina for petitioner.

Oliver B. Gesmundo for respondents Laguna College Teachers Association.

SYLLABUS
1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; DIRECTOR OF LANDS; POWER; FINDINGS OF FACT
OF THE DIRECTOR IS CONCLUSIVE ON THE COURTS WHEN APPROVED BY
THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES. — The
Director of Lands has "direct executive control of the survey, classification,
lease, sale or any other form of concession or disposition and management
of the lands of the public domain, and his decisions as to questions of fact
shall be conclusive when approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources." He was possessed of such a power even under the
former law. By virtue thereof, it has been the constant holding of this Court
that the determination arrived at by the Director of Lands, as affirmed by
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, as thus provided, is
conclusive on the courts.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; FINALITY OF ADMINISTRATIVE FINDINGS OF FACT;

EFFECT OF ABSENCE OF APPROVAL BY THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE
AND NATURAL RESOURCES. — It may be said, however, that in this case,
there is no showing that there was such an approval by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources. The absence thereof does not detract in
any way from the finality of the decision, reached as far back as 1928 by the
Director of Lands and not appealed. If, after almost four decades, a
determination by the Director of Lands could still be inquired into, there
would be no stability in property rights which, undoubtedly, is demanded
by public interest. The City of Baguio could have raised the issue after such
a ruling was made by the Director of Lands in 1928 if in reality the site
intended for the Baguio General Hospital became subject, as disposable
public domain, to sales application by interested parties. All the while, it did
nothing to protest against such an alleged invasion of its rights. It was not
until 1961 that the complaint in this case was filed. It was much too late. It
had slept on its rights too long.

DECISION

MAKALINTAL, J p:
This case started with a petition for certification election filed by the Laguna
College, also petitioner before us, in the Court of Industrial Relations on
October 20, 1967 (Case No. 2037-MC). The purpose was "to determine
whether the Laguna College Teachers Association (LACTA) or any other
labor organization is the true and voluntary choice of the majority of the
teachers working in petitioner's establishment, as the sole and exclusive
bargaining representative."

LACTA intervened and filed an answer on November 18, 1967, praying that
the petition for certification election be dismissed and that it be directly
certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all the
teachers, excluding "those occupying supervisory and confidential positions
(as) defined and settled by jurisprudence."

While the certification proceeding was pending before the Industrial Court,
specifically on January 2, 1968, LACTA staged a strike, but the same was
settled by a return-to-work agreement executed by union and management
on January 4, 1968. One of the stipulations in the said agreement is as
follows: "That, except on questions of law, both parties hereby waive the
right to appeal any decision or order that may be rendered by the Trial
Court of the Court of Industrial Relations (not Court en banc) in case 2037-
MC pending in said Court."

On March 11, 1968 the trial Judge, Hon. Ansberto P. Paredes, issued an
order of which the dispositive part reads as follows:

"WHEREFORE, the appropriate collective bargaining unit is hereby declared

to be the employer unit comprising all the teachers of the Laguna College of
San Pablo City; the certification election prayed for is hereby granted;
Trinidad Alvera, Palermo Bañagale, Severo Belarmino, Eden Brion, Teofilo
Desamero, Senen Faylon, Natividad Evangelista, Juan B. Hernandez, Ricardo
Maala, Vicente Maneso, Wenceslao Retizos, and Julio Tunguhan, being
supervisors and/or holding confidential positions, are excluded from the
bargaining unit and therefore ineligible to vote; Moises Belen, Eduardo
Lainez, Gregorio Briones, Olimpio Cortez, Sr., Adventor Neri, Guillermo
Pisigan, Marcelo Almanzor and Pantaleon Torres are hereby declared rank-
and-file employees; Yolanda Almeda, Gertrudis Evangelista and Marlita
Evangelista are hereby declared within the employer unit and they,
together with the teachers whose names are listed in Annex "A" herewith
attached, are hereby declared eligible to vote; and the Department of Labor
or its authorized representative or representatives are hereby requested to
conduct the certification election with the choice limited to Laguna College
Teachers Association, LACTA for short, c/o Atty. Oliver B. Gesmundo, 303
Free Press Bldg., Manila, and NO UNION, and thereafter, to submit the
results thereof for further disposition by the Court."

Petitioner thereafter elevated the case to the court en banc on motion for
reconsideration insofar as the decision (1) authorized the inclusion of eight
teachers as rank and file employees and therefore declared them eligible to
vote in the certification election, and (2) authorized only one (LACTA)
instead of two bargaining units to be voted upon. LACTA interposed its
opposition to the motion. In the meantime the Bureau of Labor Relations
scheduled the election for March 26, 1968, but upon petitioner's motion
respondent Court suspended it until further orders. The motion for
reconsideration was denied by the Court en banc on April 5, 1968, and the
Director of Labor Relations thereupon reset the election for April 22.

On April 20, 1968 petitioner came to this Court on a petition for review of
the orders of March 11 and April 5, seeking a modification thereof so that
employees "holding supervisory and/or confidential positions . . . (may) be
excluded from whatever appropriate bargaining unit or units may be finally
determined," and praying that a restraining order be issued by this Court to
stop respondents from implementing the orders appealed from. This Court,
however, while it gave due course to the petition, did not issue the
restraining order prayed for.

On April 26, 1968 respondent LACTA filed a motion to dismiss the petition
on two grounds, namely: "(1) the appeal is (a) dilatory and not conducive to
industrial peace; (b) has become moot and academic, with petitioner
having actively participated in the election and is therefore already in
estoppel; and (c) raises flimsy and unsubstantial issues; and (2) the petition
raises questions of fact (and), aside from the agreement between petitioner
and LACTA that they would not appeal the order of the trial Court of the
Court of Industrial Relations; this Honorable Court, therefore, has no
jurisdiction over the present appeal (sic)." A supplemental motion to
dismiss followed, after which petitioner submitted its comment.

The main issue raised in the petition refers to the classification of the
following employees in the rank-and-file category; Marcelo Almanzor,
Eduardo R. Lainez, Adventor C. Neri, Moises Belen, Gregorio Briones,
Olimpio Cortez, Sr., Guillermo Pisigan and Pantaleon Torres. Petitioner
claims that these eight are supervisors and therefore should not have been
considered as eligible to vote in the selection of the appropriate bargaining
unit.

The issue, however, is mainly one of fact. In his resolution thereof the trial
Judge analyzed in detail the evidence before it, both oral and documentary.
The analysis shows that there is substantial support for the conclusion
reached, and the substantial- evidence rule applicable to cases like the
present precludes our reviewing the matter on appeal. The trial judge, in
his order of March 11, 1968, found as follows:

"On the issue as to whether the eight named teachers are supervisors or
not, there is, in the first place, no evidence adduced to show that Almanzor
is a supervisor. With respect to Pisigan, the only evidence offered to show
that he is a supervisor is Exhibit "R" which is nothing more than his
designation as ". . . Moderator and/or Adviser of the Sampaloc Lake News,
School Organ of the Students of the Laguna College, San Pablo City". From
this document, it is shown that the principal functions of Pisigan are to
select, by competitive examinations, the students who will occupy the
positions of editor-in- chief, associate editor, news-in-charge, feature-in-
charge, literary-in-charge; and to tone down, or totally disapprove
publication of articles which, in his opinion, are derogatory to the good
name of any person or institution. These functions and the others
enumerated in Exhibit "R" are not within the purview of the definition of
supervisor as provided in Section 2(k) of R.A. 875. So is the case of
Pantaleon Torres. Being a consultant of the College Organ, the Sampaloc
Lake News, and have (sic) duties as enumerated in Exhibit "S", do not make
him a supervisor. This is specially true when his testimony was not denied
or rebutted, disclosing that he is not an area supervisor; that there are no
teachers under him (p. 153, t.s.n. December 14, 1967); and that he does
not have the power to hire, fire, lay-off, discharge, suspend, transfer,
discipline (p. 151, t.s.n., December 14, 1967), or adjust the grievances of
any teacher of the Laguna College (p. 152, t.s.n., December 14, 1967). The
case of Belen Briones, Cortez, Sr., Lainez and Neri are no different. Although
they are area supervisors they do not exercise any of the attributes or
functions of a supervisor as defined in Section 2(k) of R.A. 875. To better
understand their functions, it is best to know what is an area supervisor.
The word "area" in the designation refers to a particular subject, like
English, Mathematics and Physics, Filipino, General Science, Biology and
Chemistry, and Social Science-History and Economics. It is a fact that not
one of these area supervisors has the power to hire or fire, lay-off, suspend,
discharge or discipline the teachers under them or adjust their grievances.
The power to rate the efficiency of the teachers under them is even subject
to review or revision by the principal, Mr. Wenceslao Retizos (pp. 30 to 40,
t.s.n., December 14, 1967). As a matter of fact, their functions are but
recommendatory (p. 48, t.s.n. December 14, 1967). Thus, the assistant
principal and general supervisor admitted that the recommendations of the
area supervisors are subject to evaluation, review and final approval by the
principal, as ". . . most recommendations of area supervisors are considered
with a grain of salt." (pp. 17 to 18, t.s.n., December 27, 1967.) It is
established by the evidence that even as the efficiency ratings given by
Lainez, an area supervisor, is (sic) based on his own observations of the
teachers under him, he was prevailed upon by the principal to change them
(p. 65, t.s.n., December 14, 1967), which he did, and that his remarks and
observations of some of the teachers under him made in Exhibit "G" were
deleted in the copy furnished the Bureau of Private Education (pp. 82 to 84,
t.s.n., December 14, 1967). In the case of area supervisor Neri, as was
admitted by the assistant principal and general supervisor, his
recommendations, indeed, are considered with a grain of salt. Neri's
testimony is not denied that when he recommended a teacher to teach
biology, his recommendation was rejected (p. 108, t.s.n., December 14,
1967); and when he assigned a teacher to teach Science, without so much
as notifying him, the teacher was given Arithmetic (p. 109, t.s.n., December
14, 1967). The preparation of program of supervision by area supervisors is,
likewise, not indicative that they are supervisors, for, as testified to by
Lainez, which testimony is not rebutted, it is nothing more than the
enumerations of activities in the area, many of them merely routinary, as
for instance, the checking of the formal themes, notebooks, survey of
textbooks, and regulating the number of students in a class (p. 52, t.s.n.,
December 14, 1967). For all the foregoing reasons, it is believed that Lainez,
Belen, Neri, Briones, Cortez, Sr., Torres, Pisigan and Almanzor are not
supervisors."

What is more, in the return-to-work agreement entered into by the parties

on January 4, 1968, to settle the strike declared by LACTA on January 2,
1968, they both waived the right to appeal, except on questions of law,
from any decision or order that might be rendered by the trial Court in the
case then pending, No. 2037-MC. The question of whether the eight
employees aforementioned were supervisors or belonged to the rank and
file was one of fact and consequently was covered by the waiver.

The second issue raised in the instant petition concerns the declaration in
the order of March 11, 1968 that only one bargaining unit should represent
all the teachers employed in the Laguna College. Petitioner insists that
there should be two units, one for college professors and another for high
school teachers. This is a matter that is addressed to the sound discretion
of respondent Court, upon its own consideration of all the pertinent
circumstances; and unless such discretion has been gravely abused there is
no justification to rule otherwise. The following rationale of the court's
decision appears to be well-advised, and the allegations in the petition do
not make out a sufficient case for the review thereof.

"On the appropriate bargaining unit, petitioner, changing its original stand,
proposed two separate units, namely, college unit composed of the
professors and instructors in the College, and high school unit comprising
the high school teachers. On the other hand, LACTA proposed only one unit
— the employer unit composing of all teachers in the entire Laguna College.
From the evidence adduced, it is believed that the factors in favor of
employer unit far outweigh the reasons for the establishment of two
separate bargaining units as proposed by petitioner. It is not denied that
college teachers are governed by rules and regulations of the Bureau of
Private Education, which are different from the rules and regulations for
high school teachers; that the high school department of petitioner was
organized at a different time from the college department; that the set-up
in the two departments are different; and that the high school teachers are
paid per period or subject, while the college teachers are paid on the hourly
basis. But it is also not denied that these two departments are under the
control of only one board of trustees; that they are housed in one and the
same building (p. 68, t.s.n., December 8, 1967); that there is but one
cashier and only one registrar who himself is the administrative officer of
the whole Laguna College (pp. 68 and 70, t.s.n., December 8, 1967). As a
matter of fact the function of the Administrative Officer who is no other
than Wenceslao Retizos extends even to the high school department (pp.
71-73, t.s.n., December 8, 1967). It is a fact that there are some teachers
involved in this case who are teaching both in the college and high school
departments (pp. 69 to 70, t.s.n., December 8, 1967; pp. 28, 111 and 131,
December 14, 1967), which is a decisive proof of the community of interest
of these teachers and which negates the establishment of two bargaining
units. Besides, in the proposed two separate bargaining units, the
elementary teachers of the petitioner will be left out without a bargaining
representative. Moreover, considering that there are only one-hundred-
and-thirty (130) teachers involved in this proceedings, after twelve of the
teachers were considered supervisors and/or holding confidential positions,
to divide the collective bargaining unit into two would assuredly be
dissipating their strength for collective bargaining purposes. Furthermore,
the proposition would not be conducive to industrial peace for the
possibility is great that, with the establishment of two bargaining units,
petitioner would be contending with two different unions vying against
each other for better benefits to gain more members."
Respondent LACTA avers in its answer that the certification election
authorized by respondent court has actually been held. The instant
petition, therefore, insofar as it seeks to enjoin said election has already
become moot, particularly in view of the fact that petitioner participated
therein actively, as also alleged in the same answer and nowhere denied by
petitioner. Whatever other questions there are relative to the conduct of
such election may be ventilated before respondent Court, which has
jurisdiction over the main case.

In a supplemental petition filed on August 12, 1968, petitioner alleges that

respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion in ordering the
certification election to be held on April 22, 1968, before the lapse of the
"ten-day period" for review of the resolution of respondent Court dated
April 5, 1968, copy of which was received by petitioners on the following
April 15. This new allegation deserves no serious consideration. In the first
place, it is a new matter which should have been included in the original
petition filed on April 20, 1968, wherein the prayer was that the
certification election scheduled for April 22 be suspended so that the
matter of excluding certain employees from voting therein could first be
settled. No reference whatsoever was made to the fact that the election, if
held as thus scheduled, would be premature for the reason now advanced.
To admit the supplemental petition would in effect be to authorize an
appeal beyond the 30-day reglementary period. Secondly, the
supplemental petition has not cited any specific rule to the effect that a
certification election may not be held until after the expiration of 10 days
from receipt by the parties of the enabling resolution of the Industrial
Court. Finally, as already adverted to, petitioner took part actively in the
election, and in fact challenged the right of 59 LACTA members to vote
therein, raising no objection with respect to the others.

Regarding the allegation that the strike staged on April 3, 1968 was illegal
and hence rendered the strikers disqualified to vote, this is a matter that
properly pertains to the ULP charge filed by petitioner precisely questioning
the legality of said strike, but which charge, according to respondents, has
 up to the present not resulted in the filing of a formal complaint by the
prosecuting officers of the Court of Industrial Relations. Besides, as likewise
alleged by respondents in their opposition to the supplemental petition,
the strikers returned to work on May 6, 1968 and were accepted back by
petitioner, thus rendering the issue of illegality moot and academic.

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed, without pronouncement as to costs.

7. NAFLU v. Mainit Lumber Dev’t, et. al., G.R. No. 79526, December 21, 1990
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FREE TRADE UNIONS (NAFTU), petitioner, vs. MAINIT
LUMBER DEVELOPMENT COMPANY WORKERS UNION-UNITED LUMBER AND
GENERAL WORKERS OF THE PHILIPPINES (MALDECOWU-ULGWP), respondents.

Salvador C. Ruiz for petitioner.

Banzuela, Flores, Miralles, Rañeses, Sy, Taquio and Associates for respondent
Union.

DECISION

PARAS, J p:

This is a petition for certiorari to annul and set aside the resolution ** of the
public respondent Bureau of Labor Relation dated January 29,1987 in BLR Case
No. A-5-99-85 entitled: IN RE: Petition for Direct Certification or Certification
Election, Mainit Lumber Development Company Workers Union-United Lumber
and General Workers of the Philippines (MALDECOWU-ULGWP), petitioner-
appellee vs. Mainit Lumber and Development Company, Inc. (MALDECO),
respondent; National Association of Free Trade Unions (NAFTU), compulsory
intervenor-appellant, affirming the Order of the Med-Arbiter date September 24,
1986 and denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

The facts are as follows:

On January 28, 1985, private respondent Mainit Lumber Development Company

Workers Union-United Lumber and General Workers of the Philippines,
MALDECOWU-ULGWP (ULGWP, for short), a legitimate labor organization duly
registered with the Ministry of Labor and Employment under Registry No. 2944-
IP, filed with Regional Office No. 10, Ministry of Labor and Employment at
Cagayan de Oro City, a petition for certification election to determine the sole and
exclusive collective bargaining representative among the rank and file
workers/employees of Mainit Lumber Development Company Inc. (MALDECO), a
duly organized, registered and existing corporation engaged in the business of
logging and saw-mill operations employing approximately 136 rank and file
employees/workers (Rollo, p. 11; Petition; Annex "A"). The case was scheduled for
hearing two (2) times. During the first scheduled hearing on February 20, 1985,
the counsel for compulsory intervenor (now petitioner), National Association of
Free Trade Union (NAFTU) requested for postponement on the ground that he
was leaving for abroad. During the scheduled hearing of March 13, 1985, they,
however, agreed to submit simultaneously their respective position papers within
twenty (20) days (Rollo, p. 17; Petition; Annex "D").

Petitioner ULGWP, private respondent herein, in its petition and position paper
alleged, among others: (1) that there was no certification election conducted
within 12 months prior to the filing of the petition; (2) that the petition was filed
within the 60 day freedom period, i.e. CBA expired on February 28, 1985; (3) that
the petition is supported by the signatures of 101 rank and file employees out of a
total of 201 employees of the employer or more than thirty percent (30%) than
that required by law (Rollo, p. 13; Petition; Annex "B"). Cdpr
On April 11, 1985, the Med-Arbiter granted the petition for certification election.
On April 26, 1985, NAFTU appealed the decision of the Med-Arbiter on the
ground that MALDECO was composed of two (2) bargaining units, the Sawmill
Division and the Logging Division, but both the petition and decision treated these
separate and distinct units only as one (Rollo, p. 20; Petition; Annex "E").

On April 28, 1986, the Bureau of Labor Relations affirmed the decision (Rollo, p.
26; Petition; Annex "J"). Thus, a certification election was held on separate dates
at the employer's sawmill division and logging area respectively. In said election
MALDECOWU-ULGWP garnered a total vote of 146 while NAFTU garnered a total
of 2 votes (Rollo, p. 42; Petition; Annex "O").

On July 26, 1986, NAFTU filed an election protest alleging massive vote buying
accompanied with grave and serious threat force and intimidation on the lives of
25 applicants as stated in a Joint Affidavit attached thereto (Rollo, p. 28; Petition;
Annexes "K", "K-3").

MALDECO filed its Manifestation on August 3, 1986, which corroborated

petitioner's stand. Attached to the said Manifestation was a joint affidavit
executed by thirty five (35) of its employees/workers (Rollo, p. 33; Petition;
Annexes "L", "L-1").

On September 3, 1986, private respondent filed its position paper (Rollo, p. 36;
Petition; Annex "I"). On September 8, 1986 petitioner filed its opposition to
private respondent's position paper (Rollo, p. 39; Petition; Annex "N"). On
September 24, 1986, the Med-Arbiter dismissed the election protest (Rollo, p. 42;
Petition; Annex "O").
On October 10, 1986, petitioner NAFTU appealed the order of the Med-Arbiter to
the Bureau of Labor Relations in Manila (Rollo, p. 46) which denied the appeal
(Rollo, p. 48) and the two motions for reconsideration (Rollo, pp. 51, 55).

Hence, this petition.

The issues raised in this petition are:

WHETHER OR NOT IT WAS RIGHT FOR THE MED-ARBITER TO CHANGE THE

EMPLOYER FROM TWO SEPARATE BARGAINING UNITS TO ONLY ONE.

II

WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS MASSIVE VOTE BUYING AND SERIOUS THREAT TO
LIFE TO JUSTIFY INVALIDATING THE RESULT OF THE ELECTION.

III

WHETHER OR NOT AN ELECTION PROTEST IN A CERTIFICATION ELECTION CAN BE

GIVEN DUE COURSE EVEN IF NOT ENTERED IN THE MINUTES OF THE ELECTION.

In the case at bar, petitioner alleges that the employer MALDECO was composed
of two bargaining units, the Sawmill Division in Butuan City and the Logging
Division, in Zapanta Valley, Kitcharao, Agusan Norte, about 80 kilometers distant
from each other and in fact, had then two separate CBA's, one for the Sawmill
Division and another for the Logging Division, both the petition and decision
referred only to one bargaining unit; that from 1979 to 1985, the Ministry of
Labor and Employment recognized the existence of two (2) separate bargaining
units at MALDECO, one for its Logging Division and another for its Sawmill
Division.

Significantly, out of two hundred and one (201) employees of MALDECO, one
hundred seventy five (175) consented and supported the petition for certification
election, thereby confirming their desire for one bargaining representative (Rollo,
p. 104). LexLib

Moreover, while the existence of a bargaining history is a factor that may be

reckoned with in determining the appropriate bargaining unit, the same is not
decisive or conclusive. Other factors must be considered. The test of grouping is
community or mutuality of interests. This is so because "the basic test of an
asserted bargaining unit's acceptability is whether or not it is fundamentally the
combination which will best assure to all employees the exercise of their
collective bargaining rights." (Democratic Labor Association v. Cebu Stevedoring
Company, Inc., et al., 103 Phil. 1103 [1958]).

Certainly, there is a mutuality of interest among the employees of the Sawmill

Division and the Logging Division. Their functions mesh with one another. One
group needs the other in the same way that the company needs them both. There
may be difference as to the nature of their individual assignments but the
distinctions are not enough to warrant the formation of a separate bargaining
unit.

Secondly, the issue had been raised earlier by petitioner. The respondent Bureau
of Labor Relations had already ruled on the same in its decision dated April 28,
1986 affirming the Med-Arbiter's Order dated April 11, 1985 which granted the
petition for Certification Election. NAFTU did not elevate the April 28, 1986
decision to this Court. On the contrary, it participated in the questioned election
and later it did not raise the issue in its election protest (Rollo, p. 210). Hence, the
principle of res judicata applies. It was settled as early as 1956 that "the rule
which forbids the reopening of a matter once judicially determined by competent
authority applies as well to the judicial and quasi-judicial acts of public, executive
or administrative officers and boards acting within their jurisdiction as to the
judgments of courts having general judicial powers . . ." (B.F. Goodrich Philippines,
Inc. v. Workmen's Compensation Commission and Leandro M. Castro, 159 SCRA
355 [1988]).

With regard to the second and third issues raised by petitioner, the public
respondent Bureau of Labor Relations in its order dated September 24, 1986
found the following, to wit:

"After a careful perusal of the records of this case and after considering, adducing
and weighing all the pleadings, arguments, etc. and the circumstances attendant
to the instant case, this Office is of the opinion that the grounds relied upon by
the protestant NAFTU in its protest are bereft of any merit, hence, this Office
finds no cogent reason to order the invalidation or annulment of the certification
election under protest or the holding of a run-off election thereat between no
union and the protestee, MALDECOWU-ULGWP. Indeed, the minutes of said
certification elections conducted both at the sawmill and logging departments on
August 15 and 21, 1986 respectively, of the respondent/employer showed that
there was no protest on massive vote buying accompanied with grave and serious
threats, force and intimidation raised by any of the parties who were ably
represented in said elections. Paragraph 2, Section 9, Rule 6 of the Rules and
Regulations implementing the Labor Code of the Philippines (now Section 3, Rule
VI, Book 5 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code) provides that
protests not so raised and contained in the minutes of the proceedings are
deemed waived. Allegations of vote buying, grave and serious threats, force and
intimidation are questions of fact which should be contained in the minutes of
said proceedings. There is no clear and convincing proof presented by the
protestant in support of its contention, hence, we have no other alternative than
to uphold the election results."

In the case of Philippine Airlines Employees' Association (PALEA) v. Hon. Pura

Ferrer-Calleja, et al., 162 SCRA 425 [1988]), this Court held that factual findings of
the Bureau of Labor Relations which are supported by substantial evidence are
binding on this Court and must be respected. LLjur

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the resolution of public respondent Bureau of Labor

Relations dated January 29, 1987 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

8. Globe Machine & Stamping Co., 3 NLRB 294 (1937)

In the Matter of THE GLOBE MACHINE AND STAMPING Co. and METAL

POLISHERS UNION, LOCAL No. 3; INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF

MACHINISTS, DISTRICT No. 54; FEDERAL LABOR UNION 18788, and

UNITED AUTOMOBILE WORKERS OF AMERICA

Cases Nos. R-178, R-179, R-180.-Decided August 11, 1937

Auto Parts Manufacturing Indastry-Investigation of Representatives: controversy concerning

representation of employees : rival organizations ; substantial doubt as to majority status-Unit
Appropriate for Collective Bargaining:

where other considerations determinative of appropriate unit are evenly balanced, decisive factor is the
desire of employees involved ; determination of

dependent upon results of elections-Elections Ordered-Certification of

Representatives.

Mr. Harry L. Lodish and Mr. Peter DiLeone for the Board.
Mr. L. C. Spieth, of Cleveland, Ohio, for the Company.

Mr. Edwin F. Woodle and Mr. Bernard C. Wachtel, of Cleveland,

Ohio, for the Polishers Union and the I. A. M.

Mr. Ralph Gordon, of Cleveland, Ohio, for the I. A. M.

Mr. R. G. Reisinger and Mr. Bert Cochran, of Cleveland, Ohio, for

the U. A. W. A.

Mr. Joseph B. Robison, of counsel to the Board.

DECISION

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On May 13, 1937, Metal Polishers Union, Local No. 3, herein called

the Polishers Union, International Association of Machinists,

District No. 54, herein called the I. A. M., and Federal Labor Union

18788, herein called the Federal Local, filed separate petitions with

the Regional Director for the Eighth Region (Cleveland, Ohio).

alleging that questions affecting commerce had arisen concerning the

representation of employees of The Globe Machine and StampingCo., Cleveland, Ohio, herein called the
Company, and requesting the

National Labor Relations Board, herein called the Board, to conduct

an investigation pursuant to Section 9 (c) of the National Labor

Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449, herein called the Act. On May 19, 1937,

the Board, acting pursuant to Section 9 (c) of the Act, and Article

III, Section 3 of National Labor Relations Board Rules and Regulations-Series 1, as amended, authorized
the Regional Director to conduct an investigation and to provide for an appropriate hearing;

and the Board further ordered, pursuant to Article III, Section 10

294

DECISIONS AND ORDERS 295

(c) (2) of the Rules and Regulations-Series 1, as amended, that

the three cases be consolidated for the purposes of the hearing. On

June 17, 1937, the Regional Director issued a notice of hearing to

be held at Cleveland, Ohio, on June 24, 1937, copies of which were

duly served upon the Company, upon the three petitioning unions,

and upon the United Automobile Workers of America, herein called

the U. A. W. A., a labor organization named in the petitions as

claiming to represent the Company's employees.

Pursuant to the notice, a hearing was held at Cleveland, Ohio, on

June 24 and 25, 1937, before Charles E. Persons, the Trial Examiner

duly designated by the Board. The Board, the Company, the

Polishers Union, and the I. A. M. were represented by counsel, and

the U. A. W. A. was represented by two of its officers. All participated

in the hearing. The Federal Local did not appear and took no part

in the proceedings. Full opportunity to be heard, to examine and to

cross-examine witnesses, and to introduce evidence bearing on the

issues was afforded all parties appearing. Objections to the introduction of evidence were made during
the course of the hearing by

counsel for the parties. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the

Trial Examiner, and finds that no prejudicial errors were committed.

The rulings are hereby affirmed.

Upon the entire record in the case, the Board makes the following :

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. THE BUSINESS OF THE COMPANY

The Company is a corporation, organized in 1902 under the laws

of Ohio, with its principal office and place of business located in

Cleveland, Ohio. Its plant is also located in Cleveland. It is engaged principally in the manufacture of
radiator grilles for automobiles. It has a registered trade-mark for use in interstate

commerce."

In 1936, the volume of the Company's business was $2,500,000, of

which $2,495,300, or about 98 per cent, was done without the State of
Ohio. Delivery is made by the Company at the purchaser's plant,

shipment being made by railroad and independent trucking companies. Most of the product is sent to
Michigan. The total amount

of purchases made by the Company in 1936 amounted to $1,103,000,

of which amount $714,000, or 65 per cent, was made without the

State of Ohio. The principal raw material is steel, which comes

chiefly from Pennsylvania.

The number of the Company's employees fluctuate greatly, having

been as high as 750 and as low as 500 during the first six months of

'Board's Exhibit No. 3

r1

The Globe Machine and Stamping Co. 3 N.L.R.B. 294 (N.L.R.B. 1937)

296 NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

1937. This fluctuation is apparently due to the fact that the Company, being an auto parts plant, is
subject, in accentuated form, to

the seasonal variations of the automobile industry.

II. THE ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED

A. The petitioning unions

The three unions who filed petitions in this proceeding are all

labor organizations affiliated with the American Federation of Labor.

Local No. 3 of the Polishers Union includes members who are working in various plants in Cleveland. It
claims jurisdiction over the

polishers and buffers at the Company's plant. The I. A. M. limits

its jurisdiction to the punch press operators. Its members at the

Company's plant are in five or six different locals, all within District

No. 54. The Federal Local claims the balance of the production

and maintenance workers. Its membership is apparently restricted

to men working at the Company's plant.

B. The United Automobile Workers of America

The U. A. W. A. is a labor organization affiliated with the Committee for Industrial Organization. It admits
to membership all of

the employees of the Company who are included within the three

groups claimed by the petitioning unions. It appears to have a

separate Local, No. 243, for employees of the Company.

III. THE QUESTION CONCERNING REPRESENTATION

A. The background of organization at the con- parry's plant

In 1933, there were at the Company's plant, a chapter of the Mechanics Educational Society of America,
herein called the M. E. S. A.,

which' included tool and dye workers only; a specialists local of the

I. A. M., which included the men working in the punch press room;

and the Federal Local, which included all other employees engaged

in production and maintenance. There is some evidence in the record that for a time, the I. A. M. local
included welders and other

workers at the plant, and that after some conflict, the membership in

that local was restricted to punch press men.

During the period from 1933 to late in 1936, practically all of the

employees engaged in production and maintenance were in one of

the three unions. While it does not appear that the plant was a

closed shop, it is clear that most men who worked there joined one

of the unions shortly after they started working, if they were not

already members. Although no signed agreements were reached at

any time with the Company, there were continuous and friendly negotiations which resulted in oral
agreements covering hours, wages,

The Globe Machine and Stamping Co. 3 N.L.R.B. 294 (N.L.R.B. 1937)

DECISIONS AND ORDERS 297

and grievances. It would appear, however, that these agreements

were in no sense formal, since the members of the unions were only

informed of their terms orally by the members of the negotiating

committee, and the terms were never embodied in an agreement or

otherwise made the subject of formal memoranda. Negotiations

were conducted by a joint committee at least for the A. F. of L.

unions and the product of these negotiations was termed a "federated

agreement."

In December 1936, the polishers at the plant were transferred

from the Federal Local into the petitioning local of the Polishers

Union. There were 60 polishers at this time employed at the plant

and most of them joined in a body on December 16, 1936. Thereafter, negotiations for the polishers,
which theretofore had been conducted by the Federal Local, were conducted by the Polishers

Union.

Shortly before the transfer of the polishers, the tool and dye men

in the M. E. S. A. voted to go over to the Committee for Industrial

Organization. Just how formal that action was does not appear, and

it would seem that the U. A. W. A. did not begin its organizational

drive at the plant until some months thereafter. Nevertheless, there

is evidence that at this time, and during the following months, there

was considerable sentiment among the men to change their form of

organization and to affiliate with the C. I. O. The U. A. W. A. began

its drive at the plant in February, and on March 6, 1937, it called a

meeting of all the men, the attendance at which was between 550 and

650. No formal check-up was made of those attending the meeting.

There was a door guard who had worked for the Company for about

16 years and who knew, all of the men at the plant. He admitted

only those who he knew were employed by the Company. In addition a witness who testified for the U.
A. W. A., who had worked at

the plant for 14 years, testified that a majority from ' every department of the plant, including the
polishing and punch press del artments, were present, and a representative of each department stood

up at the meeting and attested the fact that a majority was' present

from his department. This meeting unanimously decided to join

the U. A. W. A. The U. A. W. A. witness stated that 85 per cent

of the men then working were present, and that the remaining 15

per cent endorsed the action during the following days.

During the succeeding months the U. A. W. A. attempted to

negotiate with the Company, and finally on May 17, 1937, called a

strike which was effective in causing a complete shut,-down of the

plant. It does not appear in the record how many men aid what

departments participated in this strike. The strike was settled three

days later, on May 20, 1937, by a signed agreement between the

Company and the U. A. W. A., which provided, among other things,

The Globe Machine and Stamping Co. 3 N.L.R.B. 294 (N.L.R.B. 1937)

298 NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

for a flat eight cents an hour raise for all employees, with somewhat

higher raises for lower paid employees. The agreement was to remain in force until May 19, 1938,
"unless terminated prior thereto

by any decision of the National Labor Relations Board."

B. The present situation

The Polishers Union, the I. A. M., and the U. A. W. A. placed

membership lists in evidence. No list was submitted by or for the

Federal Local. The Polishers Union list includes members in good

standing who were working for the Company, as of the beginning

of 1937. It has 59 names. The I. A. M. list contains 95 names of

members who were working at the plant on May 13, the date of

the petitions. The U. A. W. A. list includes all paid-up members

of the local at the Company's plant. It lists 35 polishers, and 119

in the press room. The total for all departments is 687. It should

be noted that the Polishers Union list was made up as of a time

when there was a production peak. At the time the petitions in

this case were filed, there were only about 35 polishers working at

the plant.

Since the Company employed not more than 750 men at any time

during the first six months of 1937, it is obvious that there are

many duplications in these lists. The exact number is difficult to

ascertain due to inaccuracy in the copying of names. However, the

names of most of the men in both the polishing and punch press

departments appear on two lists. Thus it can be seen that the men

who were in the petitioning unions at the beginning of the year

signed up almost unanimously in the U. A. W. A. during its organizational drive in February and March.
However, there is evidence

of a subsequent swing back to the Polishers Union and the I. A. M.

Several of the witnesses for these two unions testified that they

were among those who had joined the U. A. W. A. while still holding

membership in one of the petitioning unions, and stated further

that they now preferred the latter. At the present time it is impossible to find which of the contending
groups is favored by a

majority of the polishers and of the punch press operators.

C. The present controversy

The petitioning unions claim that there are three separate units

for collective bargaining in this plant. The U. A. W. A. contends

that the plant cannot be subdivided as claimed and that it should

be treated as one unit. All parties are agreed that there should be

an election. They are also all agreed that eligibility should be based

on the pay roll for the week including May 13, 1937, the date of

the petitions, and such a pay roll has been supplied by the Company

The Globe Machine and Stamping Co. 3 N.L.R.B. 294 (N.L.R.B. 1937)

DECISIONS AND ORDERS

TV. THE APPROPRIATE UNIT

299

The Company's plant has numerous departments, major and minor,

through which its products flow in the course of production. A representative of the Company testified
that all products go through

at least three departments and that a tie up of one department would

tie up the whole plant. A classification list which was placed in evidence 2 shows that many different
types of work are done at the plant.

Both polishing 3 and punch press work are done at the plant of

the Company in separate, clearly-defined areas ; the former in two

rooms on separate floors, and the latter all in one room. There is

evidence that men are shifted about from department to department and that they may be taken from
assembly and put onto polishing or punch press work. There is little evidence, however, that

men ever return from polishing or press room work to other departments.

There is a great deal of testimony as to the degree of skill required

for polishing and press room work. With regard to polishing it

appears that some degree of skill is required for the work done at

the Company's plant, although the operations are relatively simple

and can be learned rather quickly. A man may become sufficiently

adept at the tasks required in the plant without becoming an allround polisher. However polishers are
paid higher wages than are

men on the assembly line, and in general, when taking on new men,

experienced polishers are sought. Much the same applies to the

punch press men. They are termed specialists by the I. A. M.

They are not all-round machinists, but rather operators of a particular kind of machine. There was
testimony to the effect that a

new man would have to work very slowly and the product of his

early labor would not be worth very much. There was also evidence,

however, that a specialist at one machine within the press room would

not necessarily be able to operate any other punch press machine.

In view of the facts described above, it appears that the Company's

production workers can be considered either as a single unit appropriate for the purposes of collective
bargaining, as claimed by

the U. A. W. A., or as three such units, as claimed by

the petitioning unions. The history of successful separate negotiations at the Company's plant, and also
the essential separateness of

p0 i and puncl press work at that plant, and the existence of a

requirement of a certain amount of skill for that work are proof of

the feasibility of the latter approach. The successful negotiation of

a plant-wide agreement on May 20, 1937, as well as the interrelation

2 Board's Exhibit No 6

a The Polishers Union claims jurisdiction over polishers and buffers. The record is not

clear, but it seems that the same mere do both polishing and buffing at the plant.

Throughout this opinion, polishing may be taken to include buffing.

The Globe Machine and Stamping Co. 3 N.L.R.B. 294 (N.L.R.B. 1937)

300 NATIONAL LABOII RELATIONS BOARD

and interdependence of the various departments at the Company's

plant, are proof of the feasibility of the former.

In such a case where the considerations are so evenly balanced, the

determining factor is the desire of the men themselves.' On this

point, the record affords no help. There has been a swing toward

the U. A. W. A. and then away from it. The only documentary

proof is completely contradictory. We will therefore order elections

to be, held separately for the men engaged in polishing and those

engaged in punch press work. We will also order an election for

the' employees of the Company engaged in production and maintenance, exclusive of the polishers and
punch press workers and of

clerical-and supervisory employees.

On the results of these elections will depend the determination

of the appropriate unit for the purposes of collective bargaining.

Such of the groups as do not choose the U. A. W. A. will constitute

separate and distinct appropriate units, and such as do choose the

U. A. W. A. will together constitute a single appropriate unit.

V. THE EFFECT OF THE QUESTIONS OF REPRESENTATION ON COMMERCE

On May 17, 1937, there was a strike at the Company's plant which

caused a complete stoppage and shut-down during its three-day

duration. A representative of the Company testified that the strike

had repercussions outside of the state in which the Company is

located.

We find that the questions concerning representation which have

arisen, occurring in connection with the operations of the Company

described in Section I above, have a close, intimate; and substantial

relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States, and

have led and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of
commerce.

CONCLUSION OF LAw

Upon the basis of the above findings of fact, the Board makes the

following conclusion of law:

Questions affecting commerce have arisen concerning the representation of the employees of The
Globe Machine and Stamping Co.,

within the meaning of Section 9 (c) and Section 2, subdivisions (6)

and (7) of the National Labor Relations Act.

DIRECTION OF ELECTIONS

By virtue and pursuant to the power vested in the National Labor

Relations Board by Section 9 (c) of the National Labor Relations

° This factor was held to be of significance in Matter of Atlantic Refninq Co , 1 N. L R. B

359; Matter of Chrysler Corporation , 1 N. L. R. B. 164 ; Matter of International Mercantile Marine Co et

al, 1 N. L R B 384 , and in Matter of New England Transportation

Co, 1 N. L. R. P. 130.
7

The Globe Machine and Stamping Co. 3 N.L.R.B. 294 (N.L.R.B. 1937)

DECISIONS AND ORDERS 301

Act, 49 Stat. 449, and pursuant to Article III, Section 8 of National

Labor Relations Board Rules and Regulations-Series 1, as amended,

it is

DIRECTED that, as part of the investigations authorized by the

Board to ascertain representatives for collective bargaining with

The Globe Machine and Stamping Co., elections by secret ballot

shall be conducted within fifteen (15) days from the date of this

Direction, under the direction and supervision of the Regional Director for the Eighth Region, acting in
this manner as agent for the

National Labor Relations Board, and subject to Article III, Section

9 of said Rules and Regulations, among those employees of The

Globe Machine and Stamping Co. who fall within the groups described below who were on the pay roll
of the Company for the week

which included May 13, 1937:

a. Those engaged in polishing and buffing to determine whether

they desire to be re re en esl_b_y_the_Met al Polishers Union, Local No.

3, affiliated with the American Federation of Labor, or the United

Automobile Workers of America, affiliated with the Committee for

Industrial Organization, for the purposes of collective bargaining.

b. Those engaged in the press room in the operation of punch

press machines to determine whether they desire to be represented by

International Association of Machinists, District No. 54, affiliated

with the American Federation of Labor, or the United Automobile

Workers of America, affiliated with the Committee for Industrial

Organization, for the purposes of collective bargaining.

c. All other employees engaged in production and maintenance,

except supervisory and clerical employees, to determine whether

they desire to be represented by Federal Labor Union 18788, affiliated

with the American Federation of Labor, or the United Automobile

Workers of America, affiliated with the Committee for Industrial

Organization, for the purposes of collective bargaining.

[SAME TITLES]

AMENDMENT TO DIRECTION OF ELECTIONS

August 24, 1937

On August 11, 1937, the National Labor Relations Board, herein

called the Board, issued a Direction of Elections in the above-entitled case, the elections to be held
within fifteen (15) , days from

the date of the Direction. Thereafter the U. A. W. A. advised the

Board that the Company was operating with a substantially reduced force and requested postponement
of the elections directed.

It appears that although 642 men were employed on May 13, 1937,

the date on which eligibility for the purpose of voting was to have

been based, 427 men were at work on August 16, 1937, and only 330 8

The Globe Machine and Stamping Co. 3 N.L.R.B. 294 (N.L.R.B. 1937)

302 NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

on August 23, 1937. A representative of the Company has advised

the Board that it will not be operating at normal capacity until after

the middle of September.

Because of the difficulty of notifying those men who are eligible

to vote but who are not now working we hereby direct that the elections which, on August 11, 1937,
were directed by us to be held

among the employees of The Globe Machine and Stamping Co. be

postponed until further notice. The Direction of Elections is hereby

amended by striking therefrom the words, "within fifteen (15) days

from the date of this Direction" and substituting therefor the words,

`at such time as the Board will in the future direct."

MR. EDWIN S. SMITH took no part in the consideration of the above

Amendment to Direction of Elections. .

[SAME TITLES]

SECOND AMENDMENT TO DIRECTION OF ELECTIONS

October 5, 1937

On August 11, 1937, the National Labor Relations Board, herein

called the Board, issued a Direction of Elections in the above-entitled case , the elections to be held
within fifteen (15) days from the

date of the Direction, under the direction and supervision of the

Regional Director for the Eighth Region. Thereafter United Automobile Workers of America advised the
Board that The Globe

Machine and Stamping Co. was operating with a substantially reduced force and requested
postponement of the elections directed.

After investigation the Board, on August 24, 1937, amended the

Direction of Elections, by postponing the holding of the elections

to "such time as the Board will in the future direct."

The Board is now advised by the Acting Regional Director that

the Company is now operating with a force of 400 men, and that it

does not anticipate increasing its operations any further during the

current year. Although the Board found in its original decision

that the Company normally employs between 500 and 750 men, no

purpose would be served by delaying the elections in this matter

any longer. Therefore the Direction of Elections as amended is

hereby further amended by striking therefrom the words, "at such

time as the Board will in the future direct", and substituting therefor the words, "on October 12, 1937."

CHAIRMAN MADDEN took no part in the consideration of the above

Second Amendment to Direction of Elections.

The Globe Machine and Stamping Co. 3 N.L.R.B. 294 (N.L.R.B. 1937)

DECISIONS AND ORDERS

[SAME TITLES]

SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION

AND

CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVES

October 22, 1937

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

303

On May 13, 1937, Metal Polishers Union, Local No. 3, herein called

the Polishers Union, International Association of Machinists, District No. 54, herein called the I. A. M.,
and Federal Labor Union

18788, herein called the Federal Local, filed separate petitions with

the Regional Director for the Eighth Region (Cleveland, Ohio),

alleging that questions affecting commerce had arisen concerning

the representation of employees of The Globe Machine and Stamping Co., Cleveland, Ohio, herein called
the Company, and requesting the National Labor Relations Board, herein called the Board,

to conduct an investigation pursuant to Section 9 (c) of the National

Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449, herein called the Act. On May 19,

1937, the Board, acting pursuant to Section 9 (c) of the Act, and

Article III, Section 3 of National Labor Relations Board Rules and

Regulations-Series 1, as amended, authorized the Regional Director

to conduct an investigation and to provide for an appropriate hearing; and the Board further ordered,
pursuant to Article III, Section 10 (c) (2) of the Rules and Regulations-Series 1, as amended,

that the three cases be consolidated for the purposes of the hearing.

Pursuant to a notice of hearing duly served upon the Company,

upon the three petitioning unions, and upon the United Automobile

Workers of America, herein called the U. A. W. A., a labor organization named in the petitions as
claiming to represent the Company's

employees, a hearing was held at Cleveland, Ohio, on June 24 and 25,

1937, before Charles E. Persons, the Trial Examiner duly designated

by the Board. On August 11, 1937, the Board issued a Decision and
Direction of Elections which provided that three elections be held.

In its Decision, the Board made no final determination as to the

appropriate unit for the purposes of collective bargaining with the

Company. The U. A. W. A. had contended that all of the production

employees of the Company constituted a single appropriate unit. The

Polishers Union and the I. A. M. contended, however, that the Company's polishers and punch press
men each constituted separate appropriate units. The Board stated that since either contention could
be

sustained, it would direct that separate elections be held for the

polishers and punch press men, and would decide the issue on the

10

The Globe Machine and Stamping Co. 3 N.L.R.B. 294 (N.L.R.B. 1937)

304 NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

basis of the preferences indicated by the employees in the elections.

It therefore directed that one election by secret ballot be held among

the Company's polishers to determine whether they desired to be represented by the Polishers Union or
the U. A. W. A.; and that another

be held among the punch press men to determine whether they desired

to be represented by the I. A. M. or the U. A. W. A., for the purposes

of collective bargaining. The Board also ordered that an election

by secret ballot be held among all the other employees engaged in

production and maintenance to determine whether they desired to be

represented by the Federal Local or the U. A. W. A. The Board

stated,' "On the results of these elections will depend the determination of the appropriate unit for the
purposes of collective bargaining.

Such of the groups as do not choose the U. A. W. A. will constitute

separate and distinct appropriate units, and such as do choose the

U. A. W. A. will together constitute a single appropriate unit."

Pursuant to two amendments of the Direction of Elections, made

on August 24 and October 5, 1937, postponing the date thereof, secret

ballots were conducted on October 12, 1937. Full opportunity was

accorded to all parties to this investigation to participate in the conduct of this secret ballot and co make
challenges. On October 14,1937,

the Regional Director caused to be served on the parties to the proceeding his Intermediate Report on
the conduct of the ballots. No

objection with respect to the conduct of the elections was filed to the

Intermediate Report, and it was forwarded by the Regional Director

to the Board in Washington, D. C.

As to the results of the secret ballot, the Regional Director reported

the following :

Polishers

Total number eligible------------------------------------------- 31

Total number of ballots cast------------------------------------- 30

Total number of blank ballots ___________________________________ 0

Total number of void ballots------------------------------------ 0

Total number of challenged ballots____ __________________________ 2

Total number of ballots cast for the Polishers Union _______-______ 12

Total number of ballots cast for the U A. W. A__________________ 16

Punch press men.

Total number eligible --------------------------------- 129

Total number of ballots cast____________________________________ 108

Total number of blank ballots_______________ ----------------------------------- 0

Total number of void ballots------------------------------------ 1

Total number of challenged ballots________ -------- ____________ ---------------------- 2

Total number of ballots cast for the I. A. M_ ---------------------- 38

Total number of ballots cast for the U. A. W. A__________________ 67

I See Section IV of the Findings of Fact in the original Decision

11

The Globe Machine and Stamping Co. 3 N.L.R.B. 294 (N.L.R.B. 1937)
DECISIONS AND ORDERS 305

Production workers, emclnsive of polishers aid punch press men

Total number eligible___________________________________________ 456

Total number of ballots cast____________________________________ 298

Total number of blank ballots___________________________________ 0

Total number of void ballots____________________________________ 0

Total number of challenged ballots______________________________ 0

Total number of ballots cast for the Federal Local________________ 16

Total number of ballots cast for the U. A. W. A__________________ 282

Upon the entire record in the case the Board makes the following :

SUPPLEMENTAL FINDING Or FACT

In order to insure to the employees of the Company the full benefit

of their right to self-organization and to collective bargaining, and

otherwise to effectuate the policies of the Act, we find that all the employees of the Company engaged
in production and maintenance,

except supervisory and clerical employees, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective
bargaining.

SUPPLEMENTAL CONCLUSION OF LAW

Upon the basis of the above finding of fact and upon the entire

record in the case, the Board makes the following conclusion of law :

All of the employees of The Globe Machine and Stamping Co.

engaged in production and maintenance, except supervisory and

clerical employees, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of

collective bargaining, within the meaning of Section 9 (b) of the

National Labor Relations Act.

CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVES

By virtue of and pursuant to the power vested in the National

Labor Relations Board by Section 9 (c) of the National Labor

Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449, and pursuant to Article III, Section 8

of National Labor Relations Board Rules and Regulations-Series

1, as amended,

IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that United Automobile Workers of America has been designated and selected
by a majority of the employees

of The Globe Machine and Stamping Co. engaged in production and

maintenance, except supervisory and clerical employees, as their

representative for the purposes of collective bargaining and that,

pursuant to the provisions of Section 9 (a) of the Act, United Automobile Workers of America is the
exclusive representative of all

such employees for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect

to wages, rates of pay, hours of work, and other conditions of

employment.